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**Nation Assistance in National Security
Strategy: The CINC's Role**

**A Monograph
by**

**Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Barefield
Infantry**

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
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ABSTRACT

NATION ASSISTANCE IN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: THE CINC'S ROLE by LTC Robert L. Barefield, USA, 49 pages.

The end of the cold war has resulted in renewed United States interest in the challenges of Third World countries that may require U.S. involvement. This monograph examines the role and capabilities of the unified CINC in nation assistance. Historically, the United States has been involved in the reconstruction of developing nations' infrastructures. For the most part, these nation assistance efforts required "ad hoc" organizations to accomplish the mission.

This monograph first examines the theoretical views of military operations which apply to nation assistance. Next, historical examples are discussed in which the U.S. provided nation assistance. Then an examination of current U.S. doctrine and its implementation in Panama provide a better understanding of the CINC's nation assistance capabilities. Finally, a synthesis of the evidence provides an insight into future implications and impacts on the U.S. Army.

This monograph concludes that nation assistance is the most visible and effective tool for the CINC to use to influence global political, economic, and military environments in the Third World. U.S. national security strategy recognizes the significance of nation assistance in accomplishing national objectives. Additionally, numerous Joint Chiefs of Staff publications provide guidance to unified CINCs on their role in nation assistance. This monograph finds, however, that the unified CINC needs the nucleus of a joint task force permanently assigned to properly plan, coordinate, and execute nation assistance missions within his region. The importance of nation assistance in the future makes the continued use of "ad hoc" organizations counterproductive.



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	page
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. THEORY.....	6
III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.....	10
IV. NATION ASSISTANCE.....	18
V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS.....	34
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS.....	39
ENDNOTES.....	43
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	47

I. INTRODUCTION

The world is currently undergoing a transformation that is both rewarding and challenging. The United States has led the world's free nations during the cold war to an unqualified and historic success. That success was built upon a strategy of containment that has created new conditions and opportunities for a new generation of Americans.¹ Our consistent national strategy and strong alliances helped break the East-West confrontation and reduced the threat of a sudden Soviet attack in Europe.² However, as the probability of large-scale military actions decreases, the potential for crises in the Third World and Eastern Europe increases.³

General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has stated that he is not overly optimistic about developments in the Third World. He has further stated that U.S. interests will continue to be challenged by Third World debt, poverty, fragile democracies, and mutually destructive struggles, creating turmoil and tragedy that will command ever-increasing attention and resources.⁴ General Powell's remarks should not come as a blinding revelation since there have been over 200 occasions since World War II where the U.S. has either used or threatened to use force.⁵ During that period, the vast majority of those conflicts and all the wars in which the U.S. was involved were in the Third World.⁶

As a result of conflicts, sometimes the nations involved need extensive assistance in order to regain their sovereignty. The United States has been involved in reconstruction of developing nations' infrastructures, beginning with its own American Revolution and continuing to the ongoing actions in Panama following Operation "Just Cause". The military plays an active role in nation assistance efforts (previously called nation building and nation development) which have also aided other countries, such as Cuba, the Philippines, Nicaragua, Germany, Japan, Vietnam, El Salvador and Honduras. Normally, these nation assistance efforts required the formation of "ad hoc" organizations to accomplish the mission. Additionally, resources were often sporadic and personnel who were expected to accomplish the mission received only minimal specialized training preparation for their nation assistance efforts.

Nation assistance is a relatively new term that has emerged since Operation "Just Cause" in Panama. It has been associated with nation building, nation development, institution building, and several other efforts relating to civic action and psychological operations. Until recently, the "vagueness" in the definition of nation assistance abounded. The Concepts and Doctrine Directorate of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth now defines nation assistance as:

The mission of assisting a Host Nation (HN) in its efforts to restructure, reinforce, or rebuild its formal and informal institutions. Included within this definition are assistance with disaster and disorder relief, environmental repair and control, economic development, assistance, and security assistance (my emphasis).

This is a much more expanded concept than that normally thought of with the traditional definition of nation building. Nation assistance occurs across the full spectrum of the operational continuum, and includes such efforts as recent natural disasters in Yellowstone National Park and in San Francisco. The primary goals of nation assistance, however, are to help a host nation develop its capacity to nurture its society, to guide it in the processes of change, and to help it establish or sustain conditions which build stability through orderly, responsive change.⁸ This can only be achieved by assisting the host nation with its development of social, political, and economic infrastructures. (Note: In order to reduce confusion and eliminate redundancy, I will use the terms "nation assistance" and "nation building" interchangeably throughout the rest of this monograph.)

Security assistance has been the main nation assistance program used by the United States in dealing with resource needs for the Third World. However, the lack of consistent, long-term security assistance funding, coupled with continuing strategic challenges in developing nations, often create confusion and resentment among friends and allies.⁹ General H.

Norman Schwarzkopf, CINC of U.S. Central Command (USCINCENT), said that funding cuts in security assistance programs since 1985 in "non-earmarked" countries in his region have hurt U.S. credibility and decreased our influence. Several "vital countries" do not have funds for even the most basic military needs.¹⁰ With the current crisis in the Middle East, USCINCENT may be faced with the challenge of assisting the reconstruction of Kuwait's infrastructure following Operation "Desert Storm".

The purpose of this monograph is to analyze the CINC'S ability to accomplish nation assistance missions. My research question is "What are the unified CINC'S role and capabilities in nation assistance?" As stated in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-0 and acknowledged by the unified CINCs, the CINC'S mission in both peacetime and wartime includes nation assistance.¹¹ I will use the following questions as criteria to answer the research question:

1. What resources are required for the CINC to plan and execute his nation assistance mission?

2. What assigned resources does the CINC have to accomplish that mission?

3. What resources are doctrinally available from the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to the CINC to support his nation assistance mission?

4. What are the differences between resources assigned/available and resources required?

5. What is the impact of the resource shortfall on the CINC'S ability to accomplish his nation assistance mission?

I will use historical examples (primarily the Philip-

piners), doctrinal references, and the Military Support Group-Panama to determine the required resources in criteria question "1". I will use the assigned assets common to the unified CINCs for determining the assigned resources in criteria question "2". I will use the assets available from SOCOM to determine available resources in criteria question "3". Questions "4" and "5" will be determined by comparing the evidence in the first three questions. For this monograph, "resources" are defined to mean specially trained, qualified and responsive military personnel and units; associated supplies and equipment; and funding authorized for the nation assistance mission.¹²

The following methodology will be used to examine the CINC's role in nation assistance. First, I will discuss theoretical views of military operations on the lower end of the conflict spectrum which apply to nation assistance. Second, in order to establish a foundation for determining the adequacy of the CINC's current capabilities, I will review historical examples in which the U.S. provided nation assistance. Third, I will examine current doctrine concerning the CINC's role in nation assistance. The ongoing nation assistance efforts in Panama provide the most recent example of implementing that doctrine, therefore, I will review the capabilities of the Military Support Group-Panama (MSG-PM) to

get a better understanding of the doctrine. During the discussion and analysis, a comparison of the CINC's capabilities and those of the MSG-PM will be measured against the five criteria previously discussed. Finally, I will synthesize the evidence to answer the research question and comment on future implications and impacts on the U.S. Army.

II. THEORY

It is difficult to find theorists who address the concept of nation assistance. However, the basic goals in nation assistance are to stabilize economic and political institutions in order to nurture a nation's society. Each of the unified CINCs having geographic responsibilities must cope with instability and broad cultural differences within their regions, especially in Third World countries. The root of the American problem in addressing the Third World is our lack of knowledge and understanding of each country. Our attitudes toward the Third World are shaped by values and premises deeply ingrained in the American psyche and are shared by policy makers, theorists, and the general public. Basically, they assume that Third World countries can attain political, economic, and social stability by adopting Western attitudes and following Western paths of development. These attitudes form the "intellectual baggage" that American officials carry with them in thinking about the Third World.¹³

Sun Tzu, the revered Chinese theorist, wrote:

Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.¹⁴

If we adapt Sun Tzu's theory to relate to our knowledge of our own capabilities and to the needs of the Third World in applying the nation assistance concept, it becomes obvious that the U.S. faces an education process. Sun Tzu was also aware of the economic implications of war and the need for peaceful solutions. Sun Tzu did not conceive the object of military action to be the annihilation of the enemy's army, the destruction of his cities, and the devastation of his countryside. Instead he recognized the need to use the appropriate force required to accomplish the mission, without wanton destruction to a country's infrastructure. He sought peaceful solutions and taught that "weapons are ominous tools to be used only when there is no alternative."¹⁵ The alternative that Sun Tzu mentioned could apply to the conduct of nation assistance to help stabilize Third World countries so we are not required to intervene with military force to resolve conflict.

As an example, Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-Bravo) was organized in 1983 in Honduras to facilitate U.S. Southern Command contingency planning and support, train both U.S. and Honduran units, and implement nation building missions. JTF-Bravo brings together the Honduran Government (military

and civilian), the U.S. Embassy, the U.S. Southern Command, and the Agency for International Development to help Honduras help herself. During a briefing by the JTF-Bravo staff, it was noted that the significance of the nation assistance effort in Honduras was "fighting an insurgency with medics and engineers, so we do not have to do it with infantrymen ten years from now."¹⁶ The JTF-Bravo staff also stated that nation assistance is probably their most important mission in Honduras.

Carl Von Clausewitz, the early 19th century military theorist, taught that the purpose of having a military was to use it as a fighting force. Clausewitz said:

The whole military activity must therefore relate directly or indirectly to the engagement. The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained; the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place and the right time.¹⁷

Clausewitz' concept seems to counter the current thinking that the military should be used for other purposes, such as nation assistance. However, Clausewitz does talk about the importance of identifying enemy "centers of gravity" and tracing them back to a single one.¹⁸ Clausewitz also said:

One must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends... the personalities of leaders and public opinion may be centers of gravity.¹⁹

Although there are those who think otherwise, this could be

interpreted to mean that the administration of "people-oriented programs" under nation assistance is attacking the "center of gravity".

Col.(Ret) Harry Summers talks about two categories of centers of gravity-- "tangible and intangible". He says tangible is the classical Clausewitzian "destruction of the enemy's armed forces." The intangible centers of gravity, not found on the battlefield, can be just as decisive. Col. (Ret) Summers uses the example of Vietnam, in which neither the U.S. nor the North Vietnamese were very successful in finding the other's center of gravity, which changed throughout the conflict.²⁰ This again indicates that the center of gravity may be an "intangible" entity such as the infrastructures of a country, on which nation assistance works to stabilize.

Building upon the "intangible" center of gravity, Mao Tsetung showed great insight in the military's role. Mao Tsetung understood the importance of the military grasping the aspects of nation assistance (political, social, economic, educational, and cultural) in rebuilding a nation's infrastructure. Mao wrote:

The army is a school. It is still a fighting force, but it must also be a working force and shoulder urban problems unfamiliar in the past. . . all army cadres should learn how to take over and administer cities. . . first the cities and then the rural areas.²¹

Although Mao was fighting a revolutionary war in China at

the time of this writing, he knew that the Chinese must build and maintain sound agricultural and industrial production to ensure a solid economic base. Only then could the political and educational infrastructures support the military effort required to defeat the enemy and ultimately rebuild China.

A review of the theories seems to indicate that we must understand the military's role in rebuilding infrastructures and know our capabilities in accomplishing that nation assistance mission. It is equally as important to identify the "intangible" center of gravity in Third World countries that enables the U.S. to assess the political, social, economic, educational, and cultural needs required to rebuild the nation's infrastructure. The U.S. should examine these same concepts and theories when assisting other countries in the administration of nation assistance in the Third World.

III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The very "birth" of the United States of America in 1776 found us building our nation following the Revolutionary War. The Continental Army won the war with the British "Redcoats", despite the fact that the British beat us in almost every battle and occupied most of our major cities throughout the war. Our "intangible" center of gravity was the American will, which the British could never break.²² After America had gained her independence, that same determination and resourcefulness enabled the U.S. to establish strong

infrastructures and explore the western frontier. The role of the U.S. Army in nation building expanded as America settled the west. The Army provided security and explorations which established vital transportation networks that bound the nation together. Engineers educated at West Point built roads, railroads, controls for rivers, and harbors.²³

The reconstruction of the South following the American Civil War provided a tremendous nation assistance challenge. The years of war, fought primarily in the South, left destruction and devastation everywhere. An economy that had already been ruined by the war because of an inadequate industrial base, was almost beyond help. Resentment abounded between the blacks and the whites, further compounding lawlessness and disorder. The Army's efforts seemed to be hampered in all their endeavors, primarily because of lack of direction from the president and congress. The Army did succeed in restoring law and order and in establishing a free labor system to further enhance the reconstruction effort. However, reconstruction was never fully successful, especially in an education program that would allow the blacks to be fully integrated into the rebuilt South.²⁴

The U.S. really became involved in nation assistance in foreign countries around the turn of the 20th century. The U.S. nation assistance efforts in Cuba from 1898 to 1902 were unsuccessful in the long-term and required military intervention in 1906 and later in order to reconstruct the country's

political infrastructure. At the request of the President of Nicaragua, the U.S. sent military forces to help with insurgents in 1912. Marines trained the Nicaraguan National Guard and supervised open elections in the late 1920s and early 1930s. (To a certain extent, the continuing instability in Nicaragua today is evidence of the long-term failure of U.S. nation assistance in that country.) The U.S. also conducted nation assistance efforts in Haiti (1915-1934), the Dominican Republic (1916-1924), Vietnam (1962-1975), El Salvador (1918-present), and Honduras (1983-present); all with varying degrees of short-term success. The lack of consistent guidance from high-ranking officers; insufficient training for rebuilding sensitive political, economic, educational, and social infrastructures; and the "make them like Americans" mentality contributed significantly to our lack of total success.²⁵

Examples of extraordinary U.S. success in nation assistance efforts are those in Germany and Japan following World War II. Because of the length and severity of the war, both of these countries were in total shambles morally, physically, politically, and economically. The U.S. Army, on the other hand, represented the gallant victors whose country had been spared the ravages of war. Possibly the self-appointed "savior" of the world, and probably out of moral obligation, the United States committed money, technical expertise, technological advise, and other resources to rebuild the

infrastructures of Germany and Japan. Those dedicated, concerted, and fully supported nation assistance efforts were never before matched in history and probably will never be duplicated again.

To provide a valuable historical example for a more detailed analysis, I will examine the pacification efforts in the Philippines from 1898 to 1902. The unexpected success of the U.S. Navy at Manila Bay on 1 May 1898, during the Spanish American War, created a perplexing situation for President William McKinley. Cuba had been the primary concern for the U.S. since the war with Spain had started. If the president wanted to exploit the naval victory in the Philippines, it would require the commitment of approximately a 5,000 man expeditionary force to retain "possession and control" of the Philippine Islands.²⁶

President McKinley decided to send the U.S. Army, but it was not until 30 June 1898 that the first units of the expeditionary force finally arrived in the Philippines, under the command of Major General Wesley Merritt. The diverse group that made up the expeditionary force which had to be expanded to nearly 15,000 men, consisted of regulars, militia, and volunteers. The volunteers made up about 75 percent of the force and came from all walks of life. The force was composed of men drawn from every rank of society; lawyers, merchants, postal clerks, tradesmen, office hands of all descriptions, and university men. It would have been difficult to say what

trade or professional calling was not represented. From among these men, it was possible to draw fairly proficient officials to establish the groundwork for the required infrastructures. This made them well suited for the nation assistance mission, despite the lack of formal specialized training. The rest of the force was not as fortunate in their qualifications for nation assistance. It was noted that "little in the strictly military duties of the members of the Regular Army had prepared them for their role as governors."²⁷

President McKinley's instructions were excellent for establishing the provisional military government. However, they left the majority of the tactical military questions unanswered, such as how to handle the Filipino revolutionaries.²⁸ The lack of a Philippine policy by officials in Washington from the beginning and the Army's non-existent training to deal with the long-standing economic and social problems in the Philippines made the Army's work seemingly impossible. The problems were compounded by the requirement for daily "dealings" with Filipino rebels. There was still no clear policy when President McKinley signed the protocol in August 1898, ending the war with Spain.²⁹

To compound the obscure policy problem, in November 1898, smallpox broke out among Filipinos and Americans which required a comprehensive public health program to stop the threat of an epidemic. Meanwhile, venereal disease ran rampant among the American troops, because of the influx of

Oriental prostitutes. Availability of potable water was another problem that the Army engineers worked on constantly.³⁰

The Board of Health and Department of Sanitation worked "sanitary marvels" to clean up the deplorable conditions in Manila. The American effort in public education, which was valued highly by the Filipinos, was also a booming success. Reforms in commercial affairs and the judicial systems prospered. The American military government even attempted to reform the "public morals" of Manila's inhabitants.³¹ The American Army exceeded the original general instructions on pacification originally given by President McKinley. On 10 December 1898, at the Treaty of Paris, the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States, which reinforced the importance of the tremendous job done by the Army on pacification.³²

The successes of the military in Manila could not make up for the diplomatic failure in dealing with the Filipino revolutionaries. However, U.S. propaganda efforts and a benevolent approach to pacification accounted for growing support for the U.S. by the Filipinos during 1899. By the end of 1899, the Americans were sure that the war had ended with our victory.

The start of 1900, however, brought the Americans back to the reality that the war was not over. The rebels spent the first half of 1900 preparing for a new form of warfare-- guerrilla tactics and strategy. The guerrillas only fought when

they could win, which frustrated the American troops trying to pacify the Philippines. American casualties in 1900 were higher than those suffered in 1899 against regular Filipino units.³³

By the end of 1900, the U.S. reevaluated its policy on pacification (which had been one of benevolence), in favor of an offensive campaign to defeat the guerrillas. The final policy stressed "benevolence for the many and severe penalties for the minority who refused to submit peacefully to the Americans."³⁴ It was obvious that realistic pacification could not succeed while the guerrilla bands continued their intimidation and terror on the Filipino population and the Americans. The new pacification effort focused on isolating the guerrillas from their support bases while protecting the civilians from terrorism.

Under the new policy of pacification, the U.S. Army made the Filipinos more responsible for their own defense and increased their roles as scouts, police, guides, and agents to defeat the guerrillas. The U.S. continued the pacification programs that had been so successful in the Philippines with education, economics, civil affairs, health, sanitation, and government administration. The difference under the new policy was that local responsibility for the administration of the programs was transferred to the Filipinos.

To isolate the guerrillas further, the U.S. imposed a naval blockade and started a massive road building program to

improve the Army's ability to find and defeat the insurgents. Additionally, American propaganda was effective in persuading the guerrillas to surrender with their weapons, which they could turn in for payments. This "money-for-guns" policy proved extremely effective in the intelligence gathering efforts also.³⁵

The year 1901 has been called the "year of victory" in the Philippines because of the success the U.S. accomplished using the revised pacification policy. On 4 July 1902, the U.S. published a final peace proclamation which officially signalled the defeat of the Filipino revolutionaries and the successful pacification of the Philippines. The U.S. Army was successful in separating the population from the guerrillas and defeating the guerrillas in the field, which was essential to the overall pacification. Most importantly, however, was winning Filipino popular support through the transfer of American ideas and knowledge while building the nation assistance infrastructures. The Army's ability to develop systems for education, government, tax structure, legal systems, health, and public works was remarkable. The Americans were successful because they gave the Filipinos most of the reforms that the resistance fighters were seeking, while at the same time they protected the civilian population from terrorism.³⁶

The significance of the successful approach to pacification, or nation assistance, in the Philippines was the experience base it provided to the U.S. for subsequent efforts

during the 20th century, mostly in Asia and Latin America. The success in the Philippines was achieved despite the inadequate training of the Army for the pacification effort and the initial lack of a strong national policy. The instability in the Philippines today proves that long-term success is fragile and depends on the ability of the country to be fair and self-governing in order to provide for the needs of the people.

IV. NATION ASSISTANCE

Many scholars believe that nation assistance will play an increasingly important role for the United States in the future. Dr. Steven Metz, professor at the Department of Joint and Combined Operations at Fort Leavenworth, has stated that the coming decades will be dominated by four dimensions of interstate and intrastate conflict: imperial, ideological, economic, and nation building. He further predicts that nation building will become the foundation of low-intensity conflict through the continuation of racial, tribal, religious, ethnic, and regional struggles.³⁷ For the purpose of this monograph, I am only concerned with the nation assistance aspect of low-intensity conflict (LIC).

Before it can be understood how nation assistance fits into the national security strategy of the United States, I need to reemphasize the major aspects of nation assistance. Key to the understanding of nation assistance is the concept

that the U.S. is only assisting a host nation restructure, re-inforce, or rebuild its institutions. The main programs within nation assistance are disaster and disorder relief, environmental repair and control, economic relief, economic development assistance, and security assistance.

U.S. national security strategy must be developed with those major aspects of nation assistance uppermost in the minds of American strategists. Only then will U.S. strategy be effective in dealing with Third World countries. National security requires the collective wisdom of military and civilian leaders to provide quality strategic direction.³⁸ That strategic direction starts with national security strategy expressed by the President of the United States of America. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-0 defines national security strategy as "the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and informational power of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives."³⁹ President George Bush said our U.S. national interests and objectives for the 1990's are to:

- Ensure survival of the United States as a free and independent nation.
- Promote a healthy and growing U.S. economy.
- Support a stable and secure world, fostering freedom, human rights, and democracy.
- Build and nurture a healthy, cooperative, closer relationship with allies and friendly nations with shared commitments and responsibilities.⁴⁰

It would seem that inherent in the national interests and

objectives is the requirement for nation assistance. Dr. Metz wrote that American strategy must orient its planning to respond to the reality that the propensity of nation building conflicts affect both superpower relations and economic integration.⁴¹ President Bush said that the essence of strategy is determining priorities. According to Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, among the Department of Defense priorities to accomplish the U.S. national security strategy is the requirement to "address the underlying causes of instability by assisting in the nation-building process through economic, security, humanitarian assistance, and civic action in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives."⁴²

The national security strategy and subsequent national military strategy provide "strategic direction" for CINCs, who, in turn, provide "guidance and direction" for the employment of joint, service, and combined forces through their theater strategies.⁴³ This process provides the linkage needed to get the President's strategic direction to the CINCs, who implement that guidance.

It is important to establish some parameters before trying to understand the CINC's role in nation assistance. For the purpose of this monograph, I am primarily concerned with CINCs having geographic areas of responsibility (i.e., Southern Command, European Command, Pacific Command, Atlantic Command, and Central Command), since they are responsible for planning and employing military forces in support of nation

assistance efforts in their geographic regions. There is, however, another important unified command that must be considered.

The establishment of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), under the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, centralized personnel best qualified to accomplish many aspects of nation assistance missions within its force structure.⁴⁴ The first CINC of USSOCOM, General James J. Lindsay, said that "the unique ability of USSOCOM's units provide our nation with a truly diverse mix of military capabilities to deal with the nation assistance challenges of the 21st century."⁴⁵

An unusual command relationship exists between the CINC of USSOCOM (CINCSOC) and the geographic unified command CINCs. Usually, CINCSOC is a "supporting commander," providing special operations forces to commanders of unified commands who, in turn, exercise "combatant command authority" (COCOM) over those forces. However, in certain situations, and only at the direction of the National Command Authority (NCA), forces assigned to and under the COCOM of CINCSOC may be employed in another CINC's theater.⁴⁶ This unique situation demands that USSOCOM be an integral part of the nation assistance equation. Some critics, however, say the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) made LIC a low priority by the way they gave the primary role of advising, training, and assisting host nation forces (non-combat support) on nation assistance to the Special

Forces.⁴⁷ According to the current CINCSOC, General Carl Stiner, that logic is not supported by USSOCOM's record of successful worldwide deployments and nation assistance efforts during the past decade.⁴⁸

The U.S. Army has provided guidance that further supports using Special Forces to conduct nation assistance operations. FM 100-1, The Army, states that the Army's role during peacetime requires special sensitivity and interagency coordination on programs such as foreign assistance, security assistance, and nation building to promote stability. In order to accomplish those programs, soldiers have to teach, administer, help, and be ready to show the world that the United States is committed to keeping the peace.⁴⁹ Additionally, FM 100-5, Operations, states that operating in the lower end of the conflict spectrum must be coordinated with national strategy, requiring special force composition and command relationships to ensure a unified political, economic, and military effort.⁵⁰

To further compound command relationships for CINCs in dealing with nation assistance, the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1975, with amendments, charges the Department of State (DoS) with primary responsibility for administering the programs under nation assistance. Specifically, "the Secretary of State, under the authority of the President, shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic

assistance, military assistance, military education and training, and sales and export programs."⁵¹ The DoS uses the U.S. diplomatic mission to execute the nation assistance programs. The "country team" is the informal title given the interdepartmental coordination among U.S. representatives in-country executing the U.S. diplomatic mission. The U.S. ambassador is usually the chief of the diplomatic mission, however the composition of the country team varies greatly. A key point is that U.S. area military commanders are not under the control of the ambassador, therefore, they are not members of the diplomatic mission. They do, however, usually participate as members of the country team.⁵²

CINCs, as senior military commanders, must work closely with the diplomatic mission and their supporting country team to achieve the CINC's military objectives. Since many of the required military personnel and equipment are normally assigned to them during peacetime, CINCs may provide trainers, advisors, equipment, and other support for nation assistance programs. In those cases, U.S. military forces will usually operate in support of DoS agencies.⁵³ Guidance for CINCs is outlined in various Joint manuals--for example, JCS Pub 0-1 defines military support as the use of military forces and material to help another military or non-military effort conducted by our nation or allies. Examples include "airlift support for disaster relief, mobile training team support for nation building, and military engineer support for battle or

storm damage reconstruction."⁵⁴ In addition to the regional CINCs and DoS, the Department of Defense (DoD) exercises its security assistance function through the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). DSAA administers, supervises, and provides technical guidance over security assistance activities.⁵⁵ A dedicated effort is required by all participants to ensure that the necessary support is properly provided to the recipient country.

Dr. Metz believes that an organizational coherence is needed at the national level to effectively deal with LIC (for our purposes nation assistance). The current system is "erratic" and an "ad hoc patchwork" thrown together over time with lines of authority running through both the State Department and Department of Defense. He further alleges that the only "formal points of overlap and coordination are at the level of the ambassador-led 'country-team',... and at the other end of the organizational spectrum in the National Security Council."⁵⁶

The role of the CINC is critical in nation assistance. He advises the JCS on all significant events in his geographic area and focuses on the operational level of conflict with both a regional and country-specific perspective. The CINC has a direct role in security assistance, which is probably the most influential element of nation assistance under routine situations. The CINC provides security assistance organizations (SAO) to manage security assistance functions

and responsibilities.

The SAO is a joint organization, with the ambassador executing operational control of the SAO on diplomatic mission matters and the unified CINC commanding and supervising the SAO on all other matters. The SAO manages DoD security assistance functions and, therefore, also answers to the director of the DSAA. The composition and size of the SAO varies significantly depending on the country. The SAO may be known by many different names-- joint U.S. military advisory group, joint U.S. military group, U.S. military training mission, defense field office, or office of defense cooperation. If the country has no SAO, then the defense attache or consular office handles the security assistance mission.⁵⁷

The following comments reflect the views of CINCs concerning their roles in nation assistance (with emphasis on security assistance):

USCINCEUR (Responsible for most of Africa as well as Europe) states:

Major procedural and legislative changes are needed...The link between overall U.S. strategy and the use of security assistance is disjointed. This disconnect is most apparent in regional strategy, including the Unified Commands' peacetime objective and war OPLAN execution. The State Department works out its general country-by-country strategy through the use of a "goals and objectives" directive to each ambassador. Without a clear regional and country defense strategy, the SAO chief and other country team members are forced to rely on the ambassador's goals and objectives for guidance in preparing the five year plan. The disconnect with overall strategy prevents security assistance from fully complementing U.S. strategic goals.⁵⁸

USCINSO (Latin America) expressed a similiar view:

Planning should be based on objectives, not administrative expedience. The objectives, in this case, are to enhance defense cooperation and strengthen military relations with our friends and allies. Planning requirements should flow from line agencies: SAOs, Unified Commands, and JCS. The majority of day-to-day planning functions are actually managed at the DSAA level. Knowledge and pre-planning of U.S. security assistance efforts serve the CINC as an important source of information into the allied state of preparedness. The CINCs already have the war plans and intelligence at their disposal to aid them in security assistance planning and crisis response. The regional CINCs also need to have direct and formal input into security assistance budget allocations and long range planning.⁵⁹

USCINCPAC (Pacific Basin and Southeast Asia) says:

CINCs need to have greater participation in the formation of security assistance policy since security assistance actions, issues and activities potentially affect their operational responsibilities in theater. Therefore, he must be an active participant in the initial stage of the process. It is important that the CINC's insights and recommendations be received and given due⁶⁰ consideration in the program development process.

USCINCCENT (Middle East) writes:

Security assistance is a primary instrument of command theater strategy. Elements of the peacetime strategy include building pro-western coalitions, demonstrating U.S. commitment, countering Soviet influence and improving regional access. Presence, combined exercises, and security assistance form the pillars of this strategy, which includes humanitarian assistance programs. Security assistance can provide the most visible and lasting impression of U.S. presence and commitment, while gaining increased access to the region's resources and facilities. It provides a means for nations to improve their own defenses and lowers the potential for U.S. forces to directly intervene. Cuts in security assistance programs foster the appearance that the U.S. is retreating from its region's responsibilities.⁶¹

USCINCSOC states:

The application of indirect military power, rather than direct, will be the most cost-effective and appropriate means of countering the threats of low intensity conflict and achieving our national goals. Since its formation three years ago, SOCOM has made 500 deployments to 59 countries, providing security assistance training to friendly nations. Army Special Forces, civil affairs, and psychological operations forces played key roles during the tactical effort in Operation Just Cause and will remain committed to the nation building effort. Additionally, humanitarian assistance operations have had a high impact in Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America.⁶²

Major General Ross S. Plasterer, Director of Plans and Policy Directorate, USLANTCOM, is responsible for security assistance for his CINC's AOR. According to MG Plasterer, Admiral Leon A. Edney, USCINCLANT, considers nation assistance operations to be essential in dealing with the Caribbean Basin countries. Admiral Edney has constantly fought to get more security assistance funding, which has been steadily declining. To help offset the decreasing security assistance money, he has significantly increased humanitarian relief operations. Admiral Edney identifies security assistance as the principal tool for enhancing cooperation in the war on drugs in the Caribbean Basin.⁶³

There is absolutely no doubt that the unified CINCs understand the significance and importance of their roles in nation assistance. It is also evident that they feel the resources available (especially for security assistance) are not adequate.

To determine how CINCSO dealt with the recent nation assistance mission in Panama and to provide a more current perspective on nation assistance, I will examine efforts that have been ongoing in Panama. On 20 December 1989, when Operation "Just Cause" was initiated (starting combat operations in Panama), the U.S. Ambassador had been called back to the U.S. and the U.S. Military Group (MILGRP) was virtually nonexistent. There had been a nation assistance contingency plan written earlier at SOUTHCOM, to be used in the event of U.S. intervention, but the reserve component officers who wrote the plan were no longer in-country. Most of the SOUTHCOM staff and their subordinate commands were not familiar with that written nation assistance plan. CINCSO formed an "ad hoc" Civil Military Affairs Task Force at noon on 20 December 1989, to revise the existing plan and immediately start nation assistance activities in Panama.⁶⁴

On 8 January 1990, General Lindsay, CINCSOC provided written guidance and recommendations to SOUTHCOM concerning the basic operational design for the U.S. Military Support Group-Panama (MSG-PM), which would have operational control (OPCON) over all elements tasked to the nation assistance effort. While "Just Cause" was still in progress, the MSG-PM was activated on 11 January 1990, under the command and control of Joint Task Force-Panama (JTF-PM). The MSG-PM was formed to focus all DoD nation assistance efforts for Panama and develop infrastructures which would be self-supporting and


self-maintaining. Because of that broad scope, the MSG-PM operated and interfaced directly with numerous agencies as illustrated in Figure 1. (See next page)

Upon the completion of "Just Cause" on 31 January 1990 (signifying the end of combat operations), Operation "Promote Liberty" was officially started. The MSG-PM organization was expanded in order to accomplish the nation assistance mission. The purpose of "Promote Liberty" was to restore law and order and to enable the new free and democratic government of Panama to function.⁶⁵

The mission of the MSG-PM was to "conduct nation building operations to ensure democracy, internationally recognized standards of justice, and the establishment and institutionalization of professional public services in Panama."⁶⁶ To accomplish that ambitious mission, the MSG-PM required the services of all available assets that they could muster, to include combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Initially, many of these units were ill-trained to perform such nation assistance missions.⁶⁷

The MSG-PM organization that was finally developed included a cross-section of specially trained professionals, part-time soldiers with essential civilian qualifications (such as civil law enforcement), and soldiers with no special training or qualifications for the nation assistance mission. It did appear, however, that all members of the MSG-PM were

ACCESS AND INFLUENCE



EXTRACTED FROM U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT GROUP-PANAMA
(MSG-PM) BRIEFING SLIDES, 22 OCTOBER 1990.

FIGURE 1


confident in their ability to accomplish their tasks successfully. To accomplish their mission and enhance the required coordination shown previously, the MSG-PM internal organization was formed as depicted in Figure 2. (See next page)

The capabilities of the MSG-PM were stated as follows:

- Conduct liaison operations for JTF-PM with the Government of Panama (GoP) and U.S. agencies and organizations.
- Provide assistance to Panamanian National Police in the areas of personnel, equipment, and operational matters.
- Assist in the establishment of civilian control over police and para-military organizations.
- Provide advice and assistance in the use and administration of Foreign Military Sales cases.
- Report on progress of the public forces.
- Assist GoP with engineer and medical projects.
- Assist GoP in obtaining and coordinating Humanitarian Assistance.

The list of accomplishments credited to the MSG-PM in the political, social, and economic arenas are truly impressive. Although the military is restricted from training the National Police by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and a 4 April 1990 message from the Secretary of State to the American Embassy, the MSG-PM supports and monitors the police training to ensure effective training. The U.S. Ambassador and CINCSO both provided specific guidance to the MSG-PM concerning their role in police training. Basically, that guidance was to

MSG ORGANIZATION



AS OF 3 JULY 90

EXTRACTED FROM US MILITARY SUPPORT GROUP-PANAMA
(MSG-PM) BRIEFING SLIDES, 22 OCTOBER 1990.

FIGURE 2

ensure that a comprehensive and integrated effort existed between MSG-PM and the International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), with ICITAP having the lead and MSG-PM supporting as required. ICITAP is under the control of the Department of Justice for executing the police training. The majority of the ICITAP members are law enforcement officials in the U.S. and are knowledgeable and proficient in their training duties. Training the National Police (or retraining the old Panamanian Defense Forces) to enable them to execute their civilian law enforcement responsibilities in Panama was vital to law and order. The National Police mission was to "provide security and support for the democratically elected civilian government, conduct law enforcement and border patrol operations and provide emergency services throughout the Republic of Panama."⁶⁹

The SOUTHCOM military objectives and priorities include supporting and supplementing nation assistance in Latin America to accomplish the SOUTHCOM mission. Among the SOUTHCOM roles to support nation assistance are to act as theater fusion center and provide military plans. There seems to be a disconnect, however, between the SOUTHCOM J-5 Security Assistance Division and the MSG-PM. The SOUTHCOM Security Assistance Division is the focal point for all security assistance related matters in the SOUTHCOM region, and the MSG-PM provides advice and assistance in the use and administration of Foreign Military Sales cases in Panama.⁷⁰ Because

of the unique structure and broad scope of the MSG-PM mission, there appears to be minimal interaction between MSG-PM and the Security Assistance Division.

The MSG-PM formally completed its nation assistance mission at the end of December 1990. However, a reduced structure remained under JTF-PM to maintain continuity with ongoing nation assistance programs and ensure adequacy of nation assistance support to the Government of Panama. The nation assistance support that MSG-PM provided to the Government of Panama has established the foundation upon which Panamanian infrastructures can now be solidified and expanded to better serve the people of Panama.

V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

The review of how theory, history, and U.S. national security strategy address the nation assistance mission provides the primary basis for my discussion and analysis. Additionally, the examination of the support provided by MSG-PM will further provide essential information for analysis of the unified CINC's current capabilities to accomplish his nation assistance mission. As I stated in the introduction, I am only concerned with unified CINCs having geographic AORs and the CINC of U.S. Special Operations Command (CINCSOC).

An analysis of the pacification efforts in the Philippines (1898-1902) gives an indication of the kinds of resources needed for nation assistance efforts. First,

specific national guidance and determination of the end state are essential to developing a plan based on host nation assistance needs. In the Philippines, the revolutionary force had to be dealt with while simultaneously trying to pacify the country. The Expeditionary Force needed the following resources for their nation assistance mission:

- People who were proficient with the language and sensitive to the Philippine history and culture.

- A command and control (C2) cell to direct the efforts and redirect resources based on the situation. The C2 had to be influential and credible both with the U.S. and the host nation.

- Personnel with special qualifications needed to develop infrastructures and provide technical expertise for long-term host nation operations (i.e., government administration, judicial and legal systems, public education, medical and dental health, police force, banking, tax system, sanitation, public works, accounting and records, economics [commerce], agriculture, engineering [esp. road building & construction], religion, and transportation).

- Appropriate medical, dental and engineer supplies and equipment to ensure long-term success on projects mentioned above.

- Adequate funding to support the pacification effort and allow continued operation of newly formed infrastructures.

Joint Chiefs of Staff publications and Army field manuals provide the basic doctrine for nation assistance. Additionally, the Combined Arms Command at Fort Leavenworth is developing an "Airland Battle-Future Nation Assistance Concept" for global application.

A common understanding is important because the CINC must consider political alliances; ethnic, religious, and cultural characteristics; historical experience; and industrial, eco-

conomic, and technological development of nations, when planning and executing his nation assistance mission. The MSG-PM resources previously discussed and shown in the organizational chart at Figure 2 were required to accomplish their nation assistance mission and interface with the agencies shown in Figure 1. The capabilities and resources required in the Philippines, previously described in U.S. doctrine, and needed for the MSG-PM mission provide an overview of required resources.

The assets available to the CINC in order to accomplish his nation assistance mission will be discussed next. The primary tool the CINC has to coordinate all security assistance related matters in his AOR is the Security Assistance Division, which may be a separate organization found in J4 or J5 sections, and his SAOs in each country (who answer to both the CINC and the ambassador).⁷¹ The CINC may use the J5 Policy and Strategy Division to plan the integration and future implementation of nation assistance programs. Additionally, the CINC may have a deployable joint task force (DJTF) in his J3 section, which allows the CINC to fight two campaigns in his AOR simultaneously. The DJTF can do contingency planning and operations, NEO operations, disaster relief, rescue and recovery, exercise deployment and execution, and other missions as specified. The primary focus of the DJTF is to provide an operational headquarters for command and control of U.S. forces and interface with host nation

forces on tactical operations. With the exception of disaster relief, the DJTF is not normally oriented on nation assistance.

The resources available to the CINC for nation assistance missions are primarily found in SOCOM, however there are some other Reserve Component and National Guard assets (such as doctors and nurses) in U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM). One of the purposes for organizing SOCOM was to consolidate active and reserve component military personnel with those special qualifications needed in nation assistance, therefore, I will only consider SOCOM assets as resources available. The primary role of Special Operation Forces (SOF) in security assistance is to provide mobile training teams (MTT) and other kinds of specialized training assistance. All personnel are prohibited by law from performing combatant duties while performing security assistance missions. SOF are well suited to assist in other nation assistance operations such as: humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, medical, veterinary, and dental aid, rudimentary construction, water and sanitation assistance, and resettlement of displaced civilians.⁷² SOF also has psychological operations (PSYOP) groups and civil affairs (CA) battalions in both the active and reserve components to support in nation assistance missions.

General Lindsay, the previous CINCSOC, said that "existing units are insufficient to support all theater requirements without dual-tasking some forces." He continued to say that

the addition of the 3rd Special Forces (SF) Group, with its African orientation, will alleviate that problem.⁷³ The 3rd SF Group has been activated since General Lindsay's article was published, however, according to General Stiner, current CINCSOC, they are not yet at full strength, and consequentially the shortage still exists.⁷⁴

A comparison of the resources assigned and available against required resources would seem to indicate that there are no major disconnects. Upon analyzing in depth, however, it becomes obvious that the CINC does not have organic to his command a joint element with its primary focus on the expanded nation assistance role. A deployable element is needed to plan, coordinate, manage and execute nation assistance operations in more than one country concurrently. The DJTF, if present in the J3, has a tactical focus and is not suited for the expanded nation assistance mission. Many of the personnel with special skills (i.e., engineers, medics, linguists, and SOF specialties) may be either assigned to the CINC or available in SOCOM. The forces in SOCOM, however, may be committed to other requirements and not immediately available for the nation assistance mission, especially if there are simultaneous operations ongoing in the AOR. Additionally, many of the required assets (especially PSYOP and CA) are in the reserve component and may not be called to active duty by the President.

Adequate supplies and equipment may not be available ei-

ther, especially if the nation assistance mission is being conducted in conjunction with an armed conflict. As stated by the unified CINCs, funding is woefully insufficient, even for the most basic security assistance needs. All of the conditions together make the CINC's nation assistance mission extremely difficult.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Nation assistance has expanded in scope and importance since Operation "Just Cause" and subsequently Operation "Promote Liberty" in Panama. Nation assistance is normally associated with Third World countries at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, being conducted before, during, and after combat operations. In reality, nation assistance operations may be conducted throughout the entire operational continuum.

Nation assistance (especially security assistance) is the most visible and effective tool for the U.S. to use to overcome previous doctrinal voids and influence global political, economic, and military environments in the Third World. For the host nation, it provides affordable deterrence and an increased self-defense capability. The Regional Conflict Working Group of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy stated "security assistance programs have underwritten American foreign policy for 40 years, and are regarded worldwide as tangible evidence of American commitment to national independence and peaceful development."⁷⁵ Their

findings also agreed with the CINCs' assessments that legislation, policy, and procedures severely limit flexibility and utility of security assistance. The Regional Conflict Working Group said that only relatively minor changes are needed in administration and legislation to grant a small increase in foreign aid funding which will provide strategically crucial results.⁷⁶ Those changes should be made in policy and funding to fully support the CINCs' initiatives on their nation assistance mission.

U.S. national security strategy recognizes the significance of nation assistance in accomplishing our national interests and objectives. Numerous Joint Chiefs of Staff publications provide doctrinal guidance to unified CINCs concerning their role in nation assistance. Additionally, the CINCs' statements show that they understand the importance of their role in nation assistance and want to be more active players in the formulation of policy and allocation of security assistance funding. In his monograph on "Applying Operational Art to Security Assistance", LTC Tom Mitchell said CINCs should execute security assistance (a key part of nation assistance) "with a warfighter mentality, using campaigns and major operations to achieve their strategic objectives. CINCs should 'fight' security assistance instead of managing it."⁷⁷ This emphasis on warfighter mentality in dealing with security assistance must also apply to all aspects of nation assistance as the CINC executes that mission.

The CINC must have adequate resources assigned and available from SOCOM to execute his nation assistance mission without forming reactive "ad hoc" organizations. Based on my research, the permanent assignment of a nation assistance deployable task force (NADTF) with a skeleton organization would give the CINC a more proactive capability. The NADTF should:

- Analyze all the countries within the CINC's AOR to identify projected nation assistance resource needs based on the CINC's guidance.

- Identify resources from within the Unified Command and SOCOM required for the NADTF to operate independently when directed by the CINC to execute nation assistance missions.

- Plan and manage a long-range training program that integrates all identified units into realistic nation assistance training exercises to be conducted throughout the region.

- Coordinate the conduct of exercise evaluations which would enable unit commanders to identify pertinent training strengths and weaknesses while providing invaluable feedback to the CINC on adequacy of nation assistance resources.

All resources needed must be identified before a crisis arises, with particular attention to those assets that would be provided by reserve component units. Alternate resources must be planned to account for reserve component units, since they may not be immediately called to active duty. Unique missions must be assigned only to units having those particular qualifications (i.e., combat units lacking special training should not be used for sensitive PSYOP and CA operations).

Nation assistance missions have historically been accomplished by reactive "ad hoc" organizations ill-prepared to succeed. The increased importance of nation assistance in the future and its expanded scope make the CINC's role even more critical in planning, coordinating, controlling, and allocating the scarce resources essential to peace and prosperity in our ever-changing world.

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