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THE RELATIONSHIP OF MILITARY POSTURE TO NATIONAL POLICY

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September 1981

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT DIVISION

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organizational and procedural problems.

(U) These factors shaping policy and posture are analyzed in terms of their interrelationships. A generalization is suggested that in reality policy is as often a result as a determinant of posture and that often the two are not closely linked. The reasons for this are examined from the military and the foreign policy points of view. Alternative foreign policy objectives are suggested that could influence posture. The process of policy formulation is also discussed in terms of improving the correlation between its output and military posture.

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PREFACE

This paper was undertaken in mid June 1980 as an independent IDA effort.

The authors wish to thank a number of senior officials, present and past, for sharing their insights into the questions posed in the paper.

General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (Ret.)
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Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Former Director of Central Intelligence

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Assistant Secretary of Defense

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship of U.S. political objectives and other policy guidance to military readiness planning and the deployed force posture. The questions addressed are:

1. To what extent are the characteristics of our present military posture traceable to our political objectives and doctrines, and to what extent do they stem from other causes?

2. What have been the major changes in the world political-military situation and in our political objectives and doctrines over the past two or three decades, and how have they affected our current military posture?

3. Given the present and projected world political-military situation, are there some reasonable alternatives to our current political objectives? What are the key issues involved in choosing among the alternatives?

4. What are the main elements in the process for defining political objectives and doctrines and for translating policy guidance into force posture? What are the key issues involved in improvement of this process?

Much effort over the past three decades has gone into attempts to improve U.S. national security policy formulation, both in substance and in its organizational and procedural aspects. The need for closer correlation of policy and military posture has been accepted as an obvious good, yet after 30 years of effort it is clear that bringing the two into closer correlation is a difficult job that requires continuous effort and can

never be accomplished fully. Defense policy guidelines have run foul not only of disputes over substance, but also of organizational and procedural issues that seemed to recur continually, no matter how often they were "settled." Resulting guidance documents have usually tended to be too general to provide real guidance in posture development. (See Appendix A.)

Our analysis of presidential political doctrines indicated that they have historically borne little relationship to military capabilities, especially at the time of original pronouncement and also in subsequent follow-up. They have been slow to inspire major changes in actual U.S. capabilities, no matter how sweeping the new commitments may have been. (See Appendix B.)

The inadequacies of U.S. long-term planning for national security have been a repeated theme of study commissions and reports for many years. Not a small part of the problem has been the general failure to agree on just what long-range national security planning is. In this study we consider long range planning for the development of military posture to be the process of determining long-term national security objectives; assessing the overall compatibility of military, political and economic ends and means; and determining priorities among competing objectives. This process does occur, of course, in various forms--resource allocation, force planning, strategic planning--but no mechanism or system has yet been devised to do it on an integrated basis. What is done on a fragmented basis is done sometimes well and sometimes poorly--but rarely systematically.

The inadequacies of policy formulation are not the sole cause of the continuing apparent lack of congruence between policy and posture. Much of the cause may lie in the structure of American government and society, thus making change extraordinarily difficult. A president's ability to develop and put into effect a consistent foreign policy and and military

strategy is continually limited by the vagaries of a domestic political situation over which he may have little control. Given our political system and the nature of the organizations and bureaucracies that have evolved to operate it, together with the uncertainty of projection of international situations, it simply may not be possible to provide consistent long-term policy guidance for military readiness planning and for the development of military capabilities to carry out national policy. (See Chapter II for a discussion of the interplay of factors shaping American policy.)

Resource allocation is a crucial determinant of policy. Yet for lack of a joint view in either R&D or procurement, individual Service priorities largely govern the manner in which resources are expended and in which the importance of specific roles and missions is assessed. The result, all too often, is an emphasis on development and acquisition of high technology systems at the expense of readiness, and an inability on the part of political authorities to learn just how readily unified forces can carry out overall mission responsibilities.

The diffusion of authority, coupled with the short-term nature of decisionmaking roles, contributes to the difficulty in providing long-term guidance. The sheer number of persons and agencies involved in the establishment of policy and the development of military capabilities leads to an inevitable process of compromise in the short term. It is the Congress, in fact, that represents the only long-lived decisionmaking element, with members whose ability to influence policy and posture is based on long tenure in office, contrasting sharply with the political and military authorities. Only the non-political bureaucracy approaches the Congress in this regard.

The DoD resource management system with its three-part bureaucracy of budget, programming, and acquisition functions; its complex modus operandi; its potential for bureaucratic horse-

trading; and its focus on the short-term budget cycle also tends to conflict with efforts to fix military posture into a longer term policy matrix. (See Chapter V.)

We feel that a generalization can be put forward that in reality policy is as often a result as a determinant of posture and often the two are not closely linked. Policy can ultimately influence posture in the long term, but rarely in the short term, except in terms of redeployments. However, if posture is defined in terms of overall strategic priorities, there has been a broad consistency in U.S. policy and posture, primarily in relation to the primacy placed on Europe and the weapon development and force structure ramifications that have flowed from this priority. At the same time, the military adequacy of that posture has never been considered satisfactory, either in terms of Europe or of our other global commitments.

The long-term primacy of Europe in U.S. strategy has led to armor-heavy forces with massive in-place support structures, a posture tending to reduce U.S. capabilities for lesser contingencies in which lighter and more flexible forces might be required for response to short-term threats. Moreover, the NATO concentration on a strategy of deterrence has engendered a mentality of threat-avoidance rather than warfighting, and a consequent reluctance to think through the implications if declaratory strategies should not suffice to prevent the outbreak of war. Similarly, neither the 2-1/2 war rationale for general purpose forces, the subsequent 1-1/2 war concept, nor the concept for tactical nuclear warfare were ever fully defined or developed.

U.S. strategic priorities have been consistent throughout in emphasizing the primacy of nuclear weapons, especially strategic weapons, both for deterrence and for warfighting. This doctrine has been allowed to coexist, however, with two other developments that gradually brought its efficacy into question: first,

the steady Soviet buildup of strategic nuclear weapons to parity and perhaps beyond, and second, the various strategic arms control initiatives based on "equal security" of both superpowers. Threatening the use of nuclear weapons, including central war, under such circumstances becomes steadily less credible. (See Chapter III.)

U.S. thinking about the primacy of nuclear weapons did not come into question all at once. In the early and mid 1960s, as the Soviets deployed increasing numbers of short-range and continental-range nuclear weapons in Europe, earlier U.S. ideas regarding the feasibility of a "pentomic army" and tactical nuclear wars to be waged under the threat of U.S. strategic escalation began to change. Flexible response, including a conventional war phase of indeterminate but presumably substantial length, replaced massive retaliation as the basic U.S. doctrine. Neither U.S. nor NATO-European conventional forces sufficient to make such a doctrine credible were ever deployed, however, and then the U.S. buildup in Vietnam removed the issue as a realistic option. By the time the Vietnam war was over the concept of superpower strategic parity had been ratified, both in SALT and the opposing strategic inventories. At the present moment, U.S. strategic thinking appears not yet to have bridged the gap between a policy based on the threat of escalation to strategic nuclear war, and a situation of strategic parity which makes such a threat hardly rational.

Other significant changes have taken place in the world political-military environment, though the impact of some of these upon U.S. political objectives, readiness planning, and military posture seemed at best delayed and at worst confused. The Sino-Soviet monolith of the 1950s was fractured as early as 1960, but it was 1972 before the split was officially recognized in Washington, and 1980 before U.S. diplomatic relations were established with China. Once again the Vietnam war, which had cast the Chinese in the role of an enemy at least comparable to

the Soviets, served to disorient U.S. strategic thinking. Other segments of the Soviet Bloc during this period also showed centrifugal tendencies, especially in Eastern Europe where the possibility of Warsaw Pact wartime unity appeared increasingly remote. No significant changes in NATO strategy, tactics, or force posture reflected such developments, however. As for NATO itself, the West European allies steadily gained in economic, political, and potential military strength throughout the 1960s and '70s, and in recent years their international political objectives appeared increasingly to diverge from those of the United States. The Alliance remained essentially as it had been since its formation, however, overwhelmingly dependent for its effectiveness upon a substantial U.S. military presence, U.S. leadership, and U.S. nuclear weapons. (See Chapter III.)

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had gradually changed its own political-military approach to the world. From a conviction in the 1950s and '60s that Soviet technology and the Soviet economy would continue to gain on the decadent West, and that Third World liberation movements would find a natural ally in the Soviet Union, the Soviets in the 1970s were forced to recognize that their domestic economic and technological progress was faltering, that the international appeal of communism was minimal, and that massive military force appeared to constitute the surest means of furthering their national interests. While such an approach raised new dangers for the West, it also entailed serious problems for Soviet relations both with the Third World and with their own bloc members. As of the present time, there is little evidence that U.S. policy has fully adjusted to or attempted to take advantage of the new situation.

Perhaps the most momentous change in the international environment in the past two decades has been the sudden increase in vulnerability of the energy supplies upon which Western economies are almost totally dependent. With this change has come a radical shift in the strategic importance of a few major

oil-producing countries in the Third World, especially those in the Persian Gulf area. The U.S. military posture has partially adjusted to the new situation, at least insofar as deployed forces to counter a possible Soviet threat are concerned, but U.S. political objectives are still in a state of flux.

Given the nature of the American political system, official U.S. political objectives must arise out of a process of debate and consensus. The "right" objectives do not automatically evolve, however. Accidents of timing, diversionary actions of key individuals, distracting international or domestic events--all help to influence the process.

Are there, then, other political objectives that might usefully be considered, in contrast to those the United States has pursued in the past? We suggest (Chapter III) that in some cases there may be, and we put forward a few such alternatives. Whether or not the reader agrees with our suggestions, we believe that a process of official and public debate on such objectives might profitably be initiated. We have also grouped some other alternative political objectives by geographical areas (Chapter IV), and have pointed to some of the key issues involved in choosing among them as well as to areas of research which might help in further clarifying these issues. Table S-1, below, summarizes these alternatives. (Table 1, pp. 59-[illegible], in Chapter IV, deals with the alternatives in more detail, spelling out some key issues involved in choosing among them, as well as some suggested research areas.)

How might the U.S. military posture be affected by differing choices among the political objectives listed in Table S-1? How, for example, might weapons systems, strategy and tactics, force size and composition, or military deployments vary with different objectives? It would appear that so long as we consider only reasonable alternatives, such as those in the table, the changes in major U.S. weapons systems would probably be

Table S-1. ALTERNATIVE U.S. POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

EUROPE AND MEDITERRANEAN

Continued U.S. dominance of NATO Alliance
Increasing European assumption of responsibility of specific areas
Unified Europe with primary responsibility for own defense (objective gradually implemented over time)

MIDDLE EAST

Special U.S. relationship with former key countries--Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia
Strengthened Israel/Egypt axis as primary defense of U.S. interests in Mid East
Assured U.S. access to oil fields, by force if necessary
Primary emphasis on U.S. relations with major oil-producing countries

PACIFIC

Continuation of current political objectives in Pacific (re Japan, China, etc.)
Assumption by Japan of much larger defense role
Close military alliance with China
A revitalized SEATO (i.e., military defensive alliance with ASEAN countries)

SOUTH ASIA

Continuation of present disparate, generalized U.S. objectives in South Asia
Rejuvenated defense alliance with Pakistan
Closer political, economic, and military relations with India

AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA

Friendly relations with black African regimes--deemphasis on relations with South Africa
Active support of anti-Soviet elements and regimes in Africa South of Sahara

LATIN AMERICA

Encouragement of political democracy, economic progress for mass of people, and respect for human rights, using U.S. political and economic leverage
Friendly but hands-off relations with all Latin American regimes, regardless of political orientation
Active political, economic, and military support to anti-Soviet, anti-revolutionary forces and regimes

minimal--thus, ICBMs and SLBMs would undoubtedly still be required for all objectives; the strategy of nuclear deterrence would probably still be valid; U.S. naval strategy would not change substantially; a U.S. capability to fight a major war in Europe would still be required; etc. Force deployments might of course be different; force size and composition, and numbers of specific weapons, might also vary with different political objectives. But in the main, changes in U.S. political objectives would very likely have a greater effect upon force utilization than upon the actual character of the forces. Indeed, the mix of U.S. world objectives at any one time is always so diverse that a change of objectives in one area would usually require overall military capabilities just as diverse as before. In short, for a world power like the United States, flexibility in military capabilities is indispensable, and the more precisely it might tailor its forces for specific contingencies, the more it might run the risk of costly misjudgments.

There remains the question of the process itself by which political objectives and doctrines are defined, policy and planning guidance is developed, guidance is translated into force structure, and force deployment and operations are monitored. Schematically, this process can be depicted in its simplest form by Figure S-1. In an ideal sense, the process is continuous and cyclical, with U.S. policymakers first assessing the U.S. posture in relation to the world situation, developing policies and plans to meet the perceived situation, translating these into force structure through the PPBS, and then deploying and utilizing the resultant forces in a changing world situation. In actual practice, of course, the process is neither continuous nor cyclical, not only because of time mismatches in various elements but because all elements interact with each other, both forward and backward. (See Figure S-2). Because of the very complexity of the process, however, and its divergence from the conceptual ideal, the point must be empha-



Figure S-1. ELEMENTAL POLICY GUIDANCE/FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS



Figure S-2. FURTHER ASPECTS OF POLICY GUIDANCE/FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

sized that in the broadest and most general terms the system must work as it has been depicted here or it loses purpose and coherence. (See Chapter VI for a discussion of the process relating policy guidance and force posture.)

One does not have to look far for factors that tend to cause the policy guidance/posture development process to lose purpose and coherence. Perhaps the most pervasive of these is the tendency for the various components to operate as "self-running machines." Thus, left alone, such discrete elements as the DIA threat projection system, the CIA threat estimating system, the JCS planning system, the PPBS, the weapons development and acquisition system, and the system for conducting U.S. foreign relations might all operate fairly comfortably with a minimum of either new policy guidance from above or changing progress information from below. Indeed, major inputs which might radically alter the assumptions or practices of previous years often tend to appear as perturbations to the smooth running of some of these machines. Whatever the personal or bureaucratic reasons for this situation, the influence of the organizational factor--i.e., of different organizational entities with different responsibilities and traditions, and with different objectives and clienteles--upon the process can hardly be overestimated. (Figure S-3 gives an indication of the spheres of influence of major actors.)

Because of overlapping spheres of influence, all the various actors must cooperate in the policy guidance/posture development process. Inevitably, however, they all tend to look at the same policy problem from different points of view with, for example, Congress and the White House often looking toward the international and domestic political situation while OSD and the JCS look toward the PPBS and its attendant weapons development, force structure, and personnel policy problems. Clearly some continuing mechanism is required to keep each actor cognizant of the policy concerns of the others.



Figure S-3. SPHERES OF INFLUENCE WITHIN THE POLICY GUIDANCE/FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

There is no central component driving and monitoring the entire process, however. Essentially, the system is cooperative and at the same time competitive. As a result, it is ultimately built on compromise, because overlapping and sometimes ambiguous responsibilities require continual negotiation and adjustment to external challenges. In some instances, e.g., the creation and continuity of NATO, there is a broad enough consensus for all organizational entities to operate generally in accord. Even here, however, mismatches and conflicts tend to show up in a

more detailed examination of the policy process. When overall agreement does not exist, then the severe impedance mismatches which occur because of overlapping areas of responsibility, different points of view of major actors, and varying time frames of important programs begin to dominate, and various portions of the process will tend to operate almost independently of one another. Table S-2, below, gives a summary listing of the major problem areas in which improvement of the policy development process must take place. (See Table 7, Chapter VII, for a more detailed consideration of these problem areas, along with some key issues involved in their improvement.)

TABLE S-2. ELEMENTS IN POLICY GUIDANCE/FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

PERCEPTION OF POSTURE

- Intelligence assessments
- Interpretation by policymakers (White House, State, Defense, etc.) of intelligence and other information
- Assessment of U.S. and allied postures
- Interpretive interaction among Executive Branch, Congress, U.S. public, and allied governments

POLICY DEVELOPMENT

- Assessment of U.S. interests and objectives
- Formulation and dissemination of national policies
- Coordination and review of planning process

TRANSLATION OF GUIDANCE INTO FORCE STRUCTURE (PPBS)

- Determination of force goals and requirements within projected budget constraints
- Coordination of force objectives and plans with research, development and procurement of weapons and equipment, and with procurement and training of personnel
- Development of force capabilities

FORCE DEPLOYMENT

- Alignment of force posture with U.S. objectives
- Coordination with allies
- Interaction with opponents (ranging all the way from deployment of advisers to all-out nuclear war)

While this paper has steered clear of making detailed proposals for changing the policy process, there are nonetheless a few general themes that deserve comments of a prescriptive nature. Specifically, many of the key policy issues surfacing in recent months suggest a continuing weakness in the operations of the National Security Council (NSC) staff. Much of this appears to stem from a lack of continuity, between successive administrations, in both the personnel and functions of the NSC. A professional NSC staff, similar in character to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) staff, might reduce or eliminate some of the problems of the process that were noted earlier.

A second general theme is that integrated long-range planning must be improved. While this much has been recognized for decades, well-meaning efforts to cure the problem have almost universally come to naught. One corrective might lie in an increased emphasis on <u>initiative</u> planning--with such planning specifically including the setting of long-range strategic and political objectives--as opposed to planning largely for contingencies resulting from the initiatives of other countries.

A final theme that underlies our observations on problems with the process has to do with accountability. Despite egregious sins against the taxpaying public in the form of multi-billion dollar cost overruns, botched military operations, and force capabilities promised but never produced, it is rare to find the responsible parties dismissed from service or even individually tagged with the failure. The entire system invites anonymity, diffusion of responsibility, and a "not on my watch" attitude. Certainly greater organizational and administrative continuity would help to clarify past decisions and fix responsibility; it should not always be necessary for each new manager to reorganize his office and change the names of the key policy documents in order to make his impress on a still strange job. But in the end, much of the accountability problem is simply that we are too ready to forgive managerial transgressions. Specific

techniques better to ensure individual accountability are long overdue.

AUTHORS' ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

After completion of a study such as this, the authors are usually left with a disparate mixture of thoughts, strong opinions, what-appears-to-be-wisdom, and other intellectual residue that was not wholly captured in the report of the study but that may occasionally contain nuggets of value. Most such ideas, in this case, are related to those major and chronic problem areas in the American military system that never seem to be really "fixed" but in which incremental (and sometimes significant) improvements can be made at the margin. The suggestions which follow--pertaining to four different defense problems--are of necessity not analytic but subjective. Nevertheless, as insights which were developed in the course of this rather wide-ranging study they might be useful to others contemplating the same issues.

1. Development and Acquisition of Weapons and Equipment

It is widely alleged that U.S. military weapons and equipment are exceedingly complex, take a long time to develop, cost a great deal, are difficult to maintain in a state of operational readiness, and because of their high unit cost can often be procured only in inadequate quantities. Despite continual attention and concern, the problem may be getting worse rather than better. As a result, the future capability of U.S. military forces to accomplish their mission is called into question.

Clearly the requirement that modern weapons systems must survive and operate effectively in an ever more threatening and exotic environment necessitates costly and complicated technological adaptations. In the past three decades these demands

have been so great that weapons development has become virtually an industry in itself. It is now possible for large companies to conduct profitable operations sustained only by research and development contracts. Within the Department of Defense powerful staff agencies have arisen to oversee research and development alone, and in the Services separate commands have been charged with research and development responsibilities. Inevitably, the primary motivation in such organizations is for the development of high-quality individual items, rather than for the overall effectiveness of operational military forces. This fundamental "R&D bias" is difficult to counter even by instituting regular equipment review committees representing broader operational interests.

During World War II and for approximately a decade thereafter, military research and development were carried out on a largely decentralized basis. Requirements for new weapons were established by the staffs of the military departments (in the Army and Navy, chiefly by the technical services and bureaus) in cooperation with the operating forces and the R&D organizations. R&D performance itself was under the supervision of the materiel staffs (again, of the technical services and bureaus in the Army and Navy). During the 1950s, criticism became widespread that R&D received insufficient high-level attention and specifically that the procurement function tended to dominate R&D. As a result, R&D functions were separated from procurement and centralized in relatively independent staff and command functions.

The swing toward research and development for their own sakes seems to have become excessive, however. A few years ago, in an attempt to secure better balance in the process, an "acquisition executive" was assigned responsibility within OSD for overseeing both R&D and weapons procurement, thus reversing the trend begun a generation ago. But further moves appear required to assert the control of operational officials, with a wider policy view-

point, over the research and development process throughout the Department of Defense. Perhaps the time has also come to reconsider suggestions such as that made by the Rockefeller Commission in the mid 1950s for a high-level Joint Strategic Survey Committee, in the JCS organization but independent of it, with advisory cognizance over future military strategy and the role of new developments in that strategy.

2. Motivation and Utilization of Military Personnel

A military organization is by definition a very specialized segment of society. Its members must be willing to entrust their careers totally to the organization; they must be prepared to live under regimented circumstances, in places and at the times the organization decides; and some members must be prepared to risk their lives without question, on orders from above. Such individuals must be highly motivated, if they are to do their jobs properly.

Different societies over time have offered various motivations to their military personnel--adventure, loot, security, camaraderie, prestige, political power, and special privileges. The kinds of motivations have undoubtedly reflected to a considerable extent the societies themselves. There are clear limits, in any event, to the kinds of motivational devices that can be utilized for the military organization of any particular country.

One of the criticisms levied against the American military is that it is too much a part of its parent society: heterogeneous, pluralistic, materialistic, managerially-oriented, it is said to approach problems much as the American business community approaches them. Financial incentives are a large part of its motivational system; cost-benefit analysis, one of its basic managerial techniques; and preparing for a career outside the military, a pervasive concern of those who are still inside it. Hence, it is said, the military has no unique attractiveness as a career, nor any unifying esprit de corps.

We believe there is validity in the above criticism, but that something can be done about it, if only in marginal and incremental ways. The American military cannot solve its recruiting, retention, and motivation problems simply by increasing its financial rewards; while such remuneration must be adequate, in the final analysis a military organization must rely on other incentives to hold and motivate its personnel. Nor can the American military prosper long if it attempts to make itself more attractive by advertising the jobs outside the military for which it prepares its personnel; the advertisement becomes self-fulfilling. And the officer corps cannot be properly motivated by allowing it to perform managerial tasks that could as easily be handled by civilians; the temptation to think and act as civilians is reinforced.

On the other hand, the American military cannot pretend that all its parts constitute elements of a fighting organization whose personnel must always be ready to pick up and leave, who must be rotated regularly in jobs and stations to ensure all-round competence and requisite mobility, and whose officer corps must be held to uncompromising high standards of "up or out" if they fall behind their peers. Only a minority of the American military are ever called upon actually to fight; little is gained by removing a man from a job he has begun to do well after three years, and sending him to learn a completely different one; and few officers who fail the "up and out" test have lost all usefulness to the military.

The American military might fare better if it concentrated on raising the self-awareness of its members as the nation's ultimate defenders. The combat-operational functions should constitute the military elite, and be appropriately rewarded by superior promotion, pay, and prestige advantages in such matters as command, distinctive dress, public recognition, etc. Adequate opportunity would be given them to practice their skills individually and in group exercises, without undue regard for the expense

in ammunition, spare parts and fuel, or for the likelihood of war. (Actually performing as a soldier, in a "crack" organization, is a psychological form of pay in itself.)

Technical and managerial personnel might be granted differential pay according to the scarcity of their skills, and not necessarily according to rank--though pay would usually not be above that of combat-operational personnel, or below a respectable floor for each rank. Reserve personnel could be forthrightly accepted as that portion of the military most akin to society as a whole; instead of having separate reserve units, reserve personnel might be utilized in emergencies both in civilian-related military jobs and to flesh out active duty units deliberately kept below strength (something like Soviet Category II or III units). Unit replacement personnel would train regularly in their roles and remain ready for instant callup in an emergency. Financial rewards should be sufficient to make such training obligations attractive, while the training itself should be substantive and demanding.

At the same time that the American military concentrates on its ultimate military task, it should recognize that some of its internal functions are not really military in nature and might in fact be better performed by adopting civilian practices. All the military services should promise (and deliver on the promise) to take care of their people from induction to retirement at some specific age--say, 55 for combat-operational types, perhaps higher for others. An alternative minimum of, say, 30 years active duty service might also be set. If personnel should wish to retire earlier (other than for physical disability) they could of course do so but would not draw retirement pay until the prescribed time. All personnel on active duty would be guaranteed work until retirement, but rank might go with the job rather than be a fixed perquisite. As nearly as possible, military jobs should be related to the military function; those that can as easily be performed by civilians would be so performed.

Military personnel would be subject to transfer at any time, but actually transferred only when job exigencies or advancement require it, without any standard tour length. In sum, the military organization and function would be separated more from the societal context, but some of the outworn and debilitative military job practices might be patterned more after those of civilian life.

3. Coherence and Continuity of National Policymaking

For at least the last two U.S. presidential administrations a major criticism has been the "lack of an overall strategy" or coherent policy toward the rest of the world. Without taking a position on the merits of this matter, or on the extent to which an elegant presentation contributes to the public perception of a consistent national strategy, let us admit that both the internal and external coherence and continuity of U.S. foreign policy frequently leave something to be desired. A major aspect of this problem consists of the lack of continuity between administrations; for whatever the differences in ideology, style and substance in different presidents' and parties' approaches to the world, the world itself and U.S. international interests, commitments and objectives change, in the main, relatively slowly. Few incoming administrations would not gain from a comprehensive explanation of previous policies before they reject them, and such a sympathetic review might occasionally save some embarrassing backtracking after foreign realities begin to take precedence over campaign rhetoric.

The growth of institutions making for consistency in U.S. policymaking is a sometime thing, however. The National Security Council (NSC) was created over three decades ago, but it never retains precisely the same functions or the same personnel from one administration to the next. The State Department Policy Planning Council traces its birth to the same period as the NSC, but has never been able to secure more than tentative beachheads

on the monolithic islands from which U.S. foreign policy is controlled, the geographic bureaus. The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization in approximately its first decade made some attempts to accomplish unified strategic and weapons systems planning, but then increasingly settled into a routine of rarely if ever transgressing on Service prerogatives or contradicting Service initiatives. The Office of the Defense Department Under Secretary for Policy came into existence rather desultorily during the Carter Administration, and today the jury is still out regarding the degree to which it will be able to assert firm guidance and top-level control of Defense policy planning.

Such coherence and continuity as exists in U.S. policy-making (particularly between administrations) must therefore well up from the departmental operational entities where some permanent personnel remain. Subsequent policy coherence is dependent to a large extent on intra-governmental consensus. The process is not nearly predictable or reliable enough. Greater continuity is needed in the key planning documents (including document names), policy planning office functions, and at least a minimal number of personnel. (Surely all the key policy-process personnel of each outgoing administration were not dangerously wrong, leading the nation to ruin.)

The problems of the JCS and the Policy Planning Council within their respective departments are deep-rooted and not easily curable. But a beginning toward greater permanence and coherence in the national policy process might be made within the NSC--by more formally spelling out its role, regularizing its guidance and coordinating procedures, establishing its supervisory authority over departmental planning and followup actions. Admittedly, the NSC belongs to the President, to be used as he wishes. There was a time when the Bureau of the Budget--now OMB--was also new and experimental, but it became the indispensable controller of the entire federal fiscal process. Similarly, the NSC needs increasingly to be recognized as the

central governor of the national policy process, not necessarily originating policy decisions but ensuring that they are made and that, once made, other planning actions are consistent with them. Subsequently, departmental policy planning offices should begin to exercise similar control over their own areas of responsibility.

4. Training and Operational Readiness

Since World War II the United States has been the premier status quo power in the world--the chief guardian of the international system of order and monitor of world political change. This is not to say, of course, that the United States has opposed all change everywhere. It has acquiesced in some changes that appeared inevitable, and in a few cases it has actively helped to bring change about. But in the main it has seen the world as faced with massive revolutionary change that would work against U.S. interests. Soviet communism and its doctrine of world revolution were obviously the primary threat, but other political instabilities too were seen as dangerous. For U.S. military forces the fundamental problem throughout this period has been that of determining just what they should be prepared to do to support broad U.S. policy and how they should be trained in order to acquire the necessary readiness.

U.S. force deployments and readiness doctrine have been designed to meet threats ranging from, at one end of the spectrum, a direct attack by Soviet military forces either against the nation itself or a vital U.S. interest (Europe), through intermediate threats by military forces of Soviet allies or proxies against lesser U.S. interests (Korea and Vietnam), to, at the other end, increasingly ambiguous threats by disparate revolutionary forces against non-vital but still important U.S. economic, political or security interests (Middle East, Africa, Latin America). A continuing problem over the decades has been that of determining just where on the spectrum a particular

incident or crisis might lie, and how U.S. military forces should be used--if at all--to meet it. Even in NATO, on that part of the scale where the threat and resultant defense measures are presumably most easily determined, there has been severe criticism of U.S. readiness because of differences over the precise military threat to be faced. Should NATO forces always be prepared, for example, to fight a long-term, large-scale conventional war, or is a less expensive posture of lower readiness under an umbrella of nuclear deterrence adequate? Comparable arguments have arisen over the readiness required of U.S. "rapid deployment" forces to accomplish their responsibilities. Invariably, such differences represent disagreements not so much over what it takes to accomplish a particular mission but over the nature of the mission itself.

The chief operative circumstance leading to the clamor for a U.S. rapid deployment force was the Soviet move into Afghanistan. This incursion, then, would appear to be the primary problem to be confronted, for in other respects the danger to the United States from world revolutionary instability has varied little over the past three decades. Throughout that period the United States has not deemed it necessary to maintain forces with an ability to intervene rapidly in revolutionary situations throughout the world. The necessary argument, therefore, would seem to be not over why U.S. forces do not have such a capability, or what they need to do to attain it, but whether the world situation (in conjunction with growing Soviet power projection capabilities) now demands a U.S. counter-Soviet capability that in the past was not considered necessary.

Similarly in NATO, the problem is not so much why U.S. forces do not have the ammunition stocks and training readiness to fight a large-scale conventional war as it is whether the situation in Europe shows an increased likelihood of such a war and thus makes desirable the additional expense of preparing either to fight or deter it. The U.S. military training and

operational readiness problem is thus chiefly a threat perception and foreign policy analysis problem.

One further note, in conclusion. In spite of the frequent castigation of U.S. military forces for spending most of their available money on major equipment and items rather than on "readiness," there may be another side to the question from the standpoint of long-term policy. Major equipment is a long lead-time item. It makes some sense to have more than can be "kept up" in peacetime, so that it will be available if a war starts. It can then be brought up to snuff relatively quickly, but having more than can be kept up in peacetime does make the operational readiness and reliability figures look very bad. Things may not be as bad as they seem--and perhaps establishing more realistic readiness goals that recognized larger military objectives might sometimes be desirable.

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper is concerned with the relationship between U.S. political guidance and the nation's military force posture. Virtually everyone accepts, at least in principle, the Clausewitzian dictum that war is an extension of politics, and the corollary that military forces should therefore be designed to support national political objectives. But the political objectives for the nation's armed forces are not always stated clearly--if they are stated at all. They may also take a variety of forms, from formal "doctrines" and treaty obligations to more or less informal objectives such as "punishing aggression" or military forces "second to none." Moreover, political objectives must be flexible, partly because the world has a way of changing rapidly and one can't see clearly too far ahead, and partly because military forces and complex weapons systems take a long time to develop--much longer than the time distance one can see clearly into the future.

To add to the difficulty, political guidance has to be interpreted not only in a constantly changing set of circumstances but by changing sets of people who may not all see the problem the same way or who may even be members of opposing political parties. The problem, then, is in two parts: first, devising and keeping up to date well-conceived political guidance for the nation's armed forces, and second, translating that guidance into a military posture that accurately reflects the guidance and also preserves necessary options for unexpected contingencies.

In its approach to the problem of assessing the relationship between political guidance and force posture, this paper addresses four questions:

1. To what extent are the characteristics of our present military posture traceable to our political objectives and doctrines, and to what extent do they stem from other causes?

2. What have been the major changes in the world political-military situation and in our political objectives and doctrines over the past two or three decades and how have they affected our current military posture?

3. Given the present and projected world political-military situation, are there some reasonable alternatives to our current political objectives? What are the key issues involved in choosing among alternatives?

4. What are the main elements in the process for defining political objectives and doctrines and for translating policy guidance into force posture? What are the key issues involved in improvement of this process?

Chapter II, "Factors Shaping Military Posture," basically examines question No. 1 above, assessing the complex interplay of forces that act upon and determine the nation's force posture. Chapter III, "U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives and Military Force Planning," assesses the changes that have taken place in the world political-military situation over the past two or three decades, and discusses some alternative political objectives that it might be desirable to consider. Chapter IV expands upon the same theme, listing several alternative political objectives for each area of the world and noting some of the key issues involved in making choices among them. Chapters V and VI explore different aspects of the process by which political objectives and doctrines are defined, and by which policy guidance is translated into force posture. Chapter VII

then lists some important conceptual problems involved in improving the policy guidance/force development process. Appendices A through D examine in more specific terms the following subjects: formal defense policy guidelines; political doctrines; the relationship between national interests, objectives, and strategy; and long-range planning.

II. FACTORS SHAPING MILITARY POSTURE

Beyond the policy, doctrinal, and strategic bases of posture is a wide range of factors whose interrelationships and interactions heavily influence posture. Both in the short term and the long term their influence, individually and collectively, is immense. Their impact is more visible in most cases than is the impact of policy or strategy. In this cursory discussion no attempt is made to determine the relative weights of these factors, since such weighting will change with time and circumstance.

A. THREAT ASSESSMENT

The self-evident significance of the threat in influencing posture needs little comment. The threat underlies, along with U.S. interests and commitments, our policy and posture and thus is pervasive in any discussion of the relationship of policy to posture. With China apparently no longer viewed as a threat, our posture is almost completely structured against the Soviet Union. Our 2-1/2 war strategy has been reduced to a 1-1/2 war strategy, and the major forces we once deployed in Southeast Asia have been drastically reduced.

Assessment of the changing nature of the threat is reflected both broadly and narrowly in our own R&D and force development programs. The air defense buildup of the 1950s was based upon an assessment of the Soviet bomber threat. The MX is based upon the assessment of a threat from highly accurate multiple large Soviet warheads against U.S. missile silos.

U.S. capabilities in all fields are measured against assessed current and future Soviet capabilities.

B. STRATEGIC DILEMMAS

A major influence on U.S. posture derives from what might be termed strategic dilemmas, intractable and, up to this time, apparently insoluble military problems. Since 1945 the United States has faced a military situation unparalleled in our history, a situation that derives from two sources and the implications of this situation have had a continuing effect on posture.

The first derives from the existence of nuclear weapons. The utility of military power for the support of U.S. interests has been called into question. Military power as an instrument of foreign policy has been eroded by nuclear weapons, since military power can no longer ensure the physical security of the United States, except through deterrence. The capability to inflict mass destruction is difficult to translate into a plausible threat, even against non-nuclear states. In fact, it would appear that non-nuclear nations have increased opportunities for independent military action. The nuclear factor has had a pronounced impact on non-nuclear war itself. It makes it necessary that the fact of conflict itself not bring about an unwanted escalation. The requirement has implications for force types, doctrines, strategies, and tactics.

In the second place, it has been increasingly clear that there are few places on the periphery of Eurasia where the Soviets could not bring superior power to bear against a U.S. military intervention. They have the advantage of interior lines and little concern over the attitudes of allies or neutrals. The apparently unbeatable threat lies at the root of our strategic dilemma. As a result, we have no clear-cut set of war plans today similar to the Rainbow Plans that existed when we

entered the Second World War, specifying objectives in a general conventional war and positing the strategic priorities that were indeed followed. It has been extremely difficult in our time to conceptualize either the nature or the outcome of a general war.

In short, we currently have a blurred picture of how we should employ military force in defense of our interests. The reluctance to use any degree of force, deriving from the Vietnam experience (that reinforced the unsatisfactory military nature of the Korean experience), will probably fade with time, but for the immediate future it will continue to represent a constraint. The impact is obvious. If there is no clear picture of how we should use military capabilities, the posture of the forces will show it. The sense of the non-utility of force that has been created by Vietnam has led to political hesitation that in turn has probably created disincentives among the military to emphasize immediate operational capabilities and thus to maintain a higher posture of force readiness. The reduced emphasis on readiness is a key point in the capabilities-policy relationship.

Another aspect of the overall strategic dilemma which tends to warp our military structure is the fact that the most serious threat, a Soviet attack on Western Europe, is at the same time seen as the least likely threat. This is unlike the situation that prevailed prior to both World Wars. The United States knew in 1940 that it might have to fight Germany and Japan and that it would be a fight to the finish. The major threat was also the most likely threat. A military posture could be configured and its capabilities maximized to meet that threat. Although Europe will remain the key military arena, other important areas seem increasingly to pose potential military involvement. The two Asian wars are proof of that.

The long-term primacy of Europe in U.S. strategy has continuously had force structure implications. With weapon system, doctrinal, and tactical developments in response to the growth of Soviet armored power in Europe, the United States has gradually converted its field forces to an armored and mechanized structure. Armor-heavy forces require massive in-place support structures, all of which lead to forces that are increasingly employable only in a Central Front type of war. The trend thus has been toward an overall decreasing flexibility of forces. Consequently, it has become increasingly problematical for forces designed for the Central Front to be employed in lesser contingencies, while at the same time the remaining armor-light forces like Marine and airborne divisions are viewed as too vulnerable in dealing with massive Russian armored attacks in Europe, or even with the armored forces of some potential Third World enemies.

The problem is not new. In 1970 the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel stated in its report:

> The forces for limited war must be highly mobile; their weapons must be capable of being rapidly moved to trouble spots and employed in a selective manner. It is not possible to plan precisely for limited war. Therefore, contingency plans must be rapidly adjusted to the developing situation. With the forces designed for limited war assigned to six separate commands, it is not possible to achieve the coordinated planning, flexibility in resource allocation and mission assignment, and the training required to assure the capability to react rapidly and effectively to a crisis situation.*

The maintenance of flexible specialized forces is unusually expensive and within the U.S. Army has always been resisted by the "main line" leadership. The Ranger battalions in World War II and the Special Forces in the period since were both under

*Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, *Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense*, July 1, 1970, p. 51.

constant pressure to prove their utility. Similar arguments are now being made against the Marine Corps that traditionally has been the flexible force par excellence. The British have a long tradition of successful employment of specialized forces in situations requiring the application of small forces very rapidly. It is these highly flexible specialized forces which are often required to respond to the short-term threat, to handle the situations where the mismatch between conventional military posture and foreign policy goals most usually occur.

Complicating the light-heavy force equation, too, is the fact that "light" cannot be easily defined. Many Third World states against whom U.S. forces might be involved possess armored and air forces of some size, capable, at least on a numerical basis, of presenting serious and dangerous opposition. U.S. light forces alone can be expected to have less impact in many potential combat areas than they once would have.*

The military forces reflect the uncertainty and confusion arising from the dilemma of our suspected inability to hold Western Europe, under present circumstances, if the Soviets are determined to seize it. Because of this recognition, U.S. policy long ago moved toward a strategy of deterrence, not only in the strategic nuclear area, but in the conventional area as well. Our role in Europe is to deter Soviet attack; the role of the rapid deployment force is to deter Soviet or other hostile intervention elsewhere. This concentration on a strategy of deterrence rather than actual warfighting tends to create a form of wishful thinking that a certain level of capability (especially if attended by high technology weapons and systems)

*The concept of a rapid deployment force is not new. In 1958 the Army established the Strategic Army Corps to be prepared to fight limited wars. The Air Force established "composite air strike forces" for the same purpose. In 1961 the U.S. Strike Command was established to bring these forces under a unified command, later becoming the Readiness Command.

is alone enough to avoid a threat, not meet it but avoid it. The cast of mind created pursues a policy of "minimums" and takes a "calculated" risk that minimums will be enough. We have never really thought all the way through the consequences of a failure of deterrence in Europe, or even more, in the Persian Gulf where we have assumed a commitment that General Maxwell Taylor sees as potentially as great and even more dangerous than in Europe.

However, deterrence can function only if the implied threat behind it is credible and concrete. In the strategic field, the Soviets know we can inflict frightful damage on them. A similar capacity in the conventional field is not evident. The Soviets, for example, can match several times over the forces we might land in the Persian Gulf. They have the ready capability to fight there if they choose to. We do not have the ready capability, and must currently rely upon the element of uncertainty, hoping that the Soviets would be unwilling to risk a clash.

For years the rationale for general purpose forces was based on the 2-1/2 war concept, that is, U.S. conventional forces were structured for a short-term conventional defense of NATO, defense in Asia against a Chinese attack on Korea or Southeast Asia, and a minor contingency elsewhere, all operations presumably to be conducted simultaneously. The full forces required to support this strategy, however, were never achieved or even authorized. Forces are now based on the 1-1/2 war concept, the danger of a Chinese aggression having been discounted. A major threat in Europe and a contingency elsewhere set the force requirements. The 2-1/2 and 1-1/2 war concepts are probably as specific an attempt to tie military capabilities to possible policy needs as can be found, since the concepts were area-specific except for the contingency. Yet the capabilities were neither fully defined nor developed. The policy of flexible

response was established as a rationale for a buildup of conventional forces in the 1960s to swing the balance back from reliance on a nuclear strategy. The intention was to increase deterrence through increased conventional strength in order to avoid having recourse to nuclear weapons. Yet the implication was that, if deterrence failed, the ultimate defense would be nuclear. However, the concept of deterrence by U.S. conventional forces can be viewed as an ex post facto rationale for the suspected inability to carry out their 1-1/2 war mission.

It is also sometimes suggested that U.S. forces are designed to create the perception of power in the eyes of enemies as well as the actuality. Some forces, especially naval forces, do have a symbolic and representational role. However, for real effect, there must be real strength behind the symbolism. The world is no doubt aware of the immense latent military strength of the United States that can be brought to bear in a few years, but it is probably even more aware of the limitations on American military power in the short run.

Another aspect of strategic ambiguity lies in the short-war/long-war dilemma. In view of the attrition rates of the last two Middle East wars, the general long-held anticipation of a short conventional war in Europe, probably 30 days, with longer projections out to 90 days, has been reinforced. This duration would be a function of attrition rates and limited stocks and the respective force balance. Army doctrine speaks in terms of a short war of extreme violence. On the other hand, the Army especially has never totally abandoned the concept of a longer war involving an initial standoff, followed by a slow U.S. buildup in the fashion of 1941-45. Indeed, there has been, too, an increased interest recently in OSD in the possibilities of a "long" war and its implications for resource management.

It is quite possible that the short-war concept is derived not only from analysis of attrition rates in the Middle East

wars but from our own present inability to fight more than a short war. On the other hand, it should be mentioned that the short-war concept is in good part forced on the United States by the continuing refusal of most of NATO to build stocks that would last even 30 days. So long as the United States has tied itself to a NATO defense of Europe, there is a requirement for at least an intellectual acceptance of the fact that the NATO defense line might start to collapse piece by piece as allied units lose the ability to fight rather than because of a Soviet breakthrough per se.

This chapter has so far not mentioned another aspect of the strategic dilemma, namely tactical nuclear warfare. While it is a more reasonable possibility than strategic war, the military have not succeeded in conceiving the image of a tactical nuclear battlefield and how operations would continue. Plans in the 1950s to reorganize divisions and adopt open formations and tactics for use when tactical nuclear attack seemed imminent have long since been abandoned. Yet the spectre continues to haunt military policy. If a concentration on conventional defense is unrealistic because we cannot really carry it out and if the basis of our strategy ultimately relies on tactical nuclear weapons, both our planning and force development are left questionable.

The points raised in this section suggest that the state of the forces today is in large part a function of uncertainty over military issues, quite separate from national policy goals.

C. SERVICE INTERESTS AND PREROGATIVES

Among the most cogent influences that shape the military posture are those that derive from specific Service and OSD interests and prerogatives. These are institutional in nature and involve a network of interests and influences with domestic political and economic implications.

Resource allocation is a crucial determinant of policy. What has happened, in effect, is that the armed forces now follow a strategy-by-budget rather than a strategy based on operational demands. There is also the additional problem of how the Services then choose to spend their funds. For the past decade the major focus of attention within DoD has been on R&D and the acquisition of new high technology systems, at the expense of readiness. Secretary Brown has ascribed the low state of readiness to a lack of constituency for this sort of spending. Only the commanders in the field and their men, he has stated, seem concerned over the issues of readiness.

Despite their assigned mission to carry ground forces to battle, both the Air Force and the Navy (and, it should also be stressed, the Congress too in its setting of budget levels) have given this "national" role a lower priority than overall national foreign policy goals would indicate. Of the three Marine Amphibious Forces, only 1-1/3 can be carried in assault lift at one time, and this requires all assets from both the Atlantic and Pacific. Air Force airlift is inadequate to move large numbers of personnel, and especially outsize equipment, rapidly over long distances. The Navy has preferred to concentrate on building combat ships, and the Air Force, combat aircraft.*

It has been questioned whether stocks of munitions are adequate to execute the assigned 1-1/2 war mission. It is certain that the United States could not have implemented a 2-1/2 war strategy without a full World War II mobilization and the time to do it. It is also now questionable that we could carry out a 1-1/2 war strategy. The right equipment in large enough quantities and the right type forces are not currently available for the shorter-term war that is generally anticipated.

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*These issues of Service resource allocation are discussed at greater length in Chapter V.

The issue of how the Services use their resources is involved in the larger issue of roles and missions. The Key West Agreements of 1948 were simple statements of the capabilities of the Services at that time. Clearly, since then there has developed major overlapping of roles and missions. This leads to either wasteful duplication of capabilities on the one hand or an inadequately supported mission on the other.

An example of the influence of Service parochial interests in shaping the forces is the emphasis laid in U.S. defense policy on tactical airpower. All four Services have their own tactical airpower and have developed it at the expense of other functions of their missions. The major issue here is whether tactical air can indeed offer capabilities commensurate with the allocation to it of such huge resources. In Central Europe it is expected that tactical airpower will be co-equal with ground forces, and tactical air forces are expected to be able to carry the burden of the land battle until friendly ground forces are built up. However, such heavy reliance on airpower as a substitute for land power has not yet been vindicated by the historical record, although, conversely, no modern war has been won by the side weaker in airpower, except where the war was primarily guerrilla-based.

A second aspect of the problem of Service interests and overall posture is structural, the continued inability of the JCS to enforce a joint view either on R&D and procurement or posture generally. The Steadman Report of 1978 on the National Military Command Structure stressed that readiness status reports, for example, are in terms of uni-Service units and systems rather than joint combat forces. The reports thus do not provide the NCA with a picture of the readiness of the unified command forces. There also is no direct linkage between the readiness reporting systems and the JCS role in the budget process; thus there is no joint military advice to the NCA for the correction of identified capability deficiencies. Because the CINCs and the JCS now have a lesser role in corrective

decisions regarding readiness, the initiation of corrective action is left largely to the Services.* Not only is force readiness not viewed on a joint force basis, but Service readiness status systems vary markedly and there is an obvious Service incentive not to paint too black a picture. Consequently, the truth seems to be that the political authorities find it difficult at any point to learn exactly how ready for action our military forces are.

The Steadman Report stressed the two-way street nature of the problem:

> Clear and responsive professional military advice to the NCA is a prerequisite to successful defense planning. Equally, the articulation of clear national security policy is a prerequisite to sound military planning and advice.**

These words represent a noble aspiration that in the past has been seldom achieved. The civilian authorities can rarely formulate precisely the questions on which they seek military advice or the policy they lay down for the military to follow. In turn, all too often military advice on issues which deal with strategy, roles and missions, joint doctrine, or organization of command is given reluctantly and in a very waffled form. Yet these subjects are crucial in the process of relating military capabilities to political objectives.

The term military-industrial complex need not be used in a pejorative sense. It is descriptive of an existing fact recognizable when President Eisenhower coined the expression in January 1961 and it is even more pronounced today. It is not an exaggeration to state that the relationship has the most profound effects on U.S. military capabilities. A former Chairman

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*Department of Defense, *Report to the Secretary of Defense on the National Military Command Structure*, July 1978, p. 35 (the Steadman Report).

**Ibid., p. 40.

of the JCS views the relationship as having a crucial role in creating military posture by moving military R&D toward certain directions. These courses can then ultimately become irreversible.

The natural alliance of Services and industry feeds the Service pursuit of their own preferences. The resulting "composite" of capabilities may not provide the best posture, but it does favor defense industry more than a more measured allocation of resources might. The problem of the duplication of weapons and equipment, major and minor, has been at issue for decades.

So long as the Services are not required fully to justify systems within a wider context than Service requirements, programs are likely to continue that produce capabilities that may not be fully supportive of broader national objectives. The very ambiguity of national policy, of course, almost invariably leads to this situation. Pressure to start new programs also comes from defense contractors, and OSD as well as from the Services. The emphasis placed by the Services, consciously or unconsciously, on acquisition of new weapons rather than maintenance and readiness of existing inventory reflects that pressure.

D. THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY

The pursuit of high technology systems has increasingly become a critical element in the shaping of U.S. posture. Basic views on the effects of this policy differ sharply. The scientific leaders who direct military R&D have consistently asserted that in high technology lies our best weapon against the Soviets, that this was our area of greatest advantage. There has been a conscious decision to seek to use quality to outweigh numbers.

Nevertheless, concern has grown for some years. In 1970 the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel stated in regard to the impact of technology:

> It is not surprising that both in and out of the military establishment there have been sharply differing opinions on how the new technology can be applied to the spectrum of conflict situations for which the U.S. must be prepared, what organizational changes are required to exploit new and radically different capabilities, and the costs of converting technology to the uses of war. The development of new weapon systems to meet the evolving threats to the security of the U.S. is a vital part of our national defense, and is one of the driving forces behind the entire defense structure. As such, it must be carefully controlled.*

It can be suggested that we have paid a price in many respects for the pursuit of high technology systems. There has been pursuit of technology for its own sake, ignoring those more mundane aspects that are necessary to make systems fully operational under combat conditions. Secretary of Defense Brown has stated, "There is a tendency in the military services and in my own office to be entranced by technology." Weapons designers, he said, push the outer limits of technology, striving for "the last 10% performance."** It is that last 10 percent, reflecting the desire of the technologist to achieve the highest performance per unit, that is disproportionately expensive in terms of money, development time, and reliability.

The distinction should be made between pursuit of high technology that results in smaller, simpler, and cheaper systems and that which results in larger, more complex, and more expensive systems. U.S. performance in military R&D has generally been in the direction of the latter.*** This is in sharp contrast to the use of high technology in the civilian

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*Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, op. cit., p. 8.

**Quoted in *Los Angeles Times*, September 10, 1980, p. 1.

***The Soviets have also moved toward larger aircraft, doubling and tripling gross weight since 1960.

sector, where indeed end products have usually become cheaper, smaller, and simpler. The issue is not whether to use high technology but rather how to use it and at what level for military equipment, with a goal of operational utility rather than technological perfection.

The long lead time involved, with its associated political and economic pressures, tends to create a "future" mentality in the military in which things will always be better tomorrow when the new systems appear. Capabilities are often stated in present terms for weapons and systems that do not yet exist as operational entities. This can lead to an avoidance of hard issues of reality, to a tendency to think in terms of what capabilities will be rather than are now or in the immediate future. The five- and eight-year planning cycles probably reinforce the tendency, it always being more comfortable to deal at the outer edge of the planning cycle than at the inner edge. In a sense, the practice can become a form of self delusion in which it is hoped or expected that high technology systems will compensate for deficiencies in those other elements that make up a national military posture.

Furthermore, experience has shown that in all too many cases the operational effectiveness of systems has fallen far short of that originally predicted. Weapons have been sold on a "worst case" threat basis but tested against a "best case" threat. The aggregation of many less than expected reliabilities and performances makes it that much more difficult to assess the actual combat capabilities of the forces at any given time.

A case can be made for the proposition that the pursuit of high technology weapons, with an apparent emphasis on continuous R&D rather than production of final design weapons, has actually diminished our current real military capability.

Of course this could have happened if we had actually earlier procured large numbers of new high technology weapons. It can be argued that we might have already built and fielded intermediate technology weapons better than we have had we not been seeking better ones. (Especially in the ground forces we now have mainly older weapons, lower in technology and less complex than Soviet equivalents, new U.S. weapons not having yet come off the production line in numbers.)

Increasing costs have meant fewer numbers; complexity results in unreliability, short mean times before failure or overhaul, and reduced performance contrasted with original expectations; complexity has also led to the mismatch of complex weapons and a decreasing qualification level among the enlisted personnel who will operate the equipment, leading to the situation today where we have many such systems not in operation because we do not have either personnel or parts to keep them functioning.

The trend has also led to the enunciation of doctrines and tactics (such as "active defense" in the Army's FM 100-5) which are based on the existence of high technology capabilities that do not yet exist and probably will not exist for some time. This is another example of "future" thinking. Efforts to apply the "active defense" tactics in European exercises have not been successful because the advanced capabilities upon which the doctrine relied were not available.

It may be suggested that there has been some loss of perspective on the means-end relationship of military R&D. The ultimate end is battle with all its uncertainties and degradations. Military technology pursued outside those realities of battlefield conditions is unlikely to lead to useful end items.

E. THE INFLUENCE OF DOMESTIC FACTORS ON MILITARY POSTURE

The state of national military capabilities is influenced heavily both in the short term and the long term by domestic

factors quite separate from foreign policy goals. The Armed Forces are a major institution within the overall American society and as such are subject to the same political, economic, and social pressures as are other major institutions. The Services cannot be insulated from the normal and abnormal day-to-day pressures within American society or from the preferences and even whims of political leaders. These pressures shape the character of the forces at any given time and thereby influence overall posture.

The impact is seen in many ways and in a massive way in fiscal terms. The enormous growth of social programs, to mention one factor, since the mid 1950s has meant a reduced national capability to allocate additional large sums for short-term defense efforts. Even if the will were present, it would be politically difficult, short of a dire military crisis, to turn down sharply these programs in order to increase defense spending in a really major way.

An example of domestic political pressure with budgetary significance is seen in the local political and economic imperatives that keep unnecessary military facilities open when the DoD has desired to close them. Similarly, a cost-effective basis for weapon system selection has often been violated either by Congressional pressure or by executive actions dictated primarily by political considerations that involve spreading R&D and production contracts around the country. The unsatisfactory personnel situation of the Services today, especially in the combat branches of the Army, is due in good part to the drastic reduction in standards in order to maintain strength levels. It can be argued that the large influx of low-quality personnel has contributed to the declining combat capability and readiness of the Army. The other Services have suffered similarly, although in varying degrees. This is a current characteristic of our military capabilities that has nothing to do with political doctrines, commitments,, or foreign policy

goals. Racial tensions in the Services that pose a potential problem also bear no relationship to policy. The castigation and calumny heaped on the Armed Services during the Vietnam war clearly downgraded the military career in the eyes of that sector of American youth most needed to upgrade the Services. This is an issue of public attitudes with a continuing impact on military posture a decade later.

Another example of the influence of domestic social pressures in creating and perpetuating a military problem lies in the huge number of U.S. military dependents in Europe, almost as numerous as the military personnel, representing a grave weakness in time of crisis. The situation has developed across the years despite balance of payments considerations and more recently U.S. expectations on the potential shortness of warning time. The Services have felt that under peacetime conditions overall readiness was secondary to improved troop morale.

Perhaps the most serious example is the ending of the draft. The move was undertaken in response to public attitudes but with no assurance that a volunteer system would provide the number and quality of forces necessary to support U.S. commitments. Some of the proponents of the volunteer system argued that the system would lead to better quality forces, but it did not. National interest would seem to have called for another course of action, but domestic political pressures outweighed national security considerations. Without public support the draft system could no longer be sustained.

F. THE INFLUENCE OF CONGRESS

It is difficult to underestimate the importance of the Congress in the determination of defense posture. Hamilton notes in the Federalist Papers "That the whole power of raising armies was lodged [by the proposed constitution] in the legislature, not in the Executive; that this legislature was to

be a popular body, consisting of the representatives of the people periodically elected."*

Despite the change in conditions over two centuries, but with no change in the constitutional grants of power, that prerogative is guarded fiercely by the Congress and in particular by the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate. Indeed, other committees, such as those dealing with the budget as a whole and with intelligence, are interested in how much money the DoD is allotted each year, in what it buys with these funds, and in how that money is spent. Each of these three types of limitations--on the total, on the particular objects and on the procedures for obligation of the funds--constrains the DoD in its own way.

As for the total Defense budget, the Congress can choose to allocate funds between defense and other activities as it sees fit. In the 1960s and 1970s the Congress reduced the budget below that asked by the various administrations, even in years when the proposals were thought to have satisfied the Congressional appetite for reducing defense spending. The 1979 budget would probably have been approved at the requested level if it were not for President Carter's veto of the Defense Authorization Bill containing a nuclear power aircraft carrier. In the final budget the carrier was absent, but so was a significant portion of the funds that would have been spent on it.

The Congress dictates particular weapons; especially aircraft and ships, but also smaller procurement items and operations money in a process that involves two distinct bills, an authorization bill and an appropriations bill, and two separate

*Federalist Paper No. 24, "To Provide for the Common Defense." The edition quoted is Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, edited by Benjamin Fletcher Wright (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 204.

committees in each house, an armed services committee and an appropriations committee. Until 1959, only ships were authorized on an annual basis. Each year more items have been added so that by 1982 the entire defense budget, with minor exceptions, will be subject to annual authorization, an essentially duplicative process to the appropriation process. This gives the House and Senate Armed Services Committees as much power over the detail of the defense budget as the two Appropriations Committees have always had.

Once passed by Congress and signed by the President, these bills bind the President to spend the money for programs as approved, unless both houses of Congress rescind the appropriation for particular programs that the President wishes to delete. This has been true since passage of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which included a provision making it all but impossible for the President to "impound" or refuse to spend money that the Congress had approved.*

Not only does the Congress specify what the money is to be spent on, but how, in a procedural way, that money is spent. Both through law and by expressing a special interest in their committee reports, the Congress concerns itself with a vast array of military expenditure issues. Sections of the proposed 1981 Appropriation Act contain 65 special provisions covering such items as how much the DoD charges for insignia and prohibitions on decommissioning certain named ships.**

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*See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Public Law 94-344, *Legislative History*, Committee of the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives, January 1979, pp. 274-276 and 392-399.

**Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1981. *Report of the Committee on Appropriations Together with Separate and Additional Views*, Report No. 96-1317, U.S. House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, September 11, 1980.

The Congressional influence on military posture is not only budgetary. Congress has shown interest in and been a major determinant of matters of force levels and composition, based on their policy views concerning roles and missions. There have been major foreign and defense policy differences between Congress and administrations over the years in which the Congress has sought to impose its will on general defense policy, including wartime strategy. The conduct of military operations in war is also an area of Congressional investigation and influence.

It is through the Congress that domestic political, economic, and social pressures are brought to bear on military posture. The Services and defense industry pursue their interests through the budget role of the Congress. This activity is clearly within the constitutional domain of the Congress, and it is a crucial area of difficulty that the DoD and the administration must deal with in trying to develop a defense posture that is internally consistent and at the same time follows national policy. The influence of Congress in the complex process of translating policy into posture is enormously pervasive.

G. OBSERVATIONS

The foregoing discussion presents on the whole a negative tone in regard to the influence the described factors have on posture. While their individual and collective weight can indeed shape posture in ways that are not most responsive to overall policy and strategy needs, this is not automatically the case. These influences have always existed and have helped shape posture. Even at the height of the Second World War the impact of some could probably be identified. Because they are an inevitable part of the American system, we have learned to live with them. Despite these factors (and to a degree because of them), the United States has since the Korean war maintained large military forces and has continued its role as shield of the Western world. The adequacy of these forces and the posture they

represent has nearly always been challenged, primarily in terms of size. At the present moment, however, our posture is being widely criticized for an additional failing, that of quality, or actual capability to accomplish its mission. It is perhaps this aspect that makes the current debate over policy-posture mismatch so vehement.

III. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES AND MILITARY FORCE PLANNING

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter addresses the subject of U.S. political objectives in the world and their current relevance for military force planning. It first makes a brief assessment of the present and projected world situation, and then suggests some alternative political objectives the United States might pursue in several major areas of the world. The reader may or may not agree with either the assessment or the suggested alternatives, but they are chiefly intended to adumbrate the nature of the problem. It is believed, however, that the proposed assessment and alternatives are in general consistent with each other and that they do deal with some of the major political-strategic choices the United States faces in the world today.

B. THE RELEVANCE OF U.S. POLITICAL OBJECTIVES FOR CURRENT FORCE POSTURE

Ideally and abstractly, the U.S. national policymaking apparatus is continually surveying the world environment for possible threats and opportunities, assessing the requirements for action on its own part, and transmitting new or revised political guidance to its operational elements (in this case, the military) where corrective action appears needed. Practically, however, both policymaking and operational elements tend to continue with day-to-day business until the need for changed guidance is more or less abruptly brought to their attention by external pressures or internal breakdown. Because such causes of change usually suggest the unreadiness or inefficiency of the

organization which did not foresee them, they are frequently followed by efforts to reform and institutionalize the planning or "foreseeing" functions--as represented, for example, by the Policy Planning Council in the State Department, the former long-range planning section of the National Security Council, or strategic plans offices in the JCS and Services. For various bureaucratic reasons such planning entities have rarely performed as intended, despite the recurring enthusiasms and bon voyages with which they have been launched, and the persistence of the office functions on departmental organization charts. The great bureaucracies and other organizational elements of the government continue to defend their own interests (and those of the nation as they interpret them), while political guidance is either ritualized (if it is familiar) or given a lackluster reception (if it is new and contravenes established interests). The planning offices tend to be diverted into non-controversial areas of work, and once again externally initiated pressure of some sort is usually required before new or changed political guidance can begin effectively to take root.

The major political objectives and doctrines that determine the U.S. military force posture are today, by and large, holdovers from an earlier era. Since at least the early 1950s the chief objectives of U.S. security policy have been the prevention of direct Soviet-Communist expansion into Western Europe, Greece, Turkey, Japan, and South Korea, coupled with the bolstering of the internal defenses of other key areas in Southeast Asia, Latin America, North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia through political, economic, and military assistance. The basic philosophical principle of U.S. policy throughout the period was containment of communism, and its ultimate operative element was the threat of nuclear war against the Soviet homeland if efforts at local defense should fail. The underlying assumptions of the original policy were U.S. strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, economically and militarily

weak U.S. allies, and more or less monolithic Communist direction and efficiency. Today, with a few significant variations in policy implementation, e.g., the demise of SEATO and CENTO, U.S. rapprochement with China, and initiation of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, the original policy objectives and assumptions still implicitly stand.

The world situation has changed dramatically, however, and with increasing rapidity in the past quarter century. Early on the Sino-Soviet monolith broke apart, and China moved steadily away from the Soviet orbit, becoming first an ideological rival and then bitter enemy of the Soviet Union, and finally an apparent friend of the United States. The Soviet East European empire developed a growing number of cracks and internal divisions, requiring Soviet troops on several occasions to restore unity. Romania maintained an assertively independent foreign policy, Hungary an experimentally aberrant "market economy," East Germany unofficial social and economic links with the free world portion of the German nation, and Poland an uneasy alliance between a ruling Communist Party, a still powerful Catholic Church, and a frankly nationalistic populace. World Communist parties (especially in Western Europe) which had been considered faithful tools of the Kremlin in the 1950s increasingly questioned and criticized the leading role of the Soviet Union in the 1970s. In the Soviet Union itself the earlier steady rate of growth in living standards, which had been based largely on extensive exploitation of human and physical resources, began to slow, raising the possibility of serious and growing economic difficulties in the 1980s.

Only in the military realm did the Soviets show dramatic improvement. From inferiority in strategic weapons they moved to at least parity with the United States; their general purpose forces underwent massive modernization; and their navy developed from a defense-oriented, essentially coastal establishment to a

fleet with genuine "blue ocean" capability. Soviet international confidence increased with the growth of military strength, to the point that military assistance delivered rapidly and in huge quantities to local supporters became a recurring means--along with Cuban troops and East German advisers--to influence events in distant Asian and African countries.

Major changes also took place in the economic and political status of U.S. allies. In Western Europe and Japan especially, the war-ravaged economies steadily gained strength until by the 1970s they were not only fully recovered but competing with the United States in international trade and even in U.S. domestic markets. Politically, the Western European allies increasingly asserted their own national interests, at times in opposition to the United States. While the NATO Alliance itself seemed in no danger, various Allied initiatives in foreign policy--e.g., in the Middle East and in relations with the Soviet Union--clearly indicated that the Europeans no longer intended to leave to the United States the position of sole spokesman for the Free World.

The most significant shift in the world power climate in the last decade, however, arose from the sudden assumption of control over their own resources by the oil-producing countries in the Third World, especially the Middle East. The rising prosperity and living standards of the Western world since World War II had been fueled by cheap oil, and the dependence had become almost absolute in some cases. When the oil producers doubled their prices several times in succession, not only did they impose a crippling tax on the Western economies and increase their own wealth astronomically but they mightily magnified their own voices in world foreign policy councils. At the same time, several of the most important of the oil producers retained their previously strong political and economic links with the West, especially the United States, while they

continued to regard communism and the Soviet Union with deep suspicion and hostility. Militarily weak and politically unstable, for the most part, the oil-producing Third World countries for all their great power were vulnerable to outside aggression or internal subversion, and yet could neither defend themselves nor permit a resumption of the old Western colonialist-imperialist relationship. As a result, the United States was faced with a delicate strategic problem, wherein lethal political-military threats to the well-being of the West might arise suddenly in distant locations, but the traditional defense mechanisms of alliances and foreign bases were not available to avert the danger.

The world of 1980 is clearly not the world of 1950, or even 1960. But do U.S. political objectives therefore require modification, and if so, how? Perhaps the most obvious dislocation between U.S. policy objectives and the world of 1980 lies in the assumptions on which the earlier objectives were based. The United States does not today hold strategic superiority over the Soviets, and it appears unlikely that it will again, at least in the foreseeable future. Hence the United States cannot as credibly threaten strategic war if the Soviets fail to desist from aggression at a lower level. The Soviets may not believe the threat, nor U.S. allies.

U.S. allies, for their part, are no longer economically and militarily weak, and their ability to assume a larger share of their own defense burden is limited more by domestic political and social considerations than by availability of resources. Indeed, it can be argued that U.S. defense arrangements with NATO Europe and Japan are themselves part of the political and social framework that dissuades these countries from taking a larger responsibility for their defense.

Most important of all, the Communist bloc is not today monolithically directed (if it ever was), and the evidence steadily

accumulates that the Communist economies are not efficient, whatever their individual social achievements. The term "bloc" is in fact probably a misnomer for the divided, disparate, fragmented Communist Second World now comprised by the Soviet Union, China, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Angola, and Afghanistan.

If the assumptions on which U.S. containment policy was based are no longer fully valid, how if at all might this change existing U.S. political objectives? Clearly, the United States (in company with its allies) still wishes to "contain" the spread of communism. But are the political and related military structures heretofore devised for this purpose still adequate to their task?

C. EUROPE AND THE NATO AREA

Let us consider first Europe, and its southern flank, the Mediterranean. Is the basic U.S. political objective of forming the major West European countries together into a tight defensive alliance led by the United States still appropriate for the current situation in Europe? More specifically, if the United States cannot as credibly as before threaten to continue escalation of a conflict in Europe until it reaches the level of all-out strategic war, then just what is to be the operative element in the U.S. political and military commitment to the defense of Europe? The traditional answer has been that NATO must build up its conventional forces so that the Soviets cannot anticipate victory at that level, and then the threat of nuclear escalation need not be invoked at all. But for some thirty years NATO has refused to build up its conventional forces to a level approaching Soviet capabilities, and the question may well be raised whether, in view of inherent Soviet geopolitical advantages, it is reasonable to aspire to such a goal. Moreover, there

is no reason to assume that the threat of nuclear escalation is purely a Western prerogative; if the Soviets were actually willing to incur the costs and risks of an all-out conventional assault against Western Europe, and were threatened with escalation to the nuclear level, might they not themselves choose the option of a theater nuclear strike backed by the sanction of central strategic war? Again, then, what should be the basic political objective, and the resultant military implementation, of the U.S. commitment to Europe?

We have noted earlier the changed political and economic situation among U.S. and Soviet allies in Europe, as well as the increased and radically different U.S. defense responsibilities in other parts of the world. Let us also recall an earlier U.S. political objective for Europe, dating from the end of World War II and never abandoned to the present time, but frequently ignored or pushed into second place in all the political and economic misunderstandings and outright disputes that have arisen between the Atlantic allies. That time-honored objective is the eventual unification of Western Europe, so that it might serve as a strategic counterweight to the Soviet power in the East. Has the time perhaps come for the United States to take the objective seriously, with all its potentially unpleasant implications?

Let us make clear to start with that when we speak of "a united Western Europe," we do not have in mind a European equivalent of the United States of America. While some of the more extreme enthusiasts may have thought in such terms in the first years after World War II, there are today probably few people, either in Europe or America, who consider such an objective practicable, or necessarily desirable. But a confederal Europe, made up of still separate countries with certain unifying legislative, executive, and judicial institutions, and perhaps even a unified army and foreign policy, is perhaps not inconceivable.

Many degrees of unity are possible in federal and confederal systems, and even the inclusion of a number of different nationalities and languages need not be ruled out. The important thing is that all the components agree to limit their sovereignty in some respects, and to establish unifying institutions to coordinate their policies in certain agreed-upon matters--notably in defense.

Even a loose degree of unity in a future confederal Europe could, however, entail some unpleasant consequences for the United States. A united and independent Western Europe could compete with the United States in world markets even more effectively than it does today; a united Europe could largely decide its own policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; a united Europe could increasingly set its own pace in defense matters; a united Europe could take independent policy initiatives in other parts of the world, including areas where its interests differ from those of the United States. It is, in fact, because of concerns such as the above that the United States has never been willing to take Western Europe off the leading strings and forthrightly support the cause of European unity.

To add to the above problem litany, a united Europe may of course never even come into being, no matter how energetically and unselfishly the United States might work to bring it about. Certainly Western Europe is far from unity today, in spite of having more or less earnestly talked about the subject for thirty years, and in some respects the forces of European nationalism appear as strong now as they ever did. But this is all beside the point. The essence of the political objective should be that Europe must decide the issue for itself.

Some undeniably major progress has been made toward European unity in the past three decades. In addition, all the political and economic trends today appear to be moving

inexorably in the direction of a stronger, more independent and self-confident Western Europe; the military dependency alone remains. If the U.S. political objective should change from that of a tight political alliance in Western Europe led by the United States to that of a more independent and (hopefully) unified Western Europe to serve as a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union, it would both accord with world trends and put the onus on Western Europe to make the hard decisions for its own defense instead of living unrealistically in a world where all the major strategic choices are made by the United States.

We are not talking here, of course, of a sudden U.S. announcement that henceforth Western Europe will be responsible for its own defense, and that the U.S. strategic commitment no longer holds. We would simply set in motion a process leading to a new set of relations in NATO--though the effects would eventually be far-reaching if the primary U.S. political objective were changed as proposed above. In the meanwhile, the Alliance would continue, with the United States still a member and still committed by treaty to the defense of Europe. U.S. troops (and nuclear weapons) would remain in Europe--though the numbers of both might gradually be reduced. NATO command arrangements would begin to change, with more top positions becoming European. The Sixth Fleet might at some point be largely withdrawn from the Mediterranean (as part of it already is under the pressure of other U.S. responsibilities in the Middle East).

The basic NATO strategy would also change, from one of defensive escalation under the ultimate U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee to one of European defense both conventional and (if necessary) nuclear--though the Soviets could still not rule out the possibility of central strategic war because U.S. forces would be involved in any major conflict. The U.S. Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) modernization program would

continue as currently planned, and in company with British and French nuclear forces and NATO-assigned U.S. SLBMs would constitute a strategic threat to the Soviet homeland. Additional LRTNF might even be deployed under joint U.S.-Allied control, as in earlier two-key arrangements between the United States and some of its non-nuclear Allies. New planning, consultation, and command arrangements for Allied nuclear forces in Europe would clearly be required.

Such a changed NATO nuclear strategy might appear, at first glance, to confirm past European fears of a U.S. intent to limit nuclear war to the European continent, so that the U.S. homeland might remain unscathed. In reality, however, the new strategy merely conforms to changed circumstances. The belief is widespread, both in Europe and the United States, that the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee to Europe cannot be relied upon with confidence. Largely for that reason the British and French have continued to maintain and modernize their own nuclear forces, and for that reason Helmut Schmidt of West Germany began his campaign for a "Euro-strategic balance"--a campaign which subsequently led to the U.S. LRTNF modernization program. From the Soviet standpoint the strategic perspective after the proposed change should look no different than it does today: a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict in Europe could escalate to nuclear proportions if it were not quickly stifled, and such a nuclear war could involve major destruction in the Soviet homeland itself. In fact, the Soviets would face the problem of knowing their own territory would automatically be hostage in a European nuclear war, and of having to decide whether deliberately to escalate the conflict to intercontinental proportions so as to strike the United States itself and thereby bring immensely greater destruction on themselves.

Where would all the above leave us, then, from the standpoint of the political situation in Europe? Would the jittery,

ever-fearful Europeans, confronted at last with the reality of partial U.S. withdrawal, run up the white flag and beat a path to the door of the Kremlin, seeking the best surrender terms they could beg? Or might they reluctantly go through the motions of assuming their new responsibilities, but as the months and years passed, ever more supinely succumb to self-Finlandization? They might do either of these things--but the chances are very much against it. The British, the French, the Germans, and the other West Europeans are proud, freedom-loving peoples; they did not weakly give up in the first years after World War II, when their societies were in ruins and the Soviet menace seemed overpowering. They would probably not do so now, when their own populations, combined GNP, and economic capacity exceed that of either the Soviet Union or the United States, and when the latter would still be actively joined with them in a defensive alliance. Indeed, it is at least as likely that, like the American colonies at the time of the Revolution and years immediately following, they would be stimulated by the hard realities of their new situation to come closer together and develop the necessary capabilities for protecting their own interests in the world.

Would the Soviets, encouraged by the diminishing U.S. presence, seize the opportunity to increase political and military pressures against Western Europe, or perhaps even resort to outright military aggression? Once again, they might--but such a course of events, as it began to develop, might also cause the United States to rethink and perhaps even reverse its course, and the Soviets would know this. Faced at long last with the prospect of achieving an objective they have singlemindedly sought for over thirty years, i.e., reduction of U.S. military power in Europe, they might be more likely to encourage the trend by a campaign of ostentatious reasonableness.

Undoubtedly the question of the future of Germany would become uppermost in Soviet minds, under conditions of a diminishing

U.S. presence and an apparently unifying Western Europe. A long-time Soviet objective has been to prevent the appearance of a unified Western Europe, in which West Germany would undoubtedly be the political and economic core and most powerful member. Soviet political initiatives might well be forthcoming, aimed at some variation of a neutralized Germany and holding out as bait the promise of closer relations with East Germany. U.S. and NATO policy to meet such a development would have to be carefully structured well before the event.

One outgrowth of the changed U.S. approach might possibly be to enhance the likelihood of a relaxation of tensions in Europe. A number of incipient arms control measures to this end are on the table at the present time, including the recent U.S. concurrence in the French proposal for a European disarmament conference on conventional weapons. All, of course, would depend on the attitude of the Soviet Union, and the Soviets just might, as we have noted, attempt to hurry the U.S. withdrawal and at the same time head off increased West European defense efforts by negotiating seriously on arms control--especially since they would have more flexibility in this respect under the changed circumstances. If the United States could secure significant reductions in Soviet forces, in return for actions it intended to take anyway for its own reasons, the net result could be favorable for NATO as a whole. There is also the possibility, of course, that the Soviets would see no incentive at all to compromise in a situation that was already going their way. In such an event, both Western Europe and the United States would have to reassess their approaches toward arms control and the reduction of the U.S. military presence. The U.S. political objective of a unified Western Europe still need not be affected, however.

Another possible result of the changed U.S. political objective might be a further loosening of the already weakening hold of the Soviet Union on Eastern Europe. An increasingly unified

Western Europe would serve as an economic and political magnet for the disaffected peoples of Eastern Europe, especially under circumstances where both the U.S. and the Soviet military presence might be reduced. With growing trade and social contacts between the peoples of Eastern and Western Europe, added to the already substantial advances in these respects in the past few years, the Soviets would be hard put to maintain the political and military rigidities of their empire. The past year's events in Poland might well be a precursor to similar developments in other East European countries, making the Soviet task of repression steadily more difficult--and perhaps less necessary, because of the reduced threat (as they would see it) from the United States.

Meanwhile, the United States would be increasingly free to address itself to its larger responsibilities in the world. With growing Soviet capabilities for projection of its power to distant parts of the world, the United States simply cannot afford to have the greatest part of its military forces tied down in Europe--not to mention the attendant impact on its tactics, equipment, research and development programs, logistics, and other ancillary matters.

D. THE MIDDLE EAST

The outstanding region of the world requiring greater U.S. attention is undoubtedly the Middle East. The recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with the accompanying increased threat to the Persian Gulf area and its oil, clearly demand a U.S. capability for some sort of credible response to possible future Soviet aggression in the area. On the other hand, the great distance of the area from the United States, its relative closeness to the Soviet Union over land routes, the lack of an adequate indigenous base structure for U.S. forces (and the low prospect at present of securing one), the resultant immense

U.S. logistical problems--all suggest the necessity for carefully nurtured U.S. political relations with the major countries of the region, and equally carefully determined U.S. political objectives to further long-term U.S. interests. For there is clearly no way the United States could plausibly resist a Soviet attack, say into Iran, without the active cooperation of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, perhaps even Iraq, and certainly Iran itself. A more realistic scenario than an outright attack, whereby the Soviets might be invited into Iran (or one of the other countries mentioned) by a leftist-Communist "government" during a crisis, makes the point even more forcefully for cooperative U.S. relations with most, if not all, of the Persian Gulf countries.

Distances--not only from the United States to the Persian Gulf but within the area itself--are the crux of the U.S. strategic problem there. The Persian Gulf itself is some 550 nmi long. The distance from Masirah in Oman to the head of the Persian Gulf is about 850 nmi, assuming the United States can use the base at Masirah, and assuming U.S. forces wish to go only to the head of the Gulf. It is about 750 nmi from the Sinai bases being evacuated by Israel to the head of the Persian Gulf, leaving aside the uncertainty as to the availability of these bases for U.S. use in a crisis. From Berbera in Somalia to the head of the Persian Gulf is over 1150 nmi, assuming a direct flight over the Soviet client state of South Yemen. From Diego Garcia, the only permanent U.S. base in the area, to the head of the Persian Gulf is over 2650 nmi, farther than from New York to San Francisco. Diego Garcia itself, moreover, is not really suited for a staging base, because of its insufficient land space. (It is worth remembering that during the Korean war the U.S. military effort was supported from Japan, with its large land area, industries, and working population--our own "sanctuary" as real as that other much discussed one of the Communists beyond the Yalu.)

Most U.S. fighter aircraft cannot operate effectively over distances such as we have described, and even with aerial refueling their effort would be a token one. B-52s could cover the distances, but because of the time involved and without accompanying ground and air support their effort would largely be one of harassment. In sum, any kind of effective U.S. resistance to Soviet aggression in the Persian Gulf area would probably have to presume cooperation (at least during the crisis) from at least one of the nearby countries, to permit a base for U.S. military operations.

U.S. political objectives in the Middle East and Persian Gulf area have officially been stated as to achieve a stable peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict, to maintain good relations with states with important resources such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, to counter Soviet influence in the region, to minimize conflicts which might undermine U.S. interests or bring about superpower conflict, and obtain support for U.S. objectives from littoral states.*

These objectives suffer somewhat from blandness. Though they all undoubtedly reflect U.S. interests accurately, they offer little real guidance for U.S. policy or for the U.S. military force posture. The one thread that appears to run through all of them, either directly or by implication, is the desirability of maintaining good relations with the various countries in the area. The basic problem, however, is that most of the countries in the area--and let us consider here for the moment the entire region from the southern and eastern Mediterranean all the way to South Asia--are not on good terms with each other. Thus, Greece and Turkey, Algeria and Morocco, Libya and

*These political objectives are listed in *United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations*, a report prepared by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the Congressional Research Service for the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, April 1979.

Egypt, Israel and the entire Arab World (and beyond that the Islamic and Third Worlds), Iraq and Iran, and Pakistan and India all feel for each other various degrees of enmity and hostility which have led in a number of cases to outright war. How is the United States to maintain good relations with such a large number of countries when any sign of special favor or aid to one country will usually antagonize one or more others? Faced with this problem in the past, the United States selected several key countries which for one reason or another it considered of particular importance for U.S. interests, for example, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Jordan, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco, and straightforwardly supported these countries politically and with economic and military assistance, without excessive regard for the reactions of their respective enemies.

The above policy has been far from successful, however. In the first place, the area has proved so volatile politically that some of the countries most strongly supported by the United States--Libya, Ethiopia, and Iran--have undergone violent revolutions which deposed the pro-U.S. rulers and installed strongly anti-U.S. regimes in their place. (Something of a reverse situation took place in Egypt, the Sudan, and Somalia, where regimes previously friendly to the Soviet Union shifted over to the U.S. side, with no change in national leadership.) In other cases--Jordan and Pakistan--states which had been clients of the United States moved out from under the U.S. wing and into a position of near-neutralism, or perhaps what might better be termed opportunism, where they played the surrounding forces against each other to their own best advantage.

Even the one state, Israel, whose relationship to the United States has been virtually unchanged throughout, and which is if anything more dependent today on U.S. support than when it was founded, has been unable to achieve for itself either peace or security, thus causing the U.S. political objective of

a "stable Arab-Israeli peace" to appear almost as far from accomplishment as ever. Saudi Arabia, the one country that from an economic and strategic standpoint is probably more important to U.S. interests than any other, has also moved farther from the U.S. orbit; while still clearly eager to be on friendly terms with the United States, its rulers have apparently felt they could not carry the double burden of continued U.S. support for Israel and the declining U.S. power position in the area. Egypt, the dominant country in the Arab world politically, appears to be firmly in the U.S. camp, but a coup, assassination, or policy reversal could quickly change everything again, as it has in the past. In short, the overall U.S. political objective of maintaining "islands of stability"--an unfortunate phrase--through political, economic, and military support of key countries has generally failed as a means of maintaining U.S. interests in the Middle East.

It appears incontrovertible that for the foreseeable future there are going to be no islands of stability in the Middle East, and that the entire area will continue to be a very volatile place. A U.S. political objective of maintaining client states there would appear to offer little more promise for the future than for the past. If the primary strategic interest of the United States in the Middle East is to maintain access for itself and the Western world to the area's oil, then it would appear that the primary U.S. political objective in the area might be to maintain good (but not too good) relations with the nations which possess that oil.

We say above "but not too good" because, keeping in mind the abysmal history of U.S. attempts to preserve client states in the Middle East, too intimate a U.S. involvement in any one country, including especially an attempt to establish U.S. military bases there, could well be counterproductive to larger U.S. interests in the longer term. Not only does such a policy carry

the danger of increasing the ruler's vulnerability to dissident forces within his own country, but also of exciting destabilizing enmities with neighboring countries. It is worth remembering here that the two Middle Eastern countries where the United States longest retained actual military bases (Libya and Ethiopia) and the country where total American involvement probably exceeded any other (Iran) eventually became the bitterest U.S. opponents. In all these cases the ruler became isolated from powerful forces in his own country, and then hated and despised as a tool of foreign exploiters.

A corollary political objective for the United States might therefore be to prevent its relations with those countries of primary interest from becoming so close as to overcommit it to a particular ruling group or to unnecessarily antagonize other countries in the area. In the latter aspect it may be useful to recall the record of two other outside powers--the Soviet Union and France--which have managed with some success to "play both sides of the street" in the Middle East, in some cases selling arms to mutual adversaries, without losing favor completely with either side.

When we state that the primary political objective of the United States in the Middle East might become that of maintaining generally good relations with the oil-producing countries of the area, particularly those in the Persian Gulf, instead of attempting to support particular client states, this would not of course remove all the old dilemmas. Most of them would remain: How should one make choices, say, between Iran and Iraq, both of whom are Persian Gulf oil producers and yet also at war with each other? How about choices between Saudi Arabia and Iran, or Iraq and Kuwait? And especially, what should be U.S. policy choices in regard to Israel, which is not an oil producer but has a special claim on U.S. support, and Israel's many enemies in the Middle East who often <u>are</u> oil producers?

In respect to choices on specific issues between oil-producing countries such as Iraq and Iran, or Saudi Arabia and Iran, U.S. policy must clearly be guided by its own larger interests at the time, e.g., which of the two competing countries has the greater potential for helping the United States, which is more cooperative with U.S. policies, how the two countries stand in their relations with the Soviet Union, etc. Any policies adopted, however (if this overall political objective were selected), would have to remain within the limits of the two political objectives stated earlier, i.e., that the United States would still strive to maintain good relations with both countries, and not tie itself too closely to either.

Choices involving Israel are inherently more difficult. For if the dominant U.S. political objective in the Middle East should become the maintenance of good relations with the oil-producing countries of the region, which are predominantly Arab, then there will be inevitable conflicts with the traditional U.S. policy of strong support for Israel. At some point, Israeli objectives in regard to the West Bank, Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, or other controversial issues will undoubtedly require the United States to make choices between support for Israel and support for one or more of the oil producers. No attempt can be made in a paper such as this to propose specific solutions in these matters, since each case will be unique. It can only be said that, given the relative military capabilities of the various countries, it appears unlikely for the foreseeable future that Israel's national security will be in serious danger. Since the U.S. commitment to Israel is basically to Israel's existence and security, and not necessarily to support all of Israel's foreign policy objectives, there is probably more room for U.S. policy choices than might at first seem to be the case. Moreover, it appears that the most important Arab countries--Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and perhaps even Iraq and Syria--have come, however reluctantly, to accept the existence

of Israel, so that the major points of difference are now territorial boundaries and the like, which are more amenable to diplomacy.* In the diplomatic arena in the Middle East the United States is uniquely positioned to exert maximum leverage on both Arabs and Israelis to support its own long-term interests--and, in the process, those of Israel, since Israel too undoubtedly stands to gain more from a long-term, stable peace than it does from retention of conquered Arab territory.

What should be the relationship between the political objectives posed above and the U.S. military force posture? The starting point in clarifying such a relationship must be the recognition that the United States is primarily concerned with the Soviet threat to Persian Gulf oil, not the threat by one Persian Gulf country to another, or the threat by one country's own populace to its rulers--whatever the immediate impact of the latter on oil availability. Indigenous threats would stand a good chance of being transitory, however painful, while a U.S. attempt to use military force to avert them could carry a high probability of permanently endangering overall U.S. political objectives in the area. But a Soviet military threat would itself be permanent in its effect, if successful, and would thus demand a U.S. military response to counter it. Such a U.S. response would in turn require an effective presence on the ground in the immediate area, which would depend upon the cooperation of the threatened country or other nearby countries. But U.S. military forces would presumably not assist one Persian Gulf country attacked by another unless the Soviet Union itself appeared to be directly involved in the aggression.

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*The Israeli bombing of the nuclear reactor in Bagdad raises a whole new genre of problems, however. If the Israelis intend to monitor the entire Middle East with their strike aircraft, it would appear that at some point both the task itself and hostile world opinion will become overwhelming. Of course, U.S. official reaction will be the critical factor.

The implications for the U.S. military force posture thus become somewhat clearer. If the United States should assume that it will have the cooperation of either the country threatened by the Soviets or a nearby country, but that prior U.S. bases in those countries will not be feasible for political reasons, then U.S. ground and air forces must be prepared to move from staging bases farther away (perhaps in Somalia or Kenya, with such additional support as possible from Diego Garcia and afloat storage vessels) into a relatively friendly but unprepared environment, and begin combat operations almost immediately. Adequate air and sea transport; combat equipment easily air-transported; combat engineers; quick-setup headquarters, housing, operations, maintenance, logistics, and communications facilities; mobile air defense; and other combat capabilities specifically designed for such conditions would all be required.

The question is repeatedly raised of possible participation by the West Europeans in defense of the Persian Gulf, because of their critical interest in Middle Eastern oil. There is little so far to indicate, however, that the West Europeans have any serious intention of taking part in a joint defense of Persian Gulf oil. Their almost universal reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in fact, was to look the other way, and to accuse the United States of over-reacting. At a time when the NATO Europeans are having difficulty securing a consensus in their individual countries for increased contributions to the defense of Europe, it would probably be optimistic in the extreme to count on them to assume any meaningful role in defending an area which is infinitely more controversial. Individual, more or less unofficial contributions to a defense of the Persian Gulf may well be made by Britain, France, or West Germany, but for some time the cooperation of Western Europe will very likely have to remain on that level.

None of this is to suggest that the United States should not attempt to encourage the involvement of its allies--

including Japan--in the defense of the Persian Gulf area and of other regions where they also have interests. It should no more be assumed that the United States will unquestioningly carry the entire burden in the world outside Europe than that it will sustain indefinitely the primary responsibility for defense of Europe itself. A multilateral effort will usually meet with a better reception both in the subject areas and the world at large, and meanwhile the attitude of the allies themselves will be much more sympathetic and cooperative if they too are physically engaged. Moreover, some of the allies may have an entree and a potential stabilizing capability in their former colonial areas that the United States cannot match. But having said this, it is still true that, first, most of the allies have at present very little real capability to assist in any meaningful way; second, their assumptions of increased defense responsibilities in their own regions will undoubtedly make the greatest overall contribution; and third, the domestic political repercussions of extra-regional involvement will be much greater for almost all these countries than defense initiatives nearer home. Ir addition, certain countries might carry a stigma in particular areas--such as Japan in Southeast Asia--that would require a special delicacy in reintroducing their armed forces into that region.

A more fundamental problem, perhaps, than that of Allied participation in a Middle Eastern Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) involves the nature of the RDF itself. Should it be a Middle East-oriented force, or one capable of worldwide use? The answer to this question would depend in the first instance upon U.S. political objectives. If the broad U.S. objective is for a Third World of independent countries basically free to choose their own political futures, and if the United States is not insistent that the political systems of these countries be acceptable or even friendly to itself, then U.S. requirements for intervention would probably be very few. If on the other

hand the U.S. view of the Third World is as a battleground between outselves and forces inimical to us, and if revolutionary, leftist, or Marxist-type governments are seen as a potential threat to U.S. security, then a much more activist and interventionist U.S. policy would be indicated. The suggestion of this particular paper is that, while a major Soviet threat exists at present in the Middle East, there may be a lesser chance of direct intervention by Soviet troops in other parts of the Third World. Under this line of reasoning, a worldwide U.S. intervention capability would not appear to be indicated at this time for the RDF. If the objective were decided differently, however, the mission of the force should undoubtedly change with it.

E. THE PACIFIC

If the United States should gradually reduce its former concentration on Europe, meanwhile encouraging a unifying Western Europe gradually to take over increasing defense responsibilities there, the U.S. emphasis on the Pacific (and, of course, the Indian Ocean) might well be increased. Admittedly, the Pacific is at present, from one point of view, virtually a U.S. lake. Politically, the U.S. position is anchored at the northwestern and southwestern corners of the Pacific Ocean by two treaty allies, Japan and Australia. In between, three former political clients of the United States--South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines--lie just off the Asian landmass. Two of these countries are still treaty allies and contain U.S. military forces, as do Japan and the Japanese dependency of Okinawa. China, with its immense population, land area, and strategic position, has steadily moved toward a more cooperative relationship with the United States, while to its south and east the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)--Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines--clearly see themselves as friends of the United States rather than the Soviet

Union (and its client, Vietnam, which they practically surround). The states of Alaska and Hawaii buttress the U.S. position in the northern and central Pacific, while other U.S. island dependencies and the U.S.-dominated Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands are spread over the vast area from Hawaii to the Philippines. No other ocean area of the world is as politicaly under the influence of a single country as is the Pacific under that of the United States.

Notwithstanding the above, in the past decade there have been other changes in the Pacific environment that raise disturbing questions about the future of the U.S. position in the area. Most important of these is the growth of Soviet forces. In the mid 1960s the Soviet Union began to build up its ground units in Siberia facing the People's Republic of China, so that presently some 46 divisions, nearly 25 percent of Soviet ground forces, are on the Sino-Soviet border, compared to 15 divisions in 1965. These forces appear to exceed the requirements for defense against a Chinese attack, and in addition the amphibious warfare capability of some units suggests a mission against Japan. The Soviet Pacific Fleet contains about 30 percent of the U.S.S.R. navy, including 125 submarines--of which some 50 are nuclear-powered--and 67 surface combat vessels. This fleet has steadily improved its capabilities for nuclear attack, strike against opposing ships, blockade of the sea lanes, and amphibious operations. It has held frequent naval maneuvers in the area of Japan, tending to intimidate that country, and its operations have also extended as far south as the Philippine Sea. Soviet access to the base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam adds a further dimension to Soviet naval capabilities in the Pacific.

Meanwhile, the U.S. humiliation in Vietnam, withdrawal from Thailand, termination of its treaty with Taiwan, domestic debate over retention of bases in the Philippines, and proposed withdrawal from South Korea created widespread uncertainty about the future U.S. role in the Western Pacific. Moreover, the emer-

gence of Vietnam as the strongest military power in Southeast Asia, with forces equal in sheer numbers to those of all ASEAN nations combined, constituted an especially unsettling factor for the latter in view of their earlier support for the United States during the Vietnam War. The open Soviet sponsorship of Vietnamese power ambitions, and ambiguous calls for a Southeast Asian "collective security" agreement, added a still further cause for alarm in ASEAN.

The Soviet position in East Asia also has fundamental weaknesses, however. The long supply lines from European Russia across Siberia mean that rapid reinforcement of combat power would be limited to air transportation. Also, the Soviet Pacific Fleet is seriously inhibited by the location of its naval ports facing the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk, and by the resultant narrow exit routes to the Pacific. Even the establishment of new air and naval facilities at Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka, facing the Pacific, solves only part of the problem and entails severe operating difficulties and combat vulnerabilities.

The dominant U.S. political objective in the Pacific area for many years has been the maintenance of a secure alliance with Japan. Clearly there seems to be no reason for change in this priority. As a friend of the United States, Japan has an immense potential for helping to further U.S. and free world objectives. As an enemy, or even a disaffected partner, Japan could become a "loose cannon" in Pacific international politics, with possibly catastrophic consequences for U.S. objectives there. For some time Japan has been accused of taking a "free ride" under the U.S. defense umbrella, and there is increasing pressure, both within the United States and to a limited extent within Japan, for an increased assumption by the Japanese of their own defense responsibilities. Japan is a special case, however, and cannot be pushed too rapidly; the same relatively "cold bath" treatment we suggest for Western Europe would probably

be inappropriate for Japan. Under U.S. dictation Japan abjured the national right to maintain "war potential," and even today there is broad-based hostility to a military role for the nation. But the Japanese could still be pressured firmly if gradually, as they have been for a number of years, to increase their defense expenditures and responsibilities, especially in the fields of air defense and anti-submarine warfare. There should be no reason why Japan cannot eventually assume almost total responsibility for these latter areas of its own defense.

Another major U.S. political objective in the Pacific area has been the maintenance of a non-hostile relationship with China. This objective, too, there appears no reason to change. The danger to U.S. interests if China should patch up its relations with the Soviet Union, and the value of China as a counterweight to the Soviet Union and a means of tying down Soviet military forces, are such that the United States will no doubt go to great lengths to assure the status quo in these matters. By the same token, minor differences over the status of Taiwan will probably not be allowed to compromise the U.S.-Chinese relationship. On the other hand, the internal Chinese political situation is still unstable, and the United States has little to gain either by establishing too intimate a relationship or by encouraging Chinese military bellicosity toward the Soviet Union.

The United States might, however, encourage a closer economic and political relationship between China and Japan. In the process, Chinese internal economic difficulties might be to some extent alleviated, and the two countries might over the years gradually assume a larger role in countering Soviet power in Asia. Moreover, to the extent that China and Japan came to take on a larger defense role in the Pacific, they might be encouraged to develop a more cooperative relationship

with South Korea in assuring the latter's defense. Such an objective is clearly well down the road at the moment, however. Korean memories of Japanese conquest are still too recent for any close association in this respect. In the meanwhile, Japanese confidence in U.S. protection must in no way be weakened, and the process of gradual pressure to assume a larger role in their own defense should undoubtedly be continued.

One U.S. political objective in the Pacific area which might be changed somewhat, or at least incrementally developed, involves the U.S. relationship with the ASEAN nations. Since the days of SEATO in the 1950s, it has been a U.S. objective to maintain the security and stability of the non-Communist nations of Southeast Asia. After the failure in the Vietnam War, and announcement of the Nixon Doctrine, the United States pursued a policy supporting the growth and unity of ASEAN, partly to balance regional Communist pressures with indigenous capabilities, and partly to promote Western and Japanese access to the area's resources, markets, and the all-important straits linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Future U.S. political and defense relations with ASEAN might well be strengthened, to the extent feasible, with the twin objectives of both constraining Soviet influence in the area and further encouraging the region's basic sympathies toward the West. Several years hence, it could well be a U.S. objective to secure use of the naval facilities at Singapore. Singapore is, of course, potentially one of the great naval bases of the world, and its utilization by the United States would not only protect the Straits of Malacca but move U.S. carriers and other naval support more than 1500 miles closer (than Subic Bay) to the Persian Gulf--an area where U.S. military bases are highly unlikely and might, as we have noted, even be counterproductive.

F. SOUTH ASIA

Regarding U.S. political objectives in South Asia, there is probably not a great deal that can usefully be said at the moment. Most of the region is either resistant to, or insulated from, Western influence, and appears to be largely obsessed with its own internal problems. The dominant country by far is India, and the potential for change, either for better or worse, in U.S.-Indian relations for the foreseeable future does not seem to be high. While India is still a democracy, and not a Soviet satellite, its leadership has usually had a strong underlying element of anti-Americanism in its makeup, and it has made a practice for many years of staying on friendly terms with the Soviet Union. Essentially, the Indians do not trust the Western nations, especially Britain and the United States, and they see in Soviet support a means of keeping all the great powers guessing--including China, their major rival for power in the region. India has daunting internal social, economic, and political problems, and alongside these all international problems pale, so long as the great powers can be kept at a distance.

The other major countries in the South Asian sub-continent--Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka--also appear to offer little opportunity or potential return at the moment for a change in U.S. political objectives pertaining to them. Indeed, there probably are no sharply focused U.S. political objectives in regard to these countries. For the foreseeable future Afghanistan will probably have to continue through its travail of Soviet occupation, and will either emerge as a full-fledged Soviet satellite or prolong more or less indefinitely its guerrilla resistance. In either case there is not a great deal the United States can do, other than perhaps to encourage Afghan resistance through indirect support of the guerrillas. The other three countries are largely preoccupied

with internal problems and by their relationship to India, and show little receptivity to Western overtures. Pakistan, especially, suffered grievously during the period when it attempted to play on the fringes of the great power league, losing two wars to India and undergoing national dismemberment. Now the Pakistanis appear more introvertive, suspicious, and uncertain in their international relationships, and if anything seem to be pursuing a more obscurantist and even romantic foreign policy, seeking national salvation through closer Islamic ties and an atomic bomb of their own. All things considered, the openings, or rewards, for imaginative U.S. foreign policy objectives in this entire area do not appear attractive.

G. AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA

The two remaining areas of the world, Africa south of the Sahara and Latin America, appear to pose a less immediate problem for U.S. policy, when considered on the strategic scale we have utilized in looking at Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific. Effective and long-lasting Soviet penetration of either region appears both less likely, because of the distances from the U.S.S.R., and less critical for U.S. interests, because of the relatively lower immediate impact upon U.S. security. True, the Soviets have been able to chalk up successes in both Africa and Latin America. In the former, Ethiopia is at present firmly in the Soviet camp, and Angola and Mozambique are ruled by Marxist Soviet-sympathizers. A guerrilla war goes on, however, in both Ethiopia and Angola, and all three countries have formidable internal political and economic problems. In the remainder of sub-Saharan Africa, the Soviet record has been very spotty, and not particularly successful. They have been thrown out of several countries, and in the remainder appear to be treading rather carefully.

In Latin America, Cuba stands as the outstanding example of a Communist Soviet satellite. Leftish revolutionaries are also

active in many other countries of the region, especially some of the Caribbean islands. Only in Nicaragua, however, are such elements in control of the government, and even there they appear to be still vulnerable to U.S. economic pressure. The chances of a Soviet Communist satellite surviving for many years on the mainland of either Central or South America have historically not been good. They probably are still not high, when one considers such a regime's potential vulnerability, first, to internal coup-makers, second, to overthrow from neighboring countries, and third, in the last resort to U.S. military or covert intervention.

Still, it is conceivable that the Soviets might make major political and military inroads in either Africa or Latin America if they gave these regions high priority and perhaps made maximum utilization of their Cuban, East German, and other bloc surrogates. If such a situation should begin to develop, the United States would be faced with a clear choice of alternative policy objectives for these areas. On the one hand, currently friendly governments might be shored up by all political, economic, and military means, and the United States might involve itself deeply in the affairs of these countries in an effort to assure both the retention of power by its friends and their maximum cooperation in resisting Soviet moves in the area. On the other hand, the United States might continue its previous policies of trusting chiefly to indigenous forces to resist Communist infiltration, and of assisting friendly regimes politically and economically while maintaining a low U.S. profile in the actual affairs of the countries. There would also, of course, be a range of U.S. policy choices between these two alternatives. At the present moment, the Soviet threat in Africa and Latin America does not appear comparable to that in the Middle East, Europe, or the Pacific, but changes could occur that might begin to alter this assessment.

IV. ALTERNATIVE U.S. POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND KEY ISSUES INVOLVED IN MAKING CHOICES AMONG THEM

The preceding discussion was designed to illuminate the nature of some of the alternative choices that might be made regarding U.S. political objectives in the world. While the paper takes a position as to the desirability of some of these choices, it is recognized that this position is subject to question and possible rebuttal. We now wish to broaden our investigation of U.S. political objectives, therefore, by indicating more systematically something of the range of choices the United States faces--first in Europe, then successively in the Middle East, the Pacific, South Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Our purpose is to highlight the kinds of political decisions that will ultimately determine the structure and functions of U.S. forces worldwide, and to suggest some of the considerations that must be explored in making these decisions.

For each of the geographic areas noted above we list some "Alternative U.S. Political Objectives," "Key Issues Involved in Choosing Among Alternatives," and then "Additional Research Areas" that might be pursued by anyone (possibly, though not necessarily, IDA) wishing to explore these issues more deeply. We make no pretense that the "Alternative Political Objectives" listed are all-inclusive; the "Key Issues" and "Additional Research Areas" similarly make no presumption of exhausting all possibilities. It should be borne in mind, moreover, that any of the "Alternative Political Objectives" listed could be implemented partially, and also that elements of two or more might be combined in actual practice.

Both the "Key Issues" and "Additional Research Areas" should be read cumulatively from one alternative political objective to the next; in other words, items that might be pertinent to two or more objectives are not repeated after the first mention, in the interest of simplicity. Also, in some cases there is not a great deal of difference in the level of specificity between items listed under "Key Issues" and those in "Additional Research Areas." Both columns should be treated as potential research areas. Table 1 lays out some alternative U.S. political objectives, key issues involved in making choices among them, and potential research areas.

The question might be raised of just how a choice of different U.S. political objectives--say, among those listed in Table 1--might affect the U.S. military posture. How might weapons systems, strategy and tactics, force size and composition, military deployments, etc. vary with different objectives? It would appear that so long as we consider only reasonable alternatives, such as those below, the changes in major U.S. weapons systems would probably be minimal--for example, ICBMs and SLBMs would undoubtedly still be required, the strategy of nuclear deterrence would probably still be valid, U.S. naval strategy would not change substantially, a U.S. capability to fight a major war in Europe would still be required, etc. Force deployments might of course be different; force size and composition, and numbers of specific weapons, might also vary with different political objectives. But in the main, changes in U.S. political objectives would very likely have a greater effect upon force utilization than upon the actual character of the forces, since the mix of U.S. world objectives at any one time is always so diverse that changes in them would usually require military capabilities just as diverse as before. In short, for a world power like the United States, flexibility in military capabilities is indispensable for the accomplishment of its multifarious objectives. Indeed, the more precisely the United States

Table 1. ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES, KEY ISSUES AND ADDITIONAL RESEARCH AREAS

EUROPE AND MEDITERRANEAN

ALTERNATIVE US POLITICAL OBJECTIVES	KEY ISSUES INVOLVED IN CHOOSING AMONG ALTERNATIVES	ADDITIONAL RESEARCH AREAS
Continuation of present objectives in NATO, maintaining US dominance of Alliance for indefinite future.	•Is it practicable for US to sustain its current level of responsibility for European defense, along with its other responsibilities? •To what extent can US count on additional help from its allies, particularly those in Europe, in carrying out its defense responsibilities outside Europe? •Can the US count on continuing indefinitely its current domination of the NATO policymaking process, in view of the widening rifts between US and West European attitudes toward, for example, detente and the Arab Israeli conflict?	•What is a reasonable picture of projected US worldwide defense requirements? •What specific forces might the US be able to count on from the Europeans, say in the Indian Ocean? The Mediterranean? Other areas? What from the Japanese? What from other regional powers, say in Southeast Asia or Latin America? •Are there approaches to Reserve Forces Training, operations, longevity, activation, etc. which might allow for vastly different Active/Reserve mix than we presently have and yet permit greater force capability on short notice than at present, allowing us to maintain our present commitments and add others?
Maintenance of US leadership in NATO as long as necessary, but encouraging European assumption of responsibility in specific areas where feasible.	•In what additional NATO areas would it be reasonable to expect Europeans to take on additional responsibilities? •What should be the US policy toward independent European nuclear forces? Should they be encouraged? And assisted? What should be the role of the FRG in this respect? •Suppose there is no disposition on the part of the Europeans to pick up any additional responsibilities; would this affect the US objective?	•What would be the military practicability of some of the current European proposals for increased reliance on reserve force? •If, because of economic problems, the Europeans are unable to devote more resources to defense, are there changes in NATO tactics, organization, command & control, logistics, and other areas which might strengthen the European defense capability? •What kinds of procedures (if any) for improved planning, coordination, and control of a US-led "European nuclear deterrent" force might it be useful to establish?
Official change of US political objective to that of a unified Europe having primary responsibility for its own defense, but with gradual implementation over time.	•What would be the political impact within Europe of such a change in official US policy? •What would be the effect upon Soviet policies? •What are the alternative political and military institutions or institutional links that might form the building blocks of a confederal Western Europe? How likely are these to evolve, given the current and projected environment? •Can viable defense arrangements for NATO be developed, assuming a reduced US role? •Is it reasonable even to contemplate a continued US nuclear commitment to Europe, without direct control by the US over NATO-European policy toward the Soviet Union? •As a corollary to the above, can US control of escalation to TN warfare and strategic warfare be maintained in war, with a greatly reduced US military and political influence during peacetime?	•What changes might implementation of this objective entail in NATO command & control, deployments, tactics, etc.? •What requirements for additional air and sea lift and sea control arise from reduced in-theater presence of US troops? Do these increased requirements offset the reductions anticipated, i.e., is there a net gain or loss to the US taxpayer in the change in military presence in Europe, assuming a fixed commitment of forces some defined time after mobilization begins? •Would a reduction in US military influence in the alliance tend to increase or decrease our armament-related technology exchanges with our allies, increase or decrease our industrial capabilities or that of our allies and therefore improve or hinder our individual or collective security with respect to the USSR and its Eastern European allies?

MIDDLE EAST

Special US relationship with former key countries--Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia.	•What would be impact on US longer-term objectives (e.g., stable Arab-Israel peace, oil availability, etc.) of US increased support for these countries? •Is a US objective of supporting this group of countries internally consistent? In other words, would simultaneous US support of Israel/Egypt and Saudi Arabia/Jordan be politically feasible? •Would US interests in the Middle East be adequately protected, even if the objective were successfully accomplished? •Should US special relationship with, say, Saudi Arabia be carried to the point of military support against internal revolt? Would such support be politically and militarily practicable?	•What would be some feasible military expressions of "increased support" by the US for this group of key countries? •What is political likelihood of actual US bases in these countries, and what would be political impact of securing them? •What would be US defense capabilities against Soviet attack, assuming various base structures, degrees of readiness, scenarios, etc.?
Strengthened Israel/Egypt axis as primary defense of US interests in Middle East, and deemphasis on relations with "rejectionist" countries--Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan.	•Can US interests in rest of Middle East--especially Persian Gulf--be adequately protected by such a policy? Suppose Saudi Arabia is increasingly alienated by it? •Is political future of Egypt sufficiently secure to make such a policy attractive? •Is Israeli policy sufficiently under US control to prevent major damage to US interests by Israeli actions in pursuit of their interests?	•What would be in-area military requirements (bases, logistical support, etc.) to effectuate such a policy? Are these politically feasible? •How would the US respond, say, to a Soviet threat in the Persian Gulf area, with Israel and Egypt as its primary allies? •What would be US options if, and when, the Arabs (e.g., Iraq) develop an atomic bomb?
Assured US access to oil fields, by force if necessary.	•Can US physically assure access to the oil fields, in the face of indigenous military resistance, sabotage, etc.? •What would be the political impact of such US actions? In the Middle East? Europe? Soviet Union? Elsewhere? How might this affect US ability to carry out its objective?	•What would be military requirements to enforce US access to oil fields against wishes of host country? •Could US respond adequately to a simultaneous Soviet threat, either (a) in support of the country attacked by the SU or (b) elsewhere in the area? How?
Primary emphasis on US relations with major oil-producing countries.	•What level of US support for the oil-producing countries is likely to be required in order to maintain good relations with them? •Is it feasible to carry out such a policy without having US interests become hostage to the demands of particular ruling groups? •Is such a policy consistent with the US commitment to Israel? •How likely is it that Israel can retain its current military dominance? For how long? What are chief factors affecting this?	•Assuming US need for a capability to deploy forces into an area whose government was friendly, but where there were few, if any, prepared facilities, what kinds of specific requirements would this entail for US combat equipment, logistics, communications, command & control, transport, etc.? •Of such requirements, which can be met by current US equipment? How and when could other requirements be met? •What kinds of operations are feasible in the meanwhile? To what extent would this intermediate level of capability permit accomplishment of US objectives?

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PACIFIC

ALTERNATIVE US POLITICAL OBJECTIVES	KEY ISSUES INVOLVED IN CHOOSING AMONG ALTERNATIVES	ADDITIONAL RESEARCH AREAS
Continuation of current political objectives in Pacific (re Japan, China, etc.).	•Are current US political objectives adequate for protection of US interests, in view of increased Soviet threat in Pacific, and changing world situation elsewhere?	•Are available US resources adequate to support current US political objectives in the Pacific? •What is US offensive capability against Vladivostok, Sakhalin, Kamchatka, etc., and also US ASW capability, in event of war? •What are current US alternative capabilities of supporting forces in Indian Ocean and Middle East from Subic Bay, Singapore, Australia, etc.?
Assumption by Japan of much larger defense role.	•In what defense areas, functionally and geographically, should Japan take on a larger responsibility? •Is it politically realistic, from a standpoint of domestic Japanese politics, to plan for a much larger defense role by Japan in the near future? •What would be implications in the rest of Asia (e.g., South Korea, Southeast Asia, China) of Japan's assumption of a larger defense role? •What might be the implications for the US of a Japan that is considerably more powerful militarily?	•How should defense responsibilities in Northeast Asia be divided, and coordinated, with Japan assuming a much larger role? •What responsibilities, if any, might Japan assume in defense of Straits of Malacca? In Indian Ocean? •What new command & control and logistical support arrangements might be required? •Are there opportunities for rationalization and standardization of weapons and support that could be implemented early in the buildup phase of such a growing defense relationship?
Close military alliance with China.	•What would be impact on US-Soviet relations, and also on Japan, South Korea, and rest of Asia, of US-China military alliance? •Is future stability of China sufficiently assured to make such an alliance a reasonable consideration? •What would be approximate structure, and mutual responsibilities, of such an alliance?	•How would a US-China alliance be organizationally and functionally implemented? What would be the implications for defense planning, command & control, and logistical tasks? •How would nuclear defense be coordinated? •Would it be desirable to station any US forces in China? Under what conditions?
A revitalized SEATO (i.e., military defensive alliance with ASEAN countries of Southeast Asia).	•What is political likelihood of ASEAN countries joining with US in a defensive alliance? •What would be the benefits from such an alliance? The disadvantages?	•What should be US responsibilities in a Southeast Asian defense alliance? •What should be advantages and disadvantages, as well as political likelihood, of a US base at Singapore? Are there any feasible arrangements short of an outright basing agreement? •What is likelihood, and what would be defense capabilities of an ASEAN defense alliance with only a minimal US role?

SOUTH ASIA

Continuation of present rather generalized US objectives for South Asia.	•What are disadvantages of present course, and what are pressures for change? •What is nature of the Soviet threat in South Asia?	•What are US military capabilities for support of its current objectives in South Asia? Can these feasibly be augmented? How, when, and at what cost to objectives in other areas?
Rejuvenated defense alliance with Pakistan.	•What would be impact on rest of subcontinent, and especially India, of such a US course? •What would be implication of a rejuvenated US-Pakistan defense alliance for support of Afghan rebels? Would US be willing actively and overtly to begin resupplying and otherwise assisting rebels? •If Soviet forces invaded Pakistan in hot pursuit of rebels, would US assist Paks in repelling Soviets? •How would Pakistan's apparent plans to develop an "Islamic atomic bomb" (with suspected Libyan support) affect this US objective?	•How would US organize and carry out its support of Afghan resistance? •What would be US capabilities to assist Pakistan militarily against Soviet invasion? •If India insisted that Parkistan was rearming against her, and reacted by moving even closer to the Soviet Union, what would be US policy options?
Closer political, economic, and military relations with India.	•Would India be receptive to such an approach? On what likely terms? •What would the US gain from such a policy? What might it lose? •What would be impact on Pakistan? On China?	•What kinds of specific returns should US seek to gain from India? Use of naval facilities? Active Indian support against Soviets? Are favorable Indian responses on such matters likely? •At what point would US support of India compromise the US relationship with China? How might this problem be resolved? •If Pakistan reacted by moving closer to Soviet Union, what would be effect on US objectives in the area?

AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA

Friendly relations with majority of black African regimes, and deemphasis on relations with South Africa.	•Since such a policy would entail a generally hands-off US attitude toward internal African affairs, would this be sufficient to repel threat of Soviet subversion and takeover? •How serious is the Soviet threat in Africa South of Sahara? •What are US interests in Africa South of Sahara? How important are these interests, both to the US and to prevent Soviet exploitation of them? •How would US respond to black African pressures to ostracize and otherwise weaken white regime in South Africa?	•What mineral and other resources, strategic locations, etc. constitute major interests of the US in Africa? How important are they and for what? •Specifically what is the nature of the Soviet threat to these interests? What is the historical record of Soviet efforts in this respect? What appears to be the trend at present?
Active support of anti-Soviet elements and regimes in Africa South of Sahara.	(Some key issues pertinent here are listed above [e.g., nature of Soviet threat, importance of US interests, etc.] and will not be repeated.) •What would be overall impact in Africa of such a US policy? On balance, would it be likely to strengthen defenses of region against Soviet subversion, or might it be counterproductive and alienate most of black African regimes, rendering them susceptible to Soviet overtures? •If active intervention of US military forces appeared indicated to support the objective, should US pursue this option? What would be impact within rest of Africa? In domestic US?	•What kinds of US forces might be needed to intervene in African internal conflicts? Would they be similar to RDF forces in Middle East? How would they be organized, trained, logistically supported, and transported? What would be the overall command & control arrangements?

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LATIN AMERICA

ALTERNATIVE US POLITICAL OBJECTIVES	KEY ISSUES INVOLVED IN CHOOSING AMONG ALTERNATIVES	ADDITIONAL RESEARCH AREAS
Encouragement of political democracy economic progress for mass of people, and respect for human rights, through use of US political and economic leverage.	•Would policies in support of such an objective be sufficient to prevent leftist and Soviet incursions, and possibly takeovers, in vulnerable regimes? •Would it be in US interest, in pursuit of such a policy, to permit authoritarian but anti-Communist regimes to fall to revolutionary forces? •Is there reasonable hope that this policy might accomplish its objectives?	•What is historical record of US efforts to encourage political and economic democracy in Latin America? •What is nature of Soviet threat to Latin America? Which countries are most susceptible to violent upheaval and influence from Soviet and Cuban sources?
Generally friendly, but hands-off, relations with all Latin American regimes, regardless of their political orientation.	(Some of issues listed above are pertinent here, and will not be repeated.) •Might a policy of friendly but hands-off US relations with authoritarian regimes stimulate growth of revolutionary forces and make these regimes more susceptible to eventual overthrow?	•Are there methods of encouraging cooperation among Latin American states, and thus perhaps strengthening indigenous resistance to Soviet and leftist subversion?
Active political, economic, and military support of anti-Soviet, anti-revolutionary forces and regimes, without regard for their attitudes toward democracy and human rights.	•What is the long-term likelihood of such a policy accomplishing its objectives? •What would be the impact in other Latin American countries of such a US policy? Impact in US? •If active intervention of US military forces appeared indicated to support the objective, should US pursue this option?	•How might US military and economic assistance best be organized to help threatened regimes resist subversion and overthrow? •What kinds of US forces might be needed to intervene in Latin American internal conflicts? How should they be organized, trained, logistically supported, and transported? What would be the overall command & control arrangements? •Is there a role for naval forces in the protection of Central and South American countries from imported violence?

might tailor its forces for specific contingencies, the more it might run the risk of costly misjudgments.

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V. THE ROLE OF DOD ORGANIZATION AND PROCESS IN SHAPING MILITARY POSTURE

All the factors previously discussed come to bear upon the organization directly responsible for the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. The provision of men and equipment to provide a military posture requires a complex organization which must engage in a complex set of processes. That organization and its processes themselves shape posture in a number of ways. This chapter will consider how this influuence operates, primarily in the matter of resource allocation.

As the size and responsibilities of the DoD have grown, efforts, starting with the Hoover Commission of 1948, have attempted to deal with its organizational and procedural problems. Functional demands on the DoD have been conflicting: for example, the demands of civilian control and managerial efficiency may point in opposite directions, the former might require a single line of authority, while the latter might point towards multiple channels of authority and some confusion of authority and responsibility. Changes in the last 30 years in the name of managerial efficiency, civilian control, and other conflicting imperatives have left the DoD with its present complex organization.

The current strategy, supplemented by certain operational assumptions and threat assessments, implies certain general mission requirements which can, in turn, be narrowed to resource requirements. Each step, however, is subject to considerable argument with differences of opinion so that by the time defense posture is defined the relationship between defense and foreign policy is tenuous.

As illustrations, two major equipment areas are discussed in which the United States faces resource requirements problems and factors that may have contributed to those problems suggested. These areas are the modernization of the Army's ground force equipment and the Navy's shipbuilding program. The purpose of the discussion is to demonstrate that, although policy does affect defense spending, the inherent limitations in the policy process in turn limit the extent to which policy can affect the DoD.

A. THE IMPACT OF A COMPLEX ORGANIZATION

The DoD is charged with providing for the common defense, involving the management of several million military and civilian employees who develop and buy billions of dollars worth of equipments, operate them in peacetime, and fight with in war. The whole system is operated in a complex environment constrained by domestic considerations, such as the need for broad political support that provides a series of annual budgets. The funds from those budgets must attract people, at reasonable wage rates, and contractors to provide the $150 billion of goods and services every year.

The nature of the bureaucracy to handle the problem of providing defense has changed and has become more complex as demands have grown. Demands for efficiency and for a centralized military structure led to formation of the Department of Defense to oversee the individual Services and to formalization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There were, in the resource management area, certain minimal requirements of the bureaucracy: a comptroller to put together an annual budget, someone designated to carry out the research and development and the acquisition of equipment, an organizational unit to acquire and train people, and an operational military command to receive the men and equipment and to use them as a fighting force. In the military planning arena, the role of the JCS was enhanced. Rather than

being supported by committees from the Services, they were given a separate Joint Staff.

Until the mid 1950s, except for budgeting, all the above functions were still performed by the individual Services. But as time passed more and more functions were centralized.* After the Sputnik crisis, a perceived neglect of technology and duplication of programs by the Services led to the upgrading of the function of technology, from an advisory group to central manager in charge of the R&D program. Because uniform regulations were thought to be necessary for manpower and for procurement, managers and staffs within OSD were given the job of making that uniform policy. There has been a fine line between a staff in OSD whose function is to establish a uniform policy for the Services, acting as staff to the Secretary, and a line organization that would tell the Services what to do. Since the DoD was formed in the late 1940s, OSD line responsibilities did increase through the 1950s and 1960s.

Because it was thought necessary, both for institutional reasons and for fighting efficiency, to separate the operational commands from the Service staffs, the unified and specified commands were reorganized in the late '50s to report to the Secretary through the JCS. Service staffs that provided the people and equipment continued to report to the Service secretaries. The Service staffs and bureaus became providers of equipment, while the operational commanders became consumers. Again there is a question about whether the separation really

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*This simplified description of organization changes is drawn from a book published by the Office of the OSD Historian. See Alice C. Cole, Alfred Goldberg, Samuel A. Tucker, and Rudolf A. Winnacker, *The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978*, Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, Washington, D.C., 1978. The book contains the complete description of the changes in DoD organization since World War II, including the legislative background.

exists within the Services. It is probably the case that it exists more in some areas and less in others.

In the early 1960s, for reasons of efficiency, DoD-wide agencies were formed to evaluate intelligence, provide equipment, manage supplies, manage nuclear weapons, etc. These agencies perform a function which is similar to the Service staffs in providing support to the operational commanders in one way or another.

A complex bureaucracy now exists with four kinds of functions: DoD-wide staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to make uniform policy, DoD-wide agencies to be central managers of certain support functions, the Service staffs and bureaus to provide planning and support including weapons development, and finally the unified and specified commands to command the forces.

Due to the very nature of bureaucracies and to the incentives that have been built into this particular bureaucracy, individuals and organizational units are led to behave in ways which at times may be detrimental to the whole. Their incentives are to support Service or branch policy. Since these contradictions cannot be entirely eliminated, the challenge facing a reformer of the DoD or national security organization is to design a bureaucracy, including a structure and set of incentives, that minimizes these problems to a reasonable degree.

B. BUDGET, PROGRAM, AND ACQUISITION SYSTEMS

The debates of the last five years have underscored the importance of the defense budget as a political document. It has served, to some people, as a symbol of too much concentration on defense, of control of the political process by a military-industrial complex, and of the inability to control a spendthrift military. On the other side, the defense budget has been seen as a symbol for declining U.S. power in the world,

of a new softness in American society and lack of resolve in the world, and as a victim of excesses of Presidents and Congresses of the past 15 or so years in over-expanding government programs in domestic areas. Although these accusations are certainly exaggerated, they have served to focus attention on the defense budget and its significance in determining national security policy and posture.

Unfortunately, focusing of that attention and political debate on a series of annual budgets, examined one at a time, has served to distort the debate. Because weapons take so long to develop and produce and have such a long life span, the current U.S. posture was largely determined in the 1960s. Current decisions are determining not the force of 1981, as many in the administration, the Congress, and media suggest, but the force of the mid and late 1990s.

This is not to say that nothing can be done about the 1980s, but that what can be done is limited. Thus the capability or readiness of the existing fleet of ships, aircraft, and tanks can be influenced, although only in limited ways, for even the next few years. Increases in operating funds for training and spare parts will not increase readiness for several years. The situation is not symmetrical--forcing the military to save funds (outlays) in the very short run can be done only by cutting back on operating funds which can cause things to get worse very quickly.

Thus in a single year little can be done to influence the total capability of the DoD to support national policy. Accomplishing significant change is a longer run proposition, two or three years for improving readiness of weapons already in the force and 10 to 20 years in other cases. Even under full mobilization drastic increases in production would take several years. From the presidential decision to rearm the

nation at the outbreak of World War II to the peak production was five years.*

A single defense budget cannot be a major influence on the U.S. military posture, at least within a wide range, nor can it serve as guidepost or explanation of our military posture. Rather it is the decisions of the programming system and acquisition process which could, because of their influence over a number of years, change in a significant way U.S. military posture. At the same time, a series of annual budgets can and often does influence military posture by undermining or at least modifying the decisions that result from the programming and acquisition systems.

The programming system is ostensibly the bridge between long-run considerations and the annual budget. The DoD programming process operates on an annual cycle which generates a five-year resource program and eight years of forces. It is generated in a series of steps that begin with the issuance of DoD guidance covering five-year spending totals, measured in TOA, and strategic guidance which is supposed to tell the Services the foreign policy goals to be supported. Usually specific issues involving major force and support issues are also raised, but consideration is not usually aimed at solving in an orderly way the long-run problems of DoD force posture. Instead, these issues are frequently focused on the coming budget, and are the result of items raised in the past year's review.

The acquisition process is a separate process that begins with the earliest conceptual phases of looking at new weapon

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*Production of aircraft was as follows: 1939-5,856; 1940-12,804; 1941-26,277; 1942-47,836; 1943-85,898; 1944-96,318; 1945-49,761. From Irving Brinton Holley, Jr., *United States in World War II, Special Studies:* "Buying Aircraft: Matéeriel Procurement for the Army Air Forces" (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1964) p. 548.

system requirements through development to the acquisition of major weapons. Every weapon that will result in development spending of over $200 million in R&D or $1 billion in procurement costs (both expressed in fiscal year 1980 dollars) is given special treatment, which includes both a standard set of program review papers and meetings of most of the senior DoD officials in the Defense System Review Acquisition Council (DSARC). These meetings are for the purpose of approving higher and higher levels of commitment, ending the consideration of whether a system should go into production.*

Each of these three systems--the budgeting, programming, and acquisition--is managed by a different bureaucratic entity within OSD. Although the Secretary of Defense ultimately has responsibility and approves budgets, FYDP, and DSARC decisions, the three systems have been allowed to operate independently. These problems occur because the budgeting, programming, and acquisition systems all serve different purposes.**

The OSD Comptroller is responsible for putting together a budget for the President to submit to Congress. It must fit in with the administration fiscal policy and must, eventually, be acceptable to Congress. A single year is too short a time to plan resources in an orderly way. The programming system managed by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) has as its purpose developing a balance over a five-year period. Indeed, justification for the budget before Congress includes considerable detail from the

*The recent changes in the system decrease the number of reviews in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 4 to 2, but preserve the essentials of the system, with reviews continuing in the Services. See Carlucci, Frank C., "Improving the Acquisition System," Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments and Others, April 30, 1981, p. 4, and Attachment 2, "Recommendations," pp. 27-33.

**As will be discussed later, this is one of the issues addressed in the Carlucci memo cited above.

associated "balanced" Five-Year Defense Program. Finally, the acquisition system is managed by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and is aimed at review of individual weapons for technical feasibility, military need, producibility, and other characteristics. Although "affordability" is supposed to be considered, it is not clear how it can be considered independent of the calculation of the cost of the total program.

Thus three separate bureaucracies are responsible for these three necessary tasks: producing an annual budget, producing a balanced long-range resource program, and reviewing the acquisition of individual weapons. They tend to be coordinated in a somewhat haphazard way despite repeated attempts to change and reform the system over the last 20 years. As long as the processes are kept separate and the Secretary gives himself maximum "flexibility" at each stage, treating prior decisions as if they were someone else's rather than his own, it is unlikely that the processes can be better coordinated.*

The most recent attempt at reform adopted by the new Administration for the PPB and acquisition process ties the acquisition process more closely to the PPBS "by providing that programs reviewed by the DSARC will be accompanied by assurance that sufficient...resources [are available]." Whether this will be successful remains to be seen.**

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*Rice, Donald R., *The Defense Resource Management Study, Final Report*. This report, requested by the President and submitted to the Secretary of Defense, February 1979, and commonly known as "The Rice Report," recognizes the problems and recommends a reduction in flexibility. The incremental nature of the process would be recognized as explicit rather than treating each year's consolidated guidance as if it were something new.

**Carlucci, op. cit., pp. 4 and 34-35.

C. TWO EXAMPLES

Some of these policy and bureaucratic problems can be illustrated by contrasting two areas of spending: one, land forces procurement that has been influenced by the NATO emphasis of national policy in the early 1970s and, two, shipbuilding procurement which has been allowed to flounder because of lack of consensus on how it fits into national policy. The cases exemplify the interaction of policy, bureaucracy, and process that can influence overall posture.

In the one case, the Army followed policy by orienting itself to a NATO war. At the same time, the Army has been allowed to develop a large number of systems without regard to the total cost or the timing of these systems. This appears to result from the operation of the Army bureaucracy which requires modern weapons in each of its major branches. Similarly, the Navy follows a shipbuilding program which emphasizes the three major combat branches and their preferences for highly capable and expensive ships. This approach overcommits its budget while cutting back on support ships and on land-based and other alternatives that might accomplish Navy missions more efficiently.*

1. Modernization of Army Equipment

Land forces modernization is an area in which policy has dictated substantial increases since the mid 1970s and, in fact, substantial relative increases. Comparing Army General Purpose spending, both total and procurement, with other categories of General Purpose spending, we see dramatic increases. Army General Purpose spending has increased in real terms by 48.4 percent in six years, or 6.8 percent annually (see Table 2).

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*For a discussion of these alternatives, see Herschel Kanter, "The Fleet for the 21st Century: At a Fork in the Road," *National Defense*, February 1981, pp. 36-39 and 65-67.

Table 2. DOD SPENDING 1975 AND 1981
(TOA in 1971 Dollars)

Program	1975	1981	Percent Increase	Annual Rate of Growth
General Purpose				
Army	12.4	18.4	48.4	6.8
Navy	21.5	27.3	27.0	4.1
Air Force	9.3	12.8	37.6	5.5
Other	0.0	0.1	--	--
Total GP	43.2	58.5	35.4	5.2
Other	90.6	100.2	10.6	1.7
Total DoD	133.8	158.7	18.6	2.9

Source: OASD (Comptroller), no title, printout of Defense Budget 1945-1981 by program and appropriation category, February 1, 1980.

Table 3. GENERAL PURPOSE PROCUREMENT SPENDING 1975 AND 1981
(TOA in 1981 Dollars)

Category	1975	1981	Percent Increase	Annual Rate of Growth
Army	2.3	6.3	174	18.3
Other	14.4	21.3	48	6.7
Total	16.7	27.6	65	8.7

Source: Same as Table 2.

Navy and Air Force figures are 27.0 and 37.6 percent, with annual increases correspondingly lower. Army General Purpose Procurement has grown in real terms from $2.3 billion in 1975 to $6.3 billion in 1981, an increase of 174 percent--an annual rate of 18.3 percent, compared to an increase of 48 percent for all other procurement (see Table 3). This buildup and modernization of Army forces was initiated by the recognition that while the United States had been distracted by Vietnam from its focus on the NATO commitment the U.S.S.R. was modernizing its

European forces at a rather rapid rate. The DoD was clearly following policy with this buildup.

But such guidance did not dictate how far or how fast this modernization should go. Other considerations are also important. Army doctrine, the pace of technology, the neglect of Army development during Vietnam, and budget considerations have all led the Army to its present situation. The Army is now committed to introducing 10 significant and expensive weapon systems in the early 1980s (see Table 4).

Table 4. NEW ARMY SYSTEMS PROCUREMENT, 1979-1982
(Dollars in Millions)

Weapon	1979	1980	1981	1982	Approximate IOC
Tank, XM1	373	648	1,032	1,005	1981
Helicopter, ATK	0	0	50	399	1982
Hellfire	0	0	21	123	1981
FVS, Vehicle	39	225	404	542	1981
General Support Rocket System	0	62	114	150	1981
Stinger	105	81	71	169	1979
Roland	165	283	367	500	1981
Patriot	67	396	470	575	1981
Divad	0	0	183	413	1982
Blackhawk, UH60A	359	355	298	358	1979
TOTAL	1,108	2,020	3,070	4,234	

Source: *The Army Budget: Fiscal Year 1981*, Office of the Army Comptroller, January 1980, p. 22.

The Army modernization program is thus one in which policy, i.e., emphasis on NATO forces, has dictated the pace of the process. However, the simultaneous development of an almost complete line of weapons, perhaps based on a compromise among the infantry, armor, artillery, air defense, and aviation

interests, has brought the Army up against annual budget limitations.* Another plausible explanation not inconsistent with the competition of the various branches is that neglect of Army modernization for 10 years left a situation in which every combat arm indeed had a legitimate claim on the Army's modernization budget.

The recent Reagan Administration budget increases may allow the Army to buy all these systems and introduce them at a reasonable rate. On the other hand, early indications are that all the Services, including the Army, have already pushed up to these new budget levels. Preliminary estimates for the 1983 budget, for example, had Army aircraft and missile procurement at $5.9 billion, up from $4.6 billion in the Reagan 1982 program.** The attempt to add two more Army divisions to the force by the mid 1980s should make the problem even more severe.***

We can trace, in rough terms, how Army spending has followed the pattern of events (see Figure 1). When spending fell following World War II, dropping to almost a tenth of the 1945 figure, Army procurement fell from $70 billion (in 1981 dollars) to slightly more than $0.2 billion. The swings in response to the Korean war, the new look of the 1950s, the buildup for flex-

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*An excellent study which documents internal Army competition is *The Army Gets an Air Force: Tactics of Insurgent Bureaucratic Politics*, by Frederic A. Bergerson, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Md., 1980.

In the 1950s, the Army also pushed technology, perhaps too hard. They added the Hawk air defense system, M-60 tank, M-113 armored infantry vehicle, Huey and Chinook helicopters, M-14 rifle, 8-inch and 175 mm guns, and several rocket and missile systems. They may have been saved by the buildup in the early McNamara years or perhaps high technology in the 1950s was, for the Army, less of a jump than high technology in the 1970s.

**See "FY '82-83 Army Procurement Funding," *Defense Daily*, March 30, 1981, p. 174.

***The Army hopes to increase by 96,000 men above its current (1981) level by 1987. See "Army Hints Draft May Be Required," *Washington Post*, July 9, 1981, p. A1.



Figure 1. DEFENSE SPENDING, 1945-1981
(TOA in 1981 Dollars)

ible response in the early 1960s, and the Vietnam war are all there. The marginal spending due to Vietnam estimated by the DoD is shown in Figure 1. We see that current spending levels for Army procurement are now climbing at a rapid rate, a rate well above the Army non-Vietnam procurement levels of the late 1960s. Army spending, as contrasted with posture, appears on an aggregate basis to have followed national policy since World War II. Controlling the development of specific weapons or of the Army posture so that policy is followed is much more difficult than using policy to guide aggregate spending. Indeed, it may be impossible to exercise such control and may not in some cases even be desirable.

2. The Shipbuilding Program

Naval force levels were set in the 1950s more on the basis of assets remaining from World War II than on the threat of the then relatively weak Soviet Navy. Ship force levels have dropped from 924 in 1969 to 462 in 1979, with the number expected to rise to perhaps 500 in the 1980s. This decline has resulted primarily from the dramatic increase in the cost of ships combined with the retirement of ships built during World War II.

Thus the DoD has been unable to replace ships on a one-for-one basis without a dramatic increase in spending. Whether or not replacement on a one-for-one basis would be desirable is open to argument either way. What is clear is that the option to maintain world coverage has declined at the same time that the Soviet fleet has become increasingly aggressive in its role of coercive diplomacy.

The added expense of individual ships has been due in part to substantially increased capability. At the same time, ship costs have risen, in real terms, more rapidly than any other type of major weapon system. Shipbuilding costs have grown at a rate of 6.43 percent per year since 1950 and are--for equal capability--almost seven times as expensive as 1950, compared

for example to 4.08 percent for aircraft. The corresponding average figures for all procurement were a 4.23-percent growth rate, resulting in costs 3.6 times as large in 1981 as they were in 1950 (see Table 5).

Table 5. SELECTED DOD INFLATION FACTORS[1] TOA, 1950-1981

	1950	1981	Ratio 1981/1950	Annual Growth Rate
All DoD	21.39	100	4.68	5.10
R&D	24.23	100	4.13	4.68
All procurement	27.69	100	3.61	4.23
Shipbuilding	14.47	100	6.91	6.43
Aircraft[2]	29.02	100	3.45	4.08

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), "Department of Defense Deflators," January 28, 1980.

[1]These are the DoD deflators used to adjust DoD TOA to constant dollars. In principle they hold constant the quality of the output.

[2]Average of Navy and Air Force aircraft procurement.

However, other factors in addition to cost have held back the Navy's shipbuilding program. The Navy itself is composed of three communities--air, surface, and subsurface. Each has attempted to protect the ships it commands--aircraft carriers, major surface combatants, and submarines--by supporting the highest quality ship, assuming apparently that numbers of ships would be fixed to maintain balance within the Navy. Major Navy studies, such as Sea Plan 2000, opt for "balance: in the name of flexibility, where "balance" means a Navy containing ship types in numbers roughly proportional to today's mix.

Another factor influencing fleet size is that the shipbuilding program provides a good target for program budget cutters. The least expensive ship in the 1979-1983 program cost $27 million. Warships ranged in cost from $200 million up

to $1.5 billion. While it is usually difficult to find $200 million or more to cut from a program or budget that has already been reviewed at three or four levels, a single ship can indeed provide that much. The 1978 shipbuilding program contained from 3 to 15 major combatants in each of the five different five-year programs issued from January 1973 through January 1977 (see Table 6). The final number was 10, the number

Table 6. SHIPS IN 1978 SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM IN FIVE-YEAR PROGRAMS AS PROPOSED AND APPROVED

	Combatants	Total Ships
Lowest	3	17
Highest	15	34
Approved	10	18

Source: Naval Ship Procurement Process Study: Final Report, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Manpower Reserve Affairs and Logistics, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., July 1978, p. 54.

approved by Congress. The total number of ships in the five programs had ranged from 17 to 34, with 22 proposed in the budget and 18 finally approved by Congress. While budget or program decisions for a particular year may have little effect on short-term capability, such massive changes on every shipbuilding program will have a major impact on the long-term ability of the fleet to fulfill its mission.

Finally, the Navy shipbuilding program suffers from the fact that there continues to be major disagreement over the role of the Navy. Technological developments have had and are having a profound effect on the way we think about and use a Navy, and unfortunately there is no consensus on just what that effect is.

Since World War II the U.S. Navy has been built around two main ship types--the aircraft carrier and the nuclear submarine.

The nuclear submarine was truly a revolutionary weapon, and when combined with the ballistic missile gave the United States a secure retaliatory capability for its strategic forces. As a part of the General Purpose Forces, the hunter-killer submarine, i.e., an anti-submarine weapon, gave the United States a substantial lead in the submarine-anti-submarine race, one that is reinforced by constricted access of the Soviet Navy to the high seas.

The new large aircraft carrier, the Forrestal class, funded in the 1950s was built ostensibly to deliver nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. It required major surface escorts to protect it. Not long after the first one was completed, the carrier became obsolete for its original purpose. Manned bombers, land-based missiles, and submarine-launched carriers, all carrying thermonuclear weapons, dwarfed the destructive power of the smaller nuclear weapons on the aircraft carriers, all these other systems were considerably less vulnerable.

The aircraft carrier was used instead for tactical warfare in Vietnam, as it had been in Korea, and for peacetime presence and crisis control in other times and places. Most recently the Navy has advanced the argument that the carrier could be used in a non-nuclear war to strike naval air and submarine bases in the Soviet Union.* Because the aircraft carrier is again advanced as a weapon that can be used against the Soviet Union proper, the carrier must be protected by sophisticated anti-submarine and air defense systems to meet the threat of sophisticated air and undersea weapons that the Soviet Navy now possesses. The Navy is completing purchase of the DD-963 class anti-submarine destroyer to protect the carrier, and is now

*See Admiral Holloway, Chief of Naval Operations, in *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979*, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 95th Congress, 2nd Sess., Part 5, General Procurement, p. 4321. See also *Summary of Sea Plan 2000: Naval Force Planning Study*, Executive Summary, March 28, 1978, p. 15.

beginning a program to buy approximately $15 billion worth of Aegis guided missile cruisers for air defense, each ship costing $800 million. Thus the surface community will be taken care of. The Navy is also proposing that each carrier may need the protection of one or more of the Los Angeles class submarines costing $500 million each. In addition to its defensive role, the surface community is pushing for land attack cruise missiles aboard its cruisers and destroyers to provide offensive capability. There are also those outside the Navy who believe that Vertical or Short Take-off and Landing (V/STOL) aircraft are the wave of the future and that the large carrier should eventually be replaced by smaller carriers, with fixed-wing V/STOL aircraft spread throughout the fleet.

These factors and factions have contributed to the present status--a ship force level based on inherited assets, ship costs going up 50 percent faster than other weapons, three Navy branches supporting the most expensive of their own ship types, a budget review system that focuses easily on expensive ships, and, perhaps most important, a confusion of voices in Congress and the Executive Branch about the future role of the Navy. We now have a Navy whose composition through 1990 is largely determined and construction is proceeding on the Navy of the year 2000. There is still considerable disagreement, however, on the purposes that the Navy should serve and on what instruments are best for carrying out such purposes.

3. Summary

Thus, we see that DoD and the Army followed policy with respect to budget levels, but were unable to come to grips with what weapons might fit within budget limitations after weapons systems were developed. The Navy was less focused and, for bureaucratic reasons, has pursued the highly capable expensive weapons in each of its major missions while neglecting substitutes that might serve somewhat different purposes or that

might have served the same purposes in a more effective manner for the same cost.

D. BUREAUCRATIC CONSIDERATIONS

We have highlighted several aspects of DoD organization and process that help determine posture:

- Independent operation of the various staff bureaucracies within the OSD which emphasize different aspects of the program as we move through various phases of an annual program and budget cycle or through the phases of an acquisition cycle from early development to deployment.
- Intra-Service and inter-Service rivalry on new technology, particularly for use in individual high-capability weapons without consideration for its full cost and impact on readiness.

Where resolution of an issue involves broad budget allocations and where a consensus exists, the tools are available to make posture conform to policy. Indeed, as illustrated by the Army spending profile shown earlier, tools were available in the 1950s, as they are today, to make these broad budget allocations. But where it is necessary to deal in more detail with the budget and to apply pressure in a consistent way over a period of years, the system tends to break down.

Indeed, both of these resource problems have at their roots the constraints of the budget, not only the longer term constraints on the availability of funds, but also the short-term changes due to the peculiarities of an annual budget cycle. Of course, there are other causes of current deficiencies, including the outside constraints under which the DoD operates: the degree of political support for the overall budget and specific programs, the view of military service by potential recruits and those already in the Services, the attitudes and contribu-

tions of allies, the threat as presented by the U.S.S.R. and other potential adversaries, and the state of technology and its impact on warfare. It is the job of the DoD and the Executive Branch to adjust to these constraints, but the adjustment may mean that on occasion there are no completely satisfactory solutions.

Devising new organizational forms to prevent these problems is difficult. The particular problems cited--inter-Service rivalry, intra-Service rivalry, etc.--are inherent in the current assignment of tasks to components of OSD, to the Services and their components, and to the Defense agencies. Alternate organizational arrangements or incentives may strengthen some activities, e.g., readiness, but at the expense of others. Downgrading operational components of the Services runs the risk of degrading the military capability and esprit of those components.

Bringing together components of OSD, e.g., program and budget, can only be done by giving responsibility for the longer range program, the annual budget, and the acquisition process to individuals dealing with the resources for missions or appropriation categories. But these three activities require, or at least may require, different skills and knowledge. Moreover, it is not casual preferences of the budgeting, programming, and acquisition bureaucracies that lead to conflict. Rather, there is a conflict between the need for continuity as represented by the programmers, the need for flexibility in presenting the annual budget, and the need for management and review of individual programs. Ultimately, these conflicts can be resolved only if the Secretary of Defense recognizes that the functions of acquisition, programming, and budgeting are not independent.

Even if these internal DoD difficulties were to be surmounted, no changes or reforms would relieve DoD of the outside

constraints that face it. The continuity of the total program and acquisition of particular systems must be reconciled with the wishes of the President and Congress to use the annual budget to fine tune the economy, to signal resolve, to improve government efficiency, and to balance the budget. No reorganization or reform will substitute for the availability of funds or circumvent the pluralistic nature of our society and the inherently complex nature of the problems confronting the DoD.

VI. THE FLOW PROCESS RELATING U.S. POLICY GUIDANCE AND FORCE POSTURE

This chapter, and the following one, are concerned with the processes for defining political objectives and doctrines, for accomplishing DoD force and readiness planning in response to those objectives and doctrines, and for increasing overall military operational effectiveness. Neither chapter goes so far as to suggest specific changes in these processes. The first chapter puts forward a model of the overall policy guidance/force development process, and the second suggests some of the more important conceptual issues involved in improving that process. While this discussion is admittedly on a somewhat generalized level, there could be major benefits from approaching the overall problem at least initially from such a standpoint.

Conceptually, the connection between policy development and military posture involves a continuous, cyclical process which can be depicted in its simplest form by Figure 2. Thus, if we



Figure 2. ELEMENTAL POLICY GUIDANCE/FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

arbitrarily enter the process at the top of the figure--"Perception of Posture"--we can picture an idealized U.S. "perceiver" assessing the world situation for security threats, U.S. and allied military postures for current capabilities to meet the threats, and the domestic political situation for an estimate of the likely political, budgetary, and other reactions by the American public to the world situation. From this perception arise the general objectives toward which American security policy should aim; policies must then be developed--the second stage in Figure 2--to meet these goals. The policies in turn become the principal guiding elements for the PPBS which must translate the policies into "Operational Forces." These forces are deployed either in the continental United States or in various places around the world in accordance with U.S. foreign policy to support national objectives. A changing world situation now leads to a new perception of posture, new policies, and so on through the process again.

The actual process is of course infinitely more complex and disorderly. Thus, the "perceiver" of posture includes not only the U.S. Executive Branch (President, NSC, CIA, State, Defense, major commands, etc.) but the Congress, general public, U.S. allies, neutrals, and potential enemies, as well as the intricate interactions of one actor's perceptions of another's perceptions. The U.S. executive, in making his assessment, must also allow for divergent, and sometimes conflicting, official perceptions which must somehow be reconciled before consistent policies can be developed. The "Policy Development" stage, for its part, includes the entire process ranging all the way from broadest statements of Free World objectives--deterrence of nuclear war, defense of the NATO area, etc.--down through the myriad expressions of sub-objectives and implementing policies by successively lower echelons and different functional headquarters and offices. By the same token, the next two steps in the process of developing our military posture from political objectives and policies--

the "PPBS" and "Force Development"--are similarly subject to almost infinitely complicating factors and forces.

Figure 3 attempts to give some indication of this complexity. Looking at the interaction between perception of posture and policy development, for example, we note that there is actually a movement of influencing factors in both directions, and not simply a straightforward linear progression around the process loop. Some of the influences shown--the domestic political situation, or the international situation including friends, foes, and neutrals, and projections of those situations--not only contribute to our perception of posture, but they may involve active forces that in themselves lead to, or virtually require, the development of policy. For example, international events may already be in train, or various actors may be forcing on the United States a policy line that will in effect constitute



Figure 3. FURTHER ASPECTS OF POLICY GUIDANCE/FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

a policy choice if we simply acquiesce without making a conscious decision of our own.

Other influences on the development of policy include long-range planning of national objectives and strategies (see Figure 3), which would normally be accomplished only after necessary policies have been developed. Yet planning is itself an on-going process that will occasionally uncover future situations or contingencies requiring policy choices now to permit completion of plans, and future accomplishment of them, in an optimum manner. By the same token, programs (normally prepared only in the PPBS portion of the process) may themselves drive policy decisions. Thus, for one reason or another a program may not unfold according to schedule and in the manner projected, and as a result new policy choices may be required that will henceforth take events in a previously unplanned direction.

Throughout the entire process, it might be noted, a continual measurement of posture is taking place. Such measurements are made in various ways. Military exercises will measure operational capability, sometimes of individual units and sometimes of much larger force increments. A wide variety of analytical studies attempts to focus on other specialized facets of our military posture. Numerous operational, administrative, logistical, and other reports provide a continuous measure of status and progress as compared to program.

Long-range planning and threat projections are also intended to influence the PPBS directly, aside from their indirect influence through policy development. In addition, other strong influences on the PPBS include those shown on the lower left--threat assessments, "available" budget for the coming year, existing forces and existing programs which naturally lead to follow-on programs, and then "new starts" which are the opportunities that industry and the Services see for new required weapons systems based on new kinds of technologies. It should

be understood that "available" budget, in the sense used here, comes out of the planners' understanding of the domestic political situation, and from their understanding of prior policy development and long-range planning--in short, the guidance from previous portions of the cycle and previous years' PPBS. At Service level there is little flexibility for making changes in the estimate of the "available" budget; by this point such guidelines have become much more nearly fixed limits within which programming must be performed.

All these same elements shown on the lower left in Figure 3 also influence the deployment and structure of operational forces around the world, which in turn constitute our international posture. In addition, however, our operational posture is inextricably a part of the world situation in which it is deployed, as well as of the manner in which we conduct out foreign relations--hence the factors shown in the upper left. This new posture, of course, in a changing international context merges directly into a new perception of the world situation and our posture in regard to it. We have thus come full circle in our cyclical policy-posture process. Meanwhile, it should be repeated that the measurement of our posture will have been going on continually, and this in itself will constitute a guiding corrective element throughout the process.

We have suggested earlier that our idealized policy-posture process may not in reality "work that way." There are various reasons for this. Before discussing any of these exceptions, however, it is important to reiterate that in its broadest and most elemental form the system does work that way, and indeed must if it is to make any sense at all. With that said, let us recognize that when one establishes different administrative systems at different points in time to accomplish different things, and then grafts one on to another--or even more challenging, if one attempts to graft them all to each other in one

overarching system--there will inevitably be problems of coherence and coordination.

One of the most pervasive of these problems is the tendency for each area in such a complex system to be run as an independent machine. For example, several aspects of the process in the lower right corner of Figure 3--the area between Policy Development and the PPBS--can almost be viewed as independent self-running machines. Thus, the JCS planning system, of which the most important element was the old JSOP and now the JSPD; the DIA threat projection system; the CIA threat-estimating system; and the long-term aspects of the DSARC weapons development system, could all be said to operate fairly well with a minimum of policy guidance. Indeed, major inputs from above that might radically alter the assumptions and practices of previous years tend to appear as friction-causing agents rather than lubricants in these machines. Similarly, in the lower left corner of Figure 3 one might view the PPBS and its interaction with operational forces as something of a self-running machine. This is primarily the sphere of the Services and the JCS, and the PPBS of a given year along with available budgets, threat projections, and the like constitute only incremental variations in a force structure process that continues on with its own momentum from one year to the next. Meanwhile, the influences brought to bear from the lower right-hand policy development quadrant and the upper left foreign relations quadrant tend to appear as perturbations in a basically self-running process. In a similar fashion, U.S. foreign relations and related overseas-deployed forces can also be viewed as self-running machines, with perturbations arising from the other areas.

The reasons for the above general condition may be in various parts sociological, bureaucratic, and even psychological, but clearly much has to do with the tendency of individuals (individuals anywhere, but especially those working in offices) to resist change, and of organizations charged with particular

responsibilities to maximize the importance and continuity of processes which relate to their own peculiar functions and expertise. In any event, the influence of the organizational factor, i.e., of different organizational entities with different responsibilities and traditions, and with different objectives and clienteles, upon the policy guidance/posture development process can hardly be overestimated.

Figure 4 gives a rough indication of the spheres of infuence of the main organizational actors in the policy development process--Congress and the Executive, OSD, JCS, the Services, and the State Department. Congress and the Executive Branch, as shown in the upper right-hand corner, cooperate in the perception of posture and in development of the broad national security objectives necessary for the determination of long-term military policy. In the lower right-hand corner, OSD and the JCS are the principal actors in developing policy guidance for the PPBS--at least as viewed from the Pentagon. It must be understood, however, that policy development is a somewhat different process as viewed from OSD/JCS than as viewed from Congress or the White House. To oversimplify the matter, Congress and the White House tend to look more toward the international situation and the domestic political situation as the genesis of policy problems, while OSD and the JCS tend to look forward toward the PPBS, with its attendant weapons development, force structure, and personnel policy problems. The two layers overlap, however, with Congress and the White House occasionally getting into weapons and operational policy, and the OSD and the JCS occasionally taking positions on international and domestic policy problems. But since the basic points of view of the actors are different, even though all may be looking at the same policy problem, clearly some continuing mechanism is required to keep each cognizant of the policy concerns of the other. (It is this fundamental mismatch which has been referred to at some points in Chapter II and Chapter V.)



Figure 4. SPHERES OF INFLUENCE WITHIN THE POLICY GUIDANCE/FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

There is a similar overlap of spheres of influence--and difference in point of view--with respect to the development of the PPBS. OSD in coordination with the JCS helps develop the PPBS from the policy point of view and tries to sort out disagreements between the Services. But as shown in the lower left section of Figure 4, it is the Services (also acting in coordination with JCS) that develop the details which ultimately become the PPBS. The Services are of course influenced in this process by OSD/JCS guidance and by prior policy development, but the motive force

which chiefly drives the Services and the JCS in development of the PPBS is the problem of developing and equipping operational forces, e.g., weapons systems requirements, R&D and procurement program projections, and finally the manning and development of operational forces themselves.

The sphere of influence of the foreign policy apparatus is shown in the upper left-hand quadrant of Figure 4. There is again overlapping influence, not only with the Congress and the Executive (including the NSC and others) but with the Services and the JCS. The State Department is the principal actor in managing our foreign relations, including our foreign commitments and agreements, and therefore exerts a strong influence upon the deployment and actual utilization of our military forces. At the same time, through State's estimates of the extent to which we are meeting our commitments abroad, it also strongly influences the overall perception of our international posture. All of the spheres of influence seem to overlap in the area of posture measurement, and all the principal actors--admittedly from different points of view--undoubtedly have under way some programs and assessments which actually try to measure various aspects of our posture in order to lead to a better perception of its relation to our national commitments.

There are probably only a few instances in which sufficient unanimity and agreement exists among all the players--Congress, Executive, OSD, JCS, the Services, State--that the mismatches which are created by the overlaps of influence and by the differences in time frames of weapons development, force deployment, policy creation, and perception of the threat are all submerged, and there is a common enough appreciation that all players act in accord. The creation and continuity of NATO probably constitutes such a case. For over thirty years we have had a firm commitment to defend Western Europe against potential Soviet aggression, and that very general objective, having been agreed to by all

the players, throughout that period has influenced the development of our policies, the thrust of the PPBS, the weapons and operational deployments of our forces, and the manner in which we have measured our posture. There may be legitimate questions as to the efficacy of our effort in defense of NATO; indeed, some may charge that the effort devoted to NATO has been disproportionate. But it is difficult to question the basic congruence of our national commitment and our operational posture.

There are very likely only a few such examples, and even in these, mismatches and conflicts undoubtedly begin to show up in a more detailed examination of the policy process. It is clearly the exception rather than the rule when there is such a fundamental unity at the overall policy level among all the players. When such agreement does not exist, then the severe impedance mismatches which occur because of the overlapping areas of responsibility and different points of view of major actors, and the mismatches that have to do with the varying time frames of important program and policy elements can begin to dominate, and various portions of the process can begin to operate almost independently of one another.

With this essentially theoretical background, the following chapter will now look in more detail at the individual elements in the process as discussed above, and will attempt to suggest some of the major issues involved in improvement of the policy guidance/force development process.

VII. SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTUAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN IMPROVING THE POLICY GUIDANCE/FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

This chapter explores in more detail--but still on a rather generalized and conceptual level--the major aspects of the policy guidance/force development process discussed in the preceding chapter. To some extent the treatment here is also indebted to the discussion in Chapter V, "Role of DoD Organization and Process in Shaping Military Posture." The basic approach is to take the four major process phases discussed in Chapter VI, and in tabular form break each of these out into several representative further elements (see Table 7). For each of these elements some potential key issues involved in improvement of the process are then listed. Following is the outline of topics treated in Table 7:

PERCEPTION OF POSTURE

- Intelligence assessments
- Interpretation by policymakers (White House, State, Defense, etc.) of intelligence and other information
- Assessment of U.S. and allied postures
- Interpretive interaction among Executive Branch, Congress, U.S. public, and allied governments

POLICY DEVELOPMENT

- Assessment of U.S. interests and objectives
- Formulation and dissemination of national policies
- Coordination and review of planning process

TRANSLATION OF GUIDANCE INTO FORCE STRUCTURE (PPBS)

- Determination of force goals and requirements within projected budget constraints
- Coordination of force objectives and plans with research, development and procurement of weapons and equipment, and with procurement and training of personnel
- Development of force capabilities

TABLE 7. ELEMENTS IN POLICY GUIDANCE/FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS AND KEY ISSUES

PERCEPTION OF POSTURE

REPRESENTATIVE ELEMENTS IN PROCESS	KEY ISSUES INVOLVED IN IMPROVEMENT OF PROCESS	ADDITIONAL RESEARCH AREAS
Intelligence assessments	•Promoting a national viewpoint in estimating. •Preventing necessary systematization of intelligence production process from degenerating into routinized, bland assessments unhelpful to creative decisionmaking. •Preventing errors in estimation--in whatever direction and for whatever reason--from becoming self-perpetuating and cumulative from year to year. •Harnessing benefits of the adversary process but avoiding production of lowest common denominator compromises. •Assuring security of highly classified information but still disseminating it in usable form to those who need it for decisionmaking. •Leavening technical expertise of intelligence specialists with understanding and judgment of the outside experts with broader viewpoint.	After giving the problem of additional research a great deal of thought, we were unable to conclude that further study is at the moment a major requirement for improving the policy guidance/force development process. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci, who recently initiated a review of the defense acquisition process, specifically directed that a study of the process not be conducted or recommended by the reviewers. The process, Carlucci stated, "has been studied many times by consultants, by internal review groups, by GAO and congressional committees, and recently, by the Defense Science Board." Apparently he believed, as we do, that some of the major issues involved in improving the process are already well known--even if their solution may be difficult. A few such issues we have listed at the left. It should be noted, however, that within these issues of process are some issues of substance. Research can undoubtedly be helpful in shedding light on many of these substantive issues. Where we believe this to be the case, an asterisk (*) is shown in this column beside the process issue in the opposite column.
Interpretation by policymakers (White House, State, Defense, etc.) of intelligence and other information	•Allowing for the inherent uncertainty and ambiguity of many international situations which cannot be clarified by good intelligence work. (In other words, the Iranians, or Poles, may not themselves know what they're going to do.) •Dealing with conflicts in interpretation among agencies with strongly differing positions. •Reconciling an apparent external threat with the unpleasant domestic consequences of preparing for it (e.g., Israeli reluctance to mobilize in 1973). •Building into assessment process the recognition that predominant consensus or existing preconceptions may be wrong (e.g., "the Soviets will not put missiles into Cuba"; "the Shah's position is too strong for internal opposition to bring him down"; "the Japanese are planning to attack Southeast Asia"). •Assuring optimum availability and utilization of high-quality analysis from extra-governmental sources, either through direct subsidy (e.g., defense research contracts, *maintenance of FCRCs, foreign policy research, special* commissions [Gaither Commission, Draper Commission]), or conscious program for evaluating material produced by private sources, or the like.	*
Assessment of US and allied postures	•Assess capabilities to do what, on the broadest scale? Fight 1½ wars? (Where and under what circumstances?) Contribute to deterrence? Contain Soviet expansion? Where? •Devising realistic scenarios and testing US capabilities against them. •Assessing interrelationship of various parts of posture with each other--including allies. How assess allied capabilities when their objectives and procedures are both different from and not under the control of the US?	* * *
Interpretive interaction among Executive Branch, Congress, US public, and allied governments	•How, how much, and when to consult with Congress on issues in which secrecy is vital but public support may be required (e.g., Truman Doctrine, Carter Doctrine). •Assessing accurately the mood of general public in matters that may have serious import for military policy but changing public reaction could upset established policy (e.g., Vietnam, El Salvador). •Reconciling divergent Congressional views on US military posture and world situation (sometimes formalized in legislation) with those of the Administration in such a way as to minimize damage to US posture. •How, when, and with what degree of receptiveness to consult with allied governments on their interpretation of international situations, when their cooperation will eventually be required	*

*Where the process issues we have listed also contain issues of substance, in which further research would undoubtedly be helpful, we have placed an asterisk (*) beside the listing.

Table 7 (cont.d)

POLICY DEVELOPMENT

REPRESENTATIVE ELEMENTS IN PROCESS	KEY ISSUES INVOLVED IN IMPROVEMENT OF PROCESS	ADDITIONAL RESEARCH AREAS
Assessment of US interest and objectives	•Coordinating, at NSC level, the development and assessment of US interests and objectives by agencies and offices with frequently disparate points of view; arranging resultant US interests and objectives in some useful order of priority. •At DoD level, translating approved US national interests and objectives into national security and defense objectives that constitute meaningful goals for force planning. •Keeping entire process up to date, and reviewing it, in some regularized fashion that both permits and encourages debate.	
Formulation and dissemination of national policies	•Defining US national policies in mission capability terms useful for all component parts of DoD. •Providing a regularized process for review of the adequacy of US national policies; assuring a mechanism for followup of new policy actions required. •Recognizing, as a regular part of the policy process, the potential for failure in some policy choices, and providing for a fallback position. •Assuring the consistency of each successive element in the national policymaking process with the policies developed at the highest echelon. •Within the DoD providing an adequate mechanism (other than surfacing in a board or committee) for bringing to each higher level and especially to OSD the policy choices that must be made at that level.	*
Coordination and review of planning process	•Defining "planning" in some consistent way so that offices charged with it in various agencies are all performing approximately the same function. •Giving some useful content to the long-range planning function at all echelons from the NSC to the State and Defense Departments and the military Services. •Creating in the JCS a unified long-range planning function that can add to and more often than at present differ with the plans and programs submitted by all the individual Services. •Developing a distinctive JCS position on matters of *national strategy, future weapons requirements,* or comparable military policy problems when there is conflict between the Services or a shortage of available resources. •Devising, coordinating with each other, and keeping up to date contingency plans (at NSC, OSD, State Department, JCS, and Service levels) that accurately reflect likely contingencies, available US resources to meet them, and applicable US interests, objectives, and policies.	* * * *

*Where the process issues we have listed also contain issues of substance, in which further research would undoubtedly be helpful, we have placed an asterisk (*) beside the listing.

Table 7 (cont.d)

TRANSLATION OF GUIDANCE INTO FORCE STRUCTURE (PPBS)

REPRESENTATIVE ELEMENTS IN PROCESS	KEY ISSUES INVOLVED IN IMPROVEMENT OF PROCESS	ADDITIONAL RESEARCH AREAS
Determination of force goals and requirements within projected budget constrains	•Allocation of weapons systems priorities between Services, and within each Service, when major decisions regarding strategy or mission responsibilities are still controversial (e.g., desirability of a naval power-projection mission against Soviet mainland; need for an RDF with worldwide capabilities). •Accurate projection of force goals and weapons deployments when weapons availability from procurement cannot be predicted with confidence. •Difficulty in projecting budget expenditures when actual budgetary amounts to be made available, eventual costs of weapons systems, and future inflation rates are uncertain. •Giving meaning to a policy that DRB and DPB members will be "more than advocates of their particular areas of responsibility," and will take a "broader and deeper DoD view." How? •Ensuring that once the SecDef has made a policy or program decision the losers give "full support in the implementation of those decisions." (This is not the traditional DoD approach; what is going to bring it about?) •How will SecDef ensure that OSD staffs are able to concentrate on major DoD policy, planning and program issues, as opposed to the more detailed approach of the past? What mechanisms will select these issues and problems and bring them to the top?	* * *
Coordination of force objectives and plans with research, development, and procurement of weapons and equipment, and with procurement and training of personnel	•Reconciliation of three different systems--for budgeting, programming, and system acquisition--managed by three different bureaucratic entities within OSD for different purposes. •Incorporating in a single overall projection a number of elements with widely varying lead times--e.g., major weapons systems that may require 4-10 years to produce, support items that may be available in 2-3 years, personnel who can be trained in perhaps a year, and policies that can change immediately. •Accommodating changes in political process that can create a "boom and bust" effect (e.g., the Army procuring very few new weapons systems for several years, and now having under procurement ten major and expensive systems simultaneously). •Adjusting for tendency of the Services to spend available money for major weapon system end items, with less concern for necessary readiness and support items.	*
Development of force capabilities	•Tendency of guidance to become progressively diluted as it works downward through echelons. •Conflict of Service interests and prerogatives with force requirements, in some cases, for joint or unified capabilities. •Allowing for pervasive deficiencies both in quality and quantity of personnel for a number of vital missions.	

FORCE DEPLOYMENT

Alignment of force posture with US objectives	•Assessment of the threat. What does this require in the way of US force projection? How can such assessments best be kept up to date and, to extent possible, validated. •Translation of qualitatively stated political objectives--perhaps couched in vague doctrinal pronouncements--into quantitative force deployment terms. •Incorporation of changes in the world situation--and perhaps in the circumstances which dictated an original force deployment decision--into up-to-date decisions on force deployment on a realiable and recurring basis.	* * *
Coordination with allies	•Ability to take into account the potential contributions of allies in making decisions on US force deployments. •Realistic assessment of allied objectives, which may differ in some respects from those of US, and adequately relating them to US force plans. •Ability to take into account in US force plans the limitations--some foreseeable and some not--inevitably resulting from US dependence on allies.	* *
Interaction with opponents (ranging all the way from deployment of advisers to all-out nuclear war)	•Estimation beforehand of circumstances most like to result in requirement for force utilization, and establishment of policy governing this. •Ability to assess, on a timely basis, what actual circumstances are, and extent to which they accord with those predicated in policy statements. •Adequate capability for command, control and communications, all the way from local up to national level, to manage properly US forces in accomplishment of their mission. •Capability for logistic support of deployed forces, both for most likely eventualities and for possible emergencies.	 * *

*Where the process issues we have listed also contain issues of substance, in which further research would undoubtedly be helpful, we have placed an asterisk (*) beside the listing.

FORCE DEPLOYMENT

Alignment of force posture with U.S. objectives
Coordination with allies
Interaction with opponents (ranging all the way from deployment of advisers to all-out nuclear war)

The key issues pointed out in Table 7 all reflect problems that have burdened the process in the past. Now that we have reviewed these issues, the obvious next step would be to propose changes to the process that would ameliorate these problems, and we would hope, not create others.

We have steered clear of making detailed proposals for several reasons. First, changes to the process inevitably involve significant changes in the power, prestige, and turf of those currently in the process. If specific proposals are to be generated, they should probably be in the form of a discreet response to requests from someone in a position to change the process.

Second, the process has just been changed by the new administration, in ways that may reduce or eliminate some of the problems we have pointed out. Specific proposals for further change should come after enough time has elapsed to see how the new arrangements work out.

There are nonetheless a few general themes to the issues reviewed above that deserve comments of a prescriptive nature--themes that will likely remain valid if the new administration rests on the process changes it has already made.

A. CONTINUITY IN THE NSC

Specifically, many of the key policy issues surfacing in the past several months suggest a continuing weakness in the operations of the National Security Council staff. While individual members of the staffs have been of generally high quality over the years, each new administration has conceived of the

NSC staff as an extension of the President's staff and thus, when administrations change, the NSC staff is quickly turned over.* A further aspect of this continuity problem in the NSC flows from variations in the bureaucratic arrangements under which it operates and the more or less ad hoc nature of some of its specific functions. These too change from administration to administration and even from one NSC head to another.

A professional NSC staff, similar in character to the OMB staff, might reduce or eliminate some of the process problems noted above. With sufficient continuity and experience, a staff operating at this level could conduct long-term net assessments of national security issues that are difficult or impossible to carry out objectively within specific departments or agencies. A more stable and experienced staff could thus allow more continuity in our national security policies. The high-level coordinating element of the Executive Branch would not lose its memory whenever a new party took power, and a more permanent staff would be around to monitor the implementation of the policies it had helped foster. Finally, it is vital that the national security policymaking process always reflect presidential priorities--as opposed to State Department priorities, Defense Department priorities, Treasury priorities, etc. The NSC is the only entity that can effectively impose such constancy of direction on the process; interdepartmental cooperation and consensus is not an adequate substitute. In sum, a professional NSC staff with greater continuity both of personnel and functions would be uniquely positioned to set more explicit long-term objectives, monitor consistency of governmental policies in pursuit of those objectives, and ensure that presidential priorities obtain throughout the policy process.

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*Of course, staff turnover is not just an NSC issue. It has become an increasingly damaging characteristic of the entire DoD.

B. LONG-RANGE PLANNING

The second general theme is that long-range planning of national objectives and strategies must be improved. This has been recognized for decades, and many well-meaning efforts have been made to create and maintain high-level, long-range planning staffs in the various departments and agencies concerned with national security and as well as within the NSC staff. These efforts have all failed, generally due to lack of sustained interest by (1) the potential consumers of the plans and (2) the planners themselves.

This lack of sustained interest is at least partly due to the fact that the planning operation comes to be seen by both producers and consumers as planning for contingencies that almost never take forms close enough to what was anticipated to make the plans useful. The key to sustaining an effective long-range planning operation is to use some of the plans that it generates. To make this happen, the operation should place considerable emphasis on initiatives that might be taken, rather than chiefly planning how to react to initiatives taken by other countries. The Marshall Plan, the U.S. troop commitment to Europe, and the flexible response strategy, for example, were U.S. long-term initiatives that altered the course of events in Europe and required Soviet adaptations to them for many years to come. (Admittedly, planning for follow-up on these initiatives was frequently ad hoc, rather than the result of some integrated plan.) A new U.S. initiative regarding the Palestinian problem in the Middle East, that took into consideration the long-term interests of all parties but was prisoner to none, might be a future example--again assuming planning for adequate follow-up.

The principals and planning staffs should find it easier to sustain their interest in initiative planning, especially if these initiatives were reflected in the long-range plans of all subordinate agencies, and if the definition of planning

specifically included the setting of long-range objectives. We might also find life easier if the Soviets and others spent more time reacting to initiatives of our choosing--rather than the other way around.

C. ACCOUNTABILITY

The final theme that underlies our observations on problems with the process has to do with accountability. Egregious sins are committed against the American taxpaying public in the form of multibillion dollar overruns on weapons programs, botched military operations, force capabilities promised but never produced, etc. It's a rare thing, however, when the responsible parties get dismissed from service, fired, or even individually tagged with the failure. The entire system invites anonymity, diffusion of responsibility, and a "not on my watch" mentality. The requirement is not, of course, that a scapegoat environment be created or that individuals found responsible for failure be drummed out of public service in disgrace. But a major problem is that there are few institutional or procedural devices which make it easy, or even possible, to fix the blame.

Certainly greater institutional memory and organizational continuity would help if these could be established in the policymaking system from NSC level down through the departments and sub-agencies. It should not always be necessary for every new manager to reorganize his office and change the names of the key policy documents as the first step in making his impress on a job whose ramifications he is just beginning to understand. With greater organizational and functional continuity, it should at least become easier to trace the background of long-term projects and find out where the bodies are buried. Increased personal accountability is also required, however, and specific procedures to this end such as personal identification of document authorship and attributions of individual responsibility for decisions may well be needed.

But in the end, much of the accountability problem is simply that we are too ready to forgive administrative and managerial transgressions. The current system frequently rewards those who can maintain a high level of activity while leaving no footprints, and it does not appear to punish those who fail the ultimate tests of actual productivity. Greater institutionalization of the policy guidance process, with a concomitant raising and tightening of the professional standards for high-level government job performance, and especially an increased emphasis on personal accountability, are long overdue in the American governmental system.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

DEFENSE POLICY GUIDELINES

Every U.S. administration since World War II has recognized the need to develop and issue statements of broad national security policy that relate defense plans, programs, and budgets to some more or less explicit set of national interests and objectives. Each administration has approached this task in its own way, with the result that over the years the form and style of such statements, as well as their substantive policy content, have differed considerably. Their intended function and utility have also varied from administration to administration, so that their practical significance in managing defense affairs has varied as well.

Not all such statements are expected to serve as administrative guidelines within the government. Some, particularly those that are put forth in campaign speeches, posture statements, or other public pronouncements, may be designed primarily for political purposes. They may be formulated to explain and justify proposals t Congress and the public at large, and they may therefore be slanted heavily toward the requirements of public advocacy and persuasion. Statements of this sort may have broad educational value, but they are not necessarily meant to perform double duty as policy directives for planners, programmers, and operators inside the government. Such policy directives ideally would provide guidelines that are clear, specific, conceptually rigorous, and, above all, frank, especially in defining the expected interconnections between realistically available means and realizable ends, ordering them as to priority, and shaping them into practical courses of action.

Under Truman. Concerted efforts to develop authoritative national security policy statements, explicitly sanctioned by the President to serve as guides to action for all government agencies, were initiated during the early years of the National Security Council in the Truman Administration. These efforts were motivated by the widely perceived need for more effective coordination among interrelated but frequently divergent activities of the executive departments and agencies involved in conducting national security affairs, particularly State and Defense, and, within Defense, the three military Services. It seemed reasonable to expect that presidentially approved definitions of national goals and the methods to be pursued in achieving them, carefully prepared on the basis of interagency staff studies and brought before the NSC for discussion and resolution, would facilitate coordination by providing those concerned with a common frame of reference and a consistent set of marching orders.

In practice, the results were almost universally regarded as disappointing. A large number of formal statements of policy were developed on a wide range of subjects, including overall (or "basic") political, economic, and military strategy, "geographic" policy toward specific countries or regions of the world, or "functional" policy on subjects like trade or arms control, but it proved difficult to make these dovetail or add up to a coherent body of guidelines covering all major national security activities. Most of the papers were criticized for being composed as broad statements of principle that were entirely too general for practical application, for failing to come to grips with major issues, and for lacking in decisiveness.

Under Eisenhower. By contrast with Truman, Eisenhower routinely treated the NSC as a conspicuous instrument for managing national security policy. He established an elaborate

substructure of interagency committees and staffs to support NSC deliberations, and instituted detailed procedures for producing, processing, and distributing a voluminous collection of written policy documents on virtually every national security question of consequence. Chief among the documents was the "Basic National Security Policy" (BNSP), an annual overview paper that broadly defined U.S. national interests worldwide, analyzed the major trends that might affect them, and outlined a national strategy for achieving them. The primary aim of the BNSP was to provide a unified, comprehensive, and integrated policy synthesis, prepared with the full participation of the responsible departments and agencies, formally promulgated after thorough discussion and debate, and presidential approval, to operate as a master set of guidelines for implementation throughout the government.

While the established procedures did enforce a greater degree of collaboration among agencies in clarifying national security objectives, analyzing trends, identifying problems, and evaluating ways of tackling them, it was generally felt that pressures for interagency consensus in the system led to watered-down language and lowest-common-denominator treatment of issues in the BNSP and its offshoots. Papers tended to compromise, straddle, or suppress important questions, and thus were virtually useless as guides for planning and action. The implication of such charges is that these presidential policy documents had little direct bearing on the resolution of defense resource allocation or force posture problems.

Under Kennedy-Johnson. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson dispensed with the highly structured formality of the Eisenhower NSC system and dropped the attempt to codify national security policy in a single all-encompassing BNSP. They took a more pragmatic management approach, issuing explicit policy guidance where and when required, according to the problem and situation

at hand. They relied largely on direct interaction with their principal subordinates to enforce coherence and continuity in national security plans and programs, and employed a variety of document formats and procedural channels for such written guidelines as appeared to be required.

Among the chief presidential policy management documents of the Kennedy-Johnson period were a series of National Security Action Memorandums (NSAMs). These were not elaborate or lengthy descriptions of policy positions as such, but were more in the nature of operational directives addressed to individual national security topics. Although NSAMs included careful formulations of national objectives, they were not produced according to any organized pattern and were not intended to add up to a broad conceptual framework or global strategy in the manner of an Eisenhower BNSP.

In defense matters, the most important policy guidance documents of the Kennedy-Johnson years were the Defense Secretary's Draft Presidental Memorandums (DPMs) and the DoD "posture statement" that accompanied the annual submission of the defense budget to Congress. DPMs were memos to the President summarizing critical issues and recommendations in selected "functional" areas, such as strategic offensive and defensive forces, tactical air forces, or antisubmarine warfare forces. Each one spelled out pertinent policy assumptions and provided an analytical rationale covering the strategic, force structure, weapons systems, and budgetary considerations with respect to the subject at hand. Since they were usually staffed through the President and senior officials, they were frequently treated as having tentative presidential concurrence and became a prime source of policy guidance within DoD. The same was true of the annual posture statement, which became a comprehensive exposition of the world situation, U.S. foreign policy objectives, defense commitments, military strategy, and force

posture, acquiring considerable authority within the DoD as the closest available approximation to the former BNSP. However, such instrumentalities as sporadic NSAMs and DPMs were criticized on the grounds that they were fragmented and disorderly, overly preoccupied with crises and other priority problems of the moment, consumed inordinate time and attention at the top, and were insufficiently clear as to the ultimate intentions or longer range plans of decisionmakers. Even the defense posture statement furnished after-the-fact rationalizations rather than advance guidelines for planning or resource management. There was no direct interaction, for example, between the staffing of the annual posture statement and the flow of PPBS/FYDP actions in the preparation of the defense budget.

Under Nixon-Ford. The Nixon and Ford Administrations reverted to a more structured approach. Their system consisted of an interlocking network of interagency committees and boards, most of them chaired by the Assistant for National Security Affairs, organized to carry out strategic policy reviews of all kinds (National Security Study Memorandums, or NSSMs) and oversee their implementation throughout the government (via National Security Decision Memorandums, or NSDMs). The Nixon-Ford-Kissinger procedures were deliberately selective rather than encyclopedic, focused on the formulation and analysis of real decision options for the President, and strengthened executive procedures for feedback and follow-through on presidential decisions. No attempt was made to resuscitate the Eisenhower BNSP, however, although Nixon did initiate an annual foreign policy compendium of sorts for public distribution, Foreign Policy for the 1970s, a report to Congress that presented a synoptic overview of the U.S. role in world affairs as seen from the President's perspective.

Changes were also made in internal DoD policy management mechanisms. The McNamara DPM was abolished and policy

procedures instituted which appeared more responsive to White House national security/foreign policy guidance and at the same time provided greater scope for JCS and Service initiatives in shaping the details of the Defense program. Secretary Laird provided general policy guidance in the PPBS via a Defense Policy and Planning Guidance (DPPG) memorandum, prepared on the basis of relevant NSDMs, the President's "Foreign Policy Report," and other White House/NSC policy expressions. At the same time, the DPPG constituted the Secretary's response to JCS proposals for general strategy (based on U.S. national security policies in NSDMs and elsewhere as the JCS interpreted them in the JSOP). Fiscal guidance was handled separately, as was weapons systems acquisition (which evolved into a distinct DCP/DSARC system), but generally speaking the DPPG represented the major effort to link the development of U.S. military force posture to specific national security/foreign policy objectives during the Nixon-Ford years.

The same criticisms were leveled at the policy guidelines: that the system of defense policy guidelines was too loose and imprecise to exert more than a general influence over force posture planning and programming decisions. Commenting on the DoD guidance memorandums of the previous administration, the new ASD/PA&E in 1977 saw the same chronic weaknesses that had afflicted attempts to formulate overall policy guidelines since the Truman and Eisenhower eras: he found them full of "statements of such generality and so free of controversy as to be of little practical use in guiding our Defense planning and helping us with the really hard choices." He criticized most sharply the discontinuity between statements of national security objectives and "mundane" fiscal considerations:

"To propose fine objectives in one paper, and then authorize too little money to achieve them in the next, is irresponsible."*

Under Carter. The Carter Administration instituted a number of changes, both at the presidential/NSC level and within the DoD. At the presidential/NSC level, the administration cut back and simplified the Kissinger apparatus by reducing the major standing committees to two, the NSC Policy Review Committee for developing national security policy recommendations and the NSC Special Coordination Committee for overseeing the implementation of decisions and other operational matters. The Kissinger NSSMs were replaced by Presidential Review Memorandums (PRMs) and the NSDMs by Presidential Directives (PDs), in both cases to underline the fact that national security policy guidance derived from the President rather than from his national security adviser. A comprehensive national strategy and force posture review produced PRM-10 and its companion PD-18 on "U.S. National Strategy," issued in August 1977 to provide basic policy guidance throughout the national security bureaucracy.** Neither document escaped the usual charges that they contained many built-in compromises among conflicting interests, were unclear and ambiguous on important issues, and were virtually useless as a guide.***

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*Assistant Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Memorandum for Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force, et al., "Possible Revisions in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System," September 26, 1977.

**Laurence J. Korb, "National Security Organization and Process in the Carter Administration," in Sam C. Sarkesian (ed.), *Defense Policy and the Presidency: Carter's First Years* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 111-137.

***Ibid.

Policy guidance documentation within the DoD was also modified rather than completely revised. The SecDef's annual posture statement was continued in its established role as an authoritative articulation of the administration's rationale for the existing and planned force structure, primarily for public consumption. For managing force planning, programming, and budgeting activities within the DoD system, the former DPPG documents were integrated into a single Consolidated Guidance paper. This document was intended to perform the standard function of translating general presidential/NSC policy determinations into explicit guidelines for force structure and resource allocation decisions, and, at the same time, assure that those decisions were in general accord with fiscal realities.

How well the Carter modifications in defense policy guidance arrangements have worked is still an open question. The Carter Administration's own national security/defense reorganization studies--the Steadman, Ignatius, Rice, and Odeen reports*--have continued to treat the problem of providing effective policy guidance as an unresolved challenge. Steadman reported that clearer and more definitive national security policy guidance was needed, setting forth specific objectives that military forces should be capable of attaining and the order of priority among them. Ignatius saw a need to improve the interaction between OSD, the JCS, and the Services in developing policy guidance for force structure and resource allocation decisions. Rice felt that policy and strategic planning guidance could be made more relevant and useful by shifting

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*Richard C. Steadman, *Report to the Secretary of Defense on the National Military Command Structure,* July 1978; Paul R. Ignatius, *Departmental Headquarters Study, A Report to the Secretary of Defense,* June 1, 1978; Donald B. Rice, *Defense Resource Management Study,* February 1979; and Philip Odeen, *National Security Policy Integration,* September 1979.

from a comprehensive to an incremental approach that focused primarily on important changes or unsettled problems. Odeen emphasized continuing difficulties in ensuring that defense policies and programs were consistent with foreign policy and arms control goals without greater White House/State Department/ ACDA participation in earlier stages of DoD decisionmaking.

A Pragmatic Assessment. Defense policy guidelines have been an almost intractable problem for every administration, not only because of inevitable disputes over their substance but also because of difficulties with respect to the processes through which they are developed and the forms in which they are issued. For any administration, establishing and clarifying its overall purposes and the manner in which it hopes to attain them, in national security as well as other areas, would seem to be the essence of government. Yet, attempts to be comprehensive, clear, and detailed--to codify a set of policy guidelines for integrating and coordinating the myriad activities of planners, programmers, and operators throughout the defense establishment--have apparently never been really successful.

Recent administrations have attempted to formulate and issue some more or less coherent set of major goals and principles that are meant to add up to a rationale that justifies its military resource allocation and force posture decisions, but they have not attempted to do so in one authoritative document issued at one time and place. They have issued a variety of guidance documents, multi-tiered to meet the requirements of interpretation and amplification at lower organizational echelons within the government, and selective in coverage to focus on priority areas in which explicit guidance was most required. The loss of visible coherence and consistency in such an approach seems to have been an acceptable price, at least for internal management purposes.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX B

POLITICAL "DOCTRINES" AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO U.S. MILITARY POSTURE

It is often assumed that an important source of political guidance for U.S. military capabilities lies in those "doctrines" that have been enunciated by U.S. presidents from time to time and that seem somehow peculiarly American. Examination of the circumstances surrounding and consequences of the four recent doctrines yields some interesting insights on their relationship to military posture.

Truman Doctrine. Of the four doctrines considered here, the Truman Doctrine is clearly the most significant in respect to its long-term political consequences. However, it is also the classic example of how a political doctrine is adapted to time and circumstances in its relationship to military posture.

In late February 1947, the British Government informed the United States that it would be forced to terminate its economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey, and strongly urged the U.S. Government to assume the burden. In March the President sent Congress a message recommending aid to Greece and Turkey, which became known as the Truman Doctrine.

> I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.
>
> I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.
>
> I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.*

*Recommendations on Greece and Turkey, Message of the President to the Congress, March 12, 1947, *Department of State Bulletin*, Supplement of May 4, 1947, pp. 829-832.

Despite the President's emphasis upon primarily economic and financial aid, he made it clear that military assistance and personnel (which Congress later qualified as "in an advisory capacity only") would also be required. In any event, the intent of the message was clear, if its ultimate implications were not. The President was proposing an open-ended commitment to help "free peoples" everywhere to resist "attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Organized U.S. military forces clearly might be required if threatened countries should be unable to carry their defense burdens alone.

While Congress was persuaded of the necessity for supporting Greece and Turkey, there were also other priorities to consider. As a result, the Eightieth Congress gave the FY48 defense budget one of the most exhaustive reviews any defense budget ever faced. Walter Millis states:

> But while the exploration was thorough, one cannot feel that it really threw much light on the underlying civil-military problem. Some thought that to strengthen our military posture would invite war; others, that it was the chief means for averting one. Some wanted to enlarge aircraft building because that would impress the Russians with our power; a few opposed this on the ground that it would simply play into Soviet hands by wrecking our own economy. For some, the principal standard seemed to be whatever was required to maintain a prosperous and adequate aircraft and munitions industry. Hardly any seemed to conceive the problem as one of providing a currently sufficient military force to meet the current military-political issues with which we were confronted.*

Certainly few saw the Truman Doctrine as an occasion for a massive increase in defense spending. After the ending of World War II in the early months of fiscal '46, the Truman Administration had managed to reduce total defense expenditure

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*Walter Millis, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Harold Stein, *Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 199.

for that year to $45 billion. Fiscal '47 showed an expenditure of only $14.25 billion, and after the Budget Bureau had done its work the defense budget for fiscal '48 (presented by the President in January 1947) called for an estimated expenditure of only $11.25 billion. This was reduced by the Congress another half billion dollars, after pronouncement of the Truman Doctrine. There were, however, Congressional changes within the Truman defense budget, in the direction of increasing reliance on strategic airpower. "It seems fair to say that the budget for fiscal '48 had the effect of launching the independent Air Force on its career as the dominant element in American military policy. Air Force strategy was, of course not devised as an economy measure. Yet partly because it seemed economical, thereafter the Air Force was to come first with Congress...."*

In February 1948, Czechoslovakia fell to an internal Communist coup, and on March 5 occurred the alarming "March crisis," when General Clay warned from Berlin that war might be imminent. It was apparent that U.S. armed forces were in no condition to go to war. "Existing war plans called for larger ground forces than were even authorized; the active Army had sunk well below the authorizations; voluntary enlistment was clearly a failure, while UMT, whatever its utility as a long-range project, could not furnish men needed immediately."** It was agreed that the President should ask for a supplemental military appropriation to bring the armed forces as a whole to a state more nearly commensurate with the ominous "realities of the world situation.*** The entire supplemental requested, however, came to only about $3 billion over the $11 billion in the regular budget.

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*Ibid., p. 200.

**Ibid., p. 212.

***Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), pp. 392-393.

Truman maintained his budgetary stance throughout 1949, refusing to alter his limits for the fiscal '50 defense budget. In October, only two months after the Soviet Union's first atomic bomb explosion, the President declared in signing the defense appropriations bill that he would not spend $800 million additional funds mandated by Congress and would keep the Air Force at 48 groups instead of increasing it by 10 groups as Congress had demanded.

In sum, while the Truman Doctrine expressed a widely held opinion and even conviction on the part of the American people, it had little direct effect, as such, upon U.S. military capabilities in the short term. Indeed, succeeding international crises which presumably should have triggered major revisions in U.S. defense budgets and military plans were simply assimilated into the welter of other forces--e.g., the desire for economy, fear of provoking war, and competing domestic requirements--acting upon the Administration and Congress, and largely damped out. It was not until the country was actually at war in Korea that U.S. defense budgets turned dramatically upwards. The Truman Doctrine was potentially an immense commitment and laid the basis for the whole pattern of alliances to come. It was, in essence, an articulation of the policy of containment which the United States has indeed followed ever since. Yet there was never a deliberate program to build the military capabilities that were implied by the broad commitment.

Eisenhower Doctrine. If the Truman Doctrine may be considered comparable to the Monroe Doctrine in its widespread support among the American people and its relevance for long-term U.S. national security, the Eisenhower Doctrine seems more ad hoc and even confused in its rationale; at best, it was ahead of its time. It is in fact virtually forgotten now.

The general motivation for the Eisenhower Doctrine appears clear enough: fear of Soviet military penetration into the

Middle East, especially via the radical Arab states. Prior to about the mid '50s, of course, this had not been considered a serious problem. The Middle East had been something of a joint U.S.-British responsibility, with the British the older and senior partner, and the French filling a lesser and more specialized role in particular areas. But the decade after the end of World War II had seen a steady contraction of the British presence.

In 1955 Egypt became the first military client of the Soviet Union, followed shortly afterward by Syria, Afghanistan, and Yemen. The proffer of such military assistance constituted a radical change from former Soviet policy. Dulles' attempt to punish Egypt through withdrawing the U.S. offer to assist with financing the Aswan Dam, the Soviet response by picking up the U.S. commitment, Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, the joint Israeli-British-French attack upon Egypt, the U.S. moves to halt the invasion, and veiled Soviet rocket threats against Britain and France after the action was over, all followed in rapid succession. The British position in the Middle East was suddenly a shambles, the Soviet Union was now a major factor in the area, and the United States confronted the new security problem virtually alone. Adding to the overall tension was the concurrent Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt.

The United States clearly required a modification of the Truman Doctrine, which had been aimed at keeping the Soviets out of the Middle East altogether. The Soviets now had acquired military clients in the area, and the United States had to make certain the Russians did not convert them into satellites or establish military bases in these countries. President Eisenhower, in his memoirs, outlines the crux of the U.S. thinking at the time:

> In [the] confusion, one danger loomed above all others: The leaders of the Soviet Union, like the Czars before them, had their eyes on the Middle East.... The Soviet objective was, in plain fact, power politics: to seize the oil, to cut the Canal and pipelines of the Middle East, and thus seriously to weaken Western civilization.*

On January 5, 1957, in a Special Message to Congress, the President propounded the Doctrine that bears his name, and two months later it was embodied in a joint resolution passed by the Congress. The resolution authorized the President to give economic assistance and "to undertake in the general area of the Middle East military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations...desiring such assistance." At presidential discretion, moreover, the Congress declared that the United States would be "prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism."**

It is difficult to discover any significant impact of the Eisenhower Doctrine upon U.S. military capabilities. At the time, U.S. military capabilities in the Middle East were embodied in the U.S. Sixth Fleet which, along with other U.S. air and amphibious forces (plus units from Europe), gave the United States a considerable capacity to intervene against radical Arab states that threatened American friends. Yet the rationale of the Eisenhower Doctrine, based on intervention against a Soviet attack, implied a totally different military situation and necessary capabilities.

The predominant military strategy during this period was that of Massive Retaliation, with the Air Force consistently

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*Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1965), pp. 177-178.

**Text of the Eisenhower message and the joint resolution are in *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1957* (New York: 1957), pp. 195-204.

consuming some 40 percent of the total defense budget. While the U.S. Army rejected Massive Retaliation with increasing vigor as the decade progressed, its protests had little impact on either the administration or the Congress. An event that did have a major impact on U.S. defense budgets was the Soviet Sputnik launched in October 1957, but the chief beneficiary was again the Air Force. In fact, the chief doctrinal change proposed by the Army itself in the FY58 budget was an attempt to carve out for the Army an atomic role--the new pentomic army. By the time the Kennedy Administration began to call for a much increased role for conventional forces, the Eisenhower Doctrine was probably only a minor factor.

Nixon Doctrine. Where all the other doctrines discussed in this paper announced an assumption by the United States of increased international responsibility, the Nixon Doctrine declared the opposite--that the United States intended to do less and its allies must do more in the defense of common objectives. Essentially, this doctrine arose from U.S. efforts to adjust the earlier strategy of containment to the realities of failure in Vietnam.

Some time appears to have elapsed before the Nixon Administration decided that its rationalizations for disengagement in Asia--first enunciated during some informal remarks by the President in Guam on July 25, 1969--constituted a doctrine. In his State of the World address on February 18, 1970, the President specifically referred to the Nixon Doctrine and amplified its meaning:

> This is the message of the doctrine I announced at Guam--the "Nixon Doctrine." Its central thesis is that the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot--and will not--conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free

> nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest.*

The Doctrine reflected the war weariness of the time, and the disinclination of most Americans at the time to become involved in another conflict in the Third World that entailed commitment of ground forces. Allies and non-allies were now expected to do more in their own behalf. The Doctrine raised the attitude to the status of a national policy, reaffirming U.S. intention to stand by its treaty commitments and specifically including a guarantee of support against nuclear threats, but proposing not to go beyond economic and military assistance so long as indigenous military forces appeared capable of supplying the necessary manpower. It was an admission of the limits of U.S. power as well as will, and also a recognition that formerly dependent nations had now developed sufficiently economically to provide a much greater share of their own defense. Thus the partnership principle was invoked to justify reductions in U.S. military strength under the formula of a "total force concept," this being the aggregate of U.S. active and reserve forces plus the national forces of allies.

The Europeans, however, were not prepared to accept the implications of the Nixon Doctrine that they should take on a much larger responsibility for their own defense. The Doctrine was virtually ignored. There was no major increase in the European role in their own defense, possibly in good part because the United States did not reduce its European forces as might have been expected under the Doctrine. It should be recalled that the Doctrine was no doubt viewed as a second blow by the NATO states, MC 14/3 having been forced on them by the United States in 1967. The switch from an essentially nuclear response

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**U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace,* A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, February 18, 1970, p. 6.

strategy under MC 14/2 to an essentially conventional/flexible response of MC 14/3 already implied a greater European effort in conventional force buildup. While they tended to view the Doctrine and the U.S. pursuit of détente as further evidence of American retreat, they were not willing to do much about it.

The effort to build up Iran as a U.S. surrogate in the Persian Gulf reflected the policy of letting local powers carry the burden.

As for the Doctrine's role in determining future U.S. military capabilities, the picture is even more blurred. Clearly, the Doctrine portended--or rationalized--a major U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. Similarly, a significant reduction took place in U.S. forces in South Korea and Thailand, while political sovereignty over Okinawa was allowed to revert to Japan (with U.S. military installations remaining, however). In accordance with the Nixon Doctrine's concept of allocating U.S. defense resources on a basis of priorities--with NATO accepting as a top priority, U.S. troop strength was retained at a relatively constant level in Europe.

The former overall U.S. military objective of maintaining a capability to fight two and one-half wars simultaneously was revised downward to provide for a one and one-half war capability. However, measures that would appear to have been necessary toward recasting the forces to accord with a U.S. "central reserve" strategy were not carried out. Airlift and sealift forces were not increased, nor were there efforts to ensure access to bases overseas.

Carter Doctrine. On January 23, 1980, in his State of the Union Message, President Carter declared "an attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by use of any means necessary including military force." Some of the early press treatment of

this statement began immediately referring to it as the "Carter Doctrine."

At the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. military capability in the Persian Gulf area was minimal. Perhaps more important, U.S. ability to project military power into the area from outside, sufficient to defeat further Soviet expansion, was also minimal. The great distance of the Persian Gulf from the United States and the immense logistical problems in deploying and supporting substantial military forces in that region indicated that the Soviets were in a position of virtually unalterable superiority if they should choose to move beyond Afghanistan.

However, this has been the Soviet position at any point around their vast borders, including Western Europe. This was, of course, precisely the point of the U.S. containment strategy, as amplified by the Truman, Eisenhower, and Nixon Doctrines: it put the Soviets on notice that they risked a major war with the United States--perhaps an all-out nuclear war--if they attempted to take advantage of their inherent geopolitical advantage to expand their borders through armed aggression. In this sense, the Carter Doctrine was firmly in the tradition of the other major U.S. statements of postwar strategic policy. Militarily, it represents a goal for planners, not an existing capability and the threat behind it would seem to be, as in the other doctrines, in a vague potential capability.

From the current near-term vantage point, it appears that the Carter Doctrine should have some eventual effect upon U.S. military capabilities, if current plans to develop a Rapid Deployment Force should continue to be pursued, and if U.S. efforts to shift part of its European defense burden to its allies should be successful. Whether such actions could possibly result in a U.S. military capability to "repel" a Soviet attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf region, of course, is another matter.

But, as we have seen earlier, that would hardly make the Carter Doctrine unique among such U.S. policy statements.

The Essence of Doctrines. A few generalizations can be drawn from this review of the four "doctrines" and their relationship to military posture.

1. U.S. political doctrines have tended to distill, condense, systematize, and focus the majority political sentiment in the country in respect to major questions of U.S. national security at a certain time. Thus, General Maxwell Taylor declared recently, in speaking of the Truman Doctrine, that it put down on paper the "general feeling of the nation at the time that we should help nations defend themselves against aggression."

Ideally, a doctrine should spell out responsibilities and missions to our own people and put enemies on notice of our attitude, and should represent both a national policy and a capability.

2. The relationship of a doctrine's objectives to actual U.S. military capabilities, however, either at the time or subsequently, has proven to be indirect, long-term, and dependent upon particular events and challenges which might dictate an increased or specialized U.S. military capability. Historically, there has, as a rule, been little real U.S. capability to enforce its doctrines at the time they were pronounced. But the latent capability has usually been present--or at least, the doctrine has put potential aggressors on notice that the United States will make every effort to develop such a capability and employ it to the fullest, if it should be required.

The ultimate American threat between 1947 and the buildup following the outbreak of the Korean war was strategic nuclear airpower, but we know now that that capability was limited and whether it would have been used against the Soviets except in the very gravest circumstances remains a moot point. The fact,

however, does not change the above comment on the doctrine-posture relationship.

The continuation of this relationship has been described thusly:

> As Army Chief of Staff in the period 1955-1959, I was constantly concerned about the extent of our political commitments--most of them based on the Truman Doctrine--implying some kind of military obligation. On my office wall I kept a chart showing forty-odd nations to which we had in effect given promissory notes backed by inadequate military assets. Today [1978] these commitments remain essentially unchanged on our national debit ledger.*

3. The proliferation of U.S. doctrines since World War II is undoubtedly attributable to the unprecedented circumstances in which the United States has found itself--in a state of more or less permanent world unrest and crisis, confronting a powerful and ideologically implacable opponent, at a time when technology has made available to both sides weapons of great destructiveness that require many years to develop and produce. As the global political, economic, and (indirectly) military contest has progressed, shifting international circumstances have prompted both American political leadership and other opinion-formers, especially the press, to attempt to summarize and simplify into "doctrines" the majority sentiment of the American people in regard to the challenges faced by the nation.

4. The nature and scope of the pressures acting upon the process of developing U.S. military capabilities--pressures ranging from the extent of public support and understanding (often reflected in "doctrines") through Service interests and disparate Congressional motives to the specific administrative and technical processes of weapon development and acquisition--dictate

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*Maxwell D. Taylor, et al., *Grand Strategy for the 1980's* (American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.: 1978), p. 3.

that the linkage between the simplified and generalized content of a doctrine and actual military forces will be tenuous at best. The real impact of political guidance upon force development will come well after the statement of a political doctrine, in the actual follow-up and response of political leadership to particular situations that appear to require increased military capability for their resolution.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX C

INTERESTS, OBJECTIVES, AND STRATEGY

We have examined the doctrinal sources of policy guidance and noted the relative lack of success of efforts to present such guidance in a form useful for posture development. We should now consider the elements that underlie policy guidance. Policy guidance should reflect both objectives to be sought in defense of interests and the means of achieving those objectives.

A. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES

In a very fundamental sense, a national military posture exists to protect national interests and to support national objectives, policies, and commitments. There is a relationship between interests and the military posture of a nation, but it is by no means either direct or obvious. There are some interests that cannot be defended by military force, or interests in relation to which military force is irrelevant. In the broadest sense, a military posture should include the military capabilities that permit the defense of a wide variety of interests in a variety of ways.

Current U.S. national interests were spelled out by Secretary of State Vance before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in March 1980. He listed eight broad interests: physical security of the nation, careful management of East-West relations, controlling the growth and spread of nuclear and other weapons, confronting the global energy crisis to strengthen the international economy, support of peace in troubled areas to reduce threat of wider war and remove opportunities for rivals to extend their influence, broadening our ties to the Third

World, advancement of human rights, and environmental global trends. Describing the problem of priorities, Secretary Vance said:

> The hard fact is that we must face each of these and other challenges simultaneously. Clearly, our interests do collide in particular circumstances.
>
> There will be no escaping the difficult task of weighing our interests against each other, moving each other, moving each forward whenever possible.
>
> Our course in the world must be defined by a mix of interests, sensibly balanced, meeting always the central imperative of national security for our country and its people.
>
> *******
>
> Nor can we define our security interests in ways that exclude any region. To do so could leave beyond the lines of our interest nations of genuine importance to our well being or tempt others to believe that we were ceding to them new spheres of influence.*

The statement represented primarily a list of political and economic objectives as well as interests, but includes nothing about the means by which these interests will be maintained or objectives pursued. Because these are lofty statements, understandably the security objectives that flow from the interests, as enunciated in the 1979 DoD Consolidated Guidance, were hardly more specific:

> The basic national security objectives of the United States are to provide for the physical security of the United States as a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact, and to advance and protect our interests in the world. To achieve these objectives, we must be able to deter attacks on the United States, our allies and our friends; to prevent others from imposing political and military solutions on the United States; to influence international affairs from a position of recognized strength; and to fight successfully

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*U.S. Senate, 96th Congress, Second Session, *U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives,* Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, March 27, 1980, pp. 11-12.

> when necessary so that conflicts terminate on terms favorable to United States national security interests.*

The Consolidated Guidance summarizes national security objectives in military terms, as first deterrence of military attack on the United States itself, and secondly, protection of our most vital interests from attack and coercion. Such interests include access to resources and markets, security of allies, and access to key geographic regions for political, economic, and military reasons. The first objective is related to strategic nuclear capabilities and the second to conventional and theater nuclear forces, though linked to the strategic forces.

The Guidance then states that:

> These objectives form the basis for United States decisions as to the quantity and characteristics of both nuclear and conventional forces.**

It is obvious that interests and objectives stated at so high a level of generalization give little guidance to the actual shaping of military capabilities. The statements are general because they refer to very long-term interests and objectives and long-term means of defending them. The issue of time is crucial in comprehending the relationship. There are long-term and short-term relationships. Because military capabilities take so long to develop, they can relate best to the long-term enduring interests and objectives. However, a capability to support long-term interests and commitments does not automatically imply a capability to support specific short-term objectives, commitments, or policies. It is in the short-term category that the United States seems to have had the most problems. It is in the short term that mismatches between

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*Department of Defense, *Draft Consolidated Guidance, FY 1981-1985*, April 12, 1979, p. A-2.

**Ibid.

capabilities and the pursuit of a specific objective in a specific situation will most likely occur.

This is because the more immediate year-to-year impact on the military posture comes not from enunciated interests, objectives, policies, and commitments, but rather from the many other factors which shape capabilities. A generalization can be made that only in that long term can military capabilities be made to relate to interests and objectives in the sense of being constructed consciously, and that, except in the long-term sense, the development of military capabilities and their status at any particular time essentially occur apart from foreign policy objectives.

B. CURRENT U.S. STRATEGY

The next step in the process of translating policy to posture comes in the development of a strategy. It is the strategy that should be most directly reflected in the military posture. The basic strategic concepts used to develop U.S. forces involve deterrence of war on the one hand, and on the other, warfighting in order to deny to the enemy his objectives if deterrence should fail.

This strategy is based on certain operational premises about contingencies, Allied support, mobilization, and warning. The FY81 DoD Annual Report stated key issues in regard to that strategy:

> ...how many contingencies we want to be able to deal with at one time; how ready we should be for them; what contributions we expect from our allies; how long we should be prepared to fight; and what probability of success in reaching objectives we should seek to achieve.*

**DoD Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981*, p. 64.

For the United States to have the posture to deal with two or more simultaneous contingencies, and to keep such a posture "within reasonable cost bounds":

--We must depend primarily (but not solely) on our allies to hold forward defense positions in peacetime.

--This, in turn, permits us to organize a central reinforcement capability of combat-ready ground and tactical air forces located in the United States and able to move in support of a threatened theater.

--Such economy of force and the flexibility that goes with it, however, requires the presence of a number of other capabilities:

  --Naval forces for sea control and, where appropriate, power projection;

  --Early arriving guard and reserve forces to support the initial efforts of the active duty forces;

  --War reserve stocks to keep forces supplied and equipped in combat for at least as long as enemies; and

  --The ability to move with great power and speed on a worldwide basis through an appropriate mixture of strategic airlift, sealift (some of it with prepositioned stocks aboard), and what has come to be known as POMCUS (Prepositioned Overseas Material Configured to Unit Sets)--equipment and supplies stored in theaters of greatest danger to which personnel can be flown rapidly without absorbing large quantities of expensive lift.*

Judgments as to whether the United States (to say nothing of its allies) has the posture adequate to meet specified requirements "within reasonable cost bounds" have become increasingly difficult to make and controversial.

The ability of the United States to maintain an "adequate" posture depends on the Soviet threat that it is meant to meet, Allied efforts, and many other factors. The leap from military requirements to a particular combintion of hardware, readiness, and military manpower levels frequently requires an intermediate step which involves an act of faith. The specific requirements

*Ibid., p. 98

for combat capability are still arbitrary, that is, given the strategy, the operational assumptions, and the general capabilities, there is still considerable room for argument. There are many military postures that will satisfy some requirements, while other requirements may be impossible to fulfill.

The difference between stated strategic and actual performance was admitted by Secretary Brown, referring to how posture should follow from strategy and to the required capabilities cited earlier:

> That, I should emphasize is the theory. Our practices have not been entirely consistent with it. We have never fully acquired the agility and the mobility required by such a reinforcement strategy. We have tended to settle for a lower level of combat-readiness than is desirable for sudden and rapid long-distance movement and prompt fighting effectiveness. Despite our desire to build barriers to the early use of nuclear weapons, we have economized (some would say skimped) on the nuts and bolts needed to sustain a non-nuclear conflict in a particular theater for more than a relatively short time. And our allies have been even more cavalier about the support of their forces, especially in Europe.*

There is an issue involved here which is more than just semantic. If posture refers essentially to priorities, assessment of that posture could be quite different than that of a posture that included adequacy as an integral part of the definition. If the former definition is taken, the U.S. posture can be seen to have indeed followed policy across the years, concentrating on Europe as the key interest after the United States itself, basically shaping our overall capabilities to fight a European war. That priority was maintained even when budget pressures required force cuts elsewhere. Long-run posture thus accorded with long-run policy.

However, if the adequacy aspect is included, a different perspective emerges. As Secretary Brown has stated above, our

*Ibid., p. 99.

capabilities have not been adequate to carry out the strategy. While we have focused our posture on Europe, it may be questioned whether we ever have been capable of actually defending Europe at any particular time in the last 30 years.

The long-term-short-term relationship of policy to posture is illustrated by the adequacy issue. Over the long term we have defended Europe, by deterrence if not with conventional capability. That long-term focus, however, did not prevent the United States from fighting two long Asian wars with consequent impact on our posture. These wars, long as they were, can be viewed as relatively short-term policy consequences as compared to the strategic primacy of Europe.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX D

LONG-RANGE PLANNING IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY POSTURE

Other parts of this study have examined the sources of policy guidance and some of the influential factors involved in the process of translation into a military posture, and they have stressed the complex and disorderly nature of the process. Even with acceptance of these characteristics as constants, the observer is struck by the lack of any overall road map that combines policy and strategic goals with military capabilities. It would seem, in other words, that perhaps in longer term political-military planning would lie the means to achieve a greater correlation of policy and posture. However, long-range planning has until now had relatively little impact in DoD. The 1979 Rice Report stated:

> There is broad agreement that the first "P" in PPBS is silent.... Well done strategy reviews... are largely missing; long-term trends in international politics, economics, and technology and their influence on defense policies and programs are seldom treated systematically. A process for periodically challenging basic Defense policy is needed.*

By long-range planning for the development of military posture we refer to the process of determining long-term national security objectives; assessing the overall compatibility of military, political and economic ends and means; and determining priorities among competing objectives. This process does occur to a degree in different forms--resource allocation, force planning, strategic planning--but no mechanism of system has yet

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*Donald B. Rice, *Defense Resource Management Study,* Department of Defense, February 1979, p. 6.

been devised to do it on an integrated basis. What is done on a fragmented basis is done sometimes well and sometimes poorly.

An IDA study in 1974 revealed that in DoD, CIA, and the Department of State formal long-range planning and forecasting were either not undertaken at all or played a minor and symbolic role. While each of the Services had a long-range planning office, these offices spent most of their time on other work. The formal documents they produced carried little or no weight, even within their respective Services, being produced as part of a ritual drill rather than in response to an expressed need.*

One of the problems encountered in the development of formal long-range planning documents has been the fact that unfortunately the terms "long-range planning" and "long-range forecasting" have tended to be used interchangeably. Yet there is an important distinction, perhaps the difference between where one "wants" to be and where one "might" be, although, admittedly, in the long range it becomes difficult to separate the two lines of thought. All planning involves a degree of forecasting and indeed some forecasting should logically precede planning.

Yet planning is not forecasting. Forecasting is descriptive; planning is prescriptive. Forecasting is involved with possible futures; planning is goal oriented in that is is concerned with how to achieve certain selected objectives. The very dubiousness of long-range forecasting appears to discourage either planning or action from flowing from it.

The weapons acquisition process is by its very nature a form of long-range planning, with a continuing impact on posture 10-20 years ahead, but this planning is different both in nature and process. Ideally, a long-range political assessment would initiate the weapons planning cycle by laying out future strategic settings and suggesting the military capabilities to be

*IDA, *An Evaluation of the Joint Long-Range Strategic Study*, S-437, August 1974.

required to operate in those environments. Concurrently, a technological forecast would attempt to describe the possible state-of-the-art and then allow R&D objectives to be set to fulfill the ultimate requirements that flow from the future strategic situation.

A 1977 analysis of Navy long-term planning suggested the ideal process:

> While planning required for the PPBS and FYDP is important, a broader and longer range view of the world is greatly needed in three related areas. First, the Navy must consider social, economic, and political developments that will affect it as a military institution. Second, military doctrine must be considered against the background of changing technological and strategic developments and assessments of the future. Third, these changes must be considered in terms of the lead time needed for both hardware and manpower planning.*

Actually, the weapons planning process remains much more ad hoc and is influenced by factors more influential than strategic environmental assessments or forecasts. In 1972 the DSARC Cost Reduction Group addressed the problem of a more structured long-term planning function in contrast to the rather loose mechanisms that existed. They stressed the essentially short-to-mid-term nature of what structured planning is done, and called for an expansion of the planning horizon beyond the existing five-year "financial" horizon and the eight-year "forces" horizon to one more comparable to the life span of a weapons system.

The same point was stressed by the 1979 DSB Task Force on Strategic Planning, along with other recommendations intended to strengthen the long-term planning in DoD. The Task Force concluded that (1) the current planning system ("if one exists")

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*Office of the CNO, *Maritime Balance Study: The Navy Strategic Planning Experiment*, Appendix A, "History of Navy Long-Range Planning: An Overview, 1977," p. A-16.

is too budget oriented and short sighted, (2) long-range planning is worthwhile, (3) it must personally involve the highest levels, (4) OSD should create a long-range planning organization that is responsive to the Secretary and is related to the budget process, and (5) the Services should perceive OSD actions as the consequence of well thought out, long-range strategy (recognizing when the budget is insufficient to carry out that strategy); we should not reinforce the impression that we create a strategy each year to support a budget.*

Apparently the reason formal documents projecting long-range strategic environments have been ignored by weapons planners derives from the difficulty of establishing a relationship between such environments and R&D objectives, except in such a broad sense as to be all but devoid of any significance. Given the range of future potential strategic environments, prudence dictates that a system be capable of operating in as many ways as possible within the limits of its mission. Detailed political assessments and forecasts are not needed to justify the requirement. The link between policy and weapons becomes more tenuous the closer to specific systems one moves.

Force structure plans bear an equally loose relationship to long-range forecasts and assessments. Again the possibilities are so great that planners will usually pursue an objective of multi-purpose forces that are capable of operating in diverse environments. Of the several determining factors, the future world scene is the least predictable and, above all, the least controllable and thus will inevitably be of lesser interest to the decisionmaker. Consequently, long-range political and strategic forecasting can probably be considered at best a background for, not a direct input to, the military planner or decisionmaker

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*DSB Task Force, forwarding letter from the Chairman, DSB, to the Secretary of Defense regarding *Report of the DSB Task Force on Strategic Planning and the Maritime Balance: An Experiment,* OUSDRE, November 1979.

who will want as much as possible to deal in facts or estimates based on facts.

The prime issue in the lack of any effective long-range planning, however, really appears to have been not so much what the decisionmaker would like to have as his awareness of the limitations of what he can get. In the actual, as contrasted with the ideal, planning process decisionmakers would appear to be fully aware of how little they can estimate the long range and, consequently, they tend to ignore it. Long-range strategic considerations that are taken into account must necessarily be very broad, so as not to foreclose any options. Such long-range political environmental considerations as underlie the long-range planning that does go on in DoD would appear to have been essentially intuitive on the part of planners and decision-makers.

Relatively recent changes in OSD may offer some improvement. The assignment of a long-range resource planning function to the Assistant to the Secretary for Atomic Energy represents a useful concentration of authority. On the broader planning level, the role of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy could develop into a crucial planning link between policy and posture.

Strategic Planning. A distinction has been made above between the long-range planning as the term is generally understood and long-range forecasting. There is another category of longer term thinking, however, that does not really fit under either of the two categories. This is what can be termed strategic planning, which comprehends analysis of objectives and problems without necessarily laying out specific courses of action.

Strategic planning can be defined as focusing on the broad policy questions facing the nation, such as basic purposes and alternative courses of action or strategies to achieve those

purposes. It stands in contrast to operational planning that is more limited in its range of concerns and usually focuses on problems of implementation of broader objectives that have already been determined. The distinction between strategic and operational planning is sometimes not clear. The former is normally carried out at higher levels of authority, includes a wider range of alternatives, covers a longer period of time, and includes a higher degree of uncertainty and more unstructured problems. It takes a national perspective, while operational planning is done principally on a regional and suborganizational basis.

The contingency planning conducted by the unified commands and the JCS falls within the category of operational planning. However, there has been no continuing equivalent to strategic planning in DoD or the U.S. Government, and it is this lack which contributes heavily to the gap between policies, objectives, commitments, and military posture. Individual NSSMs or PRMs have taken a broad strategic view, but once completed they nave generally been pushed to the side by short-term considerations.

Across the years there has been some effort along this line. The Joint Strategic Survey Council existed within the JCS from 1942 to 1964, a senior group of two-star officers with a charter to conduct long-range strategic planning.* In 1966 an inter-agency group called the Contingency Coordinating Committee was established to consider potential politico-military scenarios. However, it was a lower level group that never achieved much impact, and it faded within a couple of years.

*One of the reasons given for the disestablishment of the JSSC was that it operated of a "partial vacuum," owing to its limited contact with the immediate problems engaging the Joint Staff. This, of course, reflects the basic problem of long-range planning, the need to break free of the short-term and immediate issues without losing touch with them. OJCS, Joint Secretariat, Historical Division, *Joint Strategic Survey Council*, November 1942-July 1964, December 6, 1974.

Of course, most of the activity of DoD is not linked to any longer term strategic concepts. The emphasis in planning tends to be on next year's budget. The system forces action toward minor perturbations in current courses of action. Broader strategic issues are, perhaps inevitably, reduced to generality and banality. National "needs" have come to be thought of almost exclusively in terms of money and hardware.

The Defense Science Board study of strategic planning in 1979 asserted that the OSD budget review process tended to look upon ideas or innovation as "soft" or "matters of opinion," and to direct attention toward more tangible hardware, thus underrating conceptual advances and doctrinal development.

The DSB summed up its finding in these words:

> There is no American strategy for the long run competition with the Soviet Union which warrants the label "adequate." For instance, a central component of a strategy is the definition of its objectives and it is evident that in many key areas of national security there exist no well formulated set of objectives which has the imprimature of the highest authorities.
>
> We make this observation while recognizing the lack of consensus on the scope and nature of American interests and on the threats to these interests. We also recognize that a system which has loose topdown direction allows potentially useful diversity to develop; it is a way to hedge against being systematically wrong. We are approaching the limits of incoherence in strategy that we can afford if we have not already passed them.*

Admittedly, strategic planning is limited by the legacy of the past in the form of existing posture-forces, organizations, and weapons. An example in the weapons field is that of the large aircraft carrier. Admiral Stansfield Turner has pointed

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*Defense Science Board, *Report of the DSB Task Force on Strategic Planning and the Maritime Balance: An Experiment*, OUSDRE, November 1979, p. 1.

out that there are certainly strong tactical arguments in favor of the large carrier (with large size implying small number). However, the key question as he sees it:

> ...must be what the strategic concept is behind what is becoming a small force of large carriers with high performance aircraft. What will the United States Navy need to accomplish in the 1980's and 1990's that will require Eisenhowers and Nimitzes and that cannot be accomplished by small carriers? Only after we establish our strategic goals by defining the kinds and amounts of air power that we believe the nation will need from the sea, can we address tactical issues like seakeeping and self-defense.*

Strategic planning is also inhibited by the ambiguity in the U.S. Government as to who the decisionmakers really are. There is a great diffusion of decision-making authority as a result of the diversity of participation. This tends toward the characteristic unraveling of decisions, the changes in response to next year's budget, because of the number of people who can influence what are in fact strategic decisions.

Secretaries of Defense themselves have not usually been able to engage in long-term strategic planning. Their concerns are day-by-day issues which effectively absorb all their time and energies. This is doubly unfortunate, since strategic planning should for greatest effectiveness be conducted at a very high level. The bureaucracy has apparently in the past provided little to the Secretary that could be termed strategic planning, thinking about areas that we should be getting into or out of or about our enemies' weaknesses and how we might exploit them. Such thinking is not a plan in the sense of being a blueprint for action, but rather an analysis of possible situations, their costs and benefits, and their possible consequences.

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*Admiral Stansfield Turner, "Thinking About the Future of the Navy," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1980, p. 69.

The need for strategic planning is illustrated by the current situation in the Persian Gulf. U.S. reactions to events there are an example of the difficulties that can beset an effort to link policy and posture. The importance of the oil has been apparent for years, and has been so identified in policy guidance. At the same time, the short-term political constraints on any efforts to protect the oil were equally apparent, the long-term interest being subject to the short-term state of U.S. relations with the Arab states, to relations with the Soviet Union, as well as the varying political views of different administrations. The STRIKE Command that was established in 1961 with a mission to prepare plans and forces for Middle East operations was never provided resources to back up the contingency plans.

However, the agreement with Britain in 1965 to develop a modest base on Diego Garcia did represent an effort to prepare militarily for changing political patterns in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean by providing the United States with a secure small facility in the middle of an immense area where we previously had not had such a base since the ending of British dominance. There was a long internal controversy over U.S. use of the base, but work finally began on Diego Garcia in 1971 and by early 1977 facilities were almost complete. Yet in March 1977, in the interests of a policy of détente, the United States proposed to the Soviet Union that the Indian Ocean be demilitarized. This would necessarily have ended our use of Diego Garcia, even though the utility of such a facility had grown yearly more apparent. Even as late as the June 1979 Vienna Summit Conference the United States endorsed an Indian Ocean "zone of peace."

The episode illustrated how short-term political considerations and conflicting policies can hinder or block military preparation to support a long-term political interest. Almost invariably these shorter term political considerations prevail.

The overall improvised character of the U.S. political-military response in 1979-80 to events in the Gulf does not suggest that it rested upon well considered longer range analysis of policy-posture, ends-means relationships. A *New York Times* editorial described it thusly:

> In effect, a new command has been created for anti-Soviet operations in the Middle East, to complement deterrent forces in Europe and northeast Asia. And this plan to defend a major new theater half a world away has been undertaken without any increase in total American forces. That means strength hitherto committed to Europe would be diverted; pressure to have the NATO allies fill the gap has not produced adequate results.
>
> Some haste to fortify the threats of a President may be understandable. But hardly anyone has been able to assess these priorities. The extent and risks of the Middle East preparations certainly need fuller explanation and debate.
>
> Any Soviet advance would then have to weigh the risks of an encounter with American forces. This has been described as deterrence with "a portable plate glass window" or "getting there first with the least." But an insufficient deterrent could also be a dangerous invitation to a wider war.*

The statement incorporated many of the issues described earlier in the policy-posture relationship.

Strategic planning should include what might be termed "disaster scenarios," scenarios more dangerous than and abruptly different from the scenarios normally used in short-term force planning. Scenarios like this might have included the possible collapse of Iran or the rise of an Arab oil cartel called OPEC. Current war scenarios for war in Europe, for example, tend to be narrow, concentrating on a competitive mobilization scenario. Russian attacks are usually presented as clear-cut aggressions, which is also a convenient means of ensuring a united NATO response. Yet the outbreak of war could

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**New York Times*, September 22, 1980, p. 22.

well be more ambiguous and thus lead to unforeseen consequences for unified NATO action. The scenarios also tend not to make the Soviet attacks as reasonable, daring, or imaginative as they may well be. A fuller range of potential perils needs to be examined for insights with implications for capabilities developments. The range of possible consequences of our involvement against Soviet forces in a Persian Gulf area war should be thought through, a process that is as much a part of preparation as the designating of forces and the prepositioning of equipment.

However, by its very nature strategic planning involving "disaster scenarios" would be extremely sensitive. The possibilities of leaks with their potential consequences cannot be overlooked, and it may well be that this is one reason why such an effort has not already been undertaken. In fact, given the nature of our open government, strategic planning may simply not be feasible. Nevertheless, such thinking should be an indispensable part of any analysis of national military capability to support national policy. The potential consequences of the employment of force, the spectrum of possibilities, must be considered beyond the outbreak itself.

Paul Nitze recently described the need for a longer vision:

> We must rid our minds of the fallacy that the concepts of détente and deterrence absolve us from concern with the possibility of military confrontations and the probable outcomes of such confrontations. We should seek to end the alienation of the U.S. middle class from our military. We should lessen the degree to which we conduct our foreign and defense policies in response to the public mood created by yesterday's television programs and guided by today's public opinion polls. Instead, our leaders should adopt a strategic view of foreign and defense policy--one which, even when dealing with specific problems, takes into account the entire world chessboard and the correlation of forces five and ten years from now, not just today's hot issue.*

*Paul H. Nitze, "Strategy in the Decade of the 1980's," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1980, p. 92.

Planning: The Outlook. More integrated and longer range planning is obviously not a panacea for all the problematical elements discussed in this paper that enter the policy-posture relationship. It does, however, represent at least a way to approach the problems arising from the mismatch between longer term military posture and shorter term political goals.

The major difficulty is and has been where in the diffuse American system such planning should and could effectively be done. The nature of the system itself is not conducive to this sort of planning, despite the awareness for the need of it. The repeatedly displayed difference between aspiration and actual performance of the many long-range planning efforts reflects the basic problem.

None of the existing organizational entities seems ideally suited to the sort of planning responsibility discussed above. The JCS is not, because it is a joint staff, a coordinating body, rather than a general staff. OSD planning offices offer more latitude but are still not strong enough. What is needed is a strong continuing entity, supported at the very top political and military level, and staffed by experienced long-term personnel.

Planning, it should be emphasized, is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Planning alone does not resolve issues of choice. What it does is to clarify the choices by putting them into context. The broader that context is the better the basis for decisions. A serious weakness of the American system has been the inability to generate an enduring mechanism to consider that wider context.