USAF AIR BASES: NO SAFE SANCTUARY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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In the short history of the United States Air Force, air base ground defense (ABGD) has been maintained episodically. Each time the Air Force has gone to war, a great deal of emphasis was given to the protection of air bases. However, upon the cessation of hostilities, ABGD quickly lost any serious planning, funding or training. In the early 1980's because of the increasing worldwide threat against air bases, the Air Force re-examined the subject and found it needing serious attention. Large programs were started which required extensive funding and manpower. The air operators had never been interested in this ground mission, they looked upon it as a siphoning of funds that could be spent on airframes. Therefore, the exterior defense of bases was gladly given to the Army under a Memorandum Of Understanding between the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff in 1984, which subsequently became a Joint Service Agreement on ABGD, commonly referred to as JSA #8. Many senior Air Force officers incorrectly believed this agreement answered the base defense question. This study concludes that nothing has occurred to improve the defense of air bases. The Air Force continues to offer no training in basic soldier skills to all airmen, and in doing so jeopardizes the security of its bases during wartime and contingencies. This study offers a brief history of ABGD. Then it assessed the general threat to air bases. It goes on to review current training programs and reviews JSA #8. The paper concludes with a number of recommended changes to improve ABGD.
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... Every airfield should be a stronghold of fighting air-groundmen, and not the abode of uniformed civilians in the prime of life protected by detachments of soldiers...

Winston Churchill, 1941

The United States Air Force, after much debate, agreements with other services, and wrestling within its own commands, does not have an accepted/approved air base ground defense (ABGD) directive. Nearly six years have passed since a Joint Services Agreement on ABGD, commonly referred to as JSA #8, was struck between the Army and Air Force directing the two to come to a common agreement on the defense of air bases. Despite protracted discussion between both services to the challenges of ABGD, no significant progress has been made.

The Air Force has failed to elevate the subject to a sufficient priority. This study will reveal that the Air Force has always treated the defense of its bases as a lesser need, until a war comes along, when it attempts to reinvent the wheel. History neatly reveals how the Air Force reacts to the challenges
of ABGD.

The Air Force leaves the chore of defending its air bases to one career field, the security police. This force consist of approximately 38,000 regular airman augmented by another 13,000 personnel in the reserve components. They provide excellent peacetime security for weapons systems, and nuclear arsenals. Also they provide law enforcement services to a worldwide compliment of air bases. Yet this force seldom has the opportunity to train for the war time mission of base defense. And when it does, the majority of other Air Force personnel do not participate. This lack of preparation has repeatedly been identified as a major weakness in base defense planning throughout the Air Force.

It seems the Air Force has always considered that taking up a rifle, and developing basic soldier skills for its own protection is distasteful. They would prefer to leave such task to the Army or host nation. An analysis of the enlisted and officer basic training programs will bear this out, for they offer no instruction in basic soldier skills.

Unfortunately, in the current global threat environment there is no refuge for anyone in uniform. Conflict may well break out inside bases, and there should be no room for the specialist who cannot protect himself and the resources he is to fly or maintain. This study will urge the Air Force to completely reorganize its basic training program and to train all airmen in the common military skills necessary to assist in the defense of
their base under any threat. The Air Force can no longer operate under the assumption that the umbrella of JSA #8 is the answer to ABGD. Likewise the myth that large numbers of Army Military Police (MPs) awaiting just off base for the beck and call of the air base commander must be dispelled.
ENDNOTES


CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE

You can never plan the future from the past.

Edmund Burke. 1797

Throughout the history of U.S. military aviation, air bases have, for most part, been immune from large ground threats. During WWI, when airpower was in its infancy, the airfields were located some distance from the enemy's lines. While there were often attacks from the air, ground based attacks did not occur. WWI history does not record acts of sabotage or guerrilla activity.

During WWII, Germany captured the British Air Base at Malarme, Crete, in May 1941. This event certainly changed the concerns of protecting air bases. Churchill immediately made the Royal Air Force (RAF) fully responsible for its own defense. This initiative gave birth to the RAF Regiment, whose sole purpose was and remains the defense of British Air Bases. 1 The U.S. quickly followed the British. During February 1942, Gen. George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, approved the formation of 296 air base security battalions. 2 But the need for these units was never realized, so by 1943 their inactivation was already
under way. After 1942, U.S. air bases never experienced a serious threat, and other conventional military units were assigned to protect the air bases when the situation demanded. The only other serious problem came in late 1944 and early 1945 when over a half million Japanese overran the so-called eastern bases in the China Burma India Theater. A ground offensive of this size was of course beyond the scope of any local defense capability. At the end of WWII, the Army Air Force lost all of its air base defense forces with the inactivation of the air base security battalions.

In 1947 the Air Force became an independent department with specific missions and responsibilities outlined. However, the responsibilities for defense of its bases remained vague. The Key West Agreement of 21 April 1948 described basic roles and missions of the armed services. Base defense was identified as a function common to all services, and no other attention was given to this important mission.

In 1950, when the Korean War broke out, the Air Force was in no position to defend its bases. There were approximately 10,000 active air police, but their duties consisted of the traditional military police functions of law and order in and around air bases. The Air Force quickly recognized that the Korean bases would require wider protection, so the ranks of air police rapidly grew to 39,000 in a short fifteen months. An air base defense school was organized at Tyndall APB, Florida. Additionally, many NCO's and officers were trained at U.S. Army
schools to lead and direct these forces. Immediate procurement of armored vehicles, recoilless rifles, and other infantry weapons was also undertaken. During the Korean conflict, air bases received some harassment from both North Korean regulars and guerrilla forces, but no large scale conventional attacks were made on the bases. When the Korean Truce brought hostilities to an end in 1953, the Air Force, with its large air police force of 39,000 still did not have a doctrine on air base defense. Immediately after the war, Congress began an examination of Defense Department strength, and one of the first questions put to the Air Force asked for the justification for 39,000 air police, which exceeded the total number of the Army and Marine Corps MP's. The Air Force could not support these numbers, because it had not established a formal ABGD program. Congress then threatened to set a ceiling on security forces for the Air Force. The restriction was avoided when the Air Force immediately announced a twenty percent reduction of air police forces. 6

After the Korean war and through the rest of the 1950's the Air Force returned the air police to their traditional law enforcement and physical security duties. Base defense was all but forgotten. The schools were inactivated, and the acquisition of weapons, other than small arms, stopped.

There was one notable exception to this deemphasis of ABGD. General Curtis E. LeMay, Commander In Chief of Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), directed the security and defense of Strategic
Air Command (AC) bases would be a SAC responsibility. SAC had become a world-wide command with bases scattered around the world—many in remote regions, where no other U.S. Forces were present. The bases also had large nuclear inventories. LeMay stated that he was getting most of the defense budget on new jet tankers and bombers, and he recalled, "By God I was going to look after them." 7 This was the beginning of a professional security force within SAC that received tremendous support, which continues to this day. SAC developed the first directives to be adapted by the Air Force as a standard for the protection of air bases. 8

The Vietnam War changed the threats to air bases. No longer were airfields refuge from battle. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese often targeted air bases in South Vietnam, and a large number of U.S. aircraft were destroyed by ground attacks. The bases were often targets of standoff weapons, such as mortars and rockets. Enemy ground attacks ranged in strength from platoon to battalion. Once again the Air Force frantically increased the size and capabilities of its security forces. Security police strength in Vietnam grew to where each base had a squadron that numbered from 300 at small sites to 800 at large bases. 9 All of the bases within the theater experienced some threat. The security police, for the most part, did an admirable job in protecting the bases in Southeast Asia, with considerable assistance from other services and South Vietnamese Forces. However, the Air Force was reluctant to commit its own forces to
the defense of air bases early in the conflict. Only after the Commander United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV) announced that all services would provide their own base defenses and not tie down tactical forces in this common responsibility did the Air Force start committing numbers of security police to ABGD. 10

Following the Vietnam War, predictably, the Air Force dropped base defense training, and eliminated key funding for modernization of weapons, communications, and vehicles. Yet history was not allowed to be completely repeated again. The terrorist threat, particularly in Europe, where air bases with large nuclear stocks require great numbers of security forces with ground combat skills to protect those critical assets, did not allow the Air Force to totally dismiss concerns of ABGD.

In May of 1975, an important personnel event occurred which impacted the security police field more than anything else in its brief history. Air Force Chief of Staff, General David C. Jones, appointed Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Sadler as Air Force Chief of Security Police. Sadler would report directly to the Chief Of Staff. 11 Under Sadler's direction the security police found the leadership and support this large force needed. Anti terrorist courses soon became soldier courses with emphasis on small unit tactics and equipment. Funding for the programs received priority and the term "base defense" became synonymous with security police forces. After General Sadler was reassigned, the security
police remained under the direction of a general officer, and the
career field has emerged. producing a very professional security
force capable of performing its mission of base defense anywhere
in the world. Unfortunately, however, security police still do
not enjoy the unqualified support of the rest of the Air Force,
and this apathy jeopardizes the entire ABGD mission as this paper
will further illustrate.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p 3.

3. Ibid., p 3.


5. Ibid., p 6.


7. Telephone interview with Curtis E. LeMay, General USAF, retired, Former Commander in Chief of Strategic Air Command (SAC) and Chief of Staff, USAF. 21 and 25 January 1990.


10. Ibid, p 11.

11. Prior to the appointment of General Sadler, the security police were under the staff direction of the USAF Inspector General (TIG). It has since been reassigned to the TIG, but under the supervision of a security police brigadier general.
CHAPTER III

THREAT

It is easier and more effective to destroy the enemy's aerial power by destroying his nest and eggs on the ground than to hunt his flying birds in the air.

Giulio Douhet, 1921

There are numerous threats to air bases. In the European scenario, Soviet special forces (Spetznaz) or operational maneuver groups (OMG) are targeted against air bases and their facilities. The same applies in the Korean theater with ranger/commandos from North Korea. These are the threats that our security police forces train against. However, what it takes to immobilize an air base is amazingly simple: First, make the runway inoperable. This requires nothing more than a crater or two on the runway or at key taxiway gaps leading to the runway. Second, destroy the aircraft at parking stations, shelters, hangars, and alert pads. Third, wound or kill the aircrews. This prescription for catastrophe could continue on with the placement of surface-to-air-missiles at departure and approach ends of runways, the destruction of fuel terminals and command and control facilities. The point is, air bases are soft targets and very difficult to defend. Large conventional units are not
needed to execute these kinds of actions. In fact, air bases are ideal targets for enemy special forces, sympathizers, and in-place agents with rather simple explosives and equipment. They will probably speak our language and wear our uniforms. Therefore the threat can and will be executed from within the perimeter as well as from outside. This kind of action will occur long before any reinforcements will ever arrive so it is sheer folly to depend on any one other than Air Force personnel to defend against these threats. USAF air bases occupy every conceivable terrain and location. Their only common feature is ten to twelve thousand feet of flat surface for a runway. Air bases are found crowded along side of metropolitan areas and in the rural countryside. They are located in mountains, deserts, artic and tropical regions. They are situated on every continent among some of the most diverse populations on earth. The perimeters range from only a few miles to more than thirty five miles. In many cases, the bases are hours or many miles from other U.S. Forces. The very nature of air bases will always offer the advantage to the attacker rather than the defender. The protection of an air base will depend upon every airman assigned; and such protection must not rely upon reinforcement from another service or ally. The F-16 mechanic, munitions specialist, or any airman that realizes the threat to his resource, and who is trained to challenge and report that threat is as vital to the ABGD effort as any security police trooper or soldier. "Everybody on the air base must play a role in defense of their air base."
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid.
CHAPTER IV

TRAINING

"With today's threat, there is absolutely no reason why every member of the Air Force can't be reasonably proficient with a rifle, and contribute to the defense of their base, otherwise, they are a burden and liability."

General Curtis E. LeMay, 1978

The Air Force is a superb trainer and educator of aviators and the technicians who support and maintain aircraft and missiles. On the other hand the Air Force neglects the basic military skills so common to other services. No where is this more evident than the lack of common and basic soldier craft found in the Air Force basic training courses for both enlisted and officer personnel.

The basic training courses of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps teach a common skill. The Army and Marine basic training programs turn out a basic rifleman with a fundamental knowledge of tactics at the fire team or squad level. Navy basic training produces a sailor trained in the basic skills of fighting the ship -- damage control, survival at sea, and ship security. These basic skills are taught to each member of these services, regardless of their future military occupation.
Air Force basic training fails to prepare its people in these military skills at the very time when the foundation of military skills should be instilled. The current basic training program produces an airman who can properly wear the uniform, recognize and salute an officer, march in flight formation and live in an open-bay barracks, which he will probably never again see after basic training. He receives a total of ten hours of marksmanship training with the M-16 rifle, including pre-mark, maintenance, and range time. The course of fire is only for familiarization and does not qualify one to be armed in the performance of other duties. A serious indictment of the entire basic training program is that the trainee spends more time on administrative details than he spends in weapons training. Other basic military skills, such as cover and concealment, challenging and reporting are not taught. The airmen move on to their career courses and bases without being prepared to contribute to the defense of their bases. Neither the technical or career courses include ground combat in their curriculum.

The commissioning courses -- OTS and ROTC -- are failing to prepare future junior officers in base defense methods. These courses offer no standard weapons training with the rifle. Most offer only a familiarization course with the handgun. Site defense tactics and unit security methods are not found in the Air Force officers basic courses, other than for security police. The Air Force policy is these skills will be taught, when needed, at the permanent duty station. However, line bases are not
staffed or equipped to administer this training.

Recently the Vice Commander of the Air Force's Air Training Command made this observation on the lack of general military skills taught in the Air Force:

I think we need to review all of our training programs with an eye toward including more of the traditional military skills. I think the warrior spirit and leadership responsibilities are closely tied to retention. People come in to the Air Force expecting discipline and training necessary to employ arms, because that is what the military is all about and they do not expect someone else to do it for them. I often feel that one of the reasons our pilot retention is poor, is because we don't challenge them enough. Sure they love the cockpit, but I know they feel responsible for more, and maybe ground defense along with maintenance could offer those additional challenges. It's not just the pilots, but all our people need to be prepared for eventualities. The world today offers no guaranteed protection to any specialty, and when people can't protect themselves they burden our entire force. 3

The training program is the weakest link in the security and protection of air bases. Basic training does not introduce fundamental ground combat skills, and this neglect sets the attitude for the new airman for the rest of his career. The airman leaves basic training without any grasp of critical ground combat skills that could mean the difference between failure and success of future Air Force missions.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid

Only those defenses are good, certain, and durable which depend on yourself alone, and your own ability.

Niccolo Machiavelli, 1513

Prior to 1984, when the Joint Services Agreement on Air Base Ground Defense (ABGD) was struck between the Army and Air Force, ABDG was receiving tremendous support. In fact the Air Force was near to developing its own light infantry with some light armor for executing the ABDG mission. It was common knowledge among Air Force personnel that the size and scope of the ABDG mission was beginning to attract the attention of the senior leadership of the Air Force because of the cost. It came as no surprise, then, that ABDG became one of the initiatives to be negotiated with the Army along with thirty other roles and missions. The entire program is commonly referred to as the 31 Initiatives. Nevertheless, when the announcement was made there was an immediate loss of morale among Air Force Security Police. The SP's had toiled hard at their task of preparing forces to defend air bases. Their arsenals had grown to include 61mm mortars, 90mm recoilless rifles, .50 cal.
machine guns. Funding had been received to convert light armored vehicle (LAV) 25's for ABGD. The ABGD school at Camp Bullis, Texas, was turning out airmen/soldiers. The Army Infantry Officers Basic Course (IOBC), the Infantry Basic Course for NCO's (BNOC), and the Ranger school were providing key instruction to key cadres.

Then the axe fell! Overnight the security police mission changed from an off base tactical defense force, to an internal security force, confined within the perimeter of the air base. JSA #8 basically stated that the Army was responsible for the exterior protection of air bases and the Air Force would have the inner perimeter security. The agreement also placed all forces under the operational control of the air base commander. In addition, the Air Force pledged to transfer Air Force Reserve manpower spaces to the Army if ABGD requirements exceeded the Army's capabilities. 3

JSA #8 further directed the two services to develop joint procedures for rear area security. This was meant to provide enhanced base defense against low threat levels of enemy response, from protection against saboteurs up to, but not including, battalion level assaults. The immediate interpretation of across the Air Force was reduced to "our business is inside wire." Wing commanders curtailed ABGD funding, and emphasis around defense beyond the air base perimeter was ignored.

The Air Force had earlier established its base defense
doctrine and tactics as outlined in AFR 206-2. JSA #8 made this obsolete. The Air Force has yet to provide a directive that establishes new doctrine and tactics for the defense of air bases. The only interim directive that attempted to implement the JSA #8 is a joint pamphlet, DAP 525-14 and AFP 206-4 "Joint Operational Concept for Air Base Ground Defense." This pamphlet only defines the terms of JSA #8. No real guidance or direction is offered.

Three years after the formal agreement of JSA #8, the Air Force Office of Security Police (AFOSP), which is the Air Staff office providing the direction for Air Force Security Police, briefed the Inspector General (TIG) of the Air Force, who has overall responsibility for ABGD under the new proposed directive. The TIG found the directive implementing JSA #8 lacking and ordered a new concept be immediately prepared, "one which would work for the Air Force." That directive has not yet been published.

It appears that the reason for the long delay in establishing a joint doctrine is that neither the Army or Air Force proponents for this task believe that JSA #8 is workable in its present form. Further, there has been a serious lack of effort by both services to resolve this critical issue.

It can be argued that JSA #8 was not necessary. The U.S. Army is the service charged with the execution of land warfare, and that task includes defending any United States site that is
threatened by a large ground force. JSA #8 directs the Army to respond to threats from less than battalion size forces with its MP's, and with a tactical force to threats from a battalion and larger group. The real threats, as indicated earlier, are not from this size of force. They will attack early in the conflict, and only platoons or smaller forces that will conduct these attacks. This is exactly the mission for the Air Force's security police. However they must not be confined to the perimeter of the base.

Defenses cannot begin and end at the wire. Listening and observation posts for screening must be some distance from the base. They must be in place at all times, aided by the latest technology in sensors and detection equipment. The threat must be detected early, and response forces must come from the base, operating under the command of the base commander. It is not feasible to expect a timely arrival from the military police, who are already over loaded with other wartime missions of area security, law and order, protection of main supply routes, and management of enemy prisoners of war. It is really unrealistic to consider any other force than the Air Force's own to deal initially with threats to air bases, regardless of where that threat comes from.

JSA #8 does not meet the needs of either service and should be discarded as a source of doctrine. Other mutual supporting agreements should be pursued regarding ABGD, such as the training of ABGD forces that came about under JSA #9 which is working for
the interest of both services. JSA #9 is a fine example of what the Army and Air Force can accomplish when similar skills are required by one or the other branches. In this case Air Force security police receive ground combat skills training from the Army. It is proving to be an excellent program and eliminates duplication of another training function. The training is presently given at Fort Dix, New Jersey.
ENDNOTES

1. Prior to JSA #8, the Air Force Systems Command/ADYQ at Eglin AFB Fl, was in the development stage of testing a light armored vehicle (LAV) 25 with a number of weapons systems, including the Stinger, surface to air missile (SAM) and a 20mm cannon. The funding for this program ceased in July 1984.


4. Department of the Air Force Regulation 206-2. Air Base Ground Defense and Contingencies (Draft), is still in coordination, and according to AFOSP/SPOA, Kirtland AFB, N.M. the final product is some months away from publication. 30 November 1989.


6. JSA #9 as outlined in Richard G. Davis's The 31 Initiatives: A Study in Air Force and Army Cooperation initiated the training of Air Force Security Police in ground combat skills which is now conducted at Ft. Dix, N.J. by the U.S. Army.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Air Force has developed a union membership mentality toward ABGD: "if it ain't my job, I ain't doing it." This specialist attitude begins in basic training and is nurtured through the technical training courses and later in career assignments. While such indifference is unintentional, the lack of common military skills taught during basic training tends to make one think that either these skills are not important, or such tasks are someone else's responsibility.

The basic training program of the United States Air Force fails to provide the instruction necessary to allow its members to contribute to the defense of air bases, and by doing so this training degrades the security of USAF air bases. The Air Force must first realize that air base ground defense is an entire service mission, rather than just a security police function. Every uniformed member must be able to take up arms and become a part of the overall base defense effort.

The entire training program needs immediate revision; we must launch a major effort to initiate every new member to the brotherhood of arms. Among the first items issued should be a rifle. The rifle, after indoctrination, should be carried every
day of training. The weapons should be secured in the barracks and not turned in to a central armory at the end of each day. Training in the security and control of the weapons is essential, so when the trainee arrives at his permanent duty station he is familiar with the procedures. Every basic training squadron should establish an exterior guard system that requires trainees to man posts. Certainly, they should not have live ammunition. But the point is, that the trainee should recognize that regardless of his future specialty, a rifle will be a part of his equipment.

The program must include other common skills. Cover and concealment, challenging and reporting could easily be introduced. There must be an indoctrination that brings about a wider understanding and awareness of the vulnerabilities associated with the defense of air bases.

Rifle training should produce an airman who can maintain and employ a weapon safely and the airman should be capable of putting sustained fire on a target, and hitting it. Such training far exceeds the familiarization course that is currently presented in basic training. This is a pitiful program, not worth the money and time spent on it. Why? Because it accomplishes nothing. It offers inadequate maintenance training, and requires no recognized qualification course. In fact, the standards remind one of those found at carnival shooting galleries. For example, a trainee walks to a firing position
where a weapon awaits. He fires at a fixed target from only one distance. If the weapon malfunctions, he raises his hand and a instructor attends to the malfunction. Immediate action drills are unheard of. The entire rifle program needs immediate overhaul. The time, money, and resources should be made available to produce an airman who leaves basic training capable of bearing arms upon arrival at his new duty station. He should be thoroughly prepared to assist in the defense of his installation.

Other skills could be introduced like, Rapid Runway Repair (RRR). This critical air base operability task could be substituted for half the the time now devoted to barracks arrangement, flight drill, and field days of athletic events. Consideration should be given to performing some of the training while in chemical protection gear.

In basic training, each member should be introduced to the basics of their service, where certain skills common to all in the operation and defense of an air base during war are taught. Basic training must be a time when the new member becomes acutely aware that he is no longer working for McDonalds, Sears, GMC or the neighborhood supermarket. There must be no doubt in his mind that he is now a member of the United States Armed Forces. Unfortunately, the Air Force has considerable distance to go before such military awareness is instilled in to every new member.

Procedures out in the line of the Air Force must also change. Since the security police alone are presently charged with the
security and protection of air bases, many institutional procedures are liabilities. The SP's have all the base weapons in one storage facility. Destroy it, and no one can be armed. Every squadron should have a minimum number of assigned weapons and an armory where a commander can immediately arm his people to assist in the defense of the base. Strict physical security requirements on armory construction must not interfere with a base being able to arm itself quickly. If an aircraft shelter is sufficient for securing an F-16 fighter, then surely it can safely secure an M-16 rifle and ammunition. The same applies to wing command post, communication centers, petroleum terminals and other critical choke points to base operability. These are the locations that will quickly become the first targets in any conflict. So the Air Force must have people ready to fight to at these critical locations. The time to train and equip these forces is now. We must immediately discard the idea of depending on some other service or ally to provide this response. "It is an Air Force responsibility and duty to protect air bases, and not to burden others with this common critical task."
ENDNOTES


3. Department of the Air Force Regulation 125-37 "Protection of Air Force Resources" 1988. requires the storage and security of small arms to exceed the physical protection provided to some aircraft. This directive must be relaxed to allow and encourage units to meet good sensible and secure weapons storage that will permit the rapid arming of airmen when needed.
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Indeed these are changing times for our world, our traditional opponents, our national priorities, and our armed forces. At the center of this change is a debate on force structure, capability, roles, and missions to deter or fight an enemy at the lower end of the operational continuum. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are highly trained forces which can operate particularly well in what has been described as a "Low Intensity Environment." In this study, the author describes peacetime contingency operations and the generic roles of SOF conducting direct action missions within a theater. He then describes...
command and control options and senior leader considerations. The study con-
cludes that SOF's flexible employment capabilities in the contingency role and
across the operational continuum are at the leading edge of a change in Army
priorities to highly deployable, CONUS-based, contingency forces.