MANNING THE ARMY IN PEACE AND WAR

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOSEPH W. TREZ, IN

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
This study examines the key manning decision that faced the senior Army leadership during the 1980s and which will continue into the 1990s. It analyzes the concept of the Individual Replacement System (IRS) versus the Unit Manning System (UMS) as competing personnel management systems in the way we man the force in both peace and war.

The paper provides a historical background of our manning system. Next, the author provides his personal perspectives on the issues from his
experiences in units as a commander and as a personnel staff officer under both systems as well as a Unit Manning System project officer in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) at Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). The paper also provides the reflections and manning philosophies of many of our senior Army leaders. Finally, the paper concludes with recommendations for the senior Army leadership on ways to man our future force in both peace and war.
USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM

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MANNING THE ARMY IN PEACE AND WAR
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph W. Trez, IN
James W. Williams, PH.D.
Project Advisor

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US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
12 March 1990

UNCLASSIFIED
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. MANNING THE FORCE: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Cohesion: The Reason Why Men Fight</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre World War I Manning Procedures</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War I Manning Procedures</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II Manning Procedures</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean War Manning Procedures</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manning Procedures Between the Korean and Vietnam</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicts</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War I Manning Procedures</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Historical Lessons</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. A NEW MANNING SYSTEM FOR THE ARMY OF THE EIGHTIES</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Experiences Under the Individual Replacement System</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A New Way of Manning: By Unit</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putting the Plan Together</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Rotations To Korea</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Otis Model For USAEUR</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The COHORT Integration Model (CIM)</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of CIM Results</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Key Decision by the Chief of Staff, Army</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing the New System</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apply a &quot;Unit Equity&quot; Approach</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish a Regimental Depot System</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide a Menu of Replacement Options</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Align the Training Base with Active FORSCOM Divisions</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Final Plea For Cohesion</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX 1</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1: Macro View of Rotation Option</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2: FORSCOM Brigade (Under Rotation Concept)</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3: Training Base Alignment Concept</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

This study examines the ways in which our Army mans the force in both peace and war, provides (for historical purposes) personal insights into the key Unit Manning System (UMS) decisions made during the 1980s, and provides recommendations to the senior Army leadership for the future based on past lessons.

The paper analyzes the differences between the Individual Replacement System (IRS) and the Unit Manning System (UMS). It also provides a unique personal view of the subject based on the author's experiences as a commander and as a staff officer in units manned under both systems and as a project officer in the Unit Manning System Division of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) at Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). The paper concludes with the author's recommendations for the senior Army leadership on how to man the force in the future.

I designed this paper to provide a basis for a future direction to the manning program based on the lessons from past programs and my extensive experience with the subject matter. I believe that the timing is right for implementation of the entire program to build a more combat ready force for the future.
CHAPTER II

MANNING THE FORCE: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

This chapter briefly outlines the history of the our Army’s manning systems and describes the controversy that surrounds the subject area. The first subject discussed is cohesion because it's at the root of the manning issue.

UNIT COHESION: THE REASON WHY MEN FIGHT

Many contemporary soldiers and scholars believe that unit cohesion ties closely to combat performance. For example, James Pulley concluded in his recent study that,

> For centuries armies throughout the world have studied the art of fighting wars ... and certain principles consistently come to the front. One of these is that men who go into battle and fight as cohesive teams always produce better results.¹

S.L.A. Marshall’s Men Against Fire, provided a detailed study on cohesion in small combat units. He concluded that men fight because of the moral strength that they draw from the other men in the unit. The stronger the bond between soldiers, the better the soldiers perform in combat. When Morris Janowitz, the dean of American military sociology, was questioned on the subject, he said, "The question is not how to create cohesion. Armies have known how for centuries. The question is, why the
American Army doesn't want cohesive units."²

Keeping soldiers and their leaders together as long as possible, in both peace and war, apparently adds to their combat effectiveness. The relationship depends on the unit member's attitude. When high turnover and turbulence exists in units, then soldiers usually do not feel the strong sense of cohesion necessary to fight effectively in combat.

This study provides a review of our background in this area, and the lessons that are applicable to determine the way we should man our force in the future.

PRE-WORLD WAR I MANNING PROCEDURES

Throughout the early history of the American Army, we followed the European regimental depot model of manning. In this system, soldiers stayed in the same unit for the length of their enlistment. The soldier owed allegiance to his regiment and to the other soldiers of the unit. Many of these units contained members of the same family and established a tradition of regimental family service.

In the beginning of the American Civil War, our forces attempted to adhere to this manning principle; however, as the requirement for larger forces on both sides grew, both sides had a tendency to rely more on an individual replacement system. This situation resulted in the constant activation of new units rather than the maintenance of experienced ones with replacements.³

As a departure from our Civil War replacement system, in
1899, each of the American regiments in Cuba designated one of its three battalions as a depot battalion. Personnel assigned to this battalion were either ill or about to be discharged, and they returned to the Continental United States (CONUS). The battalion remained in CONUS for a year while it rebuilt and retrained and then rotated with another battalion. Under this system, a recruit spent two of the three years of his enlistment overseas. The success of this program led the United States Army to adopt this program for its units stationed in the Philippines and Puerto Rico. The program continued until 1912. By then, budgetary considerations and the eventual introduction of American combat units in World War I required that we send personnel overseas regardless of their time left in service. The result was the return of the individual replacement system for manning overseas units.4

WORLD WAR I MANNING PROCEDURES

The U.S. Army fully instituted the Individual Replacement System (IRS) in 1912 to meet the urgent need to rapidly place large numbers of soldiers in the combat theater for geopolitical reasons. The system relied on the fundamental concept of industrial mass production. The system essentially defined soldiers as interchangeable spare parts in a system that required stereotyped behavior.5 Under this system, many presumed unit performance as a simple summation of the skills of the individual soldiers. Furthermore, in this war, many believed that material
technology and numbers essential drove the results of battle and not the nature of human groups performing combat operations.  

At the beginning of the conflict, the War Department, in order to raise a large standing army, activated and manned forty-two new divisions before they created a replacement pool. When committed units in combat sustained heavy casualties, soldiers from newly activated and arrived divisions broke away from their units and became individual replacements for front line units. Soldiers did not stay together in either groups or units. Furthermore, the vacancies created in arriving divisions required the breaking up of follow-on divisions. This continuous process resulted in the rebuilding of some divisions up to three times in the eighteen months of the American involvement in the war.

Additionally, soldiers who became casualties and were evacuated found themselves reassigned, when they recovered from their wounds, to whatever unit most needed replacements. Few of these individuals returned home to their original units.

The Germans sustained their entire wartime manning system using a replacement system based on the regimental depot model. Furthermore, when the war ended, both France and Britain immediately returned to their prewar regimental depot systems.

WORLD WAR II MANNING PROCEDURES

The U.S. Army used the individual replacement system as its primary manning tool for most of World War II. However, by 1945 the Army's leadership recognized the need to provide some
degree of cohesion to groups of replacements. Therefore, on 8 April 1945, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations (ETO), announced as policy the institution of a buddy system whereby reinforcements (replacements) trained and shipped in platoon or squad sized units. As a minimum, soldiers moved in groups of four. During the first six months after the invasion of Normandy, about 1,300 packages containing 250 personnel and subdivided into platoons and squads arrived at specified corps and divisions. This system aided morale in the ETO. ETO requested that commanders assign these prepackaged units or groups to the same unit in as low an echelon as possible and under no circumstances break up the four man groups. Unfortunately, this procedure came too late in the war to be beneficial or to provide sufficient time for evaluation.

The Army also ran World War II demobilization on an individual basis. Soldiers returned to the States based on a points system. This resulted in the complete shattering of unit integrity. In the end, as in the beginning, our personnel policies continued to focus on the individual without regard for the impact on the unit. After the end of the war, a number of studies examined the problems with our replacement system in this war and made recommendations for how to do it in the future.

The following discussion from Peter Kozumplik's comprehensive study of the US Army's Replacement System describes our World War II manning mindset:

Generally, the Americans placed an increased emphasis on the individual and on managerial efficiency rather than on unit cohesion. The emphasis on the individual actively impeded cohesion because it encouraged the
soldier to focus on himself instead of on the unit community. (This mindset has stayed with us since the inception of the IRS).

The emphasis on the individual was carried to the point that whole regiments were dissolved to provide individuals to fill shortages in committed units with high casualty counts.

Judged in terms of unit cohesion, the American system was a failure.12

On the other hand, the Germans, the Japanese, and the British fought the Second World War with manning programs firmly based on the nineteenth century regimental depot model system.13 In this system, each regiment trained their own replacements and sent them to the committed units of the regiment as packages to replace losses. The emphasis remained on cohesion throughout the process. American planners usually dismiss the German system as a model for our Army because the Germans lost the war. However, Janowitz and Shils analyzed the effects of cohesion in the Wehrmacht, and they concluded that the Germans exhibited an extremely strong sense of unit loyalty and pride in contrast to a sense of individualism and a weak sense of unit on the part of Americans.14

After the end of the war, many military groups also studied the German system in depth and compared it to the results of the American system. For example, the following description of the German model comes from a September 1950 study of World War II Replacement Systems by the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Because the study forms the basis for comparisons and recommendations in chapters III and IV of this study, a detailed discussion of its content follows:

The German Replacement Army came into being with
general mobilization in August 1939. Since replacement units were generally posted to specific field force units, replacement soldiers had a home in the Army. The recruit had a feeling of belonging from the time of his entry into the service.

Every infantry regiment of the field force had its own infantry replacement battalion (with the same lineage and numerical designation) which supplied it with replacements. In turn, the regiment kept the unit staffed with combat experienced cadre and kept it up to date on training problems. In their own best interest, regimental commanders detailed the best possible cadre for these units and kept close supervision over the unit’s training program. This situation also provided the commander with the ability to provide rest from the front line fighting for some of his officers and noncommissioned officers. The principle of territorial integrity played an important role in the German Army.

As the war progressed and the need for replacements expanded, one to three regiments of newly formed divisions were assigned to each replacement battalion.

A far-reaching reorganization of the German replacement system occurred in October 1942. The increased numbers of replacements required caused replacement units to be broken into two parts. One part, the training unit, had the responsibility to provide basic training for recruits. The other part, the replacement unit, had responsibility for all other functions.

However, both units were inextricably linked with each other and the field division that was to receive its replacements. Training units were sent to occupied territories to conduct their on-the-job training and served as reserve divisions and corps.

By March 1945, entire units of the Replacement Army were thrown into battle as combat units. This occurred as the battle zone and home fronts were merged into one and total war set in for the country as the German war machine collapsed.

One of the ground rules that remained throughout the war was that convalescents must be reassigned to their parent unit. In those cases where large scaled reorganizations or reactivations occurred such as after the loss of twenty-two divisions of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad, remnants were used to form cadres for new units. These units were then sent to France for training and charged with coastal defense during their train-up period before going into combat. 15

The German model made it as possible to send replacements to the front as divisions, regiments, battalions, companies, or, if
necessary, into small groups or buddy teams. This feature of rapid expansion and contraction in wartime provides a model worthy of study by the American Army for the future.

In 1947, The Department of the Army Replacement Board, which had been commissioned to study the matters affecting replacement systems, worldwide, provided the following observations and recommendations based on their study of the U.S. Army World War II model:

First, their observations of U.S. replacements in World War II:

Unanimity exists on at least one matter concerning (U.S.) replacements; generally, their morale and efficiency deteriorated steadily from the time they entered the flow until they reached their unit of final assignment. The causes are multitudinous, but one stands out in the minds of all who have (studied) and observed (U.S.) replacements in the various stages of their travel. The replacement (experiences) utter loneliness that arises from the constant change in his associates, with the result that he seldom was with others well known to him, from service under unknown and frequently changing leaders resulting in a feeling that there was no one upon whom he could depend for consideration and advice, and from the realization that he was but one individual in a tide, destination unknown. In short, the replacement stream was but a mass of bewildered individuals, each lacking the sense of belonging that members of a unit normally possess ...

Throughout the long travel, interrupted by extended periods of stagnation in storage depots, it would be the exceptional replacement who could have acquired a friend (a buddy) who accompanied him to his final assignment. Normally, replacements joined their unit as a group of mutual strangers ... Strangers in a unit cannot be effective; it ignores the psychological (and usually physical) unreadiness of the replacement to participate fully in the operations of his unit ...

And, their recommended solutions ...

Informed commanders and staff officers have commented upon the desirability of replacements being delivered to their final assignment in groups (preferably in platoons) despite the possible objections from the standpoint of the administrative difficulties that this process would cause.
Platoons should be standard in size with one officer and about fifty men. The platoon should be organized to the end that its integrity can be maintained longest in the final stages of travel to ultimate unit of assignment, preferably to the company level ...

When an individual is to be associated with a group for a long period, he instinctively seeks to build up and maintain his standing in that group ... Under this system, replacements can normally be absorbed into their units under conditions other than close combat permitting them to know their fellows and their leaders. When studied further, there are administrative efficiencies that result from this system because there is now a self-contained leadership structure as the platoon moves throughout the system. Also, the system can group individuals early by a code to track it rather than fifty individuals ...

Never again, except in the direst emergency, should replacements -- unknown, lonely, frightened -- ever be fed singly into units, only a few hours later to find themselves facing the enemy. This one act in a very short time can damage seriously, if not undo or completely destroy, all of the previous training and preparation, no matter how well it was accomplished. 16

KOREAN WAR MANNING PROCEDURES

Based on the bad experiences with the handling of replacements in World War II, the Army placed a forty man replacement company organic to every field division for this Conflict. They in processed the new replacements and provided them an in-country orientation to include the lessons that the unit learned in combat. Some divisions extended this orientation time for soldiers once they reached their regiment of assignment. 17

Although the addition of the replacement companies improved on our previous wartime experience, the procedures that dominated the personnel management aspects of the Conflict aimed at providing fairness to the individual and sharing the burden equally among individuals. It appears that we had not learned the most important lessons from the previous war - those that dealt with the aspects of cohesion.
In Korea, soldiers accumulated points determined by their exposure to hostile fire and those with a prescribed minimum (number of points) were eligible to return home. Soldiers did not necessarily remain with their units for the duration of the conflict.16

Army personnel policies in Korea were based upon World War II findings that the length of combat exposure in relation to combat intensity was the most significant risk factor leading to a stress casualty. The comparatively massive resource base of the United States and the nature of the conflict led to the decision to minimize combat exposure for the soldiers involved. Korea saw the imposition of a one year tour for most soldiers in a combat zone followed by the return of each eligible soldier home at his rotation date.

With the exception of the first bloody months in Korea, most units were introduced to combat at levels of intensity just high enough to enable the rapid testing and development of knowledge, trust, and intimacy that exemplify the horizontal and vertical bonding of a combat group. The levels of initial commitment to combat most often were also low enough to pose no ultimate threat to the existence of the not yet fully bonded and integrated group.18

Army leaders in Korea again became dissatisfied with the effects of the individual replacement system and reinstituted the packet system of replacements with the minimum packet consisting of four men. However, records indicate that the packets were not always kept together once they arrived at the combat unit.19

The Korean War replacement system demonstrated that a routine peacetime distribution system failed to meet emergency and limited war requirements without modification. It also illustrated the devastating effects that an individual replacement system had on cohesion in combat units.

THE MANNING PROCEDURES BETWEEN THE KOREAN AND VIETNAM CONFLICTS

Between the Korean Conflict and the American involvement of
combat units in Vietnam, the U.S. Army relied on the Individual Replacement System to man the force. Operations GYROSCOPE, ROTAPLAN, and OVUREP provided exceptions to this procedure.

Operation GYROSCOPE included the rotation of entire divisions, regiments, and battalions (to include family members) from one stateside post to U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) (tour length = 33 months) and then rotation back to the same or another stateside post (tour length = 31 months) at the end of its tour of duty. The purposes for this experimental program were as follows:

1. Raise the morale of troops and their families by providing greater permanency of enlisted men's assignments, enable them to plan ahead better, and provide them an opportunity to establish roots in a local American community.

2. Increase the combat effectiveness of the Army by developing a sense of belonging which would lead to increased morale and esprit de corps as well as better teamwork in the unit.

3. Lower the cost of maintaining the Military Establishment through increased reenlistment rates, efficiencies of mass movement and processing, and the improved maintenance of equipment.

4. Provide experience in directing and conducting mass movements.

Lieutenant General Robert M. Elton, U.S. Army, Retired, and a former Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) of the Army, provided me a recent personal description of his experiences as a member of a GYROSCOPE unit during an oral history interview. He said, "My first unit, the 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment was a GYROSCOPE unit. I had the privilege of spending five continuous years in the unit in a number of different capacities. It was a great experience. The program kept leaders and soldiers together for a long time and provided us the
opportunity to train, take care of soldiers and their families, and to produce a truly combat ready unit.

It was this early positive experience in Unit Manning that I shared with others like (General) Max Thurman, (General) Carl Vuono, and (General) John Foss that convinced us that, as senior leaders, we had to try, to the best of our abilities, to recreate for the combat units of today's Army."

The Department of the Army discontinued GYROSCOPE after a three year test (1955-1958) based on the following reasons:

- The program created a have and have-not situation between units both in CONUS and in Europe. This perception resulted from the application of different personnel policies to one unit and not the other which created the perception of a higher degree of personnel resource requirements.

- There existed a requirement to manage personnel assigned to a GYROSCOPE unit off-line as compared with the rest of the Army which created additional administrative problems.

- The program became more expensive to manage as compared to the individual replacement system.

- Senior commanders considered the discipline of the GYROSCOPE units generally lower than some non-GYROSCOPE units.

- The inability of USAREUR to deliver on the guarantee of family quarters for all GYROSCOPE families.

- Perceived lowering of Europe's combat readiness because of the insufficient training of GYROSCOPE units in the United States before their departure for Germany.
Difficulty in handling the size of the rotating units (divisions). Personnel problems were greatly magnified. USAREUR made twenty-five thousand assignments to place the four departing divisions in a GYROSCOPE posture. Even with the massive efforts to posture these units for rotation, not a single division achieved the desired personnel eligibility requirements without reservation.²²

A post GYROSCOPE study published by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, HQDA, in March 1959, outlined the following course for the future Army replacement system:

The goal of the U.S. Army replacement system is to accomplish the unit-to-unit assignment of all military personnel ... Recognizing that neither individual nor unit replacement is at all times the most effective personnel replacement procedure, a median method is to package a number of individuals designed for a single unit when that unit will sustain large losses at one time, yet remain in its deployed position ...

Reconstitution of units whether decimated by cyclic losses in peacetime or by nuclear losses in war, can best be accomplished in the Zone of Interior ...

Units in the CONUS can be used as new deployments are required, or with the expansion of a unit replacement system will be available to replace major units requiring reconstitution. Unit replacement to a substantial degree is envisioned in current contingency and war plans of the Department of the Army ...

There are occasions when neither individual nor unit replacement methods will meet the requirements or conditions of a deployed unit. By staggering the training of packets, one armored division in CONUS is able to support two overseas. The control and transport of packets is more economical in cost and in lost duty time than by the individual replacement and is thus desirable when unit losses are too heavy for individual replacement but too light for entire unit replacement.

The objective of the U.S. Army Replacement System is to maintain procedures and structure in peacetime which will provide immediately expanded personnel support of a mobilized Army. Therefore, both individual and unit replacement procedures of Department of the Army must be currently shaped and maintained so as to fit the Theater Army replacement flow during wartime. ²³
On the other hand, Operation OVUREP (Overseas Unit Replacement) involved the rotation of combat units from a CONUS location to Korea for a one year time period. This program involved only the movement of the unit and did not include families. It also provided the Army the opportunity to take full advantage of the two year duty tours of selective service personnel. The first year involved training and preparation for overseas movement, and the unit spent the second year in Korea. This program achieved success compared to the manning of Korea with individual replacements. It also represented a departure from the unit manning procedures used during GYROSCOPE because it did not involve the movement of families, and it involved smaller units. However, the program did not last long because of the need for increased pools of available manpower in CONUS for possible use in Europe for the Berlin Crisis. Therefore, the manning of units in Korea returned to the individual replacement system. A total of seven battle groups moved to Korea under the OVUREP system.  

ROTAPLAN became the final unit rotation model used during this time period. The plan called for the rotation of an infantry battalion from CONUS to Europe, without dependents, for a six month period. ROTAPLAN existed to achieve the following goals:

- Reduce military dependents overseas.
- Reduce the gold flow to Europe by reducing the number of U.S. citizens abroad.
- Increase combat readiness in Army combat units in Europe.
- Reduce turbulence and turnover in units.
- Increase training proficiency and readiness.  

ROTAPLAN involved rotating the 1st Battle Group, 38th Infantry Regiment with the 1st Battle Group, 16th Infantry Regiment.
The unit discovered in July 1962 that as the test battalion for this project its advanced party needed to leave in September. On 15 October 1962, the main body made the transatlantic crossing and closed in on its new home for the next six months at Baumholder, Germany as part of the 8th Infantry Division.

The battalion remained in Europe until April 1963 and then rotated back to CONUS. After two successive rotations the program ceased based on the strong recommendations of Army commanders in USAREUR for the following reasons:

Financial hardships endured by married personnel of the battalion. (Seventy percent of all married personnel in the unit were grade E-5 and below). These personnel received no compensation for their family separation. Vulnerability of personnel for a short tour overseas as individuals six months after their return to CONUS. The Baumholder community experienced no decrease in the total number of dependents living in family quarters after the battalion arrived than before. No significant difference in the amount of gold flow resulting from the spending habits of this unit's personnel than if their dependents accompanied them. The unit experienced personnel turbulence. The battalion required that 187 enlisted men from other USAREUR units be transferred into the unit to make up for personnel shortfalls after deployment. Although the unit deployed over to Europe at 103 percent strength, it returned to CONUS at less than 85 percent strength after six months in Europe. The insufficient notification time and personnel turbulence which resulted in relation to this move caused a deficiency in the desired state of team training at the time of deployment. The perceived overall impact of reduced combat readiness at the division level because of ROTAPLAN.

In summary, this between the wars period found the U.S. Army experimenting with different aspects of unit rotation models to meet its overseas requirements. Only Operation OVUREP received positive results in relation to the amount of resources and effort involved. In all cases, the test programs appeared rushed.
into operation without the necessary implementation of plans and policies necessary for their successful implementation. Furthermore, the procedures used continued to focus on the individual aspects of personnel management—i.e., individual overseas tour lengths, requirements for individual family quarters, etc. The Army still failed to focus on unit equity, unit cohesion, and the minimization of turbulence and turnover in units. It appears that in our attempts to want to have something right away, we created systems that worked at cross purposes from what we were attempting to achieve. As a result, we continually abandoned our efforts and returned to the individual replacement system because it provided the necessary degree of flexibility that we desired as an institution to treat everyone equally as an individual.

VIETNAM MANNING PROCEDURES

The Vietnam era manning system, similar to our personnel systems used in prior wars of this century, focused on the individual and not the cohesion needs of the unit.

With the advent of large scale involvement in Vietnam, the active Army expanded rapidly and formed units for deployment to satisfy ground force requirements. Because the one year tour policy remained in effect after the introduction of units, the Army resorted to the use of an infusion technique which distributed soldiers with varying rotation dates into units. This was to preclude instantaneous disestablishment of the units after one year in country. While the reason for sustaining the force this way were sound, the potential for developing enduring commitment and relationships was severely diminished. 27
The procedure provided the necessary manpower to keep our units involved in combat at near full strength all the time. However, the system appeared to destroy cohesion, break up groups of soldiers on a routine basis, and in many ways isolate individuals unto themselves on the battlefield.

The rest of the Army, which included all units outside of the Vietnam Theater of Conflict, stayed in a constant state of turbulence and turnover. Individuals remained assigned for short periods of time and then rotated as individuals to Vietnam. Others were Vietnam returnees with a short period of time to serve until their End of Term of Service (ETS). The average period of assignment to a unit was six months to a year. All of these policies had a detrimental effect on combat readiness.

**POST VIETNAM MANNING PROCEDURES**

The post Vietnam Army remained under the Individual Replacement System. The emphasis remained on individual equity and centralized management efficiencies. This period saw turbulent times throughout the force as the Army transformed from a draft Army to the Modern All Volunteer Force mandated by the Government.

As the Army moved further away from the Vietnam conflict in time, and as it gained experience from studying the effects of modern conflict on the battlefield (Arab-Israeli War of 1973), the Army leadership began to reevaluate our personnel manning policies and procedures.
The Army again attempted to test a unit rotation system with a program called Brigade 75 and Brigade 76 (1975 - 1979). This rotation concept consisted of both a unit rotation of six month Temporary Duty (TDY) tours, without dependents, for ground combat units and a unit rotation of normal overseas Permanent Change of Station (PCS) tours for the Brigade's Headquarters and the Support Battalion. The PCS units received replacements during their overseas tour from the individual system pipeline.

The purpose of the rotation program was to increase combat readiness in Europe during a time of a perceived growing military threat from the Soviet Union. The program had a total of nine deployments in the Brigade 75 program and two deployments under Brigade 76. Brigade 75 and 76 commanders reported no problems in the rotation. A total of 35,848 personnel participated in the program which ended in February 1979. The last combat unit stayed in Europe on a long-tour PCS status.

When General Edward C. Meyer became the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army in the late 1970s, he appointed a council of the smartest and most promising colonels in the Army to study the causes for the problems in our units throughout the force. The group reported back that our most serious problems involved a broken personnel management system which detracted from combat readiness. As a result of their report, General Meyer appointed a special study group known as the Army Cohesion Study Task Force (ARCOST) to determine what personnel problems affected our units and how to fix them. The Army Inspector General also conducted an independent study that reached essentially the same
conclusions as the ARCOST group. Consequently, in 1979 the U.S. Army embarked on another experiment in Unit Manning in its attempt to develop more cohesive fighting units. The New Manning System had two components - the U.S. Army Regimental System and the Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training (COHORT) system. (A detailed discussion of this program follows in the next chapter).

SUMMARY OF MANNING LESSONS

Throughout our American military history we utilized various forms of individual and unit manning in both peace and war. Invariably, our American desire for efficiency, our sense of fairness and equity to the individual as part of our American ethic, and the vast personnel resources available to our country has consistently driven us to use the Individual Replacement System.

However, the Individual Replacement System is usually held responsible for the erosion of cohesion in units and for debilitating effects on the individual as he travels through the replacement stream. My analysis of our past experiences with our Army's different manning systems leads me to the following conclusions:

- Our replacement system must provide a sense of cohesion to our fighting units if it is to be effective in creating a combat ready force.

- The manning program must consist of a combination of individual replacement, unit replacement, and packaged replacement.
- The system we use in peacetime must be easily adaptable to mobilization and sustainment in war.
- Units that go into battle as cohesive teams usually produce better results than those units that are not cohesive.

ENDNOTES


5. Peter W. Kozumplik, Comparative Wartime Replacement Systems, pp. 3-4.

6. Department of Military Psychiatry, Evaluating the Unit Manning System: Lessons Learned To Date, p. 7.


8. Ibid., p. 188.


13. Ibid., p. 4.

14. Christopher C. Straub, The Unit First: Keeping the Promise of Cohesion, pp. 9-10.


18. AR 600-83, p. 4.

19. COL Norman Skinrood, USA. A Combat Rotation System for the Army, pp. 6-7.


21. Elton, Robert M., LTG USA (RET), Oral History Interview. (Cited with special permission of Lieutenant General Elton.)


24. AR 600-83, p. 4.


27. AR 600-83, p. 4.

CHAPTER III

A "NEW MANNING SYSTEM" FOR THE ARMY OF THE EIGHTIES

The following quotation from the Office of the Chief of Military History's study of our World War II replacement system outlines the challenge for designing a future manning system:

No one can foresee future replacement problems, but their solutions are likely to be based on obvious military principles. Those who violate the laws of war usually do not show much originality. They do not think up new mistakes. They just go on making the old ones. Failures in the replacement system are likely due to failures to observe known principles and doctrines. No operation is likely to be more successful than the planning which preceded it, so it is essential to adopt regulations (and procedures) which will correct the known faults of the replacement system before that system has to go into operation. Efficient operation of the replacement system also will depend upon finding the correct solutions to a whole series of problems involving staff relationships, efficient training, proper classification, correct assignment, effective orientation, prompt transportation and the effective assimilation of men into the unit. ¹

BACKGROUND

In the late 1970s when General Meyer became the Army Chief of Staff, many considered the U.S. Army as a hollow force. As a leader with great vision, General Meyer knew that to make the Army a more effective fighting force he had to directly attack those issues adversely affecting the combat readiness of our forces. Many of the manpower and equipment problems dissolved due to the timing of the increased Reagan Defense budget. However,
these measures alone would not solve the problems that plagued many of our combat units. Personnel turbulence and turnover in our units required fixing because, in combination, they eroded away at cohesion.

As a result of the Army Cohesion Study Task Force (ARCOST) report, in 1979, General Meyer directed that the Army take the necessary steps to install a "New Manning System" which established the feeling of belonging and cohesion within all of our combat units. The two parts of the system were the U.S. Army Regimental System and the Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training (COHORT) System. Both systems had as their goal keeping soldiers and their leaders together longer in units. The Regimental System focused on affiliating soldiers to specific regiments which had battalions in both CONUS and overseas. The COHORT system created specific units to a given three year life cycle. The concept called for all Skill Level 1 soldiers to train in the same unit in the training base and then move together to the same unit in U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) where they joined a cadre of officers and noncommissioned officers who stayed with them for the next three years. The model had the following variations:

The 36 month fill-and-keep FORSCOM model provided for a continuous unit lifecycle at the same installation.
- The U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) company replacement model provided the unit 18 months in FORSCOM and 18 months in USAREUR.
- The USAREUR battalion rotation model provided the unit 36 months in both locations with a first time reload package at the midpoint.
- The Korea company replacement model provided the unit 24 months in FORSCOM and 12 months in Korea.

All of our prior studies showed us that we needed a
combination of systems to include individual, unit, and packaged replacements in order to develop and sustain cohesive combat organizations. In everyone's mind and heart they knew that this program followed the way that we needed to go. However, all of our prior experiences also told us that we had not yet made the system work. Many throughout the Army's bureaucratic structure remained skeptical that this new attempt would succeed.

PERSONAL EXPERIENCES UNDER THE INDIVIDUAL REPLACEMENT SYSTEM

During my Army career, which has spanned a period of over twenty years of active duty, I experienced both the individual replacement system and the unit manning system in a number of versions. Since I extensively used this experience as a point of reference in my work with the New Manning System, I will recount the most influencing portions of these experiences to provide the reader a framework for understanding my background.

As a lieutenant from June 1969 to June 1971, I experienced the Vietnam period Individual Replacement System (IRS). During these two years, I had five moves including the Basic Course and Airborne Course, a six month assignment to Fort Bragg, followed by a return to Fort Benning for Ranger School, then an assignment to two different divisions in Vietnam, and, finally a reassignment back to Fort Benning as an instructor.

As a Vietnam replacement, I experienced the loneliness that is often described in books and movies. I felt the same feelings of helplessness as the private as I joined different groups of
faceless replacements at every step in my journey. I never belonged to one group long enough to make any acquaintances, and I arrived at my final destination with no one that I knew or who traveled with me at any other point in my two week journey.

My tour in Vietnam started at McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey along with all of the other replacements who had a port call there on that day. We sat on the World Airways jet in the order that our name appeared on the manifest. Although I remember to this day the name of the airlines, I never knew the name of any of the others on that aircraft nor did I ever see them again. Upon our arrival at Ben Hoa in Vietnam, we moved to the 90th Replacement Battalion where we joined another transient group for the next two days as we received uniforms and assignments to units across the country. As luck would have it, none of the other officers from the transient billets had orders to the 4th Infantry Division with me. All of these great revelations came via a roster posted outside the orderly room at various times of the day and night along with a notice of the time for manifest call for shipment to the next point on the assembly line.

As I moved to An Khe by C130 aircraft, I joined another group of replacements who accompanied me to the home of the 4th Infantry Division. Throughout the four day stay at the replacement center, personnel came and went on a daily basis after completing their short orientation period of training. On my fourth night in the replacement company, a truck took me to my new home, the 3rd Battalion, 8th Infantry. After a short one night stay in the battalion's rear, where I met the rear detachment as well as
those soldiers who were on their way home, I moved by truck to the brigade's forward support base. Once there, I moved by helicopter to the battalion's fire base, where I met the battalion commander, his staff, and members of the company manning the perimeter. The next day, another helicopter took me to my unit which I joined in the field.

I did not stay very long with my platoon and Alpha Company. After about a month, I became the battalion's reconnaissance platoon leader. I hated to leave my old unit. I do not even remember the names of my platoon members after so short a period of togetherness. The only exception was my radio telephone operator who died in my arms the week before I left the platoon.

I stayed with my new platoon until the end of October when we stood down the battalion as part of the President's announced troop withdrawal from Vietnam. Upon arrival of the unit at Quin Nhon, the unit split apart and went as individual replacements to units across the countryside. I never saw any members of my platoon again. And, I saw only three other members of the battalion at any time in the future.

I went to the Americal Division in Chu Lai where I repeated my experiences as an individual replacement. I joined the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry where I spent the rest of my twelve month tour in Vietnam in two different positions. Throughout this time, I watched soldiers come and go on a weekly basis. Most fell victim not to enemy bullets but rather to our personnel management system. Although I spent eight months in this unit, when I left Vietnam, I only saw three of the individuals from the battalion
at any time in the future. The entire Vietnam experience with the individual replacement system left a lasting impression on me, and it shaped the way that I would view our personnel management system in the future.

My next encounter with the individual replacement system in units came in the mid-1970s as a staff officer and company commander in the 82nd Airborne Division. The "Division" enjoyed a high priority of personnel fill and remained fenced from many externally generated permanent-change-of-station (PCS) requirements because of its high priority mission. Consequently, it had less turnover than any of its counterparts in the Army. Nevertheless, replacements arrived every week to replace losses. The battalion's quarterly turnover averaged between 15 and 20 percent. I believed that this condition hindered training and combat readiness. I always felt that we were not as good as we could be or should be. However, I took a great deal of comfort in knowing that we were better than any other unit in the Army in terms of personnel fill.

A NEW WAY OF MANNING: BY UNIT

In the 1980s, I returned to Fort Bragg again. This time as the executive officer of a battalion scheduled to go to Sinai, Egypt, on a six month unit rotation as part of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). The unit had no turnover or turbulence for a short period before and the six months of the rotation.
This experience became my first close encounter with a unit manning system. I had never before experienced such a close knit organization. The unit, at all levels, achieved heights of cohesion, proficiency, and training readiness that I had not thought possible. Furthermore, the soldiers' families also formed a close knit family support group that became the model for the Division after the Grenada operation. The entire organization from top to bottom functioned as a family unit. This experience was the way that I believed the Army should be.

Upon returning from the Sinai, I went to the Division staff where I served as the Assistant Inspector General for a year followed by another year as the Assistant Chief of Staff, (G1). During this two year period, I closely observed and participated in the forming of two follow-on MFO battalions, a COHORT company, and a COHORT battalion that would rotate to Vincenza, Italy, as part of the Army test of the battalion rotation program.

During this period, I came to realize that, to create these cohesive high performing units under a unit manning system other, units had to pay the price in terms of lower manpower and increased turbulence. Although the unit paid the price over a short period, the bad feelings ran deeply through the ranks; there were now two types of units the have's and the have-not's!

There were many important lessons for me from this experience that I applied to my next assignment, at Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) where I served as the operations staff officer in the New Manning System Division of the Office of
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER). It became my mission to help design the future for the Unit Manning System.

PUTTING THE PLAN TOGETHER

As I arrived at the Pentagon in July 1985, the New Manning System was off and running. At that point in time, the U.S. Army Regimental System was in the process of re-flagging units into regiments. The office remained busy creating four new Light Infantry Divisions using the COHORT process and simultaneously rotating eight battalion sized units under a test program that involved four CONUS based COHORT units and four units based in USAREUR. Furthermore, we continued to sustain the company COHORT program which started in 1981. At the time I arrived, a total of 80 companies and 30 battalions participated in the Armywide COHORT program. Of these, 11 companies and 4 battalions were in USAREUR, 3 companies were in Korea, and the remaining companies and battalions were in FORSCOM either waiting to deploy or as fill-and-keep units.

The plan to man all of the combat arms units within the 2nd Infantry Division with COHORT units became my first mission.

UNIT ROTATIONS TO KOREA

In September 1986 General William Livsey, Commander-in-Chief (CINC) U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) sent the following message to HQDA in an attempt to convert all combat units within the 2nd
Readiness on this peninsular remains the most important issue to consider. Conversely, personnel turbulence in this theater is a fact of life and certainly a readiness detractor. COHORT in Korea will reduce the turbulence, enhance cohesion, and foster a greater sense of belonging and esprit.2

This mission had the full support of Lieutenant General Elton, the DCSPER, and General Thurman, the Vice Chief of Staff, Army. The major objection to the program came from General Sennewald, the Commander of FORSCOM. This staff action became the turning point for traditional COHORT, because it brought to a head the major issues that surrounded the whole program.

On the one side of the issue, it made good sense to rotate units to Korea. Such a program would solve many problems of an individual replacement system and a one year tour without dependents. It would also assist in modernizing the 2nd Infantry Division. Finally, it would reduce the piecemeal takeout of personnel from FORSCOM units who provided the bulk of the individual replacements needs of Korea.

However, General Sennewald wanted to insure that the costs of doing business under the COHORT program were identified to the decision makers in Washington before they decided to expand the program. The following discussion summarizes the cost of COHORT:

For every COHORT unit created, a number of sister units became victim to increased turbulence. These units provided some of the cadre members to meet the required time in service requirements for the unit's lifecycle. To compound the problem, these same units were also the prime candidates to provide personnel to fill the requirements of the worldwide individual replacement system.

Existing units had to be stood down and broken apart to make room for the new COHORT units. Many leaders
argued that we were destroying cohesion in order to create it.
Additionally, the existing modernization schedule in FORSCOM ran counter to the requirements for modernized units in Korea. Therefore, insufficient units existed to start up and sustain the rotation scheme.
Due to the scheduled changes in the FORSCOM force structure, which included the motorized and light infantry designs, the only infantry units that fit the projected structure for the non-mechanized battalions in Korea were at Fort Campbell. Neither FORSCOM nor DCSOPS would support the use of the 101st Air Assault Division’s units to Korea because they were a one-of-a-kind design and earmarked for other contingency areas around the world.

The bottom line was that we could not execute the Korea model to meet the requirements that General Livsey provided to us unless we restructured the entire COHORT program.

THE OTIS MODEL FOR USAREUR

At the same time that we were working the Korea rotation issue, General Glenn Otis, CINC USAREUR, wanted to step up unit manning opportunities in USAREUR. However, he proposed using a model that was a drastic departure from the traditional COHORT model. He sent the following message to HQDA in September 1986:

We have received the briefings and have reviewed the outputs which support our desire to capitalize on increased combat effectiveness produced by COHORT. I firmly believe this program has potential to improve our fighting forces capabilities beyond any other single step we could take.
(The) Sustainment of existing units is essential if we are to capitalize on the full potential of COHORT. It will also align our personnel replacement system to a manner in which it must function during war.
COHORT is a great program. You have the full support of the Army in Europe.3

The quote above from General Otis, reflects his personal
feelings on the potential of cohesive units. He wanted to transform COHORT from a peacetime manning technique to the system that he believed was needed to sustain the force in peace and in war. His vision and insight were great and had a major effect on the program--so much so that, at HQDA, we named the new model after him and called it "the Otis model."

I had the opportunity to discuss this concept with General Otis on a one-to-one basis on two separate occasions. The following discussion summarizes his vision based on my personal recollections of the meetings.

General Otis believed in the power of cohesion; however, he believed that the focus on cohesion had to be down at the squad, crew, and platoon level. At the company and battalion level the issues are morale and esprit, and not cohesion. He saw focus at the company and higher level as disruptive in itself. First, the traditional COHORT program meant that existing units broke apart to make the holes for the COHORT units. Furthermore, he saw the disestablishment of a COHORT unit at the end of its life cycle as also being disruptive because some soldiers and leaders were remaining in the unit with time left on their overseas tour. These personnel had to be reassigned. Finally, he believed that the constant influx of companies and battalions, to include families, had an adverse effect on the community structures in USAREUR.

The Otis model followed the same conclusions as study groups recommended after both World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam. Additionally, the model considered the impacts that large group arrivals and departures made on the community structure. The
model basically said that, after a unit deploys to USAREUR, it should receive sustainment packages of replacements at periodic intervals, and the unit should not end its life cycle. The needs of the unit drives package size and composition. The end result creates fill-and-keep COHORT units, sustained by packages and individual replacements, in both USAREUR and FORSCOM.

THE COHORT INTEGRATION MODEL

This new approach to unit manning, as opposed to the traditional COHORT model, created a new set of management challenges. At the HQDA level, we needed an automated management tool to examine the effects of the changes and to chart the new course for implementation if the concept was approved by the Army Chief of Staff. Based on General Otis' input and the feedback received from the other Major Commands (MACOMs) and the test and evaluation agencies, we embarked on a major revamping of the COHORT program in January 1986.

Our main need was an automated management system that let us interface with all other HQDA information systems and let us examine where we were at any time in the program's execution. We also needed a program that let us run "what if" excursions to determine what would happen if certain variables changed.

In our internal discussions, we discovered that our internal Analysis and Evaluation Branch had a Symbolics 3600 single-user computer system that could operate a rule based "expert" system. A rule based "expert" system drives a model to apply a set of
logical rules to a specific problem or set of problems and then provides the results for analysis. The model does not provide an optimal solution. It does, however, provide a solution by describing what happens when the rules are applied or relaxed. With the technical assistance from Lieutenant Colonels Norv Eyrich, Doug Austin, and Jim Griffith and the programming expertise of Pete Grant, our civilian contract programmer, we successfully translated the input from the field and the Army staff into the following seven rules that operated the model.

- The amount of training base capacity that could be consumed in a given month by MOS.
- Force structure compatibility between units being considered by the model for rotation.
- Regimental compatibility between CONUS and overseas commands.
- Readiness constraints specifying the number of units by type and by brigade and division that could start up or reload at any one time.
- FORSCOM constraints concerning the time periods when units could start up or reload based on exercises or other requirements.
- USAREUR constraints on the number of companies that could arrive at a given community during a specified time period.
- HQDA generated constraints based on the requirements to support the current COHORT program sustainment and to build the battalions for the Light Infantry Divisions.

Since the model was designed to integrate all of the aspects of a world wide COHORT manning program, we called it the COHORT Integration Model or CIM for short.

ANALYSIS OF CIM RESULTS

Throughout the analysis process, major problem areas continued to appear, mainly involving the execution of the
ongoing COHORT program. The combination of changes in activation
dates for the new light infantry units, sustainment of existing
COHORT units, and the requirement to backfill the eight
battalions in the DA test rotation program consumed, in given
months and Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs), more
capacity from the training base than what was available at
maximum output levels. Problems also surfaced in the force
structure of COHORT units that would become incompatible with
their overseas unit before they rotated. Finally, the model
determined that the battalion model for Korea could not be
resourced without major changes in the COHORT program.

Although enough annual training base capacity appeared in
the macro analysis to support the program, there was not enough
capacity at specific times to meet MOS requirements for battalion
COHORT. The bottom line to the analysis was that the traditional
COHORT program required major reworking. The analysis also
revealed that the system that could be supported was the Otis
model of package sustainment. An alternative was a return to the
individual replacement system.

After we completed the analysis, we went on a worldwide
briefing tour to tell the story of the CIM and of our
recommendations for program changes. All MACOM commanders were
receptive to the package sustainment approach and were encouraged
by the results predicted by the modeling. There were some,
however, that saw a move to the package replacement system as a
return to the individual replacement system and an abandonment of
COHORT.
The time was right to brief General Wickham on the results of our study and to seek concept approval for the recommended changes to the COHORT program.

THE KEY DECISION BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY

Prior to going to General Wickham for a decision briefing, we obtained the support of several key people: LTG Robert W. Riscassi, the DCSOPS, CSM Glen Morrell, the Sergeant Major of the Army, and General Maxwell R. Thurman, the Vice Chief of Staff. At least one of these people, General Thurman, had a vested interest in the COHORT program. He had nurtured it as the DCSPER and then as the Vice Chief. Even so, we were concerned that he would not support such a drastic change to the program. He listened intently to our briefing and focused on the changes that we proposed, the sustainment issues involved, and the implementation methodology for the new program. To our surprise and delight, he embraced the new concept. I believe that he saw in this new approach that the benefits of COHORT especially, small group cohesion, could be achieved at a lesser cost to the Army. With the Vice’s blessings, we scheduled the decision briefing.

On 2 October 1986, we briefed the new concepts to General Wickham and General Thurman. In attendance were representatives from each of the principal Army staff agencies, Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN), and U.S. Army Recruiting Command. The following main points were briefed and approved:

- Use of the CIM’s methodology as the management tool for the Unit Manning System.
- Conversion of traditional COHORT units in FORSCOM and USAREUR to the package sustainment model recommended by General Otis and built into the CIM.
- Expansion of a limited number of new COHORT units in FORSCOM and USAREUR which would be sustained by the package system.
- Extension of traditional company COHORT units to Korea on a staggered life cycle and in accordance with a phased in modernization schedule.
- Phased in conversion of light infantry battalions to a package sustainment model beginning in FY88.

General Wickham was excited over the prospects offered by this program. He saw in it the continuation of General Meyer's vision as well as his own, and a transition of the Army from the individual replacement system to a unit manning system that provided commanders a menu of manning options. The message he sent to the field reflected his personal views on the new program:

On 2 October 1986, I approved a Unit Manning System which builds on the successful COHORT program. This is a significant step toward a system which becomes the strong core of our wartime replacement operations just as it is an effective means of manning for readiness in times of peace. The essential characteristics of unit manning are the development of cohesion and stability in units, which is the multiplier of effectiveness on the battlefield and in training. The concept for this system came from field commanders based on their assessment of the way to man and sustain forces.4

In his final interview with the Army Times, in June, 1987, just before he retired as the Chief of Staff, he said,

The Unit Manning System (that) replaces COHORT is as sound as a silver dollar. That is the way that we must go to war. ... Don't do what we did in Vietnam where replacements went over there individually and soldiers didn't know who was on the left and who was on the right.5

All of our studies and modeling efforts told us that the package sustainment system was supportable, that the concepts were sound, and that we had the potential of achieving the
benefits of COHORT without the added costs. However, the question that plagued all of us at HQDA was, "But, will it work in practice in the field?"

General Wickham also had some major concerns with the new program. First, he saw the possibility that commanders and personnel managers would not understand what they had, and they would break up the integrity of the packages in order to meet individual requirements.

I was soon to find out first hand. My next assignment, in June 1987, was to command a COHORT battalion at Fort Ord.

IMPLEMENTING THE NEW SYSTEM

Prior to leaving the Pentagon for command, I attempted to get approval from the 7th Infantry Division (Light) and FORSCOM to use my battalion as a test unit for the new sustainment model. I believed that, based on my background, I would be the ideal person to try to make it work. Others, I thought, would benefit from my experience. They denied my request, because the light divisions which were totally COHORT opposed the package replacement approach. This opposition sprang from a strong belief that the light infantry needed traditional COHORT for the light infantry ethos. I accepted the decision, even though my data bases at HQDA and my conversations with the battalion told me that there were at least 190 soldiers assigned who still had considerable time remaining after the current battalion's life cycle ended.
Upon my arrival at Fort Ord to assume command, I had the opportunity to experience what General Otis described and what I had previously observed. Within a month the unit virtually died. Most soldiers who had a year or more time in service remaining received PCS orders to Korea. The exceptions were those selected to remain as cadre for the new COHORT unit. Those with six months or more remaining found themselves reassigned to other battalions within the Division as individual fillers. Those with less than six months remaining stayed in the unit as overstrength until their end-of-time-in-service (ETS).

My experience revealed our worst fears. By failing to adopt the package sustainment model, we broke up the cohesion that previously existed in the unit. Some of my company commanders suggested to me that we move the residual soldiers of the old unit to barracks away from the battalion area and report them as special duty soldiers for use by the installation. I denied this request. I refused to further kill cohesion for the sake of cohesion. Instead, we used these dedicated soldiers to help train the new unit. This experience convinced me even more that our new approach was much better than traditional COHORT. The soldiers who had time in service remaining were there because the previous battalion, like every other battalion in the Army, had attrition; the losses were gradually replaced by individual replacements. I found this same situation in every battalion in the Division. In fact, no such thing as a pure COHORT unit existed. The Division used a package sustainment model without even realizing it. I found that some soldiers served in two or more battalions during
their time at Fort Ord because their units had ended their life cycle, while their soldiers still had time left to serve. This was not the type of cohesion that we were trying to develop.

On the bright side, the formation of the new unit was a great experience for all of us. During the two years of my command, the unit had a number of great experiences that facilitated cohesion and created bonding opportunities at every level of command. Within a month of the unit's formation, the battalion deployed, on no notice, to fight forest fires in California and Oregon. This "real world" experience had elements of danger and excitement which provided an excellent opportunity for horizontal and vertical bonding within squads, platoons, and companies. This experience also gave the individual soldier a natural "high" as he became a hero, making a real contribution to the nation and others. The unit returned from fighting forest fires to participate in its first live fire maneuver training at Fort Hunter Liggett, where General Vuono, the new Army Chief of Staff, visited us. Throughout the next six months, the unit executed its multi-echelon training program in preparation for its next real world mission which, again, came without notice. In March 1988, the battalion responded to a Presidential Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE) to Honduras on Operation Golden Pheasant. In December, 1988, the battalion went to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). The following March, the battalion deployed, again, on a no notice EDRE to Team Spirit 89 in Korea. This kind of activity has continued since my change of command last June. The battalion spent four months in Panama as part of
Operation Nimrod Dancer. After a short block leave back at Fort Ord in November, they deployed again, without notice as part of Operation Just Cause from December 1989 to February 1990.

The battalion sustained personnel losses throughout the past two and one half years. The losses fell into two different categories—programmed and unprogrammed. The programmed losses were caused by the ETS or PCS of soldiers (normally officers and noncommissioned officers). The unprogrammed losses were on the mark with the Army average of one percent a month. This was true whether the unit was COHORT or non COHORT. Losses in this category were caused by administrative and medical discharges, courts martial, compassionate reassignments, and AWOLs that were of sufficient duration that the soldier was dropped from the rolls (DFR). The combination of these two types of losses over time leaves a number of Skill Level 1 soldier vacancies in the unit. It is key to note that by this time in the unit's life a number of Skill Level 1 COHORT soldiers are filling Skill Level 2 and in some cases Skill Level 3 positions. This situation provides incentives for those who wish to aspire to leadership roles. However, it leaves vacancies in the follower category.

To replace losses, the battalion received three separate package replacements over two years as part of the HQDA sustainment program described earlier in this chapter. The first package arrived in June, 1988, as the unit approached its first year together. Although I had vacancies throughout the battalion, the majority existed within one company. I decided to keep the package together and place them as a replacement platoon in that
company. We wrapped around these new soldiers, who had all trained together at Fort Benning, a cadre which consisted of a new platoon leader, an experienced platoon sergeant, and three noncommissioned officer squad leaders. The remainder of the team leader and key weapons positions were filled by COHORT soldiers from within the existing platoon. This platoon performed superbly during the next year that I observed them. After one year the platoon lost only one soldier --and he was as a result of a medical discharge.

The battalion received an additional package prior to JRTC. This package was originally earmarked for my sister regimental battalion; however, both battalion commanders and the brigade commander agreed to let it flow to me because of the training value that these replacements would receive at JRTC. At the time this platoon arrived, there was not a hole large enough for a platoon package nor sufficient time to train a new platoon prior to "war" at the JRTC. Consequently, I decided to integrate the package into the battalion as "buddy teams", varying from two to four men, based on the size of the vacancy. I required the company commanders to keep the buddy team together down to the squad level. This arrangement also produced a very positive experience for soldiers. We even went as far as to permit the soldiers to have a say in who would be in their buddy team based on close associations that may have developed while at Fort Benning.

The third replacement package came from within the brigade. The battalion still had some vacancies the week prior to deploying to JRTC. So the brigade commander, the other battalion
commanders, and I decided to place TO&E squads from each of the other two battalions into the unit. The program had the following three goals: to fill the unit to 100 percent of TO&E, to test the concept of inserting TO&E squads into a unit during or just prior to combat operations, and to provide these squads with the JRTC training experience. These squads stayed intact throughout the exercise and returned to their battalions upon redeployment.

This test was successful and added significantly to the training exercise—confirming what Dr. Dave Marlowe from Walter Reed Army Institute of Research told me on many occasions. Dr. Marlowe contends that cohesion is centered at the crew, squad, and platoon level and occurs based on the positive experiences that soldiers share with each other and with their immediate leaders. Based on our experiences in the Wolfhound Battalion, I can tell you that this is not only theory, but it is a fact. The key was to keep soldiers together in small groups for as long as possible. Each time the unit had a significant positive experience—e.g., fighting forest fires, or EDREs to Honduras and Team Spirit, or to JRTC—the bonding became stronger; those who recently joined became bonded along with the rest of the group.

Our experience was what other units can expect in the future. Over the period of my two years in command, I had the opportunity to start up a new battalion, integrate platoon and squad sized packages, as well as buddy teams and individuals. This entire menu of manning options provided me the ability to structure the organization as required for combat. Many of these options would not be available to commanders under a strictly
individual replacement system where everyone gets their fair share to level the readiness bubbles. Nevertheless, I personally took great comfort in knowing that the majority of my old battalion that deployed on D day to Operation Just Cause had been together for almost two and one half years. The least amount of time that a package had been in the battalion at the time of the deployment was six months. Both old and new had shared many significant training opportunities together. This was a condition that you cannot recreate under the individual replacement system -- one that I cannot help but believe was a major factor in our many successes over the last two and a half years.

The benefits, moreover, have proven to be sustainable. Six months from now the unit will not die and lose all of the cohesion that it has built. At least three packages of approximately 120 soldiers will still be present along with the members of the original COHORT who reenlist and choose to stay in the unit. Finally there will be the noncommissioned officers and officers who remain through the assignment cycles of the individual replacement system.

My fears, while I was at HQDA, of whether or not the system would work in the field have vanished because I have seen it work. Danger is not past for the concept though. Today, the Unit Manning System is again being considered for elimination as part of the draw down in forces. Also, many out in the force still remain skeptical and do not believe in the power of cohesion.


CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

General Wickham's message to the field in November 1986 announced his vision for the manning of our Army.

"The path we have chosen aligns a peacetime and wartime replacement system. We must apply a wartime manning methodology in peacetime in order to develop the skills and procedures necessary to accomplish these tasks in war. Commanders and staffs must concentrate every effort toward keeping soldiers together in units to achieve true combat readiness.

Our goal is gradually to transition our entire tactical unit force from the individual replacement system into the unit manning system.

Our manpower vision must focus on developing the most combat ready Army in history. Cohesive and stable units provide us a combat multiplier which is a key element for success on the modern battlefield."

My experiences in command, using this system, were all positive as described in the previous chapter; however, a large portion of the combat arms force still has not experienced the real power of cohesion. To them it is something that researchers and authors hang on the subject to sell books or publish papers.

Those who come from units manned under the individual replacement system only see it if they are in high priority units with a high manning level -- such as the Airborne, Rangers, or Old Guard.

Others also see it while their unit is in a "fenced" status because, they go on the MFO mission, NTC, or JRTC. If that is the
case, then usually when the event ends, the fence comes down and most of the experience and cohesion which developed migrates elsewhere. Even some of those who commanded in units that were under the Unit Manning System still are not happy with the system because their scheduled packages were broken up and used to fill shortages in other units in the division.

The problem of stabilizing key noncommissioned officers and officers will not be fixed until we get control of the size of our TDA Army, reduce the size of overstrength headquarters, and establish a school system that does not take people out of units at the wrong time, and in so doing, increases the size of our Training, Transient, Hospital, and Student (TTHS) accounts. Finally, since close to fifty percent of our turbulence in units is internally generated, we must make and enforce policies and train our commanders and staffs on how to create stability.

The causes of turbulence do not have to be studied again. Studies already exist on this subject by agencies from both within and outside the government. Their results are just as valid today as in each of the years they conducted their research. However, we have done little to solve the problem. Things will not change until commanders and staff officers adopt a "unit equity" approach to manning and abandon the principles of "individual equity" which are now predominant in our personnel system.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

As we prepare for the large draw down of American forces due
to budget cuts, the deficit, and the changing political situation in Europe, the time is right to implement a change to our manning system for all of our combat units. The Chief of Staff's Imperatives for the Army of the 1990s call for a quality force that is well trained and combat ready. As these great challenges face us throughout the world, we will either go for short term fixes or long term solutions. The short term fix will get us over the hump and through the budget cuts. However, a long term solution provides us the opportunity to build an Army that will be more combat ready than any in our military history.

APPLY A "UNIT EQUITY" APPROACH

The first step in the process takes a "unity equity" approach to the draw down and deactivation of units rather than an Army wide "individual equity" approach that has the potential of hollowing out the force.

For example, if a decision is reached that an early out program is necessary to meet budget requirements, then the early out policy should be applied to personnel in units identified for deactivation on a phased-in basis in accordance with the draw down plan. We should resist the temptation to draw down across the force in a "salami slice" fashion for two reasons. First, the salami slice solution cuts across all units and MOSs leaving holes that may be critical to a unit's combat performance. Secondly, after applying the early out drops, a massive program
may be needed to either recruit or to move personnel to meet the shortages. Salami slice solutions foster turbulence and turnover.

The personnel remaining in units at the time of deactivation should move to their new unit and location as cohesive groups in as large a unit as the gaining command can accommodate based on their current and projected vacancies. A "battle roster" should accompany the unit to identify existing tank and gun crews, squads, platoons, etc., so that the gaining unit will recognize that a great deal of advantages accrue by keeping these groups together. The alternative is to let the computer do the drill for us. If we do, the result will be an individual levy in reverse. Everyone will get his fair share of individuals without regard to where they came from or who they trained with.

Receiving installations and units should prepare to accept these groups as cohesive packages. Where it makes sense, we should open holes up for the groups. However, we should not make the mistake of breaking up cohesive groups for the sake of a program. Our guiding principle should be to maintain a wartime manning mindset.

ESTABLISH A "REGIMENTAL DEPOT" SYSTEM

The next step is to examine our projected force structure. If possible, we should strive to achieve at least a three-to-one, CONUS-to-OCONUS mix by type of unit. This structure provides a sufficient sustaining base of personnel and units to facilitate
stability and provides a number of unit manning options for commanders. Under this approach, each FORSCOM brigade supports an OCONUS battalion. We would, therefore, create a regimental depot system for manning in accordance with a proven wartime model, as discussed in Chapter II.

Now is the time to align the Regimental System to work as General Meyer intended! This program provides a regimental home base to each soldier and unit. This home base concept fosters a feeling of stability and facilitates the establishment of family roots. Consequently, the home base is where the soldier serves when he is not serving away in the other battalion of the regiment which is OCONUS or in the TDA Army. The long term service of soldiers and leaders within the regiment provides the basis for fostering cohesion.

I believe our last attempt at the regimental concept failed because the timing was not right for its implementation. In the Army of the 1990s, there will be a strong need for unit identity. Furthermore, the current necessity to disestablish units requires that flags be removed from the structure. This condition provides a different set of circumstances than existed at the time of the original program's implementation.

The current U.S. Army Regimental System is broken in that it has little real meaning to the individual soldier. The exception is those soldiers assigned to the pure regiments -- e.g., the Ranger Regiment, the Airborne Regiments (82nd Airborne, 101st Airborne, and the Berlin Brigade), and the 9th Infantry Regiment in the 7th Division (Light).
Only through repetitive assignments within a regiment do soldiers retain the strong bonds of personal and professional relationships that are part of the cohesion equation. The current "individual equity" system does not support this approach.

PROVIDE A MENU OF REPLACEMENT OPTIONS

Within the context of a regimental framework, supported by a three-to-one CONUS to OCONUS force structure mix, we can establish a regimental rotation pattern that follows one of the following two options based on the needs and the location of the command:

OPTION ONE: PACKAGED REPLACEMENTS BETWEEN CONUS AND OCONUS BATTALIONS OF A REGIMENT DURING FIXED ASSIGNMENT WINDOWS.

Under this concept both the CONUS and the OCONUS battalions of the regiment have matched assignment windows. A window occurs twice a year with six months between each window. During the window, the regiment receives its replacement packages from the training base and also provides the opportunity for reassignments to occur for officers and noncommissioned officers. It is during this period that programmed turbulence and turnover occur. It is also at this time that personnel scheduled for schools and TDA assignments outside the regimental framework should occur. The desired assignment pattern for the majority of the personnel in the unit occurs between the battalions of the regiment. The replacement window should fall in the unit's support cycle and match the counterpart unit to the greatest degree possible. No
replacements or programmed losses occur between assignment windows; therefore, turbulence and turnover are controlled. This condition is an improvement over the current system and takes into account the realization that neither turbulence or turnover can be totally eliminated. The Army will continue to have access to personnel for worldwide needs because a unit is always in an assignment window. Unprogrammed losses that occur between assignment windows are not replaced until the next window. Unless an unknown force lies in our future, the unprogrammed loss rate will approximate six percent of the unit's strength occurring at a rate of approximately one percent a month.

**OPTION TWO: UNIT ROTATION OPTION**

The unit rotation option provides for a rotation scheme for CONUS based units to an OCONUS command. For example, a battalion goes on a six month rotation without dependents from FORSCOM to either USAREUR or Korea. If the force structure has three CONUS based battalions of a regiment assigned to the same brigade, and at the same location, then it can support a single battalion of the regiment stationed overseas. The option assumes that both battalions are compatible in equipment and force structure. The employment of this option has the following advantages:

1. Decreases PCS costs.
2. Increases family stability at a designated FORSCOM home base.
3. Decreases demand for family housing OCONUS.
4. Increases cohesion and stability "in units" for combat arms soldiers and leaders.
5. Decreases the number of family members OCONUS which facilitates the decrease in TDA requirements OCONUS for community activities.

6. Increases training opportunities provided to all combat units to attend rotations through the National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center.

7. Increases the opportunity for personnel assigned to combat arms battalions to attend DA schools while the unit is in FORSCOM which removes the necessity to send soldiers home from OCONUS to attend school.

8. Increases the opportunity for combat arms units to conduct tank gunnery, FTXs, and field firing while in FORSCOM which decreases the amount of maneuver damage OCONUS.

9. Provides all combat arms soldiers the opportunity to experience service in both CONUS and OCONUS and therefore gain a worldwide operational perspective.

10. Provides overseas commands with fully trained combat units with Combat Training Center (CTC) experience, no programmed attrition while overseas, and no families to worry about if war occurs. This philosophy provides a "forward presence", potentially more combat-ready than our forces today stationed OCONUS.

11. Provides variety to soldiers and keeps them meaningfully occupied if we are forced to reduce the amount of tactical training our forces are permitted to do OCONUS.

12. Increases deployment training opportunities for all units.
This rotation option has the following disadvantages:

1. Increases TDY costs.
2. Increases family separation in a deployed situation.
3. Increases demand for family housing in FORSCOM.
4. Increases TDA support required in FORSCOM to meet demands of more families.
5. Increases force structure to support three-to-one CONUS to OCONUS force mix.
6. Provides less continuous time on station available to overseas commanders for a continuous overseas orientation for their units.
7. Drastically changes our way of doing business.
8. Increased transportation requirements to move units overseas and back every six months.
9. Increases demands on FORSCOM to continually prepare units for deployment.
10. Potentially increases readiness downtime as units are in the process of deploying and redeploying.

The disadvantages outlined above can be offset by applying some of the following considerations:

- Consider changing the force structure mix in USAREUR to include the forward stationing of some light forces OCONUS. This solution has the following advantages: (1) Provides a worldwide orientation to all of our forces. (2) Shares the overseas burdens.
(3) Provides a consistency of a mix of heavy, light, and special operating forces in both CONUS and OCONUS commands. And (4) lessens the requirement to increase the force structure to design a three-to-one CONUS to OCONUS mix.

- Consider the stationing of divisional brigades on separate installations which takes advantage of the existing housing in FORSCOM required to absorb the families returning from OCONUS. This separate stationing option may also satisfy some of the ongoing Congressional concerns over base closings. This procedure also facilitates expansion during times of mobilization.

- Although family separation time proportionally increases under this option, these separations should offset the need to relocate families every three to four years. Furthermore, since all combat arms battalions would be in the rotation scheme, there will be no "haves" versus "have nots" among like units. This procedure also follows the same process as used by the members of the "blue water" Navy and our combat arms brothers in the Marine Corps. Family separations have become a way of life for our light forces. Various worldwide deployments have become the routine and are now expected within the community as a cost of doing business and for personnel stability over the long run.

- Finally, apply the lessons from all of our previous rotation experiments. Specifically, do not try and rotate battalions with families. Secondly, everyone must get involved in the rotation program. If only selected units are involved then we will create the "haves" and "have nots" all over again. Next, ensure that the right force structure mix exists to support the
rotation. Studies and experience show that this mix must have at least three-to-one CONUS to OCONUS. And, establish the policies in sufficient time before you attempt to execute the program. Do not try to rush into something that is not ready for execution.

The potential for increased combat readiness in this program is great; however, if we cannot meet the conditions, then we should not adopt the program. The six month rotation idea is not a new one. It has been tried before in Operation OVUREP to Korea in the late 1950s and to Europe in the form of ROTAPLAN and Brigade 75 and 76. The Congress also suggested the idea to us in the 1986 and 1987 time periods. This program will reach the same fate as its predecessors if we fail properly to prepare our leaders and our personnel managers for the task that lies ahead.

A graphical depiction of the rotation option appears in Appendix 1, figures 1 and 2.

ALIGN THE TRAINING BASE WITH ACTIVE FORSCOM DIVISIONS

The last recommendation aligns the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) training base with each of the active FORSCOM divisions. The concept is directly related to either the rotation option or the package replacement option discussed in the previous recommendation. This concept is also not an original concept. It relates to the German regimental depot model discussed in Chapter II. It was also previously staffed in 1986 within the Army staff. Past attempts to adopt this approach have also not been successful because we lacked the proper resources or because
turf battles developed over whose responsibility it was to operate the training base. The manning of the TDA force structure takes soldiers out of units! Therefore, units are forced to do without or to accept a lower grade substitution for the noncommissioned officers and officers that are not available. A major portion of the manpower that comes out of our combat arms units is used to man the TDA requirements in the TRADOC training base and the Recruiting Command. These are worthwhile requirements that take our best and brightest talent from units. Until we get TDA requirements under control, we will continuously have undermanned units and experience turnover at the higher ranks.

The concept that follows recommends that FORSCOM pick up a major share of the mission for the operation of the training base. The mission requirement, however, should be resourced with a cadre level training unit that is found preferably within each FORSCOM regiment, but may be found at the division level if we cannot afford the spaces in the force structure. The majority of the spaces to form these cadre units comes out of the TDA spaces currently existing in the TRADOC Training Centers.

The concept establishes a regimental depot system similar to the World War II German model described in Chapter II. FORSCOM should be resourced with cadre level units as part of each regiment in the force. Although the concept calls for a cadre battalion in each regiment, if required, the unit may be a cadre company. The unit in cadre status rotates among the battalions of the regiment based on their cycle and need for replacements. Members of an aligned USAR Training Division and an aligned National
Guard unit supplements the FORSCOM cadre unit and provide the link to a rapid transition during periods of mobilization and wartime sustainment.

The primary objective is to develop a unit identity process which fosters a sense of belonging to the unit from the time a soldier enters the Army. A second objective is to keep noncommissioned officers and officers in TO&E units where they are most needed while, at the same time, providing the experience of performing training cadre duty among a larger portion of the force. Under this concept most of our leaders will have at least one encounter with the cadre training experience at some time in the course of his career.

The concept is best described by the graphical depiction in Appendix 1, figure 3.

A FINAL PLEA FOR COHESION

All of the recommendations made in this paper focused on fostering a sense of belonging to a unit. The forces of cohesion are strong and can potentially make the difference between victory and defeat on a modern battlefield.

With our Army getting smaller because of budget cuts and the changes in the political scene in Eastern Europe, our forces need to be more combat ready now than before. War, if it comes, will be on short notice. Forces will need to rapidly deploy from CONUS bases to meet worldwide contingencies. Only a well trained professional Army manned with soldiers who are ready to fight can
guarantee our survival as a nation. We cannot afford to wait until the next war begins to decide how to man the force during mobilization and wartime sustainment.

I believe the time is right to implement many of the changes in our manning program recommended in this paper. Many may not agree because of the short sightedness of making it through the budget process each year. However, the price of cohesion has a multiplier effect that potentially will pay off in big dividends if and when war comes!

ENDNOTES


5. U.S. Department of the Army, Training Base Alignment with Active Divisions.
MACRO VIEW OF ROTATION OPTION  
(SIX MONTH ROTATION SCHEME)

- One Battalion is always CONUS
- Four battalions in the rotation scheme
- Rotation occurs every six months
- 18 months in FORSCOM for every 6 months CONUS
- Each FORSCOM brigade supports one CONUS battalion

Bns 3 & 6 are each supported by other FORSCOM brigades
## FORSCOM BRIGADE
### UNDER ROTATION CONCEPT

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<th>BN #1</th>
<th>BN #2</th>
<th>BN #3</th>
<th>BN #4</th>
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<td>Deployed OCONUS for 6 mos</td>
<td>Next scheduled OCONUS Bn</td>
<td>12 months from deployment</td>
<td>Last Bn back from OCONUS</td>
<td>Performs training base mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No programmed turnover or turbulence while deployed</td>
<td>Receives Buddy Team / individual Replacements during assignment window</td>
<td>Receives crew / squad package during assignment window</td>
<td>Receives Platoon / larger package during window</td>
<td>Manned at cadre status (Each bde provides one company of cadre)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Available for worldwide deployment</td>
<td>Prepared for worldwide deployment</td>
<td>Available for worldwide deployment</td>
<td>Includes personnel in DA schools</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRTC / NTO training unit</td>
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<td>etc.</td>
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### NOTES:

1. Battalions #3 & 4 provide personnel to form cadre for training battalion.
2. Provisional Divisional training battalion commanded by former battalion commander or officer awaiting to assume command.
3. Cadre return to Bns 3 & 4 after six months as leaders who have wrapped around packages of replacements.
4. Battalions shift relative positions every six months. Eighteen months between scheduled OCONUS deployments.

APPENDIX 1, FIGURE 2
TRAINING BASE ALIGNMENT CONCEPT

FORSCOM PROVIDES:
- Requisitions for replacements
- Cadre training unit (structured by grade & MOS to meet composition of trainees)

USAREC PROVIDES:
- Accessions

TRADOC PROVIDES:
- Facilities
- Cadre training
- Training Center Headquarters
- Training Resources
- Standard POIs
- Doctrine
- Quality
- Control
- Scheduling

NOTES:
1. DCSOPS missions FORSCOM for cadre.
2. D'APER / PERSCOM transmits accession requirements received from FORSCOM units to USAREC.
3. USAR Training Divisions and National Guard unit are aligned with each FORSCOM active division and provide cadre.
4. DCSOPS provides scheduled input load to TRADOC for scheduling purposes.
5. POI is trained with a unique division flavor based on SOPs, unit history, and traditions.
6. Wrap around training occurs - packages to units include soldiers plus leaders.
7. Active component unit cadre with new soldiers join home-based regiment.
8. National Guard cadre with new soldiers return to home state and unit.
9. USAR training division cadre return to IRR status in peacetime but remain at training base during wartime.

APPENDIX 1 FIGURE 3
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B. NEWSPAPERS


C. LETTERS AND REPORTS


D. INTERVIEWS


E. STUDENT RESEARCH PAPERS


F. REGULATIONS


G. MESSAGES

