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THE U.S. MARINE CORPS' ROLE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS

BY

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

THE U.S. MARINE CORPS' ROLE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
ABSTRACT		ii
CHAPTER I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	BACKGROUND	
	General	4
	National Drug Strategy	5
III.	THE DRUG THREAT	
	General	8
	Cannabis	9
	Cocaine	9
	Opiates	10
	Dangerous Drugs	11
	Narco-Terrorism	12
IV.	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INVOLVEMENT	16
	Posse Comitatus	16
	Public Law 97-86	17
	Public Law 99-570	18
	Military Support Mission	20
	Military Operations Overseas	23
V.	THE MARINE CORPS' ROLE	
	General	27
	Supply-Side	28
	Demand	32
	Intelligence	33
	Treatment and Rehabilitation	34
VI.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	36
BIBLIOGRAPHY		41

THE U.S. MARINE CORPS' ROLE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

> "No one starts a war -- or rather, no one in his senses should do so -- without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."[1]
>
> von Clausewitz

In 1981, as part of the "legislative offensive" in the war on drugs, Congress enacted amendments to the Posse Comitatus Act, which authorized the Department of Defense (DoD) to take a much more aggressive role in the war on drugs. Since that time, DoD has been embarked on a program to counter the problem of illegal drugs entering the United States. One of the main foreign policy goals of President Bush is to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States and, if possible, to eliminate it.

International drug trafficking threatens the national security of the United States in three ways: socially, economically, and militarily. Illegal drugs threaten the moral, social, and economic well-being of the country. The politico-military dimension of the drug threat consists of four elements: (1) undermining friendly governments important to US security through corruption, intimidation, and economic destabilization; (2) drug linkages to insurgencies, which further threaten to destabilize these governments; (3) the threat of drug-related terrorism to US officials and citizens abroad; and (4) the degradation in military readiness and internal security of the US Armed Forces resulting from illicit drug use.[2]

The Secretary of Defense, Mr. Richard Cheney, has stated that the specific mission of DoD is to protect national security; therefore, he has committed the military services to this high-priority, national security mission of countering the production and trafficking of illegal drugs.[3] In response to this commitment, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has made

counter-narcotics a priority within the Corps' immediate and long-term operational planning programs.

This paper will define, in specific terms, what role the United States Marine Corps can and should play in this national endeavor, consistent with its resources, capabilities and limitations, and authority under legal statutes. To arrive at the stated objective of this paper, the following framework will be used. First, a general background orientation will be presented to discuss the origins of the military role and the national drug strategy. Second, a broad review of the drug problem and its threat to this nation will be discussed. Third, an analysis of DoD's involvement thus far in the war on drugs is necessary to lend perspective to the capabilities and limitations for Marine Corps involvement in the drug war. Finally, the proper role of the Marine Corps will be discussed with subsequent recommendations on how the Corps can influence the supply and demand strategies of the United States Government.

ENDNOTES

[1] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, p. 579.

[2] The Joint Staff, United States Military Posture for FY 1989, p. 100.

[3] "Cheney at the Pentagon," Government Executive, October 1989, p. 57.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

"When you have a war, who do you call in? ...You call the Military."

The Honorable Jack Davis
U.S. Representative from Illinois
15 June 1988

General

On 14 October 1982, President Ronald Reagan delivered a speech at the Department of Justice, declaring war on crime and pledging an "unshakable commitment to do what is necessary to end the drug menace." This was not the first time a president had declared war on drugs. In a message to Congress on June 17, 1971, Richard Nixon described drug abuse as a "national emergency," portraying it "public enemy number one" and calling for "a total offensive."[1] On 5 September 1989, President George Bush issued his National Drug Control Strategy, which provides for an integrated program of counter-narcotics actions designed to move the country closer to the goal of a drug-free society.[2] Unlike previous administrations, President Bush's "war" goes well beyond the rhetoric of "declared wars" of the past, such as President Johnson's "war on poverty," President Nixon's "war on street crime," or President Carter's "moral equivalent of war" on oil dependency.[3] President Bush has made his "war on drugs" a high national priority, sighting the illegal drug menace as a potential threat to our national security. Toward that end, he has committed unprecedented resources from nearly every government agency to fight the drug war. Not the least of which has been the role of the U.S. Armed Forces to control the flow of illegal drugs, although viewed by many people as a law enforcement function not appropriate for the military and contrary to the long-standing traditional prohibition to use the military for domestic law enforcement. Nevertheless, the Department of Defense has been cast in a lead role in the nation's "war on drugs."

National Drug Strategy

The threat that the availability of drugs represents to national security was emphasized in President Reagan's National Security Decision Directive of April 1986, which pointed out international drug trafficking's potential for destabilizing democratic governments. Drug trafficking undermines the stability of governments friendly or important to US interests through corruption, intimidation, and economic destabilization. Linkage between drug traffickers and insurgents threaten to further destabilize these governments. Drug abuse and trafficking also degrade the health and morality of American society and adversely affect the economy. Trafficking in illegal drugs is a major source of crime and corruption. Billions of dollars are spent by the federal government each year on drug control, prevention, and treatment.

The national strategy to control illegal drugs is to "reduce demand through drug abuse prevention and treatment while also reducing supply through interdiction and border control, international drug control, investigations and prosecutions, intelligence activities, and control over diversion of legitimately produced drugs into the illicit market."[4] Our "national strategy" contains five principal elements, each focused on one part of the overall drug problem. These elements are:

1. Reducing the quantity of illegal drugs entering the U.S. by bringing political and economic pressure to bear on drug producing countries.
2. Increasing the resources available to domestic law enforcement agencies to improve coordination and cooperation.
3. Increasing basic research concerning the nature of drug abuse, and towards improving intelligence gathering and drug eradication techniques.
4. Improving medical detoxification and treatment programs.
5. Assisting in drug abuse prevention through greater drug education efforts.[5]

Since 1981, the federal government has spent approximately $30 billion for drug control, with an additional FY 1990 projected budget of $7.9 billion.[6] Despite these expenditures in anti-drug efforts, the supply of illegal drugs persists and continues to adversely affect American society.

There is widespread disagreement among experts about which aspect of the government's strategy works best, the proper mix of anti-drug programs, and the level of resources that should be devoted to each. Some experts believe that devoting more resources to interdiction will reduce the supply of drugs. Others say that efforts should be increased to eradicate drug production in foreign countries and cut off drugs at their source. An increasing number of experts believe that more resources should be spent on reducing the demand for drugs through education and treatment programs, possibly changing societies cultural attitudes and values which affect the demand for illegal drugs.[7]

ENDNOTES

[1] Steven Wisotsky, Breaking the Impasse in the War on Drugs, p. 3.

[2] National Drug Control Strategy, the White House, September 1989. pp.1-154 (hereafter referred to as "National Strategy").

[3] Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., "We know who will lose the Drug War," the Washington Post, 18 September 1986, p. A25.

[4] U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Control: Issues Surrounding Increased Use of the Military in Drug Interdiction, Report to Congress, April 1988, p. 14 (hereafter referred to as "GAO").

[5] Joseph F Mudd, Assigning DoD a Narcotics Interdiction Mission, p. 17.

[6] National Strategy, p. 123.

[7] GAO, pp. 16-17.

CHAPTER III

THE DRUG THREAT

General

Drug trafficking and abuse threaten the moral, social, and economic well-being of this country. Efforts to reduce the flow of illicit drugs from abroad into the United States have so far not succeeded in spite of increased action at controlling the supply of, and demand for, illegal drugs. Polls show that Americans consider drug control the number one domestic issue and nearly half of all Americans regard drug trafficking as America's number one international problem.

More than 25 million Americans buy and use illicit drugs, spending in excess of $100 billion annually in a diverse and fragmented criminal market. The addictive nature of many of these drugs, their high price and their illegality play a role in more than half the street crime in the United States. The enormous profits generated by the illicit drug market fosters the growth of international criminal organizations which can become so powerful that they threaten the authority and jeopardize the security of national governments. The illicit drug trade also has linkages to insurgencies which further threaten to destabilize governments.

At least four fifths of all illicit drugs consumed in the U.S. are of foreign origin, including virtually all the cocaine and heroin. Approximately 25 percent to 35 percent of the marijuana consumed in the United States is domestically produced. It is estimated that in 1985, cocaine, heroin, and cannabis was worth $51 billion "at retail" on the streets.[1]

Although available statistics concerning the size and cost of the drug problem vary greatly, a document called the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC) Report contains the most frequently cited statistics concerning the production, distribution, and use of illicit drugs. The NNICC is an organization administered by the Drug Enforcement Administration whose membership consists of the Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs Service, Department of Defense, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Internal Revenue Service, National Institute on Drug Abuse, Departments of State and Treasury, and the White House Drug

Abuse Policy Office.[2] By nature of its membership composition, the NNICC is capable of collecting statistics that should be fairly accurate.

The most recent (1988) NNICC report is the source for the figures presented in the discussion that follows. The NNICC essentially classifies drugs by four categories: cannabis, cocaine, opiates, and dangerous drugs.

Cannabis (Sources and Quantities available in U.S.)

Country	Quantity (metric tons)	% of Supply
Columbia	5,000-8,700	37.2
Mexico	4,710	25.6
Jamaica	260-390	1.8
Belize	60	0.3
Other		
Southeast Asia	750-1,500	6.1
Latin America	500-1000	4.0
Domestic	4,350-4,850	25.0

More marijuana was available for use in 1988 because of increased production in Columbia, Mexico, and the United States. Foreign marijuana, primarily from Columbia and Mexico, still dominate the U.S. supply. Marijuana use in the United States has declined in recent years. In 1978 and 1979, surveys of high school seniors showed that half of all seniors had used marijuana at least once within the past year. By 1988, that statistic had fallen to one-third. Nevertheless, marijuana remains the most widely used illegal drug in the United States. A total of 651.5 metric tons of marijuana were seized in the United States during 1988, a decline of 39 percent from that of 1987. The decline of seizures in the Caribbean appears directly related to the employment of smaller fishing vessels to both avoid detection and defray losses in the event of seizure, and effective interdiction efforts. However, in contrast to the decline in seizure figures in the southeast section of the United States, there is an increase in seizures of marijuana at the southwestern border by over 162 percent during the period 1986-1988.

Cocaine

Despite record seizures of cocaine during 1988, the drug continues to be readily available in the United States. It is the most popular and prevalent

illicit drug in the United States. The primary domestic entry points for much of the nation's cocaine supply are the Miami/South Florida areas, New York City, and those states adjacent to the Mexican border. Columbian nationals continue to be the predominant ethnic group involved in cocaine processing, importation, and distribution. Wholesale and retail cocaine prices continue to decline making the drug more affordable for the user. The cocaine price statistics and trends for the period 1985-1988 are as follows:

Prices	1985	1986	1987	1988
Wholesale (kg)	$30-$50	$22-$45	$12-$40	$11-$34
Retail (gm)	$100	$80-$120	$80-$120	$50-$120

The number of cocaine-related hospital emergencies reported nationwide during 1988 was the highest yet recorded, increasing by 30 percent over the previous year's record total. During 1988, 42,491 hospital emergencies were reported. Since 1984, there has been a fivefold increase in the number of cocaine-related hospital emergencies reported.

The US consumption of cocaine is estimated at well over 70 tons annually, and DEA is seizing about 35-40 tons per year. The number of cocaine users is estimated to increase at a rate of ten percent annually. 100 percent of the cocaine consumed in the United States is imported.[3] Forty-five percent of the cocaine seized in 1988 was carried by private aircraft.[4] Cocaine and cocaine products have seen the greatest increase in usage over the last few years. Crack, a derivative form of cocaine, is the most dangerous and quickly addictive drug known to man. It is inexpensive and extremely potent, with a limited-duration "high" that encourages compulsive use. Crack is primarily responsible for the estimated doubled increase in cocaine use since 1985, and for the continued marketing success of the huge international cocaine trafficking industry.[5]

Opiates

Heroin continued to be generally available in most metropolitan areas of the United States and reflected an upward trend in usage during 1988. The three primary illicit opium production areas are Southeast Asia, Mexico, and Southwest Asia.

Southeast Asia provides 43 percent of the heroin available for consumption in the United States. It was usually transported by containerized cargo aboard commercial vessels, air freight cargo, and international mail parcels, as well as couriers travelling on commercial air flights.

Mexico provided 30 percent of the heroin consumption in the United States in 1988. It was trafficked directly over the U.S./Mexico border in relatively small amounts by couriers using either motor vehicles or body carry. Mexican heroin has become more prominent in recent years because of the availability of black tar heroin, a crudely processed, high purity form of heroin which spread to virtually all western cities by the end of 1985.

Southwest Asia accounts for 27 percent of heroin consumption in the United States. Its heroin is trafficked by numerous ethnic groups, the most dominant of which are Pakistanis, Indians, Iranians, and Nigerians. Heroin is trafficked to the United States directly from producing countries and is also shipped through Europe and Africa en route to the United States.

Dangerous Drugs

The term "dangerous drugs" refers to substances, both licit and illicit, which include the following: stimulants other than cocaine; narcotics/analgesics other than opiates; psychotomimetics/hallucinogens other than cannabis products; and all depressants and sedatives other than alcohol.

In 1988, production, trafficking, and use of amphetamine and, in particular, methamphetamine continued at levels above previous years. Although PCP and LSD use declined in 1988 by 12 percent and 5 percent, respectively, the decrease is believed due to a switch on the part of users from PCP and LSD to crack. All the PCP, almost all of the Methamphetamine, and 80 percent of the injectable methamphetamine consumed in the U.S. is also produced here.

Drug trafficking, distribution, and sales in America have become a vast, economically debilitating black market. The estimated cost of the drug habit in the United States is staggering. One government estimate puts annual drug sales at $110 billion -- more than our total gross agricultural income, and more than double the profits enjoyed by all the Fortune 500 companies combined.[6] Estimates also put the total annual cost of drug abuse

to the nation, to the user, and to society at between $200 and $230 billion.[7] Obviously, these are large sums of money that reflect an enormous problem.

Narco-Terrorism

The relationship between drug traffickers and terrorists or insurgent groups is a key factor which links drugs to national security. Fledging democracies are threatened in regions where narcotic traffickers and guerrilla terrorist groups have formed alliances. The large amount of money to be made by trafficking in illegal drugs has attracted the interest and participation of terrorist and insurgent groups. Terrorists and traffickers operate together for the mutual benefit of both, rather than because they share common ideologies.

In Columbia, the insurgent organization M-19 and FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia) have provided physical security to drug traffickers at their production facilities (cocaine laboratories, airfields, growing sites, etc.) in addition to being their trigger men to carry out reprisals against the government for their efforts to fight drug trafficking.

The 19th of April Movement, known as "M-19," is a Columbian terrorist organization which partially funds its operations by cultivating coca and marijuana.[8] The M-19 are leftist guerrillas who also extort money from traffickers and other groups. In November 1985, 60 members of M-19 seized the Palace of Justice in Bogota. Their purpose was to destroy the records of some 200 key drug traffickers threatened with extradition to the United States. They took over 300 hostages and murdered 11 justices and many other people.[9]

The FARC have developed a symbiotic relationship with drug traffickers. In addition to cultivating some coca of its own, FARC guerrillas collect protection money from other growers; and they have arranged to protect traffickers' airfields in exchange for arms.[10] Money and weapons are the primary payoffs from drug traffickers to the terrorist/insurgent organizations.

The relationship between traffickers and terrorists/insurgents is not always friendly. For example, there have been several exchanges of gunfire between the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and traffickers in Peru as well as similar incidents between traffickers and insurgents in Columbia. As large landowners and businessman, traffickers sometimes find themselves

in competition with the insurgents for economic, political, and military influence among the population. For instance, traffickers find the agrarian reform ideas espoused by the revolutionaries to be threatening to their long-term financial interests.[11]

It has also been reported that Columbian drug traffickers have paid Cuba for protection and for refueling and safe haven in Cuban ports as they smuggle drugs into the United States. For example, during July 1988, Hugo Ceballos and four others were convicted of smuggling more than $10 million worth of cocaine through Cuba in 1987. They smuggled 700 kilos of cocaine from Columbia to Cuba's Varadero military base. One shipment was escorted over Cuban airspace by a Soviet MiG, flown by a Cuban air force pilot; another was escorted from Cuban territorial waters by the Cuban coast guard. The base is only 100 miles south of the Florida Keys, a major entry point for drug shipments to the U.S. The evidence in the Ceballos trial demonstrated that Cuban territory was used with the knowledge, approval and cooperation of the Cuban government. It is clear that cocaine traffickers are turning to Cuba as a transit base, and the Cuban government is supporting them. In 1988, there was an important disclosure about drug trafficking from a high-ranking Cuban defector, Major Florentino Aspillaga Lombad. He asserted that drug traffickers are frequent quests of the Cuban government. He also said that Columbian drug traffickers met regularly in Cuba with Cuban Defense Minister Raul Castro, whose brother Fidel views drugs as "a very important weapon against the United States because drugs demoralize people and undermine society."[12]

Throughout the regions of northern South America and Central America, there is a sense among democratic leaders that their political survival is threatened by the narco-terrorism phenomenon. At a recent conference at the Carter Center at Emory University, Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez said "drug trafficking is now the biggest threat to sovereign governments in Latin America."[13]

It is clear that a link exists between drug trafficking and terrorist/insurgent groups. Drug trafficking has been used to fund terrorist and insurgent activities, and therefore, is a threat to legitimate governments. As President Reagan noted in a 1986 National Security Decision Directive, the international drug trade's narco-terrorist connection, which threatens the stability of several democratic institutions that are critical

to U.S. economic and political interests, constitutes a very real threat to our own national security.[14]

ENDNOTES

[1] Raphael F. Perl and Roy Surrett, Drug Control: International Policy and Options, (Congressional Reasearch Service, 31 August 1988), pp. CRS 1-2.

[2] National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC), The NNICC Report 1988, (Drug Enforcement Administration, April 1989), p. i.

[3] Michael H. Abbott, "The Army and the Drug War: Politics or National Security?" Parameters, December 1988, pp. 96-97.

[4] National Drug Control Strategy, the White House, September 1989. p. 74 (hereafter referred to as "National Strategy").

[5] Ibid., p. 3.

[6] Ibid., p. 2.

[7] William K. Tritchler, Employment of the U.S. Armed Forces and the War on Drugs, p. 10.

[8] Ibid., p. 14.

[9] Abbott, p. 98.

[10] Tritchler, p. 14.

[11] William R. Surrett, The international Narcotics Trade: An overview of its Dimensions, production Sources, and organizations, Congressional Research Service Report, 3 October 1988, p. CRS-13.

[12] David Brock, "the World of Narco Terrorism," The American Spectator, June 1989, pp. 26-27.

[13] Ibid., p. 25.

[14] Raphael Perl, Policy Alert -- Narcotics Control and the Use of U.S. Military Personnel: Operations in Bolivia and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 29 July 1986, p. CRS-3.

CHAPTER IV

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INVOLVEMENT

A combination of growing domestic pressures from federal, state, and local citizens' groups and law enforcement agencies, and federal drug enforcement demands for more resources led to major legislation affecting the role of the military in helping civilian police agencies in the battle against illicit drug trafficking.

Posse Comitatus

The Department of Defense's role in the drug war has been traditionally and legally restricted by the legal statute known as the Posse Comitatus Act. Following the Civil War, Army troops were used in occupied southern states for law enforcement purposes, and in the North for suppression of labor disturbances. The amount of force used to enforce laws and suppress labor strife was sometimes excessive. As soon as the southern states reacquired representation in Congress, their representatives and senators acted to prevent such practices in the future. In 1878, Congress passed an amendment to an Army appropriations bill which prohibited the use of the Army or other federal armed force as a "posse comitatus" to enforce civilian laws. The Posse Comitatus Act was subsequently codified into law, becoming Section 1385 of Title 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure) United States Code.[1]

The Posse Comitatus Act does not mention the Navy or Marine Corps. The original Act was a part of an Army appropriations bill, and was enacted as a result of Army abuses during reconstruction, which may explain the naval service omission. However, the Navy officially recognized the implicit applicability of the Posse Comitatus Act to itself in 1974 when it promulgated SECNAVINST 5820.7. This publication permitted the Navy to employ its forces in civilian law enforcement actions subject to the approval of the Secretary of Navy. Thus, the principle of civilian control over the military was maintained because the Secretary of the Navy, a civilian official, had to authorize any such use.[2]

After President Reagan announced his "get tough" policy on drug law enforcement and members of Congress mobilized to develop new policies to

fight the "war on drugs," the idea of using DoD resources to interdict smugglers became very popular with politicians. Political proponents viewed the military as largely an untapped resource that could significantly impact the war on drugs. However, DoD objected to using military forces for drug interdiction and law enforcement purposes on the basis that it was a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. Consequently, civilian law enforcement agencies requested Congress to propose legislation to provide more flexibility in the interpretation of the statute. Although the Posse Comitatus Act was not changed, new legislation was enacted under Title 10 (Armed Forces) U.S.C. to clarify DoD's role in civil law enforcement.

Public Law 97-86

In December 1981, Congress passed Public Law 97-86 (10 U.S.C. 371-378), also known as the Defense Authorization Act of 1982, which clarified the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. 1385). The 1981 law clarifies the circumstances under which the military can assist law enforcement officials. The DoD is permitted to provide civilian law enforcement agencies with information collected during routine military operations, the use of military equipment and facilities, training, and expert advice. DoD personnel can also operate equipment which monitors air and sea traffic outside the United States. However, direct participation of military personnel in law enforcement activities remains forbidden. There are two major restrictions on DoD efforts to assist law enforcement agencies. First, DoD is required to seek reimbursement for its assistance unless an operational or training benefit accrues which is equivalent to military training. Second, military assistance may not adversely affect military readiness or preparedness.[3] The reasons for these restrictions are obvious. DoD is prohibited from spending money Congress appropriates for any mission other than the national defense and, after all, the primary mission of the DoD is the national defense. It is vital that its resources and equipment be on hand in combat units to allow for a quick response in time-sensitive situations. Although P.L. 97-86 clearly puts the DoD in the civilian law enforcement business, it also reaffirms the traditional prohibition against direct military involvement in law enforcement (e.g. arrests, searches, seizures), and it provides the Secretary of Defense with specific authority to use the Armed Forces for a variety of indirect assistance.

With passage of P.L. 97-86, DoD began to plan and formulate guidelines for increased military involvement in civilian law enforcement. As a result, DoD Directive 5525.5 was developed which identified the requirements for employing DoD resources in support of law enforcement activity. The Directive provided that DoD would "cooperate with" civilian law enforcement officials to the :maximum extent possible." The Directive also required that the Secretary of Defense give prior approval before any Navy or Marine Corps personnel could participate in the interdiction of vessels or aircraft involved in illegal activity.[4]

Public Law 99-570

The cocaine-related deaths of several prominent athletes in June 1986 focused attention on drug abuse in America and touched off a national outpouring of concern.The deaths became a catalyst for a flurry of political debate and subsequent legislative activity. With the fall 1986 general elections forthcoming, politicians seemed eager to produce legislation on time to use it as a campaign issue.[5] The derivative of this activity eventually led to P.L. 99-570, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, signed into law by President Reagan on 27 October 1986.[6] Not only did the Act enhance federal, state, and local drug abuse prevention and treatment efforts, but it also provided law enforcement agencies with significant new resources in the "drug war." Title III, interdiction, is of particular note to the Department of Defense because it points out that:

> - the Department of Defense and the use of its resources should be an integral part of a comprehensive, national drug interdiction program;
> - since the amendment of the Posse Comitatus Act in 1981, the Department of Defense has assisted in the effort to interdict drugs, but they can do more.[7]

Title III of the Anti-drug Abuse Act increases the level of funds and resources available to civilian drug interdiction agencies of the federal government; increases the level of support for DoD as consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act, for interdiction of narcotics traffickers before they penetrate the US borders; and improves other drug interdiction programs of

the federal government.[8] Title III also identifies specific equipment support requirements for the DoD to procure for or transfer to various law enforcement agencies. The equipment includes surveillance aircraft, radar aerostats for detection of low flying aircraft, and Blackhawk helicopters.[9] The DoD was also required to develop a detailed list of all forms of assistance to be made available to civilian law enforcement and drug interdiction agencies.[10] Additionally, the Act expanded the 1981 amendment of the Posse Comitatus Act by allowing the military to operate and maintain military equipment while assisting US law enforcement agencies outside the United States.[11]

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1989 clearly moved the DoD toward a more active role in the US effort to counter drug abuse. Under current legislation (Public Law 100-456), also known as the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1989, DoD is assigned the lead agency responsible for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime drug smuggling threats to the United States. It also directs DoD to integrate US command, control, communications and technical intelligence (C3I) assets dedicated to drug interdiction into an effective communications network and to oversee a program of enhanced use of the National Guard, under the direction of state governors, in the battle against drug smuggling. To accomplish these added responsibilities, the Secretary of Defense assigned to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel the task of providing overall DoD direction and fiscal oversight for implementation of these new responsibilities.[12]

To implement this new DoD tasking, the Secretary of Defense has assigned four warfighting Commanders in Chief (CINCs) the responsibility for anti-drug operations in their geographic areas. CINCLANT and CINCPAC have established Joint Task Force Four (JTF-4) and Joint Task Force Five (JTF-5), respectively, to direct their counter-drug efforts, while CINCNORAD and CINCSOUTH have relied on existing structure with additional personnel augmentation.[13]

JTF-4 is located in Key West, Florida, while JTF-5 is based in Alameda, California. Both are under the command of Coast Guard flag officers. JTF-4 operates a "fusion center" which provides information on air and maritime smugglers in the Caribbean and southeastern CONUS to the Customs/Coast Guard C3I Center at Miami. JTF-5 focuses principally on

maritime smugglers approaching the CONUS West Coast and provides target and intelligence information to Coast Guard and Customs' marine interdiction forces command authority. CINCNORAD operates a fusion center for collecting, coalescing and disseminating information on smuggling across the southwest border and, particularly, air smuggling in the southwestern CONUS.[14] Both the Southern and Pacific commands are drawing up plans for helping foreign governments combat illegal drug production and trafficking.

A new Joint Task Force, JTF-6 at Fort Bliss, Texas, was announced on 13 November 1989. This force plans and coordinates operations by active and reserve troops to support law enforcement agencies in surveillance, ground radar monitoring, training and general engineering support. JTF-6 will operate in the southwestern border area. The task force is under the control of Forces Command and commanded by Army Brig. Gen. Sherman Williford, chief of staff of the Fifth Army.[15]

In closing remarks before the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on the "military role in drug interdiction," LtGen Stephen Olmstead, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Policy and Enforcement, stated:

> Our commitment of material, manpower and dollars has been significant and will continue in an upward trend. Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt in the minds of those in the Department of Defense that we now have a role in the war on drugs.[16]

Military Support Mission

Although the Defense Department was made the lead agency in the drug war in 1988 and tasked to coordinate anti-drug activities of all federal agencies, its role in actually fighting the war has been almost entirely a support mission. Secretary of Defense Cheney is reviewing proposals from the designated commanders in chief to expand the military's involvement in the drug war; however, he has made it clear that although more military personnel and equipment will be devoted to the drug war in 1990, the basic support-only nature of the military's role will not change.[17] The purpose of this section will be to highlight some of the military support provided to civilian agencies for drug law enforcement. The U.S. Armed Forces' efforts

have sometimes been interservice in nature; however, for clarity and ease of presentation, the following information is presented by service component.

U.S. Marine Corps

The Marine Corps has used OV-10D Bronco aircraft to identify, evaluate, and track suspected drug smuggling aircraft, both visually during daylight hours and with the Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) detection system during hours of darkness. In FY 1986, OV-10s logged 845 hours on 335 sorties while performing their mission. Additionally, RF-4B aircraft were used to provide five hours of aerial multisensor imagery of ground sites on three sorties. The Marine Corps has also provided mobile ground radar surveillance equipment and personnel and anti-personnel intrusion detection equipment to detect smugglers crossing the US/Mexico border.[18]

The Marine Corps will begin training U.S. Border Patrol officers along the Mexican border in military skills such as scouting, navigation, map reading, camouflage and concealment, helicopter operations and the use of sensors such as night-vision equipment.[19] All Marine Corps support provided thus far has been within the continental United States.

U.S. Navy

U.S. Navy P-3C Orion, S-3A Viking and E-2C Hawkeye aircraft have flown missions in support of the drug interdiction effort. Navy support has been considerable. In FY 1986, Navy active and reserve aircraft flew 8614 flight hours in 1185 sorties to search for smugglers.[20] Surveillance flights have been flown off the east coast of Florida, throughout the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico, and over the Pacific Ocean off the coasts of Mexico and California. The Navy provides radar services, ship services (including hydrofoils which embark USCG tactical law enforcement teams (TACLETS) and are particularly effective in waters around the Florida Keys, and the towing of seized drug vessels which permits USCG cutters to remain on station longer.[21]

The Navy has proposed keeping an aircraft carrier battle group or a Marine Corps amphibious task force off Columbia, South America, at all times in 1990. Ships would also be sent to Columbia for one- to two-month training deployments that now are conducted closer to Florida in the Atlantic or Caribbean.[22]

U.S. Air Force

The Air Force uses AWACs radar planes and U-2 and RF-4 reconnaissance planes to monitor air traffic coming into the country. In FY 1986, the Air Force logged 4469 flight hours on 1311 sorties in support of counter-drug operations.[23] The service also performs radar monitoring from its fixed land-based radar sites and lends equipment such as mobile radar stations, night-vision goggles and navigation equipment to law enforcement agencies. The Air Force operates two aerostat radars located in Cudjoe Key, Florida and Patrick AFB. These radars provide a look-down capability against low-flying aircraft. Both aerostats are digitally linked to the Customs Service Miami Command Center. Two additional aerostats will be turned over to the Customs Service for use in Alabama and the Bahamas.[24]

U.S. Army and National Guard

The Army and National Guard provide a variety of support to drug enforcement agencies including: loan of night-vision imaging systems specialized training, including use of ground radars; rifle and pistol ranges for drug enforcement personnel; and special forces-type training, including rappeling.[25] The Army has assigned several Blackhawk helicopters and crews to transport DEA agents and Bahamaian police on counter-drug operations. It also placed communications equipment operators on Coast Guard ships and in Miami and San Juan, Puerto Rico and loaned administrative personnel to U.S. drug czar William Bennett, the DEA and the Justice and State departments. The Army also has participated in surveillance missions in the southwest and has provided training for law enforcement officers in the United States and abroad.

The Air National Guard provides law enforcement agencies with TPS-43 movable ground-based radars and operators to spot and track suspicious low-flying aircraft. During routine training flights, Guard pilots flying RF-4 reconnaissance planes take pictures along smuggling routes and over marijuana-growing areas. There are about 30 such flights per month.[26]

U.S. Coast Guard

The U.S. Coast Guard is one of America's five armed forces. The USCG is organized under the Department of Transportation in time of peace and is

fully committed to participation in the nation's war on drugs, through at-sea enforcement of U.S. laws on drug trafficking. The Coast Guard is the primary agency responsible for enforcing federal law at sea because the Armed Forces are prohibited from performing law enforcement functions by the Posse Comitatus Act. By statute, all USCG commissioned, warrant and petty officers are federal law enforcement officers with the authority to "make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction."[27]

Although the Coast Guard had been active in drug interdiction efforts since 1973, their initial effectiveness was minimal due to a lack of coordinated effort between all of the agencies working on the drug problem. In 1973, very little intelligence was shared by agencies responsible for drug law enforcement. Additionally, it was pointed out that the Coast Guard was poorly equipped to deal effectively with drug smuggling. In response, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger in 1982 authorized the Navy to support the Coast Guard in four specific areas: (1) air and surface surveillance, (2) towing or escort of seized vessels and transportation of prisoners, (3) logistic support to Coast Guard units, and (4) embarkation of Coast Guard personnel on Navy ships to conduct law enforcement boardings of U.S. flag and stateless vessels.[28]

The last provision listed above resulted in the creation of Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs). They are specially trained boarding parties embarked on some Navy surface ships in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico for about 30 days at a time. Suspect vessels are approached and stopped by the Navy ship. The LEDET then boards and conducts a search. If drugs are found, the vessel is seized and the crew is arrested. In FY 1987, the Navy provided over 2500 ship days to the LEDET program. This resulted in 20 vessel seizures, 110 arrests, and over 225,000 pounds of marijuana and almost 550 pounds of cocaine seized.[29]

Military Operations Overseas

Operations on foreign soil have been very limited. On 11 April 1986 President Reagan signed a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) on narcotics and national security which clarified the direct involvement of U.S. military forces in interdiction roles overseas by stipulating that they must be (1) invited by the host government, (2) directed by US government

agencies, and (3) limited to a support function. Only two operations, one in the Bahamas and one in Bolivia, have been documented.[30]

Operation BAT

BAT is an acronym which is derived from Bahamas, Antilles and Turks -- three Caribbean island chains which are used by drug traffickers as fueling and transshipment points. Following an agreement between the U.S. and Bahamian governments in May 1983, U.S. Air Force unarmed helicopters and aircrews were used to carry DEA agents and SWAT-type teams of the Royal Bahamian Police Strike Force to remote island sites used by drug traffickers. The Air Force merely provided rapid transportation for the Bahamian authorities who did the actual searching, seizing, and arresting. The U.S. government estimated that in 1983 and 1984 approximately 70 percent of the cocaine entering the United States passed through the Bahamas. Operation Bat has been successful and is continuously supported by the Air Force as a quick insertion means for Bahamian law enforcement teams on drug apprehension missions.[31]

Operation Blast Furnace

At the request of the Bolivian government to help their police conduct raids on cocaine processing facilities, the U.S. Government sent six Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters and about 160 supporting troops to Bolivia. The helicopters were used to rapidly ferry specially trained Bolivian civilian anti-drug strike force personnel to sites from which raids were launched on cocaine processing facilities. The operation lasted approximately four months. The Blast Furnace effort was effective only as long as it was in operation. Some 800 traffickers were estimated to have fled the country during the operation, and a total of 21 processing labs had been seized. However, there was no long-term effects and soon after the U.S. forces departed Bolivia, the drug business was back to normal.[32]

ENDNOTES

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[9] Ibid., Sec. 3052.

[10] Ibid., Sec. 3057.

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[17] "SecDef on Fiscal 1990 Defense Appropriation Bill," Defense Issues, 8 December 1989, p. 4.

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[20] Senate, Federal Drug Interdiction, p. 472.

[21] Ibid., p. 469.

[22] Mathews, p. 24.

[23] Senate, Federal Drug Interdiction, p. 472.

[24] Ibid., p. 469.

[25] Ibid., pp. 468-469.

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[27] James S. Gracey, "Winning the War at Sea," The Police Chief, October 1985, p. 63.

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[31] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Narcotics Issues in the Bahamas and the Caribbean, 12 May 1987, p. 32 (hereafter referred to as "House, Narcotics Issues in Bahamas").

[32] Abbott, pp. 103-107.

CHAPTER V

THE MARINE CORPS' ROLE

General

For the past several years, the Department of Defense has been embarked on a program to counter the problem of illegal drugs entering the United States. Since taking on that mission, the U.S. has committed more than 72,000 flying hours and nearly 7,000 ship days in support of the counter-drug effort.[1] One of the main foreign policy goals of President Bush is to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. and, if possible, to eliminate it. The specific mission of the DoD is to protect national security. There is little doubt that international drug trafficking is a national security problem for the United States. Therefore, detecting and countering the production and trafficking of illegal drugs is a high-priority, national security mission of the DoD.

Although reducing or eliminating the flow of illegal drugs is a statutory responsibility of the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, and the DEA, there is no question that all branches of the armed forces will continue to support governmental agencies in the "war on drugs." The United States Marine Corps has concluded that drug trafficking will likely continue to be a major national security issue in the next decade and represent a substantial threat to the United States. In the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Master Plan, a document designed to establish the operational foundation and guidance for Marine Corps operations through the year 2000, MAGTF counter-narcotics operations have been described as providing assistance in the form of individual military skills training and operational planning assistance to interagency task forces. Also, more active missions which national authorities might authorize for Marine forces include supporting surveillance and interdiction operations and supporting or conducting raids against overseas drug cartels.[2]

MAGTFs, which form an integral part of naval expeditionary forces, have a practical value in both stability and limited objective operations that no other force can duplicate. Embarked MAGTFs can precisely tailor forces ashore to the situation, and can quickly adjust them. MAGTFs operating from amphibious shipping can limit vulnerable and highly visible facilities ashore.

MAGTFs, unlike other light expeditionary forces, have the organic sustainability and seabased support capability to remain on the scene for an extended period, and they can be readily withdrawn from an area when prudent. Finally, once ashore, MAGTFs are prepared to act as either a component of a joint task force or to provide the nucleus for its headquarters. These characteristics make MAGTFs uniquely suitable for employment in low intensity conflict and counter-narcotic environments.[3]

The MAGTF Master Plan envisions that Marine forces will usually operate as components of U.S. Government interagency task forces. When tasked by appropriate authority MAGTFs will provide support to U.S. agencies conducting counter-narcotic operations outside U.S. borders, MAGTF counter-narcotic operations may include the following functions:

- Providing aerial and ground surveillance and reconnaissance functions in support of U.S. Government agencies.
- Providing command and control, as well as mission planning instruction to U.S. Government agencies.
- Providing military technical skills training support.
- Providing supporting mobility for U.S. agencies and host nation forces, (e.g. helicopter or aircraft, boats, AAVs, LAVs, etc.)
- Conducting amphibious raids against drug cartel facilities.[4]

Supply-Side

The United States Marine Corps capabilities lay primarily on the supply-side of the drug problem. In order to support host nation governments in source countries with DoD assets, CINC and component planners must narrow the scope of military application. As in other Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) scenarios, too large a US military presence can prove counter-productive to the objective of the host nation government and create concern with regard to national sovereignty. There are roles for small independent action forces (SIAFs), detachments (DETs), mobile training teams (MTTs), and technical assistance teams (TATs) from MAGTFs.

The MAGTF concept is the centerpiece of the Marine Corps' warfighting strategy. However, for some counter-narcotic missions, the MAGTF may not be the force of choice. The Marine Corps must acknowledge that there are situations/scenarios in LIC (and in this case, counter-narcotics) where it is

prudent to employ teams/elements/detachments of Marines and their support equipment in configurations less than a MAGTF. It may be time to consider a fourth type of MAGTF -- one which is smaller than the traditional Marine Expeditionary Units, Brigades, or Forces (MEUs, MEBs, MEFs). A permanent or semi-permanent Marine Expeditionary Combat Team (MECT) commanded by a Col/LtCol and a small staff with a reinforced rifle company ground combat element (GCE), aviation DET air combat element (ACE), command element (CE), and combat service support element (CSSE) might provide the required/desired Caribbean presence. The MECT could be trained to be special operations capable, similar to the current deployment scheme of MEU(SOC) -- special operations capable -- MAGTFs.[5] These "contingency MAGTFs," which employ a company-size GCE, have been used in the Persian Gulf during the recent "tanker war."

Indications are that President Bush's Andean Ridge interdiction strategy will include closure of the Andean Ridge air corridors followed by riverine interdiction of the remaining lines of communication (LOCs) to cut the coca traffic.[6] Such a strategy will produce requirements for training in riverine operations in Columbia, Peru, and Bolivia. Marines should be ready to support this requirement. Riverine operations are integral to most LIC scenarios and the Marine Corps possesses significant small-boat equipment and operational experience, especially in their MEU(SOC) organizations.

Since the United States produces no heroin or cocaine, and only 25 percent of the marijuana consumed within its borders, a major objective in reducing drug use is to restrict the flow of drugs across our borders and into the hands of potential users. Operations to reduce the amount of drugs crossing the U.S. borders can be broadly categorized as eradication, surveillance, and interdiction. Eradication efforts are those actions taken at the source to stop either growth or production of illegal narcotics. Surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aerial, electronic, photographic, or other means. Interdiction includes those actions taken to disrupt the flow or movement of the illegal drugs from the time they leave the source countries until they reach the hands of the user. As almost 100 percent of the world's coca production is from the Andean Ridge countries, eradication efforts must be focused in Columbia, Bolivia, and particularly in the Upper Huallaga Valley of Peru.[7]

Because of existing U.S. Army (SOF) orientation in South America (both in SOUTHCOM and in the MILGPs), U.S. Marine Corps support to Andean Ridge countries has been limited. However, efforts by the Marine Corps in this region should concentrate on continued participation in Joint/Combined training exercises, developing MTTs relative to counter-narcotics operations and host military needs and requirements, and generally, those activities that allow for more interface with Latin American (LATAM) military counterparts. One means to foster a closer relationship with LATAM counterparts is a forthcoming USMC/LATAM Sponsorship Program. Under the program, U.S. Marines will work with the six recognized Marine Corps of South America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Peru, and Venezuela) on various initiatives in an effort to assist in their professional development while increasing USMC regional knowledge and enhancing resident LIC experience.

Regardless of the role DoD/USMC forces ultimately play, however, there are only two means by which U.S. military forces may become involved in foreign soil, both of which are subject to the limitations of the Mansfield Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The first is by the host nation requesting military assistance through the State Department (U.S. Ambassador). The second means is by another U.S. Agency involved in foreign counter-narcotics operations requesting assistance with host nation approval.[8]

Interdiction efforts have been primarily focused in the Caribbean basin and along the southern border of the U.S. The Caribbean is patrolled primarily by U.S. Coast Guard and Navy task forces and U.S. Customs air interdiction assets. U.S. Marine Corps participation in the past has included one UH-1N for surveillance support and numerous OV-10 detection and monitoring sorties using the Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR). Training benefits can be derived from USMC aviation support to these joint task forces. All aspects of ship-board operations, to include use of night-vision goggles, would readily enhance warfighting skills. Operating in a sea-based mode clearly falls within the roles and missions of the Marine Corps. Furthermore, justification could be compiled for FLIR and long-range navigation upgrades for USMC aircraft employed in this effort.

As interdiction efforts expand in the Caribbean, an increase in drug smuggling activity can be expected along the southwest land border.

Stepped-up interdiction forces drug traffickers to change traficking routes.[9] The primary responsibility for interdiction along the southwest border falls to the U.S. Customs Service at the Points of Entry (POEs) and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Border Patrol) between POEs. Border Patrol operations between the POEs include detection and monitoring, interdiction, search, seizure, and apprehension of drug smugglers.

While there are some DoD prohibitions articulated in DoD Directive 5525.5, USMC participation in detection and monitoring (surveillance) while training the Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) is not prohibited by law nor directives and is compatible with the capabilities of the Corps. Furthermore, Title 10 of the U.S. Code specifies that to the maximum extent practical, Services may take the information needs of the LEAs into consideration when planning and executing training or operations. Title 10 goes on to stipulate that the Services may provide LEAs with any information gained during the normal course of training and operations that could pertain to drug smuggling activities.

Small Marine units with a covert surveillance capability could provide valuable information to the Border Patrol and Customs Service relative to surface and aerial smuggling activity while enhancing their warfighting skills by training/operating against "real" targets along the Southwest border. Helicopter assets could also be incorporated into the training scenarios. Other than MedEvac, helicopter training could include: NVG operations, rappeling, radio relay, visual reconnaissance, and command and control. The proximity of several military bases, diverse terrain, extensive Bureau of Land Management acreage and national forests, and realistic training would make the Southwest border an attractive training option.

Additionally, USMC and Border Patrol expertise in specific areas could be shared in a joint training program between Marine and Border Patrol agents. Deficiencies in Border Patrol capabilities are areas of considerable expertise by Marines. Conversely, Border Patrol agents possess specific skills in sign cutting (detection), tracking and counter-tracking that could be useful to Marines.[10]

Drug intelligence is one of the most severe resource limitations cited by law enforcement officials.[11] Border Patrol sectors possess intelligence sections, but their focus is more administrative than operational. Little operational intelligence is produced and disseminated to field agents and

little evidence exists of any analysis being conducted as a result of ongoing operations. The intelligence collection capability of each Border Patrol agent is significant, but there is no fusion center to collate the data at the sector level. Marine Corps expertise in this area is considerable and readily transferable to the Border Patrol.

Although detailed studies suggest that interdiction operations will probably not appreciably reduce the quantity of cocaine and marijuana entering the country, the studies do indicate that military participation does have an impact on drug trafficking. Aside from reducing the quantity of drugs reaching the user, interdiction efforts by U.S. military forces sends a visible signal that the United States takes drug importation seriously.[12]

Congress is increasingly anxious to demonstrate a convincing resolve against drug traffickers. In order to make a significant dent in the supply availability of drugs, DoD needs a legal mandate for military operations and the use of force. Admiral William Crowe Jr., the recently retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said "the nation might consider doing unusual things with the military to win the war against drugs." Crowe further suggested that "in the anti-drug fight America might want to use the military in new ways."[13] The recent attempt to deploy a naval task force (aircraft carrier JFK and nuclear-powered cruiser Virginia) to the Caribbean Sea, to be positioned off Columbia to interdict the flow of drugs, appears to be a move in the direction referred to by Admiral Crowe.[14] Operations such as this, from a naval task force, are the forte of the MAGTF. It remains to be seen however how far the nation will go to win its war against drugs.

Demand

Reducing the demand for drugs has been increasingly recognized by Congress and the executive branch as the crucial element in the war on drugs. Officials agree that the efforts to reduce the supply of illegal drugs cannot succeed as long as the demand for drugs in our society is so great. Some experts believe that substantial reductions in drug abuse will not occur unless there are fundamental changes in cultural attitudes and values which decrease society's demand for illegal drugs.[15] Demand reduction requires actions to deglamorize the use of drugs through counter-value education.

In the Marine Corps, the Recruiting Service employs an awareness program (posters, videotape, and public service announcements) to bring the anti-drug message to the high schools. There are other ways the Corps can contribute. The loan of Marine prosecuting attorneys on a case-by-case basis to expedite trials in federal courts overwhelmed with drug cases and the active participation of the Reserve establishment in the "Campaign Drug Free" program are examples. From a Marine Corps perspective, demand-side programs should be directed at active duty Marines and prospective Marines from the recruiting market segment. Such programs will have an ancillary and complimentary affect on the illegal drug problem in the general population.[16]

Efforts to curb drug abuse in active duty forces have been noteworthy. DoD figures show a dramatic decline in users from approximately 27 percent in 1980 to a present-day rate of 4.8 percent. Marine Corps statistics show an even more dramatic decline from 37 percent in 1980 to 4 percent in 1988.[17] This success can be primarily attributed to the mandatory urinalysis program and the Corps' zero tolerance attitude. Analysis indicates that increasing the frequency of urinalysis testing will further decrease the usage rate. As long as the program remains in place, there is little to indicate that a reversal in this downward trend will occur.

Intelligence

In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on 18 April 1989, Lt. General Thomas Kelly, Joint Staff J-3, stated that intelligence efforts directed toward drug smugglers may be the most significant contribution DoD can make to the nation's war on drugs. He went on to say that it is the official DoD intelligence policy to provide all possible support to counter-narcotics activities consistent with DoD mission, military preparedness, and the prudent management and application of DoD intelligence resources.

Marine Corps efforts in intelligence included a newly-formed Reserve Augmentation Unit (RAU) assigned to the Counter-narcotics Training Detachment at DIA, numerous personnel assignments to the CINCs and other federal agencies in drug-related billets, and a limited Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) capability targeted against drug smugglers approaching the U.S. southern border. All of these efforts have had a measure of success.

CINCSOUTH's intelligence exchange program with LATAM militaries is an excellent opportunity for Marine Corps intelligence personnel to enhance their skills. Many LATAM militaries seek U.S. assistance in training their intelligence forces, and this provides an excellent opportunity for Marines to train in a LIC scenario while providing the Marine Corps a cadre of personnel experienced /knowledgeable about the LATAM theater of operations.[18]

Another area where Marines can apply their tactical intelligence skills is in support of the U.S. Border Patrol. As noted previously, the Border Patrol lacks an operational intelligence fusion capability. Marine intelligence officers could readily initiate an intelligence program that would maximize Border Patrol intelligence potential to assist in stopping the flow of drugs across the border by helping to develop an S-2 arrangement at each Sector headquarters.

Treatment and Rehabilitation

The U.S. Navy currently provides the Marine Corps inpatient rehabilitation at Alcohol Rehabilitation Centers and Departments associated with naval hospitals. The Marine Corps treatment and rehabilitation programs at unit and major command levels are generally screening and counselling in nature with limited treatment capabilities for the addicted patient. Hence, the Marine Corps' ability to assist the national effort in terms of treatment and rehabilitation is extremely limited except when personnel and facility support to socialization programs is deemed appropriate.

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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The drug problem in the U.S. is enormous. The federal government is attacking the drug problem through substantial efforts to simultaneously reduce the demand for and supply of illegal drugs. Nevertheless, more drugs are available than ever before. The war on drugs is expensive and over the last several years, Congress has looked increasingly to the military to supplement drug control efforts.

In 1988, the Defense Department was made the lead agency in the drug war and charged with coordinating anti-drug activities of all federal agencies. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney has made a commitment to expand the military's involvement in the drug war. He stated that the illegal drug trade poses a direct threat to the sovereignty and security of the United States and that stemming the flow of drugs is "a high-priority, national security mission."[1]

The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) has given counter-narcotics operations priority in his MAGTF Master Plan, and supports the Secretary of Defense's commitment to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into this nation. Although CMC's MAGTF Master Plan guidance and concept of operations for counter-narcotics operations are general in nature, there are specific functions which Marines can perform in support of the war on drugs.

Marines must be prepared to provide DETs, MTTs, TATs, and SIAFs for counter-narcotics and low intensity conflict scenarios to CINCs, CJTFs, MILGP Commanders, etc.. Marine planners and operators need to better understand the nature of conflict on the LIC end of the spectrum. They must recognize that traditional naval command and control relationships do not always apply in LIC. The MAGTF may not be the force of choice in Caribbean and LATAM LIC (counter-narcotic) scenarios. Therefore, Marine planners and operators must recognize and be able to support CINC theater requirements in LIC environments even though such support may be considered inconsistent with the manner in which Marines would prefer to be employed.

The traditional MAGTF (MEU, MEB, MEF) may not be the force of choice in counter-narcotics efforts. The Marine Corps should look into the

employment of a smaller, more tailored MAGTF in the Caribbean on a permanent or semi-permanent basis to support counter-narcotic efforts. A specially organized Marine Expeditionary Combat Team (MECT) with a reinforced rifle company GCE and related ACE, CSSE, and CE would be appropriate. The MECT would require special skills and capabilities to provide MTTs, DETs, and TATs in support of CINCLANT and CINCSOUTH taskings in the Caribbean and LATAM respectively. It would also provide long-range amphibious raid capability to an appropriate CINC. Coordination with the Navy (OPNAV) concerning ship availability and the effect on deployment schedules will be necessary.

The Marine Corps must focus in on the Caribbean Basin and South America to support LEAs and host nation forces in counter-narcotics operations. Support to USCG/USN operations in the Caribbean Basin closely parallels USMC roles and missions and can have a positive impact on U.S. interdiction efforts in the region.

The Marine Corps should play an important role in support of LATAM riverine interdiction operations. Insurgents in many LIC environments, as well as drug traffickers, rely on river LOCs. The Marine Corps must review their capabilities and limitations in riverine operations and develop new doctrine and strategies which support counter-narcotics efforts. Operational concepts should include: small boat training of DEA/US Agency personnel, USMC mobile training teams to host nation (HN) counter-narcotics forces, USMC forces augmenting HN counter-narcotics forces in support of riverine operations, USMC task organized forces combined with DEA/US Agency forces to form an interagency joint task force, and USMC task organized forces combined with HN counter-narcotics forces to form an international joint task force for the conduct of counter-narcotic riverine operations.

The Marine Corps must take a more active role as "trainers" of host nation LEAs and military units. Marines have a unique ability, particularly from a sea-based mode, to provide in the way of training support MTTs, DETs, and TATs when a visible U.S. military presence is not desired. Support can be ground or air and can enhance future efforts to cut the Andean Ridge air corridor, interdict riverine traffic, and/or support DEA eradication efforts through training or outright security operations.

The Marine Corps should increase its presence in the Caribbean Basin by increasing ARG/MEU(SOC) sailing days and port visits. This additional

presence may have to occur at the expense of the Mediterranean ARG/MEU(SOC) until such time as an additional MAGTF, possibly a MECT with appropriate shipping, could be established. The MECT should be designated special operations capable and possess the necessary capabilities for counter-narcotics operations, most of which are counter-insurgency LIC skills inherent to Marine Corps capabilities.

The Marine Corps should also support USCG/USN interdiction operations in the Caribbean by providing helicopter assets for surveillance missions. Fixed wing assets (RF-4, C-130, and OV-10) could also be provided to assist in detection, monitoring, command and control, and limited logistics support.

The Marine Corps should provide ground surveillance assets to monitor the Southwest Border where gaps in Border Patrol coverage exists. By 1991, Customs will have a fully operational surveillance curtain with 19 aerostats that will provide radar target tracking data on narcotics smugglers.[2] The effective aerostats will force smugglers to shift to land means of transportation to enter the country. The Bureau of Land Management and national forest land along the southwest border will provide Marines excellent training areas for scouting and patrolling, observation post (OP) selection and monitoring, night movement, camouflage and concealment, land navigation/map reading, and helo operations. Detection, tracking and counter-tracking skills taught by U.S. Border Patrol agents will enhance USMC warfighting skills.

The Marine Corps should provide Border Patrol sectors with an operational intelligence capability. The Marine Corps should send intelligence officers/SNCOs TAD to various sectors to provide them with expert advice to develop operational intelligence fusion centers. Training would include maintenance of intelligence situation maps, analysis of sensor readouts, patrol debriefing procedures, and the integration of the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) input.

On the demand-side, the Marine Corps stands as a model of how it significantly reduced illegal drugs within its organization through mandatory drug-testing and a zero tolerance approach. The Marine Corps has set the standard in developing a large institutional model for eliminating the demand for drugs within the organization. It remains to be seen if the

civilian society at large will accept such procedures and transform attitudinal behavior sufficient enough to reduce the demand for drugs.

Accurate and timely intelligence will play a key role in any decision to use U.S. military assistance in counter-narcotic operations. The Marine Corps must get involved in the counter-narcotics business by directly participating in various government interagency drug billets, and pursue expertise in the drug trafficking geographical areas through exchange assignments with other LATAM militaries. These assignments develop skills and expertise which enhance not only counter-narcotics expertise, but also serve a broader role in preparing Marine intelligence personnel for the LIC environment.

For the military, the war on drugs is just beginning. The Marine Corps has already made some contributions to the war. The war on drugs has seen little success as illegal drugs continue to proliferate our society. With increasing pressure from Congress and the nation at large to do something about the drug epidemic in our society, the day may come when the U.S. military's role is transformed from a purely support function to a more aggressive dimension. The Marine Corps must stand ready to perform its missions as prescribed by law under Title 10, U.S. Code, which include among its naval missions the added responsibility to "perform such other duties as the President may direct."[3] The United States Marine Corps has well earned the phrase -- "First to Fight" -- from its illustrious history. The future war and battlefield may be different, but no less demanding. If summoned by the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the Corps must be prepared to fight and win the war on drugs, the nation expects no less.

ENDNOTES

[1] "Cheney at the Pentagon," Government Executive, October 1989, p. 4.

[2] Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Fighting the War on Drugs," Signal, December 1989, p. 38.

[3] Robert D. Heinl, Jr., The Marine Officer's Guide, p. 74.

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