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MILITARY FORCES IN URBAN ANTITERRORISM

R. D. McLaurin
R. Miller

Abbott Associates, Inc.

October 1989
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This report examines four historical case studies to provide valuable insights for developing U.S. military antiterrorist doctrine for urban areas. The report begins with an introduction to the nature of urban terrorism and then evaluates each case. The cases (Algiers [1954-62], Ulster [1969-72], Montevideo [1968-72], and Beirut [U.S. experience, 1983]) are diverse in many areas including causes, intensity, terrorist and antiterrorist strategies and tactics, the role of cities in the overall terrorist campaign, and outcome. After discussion of the case as a whole, emphasis shifts to military forces. The role of military forces in a government's total antiterrorist effort is examined as are the details about military execution of this role. Political, legal, and strategic factors, organization and command and control, tactics, and equipment are discussed in detail. The report develops findings and conclusions and addresses their implications for U.S. military forces in future urban antiterrorist operations.

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TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND ACRONYMS

ADF	Arab Deterrent Force--Beirut
ALN	Armee de Liberation Nationale (National Liberation Army)--Algiers
APC	armored personnel carrier
BIA	Beirut International Airport--Beirut
BLT	Battalion landing team--Beirut
CCE	Comite de Coordination et d'Execution (Coordination and Execution Committee)--Algiers
CIA	U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
CID	Criminal Investigation Department--Ulster
CINCUSNAVEUR	Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe--Beirut
COMINT	communications intelligence
CRS	Compagnies Republicaines de Securite (Republican Security Companies) Algiers
CRUA	Comite Revolutionnaire d'Unite et d'Action (Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action)--Algiers
DGSG	Directorat General de Securite General (General Directorate of General Security)--Algiers
DGSN	Directorat General de Security National (General Directorate of National Security)--Algiers
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency--Beirut
DOP	Detachement Operationnel de Protection (Protective Operational Detachment)--Algiers
DPU	Dispositif de Protection Urbaine (Urban Protection Element)--Algiers
DST	Directorat de Surveillance Territoriale (Territorial Surveillance Directorate)--Algiers
ELINT	electronic intelligence
ESMACO	Estado Mayor Conjunto (Joint Staff)--Montevideo
FASTAB	Field Artillery School Target Acquisition Battery-Beirut
FLN	Front de Liberation Nationale (National Liberation Front)--Algiers
GHQ	general headquarters
GOC	General Officer Commanding--Ulster
GRE	Groupement de Renseignement et d'Exploitation (Intelligence and Exploitation Group)--Algiers
G-2	Military intelligence--Beirut
HQ	headquarters
HUMINT	human intelligence
IAF	Israel Air Force--Beirut
ID	identification
IDF	Israel Defense Force--Beirut
IRA	Irish Republican Army--Ulster
JCJ	Junta de los Comandantes er Jefe (Board of Commanders in Chief)--Montevideo
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces--Beirut
LAMP	Lebanese Army Modernization Program--Beirut
LOC	line(s) of communications
MAGTF	Marine Air Ground Task Force--Beirut
MARG	Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group--Beirut
MAU	Marine Amphibious Unit--Beirut
MLN	Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Movement)--Montevideo
MNF	Multi-National Force--Beirut
MOUT	military operations on urbanized terrain

MSSG	Marine Service and Support Group--Beirut
MTT	mobile training team--Beirut
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSA	National Security Agency--Beirut
OCOA	Organizaciones Coordinandos para las Operaciones Antisubversivas (Coordinating Organizations for Antisubversive Operations)--Montevideo
OIRA	Official Irish Republican Army--Ulster
OJCS	Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--Beirut
OPFC	Oficina de la Prensa para las Fuerzas Conjuntas (Joint Forces Press Bureau)--Montevideo
OS	Organisation secrete (Secret Organization)--Algiers
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense--Beirut
PHOTINT	photographic intelligence
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army--Ulster
PJ	Police Judiciaire (Judicial Police)--Algiers
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization--Beirut
Provo	Provisional Irish Republican Army--Ulster
PSP	Progressive Socialist Party--Beirut
PSYOP	psychological operations
RCS	Regional Crime Squad--Ulster
RG	Renseignement General (General Intelligence)--Algiers
RI	Reunion Informaciones (Intelligence Coordination Group)--Montevideo
RMP	Royal Military Police--Ulster
ROE	rules of engagement--Beirut
RPG	shoulder-fired antitank rocket launcher
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary--Ulster
SAS	Special Air Service--Ulster
SAU	Services Administratives Urbaines (Urban Administrative Services)--Algiers
SDECE	Service de Documentation Exterieure et de Contre-Espionnage (External Documentation and Counter-Espionage Service)--Algiers
SLR	self-loading rifle (British Army standard L1A1)
SP	self-propelled
STA	surveillance and target acquisition
TARPS	target acquisition reconnaissance photography system--Beirut
UDA	Ulster Defence Association--Ulster
UDR	Ulster Defence Regiment--Ulster
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development--Montevideo
USCINCEUR	Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command
USDAO	U.S. Defense Attache Office--Beirut
USMNF	U.S contingent, Multi National Force--Beirut
VCP	vehicle check point--Ulster
ZAA	Zone Autonome d'Alger (Algiers Autonomous Zone)--Algiers

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The growing incidence of urban terrorism directed against military forces and the increased involvement of the United States in urban situations where its own forces may become targets of terrorist groups suggest that the role of U.S. forces in such circumstances should be seriously considered. The objectives of this study are to examine selected aspects of urban terrorism against military forces and of military operations against urban terrorists to identify key variables whose understanding may contribute to the development of improved military doctrine for urban antiterrorism. The findings and conclusions of this study are based on research and analysis of four cases: Algiers (1954-1962), Ulster (1969-1972), Montevideo (1968-1972), and Beirut (1983).

POLITICAL, LEGAL, AND STRATEGIC FACTORS

Important political choices were available to antiterrorists in all cases. These choices often drove the strategy of the antiterrorist campaign. At the same time, factors not open to choice often played just as great a role, conditioning the achievement or the degree of success.

The resort to terrorist tactics was consistently linked to an unfavorable balance of physical resources for the terrorists. Terrorist choice of tactics reveals strategy. In all four cases, terrorist tactics were often chosen for long-term benefits rather than short-term victories, by compelling the government to choose reactive tactics believed to mobilize public opinion against the government. Terrorist communications became important vehicles to help the public "interpret" government actions as terrorists wanted.

In each of the four cases, the terrorist group made a conscious effort to influence the audience most directly associated with the primary threat to its success, <u>even if that threat was not indigenous</u>.

Terrorist actions and politics could isolate the terrorist groups from the public. While the use of terrorism in all four cases created problems for the terrorists, it created more problems for the government. Terrorist propaganda is designed to isolate the government from its sources of support. Isolating terrorists from support is necessary, but is unlikely to be enough for victory, because terrorism can continue at a low level for a long time.

The emotional nature of terrorism frequently creates an atmosphere in which government antiterrorist policy dominates larger strategic issues, generating greatly enhanced psychological opportunity for terrorists.

The role of legal institutions in antiterrorism appears to be determined by the legitimacy of existing institutions, by the degree of underlying grievances the terrorists may exploit, and by the skill of government communications in justifying and conditioning <u>temporary</u> deviations from the legal norms.

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

The importance of an integrated and cohesive effort against terrorist groups is central to success, but this does not mean military operations should be centralized away from the scene of battle. Local decisions are imperative as far as military operations are concerned.

The progress of communications and visual technologies means that impressive quantities of intelligence are now available. Unfortunately, the quantity of intelligence collected goes beyond the ability to manage it. Intelligence about terrorist groups is especially troublesome, because the groups tend to be small, while intelligence indicators necessary to sense, identify, and destroy them may be very large.

TACTICS

Important as the use of force may be to defeat urban terrorism, force is not the main means to combat the problem Terrorism is a tactic that must be seen in its larger context. The notion that terrorists respond only to force is misguided, for terrorists usually seek and benefit from forceful reactions if those reactions are not carefully managed. Military operations against terrorism, like those against any other threat, must be designed around a comprehensive and accurate appreciation of the strategic and tactical situation. Such an appreciation must consider

a. foreign support and sponsorship
b. nature, extent, type of indigenous support
c. popular views of the incumbent
d. popular views of institutions
e. representativeness of the terrorists' political views, values, and objectives
f. resources available to the incumbent
g. rootedness of the terrorist infrastructure
h. socio-political structure and institutions
i. strategy and tactics of the terrorist group

The emphasis in antiterrorist operations should be on intelligence, covert operations, civic action, and psychological operations. Intelligence was the single most important element in both offensive and defensive measures in these cases. Despite the advantages of the armed forces in many areas of the struggle against terrorism, police forces often have important advantages in intelligence. Human intelligence is the most important type for antiterrorist operations. However, the effective use of the kinds of data uniquely available in urban areas (credit records, personnel files, educational and health data, telephone information, refuse, auto registration, etc.) is vital to success.

Communications can play an important role. To date, active communications policies have focused heavily on sterile concepts of propaganda and only barely on more sophisticated ideas about motivation and mobilization. Active government policies to assist in accurate portrayal of terrorist actions in their real context are essential. Active communications policies in free societies require understanding and respect for overall social values.

The effectiveness of patrolling, the most common active antiterrorist tactic, is unclear. When terrorist attacks are inevitable, patrols have a certain preventive effect. When armed forces contribute to the tension rather than to relaxing it, patrols may generate violence.

Population protection is a major element of urban antiterrorism. The ability to protect defectors, to protect administrative and community leaders, to protect the population from intimidation, lies at the heart of the government effort. Population protection and control measures are essential to intelligence operations and to rapid exploitation of intelligence in operations against terrorist leadership.

Antileadership tactics are also important. Most self-directed terrorist groups are relatively small. They are frequently dominated by one or two charismatic personalities. Elimination of the leadership and penetration of the group have been the two tactics with the most devastating results.

In all cases, passive systems were employed to protect against terrorist attacks. Technological developments continue to provide a wide range of passive defense systems, but because the terrorist has the initiative, he can always change targets. Passive defense is a reasonable counter to marginal terrorist threats, but is completely inadequate to significant terrorist situations.

EQUIPMENT

Equipment development in antiterrorism did not play a primary role in most cases. Optics and bomb detection and disposal technologies have made signal contributions to active tactics. Advances in automated data processing have had an even greater impact in supporting intelligence operations.

THE UNITED STATES AND URBAN ANTITERRORISM

The likelihood of the United States becoming militarily involved in third world situations where urban terrorism exists is great. Such involvement may take place in any of several contexts, including peacekeeping, military advisory relationships, normal security or attaché roles, defense of U.S. real property assets, extraction of U.S. nationals, and specific support of friendly governments against terrorism.

In countering these threats, it is essential to consider the tactic of terrorism in the context of its use. One main distinction that must be made early and honestly is between self-directed terrorism and externally directed or supported terrorism. Terrorism rooted externally must be severed from its roots. The strategic focus on internal terrorism must be on isolating the terrorists internally, on denying them the issues they need, and on developing tactics to penetrate the infrastructure or destroy the leadership of the groups, or both.

The main role of the U.S. Government in combating overseas urban terrorism has been cooperation with other governments in intelligence and special operations activities. There appears to be a need to develop command and control systems less complex and more responsive to the tactical needs of

U.S. forces engaged in such operations. Doctrine for antiterrorist operations is also limited outside special operations. In a number of areas of traditional military activities, special considerations appropriate to situations in which urban terrorism exists should be available for U.S. forces.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The objectives of this study are to examine selected aspects of urban terrorism directed against military forces and military operations against urban terrorism to identify key variables whose understanding may contribute to the development of improved military doctrine for urban antiterrorism.

To date, the United States has not identified means by which to adequately handle the problems of urban terrorism, including terrorism directed against U.S. forces engaged in noncombat military activities. The policy issue is worsened by the difficulty in understanding the problem in terms that will hasten development of doctrine, equipment, and skills to defend U.S. forces deployed in urban areas on military missions and to increase their ability to effective realize the objectives of U.S. national security policy.

A considerable range of preventive and response options is available to the United States when U.S. forces are deployed in urban environments where terrorism exists or is possible. However, in the absence of a more systematic consideration of the conditions in which the range of options may be effective, selection of alternatives appropriate to specific environments is difficult. At this time, no such comparison of response alternatives and situational variables exists.

Given the objectives of the present study, the emphasis of the work is on <u>military activities</u> as they relate to <u>counter-terrorism</u> rather than on background descriptions, historical description of case studies, or assessment of patterns and trends. We have attempted to provide an objectives-oriented analysis of the roles of the military in the case studies and to focus on the effectiveness of specific alternate courses of action within certain clusters of conditions that affect outcome.

ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT

This report is presented in 10 chapters. This first chapter constitutes an introduction and is intended to convey the purpose and objectives of the research, to define and describe urban terrorism and the challenge it presents for contemporary noncombat deployments of military forces, to highlight some methodological and epistemological problems of the effort and explain the method used, and finally to outline the report. The second chapter discusses urban terrorism and noncombat military roles more systematically, and identifies other categories of variables that help to distinguish the cases and to establish the parameters of the research. Brief abstracts of the four cases also appear in the second chapter.

Chapters III through VI contain these cases: Algiers, Ulster, Montevideo, and Beirut. These chapters are not intended to be exhaustive or even extensive narratives. (Chapter X, References, closes this report. Those who seek more extensive treatment of individual cases may wish to peruse the references which list numerous works treating each case.) They are designed to provide only that information deemed essential to understand

the course of events in each case related to the use of and response to urban terrorism. Each chapter is organized along a standard framework. An introduction that provides topographical or demographic and historical data is followed by a discussion of the background of the terrorist campaign. Subsequently, the organization, resources, and strategy of the terrorist group(s) are presented. The antiterrorist campaign is described in similar fashion; antiterrorist organization, resources, and strategy are related. A brief review of the course of events ensues, and each chapter concludes with a description of outcome. The next section addresses political, legal, and strategic factors. A similar treatment for organization and command and control follows. The next two sections are concerned with military tactics and functions and equipment.

Chapter VII presents findings; Chapter VIII, conclusions.

Chapter IX considers the subject of the research and the four case studies to infer about urban terrorism for U.S. military forces in noncombat roles overseas.

THE NATURE OF URBAN TERRORISM

The problem of terrorism[1] is growing. It is growing for the international community, for the United States, and for American military forces.

Terrorism is generally perceived as unconventional attack on nonmilitary or at least noncombat personnel. It creates terror because it is not "sanctioned" violence. An attack on military personnel involved in combat activities would not generally conform to prevailing concepts of terrorism, for even attacks on off-duty military personnel in combat environments are considered inherent in the nature of conflict.[2] Thus, to the extent the military personnel themselves are to be considered terrorist targets, such personnel must be involved in military, but in noncombat military roles. (Otherwise, one risks defining terrorism operationally as any violence directed by hostile forces against U.S. persons or property, a definition so broad as to render the distinctive nature and threat of terrorism inconsequential.) The broader focus of this inquiry is the impact of urban terrorism on military forces, regardless of whether such forces constitute the actual target of the terrorism.

In consideration of the foregoing, this research addresses itself to the problems posed by

a. the requirement for armed forces to control, combat, or suppress urban terrorism, and

b. urban terrorism directed against armed forces engaged in noncombat military activities.

Terrorism is a general threat to public security, and as such, there is an extensive literature about the subject, much of which appeared within the last decade. The specific problems that terrorism poses for military forces have not been extensively considered outside the immediate questions of security in specific environments.

Terrorism is generally an urban phenomenon. The exceptions to this generalization tend to appear in anticolonial insurgency movements that often have rural roots. Terrorist threats are symbolic by definition.[3] By this we mean that the victim of a terrorist attack is not its true target. The terrorist attacks someone or something to secure access to someone else or something else. Since the aggregate of the most central elements of national value are clustered in cities, it is hardly surprising that terrorist targets are almost always urban targets.

The same reason that the city is the primary locus of terrorist action is also the reason that U.S. forces overseas are necessarily deployed in cities. These forces may not be engaged in combat activities. The scope of U.S. military presence is very broad. U.S. military personnel serve overseas in the context of (a) international organization activities where they provide logistic, information, and other support; (b) security guards for embassies and other official activities of the U.S. Government, (c) national and multi-national peacekeeping activities; (d) deterrent and strategic missions; (e) security assistance and training operations; (f) communications and intelligence; (g) readiness activities (e.g., exercises); and (h) numerous forms of cooperative endeavors with U.S. allies and friends around the world. While these are not combat roles, they are all military missions in which U.S. military forces and personnel are serving the national interest.

The multiplicity of noncombat U.S. military missions has significantly increased the vulnerability of U.S. military targets (i.e., both personnel and facilities) to terrorist attacks. Moreover, the political and other difficulties that have prevented the emergence of an effective policy of response to terrorist attacks have also increased the appearance of U.S. weakness. The domestic and international political costs of these attacks have therefore seriously hurt the national interests of the United States. Consequently, the incentive to conduct such attacks has increased and changed. Terrorist attacks were at one time oriented toward the accomplishment of tactical objectives (e.g., the application of limited force to compel the United States or its friends to reconsider specific actions or policies), but are now frequently undertaken to realize longer-range goals (e. g., to damage the United States in its image, posture, and decision-making processes).

Terrorism directed against U.S. military interests, like terrorism generally, is characterized by a disparity in power or position between U.S. military assets and the assets available to the terrorist group(s). Traditionally, terrorism has been the weapon of the weak against the strong, a kind of "equalizer" that uses symbolic destruction to generate nonmilitary pressures that will help offset the imbalance in the field. This tradition of terrorism relates to terrorism in its purist sense, the terrorism common in anticolonial conflicts and known to every popular struggle.

The political and strategic victories scored by terrorism in recent years (e.g., see Chapter IX) have encouraged governments to become directly or indirectly involved in supporting terrorist groups. Historically, terrorist groups have been small and weak and have seen terrorism as a tactical option, one often chosen in desperation. This is fundamentally different from government sponsorship of terrorism. In the latter case, governments acknowledge the strong constraints preventing, or at least deterring, other governments from using overt force in the contemporary world. Consequently, they recognize that by acting through surrogates and directing psychologically costly and humiliating blows on their adversaries

they may be able to compel a political or physical "retreat" without ever entering into a direct confrontation. Terrorism has therefore become a major political option for national governments, an option often (and somewhat misleadingly[4]) referred to as "state-sponsored terrorism."

State support for terrorism is a development of far-reaching importance. Historically, most groups resorting to terrorism have had very limited skills bases from which to work. Their resources (manpower, of course, but financial and logistic resources as well) have been subject to difficult constraints. These problems are inherent in the weakness that has driven them to use terrorism in the first place. The addition of government support has often provided access to highly technical skills in areas such as explosives, transportation, and communication, and access to substantial financial resources, too.

The city is of particular value for terrorists, and particularly for those inclined to attack U.S. military assets. Cover is everywhere, observation of target (U.S.) forces or facilities is usually easy, and these targets are generally concentrated. The proliferation of U.S. noncombat military missions has also led to a proliferation of targets. For example, dependents often accompany military personnel on some of these missions; civilian transportation means are often used, especially in off-duty hours; limited security resources and readiness are employed by contrast with combat environments. Moreover, application of overwhelming power in response is precluded by the presence of a noncombatant civilian population. A military response that disregards that population (i.e., a response that kills large numbers of innocents) may well pay rich dividends to the terrorists, for such reactions have often been one of the primary goals of terrorist groups.

THE LEVEL-OF-ANALYSIS PROBLEM: TACTICAL VERSUS STRATEGIC

One of the main problems in addressing terrorism derives from the nature of the phenomenon. Since terrorism is a tactic, one can easily stress the importance of dealing with the tactic, or the specific manifestations of the tactic (hijacking, hostage-taking, bombing), disregarding the strategic necessities that may operate in such a manner as to require steps precisely opposite of what is necessary to control the use of this tactic.

What we today call terrorism has existed throughout recorded history. It is a tactic, as we have noted, generally resorted to as a function of relative power position. To develop a program designed to eliminate terrorism altogether by a given group is not difficult; simply provide that group enough power relative to its adversary that it will not need to use terrorism. We do not advocate this approach, nor do we believe many would endorse it as a rational avenue to contain terrorism. Yet, by focusing on the elimination of terrorism as an end in itself, rather than seeing terrorism as a tactic, one can frequently produce results quite similar to this "solution." For example, many experts insist that treating the "social problems and conflicts that give rise to terrorism" is the only feasible way to stop it, even though it is clearly evident that divergent perspectives and finite resources ensure perpetual conflict. At the same time, focusing on the tactical aspect of urban terrorism (how to protect vulnerable facilities; how to prevent attacks on aircraft or hospitals) leaves initiative in the hands of the terrorist. An exclusive focus on passive protection gives the terrorist the rather simple challenge of shifting targets. Under these circumstances, the terrorist has not only scored another blow, he has in so

doing overcome the government even though the government's limited tactical objective (protecting the initial target against attack) was met.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology of this study combines case studies and evaluation. The purpose of this combination is to derive the benefits of each--the empirical basis of case studies, the doctrinal relevance and payoff of evaluation. As with any combination, the risk has been dilution of the empirical base to such an extent that the evaluation is either too narrow in scope to be useful or overly generalized and therefore wrong. This potential problem is addressed in the final part of this section.

The research has been conducted in five stages:

1. contextual data collection,
2. analysis of contextual data,
3. data collection for case studies,
4. analysis in terms of military functions, and
5. assessment for implications.

Contextual Data Collection and Analysis

The context in which urban terrorism cases have taken place necessarily goes well beyond the narrow confines of the military focus of the present work. This is so because terrorist attacks in urban areas have never been limited to solely military targets or missions. Thus, it is imperative in establishing the environment in which terrorist tactics are used to consider the totality of that environment, not merely the one aspect. This is particularly true since terrorist attacks against military targets are usually an outgrowth of (that is, not even the primary target of) terrorism directed against another target.

The first operational goal was to identify the objectives of the terrorist groups involved in the cases to be studied. We emphasize that groups have objectives, not terrorism per se. Urban terrorism can always be associated with some political objective, even if it is motivated by economic or social drives, for the urge to change some element of government, administration, economy, or society is inherently political. These long-term objectives are several, but their number is not so great as to escape generic description.

The second step was to identify the range of contexts of the use of terrorism. These contexts are substantially more varied and numerous than the generic, long-term objectives of terrorist groups. Nevertheless, they can also be clustered into a limited number of basic types. Several of these types must be sub-categorized. For example, while one might distinguish between liberation (i.e., anticolonial) movements, political oppositionist movements, and secessionist or partitionist movements, for example, it is equally important to distinguish in each of those cases between self-directed and surrogate movements. The issue of whether a group using terrorist

tactics would exist and function without external support is not merely a data-gathering and estimation exercise; it is critical in determining the most effective response, especially if that response has a deterrent component. Other contextual issues also play an important role. Is terrorism one among a range of tactics? Is the "terrorist war" part of a larger pattern of violence? How distinct are the groups participating in both the terrorist element and the larger conflict, if any?

Terrorist strategy is distinct from both ultimate purposes and tactics. The next consideration was the relationship between terrorist groups' long-term objectives and the employment of terrorist tactics in the cases being studied. In many respects, this relationship reflects terrorist analyses of incumbent vulnerabilities. The tactical choices of terrorist groups (see next paragraph) constitute the techniques these groups have selected to access these vulnerabilities or even to aggravate them.

The fourth element involved the tactical level. We asked what tactics have groups using terrorism chosen to attack their adversaries. The number of actual tactical techniques is quite limited, although the variety of circumstances tends to increase the apparent number of these techniques dramatically. Airplane hijacking and the hijacking of the ship, *Achille Lauro*, are both forms of abduction, for example. The proliferation of sub-types among terrorist tactics is not a reflection of the growing desperation or ingenuity of terrorists. Rather, it is a reflection of their awareness of the importance of the media and of the ability of terrorists to change targets as passive defenses mature.

The fifth part of our first task was to analyze the relationship of urban areas to the basic objectives of groups using terrorism; and the impact of urbanized terrain (built-up areas) on terrorist strategy and tactics. We have already discussed some of the qualities of the urban area that tend to attract politically inspired violence. Perhaps the most important is directly related to the nature of terrorism itself. Nowhere are the symbols of political power more concentrated or more visible or more closely related to government itself than in the city. Quite apart from the logistic issues, which are of paramount importance in tactical planning, the city will always be a magnet to political violence because it contains the aggregate of national treasures and symbolizes political power. The targets are there. The transportation nets are there. Global communications, so important to establishing legitimacy and to disseminating psychological payoff, are there. Urban areas offer great opportunities for escape and evasion.

The final element of the initial task was to consider the impact of the city on security forces engaged in preventing or responding to terrorist attacks. A major part of this effort involved identifying and assessing the kinds of variables that determine who has the edge, the terrorist or counter-terrorist. While these assessments will often relate to factors outside the control of the security forces, we were particularly interested in identifying factors that security forces can influence or control. Allocation of resources, for example, is questionable. Previous evidence has suggested that the single most critical determinant in the outcome of internal conflict is isolation of the insurgent from outside support. In some cases, the government can effect such isolation through reallocation of security resources. What kinds of variables, we wondered, affect the degree to which city resources can be used by the military to prevent or respond to urban terrorism directed against its assets?

Case Studies

The second activity consisted of assessing four case studies of urban terrorism: the so-called Battle of Algiers in 1956-1957; the Tupamaros campaign in Uruguay in the late 1960s and early 1970s; the violence in Northern Ireland, particularly between 1969 and 1972; and the experience of U.S. forces attached to the Multi-National Force in Lebanon, 1982-1984.

The case studies are organized to provide information about and analysis of necessary background considerations (history, grievances giving rise to violence); precipitating events or developments; the participants, direct and indirect, at the outset of the struggle, including objectives, size, organization, geographical location and deployments, motivation, leadership, experience, training, equipment, strategy, and tactics; key changes in the above categories as the struggle progressed; military roles and missions of incumbent (government) forces; and the impact of urban characteristics and resources on the scope and nature of terrorist and antiterrorist operations.

The case studies also include two other elements. The first is a general chronology of major events during the period studied. While the focus of this chronology is major terrorist or military events, all events of a political or administrative or other nature that are critical to understanding the course of military events are included.

The final component of the case studies is an evaluation of the relative effectiveness of the terrorist and incumbent forces in achieving their objectives.

Analysis of Military Functions and Urban Terrorism

Each of the four cases identified above was analyzed in terms of the effectiveness of military functions. This analysis addresses organization (including force structure), command and control and communications, strategy and tactics, personnel (including recruitment, promotion, assignment, and training), and equipment, and explicitly takes into account the unique environmental circumstances. Among the military functions considered in detail are the following:

1. Intelligence. Terrorist operations, unlike many guerrilla activities, are necessarily covert. Consequently, the importance of intelligence in military counter- and antiterrorist operations is increased beyond that of conventional military operations. Intelligence is necessary to find terrorist groups, to penetrate their membership, and to identify targets. The effectiveness of military strategy will often be determined in the first instance by the effectiveness of intelligence.

2. Cooperation with nonmilitary organizations. Terrorist activities, even if their targets are solely military assets (which they almost never are), ultimately are not military threats. They are threats to the political system. The military forces of most countries must therefore cooperate with political authorities. This is true even in the case of military dictatorships. To the extent any single arm of the government tries to monopolize the response to the terrorist threat, the effectiveness of the government posture is likely to be compromised. A comprehensive program designed to prevent terrorist psychological victory must be sensitive to political, economic, social, and many other considerations and should employ the numerous government assets. Moreover, local police or other security

forces may be better suited than military forces to certain types of operations and may offer important opportunities to add manpower and resources to the campaign.

3. Psychological operations. Psychological operations[5] (PSYOP) are a critical component of any effort to prevent or respond effectively to terrorist attacks. PSYOP and public information programs must carefully account for local, national, regional, and international communications assets that are always present in urban environments; must exploit rapidly developing communications opportunities; and must look ahead to address future problems of mobilizing public support. Terrorist attacks have an essential psychological component. They are designed to achieve political ends through psychological means, not truly military means. The number of casualties or the amount of damage is often important only insofar as it influences the degree of media coverage. Casualty and damage estimates should really consider the psychological toll, not the physical cost, for this is the value of terrorism as a tactic.

4. Civic action. While civic action is and should be a military activity distinct from PSYOP, it is usually closely related. For the purposes of the present investigation, we incorporate civic action to the extent it is used against terrorism under the rubric of PSYOP.

5. Passive and active defense operations. Military activities designed to prevent terrorist attack and nonmilitary activities designed to prevent terrorist attack on military assets are considered. These considerations include physical security precautions (barricades, area surveillance, routine variations) and active cooperation with other security forces.

6. Combat operations. We consider the effectiveness of combat operations against terrorist groups. In general, such operations require good intelligence about the location and size of such groups. Mediocre intelligence may contribute to large numbers of noncombatant deaths and the destruction of personal property out of all proportion to the threat and may even intensify the threat. Urban combat operations also require extraordinarily effective fire discipline and effective use of appropriate equipment. One or more of these attributes may often be lacking operations of third world countries, and even limited U.S. forces deployed for peacekeeping or other noncombat activities may be deficient in one or more of these attributes.

7. Covert and counter-terrorist operations. Another approach, this one designed more for active deterrence of additional terrorist attacks, is to carry the war to the terrorists. In addition to combat operations, counter-terrorist operations are designed to use covert and other unconventional techniques to (a) avert the psychological cost of conventional operations, (b) communicate with the terrorist leadership in terms meaningful to that leadership (either to demonstrate that "we, too, can play this game," or to show that we can increase the cost to terrorist groups in their own values), (c) access terrorist targets not otherwise available, or (d) use the psychological weapon against the terrorists.

Conclusions

The results of these activities were analyzed in terms of deploying U.S. military assets overseas in the future. Each case was analyzed, with the techniques considered in their relationship to future U.S. forces'

operations. The alternate courses of action suggested by the four case studies are delineated with their implications for U.S. military operations and for the specific types of operations considered in terms of organization, command, control, and communications, strategy and tactics, personnel, and equipment variables and considerations.

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[1]There are numerous definitions of terrorism. By terrorism we mean "the planned use or threat of extranormal violence for political goals against targets whose relationship to such goals is highly symbolic." See Peter Gubser, William Hazen, Paul Jureidini, Ronald McLaurin, Decisionmaking, Bargaining, and Resources [of Selected Terrorist Groups] (Washington, D.C.: American Institutes for Research, 1975), pp. 3-5, for an explication of this definition.

[2]The reason the attack on the Marine compound in Lebanon can be considered a terrorist attack instead of a military action is that the Marines (despite their growing military support role in Lebanon in the fall of 1983) were officially in a noncombat activity (a multi-national peacekeeping activity) as the executive branch maintained quite firmly in defense of its action to send the Marine unit without securing Congressional action.

[3]The symbolic relationship of the target to terrorist goals is the key to terrorism. "The proper distinction [between terrorism and sabotage or assassination] . . . is to be found in the psychological rather than the physical objective of the act." Thomas Perry Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," in Harry Eckstein, ed., Internal War: Problems and Approaches (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 77-78. This article remains one of the most thoughtful analytical treatments of the phenomenon.

[4]We suggest the term is misleading because it implies that the terrorist impulse derives from the government "sponsor." At times, this is quite the case. But in many if not most instances, government support groups already exist. They do not sponsor terrorism in such cases; they support it.

[5]Psychological operations are distinguished from psychological warfare in the sense that the former are addressed to neutral and friendly as well as hostile audiences. Insurgent and terrorist situations are perhaps the best example of the need to structure communications carefully and meaningfully to friendly and neutral audiences.

CHAPTER II

SOME FACTORS IN URBAN TERRORISM AND URBAN ANTITERRORISM

URBAN TERRORISM FACTORS

The growing attention to the problem of terrorism has caused terrorism to be treated increasingly as a subject unto itself. Unfortunately, terrorism has become an independent variable in the analytical mind. We believe this is unwarranted.

Terrorism is a tactic used by a variety of groups to accomplish a variety of ends. While it is certainly more common and more effective today than it was in the past, terrorism is not a strategy and cannot usefully be addressed in isolation. Policies that concentrate on the tactic rather than the strategy, policies that neglect the problem in favor of the symptom, are likely to fail.

Terrorism has been used throughout history; it is not new. It is a psychological tactic designed to manipulate a target audience that is different from the immediate victim. The immediate victim is often, but not necessarily, an important subset of the real target audience. In the cases studied here, terrorism has been used by an organized and well-rooted insurgent structure representing the colonized majority, an organized insurgent structure built on a minority group, a small and elitist and rather diffuse revolutionary group, and a minuscule group of religious zealots supported by a foreign state. But terrorism is also employed by regular armed forces, and even though it is characteristically used by the weak against the strong, it has been used by totalitarian governments against their populations when no opposition was present. "Papa Doc" Duvalier's Haiti was a prime example of government terrorism.

Potential Taxonomic Categories

A wide range of categories can be employed to distinguish terrorist situations. Among those used for terrorist and other low intensity conflict situations are the rootedness of the terrorist group; the level of violence in society; the geographic size of the terrorist group's appeal; the level of armaments available to the contesting groups; public support for terrorist or others; duration of the violence; intensity of the violence; types of terrorist incidents; and terrorist objectives. Many of these dimensions are similar to those that would be applicable to any low intensity conflict situation. Some are particularly relevant to terrorism, however. For example, conflict intensity may be applied to any form of conflict, but whereas insurgency and most conflict situations suppose a certain continuity to the incidence of violence, terrorism does not. Terrorist groups may choose to wait for months or years to execute a single spectacular incident. While such characteristics certainly suggest stiff parameters on levels of organization and power, they do not alter the fundamental reality that a terrorist situation exists.

Government often faces its most difficult challenge in the purely terrorist situations. In active insurgency or conventional conflict accompanied by terrorism, the level of violence overall and the general level of threat dictate government response. They also generate a public expectation and tolerance of relatively strong government reaction. By contrast, rare individual acts of terrorism are extraordinarily difficult to handle. The public is understandably less tolerant of limitations of its rights. The cost of maintaining a high level of readiness against terrorist attacks is oppressive and may generate strong public opposition over time, as well as degrade security readiness in other areas. Moreover, targets are widespread and cannot all be protected. If the government provides enough guards on all planes, the terrorist can attack trains. Or buses. Or boats. Or automobiles. Or highways and bridges. How much security does the society wish to purchase and at what price?

Terrorist objectives have been well served by advances in technology. Some technology, as we shall see, has helped to fight terrorists. However, the progress in explosive technology permitted terrorists to kill 241 U.S. Marines with a sophisticated truck bomb that constituted the largest peacetime nonnuclear explosion in history. The progress in communications technology has facilitated the realization of a great deal of publicity for terrorist groups in many circumstances. Given the nature of public interests, it is hardly surprising that terrorist acts are news. This news generates its own political reality.

Table 1 provides a number of selected variables and applies them to the four cases studied here.

Table 1

Application of Some Variables to Four Terrorist Cases

Variable	Beirut	Ulster	Algiers	Montevideo
Terrorist objective	Withdrawal of foreign troops	government change	government change	government change
Victim	peacekeepers	police,army	all	all
Target	U.S.public	UK gov't, public	all	public, gov't
Attack types	truck bombs	sniping, mines,bombs, ambush	bombs, murder	kidnap, murder, bombs
Media	heavy	heavy	moderate	light
Antiterrorist forces	none	police,army	police, army	police, army
Duration (years)	<1	>15	<2	<10
Intensity	very light	heavy-light	heavy	moderate-light
Major/minor sup't for terrorists	minor	minor	major	minor
Major/minor sup't for government	minor	major	minor	?

Organizational Factors and Terrorist Groups

Terrorist groups are organizations of humans; they behave in general ways like many other societies or subcultures. The distinctions we observe between leadership values and behavioral patterns in other organizations appear to apply with equal effect to terrorist groups. There are diverse sets of values for leadership and followers, and for different sub-groups within the larger group, just as there are in other organizations. The same strengths and weaknesses of other small organizations apply to these small organizations. They are neither more nor less focused or specialized than many such societies. While they often command great loyalty and sacrifice from their followers, this is not a rare trait among small organizations. Rather, it is at the juncture of purpose <u>and</u> loyalty that they are more distinct.

Terrorists are human beings. They have the same needs and drives as other humans. If the "mix" is different from "average," is this not true of all distinct groups of humans? Terrorists have emotions and fears, and these are central to their mobilization and employment. They have or had families. They need shelter and food. They have identifiable values. They tend to

behave in patterned ways. (In this case, we are not discussing groups of terrorists. We suggest that like all humans, terrorists tend to create patterns in the way they, as individuals, go about meeting their needs on a day-to-day basis.)

Terrorism is not senseless, mindless, or irrational. It is a tactic of great value in certain types of situations. Recent developments should make it clear that it can be an extremely cost-effective means to achieve general or specific ends. The cost to those who sought to compel U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon was very small compared to the ends achieved. (The long-term sociological cost is not addressed in this study. There are data to suggest that the long-term cost of recourse to terrorism, expressed in terms of behavioral values in a society, may be quite significant.)

The importance of understanding the organizational normalcy of terrorist groups, the humanity of terrorists, and the rationality of terrorism lies in preventing terrorist attacks on military assets and in constructing effective counter-terrorist responses. Doctrine based on fantasies or political shibboleths will produce failure. Terrorists as enemies must be assessed like other adversaries. Their organizations are subject to the vulnerabilities of other organizations; their members, subject to foibles no less inherently human; their tactics, subject to counter-logic no less rational.

Our concept has been guided by this question: How can we use individual, organizational, tactical, and strategic[6] data to (preferably) prevent and to (secondly) respond effectively to terrorism (i.e., to punish and deter)? To answer that question, it is necessary to collect, organize, and analyze data of different types in different ways than does the existing literature.

Strategic Objectives of Terrorist Groups

The objectives of terrorist groups must be considered, as we have suggested in the previous chapter, at both the tactical and strategic levels. It is a serious error, in our opinion, to view an attack on a senior official by a terrorist group exclusively in terms of the physical security issue that surrounds the question of protecting a key person, or in terms of the reason and reasoning that produced the attack. Any approach to urban terrorism must be practical enough to deal with the tactical issue of security and far-sighted enough to deal with terrorist long-term objectives. To sacrifice the immediate to the long-term is to assist the terrorist in achieving his objectives no more or less than sacrificing the long-term to the immediate does.

Terrorist strategic objectives fall into several categories. Our listing here is not designed to be comprehensive, since it is based on a small selection of cases. The extreme diversity of these cases is perhaps useful in this regard. The terrorist groups in Algiers, Ulster, Montevideo, and Beirut had sought the following goals:

1. Internationalization
   - publicity
   - international pressure
   - international isolation of the regime

2. Leverage over public of the foreign sovereign (metropole) or foreign government dispatching troops
   pressure on political process
   extension of terror to metropole
   manipulation of fear by families of those in-country

3. Demoralization of security forces, public, and institutions

4. Alienation, social distance, social mobilization
   provocation and overreaction by security forces
   provocation and overreaction by private groups
   growth of social dichotomies
   pride of action and power by downtrodden

5. Demonstration of power and determination

These are the main means of achieving the political objectives of the urban terrorist groups. Each may also serve tactical objectives under specific circumstances, and all are always related to tactical means. (In other words, specific terrorist acts may involve tactical objectives that are identical to strategic objectives; and some strategic objective is always causally related to a specific incident.) By contrast, what we have called tactical objectives are never more than tactical.

Tactical Objectives of Terrorist Groups

The tactical objectives of the terrorist groups in our four cases, in addition to immediate actions designed to progress toward strategic goals already noted, included the following:

1. Enforcement and punishment
2. Recruitment
3. Enrichment
4. Advertisement

One of the interesting aspects of urban terrorist behavior is its similiarity across the four cases studied. Except for the U.S. contingent of the Multi-National Force (USMNF) in Beirut (which is an exception only because this study focuses on the USMNF rather than terrorism in Beirut), nearly all tactical objectives apply in nearly all cases. It is equally interesting to note the applicability of strategic objectives across cases.

NONCOMBAT MILITARY ROLES

This study is concerned with the implications of urban terrorism for military forces. It considers the role of military forces in the struggle against urban terrorists <u>and</u> the role of military forces in noncombat roles that may be targeted by urban terrorists. Violence directed against combat forces deployed in <u>combat</u> roles cannot be considered terrorism.

The common conception of military personnel as combat personnel has never been well grounded, but it is particularly misguided in an era in which political objectives infuse so much of military activities. For a variety of

military activities not considered combat activities, the military persons so engaged are chosen for reasons other than or beyond their combat capabilities.

Support for international organization activities. U.S. military personnel have long supported international organization activities. U.S. personnel have served and continue to serve with organizations such as the United Nations and regional organizations in the secretariat, in decision-making capacities, and in other roles, providing logistic, information, communication, liaison, and other support.

Participation in national, international, and multi-national peacekeeping activities. American armed forces support for peacekeeping activities has also been a constant of those operations. Even in recent cases in which the personnel of neither superpower has played an active role as armed participants, providing units for deployment, American service personnel have frequently filled important roles in support capacities, and U.S. logistic support has often been a *sine qua non* of effectiveness.

Conduct of security roles in U.S. official activities. U.S. Marine Corps guards have a traditional role guarding American embassies abroad. Security guards of official civilian government functions and installations, and of noncombat military installations, cannot reasonably be considered combat personnel except in time of war.

Conduct of deterrent and strategic missions. American military activities worldwide are many and varied. A number of these activities are designed to deter aggression, such as preventive military movements and troop increases. Others may be aimed at strategic deterrence, such as the movements of the strategic nuclear submarine fleet. While such activities involve combat-like considerations, they are specifically intended to prevent the outbreak of hostilities as well as to place the United States in a more favorable position if hostilities occur. They cannot be seen as combat actions in the absence of a state of hostilities.

Security assistance and training activities. U.S. military forces participate actively in programs of security assistance that embrace much of the globe. They train and assist foreign military personnel in the United States, but they often contribute in such programs to foreign security programs overseas, as well.

Communications and intelligence activities. The United States has numerous communications and intelligence installations around the world, and U.S. military personnel participate in a variety of activities on foreign soil to support U.S. communications and intelligence requirements. Even when these activities are clandestine, they cannot be considered combat operations.

Participation in readiness activities. To maintain an acceptable state of preparedness in its military forces, the United States, like other major powers, exercises its troops regularly and conducts a wide range of other activities to maintain readiness.

Infrastructure support. In addition to security assistance, U.S. military forces are often employed to assist foreign countries and American jurisdictions in areas, such as civil engineering, where the armed forces enjoy important assets of potential benefit. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has played an active role worldwide in this regard.

Search and rescue. Naval and Air Force resources have often assisted in maritime search and rescue.

Other support of civilian activities. The size of the military establishment and its technological sophistication have frequently enabled the U.S. Defense Department to make signal contributions to the other departments of the U.S. government and to other governments in support of official but civilian activities. For example, U.S. military communications assets frequently provide needed communications links to support sensitive negotiations where time is critical. Military aircraft have transported senior U.S. and foreign officials on important missions. Technical experts from the armed forces frequently accompany U.S. officials to provide support in a wide variety of areas from health to construction.

International cooperation. The Department of Defense, in cooperation with other elements of the Federal Government, is actively involved in extensive cooperation programs with other friendly governments.

Extraction of U.S. nationals in danger. Military resources have been employed to extract U.S. nationals from dangerous situations overseas.

This is not a complete list of noncombat military roles, but it gives some idea of the wide range of activities in which U.S. military personnel may be engaged in noncombat missions. As the missions have increased, the vulnerability of the United States through the availability of its military personnel has increased.

THE CASES

Algiers

Algiers was one of the first of the modern urban terrorism examples and has had an enormous psychological impact on the modern era. In Algiers, civilians were targeted regardless of any contact they might have with security or government personnel. Terrorism exploited the proliferation of international media very effectively in Algiers.

Despite the creativity and determination of the insurgent terrorists in Algiers, French paratroops established security and control in the city in a relatively short period. To suppress the terrorism, the French forces employed a sophisticated and profound concept of counter-penetration that touched everyone in the city. The system was effective in terms of physical security, but alienated the non-European population. Security was restored in Algiers, but the psychological battle was lost.

Ulster

The establishment of the Irish Republic in 1920 left the six northeastern counties grouped together, with a parliament and government of their own, still under the British Crown. This was believed the only possible reconciliation of island rivalries. The conflict has flickered since, and after 1969, sustained a consistently high level of tension and violence between the two communities and between each community and the British

government. Although the struggle pits Catholics against Protestants, it is not a religious struggle; no one is seeking converts, no one is seeking religious victories. Instead, the conflict is political, but the parties in the conflict are determined by their religious affiliations.

The Irish Republic is overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, while Ulster is divided between the majority Protestants (60% of the population) and a minority of Roman Catholics (40%). Most Catholics seek union with the Irish Republic, while Protestants are adamant about maintaining the affiliation with Britain. Many reject the notion of sharing power in the province.

Militant groups such as the Irish Republican Army (with two branches, Officials and Provisionals) acting in the name of the Catholic community, and the Ulster Defence Association, its Protestant counterpart, have resorted to arms. Violence spread throughout the province and crossed the demarcation lines of political conflict to become crime.

The early phases of communal strife in 1969 were marked by riots and violent demonstrations. British troops were called to reduce tensions. After 1970, the British soldiers became the target of both Catholic and Protestant attacks. Only in June 1970 did the trend toward terrorism become evident as IRA snipers initiated a campaign of violence in the province.

Montevideo

The oldest surviving democracy in Latin America, Uruguay experienced widespread terrorist activity intended to provoke an overreaction that would destroy public confidence and the cause the government to fall. The terrorist group, the Tupamaros, took advantage of Uruguay's established democratic traditions. Among the most prominent Tupamaros' tactics were kidnappings and selective assassinations. The terrorists tried to undermine the authorities by initiating spectacular incidents and kidnapping prominent people with high visibility.

Although the Tupamaros failed to transfer power to a socialist leadership, their tactics succeeded in provoking a government crackdown that destroyed Uruguay's democratic heritage. As the military took a firmer hand, it crushed both the Tupamaros and Uruguayan democracy.

Beirut

A U.S. Marine force was deployed in Beirut as part of an international peacekeeping mission. The force was intended to pursue a noncombat "presence" mission in support of the Lebanese government. Over time, foreign governments acted against the policies of the Beirut government, and mobilized elements of the divided Lebanese population to oppose those policies. The U.S. force was caught between Washington's policy objective of supporting the Lebanese national government and the size, composition, and mission of the force (which were not structured for that objective). Moreover, the force was physically caught between the two sides.

The main threat to the U.S. Marines in Beirut was not seen as terrorism, and until a single blast exacted an enormous toll of Marines, the major threat had been the escalating conventional violence directed against them.

Caught between this rapidly changing threat environment and rigid political constraints, the Marines suffered grievous losses and were withdrawn from Beirut without having achieved the stated U.S. objectives.

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[6]In this case, we do not use strategic in the sense of the global U.S.-Soviet rivalry and certainly not in the sense of strategic nuclear war. Rather, we refer to terrorist strategy and to the development and iteration of a cohesive and effective counter-strategy.

CHAPTER III

ALGIERS

INTRODUCTION

The Algerian insurgency has served as a model for many other postwar insurgents. Its protraction, the determination of French opposition to the insurgents, and the care with which Algerian nationalists developed their strategy and tactics are partly responsible. Less studied has been the key role of terrorism in Algeria's independence war. We are not suggesting that the terrorism practiced by all parties in Algeria was unknown or little remarked at the time; this is not the case. Algerian terrorism received more attention in France, and at times abroad, than did terrorism in Vietnam in the American media. Historical analyses of the Algerian independence war have underestimated the value of the tactic, an error not made by other insurgents who have sought to duplicate the Algerian case.

Treatments of the Algerian insurgency, like those of most guerrilla wars in which the battles take place in both urban and rural environments, have tended to focus on the battle outside the cities. In light of the effectiveness of French counterinsurgency in urban areas, it is surprising that more attention has not been directed to study the techniques by which French counterinsurgents in Algiers firmly re-established their control over the city, and in relatively short order. Given the importance attached to the use of terrorism in Algiers by the antigovernment forces, the Algiers case is an important one in any study of urban counterterrorism.

The counterterrorism experience in Algiers is also an important case in view of the magnitude of the effort of both sides, the human and material resources, the military efficacy of the effort, and the seeds of political self-destruction planted by that very success.

This chapter will address the terrorism and counterterrorism in Algiers itself. Some reference to the overall Algerian insurgency and French response is necessary to understand the situation in Algiers, however. Consequently, this introductory section will describe the national revolution as well as the situation in Algiers.

The Algerian insurgency was an anticolonial movement. Algeria comprises more than 2.5 million km^2 and had been under French control since 1830. The Algerian population in 1954 was approximately 10 million, of which the ethnically European[7] component amounted to about 11%. The rest, 9 million in 1954, were Arab or Berber.[8]

The city of Algiers has a long history preceding the arrival of the French by many centuries. Nevertheless, in 1954 Algiers was dominated by French culture architecturally, in city design, in cuisine, and in institutions. Except for the Casbah, Algiers was a French city. The Casbah, by contrast, was an area approximately 1 km^2 in area in which 100,000 persons, mostly Arabs, lived. The contrast between it and the European city was so great as to be a caricature of the cultural differences of the two population groups. The streets resembled alleys, wandering in and out, most of them impenetrable for any length to modern vehicular transport.

Structures adjoined, and were so close that one could frequently walk or jump from roof to roof. Algiers and its suburbs had a European population of 300,000.

THE CAMPAIGN OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN ALGERIA

Origin of the Campaign

After World War I, a small but growing number of educated Muslim Algerians sought to integrate their own and the French communities. The settlers (called *colons*) successfully resisted every attempt at integration, however. Over time, the Arab moderates were eclipsed by increasingly strident voices, a process well under way by the outbreak of World War II. One brief outburst of rioting (caused by severe economic conditions) at the end of the war produced a brutal and repressive *colon* reaction in which thousands, probably tens of thousands, were killed. These measures of French determination to resist social change and to crush any attempt at political expression by the majority of Algerians were a forerunner of things to come.

The father of modern Algerian nationalism, Messali Hadj, had led the most strident nationalist groups. One of his groups became the Secret Organization (OS) in 1947, and brought together and deployed individuals trained and armed for combat. While the OS was destroyed by the French, its members remained in contact and formed the basis of the Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action (CRUA) which became the National Liberation Front (FLN). CRUA was organized only about 6 months before the revolution officially began with widespread violence all over Algeria on November 1, 1954. Algerian insurgency was neither urban nor terrorist in its essence. Yet, it may be noteworthy that the events of November 1 in the city of Algiers were acts of terrorism--two bombs downtown.

Although the Algerian revolution was mainly rural from the outset, the rebels recognized that the same European settlement in Algeria that made their objectives so difficult to realize also provided highly vulnerable targets. Clearly, the settlers, whose lives were based on their presence in Algeria and who considered themselves no less legitimately native than the Muslims, could not be "persuaded" as long as they had the support of security forces. The goal had to be to convince the French population in France that the war could not be sustained at a reasonable cost.

Terrorist Organization

The CRUA dissolved in favor of the FLN essentially at the same time as it organized the opening of hostilities. The military arm of the FLN, the National Liberation Army (ALN), was developed as a quasi-conventional armed force, but it had no appreciable role in Algiers.

In the autumn of 1956, the FLN went through a major reorganization as a result of which an Algiers Autonomous Zone (ZAA) was created. After the ZAA was established, revolutionary organization in Algiers evolved into a fairly sophisticated institution.

The senior leadership of the ZAA, responsible directly to the national leadership, consisted of a council comprised of a political-military head

with three deputies in charge of political and financial affairs, military affairs, and intelligence. The basic unit of organization was the cell, and there were three types of cells mirroring the three deputies' functional responsibilities. Geographically and politically, the city was divided into three regions: (a) the bulk of the Casbah, (b) the remainder of the Casbah and western Algiers and suburbs, and (c) eastern Algiers and suburbs. In each region were three sectors; in each sector, three districts. Political cells, generally single buildings, comprised the districts.

Table 2

Organization of the ZAA After Mid-1957

			ZAA Council Director Political Deputy Military Deputy Intelligence Deputy					
Zonal Political Director			Zonal Military Director Bomb Network			Zonal Intel.& Coord. Director		
Reg.1	Reg.2	Reg.3	Reg.1	Reg.2	Reg.3	Reg.1	Reg.2	Reg.3
S1 S2 S3	S1-S3	S1-S3	G1 G2 G3	G1-G3	G1-G3	C1 C2 C3	C1-C3	C1-C3
D1-3 D1-3 D1-3	etc.	etc.	C1-3 C1-3 C1-3	etc.	etc.			
C1-n C1-n C1-n								

Notes: S=sector; G=group; C=cell; D=district.

The regional political director had a political deputy and a financial deputy, reflecting his dual responsibilities. These deputies' duties are reflected in Table 3. The political deputy was responsible for distributing propaganda, for secret transportation, and for supply distribution. Shock troops, charged with intimidation and assassination, with ensuring that taxes were collected, and with backing up armed groups in the military hierarchy, were a political responsibility. The financial commission oversaw taxation processes. The political organization also had an intelligence branch temporarily assigned pending creation of the separate intelligence and coordination directorate.

Table 3

FLN Poltical Organization in Algiers

Regional Political Director					
Deputy for Finance			Deputy for Politics and Propaganda		
Branch Supplies	Funds Collection	Finance Commission	Printing & Distribution	Sympathizers	Shock Troops

The military director in each region headed an organization composed of three 11-man groups. Each group was based on three three-man military cells plus a chief and a deputy. The main terrorist activity in Algiers was bombing. In addition to the "regular" military personnel, the bomb network included between 50 and 150 people and was responsible directly to the zonal military director or overall director of the zone.

The extraordinary organizational development of the FLN was most visible in its organization for terrorism in Algiers. We have already noted the range of terrorist elements attached to a wide variety of ZAA institutions. Terrorism was an important factor, after all, not merely in terms of its most visible application, the bombing of the European community, but perhaps even more in its use against the Muslim population to enforce obedience and distance from the French.

The same sophistication applied to the bomb network, where each element of the operation was compartmentalized from all other elements. The laboratories were separate from the materiel collection facilities; both were distinct from the distribution network; and those who planted the bombs were also separate. This level of compartmentalization undoubtedly explains the difficulty the French encountered in penetrating the organization and destroying it.

The organization of the intelligence and coordination deputy at the ZAA level constituted a sort of general staff. This organization is depicted in Table 4 at the zonal level. It was composed of a series of committees that served as staff sections. The intelligence committee was charged with FLN special services in Algiers, including some administrative functions related to the military and some assassination and sabotage duties as well as standard intelligence and security functions.

In theory, each region was composed of some number of five-man intelligence cells. It appears that much of the intelligence work was done by persons in the other two organizational hierarchies, particularly the political. Residents loyal to the FLN (or in urban areas subject to FLN control, such as the Casbah) were expected to report all activities of the French security forces. As in the other cases, double agents were extensively used to report on strategy, force deployments, and plans.

Table 4

Intelligence and Coordination Organization of the Algiers Zone

Intelligence and Coordination Deputy				
Coordination Committee	Intelligence Committee	Editorial Committee	Justice Committee	Health Committee
CCE Morocco Neighbor	Intelligence Security	UN Foreign	Muslim Suits	Red Cross Medication
France Tunisia Wilayas	Attack groups	Legal Press	Surveillance-Civil/Crim'l	Health
		Intellectuals	Liaison	
		Moujahid		Acquisition Organization
				Hospital
Clinics				
				Clandestine Clinics

Terrorist Resources

One of the distinctions between a terrorist organization and an insurgent organization is in the support required for the latter. Some degree of public support or tolerance must exist if an insurgency is to succeed, whereas terrorism requires a much smaller support base. In the case of terrorism incidental to an effective insurgency, the terrorist benefits from the human support base available to the insurgency as a whole even though the emotional acceptance of the terrorist tactics used may be substantially less than the acceptance or active support of the larger insurgent movement.

Most of the Muslim population gave at least silent support to the FLN in Algiers. Estimates of active participants with the FLN in Algiers vary, but a reasonable estimate is 1,000. Of these, about 200 were in the military branches and bomb network. In addition, a small number of French citizens played a significant role in supporting the FLN. Specifically, a handful of Europeans, primarily women, served with the bomb network.

The military section had relatively few arms. Each cell chief had at his disposal one machine gun, four or five pistols, and several grenades. Personnel were armed only when they left on a mission, and were disarmed when they returned.

Terrorist Strategy: Role of Terrorism

The structure of the FLN in Algiers should have ensured that the organization's actions there were strictly subordinated, as they were supposed to be, to the overall policies across the breadth of Algeria. The isolation of Algiers from the rest of the country and to a large degree from

the rest of the FLN produced a largely autonomous ZAA that operated on the basis of decisions that may, at least in retrospect, be considered contrary to the interests of the FLN in the rest of the country.

Although the FLN, like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and many other guerrilla organizations, emphasized the role of the armed struggle and insisted that only through military victory would Algerian independence be won, it was clear that in a classical and conventional military confrontation, the FLN could hardly contest French military superiority. The military strategy of the FLN was therefore based on the substantial psychological assets the FLN thought it could use to alter the overall military balance. Specifically, the FLN thought it could accept casualties and crisis far more readily than the French, and that the application of foreign pressure would have a much more harmful effect on the French than it would on the FLN. Terrorism played a major element in this psychological campaign, and because international attention could effectively be focused only on Algiers, much of the terrorism was directed toward that city. The FLN intended to accomplish several objectives in Algiers:

1. to demonstrate the inability of the French to establish peace,

2. to dispirit the French people,

3. to alienate the population from France,

4. to reinforce the psychological mobilization of the population against France, and

5. to communicate to the rest of the world a perception of national solidarity against continued French control.

In many of these objectives, terrorism came to play a capital role.

French inability to establish and maintain peace could be demonstrated by continued violence, particularly spectacular violence such as bombings. It was thought attrition of French personnel and equipment would dispirit the French. Alienation of the population was accomplished through provoking overreaction of the French security forces, and bloody terrorist attacks were especially valuable in provoking intemperate and bloody reactions. Violence tended automatically to reinforce popular opposition to the French as a result of the psychological and social distance between the two communities. A constant level of tension and terror also persuaded the international media that support for the FLN was widespread. While the support was widespread, it is not at all clear that the majority of Muslims support terrorist tactics, but this element is lost in the drama of modern mass communications. The modern term for what the ZAA had in mind is "armed propaganda." Armed propaganda is the demonstration through terrorist and other uses of violence of the inability of the incumbent to quiet the disturbance and therefore of the "strength" of the insurgent.

In Algiers, irregulars engaged in sabotage and assassination. Algerians who cooperated with the French were the main target of the assassinations, but attacks on French police and other administrative facilities were common. In late 1956, the monthly average of violent acts in Algiers reached 700.

The FLN was disappointed in the results of a nationwide coordinated wave of terrorist and other attacks on November 1, 1954. This terrorist spectacular was intended to effect the mobilization of the Algerian people.

One major explosion, such as that of November 1, is inadequate to this end, however, because it does not provide the periodic reinforcement necessary to maintain and increase mobilization levels. Yet, following November 1, French security forces kept the FLN sufficiently on the run that the organization could no longer coordinate on the national basis required for spectacular victories. By contrast, directing terrorist resources against the native Algerian Muslim population to ensure compliance with FLN wishes was easy, largely invisible, and relatively effective.

When the FLN was able to perform terrorist spectaculars, they were intended to accomplish one or more of three objectives:

1. to evoke admiration among the Algerian Muslims

2. to provoke harsh government repression that would alienate the masses

3. to achieve international attention and pressure.

THE ANTITERRORIST CAMPAIGN

A bewildering array of French security forces participated in operations against the FLN in Algiers.

Antiterrorist Organization

Historically, the French army had a major presence in urban areas where they assisted the police subject to civil administrative authority. The sharing of responsibility by military personnel highlighted the underlying power of the army. From 1954 to 1957, the police concentrated more on urban operations. After 1957, the army was heavily involved in the cities.

Table 5

Police and Intelligence Organization in Algiers at Outbreak of Insurgency

Minister of Interior				Minister of National Defence	
SDECE[a] Post	Governor General		Commanding General 10th Military Region		
Affiliated Liaison Services	National Police		Territorial Police	Gendarmerie	Armed Forces Security Service
Police d'Etat	PJ	RG	Algerian Post		Divisional Posts: Algiers,
Commissariats	Prefecture, Subprefect Posts (to subprefect level)		Brigades: Algiers	Subprefect Companies Brigades	

[a]Documentation and Counterespionage Service

Until 1957, the governor general was responsible for security in Algeria. Police responsibilities were administratively conducted within the General Directorate of General Security (DGSG), which controlled administrative services, personnel, materiel, and operational uniformed and plain clothes police services. These services included the criminal police (PJ), the Territorial Surveillance Directorate (DST), the General Intelligence Service (RG), and uniformed *police d'etat* responsible for public safety, law, and order in urban areas and on public thoroughfares. Within 2 months after the outbreak of the insurrection, the Algerian police were integrated with those of metropolitan France and were subordinated to the General Directorate of National Security (DGSN) in the (French) ministry of interior. Authority over the Algerian police was delegated by the minister to the Algerian governor general.

The state of emergency declared in the spring of 1955 applied to Algiers at the end of August. Its application allowed for the enforcement of travel controls, unusual security measures, and broadened powers for the military and police.

Responsibility for maintaining law and order in Algiers and other areas remained with the national police until the direct intervention of the 10th Parachute Division in Algiers in January 1957. In May 1958, martial law was declared and the military commander in Algeria designated France's senior decisionmaker. In 1960, the Fifth French Republic reorganized the police, placing those in Algeria under the direct control of the civil authority in Algiers, and replacing the DGSG director with a French professional police officer.

The judicial branch was responsible for the PJ, although certain administrative functions related to crime were performed by the DGSG. The PJ were organized into mobile brigades of from 8 to 21 officers, inspectors, and agents.

The DST, theoretically a counterespionage organization, actually identified and captured urban insurgents, assisting the police, gendarmerie, and army. Nominally subordinate to the governor general, the DST was directed by DST or the DGSN headquarters in Paris.

The RG had intelligence functions not directly related to terrorism.

The *police d'etat* worked closely with the PJ and RG and were responsible to civil authorities. About 2,000 troops were organized into 20 police commissariats within the *police d'etat* in the departement of Algiers.

Republican Security Companies (CRS), an elite security unit within the French ministry of interior, also served in Algiers where they were employed to capture terrorists. They supported both the police and the gendarmerie. Authority over the CRS in Algeria was delegated to the governor general.

Antiterrorist Resources

At the outset of the revolution, the French army presence in Algeria consisted of about 55,000 troops. These numbers grew quickly; within a year, they reached 200,000. By August 1956, 400,000 French troops were stationed in Algeria, and the numbers continued to increase, reaching perhaps 750,000 at their peak. These figures include Algerian Muslim auxiliaries.

The insurgency led to the assignment of seven brigades of criminal police in the *departement* of Algiers (i.e., the city of Algiers and its domain). In addition, 20 Republican Security Companies were assigned there in early 1955.

Antiterrorist Strategy

French strategy in Algiers was more closely related to French strategy for the overall problem than terrorist local and territorial strategies were. The French understood that terrorism was merely one element in the overall revolutionary campaign. They also understood the main role that terrorism directed against the Algerian Muslim community played in the revolution. To succeed, the FLN would have to be assured of compliance on the part of the non-European population.

Before 1960, French strategy assumed that the rebellion could be contained and defeated by effective measures designed to capture the loyalty and control the physical life of the Algerian population. To this end, the "battle of hearts and minds" envisioned a series of measures to (a) improve the social, educational, and economic position of the population while stressing France's role in these processes; (b) establish effective government control over most basic elements of life (including communications, transportation, employment, medicine, education, and food); (c) resettle elements of the population otherwise not subject to control; (d) collect and rapidly exploit all relevant information from the controlled populations; and (e) indoctrinate controlled populations to maintain or

restructure their loyalties. Within Algiers, the fourth point (intelligence operations) became the key to the second (population control), and to the military defeat of the insurgents.

The mission of the Algiers sector was, first, to assure the security of persons and goods therein; second, to destroy the FLN structure; and, third, to win the bulk of the Algerian Muslim community away from the FLN. The first task was seen as a police mission that simply required large numbers of personnel to establish effective surveillance through static guard positions and mobile patrols. The magnitude of the task of protecting Muslims from the FLN was probably never understood by the French because the logistical problems of penetrating an area like the Casbah with adequate protective forces were not appreciated. Those who did appreciate the magnitude of the challenge had in mind a different approach: the imposition of French totalitarian control, using terrorist methods, if necessary.

The second goal, destroying the FLN structure, was also a police function, but the magnitude of the problem substantially exceeded the capabilities of the Algiers police, or any standard police organization. The French concept of the third objective in Algiers (winning the Muslim population) was that re-education must be conducted by active and effective psychological operations, followed by organization and control of the society and then by provision of self-defense capabilities.

COURSE OF EVENTS

In June 1956, two FLN members were executed. Within a week, the FLN leadership ordered the Algiers branch (this was before the FAA was established) to attack European civilian males in reprisal, and 49 were shot at random by FLN squads roaming the city. European extremists responded: a bomb exploded in the Casbah in early August, killing 70 Arabs. The FLN decided to join the war in kind, that is, with bombs. The newly created ZAA was directed to prepare the campaign.

On September 30, three bombs were planted in European Algiers. One failed to explode, but the other two caused great damage and many injuries and deaths. At the end of the year, the mayor of Algiers was assassinated by Ali la Pointe (who later became a key aide to the head of the ZAA), and a bomb was exploded during the funeral procession. The European response to each incident was an ugly riot in which Muslims were brutalized. The ZAA organization was by this time deeply rooted in Algiers, and questionable Muslim elements had largely been removed from the Casbah which had become in many respects an FLN fortress. A number of additional assassinations followed. Terror was rampant in Algiers, where schools did not open in October. European civilians began carrying concealed weapons for security.

The FLN, which was suffering serious setbacks elsewhere, emphasized the need to internationalize the revolution. A general strike was called to coincide with the United Nations' debate on Algeria. Against the backdrop of the recent bombings and assassinations and the impending strike, deployment of the 10th Parachute Division into the city was approved with full authority for the maintenance of law and order in January 1957.

Within a week, the four parachute regiments of the 10th Division had deployed in Algiers. The city was divided into squares, and each was assigned to a unit responsible for everything in that square. The entire

Arab sector of the city was cordoned off, and a massive search undertaken. Check-points were placed at all exits. Intelligence and security units seized all police records to identify suspects who were then seized without warrants or charges. The strike was quickly broken.

The army then dedicated its efforts to destroying the FLN infrastructure in the city, and particularly the bomb network. Two more bombs had been set off in crowded stadia after the strike. The heavy paratroop presence in and gaining control over the Casbah began to reduce the terrorists' freedom of action. Women had planted most of the bombs, and consequently for the first time, women leaving the Casbah were searched carefully.

French officers of the 3rd Colonial Parachute Regiment (RPC),[9] perhaps the toughest regiment of the 10th Division, arrested a locksmith with a bomb design on his person. After extensive questioning, the suspect divulged the location of the FLN's secret bomb factory in the Casbah, but the FLN personnel had fled by the time the French raided the factory in early February. Only about a week later, the 3rd RPC captured the FLN's primary bomb carrier and the mason who had built the bomb shops. Under interrogation, they revealed the key locations and persons involved, and the French moved very rapidly, seizing 87 bombs, 70 kg of explosives, electric and chemical detonators, and related paraphernalia, as well as a large number of members of the secret bomb network.

It required only 2 weeks for the "Paras" to destroy much of the FLN organization in Algiers, which had required 2 years to develop. In early April, with the city pacified and the FLN network in ruins, two regiments of the 10th Parachute Division left Algiers.

Despite their intensive effort, the French did not find Saadi Yacef, head of the ZAA, whose identity they had determined. However, the destruction of the bomb network and of a large part of the rest of the ZAA infrastructure forced Yacef to suspend all operations. Nevertheless, in May, Yacef began once again to reorganize. Two paratroopers were shot in the street. On June 3, several bombs hidden in lamp posts exploded, killing eight and wounding more than 90 persons, European and Arab alike. On June 9, another bomb in the casino outside Algiers killed nine and injured another 85. Half of the victims were young women, and a large number lost one or both legs due to the positioning of the bomb. Another bombing, another binge of revenge--scores of injured and five killed among the Arabs as Europeans rioted.

After the casino incident, the 10th Parachute Division was recalled to Algiers. Adding to their already formidable operation a number of defectors, these *bleus* ("blues," so called because of their blue jeans) were planted to interact with the remaining FLN leaders. As a result, the new head of the bomb squad and Yacef's military deputy were killed on August 26. Soon, French pressure reached the point that Yacef and the handful of members still active were hidden in two caches in the Casbah and unable to move. On September 24, the 1st Foreign (Legion) Parachute Regiment (REP) captured Yacef, whose hiding place had been revealed by his last courier under interrogation. On October 8, acting on information supplied by the *bleus*, the French captured Ali la Pointe and the remaining two members in another cache nearby.

After the destruction of the FLN organization in Algiers, the French substituted and imposed their own methods of population and resources control. In every building, someone was responsible for all other building

residents; each *responsable* reported in turn to one for a larger area, and so forth. As a result of this *ilot* ("islet") system,[10] the French could, theoretically, and to a great extent actually, capture any resident of the city within a few minutes.

OUTCOME

The French rooted the terrorists out of Algiers, but were compelled to use a level of violence and control that can only be described as quasi-terrorist to achieve this victory. Their methods, certainly the most systematic, cohesive, and broadly based of any modern counterterrorist, completely destroyed one of the most deeply entrenched and carefully constructed urban terrorist organizations in modern times. The ZAA was removed from the Algerian revolution from the time of the French paratroop victory in September 1957 until the end of the war.

POLITICAL, LEGAL, AND STRATEGIC FACTORS

Political Considerations and Constraints

Political factors weighed heavily in the Algerian case, because the Algerian settlers (i.e., the European community) constituted a powerful bloc in a very weak governmental system. They were able through their power in Paris to prevent any effort at redressing the social grievances of the Muslim Algerians, to thwart more liberal legislation, and frequently to force the Paris government to leave the local government (often subject to the control of the *colons*) in charge of Algerian affairs and decision making.

Political or historical factors also weighed heavily on the army. Quite apart from the *colons*, the army had its own reason to take a firm line in Algeria. The defeat in Indochina in 1954 was seen by senior field grade officers as political, not military. They believed they had come to understand the nature of revolutionary warfare and had developed a strategy to handle it, only to be "stabbed in the back" by politicians at home. The elaborate programs developed and employed in Algeria by the army represented the development and implementation of programs originally conceived in Indochina, and often by the same personnel who were in charge of administering them in Algeria. The humiliation of Indochina had been reinforced by the Suez operation, and the army was determined to prove itself in Algeria. Army excesses were partly because of the intensity and emotions in settler conflicts; by the frustration of an enemy unwilling to fight under the traditional rules of warfare; but also certainly by the obsession of the army to prove itself following Indochina and Suez, episodes that seemed, if not answered to demean the power and importance of France and the French.

International pressure on France also counted for a great deal, and consequently just as the FLN's goal was to internationalize the Algerian issue, the French government's goal was to keep the question off international agenda. The decision to move the paratroop unit into Algiers was taken not to confront the terrorists in Algiers (although the wave of terror had already begun), but, rather, to put down the strike and thereby to demonstrate to the international community that there was no cohesive opposition to France in Algiers.

Legal Considerations and Constraints

Minor changes of the legal system introduced by the French after the outbreak of the revolution had little effect on the legal system or on the protection of individual liberties. The volume of legal business resulting from the breakdown of law and order made the legal system at the same time inappropriate and unresponsive. The lack of speed and the limited facilities of the standard criminal justice system could not fill the need resulting from the increase in "crime."

The army altered the system of managing accused suspects. Internment camps and clearing and transit centers (CTTs) were constructed and employed. Prisoners were screened in the CTT, then either released, held for trial, or sent to indoctrination camps. Theoretically, these camps were under civilian control, but they were completely run by the army psychological warfare branch.

Strategic Considerations and Constraints

The main problem facing the French was the differences (real, not imagined) between the European and Muslim communities. It was clear that harsh measures taken in response to the growth of the violence in Algeria had the capacity to widen these differences which would then provide firmer ground for the roots of the FLN. Thus, the challenge to France was to extend more effective control in Algiers while providing the necessary incentives to the Muslims to participate with France. It is fair to state that the French were never able to resolve this dilemma satisfactorily. Instead, they moved toward a totalitarian solution in Algiers, and that solution accomplished the objective of restoring peace and security, but it also alienated the Muslim community and strengthened the FLN by reinforcing the Muslim perception of distinction between the two components of society.

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

French administration in Algiers was exercised through a governor general by a prefect appointed by the French interior minister. The prefect's powers were increased immediately following the outbreak of the revolution in 1954; special laws and regulations were advanced, permitting greater power in search, seizure, arrest, and population control. Despite a history of "civil government" in Algiers, the governor general frequently used military personnel to fill many vacancies in civil administrative positions. Similarly, when France suddenly increased its educational efforts, building classrooms in rural areas, the teacher shortage led to the staffing of these classrooms with military personnel.

The assumption of responsibility for security in Algiers by the 10th Parachute Division in January 1957 was a precursor of the declaration of martial law in 1958. Martial law made the French military commander in Algiers the senior French representative in Algeria. The Zonal commanding general was subordinate to the Algiers Prefect, but had immediate responsibility for the entire Algiers *departement* (including that area outside the capital).

Below the zone level, the Algiers sector was subject to the authority of a colonel who acted as chief of staff to the prefect. He commanded a mixed staff including both military and civil officials. Within the Algiers sector

were seven subsectors, of which five incorporated Algiers proper. A colonel or lieutenant colonel was in charge of each subsector. He, too, had a mixed staff. The Fifth Republic in France later reduced military power in Algiers.

TACTICS

Combat Functions

Ground Forces

The main forces used by the army in Algiers for the crisis periods were paratroops. Their operations are covered functionally in other sections of this report. In addition, other ground forces served a vital role in criminal justice, civil administration, intelligence, communications, transportation, police functions, and the like, all of which are also addressed elsewhere. In no case did infantry or paratroop units conduct any classic infantry operations in the city. Specific locations were isolated to seize terrorist suspects, however. This was executed with unusual and very effective military planning and with the deployment of resources possible only among military establishments.

Special Operations

In view of the rootedness of the terrorist threat, French intelligence and security activities merged heavily into the special operations area.

The clandestine French intelligence organization, the Documentation and Counterespionage Service (SDECE), ran with the paratroops a special operations group called the "11th Shock," which specialized in intelligence-connected clandestine military operations. The 11th Shock quietly and without visible authorization seized all police dossiers on the eve of the paratroop take-over of responsibility in the Casbah. The 11th Shock created the Intelligence and Exploitation Group (GRE), which established the *bleus*, an elaborate and effective network of defectors and traitors. The *bleus* were directly responsible for neutralizing the final ZAA leadership which had spawned the reign of terror in Algiers. The French even assisted their *bleus* in setting off their own bombs in Algiers to establish the *bleus*' credibility among the FLN. The successes of the *bleus* achieved such heights that FLN members and supporters no longer knew whom to trust. Villagers in some cases began refusing to provide food. They wondered, "Are these really nationalists or French agents as a result of which I shall be punished?"

The SDECE and 11th Shock operations were also dedicated to arms and other materiel support for the FLN. While they undertook strong action abroad, very little of this clandestine activity had any effect on terrorism in Algiers, since by this time the bomb section of the ZAA was self-sufficient.

Air Operations

Conventional air operations could not be used during the urban insurgency in Algiers, since no direct confrontations between FLN and French forces took place. However, helicopters were used to move quickly within parts of the city, and the paratroops used helicopters even in the Casbah to quickly arrive and seal off specified locations.

In addition, the French Air Force and Navy were employed in patrolling the Algerian coast and borders to prevent arms and explosives smuggling into Algeria, including Algiers. The rapid improvement of French air and naval patrols were anticipated by the ZAA, which recognized the necessity to develop internal sources of explosives and did so.

Naval Operations

The only navy role in the Algiers battle was naval antismuggling patrols that contributed, along with the border control measures of the other services, in cutting off the supply of explosives available to the ZAA. The establishment of bomb factories inside the Casbah reduced the value of this contribution, however.

Support Functions

Intelligence

One of the greatest single efforts of the French in Algiers was that devoted to intelligence activities. The effort involved all phases of intelligence: collection (including interrogation of prisoners and the use of informers), analysis, and timely dissemination and use of intelligence, as well as counterintelligence. In this section, we discuss the overall intelligence distribution of responsibilities and actions first; then we address the activities of the paratroops.

The security organization of France in Algeria is described earlier in this chapter. A number of the many security organizations involved in the maintenance of law and order had collateral intelligence functions, either open or clandestine. General intelligence (RG), which retained the primary intelligence responsibility, reported to the governor general and maintained up-to-date files on a wide range of developments affecting the territory. Within each *departement* and within each city as well, a police commissioner was responsible for its duties. RG maintained continuous surveillance of political activities, economic developments, foreign institutions, the movement of people into and out of the territory (RG-manned border posts), as well as social changes and communications. DST, reporting nominally to the governor general but responsive to its own headquarters and those of the DGSN in Paris, was charged with counter-espionage duties. In reality, DST also became involved in direct action. DST was behind one of the least successful countergang efforts during the revolution.

The chief of staff of the 10th Parachute Division, Colonel Yves Godard, was himself a veteran of intelligence and security activities. He had been the first commander of the 11th Shock just after its formation by the SDECE and the division. His background was reinforced by the presence within the "paras" of an extraordinarily talented, sensitive, and innovative, but extremist, group of field grade officers with Indochina experience, including

Colonels Roger Trinquier, Marcel Bigeard (commander of the 3rd RPC in charge of the Casbah), and Francois Coulet (commander of the only French Air Force paratroop commando unit [140 men] sent to Algeria).

Roger Trinquier contributed heavily to developing the French theory of counterinsurgency warfare. His book, *La Guerre Moderne* ("Modern Warfare"), was quickly translated to English and remains a standard of the *genre*. Trinquier was placed in charge of the Urban Protection Units (DPUs) that were responsible for the *ilot* system. Under this system, the entire city was divided into sectors; each sector into subsectors; each of these into blocks; and the blocks in turn into specific buildings. In each building, a *responsable* was to be able to find and identify each building resident within minutes. He in turn was to provide information to the block representatives, who were usually Arab veterans of the French Army. The block *responsable* was expected to report any suspicious developments in his area of responsibility. The effective implementation of this system completely isolated the terrorists from active support, although it did not prevent their hiding in the Casbah.

Enormous numbers of suspects passed through this system, one of the most efficient processing systems ever created in a functioning democracy.[11] These suspects were transferred to the Operational Detachment for Protection (DOP), an interrogation branch. Torture became institutionalized in the DOPs of the paratroop battalions, and has been widely discussed. While it is not apparent that torture was a useful technique of intelligence collection in Algeria overall, it is quite clear that it made a significant contribution to the speed and thoroughness of the paratroop "pacification" of the city of Algiers.

The *bleus* were of course also a source of important intelligence, often of a very timely nature.

Psychological Operations

PSYOP was, along with intelligence, civic action, and the determined application of force, one of the key elements of the French counterinsurgency effort in Algeria. The French recognized that the Algerian Muslim population generally supported the insurgents and that PSYOP against terrorism per se was therefore not likely to have much effect. PSYOP was dedicated to the overall counterinsurgency, but was relatively outside the antiterrorism aspect.

Loudspeaker and pamphlet companies produced enormous quantities of oral and printed materials (training films and current events programs for French forces; leaflets, films, and broadcasts for the Arabs). A great proportion of the latter audience's materials were tactical PSYOP in nature, that is, employed in close support of military or police security operations. For example, 2 million leaflets were distributed in Algiers in the month of March 1957, during the Battle of Algiers.

The role of PSYOP in Algiers itself had little bearing on the outcome in the city. PSYOP was employed constantly, but the paratroop commander in charge of the Casbah, Col. Marcel Bigeard, was more oriented toward force than persuasion. Despite the considerable influence of PSYOP personnel in the paratroop command and an active campaign of follow-up PSYOP, the initial battle in Algiers was determined by intelligence and security operations rather than psychological operations.

Tactics and Techniques

Active

The French did not hesitate to adapt the modern combat technology to urban operations. As a low intensity conflict, the adaptation of firepower was not needed, but rather, a means for communication, transportation, intelligence, and control.

Curfews were used to control movement. They were also used to increase the effectiveness of other control measures. Curfews were imposed before important arrests to slow the discovery of exposure and to maximize the exploitation of such intelligence as might be derived from interrogating arrested persons. Soon after curfew began, arrests were made and interrogation began. Before the end of the curfew, French forces would have already tried to exploit the revelations of interrogation by arresting others.

Night action was particularly valuable for the French. Movement was reduced, since most people were asleep. Thus, people moving at night were more likely to be halted since they were naturally more suspicious.

Extensive patrolling was an essential element of the paratroop control of the Casbah. When the paratroops moved toward a suspect building in the Casbah, they remained sensitive to the 3-dimensional aspects of urban terrain. Typically, they would seal off a street at ground level and land with helicopters on the flat roofs, entering from top floors. In the Algiers Casbah, the upper floors of houses extend outward to such an extent that, with the narrow alleys below, they almost touch. Insurgents could move across rooftops or from building to building on upper floors. Thus, use of helicopters and entering structures from the top was often valuable. The capture of the Algiers bomb network chief and Yacef's military deputy was characteristic. Their location was determined through information provided by the *bleus*. The street and then the building were sealed off. The suspects were hiding in a second floor apartment. Helicopters patrolled above, and troops from the 3rd RPC moved toward the apartment. Loudspeakers were used to communicate with the two Algerians.

The intelligence and administrative organization pattern developed by the French in Algiers is important, if only because it proved so effective against enormous odds. In February 1956, the French Army completely changed its strategy in Algeria and in Algiers, implementing a new approach to population, resources, and territorial control. The new approach was called *quadrillage*, and essentially meant dividing the country into manageable geographical units. A hierarchical organization based on civil administrative divisions was established: the *departement* equated to the military zone, the *arrondissement* to a sector, and the commune to a subsector.[12] Military operations tended to focus at the sector level. French forces were stationed in all major cities.

Quadrillage was applied in a special way in Algiers because of its size, because of its importance, and because of the growing troubles in the city. When the paratroops moved into Algiers in January 1957, they conducted a complete census of the city of Algiers and issued new identity cards for all city residents. A central headquarters was established at the main entrance to the Casbah, and mobile checkpoints in radio contact with the headquarters

were set up at key locations to control entry into and exit from the Casbah. Identity checks were common, and long lines were frequently visible. The *quadrillage* approach was further developed into the *ilot* system (previously described) in Algiers. The system was established for both security management and intelligence, and was monitored by the Urban Protection Unit (DPU) under Colonel Roger Trinquier. The GRE *bleus* were linked to the DPU also.

The French population control effort in Algiers is the central element in the French victory in the Battle of Algiers. It is intimately linked with intelligence operations, as well. Without this thorough and utterly totalitarian penetration of the community, it would have been impossible to destroy all remnants of the small terrorist group that remained in the Casbah by the end of the Battle of Algiers, especially since it enjoyed the sympathy of the population.

Passive

Checkpoints through which all Muslims had to pass entering or exiting the Casbah were a primary passive measure for security adopted by the French. The inability to exert complete control inside the Casbah was acknowledged, but the checkpoints were mainly there to prevent the planting of bombs in the European community.

EQUIPMENT

The French counterinsurgency effort in Algiers depended only very little on equipment or technology. The use of helicopters to move quickly to selected points in the Casbah is an example of application of modern transportation technology, but the contribution of the helicopter was certainly not decisive in the French campaign. Intelligence and torture were probably the most central elements in Algiers. While some technology was involved in both, technology was certainly not the decisive factor.

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[7]Less than half the European community was of French origin.

[8]The Berbers are Hamitic; Arabs, Semitic. Berber dialects are quite distinct from Arabic. While Algerian Berbers experienced disciminatory behavior by Arabs, both groups were discriminated against by the European settler community.

[9]The 3rd RPC had been given responsibility for the Casbah.

[10]Literally, ilot means "islet." The system created a series of islets of a complex social organization.

[11]We are not suggesting that Algeria was administered democratically, for it certainly was not. The system was a French system imposed on Algiers, but for a democracy to create such a system is itself very difficult, and the self-examination to which the French subjected themselves about the moral aspects of the functioning of this extraordinary system reflects precisely our point.

[12] *Departement*, *arrondissement*, and commune are administrative levels of jurisdiction. The *departement* is akin to a state. The *arrondissement* is smaller--a district. Similarly, the commune is might be considered best as a sub-district.

CHAPTER IV

NORTHERN IRELAND

INTRODUCTION

Conflict in Northern Ireland was derived from the 17th century English and Scottish settlement in the province of Ulster. The deeply rooted animosity between Catholic and Protestant compounded over the centuries, having been imparted from father to son, and translated into a struggle for power between the two communities.

The province of Northern Ireland was established by the partition of the island following the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, which provided independence for the Irish Free State. (In 1940, it became the Irish Republi) The Irish Republic (or Eire) occupied 83% of the island of Ireland. The remainder was the province of Northern Ireland, comprised of six counties (Antrim, Armagh, Derry, Down, Fermanagh, and Tyrone). Historic Northern Ireland was called Ulster.

Northern Ireland was an integral part of the United Kingdom (UK). The province enjoyed a measure of self-rule that varied from legislative to administrative functions. The responsibilities of the various ministries of the home government of Northern Ireland included finance, home affairs, health and social services, education, agriculture, trade, and development. A dozen members of the provincial government were represented in the British parliament. The unicameral parliament of Northern Ireland, with 52 members, was located in Stormont.

The superior courts in Northern Ireland were under the jurisdiction of the British parliament while the lower courts, handling criminal and civilian matters, fell under the jurisdiction of the provincial parliament and were the concern of the ministry of home affairs.

The partition of the island underlined the divergent and irreconcilable political aspirations of the two communities. Protestants supported the Unionist Party, favoring continued affiliation with the UK, while Catholics preferred the Nationalist Party and a united Ireland (i.e., union with the Irish Republic).

The terms of the 1921 partition left the Protestants in control of the parliament and government in Stormont. This control lasted for about 50 years until 1972 when Direct Rule was imposed by Britain. In the face of increased disorder in the province, the British government (British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland) assumed executive powers in March 1972. Under this system, all laws were made at Westminster. Between January and May 1974, an experimental "power-sharing" executive operated. Mass Protestant civil disobedience, culminating in a Protestant general strike that brought about the fall of the government, destroyed the "power-sharing" system, however, and led to reinstitution of Direct Rule.

The two religious communities of Northern Ireland were also divided by social and political fences which only enhanced the demarcation lines. Separate schools, different employment patterns, and preferences for living in separate neighborhoods reinforced mutual alienation. Catholics seemed to

be more heavily represented in unskilled labor and other menial areas. A minority in the legislature and even smaller minority in the security forces, the Catholics saw themselves as excluded from power.

The Irish Republican Army (IRA) dated to World War I. While Britain was preoccupied in Europe, the Sinn Fein emerged as the leading republican force in Ireland (then united under the British crown), launching the Easter Rebellion in Dublin. While the uprising aborted, the martyrdom of Sinn Fein supporters produced widespread support for the republican movement. In 1919, the IRA was created as the "military" wing of the Sinn Fein movement. It undertook full-scale rebellion against the United Kingdom in 1919, the IRA serving as a guerrilla force that operated mainly in the countryside against the police and British military. When, in 1920, the British government proposed and Irish leaders accepted the partition of Ireland (assuming a federation of the two parts), much of the IRA undertook a renewed and bloody war to insist on Ireland's unity and sovereignty. At the end of 1921, Irish independence--in all but the six counties of the north--was granted. Large segments of the IRA rejected the agreement because of the island's partition, and launched another wave of violence. This time, the brunt of the anti-IRA campaign was carried on Irish shoulders, and after 1-1/2 years, the IRA declared a cease-fire. Intermittent Ireland-IRA violence continued, and eventually Ireland outlawed the organization.

During World War II, the IRA once again used British attention on European problems to initiate a campaign, this time in the north. Receiving some assistance from Nazi Germany, the IRA undertook a widespread bombing campaign. The Free State, fearing British intervention, increased its own anti-IRA efforts, and once again crushed the IRA. Most of the organization's leaders were either dead or in prison by 1947.

After the Free State became the Republic of Ireland in 1949, Ulster Protestants pressed London to incorporate Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom to ensure they would not be annexed to the Republic. On May 17, 1949, such legislation was passed. Once again, the IRA found an issue upon which to resurrect itself, and by the mid-1950s, had launched a new campaign, this time a series of attacks along the border (the "border campaign").

The IRA campaign with which we are concerned, which began in 1969, was aimed at the withdrawal of the British troops in an armed struggle for the union of Ireland. Such a withdrawal would have been perceived as a threat by the Protestant community since it would lead to unification with the Republic.

The relatively peaceful conditions of the 1950s and 1960s are attributed by some to the unprecedented prosperity that Northern Ireland experienced during the World War II era.[13] Economic expansion in the postwar period temporarily removed the overt conflict. Economic growth provided only an interim period of peace, however; it did not remove deeply rooted Catholic fears about the province's future. Catholics demanded a number of institutional and social changes. The failure of the government to respond effectively to these demands produced political tension which developed from 1968, erupting in violence in 1969.

The growing violence was compounded by economic depression over the years. The relationships between the Republic and Britain increasingly reflected economic ties. Most of the skilled and professionally trained populace migrated, while at the same time, the economy stagnated. The

unskilled and untrained, who joined the unemployed and disenchanted, remained. The rift and antagonism between the two communities increased over the years and penetrated deep into every aspect of their lives. Thus, Catholics claimed discrimination in justice and housing allocation, unequal representation in local elections, and the like.

More than half the population in Ulster was urban. Cities were divided into neighborhoods densely populated with Catholics and Protestants who lived adjacent to each other. Shortage of housing was evident. Often the streets were narrow and the buildings, terraced. The Catholic community, with large families, was crammed into small apartments. While some Catholic communities were large and easily protected, others were isolated in the midst of the Protestant population. For example, Ardoyne in Northern Belfast and the Short Strand were in overwhelmingly Protestant neighborhoods in the eastern part of the city. These Catholic sectors were exposed and vulnerable to any potential threat from the Protestants.

Economic deprivation hit especially hard at the Catholic sector of the population like that in Ballymurphy in West Belfast. Unemployment was particularly high within the Catholic community, and some parts of the city reached a rate of 40% unemployment. (The average rate was about 10%.)

These conditions of economic stagnation compounded by social and political deprivation provided breeding grounds for violence. The large population of bored teenagers increased the probability of violence and social unrest. Violence reflected adventurism and the resulting action directed at the Protestants, the police force (officially, the Royal Ulster Constabulary or "RUC," a predominantly Protestant body), and (later) at British troops. Rioting became a form of entertainment. The search for some type of action and the lust for the gun provided incentives for new recruits to join the IRA.

One of the most significant problems for the British forces in Northern Ireland was the proximity of the Irish Republic to the province. Popular Irish sympathy with their co-religionists in the north meant that IRA members could easily slip through the border to find sanctuaries in the Republic. The Army was not allowed to conduct systematic raids across the border into the Republic. The British government was sensitive to British and Irish public opinions. Nevertheless, several skirmishes did take place between British troops and IRA gunmen along the border. In some cases, British troops raided across the border, mined roads, sabotaging others on the Irish side of the boundary. Overall, however, the focus of the violence was in the cities of the province and not in the countryside. Since the main effort was directed in the cities, less emphasis was given to border areas in terms of force deployments and other resources. The border was considered relatively open, an IRA advantage that dismayed and disgruntled the British military. The decision to maintain such a border was political. It was conceived in London, but coordinated with Dublin.

To close the border would have required large numbers of troops as well as other resources (fences, checkpoints, patrols [foot and mobile], aerial surveillance, etc.). The British government was not ready to allocate these resources. In addition, the government in Dublin objected to such measures since the populace in both parts of the country had close relationships and family ties. Thus, such actions would not be acceptable politically in the Republic. To close the border only on the northern side would not have sealed it without the consent of the Irish Republic.

BACKGROUND TO TERRORISM

The wave of terrorist violence in the province evolved from communal unrest which started in mid-August 1969. The introduction of the army was welcomed by the Catholic community since the army was viewed as a protector against the hated RUC. The soldiers were greeted with cups of tea in Belfast.

There were no more than 50 full-time IRA volunteers in 1969. Most were old and reluctant to fight, although some probably participated in the August riots. Many hard-core sympathizers remembered the border campaign,[14] and some even recalled the earlier events of the 1920s. The absence of the IRA during the riots was obvious, however.[15]

Terrorist Organization

The majority Northern Ireland Protestant community was believed to favor continued union with the United Kingdom, and was therefore called "unionist." The Catholic minority favored a "nationalist" approach, that is, an Irish nationalist solution, specifically a united Ireland. Nevertheless, even nationalists in general did not favor union with the existing government in Dublin.

Voices in the Republican movement had been calling for active protection for the Catholics in the six counties of the province. At the time, the IRA was based in Dublin. The main body of the movement, though sympathetic to the plight of the North, was reluctant to engage in any active form of confrontation and to resort to arms. In mid-January 1970, the Republican movement in Dublin convened. After enduring efforts to gain support for an active role in the North, the disgruntled delegation from the province split from the main body of the IRA and created a caretaker executive which immediately formed the "Provisional Army Council." Thus, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA or "Provisionals" or "Provos") was created while the main body of Dublin was called the Official IRA (OIRA or "Officials"). The officials were a predominantly Marxist group that looked to political struggle to accomplish the national objective of unification, while the Provisionals were nationalist and were committed to the armed struggle. The main objective of the Provisionals then was a commitment to wage war in Ulster as a means to unite with the independent Republic. The PIRA was a small force, but was well organized, highly disciplined, and fanatically dedicated to unification. The Officials did not threaten the dominance of the Provisionals in the province. Since the PIRA enjoyed a sense of continuity and respect within the Catholic community of Northern Ireland, the OIRA refused to compete.

Little is known about the organization of the secretive IRA. The IRA was divided into local brigades and battalions with companies and cells. By the end of 1969 (before the split between OIRA and PIRA), IRA battalions had dwindled to such an extent that companies consisted of about 12 to 14 volunteers. After the break-up of the IRA, the PIRA was organized into two brigades, Belfast and Londonderry. The Belfast Brigade had three battalions, each with about 100 men. Despite the delineation of the PIRA structure, organization was of a skeletal nature. At each level (brigade, battalion, company, cell), each unit had its staff including commander, adjutant, intelligence, training, recruiting and arms officers, engineers, paymaster,

signal, and transport personnel. Use of a cell structure prevented hostile penetration into the IRA organization since members of a cell knew each other but if interrogated or followed could not provide information about members in other cells.

The Ulster Defence Association (UDA), a semi-covert, Protestant paramilitary organization, was formed in September 1971. Its task was to protect Protestant neighborhoods against IRA activity. UDA actions also included hit squads, acting either under official UDA sponsorship or independently. Also among its activities were retaliations for IRA operations (including bombings and assassinations). The UDA also intended to intimidate the Catholic community and thus to put a wedge between the Provos and the community.

Terrorist Resources

By November 1971, there were about 500 active members in the Provisional IRA[16] in the province of whom 200 were in the bombing section and about 20 to 30 were snipers. Others were assigned to supply, propaganda work, or intelligence. Some were part-time organizers who focused on securing safe houses and secure escape routes. New recruits joined the IRA to defy the British, to find adventure, and to possess a gun (a status symbol), rather than for ideological grounds. Pools of inactive or "reserve" members could also be called as needed. This reserve included women who served as lookouts and messengers, since the PIRA rarely used the public phone system. Teenage boys were frequently used to scout and to find cars that could be used as car bombs.

The IRA benefited from support of the Catholic community which provided a pool of new recruits. Furthermore, the IRA also relied on support from across the border for much of its arms supplies. Arms were smuggled from the Irish Republic as well as from overseas. Arms arrived from the United States by ship. Guns were obtained in the United States and then shipped to the relatively unguarded coasts of the Republic later to be smuggled across the border. On at least one occasion, Czech arms were smuggled through Holland and then flown to London. Some arms were obtained from the Czech Omnipol armament organization near Prague for hard currency. In the late 1970s, arms shipments were known to be arriving from Libya, the PLO, and other arms sources in the Middle East.

Sympathizers and activists fabricated their own bombs and other forms of explosives. Bomb factories were set up in various parts of Ulster, and agricultural chemicals and fertilizers, as well as other materials, were used in explosive production.

Money was raised by contributions from the Irish Republic and from the Irish community in the United States. Irish emigrant groups in New York, Boston, and other east coast cities served as an important support network in terms of funds and arms. Bank robberies, extortion, unlicensed drinking clubs, and other illegal fund-raising operations also yielded cash.

Terrorist Strategy

The violence in Northern Ireland was visited on all major cities of the province: Belfast, Londonderry, Armagh, Derry, and others. Tactics were similar in all locations.

The IRA had no grand design for an urban guerrilla campaign. The Provisional IRA strategy was simple--to make the North ungovernable by either Stormont or London. The planners of the Provisional IRA waged their war in anticipation that a protracted war of attrition and terrorism through continuous disruption of daily life, law and order, would lead to the disintegration of the province and would bring about a political change and, ultimately, evacuation of British forces.

The IRA successfully penetrated the native society and instilled fear as well as respect. Continuous intimidation of the population achieved at least two objectives. First, it put a wedge between the British forces and the population. Second, the IRA gained a recognized status of power in the Catholic community as protector.

ROLE OF TERRORISM

Terrorism was employed against British troops, but it was also used against rival groups to gain influence and consolidate power within the community. Intimidation was intended to isolate the British forces and therefore prevent them from gathering information from the general population. Any British attempt to interact, establish rapport, and gain trust was to be met by silence and refusal to collaborate. British forces depended heavily on the population to provide vital information. Any person seen or heard talking to security forces or personnel was considered a potential traitor.

Intimidation even penetrated the judicial system where jurors and juries, as well as witnesses, were threatened. Jurors' houses and businesses were bombed if they did not cooperate with the IRA. At least one case led to murder; in October 1972, a court magistrate was shot in front of his children for not complying with IRA pressures. In another case, an eyewitness in the trial of three IRA members was murdered in March 1972 in front of his family.

IRA violence established the organization as the arbitrator of power in the community. Various methods of intimidation (such as tar and feathering, shooting kneecaps, shooting the front teeth sideways, torture, and mutilation) convinced the community that the IRA was the only organization that could exercise control. At the same time, the majority of Catholics in the Catholic areas tended to see the IRA as their only viable protection against Protestant persecution and violence. Appeals outside the community (i.e., the British forces) for help were severely punished. Thus, the IRA managed to raise funds, to secure houses and sanctuaries, to obtain logistical support such as food or transportation, and to deliver information. In other words, the IRA penetrated deeply into the community and established a reliable network of support despite British efforts to destroy the organization.

The IRA earned its status and position of power over time. Initially, the organization had to contend with hooliganism and disorders by unorganized youth groups who periodically resorted to violent demonstrations, barricaded streets and neighborhoods, and threw stones and homemade bombs at British soldiers. Even though these demonstrations and violent disturbances interfered with the tasks of the British forces, they also undermined IRA plans.

ANTITERRORIST CAMPAIGN

Antiterrorist Organization

Although the British Army gained considerable experience in counterinsurgency after World War II and conducted some low intensity operations in former colonies, the nature of the fighting in Northern Ireland was different. One distinction was legal status; the province was considered an integral part of the United Kingdom. The Army was restrained in its activities since it was operating on British territory proper rather than colonial territory. The military was exposed to the mass media and was under constant scrutiny of public opinion, civil liberties groups, and British law. The small number of Royal Military Police (RMP) personnel in Northern Ireland also increased dramatically with the rising violence. The RMP mission was to support the RUC, primarily through joint patrols and particularly in Belfast.

In addition to the British Army, several local forces played a role in Ulster. Local security forces included the RUC (the six-county police force), and Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR, a branch of the British Army that functioned as a militia force). The UDR consisted of both full- and part-time members. This force replaced the B-Specials, a part-time militia staffed mainly with Protestants. Both forces were locally recruited.

The RUC was the police force for Northern Ireland. It was organized like all other British police forces into eight departments: A (administration), B (personnel), C (crimes), D (operations), E (intelligence), F (command and control), G (complaints and discipline), and H (community relations and traffic).

The UDR became operational on April 1, 1970, and was organized into 11 battalions of 56 companies consisting of 25% full-time duty personnel (1,600 men) with the remaining 75% part-time soldiers. The troops were members of the armed forces of the Crown, and the regiment operated solely in Northern Ireland while on active duty. All personnel were subjected to military discipline, but it was a civilian force. Members typically served 1 to 2 nights per week and some weekends. By law, the UDR was required to recruit tolerant men regardless of religious affiliation. Tactically under British Army control, the UDR was separately administered.

UDR recruits went through about a week of individual intensive training, with another 12 or more days of training annually. All soldiers attended courses at army schools. UDR battalions were commanded by regular officers, and certain other roles were also filled by regular British Army personnel. Women joined the UDR after August 1973, at first simply doing patrol duty with the capability of searching women, but later assuming all types of male roles in the UDR. Women did not carry arms, however. After 1975, the UDR was allocated its own tactical areas of responsibility.

Perhaps in part as a result of the recognition of the Catholic community's incorporation in the United Kingdom, and as a result of the acceptance of the norms associated with that country, a "we-they" dichotomy did not exist in spite of the sharp cleavages between the Catholic and Protestant communities. The IRA forced the issue after the summer of 1970 and implanted feelings of resentment among the Catholic community toward the

British Army as well as the Protestants. Thereafter, the British Army was considered and treated in the Catholic community as a foreign force of occupation.

British forces were introduced initially to separate the Catholic and Protestant communities and to restore law and order in the province. Hence, the British army's task was to operate as a peacekeeping force. The role of the army was transformed, however, and the British forces were dragged into a protracted, limited urban war with both Protestants and Catholics. The army became the object of violent attacks from both sides. After the fall of 1969, when Protestants began to attack British forces, those troops had to respond to different types of communal unrest such as demonstrations (which often developed into fights), riots, terrorism in the broadest sense, and violent crime. When all these types of activities were interwoven, it was difficult to distinguish the causes and proper responses to each.

Different forms of terrorism, from indiscriminate bombings and shootings to sniping, murder, and intimidation, placed enormous burdens on British troops who had to adapt to the myriad forms of violence while acting as police force constrained by rules of involvement. In other words, the army was not given a free hand to take swift action throughout the province.

Antiterrorist Resources

Even before the outbreak of violence in Ulster, the British stationed British army regiments in the province in addition to three resident units. The regular units stayed for 18-month duty tours and were stationed near permanent army bases.

After 1969, additional British soldiers arrived in Northern Ireland in response to civil strife culminating in communal civil disobedience. The force included 6,500 men divided into two infantry brigades, one based in Derry and the other in Lisburn near Belfast which was also the location of the headquarters of the General Officer Commanding (GOC). Due to a rotation system for the British units, those sent to Northern Ireland served for a 4-month period only. These units were usually rotated (hence the name *roulement* [rotation] battalions) from Britain's Army of the Rhine, based in the German Federal Republic, and served in high threat areas. Most of the United Kingdom's land forces attached to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) served in Ulster, the officers generally several times. Rotations were generally to the same area the unit served in previously, with implications discussed in later sections.

At the beginning of 1969, there were 2,400 troops of the 2nd Queen's Regiment in Northern Ireland. When the surge of violence increased in the summer of 1969, the most notorious of the Protestant-dominated police units were disbanded, eventually to be replaced by the RUC and RUC Reserve. (Attempts to recruit larger numbers of Catholics into these forces failed, however, and the percentage of Catholics fell as a result of intimidation by IRA and community perception of role. Most RUC Reservists were formerly in the earlier Protestant groups.)

After August 1969, British Army deployments in Northern Ireland increased. The British Army was aiding the civil power in principle but retaining control in operational terms *de facto*. The Army had assumed police duties, and the boundaries became obscure between the two forces. British forces increased as follows:

August	1969	3,000
Sept	1969	6,000
July	1970	13,000
August	1971	14,000
October	1971	15,500
July	1972	21,000

At the end of 1972, more than 22,000 men, plus 8,000 members of the UDR, were deployed in Northern Ireland. Before 1978, the average number of troops was 12,000 to 14,000, but these were assisted by only 6,000 police and 2,000 reserves, plus the UDR, a body that by 1981 had formed the RUC's first reserve when military help was required. Sixteen officers and 470 non-commissioned officers of the RMP served in Belfast.

Equipment used depended on the perceived threat and intelligence estimates of IRA planned activity.

> If riots or demonstrations were expected, platoons were deployed carrying riot shields, batons, and gas guns, with standard weapons slung (except for designated counter-sniper teams). At other times, Land Rover or trucks following platoon "box" patrols carried the riot equipment while the troops themselves patrolled as if in a war zone.[17]

The RUC was divided into 16 divisions throughout the province. The primary police force in Northern Ireland and the only armed police force in Britain, it could not assume all-encompassing duties with the increase of violence and civilian disturbance. Hence, the arrival of the Army improved morale and increased recruiting, enabling the regular establishment to increase in numbers from 3,000 in 1969 to 6,500 in 1978. The overall manpower ceiling (which could be reached at short notice by reserve battalions) had steadily declined from its peak of 22,000 in 1972 to 13,500 in 1978. The number of regular garrison troops on extended 18-month tours progressively rose from 3,000 to 6,000. The troops were drawn from British NATO forces in West Germany.

The RUC part-time police reserve expanded to more than 4,000 members. This growth enabled the police to focus on Special Patrol Corps, reaction forces to handle sieges, bank robberies, street disturbances, bomb incidents, and the like. The RUC after 1972 divested itself of its paramilitary role and concentrated on fulfilling normal police and criminal investigations activities carried through with the assistance of military personnel where the presence of firearms was required. This force worked closely with the Army and was secondary to it until 1976 when the primacy policy was instituted.

Under the primacy policy, the RUC assumed the brunt of the security duties in the province while the military provided technical and tactical support to the police. The RUC traveled in Land Rovers, always carried riot gear, and equipped itself with British self-loading rifles (SLR--the L1A1 British Army standard), Sterling submachine guns, and M1 carbines. The RUC patrolled in troubled areas and flooded areas in response to terrorist activity. The members of the Regional Crime Squad (RCS), organized in 1975, were detectives drawn from the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) who focused on terrorist interrogation. The force was organized in 10 sections of 36 men each, further divided into mobile crews who stayed together for a whole tour. The Special Branch was dedicated to gathering intelligence and

information about terrorists. At times, Special Branch personnel successfully penetrated the IRA and monitored its activity.

The UDR, formed in 1970, originally consisted of seven battalions--one for each of the six counties, and the seventh for Belfast, the PIRA stronghold. The UDR mission was primarily to support regular British forces in Northern Ireland (if the situation required such support), mainly through border protection and guarding against sabotage. Additional battalions were raised in January 1972 (three) and September 1972 (one).

Antiterrorist Strategy

The British Army's mission in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1972 was responsive rather than aggressive. The mission was to end the violence in the province and to maintain peace in the community. Consequently, the army tried to keep the two warring communities apart. This mission and goal were feasible in the context of marches and demonstrations. During riots, however, the British Army was generally targeted. Often those riots were spontaneous and unorganized, but they erupted as a direct outgrowth of the rejection by violent youths of the army's presence in certain sectors.

The overall objectives of the British military in the province were (a) to provide support to the civilian authority in Stormont; (b) to isolate the terrorists from the community; and (c) to arrest or kill the hard core gunmen of the IRA.

The British failed in all initial objectives. Direct Rule in March of 1972 reflected the failure of the first objective after all attempts to preserve law and order collapsed. When the army realized that it had become the target as early as October 1969, all hope to put a wedge between the community and the terrorists disappeared. With the failure of the second goal, the third task could not be achieved, lacking the cooperation of the populace.

COURSE OF EVENTS

Initially, the British troops were called in August 1969 when communal violence erupted after a peaceful Catholic march was confronted in Derry by the RUC. After this surge of civil disorder and disobedience which could not be controlled by the police, the British Army was called to maintain peace and to restore law and order. When the soldiers arrived, they did not know and could not distinguish who the "enemy" was. Their mission was ill defined. There were no battle lines drawn yet, and they could not tell the two warring sides apart.

While the events in August 1969 could be described as civil disorder, though violent in character, they were marked by the lack of a systematic and organized campaign of terror. The August violence could be described more accurately as a spontaneous eruption which the RUC could not control.

By mid-1970, the PIRA was at work, waging a bombing campaign, mainly in Belfast.

The change of heart among the Catholic community toward the British Army took place after a Protestant attack on the Short Strand in West Belfast on

June 26, 1970. The Protestants stormed the isolated Catholic enclaves while PIRA for the first time engaged in defending the community. The army did not come to repulse the Protestant mob. Thus, a bond was established between PIRA and the people in Short Strand. During this confrontation, the IRA shot six Protestants. Following these events, the army stormed the ghetto of Lower Falls on July 3, 1970 in a house-to-house search. This operation netted a sizable arms cache: 52 pistols, 35 rifles, six automatic weapons, and 250 pounds of explosives. The army's arrival instigated a violent reaction from youth groups, who threw stones and bottles at the soldiers. In response, the army used CS gas canisters.[18] The army brought 3,000 soldiers who roamed on jeeps and Land Rovers and observed from above by helicopters. General Freeland, Commander of the British troops, imposed 35 hours' curfew on the neighborhood. For the first time, the army used rubber bullets that maimed many rioters.[19] The end of July saw the first Catholic victim in 50 years to die from British fire. His death marked the beginning of a new IRA campaign of violence against British troops. On August 11, two RUC members were killed in a booby trap car bomb in Crossmaglen.

Thenceforth, Catholic areas became dangerous to foot patrols. As soon as a uniformed constable appeared in those neighborhoods, riots broke out, forcing the police to leave. The army only dared to appear in a show of force of five or more soldiers heavily armed and backed up by support units in nearby locations. Thus, the army and police were ousted from all Catholic areas. The lack of these forces exposed those communities to vandalism, theft, break-ins, murders, and other crime. The IRA then emerged as the dominant power in these areas of lawlessness.

Rioting and attacks against British troops, who were now being shot by snipers and machine guns, returned in 1971. On February 6, for the first time in 50 years in Ireland, a British soldier was killed by IRA gunmen. The ensuing violence led to the arrival of an additional 1,000 British troops. In July and August 1971, the army searched suspected homes in the middle of the night. These searches caused the IRA to run. On August 9, 1971, at 4 a.m., an internment campaign ("Operation DEMETRIUS") began during which 342 people were arrested without charges during the first 24 hours. Over the next 3 months, 882 people were arrested, and 2,158 orders of internment were signed during the following 4 years. Some of the internees were placed on the *Maidstorm*, an old British prison ship anchored in Belfast harbor, but most prisoners were moved to a camp west of Belfast. (Others were sent to a prison camp near Derry.)

Instead of intimidating the terrorists, Operation DEMETRIUS provoked them, providing incentives to fight back. Reprisals, shooting sprees, and bombing attacks against British targets and personnel increased. During that era, the IRA attacked police stations and barracks, challenged the army and police in open gun battles, and built barricades on the access roads to Catholic neighborhoods.

The barricades effectively established areas of Catholic autonomy within Ulster, areas where the authority of the crown could not be exercised. Those barricades became symbolic obstacles marking the perimeters under PIRA control and the no-go areas for the army and police. In addition, the barricades served as an early warning system if and when British forces intended to penetrate these no-go sections of town. Since the IRA was so well entrenched in certain neighborhoods, their members could come and go as they liked without fear of being betrayed. The terrorists were to a large extent an integral part of their community. In Belfast and Derry, the barricades effectively prevented the entry of British security forces, but

these forces successfully removed the barricades in the small towns of Armagh, Newry, and Strabane after riots subsided.

Shortly after the internment campaign began, a few women in Belfast declared a rent strike. This boycott meant the refusal to pay property taxes, rents, and utility bills. The strike reached its peak in December 1970, when 23,190 households were involved.

On January 30, 1972, 15,000 people participated in a large antiinternment demonstration rally in Derry. The army and the RUC tried to confine the demonstration to the Catholic sector of the city and to prevent it from entering the main shopping streets in the walled city. To this end, the security forces built a barrier and roadblock at the end of the streets leading out of the Catholic sector. While most of the demonstrators disbanded at the end of the march, several hundred youths gathered at the barrier, shouting insults and throwing stones and bottles at the troops. The soldiers used tear gas and water cannons to disperse the marchers. Suddenly, shots were fired. When the shooting stopped, 13 Catholics had been killed and 29 wounded.

The violence in the province intensified following "Bloody Sunday," as the January 30 events came to be called. The Provisionals increased sniping and bombing, and the OIRA also joined in the bombings. In contrast to other periods, various bomb attacks went unclaimed. Restaurants were bombed in central Belfast without warning. Car bombs were frequent. The most characteristic feature of this new wave of bombing and terror was the increasing number of innocent civilian victims.

In March 1972, the Stormont government dissolved as a result of growing disorder, terrorist attacks, and the general spread of violence, both political and criminal. Against this background, the British government, aware from the outset that the problems in the six counties would not be resolved in the violent streets, assumed direct rule of the province. Even with direct rule, however, the wave of terrorism did not decline. In the summer of 1972, a full-scale operation (MOTORMAN) was launched to clear the barricades and to restore the presence of the civil police throughout the province, in other words, to ensure the end of "no-go" areas. The operation was successful in clearing obstacles, but bombings, sectarian murders, and the shooting of security forces continued.

This chapter does not cover the changes since 1973 in any detail. British intelligence operations eventually penetrated IRA sympathizer communities in the cities to some degree, reducing the possibilities of effective urban terrorist operations against British forces. Moreover, improved effectiveness of security operations generally diminished local participation and increased the relative frequency of rural and cross-border actions as a percentage of overall IRA operations.

Similarly, the profile of targets changed. As operations against British forces became increasingly difficult, so did those against previous soft targets in the province (juries, judges, security forces personnel). In search of other targets, the IRA attempted major attacks <u>outside</u> the province, where defensive precautions were less extensive.

In the early 1980s, imprisoned IRA members began a hunger strike to demand the status of prisoner of war within the meaning of the Geneva Convention. The British did not yield.

OUTCOME

The Northern Ireland conflict continued with British forces still entrenched in the province. The spirit of the IRA remained unbroken, but more effective British policies and actions reduced the IRA's ability to conduct a continuous campaign of terrorism in Northern Ireland. After the re-establishment of Direct Rule in 1972, the atrocities and campaign of terrorism spread to England, and particularly to soft targets there. A measure of Britain's greater success in Ulster was that terrorism moved away from the province and away from hard targets. Bombing sprees became almost a routine Christmas holiday in London and other British cities. The IRA proudly claimed "credit" for assassinating Lord Mountbatten and for trying to kill the British prime minister.

The British long recognized that the resolution to the Northern Ireland problem was political, not military. British efforts were intended to create the psychological climate in which such a solution might emerge through reducing violence in the province and, as a result, the tension spawned by that violence (as opposed to the tension resulting from divergent political aspirations). While the British approach to conflict resolution did not produce a satisfactory solution, the campaign to reduce terrorism certainly had substantial success, and the security situation in the province improved significantly.

POLITICAL, LEGAL, AND STRATEGIC FACTORS

Political Considerations and Constraints

Since the division of the island, the establishment of the Irish Republic as an independent state, and the creation of the Northern Province, irreconcilable positions separated the main actors. The partition of 1920 perpetuated the conflict and inflamed ingrained communal hatreds among the populace of Northern Ireland. The majority preferred union with Britain, while the minority preferred a united Ireland, though not with the existing government in Dublin. London exercised reluctant sovereignty in Northern Ireland, while Dublin maintained a quiet claim to that sovereignty.

British governments, while seeking solutions, were also constrained by the democratic principle that the majority in Northern Ireland should decide its future. Unfortunately for London, this provision did not resolve the inherent contradiction and therefore did not produce peace or stability in the six counties.

After the British government sent troops in August 1969 to help Stormont, it realized that no military solution could be imposed on the province. The solution to the Northern Ireland question was political. Therefore, the British government tried to maintain some balance in its approach. The line that the British tried to walk was too fine, however. British troops were constrained by orders from London in their antiterrorist operations, especially along the border with the Republic. Hot pursuit was abolished. General curfews were not imposed. This restraint was unproductive in political terms and yet ran counter to military considerations.

One of the major problems the British encountered was the internal political dynamics of each community. The British government had no leverage on either the Unionist or the Nationalist factions.

London discovered that Direct Rule aggravated the tensions and conflict in Northern Ireland and, worse, engaged it directly in the political future of the province. Direct Rule was disliked by all parties, including the British government, since it meant heavier involvement, allocation of greater resources, and eventually incentives for IRA terrorism to spread to England. This spread occurred in 1974, when the violence spilled into British cities.

In light of these developments, an attempt was made as early as the summer of 1973 to establish the "Northern Ireland Assembly," a power-sharing mechanism containing representatives of both communities. A council of Ireland was proposed to provide a link between Dublin and Stormont while Northern Ireland would continue to be a part of the United Kingdom. However, this attempt at power-sharing collapsed from within in May 1974. Unionists and Nationalists mistrusted British intentions for Ulster as well as the intentions of their enemies.

Another example of Britain's attempt to provide and encourage avenues for cross-community investment in common institutions was the vigorous attempt to recruit Catholics into security forces. This policy also failed in the face of IRA intimidation.

Legal Considerations and Constraints

Initially, the British government introduced troops to Northern Ireland to preserve law and order. This continued to be the main mission of UK forces throughout the period of British force deployments in the province. The British government attempted to underscore the image of legality, of rule by law rather than rule by force. Charges of legal abuses or security force excesses led to the institution of investigatory bodies that discovered substantial compliance of security forces with civil liberties and other British traditions.

Particularly in the early period of the deployment of British regular forces to Northern Ireland when the violence was increasing, some legal provisions were ignored. On the whole, however, the British government made very clear its determination to abide by the law by prosecuting British soldiers found guilty of excessive force. In some cases, British soldiers shooting miscreants who did not pose a direct threat were prosecuted for (and convicted of) murder.

Every British soldier was under strict restraints to operate within the boundaries of civil law. Troops were issued yellow cards on which the rules of engagement (ROE) were printed, describing actions they were permitted to take in specific situations and those that they were not allowed to take. The ROE were constantly drilled and were to be memorized. Commanders indicated that the ROE reflected the political nature of the conflict that was decisive, and that army personnel were to perform their jobs of seeking terrorists, destroying their units, depleting their arsenals, and stopping the inflow of arms without accomplishing the terrorists' mission in the process. That is, the job of the army was to diminish bloodshed, not to increase it.

Ill treatment at times characterized British behavior toward detainees. This treatment included such practices as bread-and-water diet, wall-standing, hooding, sleep deprivation, noise, and other techniques designed to induce disorientation and fatigue. However, in view of the provocation directed against British forces in 1970 to 1971, restraint was remarkable and may have been an important factor in turning the tide in Northern Ireland.

Important legal changes were introduced in Northern Ireland as a result of the wave of IRA violence that began in 1969. In August 1971, internment without trial was introduced to Northern Ireland. This change raised an outcry among civil liberties organizations in the United States and in other West European countries. According to the internment rule, suspects could be detained for 13 days' interrogation and then brought before the court or released, or be interned indefinitely. Technically, a person could be held by police without charges for 48 hours, after which he became a detainee. When the 2-week period lapsed, he became an internee if not charged or released.

A study of the effectiveness of antiterrorist policies in Ulster has shown no statistically significant correlation between numbers of IRA deaths and levels or amounts of violence, even allowing for time lags. However, the same study demonstrated that the number of IRA personnel arrested was significantly correlated with levels of violence. Arrests seem to be more effective than security force killings of miscreants.

In 1973, the British parliament passed the Emergency Provisions Act (EPA) for Ulster, amended in 1974, and extended since. This act introduced a number of emergency regulations to the province which significantly enhanced the ability of law enforcement bodies to maintain law and order. The main provisions of the act were to specify "scheduled offenses" that trigger the application of the EPA. Accusation of the commission of one or more of these offenses permitted detention under the special provisions noted and also permitted use of trial by a single judge rather than trial by jury.[20] The jury system was a hallowed canon of British law, and exceptions were viewed as potentially serious infringements of liberties traditionally owed British subjects. Consequently, trial by judge was to be accompanied by more generous appeal standards and by automatic review. Other elements of the EPA were broadened powers of search and seizure by security forces; more restrictive bail provisions; and reversal of the burden of proof in offenses concerning possession of arms and explosives.

Strategic Considerations and Constraints

The British government had to exercise caution toward two main protagonists: the Republic of Ireland and its government, and the United States. High levels of sympathy for the IRA were known to exist in both countries. In both cases, aid and support were sifting through to the IRA.

The British government understood the volatile situation in which the Republic government found itself. Strong family ties bound the families of North and South. Common historical background over centuries linked the Catholics in both regions. It seemed only natural to many on both sides of the border to provide help for those who were seeking union with the Republic. However, recognizing this particular bond with the minority Catholics in the province, the British government exercised caution in dealing with Dublin. It did not apply pressure to take active counter-measures against the IRA because of the fear that such pressure would produce

counter-productive reactions and drive the Republic to provide support to the IRA. The British government did not insist on the closure of the border, knowing that would cause a major outcry in both parts of the divided island. The "open border" surprised many military tacticians who saw the situation from a military perspective, but failed to understand the fragile political makeup which easily could tilt the Dublin government to side with the IRA. The British government foresaw the political ramifications of heavy pressure on Dublin, and therefore held back its disgruntled military leadership that preferred a military solution. Her Majesty's Government understood that the Irish Army would be compelled to intervene and engage British troops in Northern Ireland if the British forces violated the sovereignty of the Irish Republic and established a policy of conducting raids into Irish territory as retaliation for IRA operations in the province. Such confrontations along the border would have led to a major crisis and further complicated the situation, especially since British and Irish security forces cooperated quite effectively even if quietly: both sought the apprehension of elements of the IRA. (In some cases, Ireland even extradited IRA officials to the United Kingdom.) Therefore, the British government was willing to tolerate some Irish government practices, such as relaxed border control, sanctuary for IRA members, fund raising, and smuggling. After all, the costs in these terms were acceptable by comparison to a change in the Dublin government toward a more active posture in keeping with public sympathies toward the Catholic community in the North.

The British government also understood the danger of applying too much pressure on the United States. In 1970, there were 290,000 Irish-born U.S. residents and 15 million American citizens of Irish descent. London understood that the Irish community in the United States was powerful, and built its policies on this understanding, even though that community provided an enormous pool of potential and real support to the IRA. A group calling itself Irish Northern Aid was set up in New York in January 1970 to provide aid to the Provisional IRA. It rallied political support for the Provos' cause, but claimed that it raised funds for humanitarian purposes. Members were mainly IRA veterans. The Irish American community, large and powerful, applied pressure on President Nixon. It tried to pressure the president to influence the British government. For example, Senator Edward Kennedy denounced Bloody Sunday. He and Hugh Carey (future governor of New York) also sponsored a congressional resolution calling for the abolition of internment, the withdrawal of the British Army, the end of Stormont's autonomy, and the establishment of a peace-keeping force in the North. A House of Representatives subcommittee announced after Bloody Sunday that it would hold hearings on the situation in the province.

The British government was sensitive to these and other voices of criticism. Political movements and civil liberties organizations in Western Europe and the United States urged their governments to pressure the British to abolish internment as unconstitutional and counter to democratic procedures and principles.

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

Northern Ireland was an integral part of the United Kingdom. Consequently, the British Army had no jurisdiction in internal security or law and order, since these were police matters. Technically, the British Army was subordinate to the RUC in Northern Ireland, and in normal circumstances, the army would not even have had the right to stop a vehicle.

In practice, the British Army was called to the province when it was apparent that local police forces could not meet the magnitude of the threat. For some time, the army tended to "overlook" limitations of its authority, but eventually legal changes were introduced that provided the required authority to the army for the specific circumstances. Traditionally, the British had felt in other insurgent and terrorist situations that the police were a more appropriate vehicle than the military to restore internal law and order. As in those circumstances, however, the local police did not have the capacity to stabilize the situation and return it to acceptable levels of security without outside help.

Specifically, the RUC was totally inadequate to the task in 1969. Not only was firepower lacking from the RUC, but some personnel were afraid while others were provocative. RUC personnel would not even accompany British Army units on patrol in 1969, largely out of cowardice. One of the most important British Army activities in Northern Ireland was the re-training of the RUC. British officers interviewed for this study believe the RUC now is one of the finest police forces in the world. Congruent with British practice, the RUC returned to the position of internal security primacy, and the British Army now backs up rather than leads the security effort. Intelligence operations in Northern Ireland were much more extensive than could be controlled by the RUC, however, and a number of programs were coordinated in London. Nevertheless, the locally relevant data were then provided to the intelligence section of General Head Quarters (GHQ)-Northern Ireland and shared with police from that location.

TACTICS

Combat Functions

British forces initially were called to contend with civil disobedience and demonstrations (which later developed into riots), not a systematic and organized campaign of terrorism. The violent activities they faced at the outset were spontaneous in nature. The army's peacekeeping tasks mainly involved keeping the two communities apart. Over time, however, the army engaged in a protracted war of terrorism it was unprepared to fight. As a result, methods and tactics developed on the ground from daily experience and as events unfolded.

British forces never intended to defeat the terrorists in military terms. The profound bonds of the terrorists with the larger community and its values prevented British forces from penetrating the community and destroying the terrorists' base. Hence, the British had to resort more to damage control and reduction than total destruction of the terrorist organizations. Over time, and with the improved training of the RUC, the army was able to step back and allow the RUC to assume a heavier load of the security responsibility in Northern Ireland.

The two phases of British involvement in Northern Ireland (August 1969 to March 1972 and March 1972 to the present) also produced changes in tactics. Active measures characterized the first phase; more passive, the second.

Ground Forces

British Army operations vacillated from policing duties and peacekeeping to sporadic gunfire exchanges with the Provos. Most army activities were responsive in nature. Army actions and operations were ground activities limited to municipal boundaries of the cities where Provo strength remained.

British Army task force structures were specially tailored to the specific characteristics of the Ulster situation. The more dangerous areas saw regular army backup of RUC patrols, while low- to mid-level threat environments returned to complete RUC responsibility as the RUC was retrained and upgraded.

Army casualties resulted from bombings and shootings. The army uniform was highly visible and presented a ready-made target. Nevertheless, troops did not become a major target.

Air Operations

Air operations were limited to (a) helicopter surveillance and observation in support of ground forces patrols of streets and neighborhoods and (b) routine aerial surveillance associated with border patrol.

Helicopters were used for observation, reconnaissance, airlifting troops, and occasionally for medical evacuation. Before large numbers of forces were deployed in Ulster, the Army Air Squadron there amounted to six Sioux helicopters. By June 1972, a full squadron was deployed. In October, the number had increased to 21 Sioux and eight Scout helicopters.

Sioux helicopters were used for individual reconnaissance missions, for flying with patrols, and for observation in support of patrols. The four-passenger Scouts were used for small airborne patrols and for vehicle checkpoints. They transported troops quickly to incidents (e.g., bank robberies). At times, both helicopters operated simultaneously, one covering the other. Wessex helicopters were also used for troop transport. Helicopters were employed at night using "Nitesun" (an 800-candlepower searchlight with a focusable beam that could light up the ground at night from helicopters. The same helicopters were also used periodically for patrolling electric power lines.) Helicopters also served to support aerial photography during marches, demonstrations, and rallies.

Naval Operations

Naval activity by the British government was limited to coastal patrols over all of Ireland to prevent smuggling of arms or other support to the IRA. The coasts of Ireland were relatively unprotected and it was easy to land on shore without detection, unlike the shores of the Province. In 1976, the Royal Navy captured a ship trying to smuggle several tons of weapons, mainly small arms, from the United States to the IRA in the Republic of Ireland.

Support Functions

Intelligence

Intelligence in Ulster was a function of British Army, police, and national assets in combination. RUC Special Branch and CID elements, British foreign and counterintelligence, Special Air Service (SAS), and British Army electronic warfare and tactical intelligence all played a role in Ulster. National-level assets (foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, electronic intelligence) were managed in London. They were then directed to GHQ-N.I.'s intelligence section and to the RUC Special Branch. Meanwhile, these elements received their own contact intelligence from patrols, informers, and other local assets. (The SAS reports were also integrated at this level.) The intelligence effort in Ulster was a joint activity, but was managed by the British Army before 1977.

The British practice of deploying regular army units rotated from the Army of the Rhine to the same areas to which they had been deployed on earlier rotations paid important dividends. Personnel were familiar with the terrain and populace. They were able to "read" the population instantly, providing much better sensors for early warning of tensions or problems. In one sense, the turnover rate in 4.5-month rotations almost necessitated such a practice, since such a short period of deployment provides little opportunity to develop and exploit area-specific tactical experience.

The change to less aggressive tactical practices after March 1972 displeased the intelligence community. The more vigorous security forces posture had netted important intelligence from arrested suspects. Intelligence was obtained through informers on the streets under the pretext of being checked.

Dictated by political considerations to cultivate a more conciliatory mood in the province, the transition to less visible security forces after March 1972 enabled the terrorists to regroup, reorganize, rebuild their infrastructure, and expand their network. The change also permitted the IRA to operate more freely and with greater mobility. The breathing space afforded the terrorists was a net loss for army intelligence collection, eliminating such overt operations as use of informers on the street. One battalion commander described Northern Ireland as "an intelligence desert," so difficult was it to acquire the appropriate intelligence. Instead, covert operations for intelligence gathering were required.

Most intelligence was collected from the general public. The main official intelligence service in Northern Ireland, the Special Branch of the RUC, identified and interrogated suspects. It was supplemented by units of the army's Intelligence Corps. The two cooperated closely.

Much overt information derived from operatives on the ground "patrolling" the streets. These personnel were intimately acquainted with the physical layout of the environment. Thus, observers noticed sniper positions in a street and escape routes. Inquiries often cast doubt on cover stories. Observations of particular house doors and facades of buildings, window curtains, parked vehicles in front of houses, types and models of cars helped in interrogating suspects and in determining precisely where they had been in a large area. British Army plain clothes photographers attended IRA funerals and demonstrations to photograph those gathered for the funeral, knowing some would be the IRA associates of the deceased.

Army intelligence conducted local censuses of the population, street by street, compiling card indices and fairly complete dossiers on terrorist suspects, including cross references to families and friends. These and other intelligence files were subsequently computerized to provide rapid access to extraordinary quantities of environmental data. Analysis of shooting incidents was kept and was compared regularly with the weapons recovered in an area. Maps were created with dates on which each house in an area was last searched and recorded.

No less important was covert intelligence (use of informers, infiltration, defectors, espionage, undercover operations). Undercover soldiers were volunteers.

The introduction of internment without trial in August 1971 also generated more timely intelligence. The RUC Special Branch listed those sought for questioning, and the army interned them.

The British Army employed a form of intense interrogation designed to manipulate the victim's sense of isolation and vulnerability and to push him into responding to stress and ostracism. Interrogation techniques included "sensory deprivation" in which the brain is deprived of the constant supply of oxygen and sugar it must have to function; a bread-and-water diet to weaken the suspect physically; darkness (being hooded) to confuse the senses; sleep deprivation to tire the brain and body and to lessen physical resistance to interrogation. These techniques characterized "deep interrogation." Those interrogated in depth offered information about 700 members of the IRA and identified those involved in 85 unsolved incidents of murder.

Rumors spread among the IRA that the British resorted to torture techniques; this explanation alone seemed to account for the fact that captured terrorists were responding and willingly providing information. Some talked quickly to avoid torture. Interrogation methods were sometimes ineffective, however, and suspects known to be hard-core members withstood those interrogations.

Communications

The majority of British troops were connected with walkie-talkies to their command posts. All patrols, foot and mobile, were equipped with means of communication so help could be requested immediately from forces in nearby locations.

Engineers

The Protestants resorted to some self-defense initiatives including barricades erected on May 13, 1972 in Belfast. On the second weekend of barricading (May 20, 1972), the army used bulldozers to remove the obstructions the Loyalists (Protestants) had erected.

Police/Security

The Royal Military Police supported the RUC in Belfast and, before 1973, other cities of Northern Ireland. RMP/RUC joint patrols were routine police patrols in areas of Republican strength (no-go areas). Military police stood

between civil and military forces, and established a good rapport with the population of Ulster. RMP personnel had the authority of constables (policemen) in the province. The RMP eased the transition from military to police patrols and responsibility.

When the army was the *de facto* authority in Northern Ireland, the RMP served as the constables who held suspects for processing, since the army itself had no civil (police) powers.

The military *de facto* assumed all responsibility for internal security largely as a result of the inefficiency of the RUC at the time the British Army was deployed to Northern Ireland. Demarcation lines between the army and police were obscured. The RUC coordinated its operations with the British Army. The army conducted foot and mobile patrols in the troubled areas. No security forces patrolled areas in the heart of the Catholic community, however. These sectors were called "no-go" areas.

The police force had a limited capability in tactical terms and therefore was overwhelmed and overshadowed by the army's presence. The police became an auxiliary force to the troops, and the main role of the police in peacekeeping was limited to demonstrations and marches rather than engagement with IRA gunmen. Over time, with re-training, the RUC increasingly undertook greater responsibilities in the province for security.

In view of its sectarian recruitment pattern, the UDR was not allowed to participate in crowd control or to patrol in Catholic areas in Belfast or Londonderry except with and subordinate to the command of regular British Army units. The UDR was not authorized to participate in covert operations, operate in plain clothes, or screen suspects.

Psychological Operations

British Army psychological operations personnel numbered only 18 people at the outset of the campaign.

With the adoption of Direct Rule, less provocative measures were implemented at least in part to reduce Catholic opposition. The number of patrols in Catholic areas and Belfast was reduced and patrolling was often allowed only at night. Hot pursuit of terrorists was discouraged, and strict limits were placed on the number of random searches and arrests made.

Internment was intended to have a powerful psychological impact, highly visible to the community. Army trucks filled with suspects were deliberately driven through Protestant neighborhoods to demonstrate even-handedness. By contrast, the RUC and army quickly and quietly arrested suspects in the early hours of the morning, avoiding publicity and exposure.

Civic Action

British Army units actively conducted a wide variety of civic action activities in Northern Ireland. Every battalion did something to improve community relations:

1. In its effort to penetrate and gain the trust of the Catholic populace, the army sent "meals on wheels" to elderly Catholics.

2. Many robberies of gas metermen had led to the suspension of gas meter reading. The army provided protection for meter reading, and service was restored.

3. The army renovated and constructed the homes of elderly residents.

4. In some cases, British Army personnel repaired private as well as public property damaged by IRA bombs.

The RUC initiated frequent government-funded residential seminars and set up "blue lamp" discotheques to serve the needs of youth.

Tactics and Techniques

Active

The primary security techniques remained: (a) patrolling on foot, in vehicles, or by helicopters; (b) vehicle check points; and (c) the manning of permanent observation posts.

These activities enabled the troops to familiarize themselves with their operational area and its inhabitants. The latter two, however, are passive techniques dealt with in the subsequent section.

British Army culture has always stressed the importance of patrolling, and patrolling was long the core of security activity in Ulster. Increasingly, however, it became clear that the patrols also heightened tensions and fostered terrorism. They made a partial contribution to reducing IRA readiness, but they clearly increased local alienation. Thus, if there were no patrols, there would be no patrol casualties. Foot patrols as a consequence diminished substantially over time and became rare except in West Belfast and South Armagh, the most troubled areas.

During the first phase of British involvement in Northern Ireland, the army conducted foot and vehicle patrols and actively pursued IRA suspects. Throughout the period between August 1969 and March 1972, patrols sighting suspects asked them to halt. If the suspect ran, the patrol chased him, whether to a private house, a bar, or any other sanctuary.

Men on patrol were instilled with the need to "keep their cool" even if challenged and insulted. Patrols were usually conducted in such a manner that maximum protection was provided to the foot soldier. Thus, soldiers walked in twos on both sides of a street, covered by other soldiers (on foot or in vehicles) behind the first group. The vehicle was often an armored Land Rover or other armored car with a reserve company at headquarters, rarely more than 5 minutes away. In response to experiences in the province, the British Army developed a simulated urban area for training purposes. In this camp, foot and vehicle patrol techniques were practiced in a "typical" urban area, observed by commanders from high towers.

Patrol duty in civilian vehicles consisted of a three-man squad. One man generally carried a Sterling submachine gun, while his companions had automatic pistols. The use of plain clothes soldiers in reconnaissance and surveillance duties was common, since uniformed patrols were more likely to be attacked.

Patrolling techniques varied somewhat by type of unit. British Army regular units patrolled with two to three four-man teams ("bricks"), one covering the other, with a third in reserve if available. The brick was commanded by a corporal, and each member of the patrol had his own radio communications capability. While foot patrols were uncommon in urban areas, vehicular patrols continued. They were deemed less provocative, more protected, and could quickly cover more territory.

The UDR followed British Army urban patrolling practice, although its weapons were generally not kept in ready condition. The RUC, by contrast, usually patrolled in pairs. UDR patrols were armed with rifles or at least submachine guns, while the RUC personnel typically carried only pistols.

The Roulement[21] battalions, assigned to high threat areas of Ulster, used foot patrols extensively, trying to saturate their areas of operations. They often deployed by helicopter, returning to their "forts" on foot. When they deployed on foot from their forts, it was by armored column, covered by air power (helicopter), and preceded by foot patrols seeking bombs.

Riot control practice provided for keeping crowds back 40 to 60 yards beyond the reach of gasoline bombs. Plastic and later rubber bullets were used, as well as standard riot control materiel and tactics.

The Special Air Service (SAS), attached to the General Head Quarters-Northern Ireland (GHQ-NI), operated in Northern Ireland as early as May 1971. The SAS conducted covert actions of both an intelligence and a combat nature and is alleged to have selectively assassinated IRA members to provoke internecine fighting. The SAS operated four-man ambush teams. One member was an expert in all types of weapons from Thompson submachine guns to Kalashnikov assault rifles; another, in explosives and sabotage; another, in all types of communications; and the fourth, in either medical skills or languages. SAS personnel were equipped with special weapons and trained to lie in hidden stakeout positions for days at a time.

In July 1971, the British Army launched a search campaign which captured arms, ammunition, equipment, and documents. The search efforts were reminiscent of British cordon-and-search techniques in Palestine and Cyprus. Subsequent analysis of data during these episodes revealed a direct and pronounced inverse correlation between the number of houses searched and the quantity of weapons found. That is, the more houses were searched, the relatively fewer were the weapons found. (The presumed reason for this finding is that searches of individual or small numbers of homes were based on intelligence, while larger area searches were often undertaken for psychological or other reasons and generally without specific, detailed intelligence about weapons storage.) At times, the army used a "snatch squad" assigned to grab people suspected of causing trouble in riots and demonstrations. The purpose of these quick raids was to seize suspects for interrogation purposes.

After March 1972, the security forces scaled down their activity. They kept a low profile on the streets while on patrol. If a suspect was spotted and began to run when told to stop, the patrol did not follow him. This modified approach to fleeing suspects enabled the terrorist groups operating in Northern Ireland to regroup, reorganize, rebuild their infrastructures, and expand their networks. The new approach gave the IRA greater freedom and more mobility in the province. Easing the security checks on personnel produced new recruits, but recruits on whom there were no records. The result was a drop in effective intelligence operations.

The experience at the Brixton riots of 1982 confirmed that the technique of "swooping" (flooding) an area with forces only hardens existing antagonism and provokes renewed violence.

The army had to respond to numerous methods of intimidation and terror aimed at the army. Those tactics often required immediate active response to direct fire. In August 1969, the security forces originally faced rioting, mob violence, and sporadic shooting. The British Army was called to respond actively to such violations of law and order. The army had to respond to hit-and-run sniping, bombs in public places, concealed mines, and murders of off-duty soldiers.

Some of the terrorist tactics were designed to lure army troops to a prearranged exposed position. The troops were then targeted directly during riots and violent demonstrations during which stones, nail bombs, and gasoline bombs were thrown by the rioters. Often, the site of the riot or demonstration was selected in advance, and snipers were positioned to ambush the army when it appeared. After shooting the troops, the snipers would escape to safety. After the outbreak of provoked riots, the police and troops often conducted house-to-house searches without warrants.

Another variation of the ambush technique was to implant a mine in the side of the hedge or culvert and detonate it by remote control radio as a patrol passed by. The army had no practical solutions to such techniques. Research into a radio-jamming device to prevent detonation did not prove successful for some time. Army troops on patrol in plain clothes killed civilians at times. The soldiers claimed they were fired upon and returned fire. In at least two cases, army personnel fired Sterling submachine guns from speeding civilian cars apparently used to avoid identification.

Over time, British forces adapted to various terrorist techniques employed by the IRA, and different British units developed their own innovative methods to thwart terrorists in the province. For example, British forces initially faced riots and demonstrations that lured soldiers into an area where they were the targets of snipers. In response, the British depended less on force and more on restraint in handling demonstrations, using shields and helmets against stone-throwing and clubs against violent demonstrators. If matters became uncontrollable, front line troops were backed by a reserve of armed troops in armored personnel carriers (APCs). Barricades, instead of being removed by hand, were removed by bulldozers or in some cases by Centurion tank bulldozers.

The IRA resorted to a car-bombing campaign in 1972. This change in tactics complicated the countermeasures that the British forces were employing. The British prohibited the parking of cars in the shopping centers of Belfast in 1972. No car could be parked in most parts of the city without someone's sitting in the car.

British forces with the aid of modern data processing established a system of informational identification not unlike the French *ilot* system in Algiers. The entire province was divided into operational areas, each under the control of a formation whose commander was responsible for assisting civil authorities to prevent disorders and terrorism. Operating in conjunction with the RUC and U R, the British Army established unit and subunit responsibility for small areas, with personnel required to familiarize themselves with both terrain and inhabitants.

Passive

RUC stations were protected by heavy fortifications, including concrete and steel blockhouses, car barriers, high mesh fences to detonate rockets, controlled entryways, blast-resistant walls, steel gates, and armed gatemen. In troubled areas, the stations were fortified with stone walls, antimortar fences, tall gates, floodlights, steel window shutters, closed circuit television surveillance, and careful inspections of all incoming vehicles.

The army constructed concrete ridges, almost 1 foot high, positioned at right angles to the roadways. These were designed to prevent IRA attacks by speeding cars, particularly bombs thrown at RUC personnel, housing, stations, gates, barracks, offices, checkpoints, and other vulnerable installations.

Many streets in the central part of Belfast were sealed off with barbed wire and wooden army barriers. Large sections of the city also were closed off by checkpoints at which soldiers conducted checks and searches of pedestrians. Only vehicles with special passes were allowed in. These mechanisms enabled the troops to monitor the flow of human and vehicular traffic.

In view of the large numbers of troops tied down to static activities (guarding, searching troubled areas), metal gates and fences were constructed only some of which could be traversed by the public. The increasing use of women to transport incendiary devices led to the deployment of policewomen from the Women's Royal Army Corps and the RUC to search females trying to enter fenced off areas.

Troubled areas where tension existed between two neighboring communities were at times fenced off with corrugated iron upon which floodlights were trained at night. While passage was allowed during the day, it was forbidden at night.

The British also resorted to rapid checkpoints or vehicle check points (VCPs) that took place without prior warning and became important in preventing the use of cars for transporting explosives, weapons, and terrorists. Roadblocks were often established by helicopters under the command of sergeants or corporals. The VCPs operated at times for only a few minutes to avoid traffic jams, crowd assemblies, and snipers. The mobility of the rapid checkpoint provided a sense of randomness that vastly enhanced the effectiveness of the tactic.

The army maintained card indices for known and suspected terrorists, their families, contacts, movements and customs. A complete profile (including photographs) could easily and rapidly be assembled for any person whose name surfaced.

Individual unit tactics extended to procedures for screening civilians. For example, the 2nd Fusiliers, using the Special Powers Act, focused on a specific part of the city within the battalion's area of responsibility. Within selected areas, soldiers escorted all males discovered walking on the streets, gathered them at a mobile screening unit, identified them, and checked them against the extensive files kept by the British.

Antimissile fences or screens were built around the perimeters of barracks, police stations, and other security installations to guard against

IRA use of RPGs. A variety of technologies was used to prevent the transporting or planting of bombs or incendiary devices. These passive techniques are discussed in the next section.

EQUIPMENT

British equipment reaction to the IRA terrorists developed piecemeal. The British Defense Minister promised that the army would have an early delivery of new antiriot weapons and equipment, and approved the army's implementation of techniques of dispersing crowds, riot control, control of mass movements of people during disturbances, and identification of active instigators and their arrest by army "snatch squads." More generally, the army decided to bypass normal procurement channels soon after its deployment in Northern Ireland. In practice, a virtual blank check was provided to a senior British officer to do whatever research and development that might be necessary to meet the needs of forces in Ulster. For some time, this approach seemed to be providing little, and an enormous amount of money was apparently wasted. Over time, however, some important developments emerged from the British determination to support its Ulster deployment with advanced technology.

The army had little equipment to handle riot situations (primarily, helmets and riot shields). As the situation worsened, equipment was modified and new ideas were developed. Helmet visors, specially designed plastic shields, flak jackets and vests, and plastic and rubber bullets were all employed. Water cannons were used, and crowd pushers developed. Troops monitoring demonstrations carried batons. CS gas cartridges and gas grenades were used during violent riots and demonstrations. Lead bullets were fired from the SLR ([FN] self-loading rifle) or the Sterling submachine gun or the .38 service revolver. From the beginning of August 1969 until August 1970, rubber bullets were used. By July 1971, the situation had changed to a shooting war.

The RUC chose to phase out its 7.62mm stock of SLR and 9mm submachine guns in favor of the M1 Carbine. This rifle was relatively light and compact. It used .30 caliber rounds of lower velocity than the standard NATO rifle. Ironically, the M1 was one of the first weapons to be deployed against the security forces by terrorists.

Patrols were equipped with fragmentation jackets but those are effective only against low velocity fragments and bullets. Other flak jackets provided better protection but restricted movement.

The lowering of military profile led to the use of armored Land Rovers modified with head restraints, antiroll bars, and seat belts.

The army had used Saracen armored cars. Another useful vehicle was the Pegasus APC, whose firing positions are available without opening a hatch and which had thicker armor to protect against high velocity rifles used by terrorists. The army used image and seismic surveillance equipment to find and listen to terrorists at night. It also used "sniffers" to trace explosives in suspects, dog-handling teams, Nitesun, and infrared devices on its weapons. Soldiers used body armor.

The U.S. M79 40mm grenade launcher was added to the army inventory in a defense capacity for observation posts, patrols, and the like in 1976.

Among the equipment judged by the British military to be particularly valuable in the struggle against terrorists in Northern Ireland were (a) observation and intrusion devices and other optic technologies, (b) bomb protection technology, (c) flak vests, and (d) computers.

Night vision devices were considered invaluable. Night patrols were common practice among British Army units, and the night vision devices gave the patrols and observation posts much greater ability to detect threats and other illicit activity. Similarly, high resolution observation devices allowed extraordinary view of details from great distances. PTZ closed circuit television systems and aerial photography made stationary positions much more secure.

Among recent anti-bomb technology developments valued by the British were robot bomb detonators and bomb sensors, which became increasingly sophisticated.

Flak vests or jackets, a low technology item, saved countless lives and prevented even more injuries. A profile of frequency of targeted area showed that nearly all shots clustered in the center of the chest. Consequently, newer versions of the flak vest had a steel plate in that area.

Finally, computers enabled the British to process so much more data so much more quickly than before, that whole new areas of data analysis became feasible. The linkages of people and vehicles and frequency counts of these items, previously very consumptive of human resources, were now much easier to accomplish on a large scale.

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[13]This thesis assumes that economic development produces political and social stability. Quite a large body of data suggest that just the contrary is the case, namely, that economic development is destabilizing in its early stages when traditional customs and conditions are subject to new challenges.

[14]The border campaign from 1956-1962 was an IRA attempt to drive the British from North Ireland by force. Sporadic and poorly organized attacks were conducted along the border between the republic and the province. The effort produced no mass support on either side of the border, and generated an immediate and harsh reaction from both Dublin and Stormont. Internment of IRA members put an end to this effort; the IRA canceled the campaign on February 16, 1962.

[15]This absence was depicted on wall graffiti reading "IRA--I Ran Away."

[16]Unless otherwise indicated, references to the IRA henceforth in this chapter will be to the Provisional Wing of the IRA.

[17]Ross Kelly, "Not Quite War, Not Quite Peace," Defense & Foreign Affairs, XIII, 5 (May 1985), p. 39.

[18]CS is a form of so-called "tear gas" commonly used by many police forces throughout the world for dispersing demonstrations. Before the employment of CS in Northern Ireland, it had not previously been used by the United Kingdom.

[19]While the rubber bullet is less lethal than conventional bullets, it has caused a number of documented injuries, at times of people not directly involved in the violence. (Rubber bullets are not discriminate munitions.) The development of the rubber bullet is discussed in David Barzilay, The British Army in Ulster (Belfast: Century Services Limited, 1973), pp. 73-74. Other sources report, on the basis of British data, that rubber bullets have killed three people and "have caused skull fractures, brain damage, lung injuries, and ...blinding." A study of 90 hospitalized (so, presumably not all) victims of such bullets in a 2-year period ascertained that "17 were permanently disabled or deformed..." Alfred McClung Lee, Terrorism in Northern Ireland (New York: General Hall, 1983), p. 175.

[20]The institution of trial by judge results from the IRA practice of intimidating juries (and judges) in earlier trials. The judge trials are sometimes referred to as "Diplock Courts," after Lord Diplock who chaired the committee recommending the changes.

[21]Roulement battalions lived and operated from facilities surrounded by high metal walls and observation or firing blockhouses.

CHAPTER V

MONTEVIDEO

INTRODUCTION

Uruguay is a highly urban country. More than 80% of the people live in cities, and Montevideo, the capital, houses half of the country's total population In a continent of political turmoil, Uruguay before the 1960s knew moderate economic progress and extraordinary political stability.

Political opposition that later served as the base of the Tupamaro movement arose in the city of Montevideo, a rapidly growing metropolis whose urban infrastructure was tapped effectively by the organization. For example, communications among Tupamaro leadership took place in public view at times using public facilities. Similarly, the sewers of Montevideo were used for hideouts, meeting places, and communications exchanges. The university served as a meeting place and as a key recruiting ground for the movement.

Although Uruguay in the 1950s experienced something of an economic boom, the sudden drop in the world markets of the major Uruguayan exports produced large deficits and foreign debt in the 1960s. This downfall in economic life affected the sugar cane workers of the northwest country who were organized by Raul Sendic Antonaccio. Sendic established the Movement for National Liberation (MNL) or, as it was popularly known, the Tupamaros (after the Inca chief, Tupac Amaru). The movement was heavily influenced by the writings of Abraham Guillen, who theorized that revolution in Latin America should succeed in the urban environments, the centers of economic and political power, rather than the countryside (that most other advocates of guerrilla warfare thought more hospitable). This was the intellectual heritage of the "urban guerrillas" who surfaced to terrorize the largest of Uruguay's cities and the center of political life in the country.

THE CAMPAIGN OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN URUGUAY

Origins of the Campaign

The early years of the Tupamaros, from 1962 to 1968, were dedicated to the developing a well-organized, -structured, -coordinated, and -supplied organization. The emphasis was to establish a cohesive organization of dedicated people with an infrastructure that would sustain protracted war. Thus, underground hideouts were constructed, equipped with hospitals, and supplied with food and medical equipment that could sustain members for long periods of time underground and away from the security forces. The Tupamaros also concentrated on building a broad popular support base, especially among the poor of Montevideo's suburbs. Trucks loaded with food, clothing, and even toys were hijacked and driven to those parts of the city where the goods were distributed to the needy. Such "Robin Hood" operations gained recognition and sympathy for the Tupamaros. Above all, however, these activities discredited the authorities' image. Until 1968, the Tupamaros

refrained from inflicting casualties in their operations; this was also to their credit. Even during bank robberies, no casualties were reported.

Even in these early years, the Tupamaros conducted a large number of terrorist attacks, such as the bombing of the Bayer chemical plant, which was intended to manifest opposition to the Vietnam war. Most violent attacks were aimed at U.S. businesses, at radio transmitters, at Uruguayan businesses linked in some way to the United States, and at banks.

The Tupamaros thought they had a real chance to gain political power in the elections of 1968, but Jorge Areco Pacheco was elected and assumed the presidency in 1968. After his election, he closed two radical newspapers and six extreme left wing political parties (but not the Uruguayan Communist party which enjoyed exceptional freedom and was allowed to produce its own newspaper and run a radio station).

Although the Tupamaros resorted to acts of violence and sabotage before the elections, the real shift in their tactics was visible on August 8, 1968, with the kidnapping of Dr. Ulysses Pereira Reverbel, director of the state power company. This event had more than symbolic importance, however. In the search for Reverbel, who was a friend of the president, police entered the university grounds. The traditional sanctity of university campuses in Latin America made this a completely unacceptable act to students, and served to radicalize and mobilize a large part of the student population.

After their electoral failure, the Tupamaros resorted to other new tactics, notably terrorism, kidnappings (including the kidnapping of foreign nationals), and murder. The logic behind this change of direction was derived from the premise that although the Tupamaros enjoyed public sympathy, they lacked the kind of actual support which could translate into political power. Therefore, they believed if they could prove the newly elected government unable to contain the violence and control the country, that government would be compelled to resort to violence and to commit crimes against the general populace that would alienate public support from the government and bring the Tupamaros and the Left to power.

Terrorist Organization

No single ideology unified the Tupamaros. Instead, the group (which can only loosely be called an "organization") brought together a wide array of ideological Leftists and anarchists. A seven- or eight-person executive committee dominated by Raul Sendic constituted the leadership. The executive committee was supported by a secretariat. Theoretically, a national convention composed of representatives from all Tupamaro units was superior to the executive committee, but the convention had ceased to operate by the end of 1970.

The Tupamaros were organized into small cells of between two and six members. Cells were then linked together to form the columns that operated in particular geographic areas. Columns were subordinate to the committee. Combat columns in Montevideo bore the numbers 7, 10, and 15. Column 7 formed a ring around the city through its suburbs. Column 10 operated in the downtown area. Column 15 operated in the remainder of the city. Columns consisted of between 50 and 300 members. Some Montevideo columns had a specialized function, such as the medical treatment of wounded insurgents. Column 45 handled logistics and column 70 was in charge of recruitment, training, intelligence, and political affairs. Only a minority of the cells

was engaged in combat. Combat cells had to remain in hiding while the rest were concerned with providing logistic support. Cells and columns had an infrastructure of sympathizers who did not live underground but aided the Tupamaros in various ways. These supporters led normal lives; they conducted their daily business and went to their jobs without attracting any attention.

The cell structure in Montevideo, as elsewhere where cells were used, enabled small operational units to function while maintaining such compartmentalization that cell members did not know each other's identity and used nicknames and false identity papers. Links between various cells were minimized by the principle of compartmentalization. The group leader of each cell was the only contact between cells and there was no hierarchical structure within columns. At the same time, compartmentalization seriously impeded larger scale operations, since coordinating links were not developed to support such operations. Even in their day-to-day operations, the Tupamaros often appeared to lack a unified command. The positive side of this fragmentation of leadership was its inherent durability, because even the capture of Sendic in August 1970 did not seem to impair the planning and execution of later operations.

Terrorist Resources

A local opposition, the Tupamaros received no external support or aid. However, Tupamaros did export Viet Cong-type booby traps to Argentina and Brazil.

Tupamaro strength grew from an original nucleus of fewer than 50 activists in 1965 to about 3,000 persons, including those active in operations and active in support in 1972.

The Tupamaros were of predominantly middle class origin, including civil servants, students, and members of the professional classes, and a number of "career revolutionaries." Despite their leftist orientation, they attracted few members from the working classes. The average age of the Tupamaros was 27, and one-fourth were women. Occupationally, the composition contained three groups of almost equal size (students [29.5%], professional and technical persons [32.4%], and workers [32.4%]). While the Tupamaro campaign did not succeed for the movement itself, the strategy of using terrorism and other disruptive tactics to provoke an overreaction did work. As it worked, the growing military dictatorship in Uruguay alienated an ever larger fraction of the population. Before 1972, therefore, the Tupamaros can be said to have severed the government from widespread public support and to have substantially increased their own quiet support base.

Well-placed Tupamaro sympathizers in the police, the military, the civil service, and the banks provided vital information about the authorities. A network of support groups (*Comites de Apoyo a las Tupamaros*) was organized in the trade unions and among high school and college students.

Terrorist Strategy

Unlike a number of Latin American revolutionaries, the Tupamaros never developed an elaborate or even a cohesive ideology or philosophy. Given the philosophical differences within the movement, it is likely they could not have done so in any case. The final objective of the Tupamaros' struggle was

to set up a socialist order under which basic industries would be owned and controlled by the people. They reiterated their belief in armed revolution as the only solution for the problems of Uruguay.

Their strategy was also intentionally left vague to permit flexibility as conditions changed. Originally, their strategy was largely political and depended on communications (propaganda). However, the consistent failure of the movement to make any national political headway encouraged greater Tupamaro interest in violence and produced an emphasis on the role of armed revolution. Several political strategies, from provoking foreign rightist intervention (which would permit them to lead national resistance as a "vanguard" party) to labor uprisings, came to naught, largely because the Tupamaros were too small a movement to accomplish important political objectives unless they used an equalizer--violence.

Two distinct categories of activity formed their operational behavior. The first included that cluster of activities designed to build a mass base for the Tupamaros movement (the "Robin Hood" ventures, the efforts designed to organize laborers and intellectuals, the propaganda campaign, etc.). The second category of activity was violent action. Success in the first category was intended to build the required base, while success in the latter was designed to bring about the collapse of the government. The specific actions undertaken by the Tupamaros must be seen in the context of both these drives.

The active campaign by the Tupamaros to bring down the government focused on demoralizing the police and the armed forces by subversive propaganda and the campaign of selective terrorism. Whereas the Tupamaros seemed curiously ambivalent about the armed forces, appearing to seek to attract their support as well as to neutralize them, no such ambivalence applied to the police who were seen as closely wedded to the regime and therefore unsalvageable. The army tradition of staying out of politics and yet being a national institution appeared to make it less objectionable. From the beginning, therefore, the police were generally fairer game for Tupamaro attacks. At times, both security forces were subjected to threats, bombings, assassinations, and infiltration.

Terrorism was intended to drive the government toward repressive measures that would arouse liberal critics at home and abroad and weaken the government's position by dividing the cabinet and inciting trouble in congress, where the president's partisans were in a minority. The Tupamaros also tried to aggravate the economic crisis, reasoning that if circumstances deteriorated, people would blame the government, not the Tupamaros.

From 1965 to 1967, the Tupamaros concentrated on gaining publicity and funds and on infiltrating the university and some public service corporations. In 1968, the Tupamaros shifted direction to engage in more violent activity (kidnapping, bombing, armed robbery, and murder). Most Tupamaro attacks must be understood in the context of "armed propaganda," that is, demonstrations of force intended to create credibility for the Tupamaros and deprive the government of credibility.

ANTITERRORIST CAMPAIGN

Public commitment to the democratic institutions of the country was an asset of the Tupamaros in several ways. The group tried to force the

government to move toward more repressive measures and then to accuse the government of dictatorial tendencies to weaken public support. At the same time, the well-established democratic institutions and the lack of tradition of repression constrained the government's response. At no time during his presidency (1968 to 1972) did Pacheco suspend the constitution or declare a stage of siege or emergency, actions that would have granted him unlimited powers.

Antiterrorist Organization

The traditionally democratic government of Uruguay, intensely aware of the South American history of military primacy in politics to which Uruguay was such an exception, was intent on avoiding army involvement in the growing security problems in the country. Before 1971, the police were charged with containing the Tupamaros. The national police fell under the control of the ministry of the interior and included (a) the Montevideo police, (b) the interior police, (c) the highway police, and (d) the national fire corps. The chief of the Montevideo police was an army officer, as was his deputy. As chief of police, he also commanded a small paramilitary force (600 officers in 1966) called the "metropolitan guard," as well as a Quick Reaction Force that was developed later.

The Montevideo police were the primary force in charge of security in the city. (Interior police were essentially a political police unit.) While the police received important logistic support from the armed forces (including training facilities and helicopters for rapid mobility), they proved unable to control the insurgents or prevent the growing terrorism. Consequently, the paramilitary forces were given a greater role in combating the Tupamaros.

When the metropolitan guard as well as the police proved inadequate to stop the Tupamaros, the military leadership became increasingly impatient and made growing demands (usually in secret) of the government. Ultimately, in September 1971, the armed forces were assigned the task of rooting out the Tupamaros.

The armed forces were historically, but later only nominally, under the control of the minister of defense. He also directed the maritime police. In Montevideo, the service chiefs jointly directed the campaign supported by the ministry of interior that controlled the police. To handle the terrorist problem, the government of Uruguay created a number of antisubversive organizations. These organizations, which integrated armed forces (army, navy, and air force) and police representatives, include the Board of Commanders in Chief (JCJ), a Joint Staff (ESMACO), regional Coordinating Organizations for Antisubversive Operations (OCOA), an Intelligence Coordination Group (RI), and a Joint Forces Press Bureau (OPFC).

The JCJ and ESMACO were created simultaneously in December 1971. The former had the mission of advising the executive about joint plans pertaining to antisubversive activities and about problems of national security and national defense. The latter had the mission of conducting studies, advising, coordinating and planning for the JCJ. These organizations facilitated the high level, centralized overall antisubversive effort, ensuring consideration of every aspect of the national problem, not just the military or police impacts as was previously the case.

OCOA was created in each of the four military regions of the country, but the most complete and powerful was the one in Region I (Montevideo-Canelones) in existence since June 1971. This OCOA operated with an integrated staff of representatives from all services in the region and including members of the naval prefecture. The OCOA planned, coordinated, and conducted all land antisubversive operations executed with the region.

The RI never became formalized. In existence since 1969, the RI functioned on the basis of informal meetings of representatives of the military intelligence service acting directly under the minister of defense, the intelligence departments of the three armed services, and the Montevideo police department.

The OPFC was the main propaganda instrument employed by the armed forces and police against the Tupamaros. The OPFC broadcast government views on national issues as well as the latest news about anti-Tupamaro operations.

Antiterrorist Resources

Uruguay does not have a long martial history and before the insurgency possessed only very small security forces. The country did not have compulsory military service. The armed forces had no history of involvement in national political life, and political discussions were forbidden within the ranks. At the outset of the Tupamaro offensive in 1968, there were only about 12,000 men in Uruguay's army, approximately half of whom were deployed in the Montevideo area. The navy boasted only 2,500 personnel, and the air force was even smaller (1,700). Air force helicopters (two UH-12s armed with machine guns and based at Carrasco airport near Montevideo) did take some role in transporting police (and later army) personnel quickly from place to place. In addition, there were about 22,000 men in the police force, 6,000 of whom were stationed in Montevideo. A paramilitary force included approximately 20,000 men with 600 officers. This force (the metropolitan guard) had machine guns, fire hoses, and gas weapons. It was used to guard banks and stores. Very few army officers or policemen (perhaps 1,000) at that stage had any specialized training in antiterrorist techniques.

Antiterrorist Strategy

No cohesive strategy was developed during the early years of the Tupamaro problem, in part because the Tupamaro threat was so limited. When the violence escalated, pressure on the government escalated as well. The central theme of government policy in the Pacheco years seems to have been to preserve democratic principles but improve the organizational and operational efficiency of security activities. The inability of the government to crush the Tupamaro terrorist campaign produced precisely the kind of overreaction the Tupamaros sought, and increasingly the government subordinated everything, including the Uruguayan form of government, to the objective of defeating the Tupamaros.

Under Pacheco, the strategy was aimed at finding the Tupamaros and divorcing them from the public. By the end of the Pacheco government and the installation of Bordabery, however, the strategy was increasingly oriented toward saturation of society and terrain with security forces that would flush out the Tupamaros and their sympathizers.

COURSE OF EVENTS

From 1965 to 1967, the Tupamaros concentrated on gaining publicity and funds and on infiltrating the university and public service corporations. Toward the end of 1967, after a wave of violence and the burning of several cars in Montevideo, the government was forced to take action. The government imposed strict censorship on news pertaining to Tupamaros operations. The Montevideo press was forbidden to refer to the Tupamaros by name. Instead they were referred to as "criminals" or simply "the nameless ones." After Jorge Areco Pacheco assumed the presidency in 1968, he shut down two radical newspapers and six extreme left wing political parties. This was the first concrete action on the part of the government.

Implementation of strict wage and price controls in 1968 stimulated violent strikes throughout the country. The government reacted with a show of force from the army and the use of emergency powers. From that point until the demise of the Tupamaros in 1972, acts of violence and urban insurgency punctuated the political life of Uruguay.

On August 8, 1968, after a series of armed robberies and acts of sabotage, the Tupamaros conducted their first kidnapping, abducting Dr. Ulysses Pereira Reverbel, director of the state power company. This operation demonstrated the increasing strength and confidence of the Tupamaros, and the government mobilized 5,000 troops and police in an unsuccessful attempt to find Reverbel. Reverbel was released 3 days later.

In September, the Tupamaros abducted a leading banker, Gaetano Pellegrini Giampetro, holding him for 10 weeks. The Pellegrini kidnapping was timed to serve as a show of sympathy with bank employees who had gone on strike after 182 of them were fired.

Until late 1969, the Tupamaros avoided bloodshed, and their only victims were shot when the police closed in and forced them to fight a street battle. The first man they "executed" was a police agent, Carlos Ruben Zambrano, who was murdered while sitting in a bus on November 15, 1969. This killing marked a change in tactics, and after that, the Tupamaros resorted to selective assassination.

In early 1970, the Tupamaros assassinated a police inspector. In April, a police inspector was shot in the street. More murders of police agents dominated June. On June 17, the insurgents issued an extraordinary communique stating their readiness to observe a truce until early in July. During this period of calm, the government was supposed to reconsider its policy, and policemen and soldiers who had lost their appetite for battle were invited to resign and find new jobs. The impact of this bit of psychological warfare on morale can be gauged by the fact that police went on strike a few days later, demanding higher pay and the right to work in civilian clothes in order to make themselves less conspicuous targets.

In July 1970, the Tupamaros kidnapped a magistrate responsible for the trial of some insurgents. On July 31, they attempted four kidnappings in a single day. Two of these failed. One victim was a member of the U.S. embassy who resisted his attackers when they entered his garage. The other, also a U.S. diplomat, managed, though bound hand and foot, to roll out of a pickup truck into which his abductors had shoved him. On that day, the Tupamaros also seized the Brazilian consul and a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) police advisor, Dan Mitrione, who was later

killed. On August 1, they kidnapped Dr. Claude Fly, American agricultural expert. President Pacheco requested and received from the Uruguayan parliament a 20-day suspension of all individual civil liberties.

The year 1971 opened with the kidnapping on January 8, 1971, of the British ambassador, Sir Geoffrey Jackson, as a continuation of Plan SATAN which called for the kidnapping of well-known and important national and international personalities to demonstrate Tupamaro power and immunity, thereby embarrassing the government. Jackson was freed 8 months later. His release was a show of strength as much as it was a humane gesture. In March 1971, Uruguay's attorney general was kidnapped. He was released after he had been forced to admit (in tape recordings circulated to the press) that he had agreed to transfer political prisoners to military tribunals and that he had signed orders for further detention of prisoners after their original sentences expired. At the end of the month, Ulysses Reverbel was abducted a second time. Two months later, Carlos Frick Davies, former minister of agriculture, was kidnapped. As in the previous year, the president requested and received a temporary (this time, 40-day) suspension of individual liberties.

The kidnapping and murder of Dan Mitrione followed by Sir Geoffrey Jackson's kidnapping contributed to a sense of alienation from and loss of sympathy for the Tupamaros. That year (1970 to 1971) witnessed the beginning of the end for the Tupamaros. The murders helped to change the public perception of the Tupamaros.

The Tupamaros' continued success during 1970 produced increasingly harsh repressive measures by presidential decree. As the Tupamaros had hoped and we have noted, the Uruguayan congress immediately granted President Pacheco sweeping powers, including the power to suspend civil rights. To help defeat the insurgents, the traditional liberal freedoms previously enjoyed in Uruguay were abandoned. Press censorship to deny publicity, detention without trial, and military involvement in civil government succeeded in crushing the urban terrorists when a benevolent but irresolute administration had failed. This iron hand was precisely what the Tupamaros had been trying to provoke; they succeeded in creating a military dictatorship. It was a dictatorship that quickly crushed the Tupamaros themselves, however.

To stop Tupamaro action, President Bordabery initially asked (at the direction of the increasingly threatening military) for greater powers than his predecessor had. His request was denied, however, by a parliament already upset about documented police and military excesses, including torture and reputed "death squads." On April 12, 1972, 15 Tupamaros and 10 common criminals escaped from prison. Two days later, two police officers, an ex-subminister, and a navy officer were murdered. Gun battles erupted at widely scattered points in Montevideo. The following day, the president requested, and the parliament granted, a declaration of a state of internal war, suspending all civil rights. These actions empowered the military and police to conduct searches and make arrests without warrants, conduct raids during the night (previously forbidden), hold suspects for indefinite periods, and transfer them to military rather than civilian courts when the authorities were ready to charge them formally. The results were dramatic. Through strong-arm techniques and the use of a well-trained army, he managed to crush the Tupamaros within 6 months. Hideouts were discovered. Numerous insurgent leaders were captured and much of the support organization destroyed. On June 27, in what amounted to a presidential *coup d'etat*, Bordabery dissolved parliament and announced that he would henceforth govern through a council of state. After the takeover, the armed forces imposed

restrictions on the press, assumed the responsibility for managing public services, and closed all schools and colleges. The military, acting upon information already available, began to roll up the Tupamaros. In two quick raids, eight Tupamaros were killed. On May 18, four soldiers on guard duty in front of the private home of the army commander-in-chief were murdered. This last act was considered the greatest provocation against the armed forces, and marked the loss of initiative by the Tupamaros; abandoning large scale raids and kidnappings, they reverted to selective terrorism. On September 1, Raul Sendic was wounded and captured a second time after a brief gun battle. By October, more than 2,400 suspects were in prison and more than 300 hideouts were discovered.

OUTCOME

As a political group, the Tupamaros played an active role in Uruguay. Their analysis of political development was seriously flawed, however. Tupamaro activism created tensions that benefited the Tupamaros. The turn to violence and terrorism eroded Uruguayan democracy. Lacking a viable political base, isolated from key centers with leverage on the political process, and without a coherent ideology to offer, the Tupamaros were unable to translate the destruction of Uruguayan democracy into a Tupamaro victory. They created the repression they sought, and then became its victims.

POLITICAL, LEGAL, AND STRATEGIC FACTORS

Political Considerations and Constraints

The Uruguayan tradition of democracy was in many respects the enemy of the Tupamaros. As long as popular legitimacy attached to the democratic process, the Tupamaros could entertain no real prospects of political triumph. Consequently, the MLN pursued a path common to terrorist groups, namely, it aimed at producing a security force reaction that would alienate the population and drive it to support fundamental political change.

The democratic elections of 1967 and the installment of Pacheco as President of Uruguay set back the Left and the Tupamaros. It was in the aftermath of this electoral defeat that the Tupamaros broadened their campaign of violence and turned to large scale terrorism. Some in the Uruguayan government understood that one of the goals of the terrorists was to force the authorities to take harsh steps against the Tupamaros, affront the democratic traditions and institutions of Uruguay, and thereby destroy government legitimacy. Therefore, Pacheco's attempts to strengthen the government response to the Tupamaros encountered serious opposition in parliament. At the same time, Uruguay polarized between those who saw the Tupamaros as the greatest threat and those who saw the security forces as that threat increased.

The 1971 elections were held in the face of Tupamaro threats to disrupt them. Government troops positioned around the city of Montevideo and other key places secured the elections. At the same time, these troops may have contributed to an election outcome many believe was "rigged." The widespread

view that the level of participation shows the viability and popularity of Uruguayan democracy misses the point: Uruguayan democracy was already under challenge and was soon to be interred.

The new president was from the outset subject to much greater pressure from the military for an active campaign against the Tupamaros. By 1972, Bordabery ruled in name; only one step behind him was a would-be military oligarchy determined to crush the Tupamaros. The steps taken by the new president were upon the demand of the military. When the Tupamaros finally over-extended themselves in April 1972, the rapid and effective destruction of the Tupamaros by the military forces merely set the stage for the final act of a usurpation of power by the Uruguayan armed forces.

Legal Considerations and Constraints

Pacheco's presidency was marked by careful political maneuvering within the democratic system and to some degree within its legal process. Gradually, however, the liberties long valued in the country were eroded. Despite the freedom of the press, for example, the government prohibited reference to the Tupamaros by name; they were called "criminals" or "the nameless ones" in the media. The prohibited use of their proper name, or of the identity and nature of their claims was intended to prevent the association of a formal group with any legitimate grievances and to brand them as no more than violent criminals who attempt to disrupt law and order, the concern of every citizen.

Throughout the period of Pacheco's presidency, the growing power of the Tupamaros produced increasing pressures from within the military and elements of the banking and big business communities for sterner action. At the same time, the institutions of Uruguayan democracy continued to function at the national level, which in effect prevented the president from taking the kinds of action the security forces and power elites sought. Handcuffed by the liberal opposition and goaded by the conservative military, the civilian executive became increasingly irrelevant to the underlying and polarizing political processes of the country. The military and police began to act outside the law. "Temporary" restrictions of traditional liberties grew. These abridgments of traditional rights alarmed and mobilized the liberal sympathizers of the Tupamaros. The liberals tried to further limit the executive branch to safeguard Uruguayan democracy.

While the military had an almost exemplary tradition of distance from political involvement in Uruguay, leaders of the security forces were appalled at the inability of the government to deal with the Tupamaros and insisted on measures which, while contrary to the principles of Uruguayan liberty, they deemed essential to preserve the order that gave rise to that liberty. Such was the rationale, and undoubtedly many believed it.

During the administration of President Bordabery, Uruguayan democracy was interred. He had benefited from the support of the security forces during the electoral campaign, and it is widely believed that his election reflected widespread fraud. The newly elected president wasted no time in requesting inroads against civil liberties far more sweeping than those sought and received by his predecessor. However, the Uruguayan parliament, where all currents were represented (unlike the executive branch which was increasingly responsive to an oligarchy of bankers and senior security personnel), refused to provide the powers Bordabery requested. At this stage, a critical moment in Uruguayan constitutional history, the Tupamaros

struck with several days of violence, including multiple kidnapings and attacks that produced gun battles all over Montevideo. When Bordabery again approached the parliament, demanding the declaration of a state of internal war, suspending all legal rights, and granting the executive unlimited powers, the parliament this time granted his request. By this time, it is likely that had the parliament not responded the security forces may well have acted as they planned without benefit of parliamentary blessing. Within 6 months, the Tupamaros were crushed. Democracy in Uruguay did not last even that long.

Strategic Considerations and Constraints

There is no real basis to consider larger questions of strategy going beyond Uruguay. The Tupamaros were self-sufficient in resources and motivation. While they had some contact with other Leftist forces in the hemisphere, and they were ideologically inspired by others, they had almost no support from any other movement.

The main external consideration, then, was the role of the United States in the terrorism and in the counter-terrorism. The United States was a major focal point of Tupamaro attacks from the earliest activist phase of the movement. The Tupamaros' first major attack was against an American chemical plant, and in the early years when they were little more than a nuisance, their attacks always included a significant number of American businesses or Uruguayan businesses connected in some way to the United States.

The main forces driving the Uruguayan security forces and the overall national policy for dealing with the Tupamaros were Uruguayan. The impatience and demands of the military were representative of their views; the concern and appeals of liberal quarters for greater respect of civil rights represented accurately the views of those who raised them. The American role, while never large in manpower or visibility, in the antiterrorist campaign was certainly not negligible.

Dan Mitrione, the American whose murder did much to turn the public against the Tupamaros and to accelerate the move toward sterner measures to contain them, was a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) employee attached to the Uruguayan national police. In this era, USAID was deeply involved in many programs around the world designed to assist the national police forces. So, too, USAID personnel such as Mitrione provided support and training to Uruguayan police, improving their communications capabilities, interrogation techniques, patrolling, and many other activities. The Tupamaros' view of the police was particularly negative, and police personnel (but also armed forces) were involved in torturing suspects, and in many other illegal activities. By mid- to late 1971, senior police personnel were involved in "death squads" that seized individual Uruguayans and killed them without charges.

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

The military and police intelligence services worked closely after 1969, and troops gained valuable experience in the antisubversive struggle through their cooperation in police operations after mid-1970. The armed forces' role was limited for most of the period to cooperation with the police, however; not until 1972 did the armed forces assume responsibility for the

overall antisubversive effort. When they did assume that responsibility, they did so completely, all the while maintaining the institutions for cooperation with other security services that had been developed in an earlier era.

The network of cooperation institutionalized in national organizations (the JCJ, ESMACO, OCOAs, RI, and the OPFC) and processes provided for extensive and effective coordination of activities against the Tupamaros, even if it did not overcome the inherent institutional weaknesses internal to the individual security forces.

TACTICS

Combat Functions

Uruguay is a deviant study in terms of tactical military operations, since its military forces were not deployed and used according to normal military doctrine. Only in the town of Pando was the military called to fight the insurgents in direct combat. In this case, helicopters were used as transport vehicles rather than fighting machines. APCs were also used to transport troops. However, the fighting was strictly infantry small arms combat. Beyond this battle, the army was involved primarily in intelligence collection, while the police assumed the primary security role.

Support Functions

Intelligence

Operational intelligence was coordinated at the tactical and administrative level by OCOA, and for policy and administrative support by the RI. OCOA had a well-defined logistical tail that provided adequate vehicles, radios, and other equipment, and the RI facilitated the exchange of substantial intelligence and the development of common doctrine across service and police intelligence arms. Intervention of the armed forces in the counterinsurgency produced substantially improved intelligence results, in part because of the greater resources available, but in large part because of the credibility of government determination and the resulting fear on the part of captured insurgents. Moreover, military interrogators had a higher degree of professionalism than their police counterparts.

Psychological Operations

The OPFC coordinated and originated armed forces PSYOP. While government PSYOP was not particularly effective for some years, Tupamaro errors in audience analysis had a cumulative effect, especially as regards the use of terrorism. Their intellectual inclinations and leftist rhetoric made no impression on the Uruguayan citizenry. The "Robin Hood" aspect of their operations carried much more weight. In several cases, the public seemed to accept Tupamaro justifications for acts of violence, whether willingly or reluctantly. The murder of USAID advisor Dan Mitrione was clearly a psychological turning point, however, after which the government was much more effective in portraying the targets of Tupamaro violence as victims

Civic Action

The Uruguayan armed forces had extensive experience in civic action. All military forces participated actively in the program. The army provided engineering support for the construction of public works, and the navy provided health care. Air force helicopters provided MEDEVAC services for citizens.

Tactics and Techniques

Active

There was relatively little real combat in the anti-Tupamaro campaign. Following an attack on the naval training center in the spring of 1970, the armed forces undertook active patrols and cut off the city of Montevideo with roadblocks and checkpoints. Without any effective control over the population and lacking popular support, these isolated tactics yielded little.

When possible, raids were conducted in the early morning hours (3 or 4 a.m.) to catch the insurgents while still asleep and to minimize potential breaches of security.

EQUIPMENT

Equipment was not a major factor in the campaign against the Tupamaro terrorists. While some communications technology was employed, the flooding of suspected areas by large numbers of security forces personnel finally broke the back of the movement.

CHAPTER VI

BEIRUT

INTRODUCTION

The city of Beirut, long a tranquil island in the turbulent Middle East, and even longer blessed with a reputation for sophistication, tolerance, and *joie de vivre*, has known little peace since 1975. This chapter is not a study of the 14 years of combat in Beirut, or of the larger political and social struggles that have generated that combat. Our purpose here is much more restrictive.

This chapter focuses on the role of terrorism in Beirut as it affected the United States contingent to a peacekeeping force deployed to the Beirut area in the aftermath of a war in Lebanon. The situation in Lebanon was and remains complex. This chapter restricts its treatment as much as possible to the narrow issues of the U.S. contingent. It should be noted that while this unit was a military unit, it was not deployed to Lebanon to engage in combat. The dispatch of U.S. forces was presented by the Administration to the Congress on the explicit assumption that there was no opposition to that role in Lebanon. This was truly a peacekeeping force, not a combat force. As a noncombat force, it falls within the parameters established at the outset of this report for the study of terrorism, since these U.S. troops were to be noncombatant.

Although this chapter does not address the complex setting to which the U.S. forces were sent in any detail, some general introduction is necessary to understand the objectives set for U.S. forces, the role of those forces in the environment, the changes in the environment that altered the position of U.S. forces, and the impact on the deployed forces.

Background

Lebanon had long been an oasis of tolerance in the often intolerant Middle East. Despite a history of intermittent religious and other frictions and clashes, the essence of Lebanon was its "multi-confessional" (i.e., diverse religious) composition and the pluralistic theme of its political structure and ideology. Lebanon was never seen as or called a "confrontation" state in the Arab-Israeli conflict. (Alone in the Arab world, its Jewish community increased quickly in size for a decade after the establishment of Israel and played an active and visible role in the country until 1967.)

Lebanon was also a small and weak state in a region of great tension and conflict. The influx of Palestinian refugees from 1948 to 1949 and after 1967 created a potential problem of some magnitude. Neither Syria nor Israel, in particular, was content with the situation in Lebanon. Syrians resented Lebanese freedom (Syrian discontents fled to the freedom of Lebanon) and prosperity. Many Syrians refused to accept Lebanon's separate existence, contending that it was really a part of Syria "stolen" by the French. For their part, many Israelis sought control of water resources in the southern

part of the country and rejected the idea of a multi-confessional state. Some even claimed that southern Lebanon should rightfully be incorporated into Israel.

As the vortex of violence in the Middle East grew, the Lebanese failed to maintain a proper degree of military readiness. Their concept that a strong army might threaten their neighbors and that maintenance of a weak country was therefore Lebanon's best security was hopelessly flawed and naïve. In 1969, Syria, which had taken an ever greater covert role in Lebanon and had infiltrated opposition elements as early as 1958, sponsored and supported the large scale arming of the Palestinians and a virtual transplantation of the Palestinian guerrilla organizations onto Lebanese soil after 1970. When the small but highly motivated and relatively well-trained Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) opposed this invasion, powerful propaganda, economic, and political pressures were imposed on the Lebanese government. Syrian support also extended to actual military operations in support of some of the Palestinian groups. Eventually, the Lebanese government was forced to adopt a compromise (i.e., the "Cairo Accords," 1969) granting the PLO substantially greater freedom of action <u>within</u> its camps, and recognizing Lebanon's duty to support the PLO in various ways, but still providing for Lebanese military control over areas in which the PLO might undertake operations against Israel.

The PLO never intended to accept the Cairo Accords but merely saw them as a first step toward taking the border area that would allow the PLO an open front with Israel. Syria, which sponsored and supported PLO action against Israel, only rarely permitted PLO operations from its own soil, instead transporting or otherwise assisting the PLO so that the latter could conduct its activities from Jordan and, to a lesser extent, Lebanon. Eventually, the Jordanian army was able to provoke a confrontation with the PLO that allowed it to drive that organization's forces from Jordanian soil in a bloody but quite decisive campaign in September 1970. Most of those expelled from Jordan went to Syria where they later infiltrated into Lebanon, dramatically increasing tensions there.

Many Lebanese were desperately concerned about the growing PLO threat. It was widely understood that the PLO would increase its attacks on Israel, and Israeli retaliatory raids against Lebanon had already begun. These raids hit Palestinian refugee camps and largely Shi`a Muslim villages and settlements. The result was a growing polarization in Lebanon between Muslims, who claimed the security forces were in league with Israel and should be defending the Muslims of the South against Israeli depredations, and the Christians who believed that the LAF could certainly not effectively stop the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), but that the real problem was caused by Palestinian raids. As this polarization grew, it tended to paralyze the Lebanese government which traditionally provides for half Muslim and half Christian ministers in the cabinet, and is based on a division of power among three "presidents" (the president of the republic [always a Maronite Christian], the president of the government [always a Sunni Muslim], and the president of the parliament [always a Shi`a Muslim]). The commander of the army (always a Maronite) has traditionally worked very closely with the president of the republic (henceforth, "president"), often to the extent of circumventing the will of the president of the government (henceforth, "prime minister") and defense minister.

Despite this paralysis that arose in the context of deepening tensions in Lebanon, as everyone after 1969 was persuaded that the situation could not endure indefinitely, the army again undertook a major operation against the

PLO in 1973. As in 1969, the army performed effectively and quickly established its military superiority over the PLO. As in 1969, however, the Arab world supported the PLO and forced another cease-fire (the "Melkite Accord") on the government. The 1973 developments, preventing the central government from establishing control over the PLO, assured the destruction of the Lebanese state, since the continued growth of the PLO and the proliferation after 1973 of other armed militias supported by a wide variety of countries and movements, far exceeded the limited capabilities of the small and lightly armed Lebanese security forces.[22]

The outbreak of violence among Lebanese in 1975 reflected the polarization of the country, although the fighting was never characterized by homogeneous religious affiliations on either side. A broad array of forces opposing the Lebanese government and supporting the PLO confronted groups advocating a stronger government and the disarming of the PLO.

From January 1976, Syrian forces participated directly in the fighting in Lebanon, although between January and June they were uniformed as Palestinians (Palestine Liberation Army and Sa`iqa, Syria's "house" Palestinian group). The direct and overt intervention of the Syrian army in June 1976, based on an agreement with Israel reached through American mediation, represented a switch in sides for Syria as it was directed against the PLO and its allies, which Syria now sought to bring under control. In September 1976, the new Lebanese president, elected because he was seen as being "Syria's man" (though still an unquestioned Lebanese patriot) took office. Syria's military presence was ratified *post facto* by the Arab League, which created a peacekeeping force, the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), dominated by Syria.[23]

Henceforth, Syria attempted to take an active and direct role in all decision making in Lebanon. The ADF was rapidly converted to a Syrian army of occupation in its areas of responsibility. At the same time, the Lebanese Forces in the Christian heartland and the PLO in Beirut and the camps to the south resisted, each in its own way, Syrian hegemony. PLO forces continued to raid and to fire rockets and artillery shells across the border into northern Israel.

In 1981, Syria, trying to bring the Lebanese Forces to heel, encircled and besieged the Beqa`a Valley town of Zahle, the largest Christian settlement in the Middle East.[24] This confrontation led to a brief Israel Air Force (IAF) attack on Syrian forces who were thought to have violated the "red line" agreement between the two countries concerning Syria's presence in Lebanon. In response, Syria introduced surface-to-air missiles into previously prepared positions in Lebanon. The confrontation generated a quick diplomatic intervention by the United States, whose negotiator was unable to break the impassé regarding the missiles but produced a separate cease-fire between the PLO and Israel.

The cease-fire "held" in theory much longer than critics on either side expected. However, both sides saw it as doomed. The PLO accepted a cease-fire in Lebanon, but never agreed to its application elsewhere. Moreover, the dominant PLO faction, Fatah, expended much energy controlling (to a surprising degree, effectively) rebellious elements that were determined to violate the cease-fire. For its part, many Israelis thought that negotiation of a cease-fire with the PLO constituted essential "recognition" of that organization. More important, the minister of defense and IDF commander were determined to destroy the PLO in Lebanon. Both sides used the cease-fire period to prepare for the expected future conflict. The PLO increased its

long-range artillery to shell the Galilee; the IDF prepared plans for a large invasion of Lebanon that would sweep away the PLO presence in the South of Lebanon.

The 1982 War

Israeli forces invaded Lebanon in 1982, rolling up the PLO from the border to its main camps on the outskirts of Beirut.[25] It was the intention of Defense Minister Sharon to force the Syrian forces to withdraw from Lebanon, as well, for he recognized that a continued Syrian presence could only undermine the new order he intended to set up in Lebanon. Sharon had no cabinet support for an unprovoked war with the Syrians (and Syrian withdrawals and movements made it quite clear the Syrian government desired to avoid a confrontation with the IDF). Consequently, Sharon attempted to deceive the cabinet. When the latter realized the contradictory approach being taken by the defense minister, it quickly placed political and command and control shackles on him and his ally, the IDF chief of staff. The Syrians stayed in Lebanon.

Meanwhile, the IDF, unwilling to engage completely the PLO in the city of Beirut, used "salami" tactics to whittle down the size of the PLO enclave; created a blockade to increase the pressures on the PLO to evacuate; heavily used psychological operations (PSYOP) to persuade the PLO that the IDF would eventually attack the city if necessary and that the PLO was doomed anyhow; and employed means to convince the Sunni Muslim constituency of the PLO to beg the latter to leave.

Because the cease-fire that had "broken down" was American-negotiated, and as a result of the emotionally gripping images in American and other Western media concerning the IDF blockade and siege of West Beirut, the United States again entered the scene diplomatically, this time to negotiate withdrawal of Palestinian "fighters" from Beirut.

By the time the negotiations were complete, it was apparent that as a result of the war a new order was developing in Lebanon. The election of Bashir Gemayel, commander of the Lebanese Forces (a militia composed of Christians exclusively) as the new president of Lebanon seemed likely, and the PLO leadership based in Beirut was seriously concerned about the fate of the tens of thousands of Palestinian families the fighters would be leaving behind if they were to be evacuated. Consequently, three Western countries, including the United States, pledged to send a small security force, the "Multi-National Force" (MNF), to ensure the safety of the Palestinian families and to undertake other peacekeeping tasks related to the withdrawal of PLO fighters from Beirut and the maintenance of security in the aftermath of that withdrawal. This mission was not opposed by any of the main governmental or non-governmental participants in the conflict, although Israeli leaders were not pleased by the approach.

As expected, August 23 saw the election of Bashir Gemayel as president of Lebanon. Two days earlier, the first contingent of the MNF had landed in Beirut and a few days later, the Marines relieved French Foreign Legion troops which occupied the port area at that time. Lightly armed Marines established blocking positions and checkpoints at the perimeters of the port. Soon thereafter, PLO fighters appeared at the port's gates on trucks ready to evacuate. The vehicles were checked by LAF personnel while armed Marines were deployed in sandbagged checkpoints and around nearby buildings, manning

M-60 machine guns. The departure of the Palestinian fighters also proceeded with only a few minor problems. Several live grenades were rolled up toward the sandbag checkpoint.

The PLO fighters were allowed to carry only personal weapons. After entering the port, the trucks were unloaded and the people allowed to walk to the evacuation ship. They crossed positions inspected by LAF infantry and gave their names before boarding the ships. The evacuation was completed on September 1, 1982.

By early September, so much progress had been made on so many fronts that the situation in Lebanon looked extremely hopeful for the first time in more than a decade. Political differences among Lebanese groups were at a standstill, and Gemayel rapidly secured the eager cooperation of both the Druze and Shi`a communities. The divided Sunni community also began to cooperate actively with the president-elect who was busily developing his administrative team and program. Declaring their mission completed, the MNF countries decided to withdraw the force ahead of schedule. The Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) remained in port until September 10, when it boarded ship and returned to Naples.

On September 14, 1982, President-elect Bashir Gemayel, while attending a party meeting in Ashrafiyeh, was assassinated by a Syrian agent. In the immediate aftermath of the assassination, (a) the Kata`ib Party (that formed the backbone of the Lebanese Forces) nominated the late president-elect's brother; (b) the IDF immediately began to move more forces toward and into the southern parts of Beirut, taking areas not previously under IDF physical control; (c) certain IDF leaders, convinced that many Palestinian fighters remained hidden in the camps, directed Lebanese Forces leaders that special security elements of the Lebanese Forces would conduct a "cleansing" operation in the Palestinian camps. Massacres of untold hundreds of Palestinian noncombatants ensued (performed by these Lebanese Forces elements with the support of the IDF on September 16-18).[26]

The "Return" of the Multi-National Force

President Amine Gemayel requested the return of the MNF on September 18. The political dislocation of the Lebanese scene, the horrors of what had taken place in the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Shatila, and the relationship of the premature withdrawal of the MNF to the subsequent developments caused the United States, France, and Italy to send a new MNF back to Beirut. Within 48 hours, the request was approved. The MNF was to remain in Beirut until the LAF was ready to effectively assume overall security responsibilities in the capital. The MNF was to provide stability and legitimacy for the rebuilding process of the Lebanese government. Once again, it was understood that the MNF was not a combat force, that it was unopposed in Lebanon. No single Lebanese group opposed the deployment of the MNF, although the Soviet Union was opposed.

The mission of the U.S. contingent of the MNF was presented to Congress by the Administration as assisting the LAF to extend its control and the authority of the central government over the greater Beirut area. The official mission, as delineated in the Joint Chiefs of Staff order to the Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command (USCINCEUR), was as follows:

To establish an environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area. When directed, USCINCEUR will introduce U.S. forces as part of a multi-national force presence in the Beirut area to occupy and secure positions along a designated section of the line from south of the Beirut International Airport to a position in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace; be prepared to protect U.S. forces; and, on order, conduct retrograde operations as required.

The environment of the USMNF was assumed to be benign. To the extent security was necessary, it was to be provided by the LAF. The USMNF was never configured to be a combat unit.

The main activity of the USMNF at this stage was expected to be the denial of passage to hostile armed elements or assistance to the LAF to deny such passage. This mission expanded over time, however. As early as November 1982, USMNF was providing training to the LAF. It provided external security to the U.S. embassy detachments after the attack on the embassy. It resupplied the LAF with ammunition when that force was engaged in combat. It provided naval gunfire support of the LAF. These activities are difficult to reconcile with the "noncombat" or "peacekeeping" nature of the USMNF as originally envisioned.

The MNF was composed of French, Italian, and American troops, each occupying a separate sector of Beirut. The French were based in central West Beirut; the Italians, south of the French (the Italian area of responsibility included Sabra and Shatila); and the Marines, at Beirut International Airport (BIA).

On September 20, 1982, for the second time, the 32nd MAU was ordered to land at the port of Beirut and simultaneously at BIA "to establish presences." The Marines contingent included 1,200 combat and support troops. From the very beginning, it was clear that a clean-up operation of the large quantity of unexploded ordnance around the BIA was required. Since the MAU was not organized to handle such a task, additional engineers, an explosive ordnance disposal detachment, an interrogator or translator, intelligence specialists, and an air-naval gunfire liaison team were requested. Also, preventive medicine and public affairs detachments were requested. Altogether, numbered about 100 men. These teams arrived within 36 hours.

BIA was a "permissive environment," that is, it was open to civilians who daily traveled through the airport. The Battalion Landing Team (BLT) and the MAU headquarters were secure buildings provided by the Lebanese government within the operational infrastructure of the airport. Various buildings around these headquarters were used on a daily basis and civilian traffic was conducted in the vicinity.

The Marine headquarters was established in a four-story building at the airport far from the control tower. The flat roof of the building provided an excellent observation post. The BLT deployed two rifle companies along the perimeter of the runway with checkpoints along a railroad track. Another company was positioned at the Lebanese University adjacent to the Italian sector in the North. All Marine checkpoints were positioned next to LAF checkpoints. The position at the University overlooked the Shi'a Muslim quarters of Hay-as-Salloum, which controlled the main routes to BIA. (Subsequently, in the aftermath of the attack on the U.S. embassy in April

1983, additional units were deployed at the British embassy and at a private building, in both of which U.S. diplomatic and consular activities were undertaken, and at the residence of the U.S. ambassador in Yarze.)

It was understood at this time that all of the major Lebanese communities sought an increase in the presence and effectiveness of the Lebanese national government and the LAF. A number of political changes were under way that fundamentally altered that fact, however.

The rules of engagement (ROE) were developed and issued by the European Command and are based on its "Peacetime Rules of Engagement." These ROE limited recourse to force for situations of self-defense to a hostile threat, reactions to hostile acts, or in defense of the LAF when it operated with the USMNF. Prevention of intrusion was a LAF responsibility. Infiltration of or intrusion into USMNF facilities was to generate only a warning, and USMNF personnel were authorized the use of force only if the intruder or infiltrator committed a hostile act. The commander of the USMNF alone was authorized to determine the measures to be employed if an intruder or infiltrator failed to leave when asked to do so.

BACKGROUND TO TERRORISM

Political Changes in Lebanon and the Region

Although no one has precise figures for the different religious or political or social groups in Lebanon (no census has been conducted there since 1932), there is a consensus that the Shi`a are now a plurality in the country. The Shi`a, who predominate in the Beqa`a Valley and in the South, but who are also the largest community in the southern suburbs of Beirut, were the poorest and most unrepresented group in Lebanon. During the 1960s and 1970s, an organization founded by an Iranian Shi`a, Amal, had for the first time succeeded in mobilizing the community. Amal was armed through a variety of sources, including Israel, and began to fight the PLO. The disappearance of Amal's leader left the community divided, torn among local secular leaders of various inclinations, those under Syrian influence, and those subject to Iranian influence and control.

A marriage of convenience between Syria and Iran had exposed growing segments of the Shi`a community to the influence of a branch of Shi`a clergy initially based in Iraq but moved to Iran after the Islamic revolution. It is not clear whether Syrian leaders had any intention of using the Iranian presence in 1982 (both Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Iranian-controlled irregular groups were based in the Syrian-controlled Beqa`a Valley). At the time, Syria was weak, having suffered a humiliating setback by the Israelis in the war, and the Iranian presence may well have been seen as merely a useful asset in case Syrian forces might be forced to withdraw in the future.[27]

At the same time, the political equation in Lebanon was also altered by the extraordinary scandal in Israel resulting from the massacres in the Palestinian camps. The result of this scandal and the further polarization of the Israeli body politic concerning the war was that further Israeli-initiated military action in Lebanon was impossible. Israel could respond, but was certainly in no position to take any initiatives to continue to build a "new order" in Lebanon. The political inability of the IDF fundamentally

changed the Syrian position. Syria had provided evidence and assurances of its willingness to retire from Lebanon in the immediate aftermath of the war, when it appeared Damascus had little choice. This willingness was based on the knowledge that plans existed to compel Syrian withdrawal. With the changes in Israel, however, there was no longer anyone to coerce Syria to depart from Lebanon.[28]

Within Lebanon, the new president was not interested in signing a full peace agreement with Israel. The maximum he would accept was an Israeli withdrawal that would include provisions designed to guarantee Israeli security from Lebanese territory. Israeli leaders were particularly bitter about this shift, since it now appeared that some of the most important political fruits of the costly victory in Lebanon were to be denied Israel. Israeli leaders determined that they would punish the Lebanese government for its approach, and at the same time administer a memorable lesson on the extent of Israel's ability to manipulate the scene inside Lebanon. Ironically, the agreement that was negotiated among the United States, Israel, and Lebanon represented to the Syrian government the potential for the creation of a close U.S.-Lebanese alliance, which, in the Syrian view, was a *de facto* Israeli-Lebanese alliance.[29]

THE CAMPAIGN OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN BEIRUT

Once the provisions of the withdrawal agreement became known, Syria encouraged and directed the formation of an anti-Lebanese government "opposition" composed mainly of Lebanese political leaders long known as agents of Syria; Walid Junblatt, a Druze leader with historic ties to both Israel and Syria; and Suleiman Frangieh, a Maronite former president of Lebanon whose base is in an area subject to Syrian military control. The "opposition" attacked the national government on a variety of grounds, but it is clear that the *raison d'etre* of the opposition was the May 17, 1983 agreement, overwhelmingly ratified by the Lebanese parliament though never executed by the president. Junblatt, in particular, played on the traditional fear of the Druze toward a powerful central government in Lebanon,[30] since it appeared that for the first time, the national government was developing an effective army that might integrate the country more completely. Druze officers of the army were wooed away. The confrontation between government forces and those of the Druze was to take place over the deployment of the LAF into the Shuf (the mountainous area dominated throughout centuries by the Druze).

At the same time, the IDF, which had never really disarmed the Druze militia (as a result of historically good though quiet Druze-Israeli relations), upon entering the Shuf in June 1982, facilitated the resupply of arms to the community. In some cases, Syrian Army support of the Druze went through IDF lines!

The Druze compose about 6% of the Lebanese population, and are also but a small factor in the LAF. By contrast, the Shi`a may constitute as much as 35% of the national population, and provide approximately 60% of enlisted personnel of the LAF. Defection of the Druze from the army was not a crippling blow militarily, although it represented an important setback to the symbolic unity of the country and the government. The key to the viability of the plans to restore and reconstruct Lebanon and its army was clearly the Shi`a community.

Throughout the period from late 1982 to late 1983, the main movement in the Shi`a community, and the only broadly based Shi`a movement in the southern suburbs, Amal, returned those few deserters (or absent without leave), Shi`a soldiers, whom they captured. Amal encouraged its men to remain with and fight for the army and government. However, the small (but growing) element of the community under Iranian influence viewed Americans in Lebanon like Americans elsewhere--representatives of the Great Satan.

Terrorist Objectives

The terrorist groups that targeted the U.S. Marine contingent of the MNF were Shi`a Muslim fundamentalists. Because of their diffuse organizational structure, it is somewhat misleading to impute specific objectives without identifying the groups or trends within these groups to which the objectives were appropriate.

The true fundamentalists (e.g., *Hizb`allah* [the party of God]) were motivated by religious fanaticism. To the *Hizballahis*, the United States represented an ideology and culture hostile and dangerous to their own values. In general, the *Hizballahis* followed the determinations of certain individuals and groups in Iran. At the personal level, their motivations were (a) to drive the United States and Western presence generally from Lebanon, (b) to force this presence from the Islamic world more generally, and (c) to achieve a personal salvation in martyrdom. The fundamentalist groups included Islamic Amal, a fundamentalist off-shoot of the main Shi`a militia, Amal.[31] The leadership of most of the fundamentalist groups responsive to Iran was linked through *al-Da`wa* ("the call"), a militant fundamentalist umbrella organization, involving numerous clandestine subgroups, originally established in Iraq but subsequently based in Iran.

While Americans have tended to focus on the individual Marines killed, those who directed the terrorist campaign against American and Western presence understood well that the real battle was not in Lebanon but in the United States. Their intent was not to win in Lebanon, but to make the Reagan administration's position unjustifiable in Washington. This, they understood, would secure the withdrawal of the Marines. In this sense, surely, the attacks were typical of terrorism; the victims were not the real targets of the terrorist attacks.

Syrian objectives, which were central to the attacks because critical support in most cases including, particularly the larger initiatives was derived from Syria, were to force the United States from Lebanon so that Syrian influence over that country could be restored to its predominant levels before 1982. Damascus understood (and was probably responsible for the *Hizballah* understanding) that the battle lines lay in Washington, and that Beirut was merely the means to change opinions in Washington. Terrorist attacks against the Marines were but one part of a broad-based offensive developed by Syria to change those attitudes. Other elements, not treated in detail here, included (a) inducing growing levels of low level violence in many parts of Lebanon, (b) supporting intense fighting against the central government in specific areas, (c) sponsoring opposition political elements to the central Lebanese government, and (d) generating pressure among Arab countries afraid of Syria to block U.S. policy initiatives in Lebanon.

Terrorist Resources

The resources available to Syria in its campaign to overturn U.S. policy in Lebanon were significant, but most of them were not narrowly "terrorist" resources. That is, Syrian resources included political, economic, social, and military assets all of which could be mobilized in support of the Syrian campaign but only a few of which were directly involved in the terrorist aspect of that campaign.

Syria's political resources included the long history of Syrian intervention in Lebanon; the nature of Lebanese political society; the Syrian understanding of Washington politics; and the inexperience and errors of the Lebanese and American political leadership involved. Syrian economic resources were confined to Lebanese economic interdependence with the Arab world. The social assets of Syria in Lebanon have already been discussed in a political context. The military assets included Syrian forces, the Druze militia, some local Christian militias, important elements in Amal, and, especially relevant to this report, several fundamentalist Shi`a groups.

Syria's extended tradition of interference in Lebanese politics is based on the close relationship of the peoples of the two countries and on Syrian claims that Lebanon is really a part of Syria. From the time the two countries were "created" (carved from the Ottoman territories in the Arab world) by the French after World War I, Syrian politicians had actively attempted to subvert and destroy Lebanese separateness. (Syria has always refused to establish normal diplomatic relations with Lebanon on the grounds that it would be inappropriate for one people to have such a formal relationship dividing it from itself.) This tradition of intervention has spawned a certain recognition on the part of regional as well as other countries of "vital" Syrian security interests in Lebanon. Syria's legitimacy as an protagonist in Lebanon, in other words, was less criticized than that of the United States. Another legacy of Syria's involvement in Lebanon was the development of numerous clients of the Syrian government inside Lebanon. These clients included important political leaders (e.g., Rashid Karame, a frequent prime minister), major parties (e.g., the Syrian Social National Party and the "Syrian" *Ba`th*), entire minority groups (the `Alawis of the Tripoli area), and various people scattered throughout the Lebanese scene (government officials, businessmen, and common people). The physical occupation of Lebanon was a major asset, since removing the Syrian presence was a *sine qua non* of extending central government authority to the whole of the country. Otherwise, the withdrawal of the MNF and of Israeli forces would return the country to Syrian domination. Syrian occupation in Lebanon was Syria's main visible trump in the complex game that followed the arrival of the MNF and the negotiation of the May 17 agreement. Syria's occupation was not merely a physical presence, but a psychological presence, since it gave Syria physical control of people whose relatives were in that part of Lebanon not controlled by Syria, and therefore provided leverage over countless Lebanese in addition to Syrian clients. A final element in Syria's historic presence in Lebanon was Syria's reputation for ruthlessness--a "credibility" none doubted. The assassination of many Lebanese, even Lebanese leaders like Kamal Junblatt (Walid's father), was only the most obvious part of this reputation, and far from the least savory part. Syria's reputation for the application of torture and for willingness to punish family members subject to Syrian control for the behavior of others not subject to that control were important elements in Syria's reputation, a reputation the United States (intentionally) lacked.

Implicit in the assets previously described are aspects of Lebanese society. The Lebanese throughout their history of thousands of years have been inclined to compromise and bargain to do business. The Syrians have long exploited the venality of Lebanese society to recruit clients. In addition, even though Syria has more potential divisions and rivalries than Lebanon, and has certainly experienced far more violence than has Lebanon across the ages, there is no question that mutual fear and distrust characterize Lebanese society. In particular, the Druze were deeply concerned about the future aspirations of the Shi`as, and sought to develop a tactical alliance with the Shi`a to create an autonomous area that could subsequently be used to defend the Druze against Shi`a inroads. Both Syria and Israel were quite willing to support Druze separatism, the former to weaken the central government, the latter to punish it.

Fundamentalist groups in Lebanon are generally responsive to Iranian or Syrian guidance. Syria does not in general provide specific direction on actions or operations to such groups. (It does at times provide such direction to the political parties and organizations under its control, such as the "Syrian" *Ba`th* Party in Lebanon.) Iran provides more direct guidance at times, but even in this case, the organizations represented a body of opinion that is clearly basic to Lebanon.

Contrary to the other cases in this study and to previous experience in effective terrorist groups, the organization of the fundamentalist and extremist Islamic groups in Lebanon is not at all tight; it is quite scattered. There is no tightly knit organization with clear-cut leadership. Instead, there is a cohesive base of Shi`a Muslims. Recruitment for participation in terrorism is effected through religious channels, and candidates are selected on the basis of family ties, personality traits, and zeal. The heavy emphasis on martyrdom in Shi`a Islam supports this natural selection process. Recruits do not generally remain in an active cell structure; they may come together only once to conduct an operation. They are mobilized and monitored within the closed religious and quasi-religious activities of the Shi`a community.

Overall leadership of the fundamentalist terrorist groups is not well understood. However, the Shi`a extremist groups in Lebanon can almost all be traced to *al-Da`wa*. *Al-Da`wa* operates as an umbrella within which a variety of trends and movements and groups are visible. *Al-Da`wa* in Lebanon appears to direct these different elements and is the closest to an overall "leadership" as exists. "Islamic Jihad" is a child of *al-Da`wa*. There is no resident Islamic Jihad, no overall chief, no senior leaders, no members, no enduring institutions to understand and target. Instead, Islamic Jihad is a name, a cover name given to terrorist attacks in Lebanon that are blessed by *al-Da`wa*.[32]

Terrorist Strategy

Terrorist strategy was simple: to generate casualties that would persuade the Americans, and therefore all the MNF, to withdraw from Lebanon. The immediate target was the Marines in Lebanon, but the terrorists understood that the real target was the American public who, it was believed, would not tolerate casualties.

THE ANTITERRORIST CAMPAIGN

The U.S. Contingent of the Multi-National Force

Unlike the other cases considered in this report, the U.S. Marine contingent of the Multi-National Force (USMNF) was not dispatched as a combat force, was not configured to be a combat force, and was unable (for deployment topography, political, and other reasons) to act like a combat force. Even when the situation changed in their immediate environment, the USMNF was under orders to avoid provocation and confrontations and not to be involved in exchanging fire unless directly fired upon. The rules of engagement (ROE) specified explicitly those circumstances under which the Marines were to engage.[33]

Interestingly, the naval ROE were much more explicitly sensitive to the terrorist threat[34] than were the ROE of forces ashore, even though the immediate terrorist threat to the USMNF was realistically far greater than that to the naval task force afloat.

The USMNF mission was conceived in accordance with political imperatives for Washington and standard practices for peacekeeping forces, while on the ground the troops were exposed on the fire line to unfriendly forces. The Marines were bound by certain rules that seemed increasingly inappropriate as time progressed to the objective situation. The problem was simply that the immediate political requirements continued to mandate care against untoward political incidents likely to incite local passions against the Marines, while such care to avoid confrontation ran counter to the kinds of precautions necessary in view of the growing threat of radical terrorism or sniping directed against the Marines. The ROE did not change from the first mission of the Marines in August of 1982 to the second mission they assumed at the end of September 1982 until their departure. The ROE were rigid in language and spirit and constrained the soldier on the field to react to fire.

The positions around the airport were exposed to observation and targeting, particularly from the overlooking Shuf mountains. Positions were fixed, and initially lacked any fortifications or defenses. The only defenses at the outset were sand bags scattered around the compound.

Despite their vulnerability, the Marines felt secure in their positions in the early stages of the Beirut case. The absence of opposition, the friendliness and gratitude of the Lebanese, and the short umbilical cord to the substantial firepower just offshore added to the positive sense of contributing to a universally acclaimed goal.

The Marines in Beirut were deployed close to the civilian population, specifically to the Shi`as. They were never able to distinguish friendly from hostile Shi`as. At the airport and at the Lebanese University post, the Marines were positioned close to LAF positions. This proximity constituted a problem of identification as to incoming fire (was it intended for the LAF or for the Marines?). Fairly inaccurate incoming fire precluded a simple determination, and the restrictive nature of the ROE sharply constrained the ability of the USMNF to respond.

The Marines, primarily equipped and trained to fight at the leading edge of attacking forces, particularly amphibious forces, in conventional wars where mobility is important, are hardly an ideal force for static

peacekeeping missions. The Marines are designed for rapid movement and aggressive action, not for protracted static behavior.[35] In Beirut, they were exposed to intimidation and constantly were tested in their daily patrols into the villages. Empty soda cans or stones were thrown at their jeeps. These exercises of fake grenade throwing helped fray their nerves, especially when they were not allowed to respond to such agitation. Only a small number participated in daily patrolling, and the Marines fell victim to daily routines easily observed by outsiders. Boredom became the dominant factor in their daily lives.

Antiterrorist Objectives

The Marine deployment in Beirut was not designed to be an antiterrorist campaign. It never became such a campaign, although the Marines themselves became targets of terrorists. At no time were the Marines dedicated to assisting the government to combat terrorists. The Marines did however expend substantial effort in defending their own positions against attacks from conventional and later from terrorist forces.

Initially, the goal was to "establish presence," which in practical terms meant that the Marines exposed themselves to the native population as a good will force. There was no expectation to exchange fire with anyone or confront hostile activity. The decision to post the Marines at Beirut International Airport (BIA) reflected the lack of opposition at the outset of the mission and the importance attached to the American contingent, for BIA was seen as the symbolic link of Lebanon with the rest of the world. For the symbolism of government stability, the BIA deployment was quite important. From a tactical standpoint, BIA was open and vulnerable, but enjoyed easy access to the sea where the Sixth Fleet was positioned. The proximity to the airport also provided easy access to air travel.

USMNF was considered to be in a "permissive environment," that is, one open to civilians. In other words, the Marines were to co-exist with the civilian population, especially those travelling daily through the airport, but also those living in the nearby Shi'a shantytowns. The Marines were in a compound easily distinguishable from the high ground overlooking the airport.

As violence in Lebanon escalated under the pressure that the Syrians were particularly able to concentrate, attacks against the USMNF increased. From isolated attacks (bottles thrown at passing patrols; hand grenades), the violence moved into conventional (artillery attacks) and terrorist modes. Almost 2 weeks before the major attack on the BLT compound, MAU intelligence reported increasing terrorist and other violence directed against the USMNF as a means of operating "against the U.S. presence in Beirut."

Antiterrorist Resources

USMNF consisted of a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), the basic unit of Marine Corps organization. Marine Corps readiness is based on the concept of a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) of which the MAU is the smallest type. The MAU, like other MAGTFs, is composed of command, ground combat, aviation, and support elements, in this case, respectively, the command group; a battalion landing team (BLT) with its organic armor, artillery, combat engineers, assault vehicles, reconnaissance specialists, communications, transportation, supply, and administrative sections; a Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron; and a MAU Service Support Group (MSSG).

USMNF was a target of terrorists (for reasons we have previously noted) but not a main element in the antiterrorist campaign. This campaign involved more active elements: (a) U.S. intelligence resources, (b) U.S. special operations resources, (c) Lebanese intelligence resources, (d) Lebanese special operations resources, and (e) other assets.

U.S. intelligence resources involved in the antiterrorist campaign in Lebanon were numerous. In addition to human intelligence (HUMINT) collected by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), operatives and contacts, a number of other national level resources were brought to bear on Lebanon. Satellite and aerial reconnaissance were used extensively. Contact intelligence resulting from USMNF patrols was very valuable. Electronic and signals intelligence capabilities were also available to the chain of command supporting the USMNF.

U.S. special operations activities in Lebanon involved the training of Lebanese personnel for covert operations and development of U.S. capabilities to insert special operations forces into the area for hostage deliverance or punitive expeditions.

Lebanese intelligence, particularly that of the *deuxieme bureau* (G-2) of the LAF, has historically been among the most effective in the Middle East. However, much of this capability was intentionally reduced in the late 1960s. In addition to G-2, other Lebanese government intelligence agencies perform important intelligence functions. The head of G-2 during the period of the USMNF deployment was not a career intelligence officer, and G-2 capabilities had further deteriorated as a result of the divisions in the army and in society. In spite of these problems, G-2 maintained much more extensive HUMINT operations than the United States; ran a limited but useful communications intelligence (COMINT) activity; and directed one or more special operations units in West Beirut.

Lebanese special operations capabilities were limited. G-2 has historically intervened in limited ways to disrupt activities deemed by the president hostile to national interests. In the past, G-2 has funded journalists, labor leaders, and even local "opposition" leaders. It has also supported specific militia leaders and groups, and reportedly has been involved in providing support for groups that have used violence against foreign forces present in Lebanon. During the USMNF period, however, political constraints limited G-2 activities. Nevertheless, G-2 provided personnel for special operations (covert action) training by the U.S. CIA. It also maintained other limited special operations capabilities in West Beirut.

Antiterrorist Strategy

U.S. forces never had an antiterrorist strategy in Lebanon because they did not see terrorism as an effective weapon aimed at the U.S. presence until after the decision had been made to withdraw that presence. U.S. political strategy is not addressed in this report, as it is largely irrelevant to the antiterrorism problem.

COURSE OF EVENTS

The first Marine casualty was an engineer who had been leading one of the mine-clearing teams. An antipersonnel bomb exploded as he tried to disarm it on September 30, 1982.

On October 29, the 32nd MAU was replaced by the 24th MAU. For the next 2 months, the Marines experienced mostly boredom relieved by daily routines of patrols through the the Shi`a quarter of *Hay-as-Salloum*. On October 31, 1982, a car bomb exploded on the southwest end of the Marine perimeter on the beach where Marine logistical units worked to control the flow of food and supplies from the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group (MARG).

On December 6, 1982, the Marines brought ashore six 105mm howitzers and five M-60A1 tanks which were stationed behind the artillery and at the north end of the airport. In late 1982, a mobile training team (MTT) detached from the USMNF trained LAF units, and the USMNF also participated in the training of a LAF rapid reaction force at the end of December.

On January 20, 1983, the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation was established to facilitate U.S.-Lebanese military interactions in training and other areas.

On February 14, 1983, 24th MAU was relieved by 22nd MAU, which was actually a redesigned configuration of the MAU. The force extended its patrolling responsibilities into an area northeast of Beirut. On February 20, the Marines responded to a Lebanese government request for help by sending nine amphibious tractors (amtracs) and other vehicles to the town of Qaraba which was isolated by a severe winter storm.

On March 16, 1983, a Marine patrol of 12 soldiers experienced the first direct terrorist attack. A Russian hand grenade was thrown at the patrol in Ouzai, a Shi`a-Palestinian neighborhood of West Beirut. Six Marines were slightly wounded, most in their legs. The assailants fled. The first major terrorist attack involving the United States followed about a month later, when, on April 18, 1983, a truck bomb with 2,000 pounds of explosives exploded at the American Embassy in West Beirut. The explosion destroyed the central section of the building, in the process severely damaging U.S. intelligence capabilities in the Middle East by killing a group of experienced intelligence experts (including the National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East) who were having a meeting at the time of the explosion. Other embassy and military personnel (17) were killed, as well as 24 Lebanese nationals. "Islamic Jihad" claimed responsibility for the attack.

After the attack on the U.S. embassy, embassy offices were established in the British embassy and in the Duraffourd building. The USMNF was authorized to provide Marine units to guard both of these positions and the residence of the U.S. ambassador.

On April 28, a speeding Mercedes raced toward the barbed wire near the British Embassy. Marines shot at the speeding car, which stopped, and arrested the men in the Mercedes. On May 5, the helicopter carrying the commander of the Marine force is reported to have been shot at by a single machine gun bullet.[36] The following day, artillery shots were fired at the Marines along the coast.

The first reported incident of the BLT taking fire of any sort was on the night of June 8, 1983, when an RPG round was fired at the observation

post near the Lebanese University library. The first combined LAF-USMNF patrols were instituted on June 25. The opposition was also uniting; on July 23, the National Salvation Front was formed. The first shells to strike BIA fell in the last days of July, three 122mm Katyusha rockets that slightly injured two Marines and blew up a grocery truck delivering goods to the BLT. The first shelling of BIA caught the soldiers of the Marine Service and Support Group (MSSG) unprepared and confused. The plan was to drive all of the heavy equipment from the parking lot and to disperse it in the open. The confusion which followed created a traffic jam at the one-lane gate.

As a result of the shelling of USMNF, a U.S. Army Field Artillery School Target Acquisition Battery (FASTAB) was assigned to the force, arriving on August 6. Most of the BLT was then moved into the BLT headquarters since this building was one of the most solid in the compound.

By August 28, 1983, the IDF had evacuated some parts of the Shuf. Druze gunners began firing at LAF positions at BIA with mortar, gun, and rocket fire. While the fire might have been directed at the LAF adjacent to the Marines' positions, the Marines went to Condition I. Small arms fire came also from *Hay-as-Salloum*. Permission to return fire was given if (a) clear targets were sighted, (b) those targets were actually initiating or returning fire, and (c) the return fire did not affect civilian targets. The Marines had difficulties identifying sources of fire and sniping coming from open windows. On the same day, combat posts 69, 35, and 76 came under fire. These positions were secluded from the rest of the Marine force. They were sandbagged positions southwest of the University on the eastern perimeters of BIA close to the railroad. Marine positions at the University also took fire. Signs of trouble were detected when civilian workers fled from a close field. Position 69 became a target of RPGs, mortars, 106mm recoilless rifles, and small arms like AK-47s. The Marines were not allowed to respond without clearance from higher authorities. Each carried 175 rounds for his M-16. Each post also had an M-60 machine gun.

At post 35, positioned in a building at the end of an alley on the outskirt of *Hay-as-Salloum*, the Marines observed teenagers carrying RPGs and AK-47s and monitoring Marine positions. Women were sent into the streets to reconnoiter the Marine and LAF positions. RPGs were fired at the position in one case. The Marines used M-203s (40mm rifle grenade) to stop the RPG fire. Most of the Marines shot 20 or more times during the day.

On August 29, medium artillery, 82mm mortars, 106mm recoilless rifles and 122mm Katyusha rockets were shot from Khalde, south of the airport, and from the Shuf. The fire was directed at the LAf training camp though some of the light fire hit the USMNF perimeter. Marines, noticing armed militiamen enter buildings and bunkers, knew they would fire soon, but were prohibited from pre-emption. Stiff confrontations with the Druze were taking place at this time, and at one point, Druze militia besieging one of the USMNF's posts demanded that it surrender.

In the morning of August 29, the main USMNF camp came under 82mm mortar fire. The first casualties were incurred in this attack. The injured men were evacuated by amphibious tractor. In response to this attack, 155mm howitzers were ordered to fire high explosive ordnance at the source of the mortar fire.

On August 30, the LAF relieved Amal pressure on Marine post 35, using three APCs carrying infantry and supported by tanks, armored vehicles, and jeep-mounted 106mm recoilless rifles. An LAF tank fired its 90mm cannon into

a school building from which Amal sniper fire targeted the Marine post. At the University, an LAF tank fired at snipers bothering the Marines. The LAF had provided more support than the MAU.

From the week of August 28 to September 4, a pattern of fire emerged that remained fairly constant in the months ahead. Shooting began Sunday each week and slowly decreased during the week. Fridays usually were quiet.

The increasing fire in late August 1983 has been attributed to the Israeli partial withdrawal of forces from the Shuf. The Israeli evacuation on the night of August 27 to 28 had removed any security buffer between the Marines and Muslim militias in the Shuf. The Marines then were exposed in the northern and eastern sectors of the BIA. The Druze militia of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) in the Shuf had more than 600 artillery pieces. Most, however, were aimed at Lebanese Forces' artillery in the north. With the increasing fighting, it was decided to suspend "presence patrols" in Beirut. All foot and mobile patrols outside the USMNF perimeter were canceled.

Although the Marines enjoyed superior firepower in terms of guns, naval guns, and air cover, the forces on the ground received little actual support and did not feel this superior force. USMNF commanders, though eager to respond to fire directed at their troops, were restrained by government constraints from using their firepower advantage.

On September 4, the LAF launched a two-pronged attack to take Khalde, a village on the southern outskirts of BIA. They came under fierce RPG, light arms, 82mm and 120mm mortar, and 122mm rocket and medium artillery fire from the PSP. The proximity of the LAF to the USMNF post 76 produced fire on that position, as well. Granted permission to respond, the Marines used M-203 grenade launchers, M-60 machine guns, and LAW (light antiarmor weapon) rockets. Counterbattery fire was based on target acquisition radar. These exchanges continued on September 5 and 6 among the PSP, the LAF, and the Marines caught between them. The Marines suffered two dead and two wounded in those two days of fire. On September 5, the LAF took *Suq al-Gharb*, a key position overlooking BIA, the presidential palace, and the ambassador's residence. On September 7, F-14 missions using Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance Photography (TARPS) began.

On September 8, Navy guns of the destroyer USS *Bowen* fired at the Druze batteries, the first time American warships fired at Muslim positions. On September 12, U.S. policymakers determined that the defense of *Suq al-Gharb* was essential to the safety of the USMNF. Consequently, emergency ammunition supplies were provided on September 14 to the LAF forces besieged there.

The Marines' positions at BIA, the Lebanese University, and the American Embassy were practically isolated posts. For political reasons, personnel were not permitted to place magazines in their rifles, leaving the positions without reasonable defenses by the end of the first week of September when it was clear that American forces were no longer seen as neutral by important elements. The contingent at the embassy then was supplied from the sea when all roads were closed around the airport. The soldiers developed a siege mentality. A command decision to terminate patrols compounded the USMNF's isolation and, more important, seriously reduced the availability of tactical intelligence. Personnel concentrated on fortifying their positions with sandbags and trenches.

On September 16, the U.S. embassy and ambassador's residence were shelled. In response, the frigate USS *John Rodgers* fired 60 high explosive

shells at Druze positions in the Shuf. On the same day, five Lebanese Air Force Hawker Hunters attacked Druze positions around *Su qal-Gharb* for the first time, destroying T-54 tanks. The following day, the *John Rodgers* continued firing at Druze positions.

On the night of September 18, tanks were detected being brought to positions overlooking the LAF 8th Brigade line at *Suq al-Gharb*. Naval ships (a cruiser, a destroyer, and a frigate) were deployed accordingly. The guided missile cruiser *Virginia* and the *John Rodgers* fired their guns, issuing a total of 338 shells. The results were watched by F-14s with other planes providing cover.

On September 21, Congress authorized the extension of the USMNF mission for an additional period of 18 months. Three days later, French planes hit positions behind Syrian lines in retaliation for injuries inflicted on French soldiers. On September 25, the battleship USS *New Jersey* arrived off the Lebanese coast. On September 28, two Marines of USMNF were abducted by Amal when they took a wrong turn; they were quickly transferred (unharmed) to a French liaison unit.

Mountain positions of the LAF were coming under increasing pressure, and heavy equipment, some of it under Syrian operational control, was arriving.

Intelligence confirmed the presence of Syrian troops in *Hay-as-Salloum* during the week of October 10, as well as Islamic Amal-Iranian guardsmen from Syrian-sponsored and -held training camps in the Baalbek area. The bunkers occupied by the militia were improved, and the small arms sniper fire became more accurate.

On October 16, Marines at the University compound noticed that no women and children were seen in the Muslim neighborhoods. During the dusk hours, the observation posts at the university came under the fire of 60mm mortars, RPGs, small arms, and machine guns. The Marines, assisted by Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) snipers equipped with ranging gear who marked the targets with single tracer rounds, responded with 60mm mortars, M-203, M-60s. The Marine positions at the university came under fire, and several injured soldiers were evacuated by helicopter.

On October 18, Secretary Weinberger recommended withdrawal of USMNF and re-deployment aboard the MARG fleet offshore.

On October 19, a car bomb exploded just after the commander of 24th MAU passed the gates of the Sabra and Shatila camps.

On October 23, 1983, at 6:22 a.m., a truck bomb exploded at the USMNF compound at BIA, killing 241 Marines. A similar truck bomb detonated at the French MNF headquarters. These attacks were planned in Damascus and involved both Iranian and Syrian participants, though again the immediate perpetrators were Lebanese.[37]

By October 24, replacement personnel had been heli-lifted to Beirut from the ships offshore. A few days later, an additional Marine rifle company was authorized for USMNF; it arrived by the end of the month.

On November 8, the BLT deployed at the university withdrew to BIA and was subsequently redeployed offshore. Three days later, SAM-5s were fired at American Navy reconnaissance aircraft flying over the Shuf. On November 17, French aircraft attacked a camp of Islamic Amal near Baalbek. The original

plan, developed by the two governments, envisioned a joint bombing raid, but at the last minute, American aircraft did not participate in accordance with a decision reached in Washington, D.C. On November 18, the 24th MAU was replaced by 22nd MAU.

On December 4, 1983, U.S. carrier-based aircraft conducted an air strike against Syrian positions in the Shuf. Two aircraft were shot down with one pilot killed, another captured. The same day, post 76 was hit directly by fire from Druze guns with eight Marines killed and two wounded. The USS *New Jersey* retaliated with fire into the Shuf. These exchanges continued into 1984.

On February 4, 1984, amid heavy fighting in West Beirut, the Shi`a leadership of Amal prevailed upon LAF Shi`as to defect, and the LAF split along sectarian lines. Four days later, the U.S. president announced the "re-deployment" of the Marines to ships off the Lebanese coast. All British forces were withdrawn from Lebanon that same day, and the Italian government declared its intention to remove the Italian contingent in the near future. Within 3-1/2 weeks, the bulk of the USMNF had withdrawn from Lebanese soil, leaving only a security contingent to guard the U.S. embassy facilities.[38]

OUTCOME

The USMNF was withdrawn from Lebanon in early 1984. It did not succeed in hastening the extension of Lebanese government authority to the rest of the country, nor did it succeed in upgrading the capabilities of the LAF, which had fragmented by the time of the withdrawal of the MNF.

When the USMNF was "re-deployed westward," the state of security in West Beirut had deteriorated to the point of virtual anarchy. A large number of terrorist incidents were planned or conducted in Lebanon in the years following the MNF's stay there, most of them in the area near the USMNF deployment. BIA itself became one of the most dramatic scenes of terrorism in 1975 when a TWA aircraft was hijacked in Europe and spent an extended period at the airport under control of at least two Shi`a factions.

POLITICAL, LEGAL, AND STRATEGIC FACTORS

Political Considerations and Constraints

Pressure on the Beirut government was allegedly to place "reform," to which the Gemayel regime was already committed, before "liberation" (withdrawal of foreign forces). We say allegedly because this theme was merely a façade behind which the Syrian government, which provided support to the most dangerous elements of opposition, hid its real aims, destruction of the May 17, 1983 agreement, eviction of the United States from any major role in Lebanon, and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. There were Lebanese who sincerely sought reform before liberation, but the opposition developed and assisted by Syria was first and foremost a Syrian surrogate inside Lebanon.

The problem confronted by the Lebanese government was that the central government controlled only limited territory and therefore limited

population. Syria and Israel controlled much more of both. The Druze collaborated with Syria and Israel, but pursued their own aim--complete autonomy in their area. The main problems posed by Druze alienation from the central government were (a) the location of this community on the hills overlooking the capital, the USMNF position at BIA, and a significant part of the Christian community; (b) the fact that the Druze area shared boundaries with Syria, enabling Syria to provide fire support and logistic support to the Druze; and (c) the mountainous terrain of the Shuf, which posed significant military challenges to the LAF.

The second major problem confronting the Lebanese government was the growing power of Syria and Iran over the Shi`a community. Loss of Shi`a support would prove catastrophic, since the bulk of the enlisted personnel of the LAF were Shi`a. While Amal (the largest Shi`a movement, including a powerful militia) supported the government, it was clear that Syrian pressure and influence were increasing. The Christian and Beirut Sunni communities were the only two groups to staunchly support the central government against all foreign foes. Gemayel's personal orientation was such that he did not wish to rely on the Shi`a. Pressures from groups within these two reliable communities prevented Gemayel from turning more to the Shi`a, even if he had been inclined to do so.

The Israeli determination to weaken the central government was a final problem. Having decided to punish Gemayel (for his unwillingness to negotiate a more far-reaching agreement with Israel than the withdrawal accord) and to rely on the traditional linkage with the Druze, Israel intentionally undermined LAF efforts to facilitate a smooth transition from Israeli occupation to LAF presence in the Shuf.[39]

The American government was also under substantial pressure. Internationally, the Arab world was primarily concerned with peripheral issues such as the Palestinians and Israel, but this concern was translated into pressure on Washington. Worse, Arab governments that initially expressed understanding of the position of the Beirut government and agreed that the most important goal was to secure Israeli withdrawal regardless of the terms upon which this withdrawal was effected, then balked at the content of the tripartite May 17 agreement.[40]

Within the United States, the policy for Lebanon was almost purely a White House policy. It was opposed by both the military and civilian elements of the Department of Defense, by the career officials at the State Department, and by many in the CIA. The White House failed to calculate properly the implications of the lack of Congressional support. Consequently, when the Marines began to be subject to attack in Lebanon, many in Congress began to insist more volubly that the terms under which the Marines were present in Beirut had changed and since opposition now existed, they should be withdrawn. With Congressional support, the administration might have had the flexibility to respond to the attacks on the Beirut government and U.S. forces with a variety of appropriate and effective counteractive steps.

Legal Considerations and Constraints

The Beirut government operated under very severe legal constraints, but overcame those restraints through determination. The LAF, as a result of the most recent National Defense Law, had little ability under that law to undertake any tactical planning, reach any strategic or tactical decisions,

or exploit any military opportunities, without a consensus of all six major religious communities as expressed in a military council within the command structure. However, military decisions were taken during this period in a manner inconsistent with the national defense law and in a manner designed to advance the interests of the central government.

Civil and criminal law in Lebanon during the period of the USMNF presence did not apply. There was no possibility that any terrorist, even if apprehended in the act of terrorism, would come to trial, since the legal system was, for all intents and purposes, suspended and the country divided. Enactment of emergency or other regulations relating to criminal penalties for terrorist acts, or acts that might be committed in the course of terrorist operations, would therefore not contribute significantly to the re-establishment of law and order and are not considered here. In any case, no such provisions were enacted. The legal vacuum reflected the state of anarchy in which government authority was completely lacking in large areas of the country. While some security forces enforcement actions were taken that exceed the provisions of Lebanese law, and although the anarchy could have been exploited to expand the *de facto* powers of the security forces in areas where they operated (whether openly or clandestinely), no systematic effort of this type was undertaken.

The American government also operated under very severe legal constraints. Choosing not to contest the application of the so-called "War Powers Act" (whose constitutionality is open to serious question) to the deployment of Marines to Lebanon as part of the MNF, the administration insisted on the "noncombat" nature of the environment as a means to secure Congressional support. When the administration could no longer claim a noncombat situation, it tried to secure Congressional support, even for limited periods, on other grounds. Yet, this support was always conditional, and the Syrian-sponsored campaign in Lebanon was specifically intended to influence Congress and the American public to prevent the administration from continuing the active American role in support of the Beirut government. The U.S. Government's (executive and legislative branches') acceptance of the application of the War Powers Act to the Marines placed heavy burdens of constant justification of U.S. behavior on the administration.

Strategic Considerations and Constraints

Syria understood immediately that the weakness of the MNF was its complete political dependence on the credibility of the U.S. commitment to Lebanon. The MNF was never a truly "multi-national entity"; it was a multi-national dress, covering a U.S. commitment to Lebanon. This was clearly what both Beirut and Washington wanted. The Syrian foreign minister explicitly stated Syrian perceptions (that Syrians believed the United States was "short of breath," i.e., did not have the political support at home to bear up under sustained attack). This assessment proved correct.

The U.S. Government was unable to consider increasing the U.S. commitment to match the increased opposition. From the outset, the real choices were only two: withdraw or be prepared to confront the Syrian opposition with a commitment to use whatever level of power was necessary to defend the Lebanese government. Instead, Washington preferred to create and live with a fantasy as an option, to "stay the course," meaning to continue with inadequate force levels against increasing opposition.

Because the executive branch of the U.S. Government was unable to provide a compelling case to the public and the Congress concerning the necessity of deploying Marines to Lebanon, it was necessary to maintain the fiction of a "peacekeeping presence." Consequently, it was not politically possible to deploy the kind of force ashore that would have provided adequate security against the growing range of attacks USMNF faced (artillery, rockets, grenades, individual terrorism, etc.). Operating on the necessity to portray the environment as more benign than it was, it was difficult to upgrade the readiness of the MAU for what was increasingly becoming a very hostile environment.

Once it was clear that the United States was unwilling or unable to match the level of Syrian determination, Beirut had two choices: to defer to Syrian demands or to move toward a much closer relationship with Israel independent of the United States. The Lebanese government also preferred to create and live with the fantasy option--reliance on the United States.

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

Although the essential strategic problem of the USMNF in Beirut was certainly one of changing political objectives that failed to relate those objectives to the resources available for accomplishment, much of the tactical problem of the Marines in Beirut was directly connected to the cumbersome chain of command.

In addition to the significant command and control problems at the U.S. level and the problems that complicated U.S.-Lebanese coordination, the MNF itself was never an integrated force, and the different participating countries in the MNF had very different ideas about what their contingents were to accomplish in Lebanon. While the four contingents had a communications link and liaison officers, there was no real coordination of activity. Other participants, particularly the French, strongly resented the domination of the MNF by the United States.

Immediate command of the Marine combat companies was at the BLT level. The BLT was under the control of the Commander U.S. Forces Ashore Lebanon (commander of the MAU, and officially Commander USMNF). He in turn reported to the Commander, U.S. Forces Lebanon (commander of the amphibious task force, Carrier Task Force [CTF] 61). The Amphibious task force commander reported to the commander of the carrier battle group of which it was a part. (This battle group changed during the period of the USMNF deployment, as the USS *Eisenhower* was replaced by the USS *Independence*.) The carrier battle group reported to the Commander U.S. Sixth Fleet, headquartered in Naples, who reported to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR). CINCUSNAVEUR is the naval element of the European Command (EUCOM), a unified command, and therefore is subordinate to its commander in chief (USCINCEUR for Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command). USCINCEUR reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in policy matters to the Secretary of Defense.

While from a policy perspective it is understandable and even important for senior levels, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to be able to control actions in the field with significant policy implications for the executive branch of the U.S. government, conventional war situations do not permit this level of control. It is in such limited intensity conflicts as peacekeeping, where communications channels are not overwhelmed with

tactical requirements, that a tendency exists to direct ground forces actions from senior levels. This appears to be very much the case in Beirut. In effect, real direction of activities on the ground in Beirut and offshore were immediately controlled by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), and the White House staff itself. This control was exercised through the entire chain of command noted previously with the result that local forces had neither the autonomy required for effective military operations in the Western system nor the benefit of the national assets concentrated on the area of operations, which were also all dedicated to senior levels' interests.

The impact of effective policy control over long distance was worsened by the physical difference of time zones. Policy decisions with operational implications reached in Washington reached Lebanon almost immediately, despite the distances, but "almost immediately" is 6 hours later there with very important operational implications. The most significant examples of this problem were the last-minute, almost last-second, decision not to participate with the French in the bombing of the Beqa`a Valley in November 1983; and the U.S. decision to bomb Syrian positions on December 4, 1983. In both cases, delays resulting from recourse to far-distant decision points had important results on the mission. The French were deeply disappointed in the American change of attitude in November. And the delay in December had even more serious operational results: faulty loading of ordnance onto attacking aircraft[41] and launching the attacks at a tactically incorrect time.[42] (We speculate that the determination to proceed with the bombing raid on December 4, and not to delay the raid until enough time had elapsed to allow both proper loading of the-aircraft and preferable environmental conditions, was a reaction to the November events. The supporters of the bombing mission probably did not wish to provide the opponents an opportunity to again abort the mission.)

TACTICS

The rules of engagement (ROE) limited and constrained Marine operations. Since the assignment of the Marines to Beirut was seen as a symbolic act of peacekeeping, so was their deployment.

Initially, the goal was to "establish presence," which in practical terms meant that the Marines exposed themselves to the native population as a good will force. There was no expectation to exchange fire with anyone or confront hostile activity. The decision to post the Marines at Beirut International Airport (BIA) reflected the lack of opposition at the outset of the mission and the importance attached to the American contingent, for BIA was seen as the symbolic link of Lebanon with the rest of the world. For the symbolism of government stability, the BIA deployment was quite important. From a tactical standpoint, BIA was open and vulnerable, but enjoyed easy access to the sea where the Sixth Fleet was positioned. The proximity to the airport also provided easy access to air travel.

The positions around the airport were exposed to observation and targeting, particularly from the overlooking Shuf mountains. Positions were fixed, and initially lacked any fortifications or defenses. The only defenses at the outset were sand bag positions scattered around the compound.

Despite their vulnerability, the Marines felt secure in their positions in the early stages of the Beirut case. The absence of opposition, the

friendliness and gratitude of the Lebanese, and the short umbilical cord to the substantial firepower just offshore added to the positive sense of contributing to a universally acclaimed goal.

USMNF was considered to be in a "permissive environment," that is, one open to civilians. In other words, the Marines were to co-exist with the civilian population, especially those travelling daily through the airport, but also those living in the nearby Shi`a shantytowns. The Marines were in a compound easily observed from the high ground overlooking the airport.

The Marines in Beirut were deployed near the civilian population, specifically to the Shi`as. They were never able to distinguish friendly Shi`as from hostile Shi`as. At the airport and at the Lebanese University post, the Marines were positioned closely to LAF positions. This proximity constituted a problem of identification as to incoming fire (was it intended for the LAF or for the Marines?). Fairly inaccurate incoming fire precluded such a simple determination, and the restrictive nature of the ROE sharply constrained the ability of the U.S. forces to respond.

The Marines, equipped and trained to fight a conventional war in which mobility and firepower are important, are hardly an ideal force for static peacekeeping missions (see footnote 35). Only a small number participated in daily patrolling, and the Marines fell victim to daily routines easily observed by outsiders. Boredom became the dominant factor in their daily lives. In Beirut, they were exposed to intimidation and constantly were tested in their daily patrols into the villages. Empty soda cans or stones were thrown at their jeeps. These exercises of fake grenade throwing helped fray their nerves, especially when they were not allowed to respond to such agitation.

Combat Functions

The Beirut case differed from the other four we consider in this report in the sense that the USMNF was not deployed to counter the forces that evolved into the terrorist threat. At no time was the USMNF endowed with significant organic combat capabilities, although its firepower was upgraded as it came under attack. Nevertheless, the following categories are somewhat misleading because the USMNF was not oriented toward the deployment of ground forces to control the Shi`as, (e.g., the collection of intelligence about the Shi`as, air operations against the Shi`as, etc.). Overall, the USMNF received far more fire from other groups than it did from Shi`a elements, even though its casualties were derived overwhelmingly from the single enormous explosion of a Shi`a terrorist attack.

Ground Forces

The BLT conducted foot and mobile patrols into Beirut and around the airport area. Each day, between four and seven foot patrols moved into the domain of BIA and two mobile patrols went into the city. Patterns of the patrol routes varied as well as times. Some patrols were also undertaken in conjunction with the LAF, and LAF personnel frequently accompanied essentially USMNF patrols.

Some of the USMNF posts received more support from the LAF than they did from the rest of the MAU. On August 30, 1983, the LAF relieved Amal pressure on post 35, using three APCs (carrying infantry and supported by tanks,

armored vehicles, and jeep-mounted 106mm recoilless rifles). An LAF tank fired its 90mm cannon into a school building from which Amal sniper fire targeted the Marine post. In all, eight rounds were fired. At the university, an LAF tank fired at a sniper's nest which was bothering the Marines. It is interesting to note that the Marines stayed in each of these positions for a week at a time. The Marines, especially in post 69, received little aid from their own forces (except on August 29 from helicopters).

Marine fire was assisted by Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) snipers equipped with range-finding equipment that marked targets with single tracer rounds. Until the exchanges became violent and sustained, BLT responses to being fired upon were to determine the source of fire with target acquisition, to fire illumination rounds over the source, and to hope that that would deter future activity. Illumination rounds were fired with 81mm mortars.

In addition to the symbolic role (the presence mission), the Marines were also involved in training Lebanese military personnel. The main training effort was conducted by the U.S. Army (the Lebanese Army Modernization Program [LAMP]), but throughout the deployment of the USMNF, some LAF personnel were being trained as well by the Marines.

Air Operations

Helicopters were used to evacuate Marines from endangered positions. A CH-46 landed at the Lebanese Defense Ministry in Baabda to pick up wounded. Two Cobra gunships escorted the MEDEVAC helicopter. CH-46s also delivered ammunition and supplies. F-14 photo reconnaissance missions became commonplace after early September 1983. Although there was no response to the attack on the USMNF compound, a subsequent strike against Syrian-controlled territory used carrier-based A-6s and A-7s.

Naval Operations

The USMNF was an amphibious force. While the Lebanese never saw it as such, Marine task forces are inherently amphibious, based on and tied to their naval support forces offshore. In many respects, the USMNF was a naval operation that completely depended on its lifeline to offshore naval support.

While USMNF was what it was designed to be, a presence mission of a peace-keeping nature, the link to the naval task force was less visible and empirical. As pressure on the USMNF escalated, the vast array of naval support became more important to the Marines ashore who (a) benefited from naval intelligence netting, (b) fell under naval command, (c) received naval gunfire support, (d) used naval photoreconnaissance assets, (e) depended on naval supplies and logistic support, and (f) evacuated to the ships (eventually) with naval assets.

Support Functions

Intelligence

The single largest problem in the Beirut deployment may be said to have been intelligence. In part, this problem reflected a larger issue--the overly complex command and control of American forces deployed to Beirut. It

also reflects the very serious deficiencies in intelligence organization, management, resources, and support appropriate to ground forces at the point of contact.

There was no shortage of intelligence collection assets in Beirut. Many U.S. and foreign organizations collected intelligence there. Among these institutions were (a) U.S. defense intelligence organizations, (b) U.S. civilian organizations, (c) host country military intelligence institutions, (d) host country civilian intelligence groups, (e) local friendly military intelligence, (f) local friendly civilian agencies, (g) MNF military and civilian organizations, and (h) other sources. This list suggests something of the bulk of intelligence collected in or about Lebanon, but only a small proportion of this intelligence was directly and immediately relevant to the USMNF. The quantity and diversity of intelligence collected also reflects the diversity of interests in the Lebanon problem. The foot soldier deployed on the ground in Beirut certainly did not command the highest priority in terms of the hard choices that had to be made about what to collect, what to watch, how to think about it, when to act on it, and so forth.

Organizations. U.S. military organizations included the USMNF itself, the Sixth Fleet, Fleet Marine Force, and related intelligence groups organically connected with the USMNF, as well as the defense attache's office (USDAO), Defense Intelligence Agency, and the office of military cooperation (OMC). Civilian organizations involved notably included CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA). Host country intelligence organizations included G-2 of the LAF, internal security, and general security. Within the presidential palace, a situation room staffed by LAF officers was established to maintain close tabs on the developing situation. Local friendly military intelligence included IDF intelligence, but during part of this period, U.S.-Israeli relations concerning Lebanon were not good, and divergent intentions and goals in Lebanon definitely reduced the value of U.S.-Israeli military intelligence connections, as well as straining management resources. Another friendly "military" intelligence source was Lebanese Forces (the predominant Christian militia) intelligence. Despite some highly competent people and contacts, the political weight on this source and its own commitment to support of its forces' rapidly deteriorating situation diminished its contribution and credibility. The remarks concerning IDF military intelligence also apply to Mossad, Israel's civilian agency, though the two were highly conflictive over Lebanon. Despite the sharp distinction between their analytical and emotional perspectives on Lebanon, the truth is that both had a long history of involvement in the country and both had considerable assets among the Lebanese.

The United States was not alone among MNF participants in collecting intelligence about Lebanon. All four contingents collected and processed the contact intelligence resulting from the contingents' patrolling, for example. All had intelligence support organizations offshore or relatively nearby. The civilian agencies of these powers must also be taken into account; the French, in particular, who have long been interested in Lebanon and who served as the mandatory power for the country from 1920 until 1943, have extensive intelligence assets and experience in the Levant. Particularly close ties exist between Lebanese Forces intelligence and French intelligence services, and between the latter and a number of private Lebanese well placed to provide useful data. Despite the absence of a joint command among MNF participants, there were facilities for sharing some intelligence. Photo-reconnaissance data were often shared with the French, for example, and all four contingents had a communications link. Regular intelligence exchange meetings were held. Yet, all parties believe that the

quantity of intelligence actually exchanged fell far short of the quantity available. Marines have often commented that journalists are particularly valuable sources of intelligence. This comment reflects less the access of journalists to otherwise unavailable information than the irrelevance of much of the official data provided to the individual Marine on the ground.

Sources of intelligence. Intelligence is produced by the target. Planning and committing a terrorist act generates intelligence. The real source of all intelligence is the source of the action. In the terrorist example, the planning will involve some communication with others; some organization and allocation of resources (whether human, financial, logistic, or other); and often some actions that reflect anticipated responses. All of these ingredients of action involve the production of intelligence. The intelligence problem is to collect the right information, organize it in meaningful patterns, interpret it in the right way, distribute it to the people who need to be aware of it, and do all this on a timely basis. In the vast array of data collected about terrorists in Lebanon, very little meets these tests.

Informers and observation were the main non-technological sources of intelligence. Several networks of clandestine sources existed, but most were only developing in the new West Beirut during the period the MNF was present. Informers and observation yielded extremely unsystematic pictures of what was taking place. Moreover, the mobilization of the Shi`a community created an infrastructure inherently resistant to the penetration necessary for informers or observation. Communications monitoring at the local and non-military level was conducted in Lebanon by Lebanese offices, but the product was not exploited in either an effective or a timely basis while the USMNF was deployed there. Marine headquarters at the airport was established in a four-story building whose flat roof provided an excellent observation post.

Types of intelligence. Types of intelligence were contact intelligence, human (HUMINT), communications (COMINT), electronic (ELINT), photographic (PHOTINT). U.S. resources in COMINT, ELINT, and PHOTINT were quite extensive in Lebanon. F-14 missions using target acquisition reconnaissance photography system (TARPS) were on half-hour alert, and the intelligence collected could be processed in less than 5 hours after the aircraft returned. (F-14 PHOTINT was also employed in support of the LAF and French MNF contingent.) In addition, several other services collected COMINT, ELINT, and PHOTINT. The results of naval shelling were, for example, observed by F-14s (while other aircraft provided cover). Reconnaissance flights were made for as much as a week before the heavy naval shelling. These types of intelligence are less valuable to the soldier than HUMINT is likely to be in an environment such as Lebanon. Given that the movement of large numbers of forces, of massive modern equipment, and of extensive support resources was not involved, the amount of light these high technology areas could shed on the situation for the USMNF was inherently limited. Unfortunately, U.S. HUMINT has been cut back quite significantly over the last decade in deference to high technology collection techniques. The Lebanese situation demonstrates the shortcomings of this approach.

HUMINT collection in Lebanon was further adversely affected by the *de facto* partition of the country. Despite the presence of the MNF and the embassy (before its destruction) in West Beirut, U.S. sources among the Muslim community became increasingly limited. The contact intelligence of the Marines on patrol, once an invaluable source, was cut off as a result of the decision to discontinue those patrols.

Priorities. The USMNF presence in Lebanon was a highly visible presence, but it was merely one of many U.S. presences in the country. The political commitment of the United States, and specific statements by the president, meant that a broad range of U.S. interests was involved. Consequently, the range of intelligence demands on U.S. assets was also broad, and those assets were tapped for political intelligence at all levels, for security information that covered an extremely broad range, and for a number of other purposes. With the vast quantities of data pouring in, and the diverse and numerous uses to which they needed to be put, it is little wonder that USMNF requirements could not be met on a timely basis. The weight of the U.S. effort was on larger issues than immediate physical security, and this is understandable, because the assets in which the United States was most advantaged were assets naturally or intentionally (in choice situations) oriented toward providing longer range and higher level support, not immediate physical security support.

Management. Management of intelligence about Lebanon was definitely a problem. We have already noted some management problems resulting from the quantity and diversity of data collected in contrast with the finite resources available to process them; and from the disjunction between USMNF physical security intelligence support requirements and broader requirements. Yet, certainly, the management of intelligence was also complicated by the number of different routes through which intelligence passed. Some intelligence that came to USMNF was derived from the DAO; some from the USMNF's own intelligence personnel; some from OMC; some from the Sixth Fleet; some from the European Command. Intelligence often skipped the first stage (USMNF) and went through numerous steps back to Washington before it was sent back to the field where it started, in Lebanon. Personnel in Beirut engaged in intelligence liaison functions were appalled and so stated to their foreign interlocutors at the extraordinary numbers of channels, actors, and services involved. Nowhere was it all put together.

Communications

USMNF had extensive communications contact with the U.S. intelligence community. Most communications were netted through the carrier battle group offshore which served as the base for the USMNF. Abundant messages arrived daily. Communications with non-U.S. sources were much more limited, and depended to a very large extent on the individual interactions of the commander, USMNF, with the Lebanese and with the other MNF contingent countries. These communications links were essentially human, although some direct communications links existed with Israel. Although the MAU intelligence unit had already noted with increasing frequency the growing terrorist threat, there was little responsiveness at higher levels to the terrorist threat to USMNF before the truck bomb attack on October 23.

Engineers

Although the engineers were not a major factor in the USMNF, their presence was evident in construction for the MNF contingent, in removing bombs and mines.

Police and Security

To remain carefully within the mission parameters of USMNF responsibilities, security external to the compound at BIA was the responsibility of the Lebanese government. Lebanese security had been relatively good against conventional types of threats, but proved no more adequate than U.S. security against the terrorist threat.

Civic Action

On February 20, 1983, the Marine headquarters responded to a Lebanese government request for help by sending nine amphibious tractors and other vehicles to the town of Qaraba, which had been isolated by a severe winter storm.

Tactics and Techniques

Active

The only active antiterrorist measures were patrolling. These patrols were not designed to be antiterrorist activities, however, since the USMNF was not intended to combat terrorism. The patrols were to maintain a level of visibility and to collect intelligence. Similarly, aerial overflights for intelligence purposes were really intended to collect intelligence about the conventional threat rather than the terrorist threat.

Passive

USMNF had no antiterrorist passive measures except those of physical security for the USMNF compound. This measure was particularly ineffective against terrorists because of the ROE, which prohibited keeping chambered rounds. Chambered rounds might have enabled the guards to divert the truck from its intended target, in the case of the attack on the Marine compound in October 1983. In different circumstances, chambered rounds might hasten the alerting of others in the compound to a threat. In the particular case of the bombing attack, however, killing the driver or forcing the truck to follow a different course might have had even worse results.[43]

EQUIPMENT

The Marines had an assortment of weapons and equipment. The most significant military capability was maintained with the presence of a task force of the Sixth Fleet offshore. The task force included enormous firepower from the battleship USS *New Jersey*, destroyers such as the USS *Bowen*, the frigate USS *John Rodgers*, the guided missile cruiser USS *Virginia*, and aircraft carriers such as the *Eisenhower*, *John F. Kennedy*, and the *Enterprise*. Each of the aircraft carriers carried nearly 100 combat aircraft capable of a variety of missions.

The immediate defenses of the USMNF were very light against any concerted terrorist attack. In part, this reflects the concentration on other threats. In part, it reflects the political determination to avoid untoward incidents and to rely on Lebanese Armed Forces for the physical security of the USMNF. The fact that cartridges were not allowed to be

authority demonstrates the concentration of command personnel on other threats and requirements.

Yet, it was not the awesome firepower of the fleet or the organic firepower of the MAU that was most useful in defending the USMNF against the terrorist threat; it was a vast array of intelligence equipment deployed among U.S. strategic and theater forces and assets; allied and friendly MNF forces; and local (Lebanese) forces. These assets were capable of collecting enormous quantities of threat-relevant intelligence on a real time basis. What they did not have was the capability to process and evaluate the data and transmit the analysis to the USMNF.

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[22]The 1970 battles between Lebanese security forces and those of the PLO are described in detail in Paul A. Jureidini and William E. Hazen, Six Clashes: An Analysis of the Relationship of the Palestinian Guerrilla Movement to the Governments in Jordan and Lebanon (Kensington, MD: American Institutes for Research, 1971). The 1973 battles are discussed in R.D. McLaurin, "Lebanon and Its Army: Past, Present, and Future," in Edward E. Azar et al., The Emergence of a New Lebanon: Fantasy or Reality? (New York: Praeger, 1984).

[23]The most detailed treatment of the fighting in Lebanon during this period is in Paul A. Jureidini et al., Military Operations in Selected Lebanese Built-up Areas, 1975-1978 (Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory, 1979). The best treatment of the role of Syria and of the involvement of Syria in Lebanese affairs during this period is contained in Annie Laurent and Antoine Basbous, Guerres secretes au Liban (Paris: Gallimard, 1987).

[24]This siege has been treated in R.D. McLaurin, The Battle of Zahle (Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory, 1986).

[25]The major urban battles have been analyzed in three studies by McLaurin: The Battle of Sidon (Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory, 1989); The Battle of Tyre (Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory, 1987); and The Battle of Beirut, 1982 (Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory, 1986). For military operations outside the cities, the best treatments are Zeev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), Richard Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee (New York: Hill and Wang, 1984), and Trevor N. Dupuy and Paul Martell, Flawed Victory: The 1982 War in Lebanon (Dunn Loring, VA: HERO Books, 1985).

[26]See Laurent and Basbous, Guerres; and the Kahane Report, the report of an Israeli government commission on the events in the refugee camps. The Kahane Report discusses the operational control of the IDF over certain LF units. One of the authors was present in Lebanon during some of these events.

[27]The best treatment of the Iranian and Syrian roles in Lebanon is in Laurent and Basbous, Guerres. The role of the Shi a community is described there and in Ghassan Tueni, Une Guerre pour les autres (Paris: Lattes, 1985); Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon (Ithaca: Cornell, 1986); Paul A. Jureidini and Ronald D. McLaurin, Political Change and Social Change in Lebanon (Alexandria, VA: Abbott Associates, 1983).

[28]See Laurent and Basbous, Guerres; Wadi D. Haddad, Lebanon: The Politics of Revolving Doors (New York: Praeger, 1985).

[28]See Laurent and Basbous, Guerres; Wadi D. Haddad, Lebanon: The Politics of Revolving Doors (New York: Praeger, 1985).

[29]Tueni, Une Guerre; Laurent and Basbous, Guerres; Haddad, Lebanon. The last source provides the best and most detailed account of the various negotiations involved, the author having served as the national security advisor to the Lebanese president.

[30]The Druze once dominated much of Lebanon, but their low fertility rate and the encroachment and growth of other communities made the Druze the smallest of Lebanon's major sects. The secretive and heterodox religious group seeks above all to preserve itself and therefore to prevent a strong central government that might further erode the autonomy of the Druze. Unlike the Maronites, Sunnis, of Shi a, the Druze do not occupy any of the main positions of Lebanese decision making and therefore fear that decisions contrary to their interests may be reached by a strong government.

[31]Amal leadership was more secular during this period than that of Islamic Amal. Moreover, Amal was under the strong influence of Syria, while Iran was at least as influential, if not more so, on Islamic Amal.

[32]See Paul A. Jureidini, unpublished paper presented at international conference on terrorism, Jerusalem, September 1985.

[33]The ROE provided to individual USMNF members (except those involved in embassy security functions, including the ambassador's residence) follows.

The mission of the Multi-national Force (MNF) is to keep the peace. The following rules of engagement will be read and fully understood by all members of the U.S. contingent of the MNF:

1. When on post, mobile or foot patrol, keep a loaded magazine in the weapon; weapons will be on safe, with no rounds in the chamber.

2. Do not chamber a round unless instructed to do so by a commissioned officer unless you must act in immediate self-defense where deadly force is authorized.

3. Keep ammunition for crew-served weapons readily available but not loaded in the weapon. Weapons will be on safe at all times.

4. Call local forces to assist in all self-defense efforts. Notify next senior command immediately.

5. Use only the minimum degree of force necessary to accomplish the mission.

6. Stop the use of force when it is no longer required.

7. If effective fire is received, direct return fire at a distinct target only. If possible, use friendly sniper fire.

8. Respect civilian property; do not attack it unless absolutely necessary to protect friendly forces.

9. Protect innocent civilians from harm.

10. Respect and protect recognized medical agencies such as Red Cross, Red Crescent, and so forth.

These rules of engagement will be followed by all members of the U.S. MNF unless otherwise directed.

[34]Specifically:

a. Any small boat/craft within the Beirut anchorage area must be assumed to be a potential terrorist threat until positively identified and shall not approach closer than 100 yards to any ship of the task force without the permission of the commanding officer of the unit.

b. Every attempt will be made to stop small craft from approaching U.S. Navy ships by friendly, nonforceful means.

c. If the approaching craft reaches 400 yards, notify ship's officer in charge, intercept with picket boat, challenge by using light or voice, warn away by loudspeaker, and illuminate by light.

d. If craft continues to approach to a distance of 300 yards despite warnings, call away security force, illuminate with searchlights, and attempt to fend off approaching craft with picket boat.

e. Craft approaching reaches 100 yards, activate fire hoses, load weapons, and fire warning shots in the air.

f. Craft approaching reaches 50 yards, engage with minimum force to prevent craft from closing farther. Deadly force will be used only as a last resort to protect the ship.

[35]No U.S. military force is designed, much less ideally suited, for static peace-keeping operations. The firepower of army forces generally exceeds that of Marines at similar unit levels, and Army logistics capabilities are designed to support forces ranging farther.

[36]How a single bullet could be fired from a machine gun, and how the Marine witnesses of the event could have known it was a machine gun instead of some other weapon are not reported. See Eric Hammel, The Root: The Marines in Beirut, August 1982-February 1984 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), p. 80.

[37]A Syrian intelligence officer (Lt. Col. Diab) in Lebanon planned the attacks. Nablan ash-Sheikh, a PLO officer belonging to the Syrian-supported dissident branch of the the PLO was the principal planner. He developed the concept and laid out the plans in Damascus a few days before the explosion. Two other Palestinians also in the Syrian-supported schismatic Fatah (the part of Fatah that split from Arafat's main branch with Syrian sponsorship) participated in Beirut planning as well. Two Syrian members of the Syrian-controlled "Palestinian" guerrilla group, Saiqa, participated in planning sessions in Beirut and may have provided some of the explosives. Wafiq Safa, the Shi'a who requested the explosives from Palestinian suppliers stated that the operation had been approved by Syria. Lebanese suppliers refused to provide the materiel, and Safa secured the explosives from the Syrian-supported Fatah group in the Palestinian area of Beirut. The truck used in

the bombing was provided by a cousin of Hussein Musawi, head of Islamic Amal, and the $50,000 payoff was also to a Musawi follower. The most detailed treatment of the background to the bombing is Bob Woodward et al., "Beirut Bombing: Political Warriors Used Men Who Crave Death," The Washington Post, February 1, 1984, p. A1.

[38]This force was withdrawn in August of the same year and replaced by other security personnel.

[39]Details are provided in Laurent and Basbous, Guerres du Liban.

[40]See Haddad, Lebanon, for details and examples.

[41]The hasty decision did not provide enough time to properly load the aircraft with bombs appropriate for the specific tactical mission. Aircraft consequently left only partially loaded and with the wrong ordnance. George A. Wilson, a Washington Post reporter who was on assignment aboard the carrier at the time of the bombing mission provides the most detailed portrait of this poorly managed strike in his superb book, Supercarrier (New York: Macmillan, 1986), chapters 10 to 11.

[42]The Pentagon insisted on launching the attack in the early morning hours, even though it is well known that aircraft attacking inland from the Mediterranean enjoy an important advantage in the afternoon when the sun partially "blinds" defenders.

[43]Members of the Long Commission have speculated to us that the power of the explosive force was so great that the compound building, by absorbing so much of the explosion, shielded the rest of the compound. They suggest that the enormous power of the bomb might have created even more damage and yielded even higher casualties if that power had not been absorbed so completely by the building in which the truck buried itself. We do not know whether this speculation is well grounded.

CHAPTER VII

FINDINGS

POLITICAL, LEGAL, AND STRATEGIC FACTORS

Each of these cases manifests unique political circumstances. Important political choices were available to antiterrorists in all cases, however. The survival and victory of terrorists over antiterrorist elements appears to reflect at least to some degree the realism and candor with which the latter address the serious problems they face, whatever their nature. The French in Algeria made tactically correct assessments and decisions and took tactically correct actions. These administrative decisions did not produce an overall victory, however. In Uruguay, too, a tactical victory for the antiterrorist forces can hardly be considered an overall victory, since the cost was Uruguayan democracy. At the same time, the wrong tactics are even more certain to produce defeat, as U.S. behavior in Lebanon demonstrates clearly. Military losses are very difficult to translate into political victories. Only the British in Northern Ireland, among our four cases, appear to have seized upon the proper balance between military and political exigencies and to have played both well. Yet, it is instructive that the Northern Ireland case continues, while the others have been resolved, even if unfavorably.

The resort to terrorist tactics is almost always linked to an unfavorable balance of physical resources.[44] This fact suggests that the antiterrorist commands a significant advantage from the outset. The terrorist chooses his tactics with reason, and his choice probably reveals much of his strategy. An effective response in terms of the challenge, however, may not be a politically effective response in terms of public opinion or national political requirements on a greater scale. This is precisely the dilemma that the terrorist tries to exploit if he chooses terrorist tactics to compel an overreaction. The government in this case must recognize the terrorist strategy and prepare active measures to resist it. Such measures will usually involve substantial communications to educate the public about the dilemma and about the options available to the government. While individuals have made such attempts, there is a systematic pattern of government noncompliance with this requirement. Among the four cases studied here, only the British government in Northern Ireland successfully communicated the necessity of tolerance to the public, that is, to the victims of terror, and to its troops.

It is clear that the terrorist attempts to exploit, particularly in open societies, the communications channels to the public. "Terrorism is theater." The terrorist communicates in his acts, and by the extreme nature of his acts tries to drive government responses in specific directions. All four cases reflect this reality. Statements made by the terrorists in all four cases were designed to assist the local audiences or the home audiences to "interpret" this propaganda of the deed "correctly," that is, as the terrorists wished. These channels enable him to "play" the public against the government and to force the government to undertake precisely the kinds of actions that it must avoid (namely, overreaction and vacillation) and to appear indecisive and ineffective.

The size of most terrorist groups and their conspiratorial organizational structure make them ideal agents to exploit and manipulate

mass media. By contrast, the size and diversity of government in open societies make it a much better victim than manipulator. It is subject to pressure from foreign elements as well as domestic groups; it is composed of constituents at odds with each other; it is inclined to subordinate strategic objectives to bureacratic goals, like any large organization. The United States in Lebanon was unable to formulate and carry through a consistent policy toward terrorist actions primarily as a result of discord within the administration. France experienced a civil war over the Algerian question, and opinion in the United Kingdom was very divided over a number of the security actions of the British government. The lack of consensus in Uruguay behind increasingly vigorous antiterrorist policies led to the erosion of democratic freedoms there.

In each of the four cases, the terrorist group made a conscious effort to influence the public most directly associated with the primary threat to its success, even if that threat was not native. The FLN established offices specifically to provide propaganda for French (and other foreign) journalists and authors. It maintained close and effective contact with influential writers in France, including many who had an important impact on the nature of the public debate over French policy in Algeria. The IRA had a smaller organization and fewer resources to devote to the issue, but has nevertheless worked closely with civil rights and other organizations to influence British opinion in England as well as Catholic opinion in Ulster. Likewise, the opponents of the American presence engaged themselves in the debates in the United States, and established new public relations organizations to do so. Closely following the debates in this country, the terrorists and their sponsors understood that a great number of casualties would make it impossible for the executive branch to retain legislative support.

The irony of the media manipulation is that the government becomes isolated instead of the terrorists who by their actions, politics, and numbers are the more likely candidates for isolation. Isolating terrorists from support is necessary but is less likely to be sufficient than isolating guerrillas from such support. Terrorism can continue at a very low level for a long time, for years if there is an enduring grievance or a deeply entrenched dispute (such as identity disputes of a religious or ethnic nature, e.g., Ulster). Because terrorism requires so much less activity and and so many fewer resources, it is less disposed to termination through isolation.

The psychological elements of terrorism have played a greater role in policy than is generally recognized, if our cases are representative. It is common knowledge that terrorism is a highly emotional phenomenon and that indeed it is precisely that emotional element that the terrorist tries to exploit. Yet, in all four of our cases, particularly in the three unfavorable outcomes (defeat of the Tupamaros in Uruguay cannot be divorced from the change of regime there), the use of terrorism has created problems for the terrorists, but has been an asset for them since it has created far more problems for the government.

Moreover, government antiterrorism policy in two cases was raised to dominate larger strategic issues, generating even greater psychological opportunities for terrorists. In Montevideo and Beirut, and to a great extent even in Algiers, the obsession with combatting terrorism pushed the government into acts and postures that visibly alienated the population in the first case and made the government and its supporters more vulnerable in the second. In Algiers, the systematic and comprehensive program mounted by

the government compensated effectively for the initial offense to the indigenous population of penetrative French antiterrorist programs.

The appeals of terrorist groups face enormous hurdles. The norms of every society are strongly hostile to terrorism. Only the government is in a position to make terrorist appeals plausible, to give terrorist appeals importance and acceptability, to provide the justification for accepting the rationale of terrorists. Too often, governments fail in their communicative duties and provide terrorist groups precisely those benefits. While the degree varied, to some extent failures produced this result in all four cases studied.

Government institutions and structures perceived to be legitimate can be an important factor, but only if they play an active rather than a passive role in maintaining legitimacy. Terrorist groups challenge the status quo. If institutions of society can be made to look as if they are defending a static and unjust status quo, they will be bent to the terrorists' ends, as in Lebanon. It is the duty of government to ensure that institutions developed to make society responsive are reviewed and reformed so that they are responsive to human needs. This is not a function of terrorism; it is a requirement of social survival. But terrorist threats telescope the process of struggle.

The level of effectiveness of existing legal and security structures is a factor. Institutions that have never been particularly effective in preserving public order, but have simply not been challenged before, must be re-assessed to determine the value of their preservation. The British seriously assessed and re-assessed the effectiveness and potential of the various security forces and legal institutions in Ulster. To their credit, the British appear to have reached correct conclusions as to the ability and potential of these institutions.

Leadership in a struggle against a well-rooted terrorist group such as the Algerian FLN is critical. Divided leadership or leadership struggles are a great boon to terrorist organizations. At the same time, this factor may be much less important in less well-rooted terrorist organizations. It is the necessity to uproot the firmly based that drives the requirement; if no such firm base exists, the diversity characteristic of open societies' leadership is not necessarily bad. This again is the difference between insurgency, which must have deep roots if it is to provide any significant and enduring challenge, and terrorism, which may be shallow and still survive as a nuisance for a long while.

The Beirut case illustrates the fact that low intensity conflicts have gathered momentum in recent years because they have been a low cost option by foreign supporters. Terrorism with clandestine, often very indirect, government support is a major challenge. To develop strategies aimed at eliminating such options is probably a waste of time. Rather, containment of the problem makes more sense and is probably much more feasible. Most important is the accurate assessment of the local and foreign components of the terrorist movement, because each requires distinct strategic and tactical treatment. This is not an easy assessment to make, for antiterrorist forces commonly overestimate the foreign involvement in domestic terrorist activities. The French fell victim to this syndrome in Algeria, as did the Uruguayan government for a period in Uruguay, and the United States never correctly understood the relationship between Syria and various Lebanese groups in Lebanon. These errors can divert scarce resources and pervert planning objectives.

The rights of individuals and the ability of the state to take security action that restricts or compromises those rights vary enormously from one country to the next. Among the cases considered in this study, British practices recognized substantial limitations of government security actions, but once emergency regulations were passed, the protection of individual rights was ensured within the judicial system, where it remained an active concern. In Algeria, by contrast, civil rights were frequently, almost systematically at times, violated by national authority. The Tupamaro case demonstrates sharp fluctuations in civil rights but extraordinary leniency in official penal practices. At various times, nearly all recognized leaders of the Tupamaros were in prison. Under the liberal prison systems, they continued to act as cohesive groups, however, making policy statements and writing position papers. Extensive liberties existed in Uruguayan jails.

Emergency regulations have been used in most cases to overcome legal restrictions of government action against individuals. Terrorists consistently use government security actions as means to mobilize the public against the government, frequently citing legal changes as evidence of antidemocratic values, intentions, or behavior. In three of the cases studied, terrorists endeavored to provoke government reactions that would alienate the public. Thus, there is a careful, sensitive balance to be struck between the need for efficiency and the need to retain or secure public support.

In most of the cases considered in this study, some emergency powers were employed. The relationship between emergency powers as a group and effectiveness is not clear from our studies, however, and even individual powers do not adhere to any readily discernible pattern of effectiveness. Table 6 demonstrates the case.

Table 6

Emergency Provision in the Four Cases[a]

PROVISION	ALGERIA	ULSTER	URUGUAY	BEIRUT
Compulsory ID papers	x		x	x
Weapons control	x	x	x	
Interrogation without charges	x	x	x	
House searches without warrant	x	x	x	
Curfews	x	x	x	
Special courts	x	x	x	
Detention without trial	x	x	x	
Increased penalties	x	x	x	
Restricted assembly rights	x	x	x	
Banning of organizations	x	x	x	
Censorship	x		x	
Collective punishment				

[a]These categories of provisions are derived from Christopher Hewitt, "The Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorist Policies," unpublished study prepared for the U.S. Department of State, 1982. We have added the data for Beirut and Algiers.

Target selection by terrorists of security forces personnel varies but is always careful. In some cases, the terrorists believe they have public support for attacks on security force personnel as individuals either because the government is not legitimate to the public (Algiers); or because the security forces are seen as a repressive institution closely tied to a particular regime (Uruguayan police); or because the forces are deemed culturally hostile (Beirut). In other cases, attacks on these personnel as individuals are considered unacceptable in the culture (Northern Ireland) and are avoided.

In most cases, terrorists seek to cultivate and subvert some element or individuals within the security forces, often for intelligence reasons. Among our cases, only in Beirut was this not a factor. In instances of ethnic or cultural conflict, when penetration of the security force is especially difficult, it may not be tried.

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

The importance of an integrated and cohesive effort against terrorist groups is central to success, as experienced senior British officials have recognized and tried to ensure in Ulster. At the same time, the proper locus of decision for military operations is less clear. The American experience in Beirut reinforces through negative example the other three cases; local decisions taken by personnel on the ground are imperative, as far as military operations are concerned. It is impractical to try to conduct an antiterrorist campaign from thousands of miles away, and it is time we take note of the very significant degree to which senior levels of command distant from the field of battle can now communicate with the field in lower intensity conflict environments, with disastrous results. Despite the differences between intense and low intensity conflicts, military operations should be determined by local commanders once the basic political or strategic decisions are made and communicated to responsible officers near the scene.

The progress of communications and visual technologies has been marshalled by advanced states to yield extraordinary amounts of intelligence. Unfortunately, the intelligence collected has reached the proportions where management of it overwhelms command. Intelligence for combat terrorist groups is particularly troublesome, because the groups tend to be small while intelligence indicators necessary to sense, identify, and destroy them may be absurdly large. The efforts to which the French went in Algeria to produce the appropriate types of intelligence yielded what the French commanders wished, but produced a public reaction that accelerated the political loss. Management of the American effort in Beirut was hampered by an almost unbelievable proliferation of intelligence channels from multiple international sources.

TACTICS

Combat Functions

It is reassuring to insist upon military solutions to terrorism in cities, because we understand that there are sound military principles and we know that we have a significant military capability. Unfortunately, it is misleading to insist upon the military aspect of antiterrorist policy as the point of departure or even to insist upon force (so often and so incorrectly described as "the only thing the terrorists understand") as the initial element in any response to urban terrorism. Even in urban terrorism directed against military forces in noncombat roles (e.g., Lebanon), force is not the main means to combat the problem.

We restate the premise we have indicated throughout this study: Terrorism is a tactic. To respond effectively to this tactic, it must be seen in its larger context. This is not unique to terrorism; it is central to any rational response to military (or other) tactics. To react with force from the misguided notion that terrorists respond only to such language, a notion dangerously at odds with the facts (terrorists seek and usually benefit from forceful reactions, if those responses are not carefully gauged), is ironic. Terrorists, or at least senior personnel in terrorist groups, are generally highly rational, and by provoking violent spasms they make us the "irrational" users of violence. The overreaction of *colons* and for a time of Algerian officials to terrorist provocations assisted in FLN recruitment and in driving a wedge between the European and Muslim populations.

Military operations against terrorism, like those against any other security threat, must be designed around a comprehensive and accurate appreciation of the strategic and tactical situation. Such an appreciation must consider (a) the nature and extent of foreign support and sponsorship; (b) the nature, extent, and type of local support; (c) the representativeness of the political views, values, and objectives of the terrorist group; (d) the rootedness of the terrorist infrastructure; (e) the nature of the social and political structure and of national political and social institutions; (f) the popular perceptions of the incumbent administration; (g) the popular views of political, economic, and social institutions; (h) the strategy and tactics of the terrorist group; (i) the resources available to the incumbent.

Typical of low intensity conflict situations, the emphasis in antiterrorist operations must be on areas such as intelligence, covert operations, civic action, and psychological operations. To the extent the terrorist problem is linked to an urban insurgency problem, infantry units among the armed forces will certainly play a role of some importance. But the terrorist leaders and structures themselves, as divorced from larger subversive activities, will generally fall within the short-term range of the police and depend in the longer term on the types of activities we have indicated above.

Support Functions

Intelligence

Undoubtedly, intelligence has consistently been the single most important military element of urban antiterrorism operations for both

offensive and defensive measures. In all four cases studied, intelligence played a critical role in both successes and failures. The development of a whole range of new technologies has materially contributed to active and passive government intelligence capabilities, but these are secondary in nature. We can see and hear the terrorists better. We can collect information about the terrorists better. But these techniques do not help prevent the development of clandestine groups. This remains a political requirement.

Not surprisingly, the most recent case demonstrated the problems associated with new intelligence technologies. Management of intelligence for use against terrorist groups has been complicated by these technological developments. The massive data handling and collecting capabilities at the disposal of antiterrorist forces may be a blessing, but it is surely not a blessing if the quantity is allowed to reduce rather than increase the flow of real-time intelligence to operating field forces. Recent technologies may have sufficient impact so that when multiple sources of intelligence are involved, new administrative procedures are developed to ensure more responsive application to the immediate military situation.

Despite the advantages of the armed forces in many areas of the struggle against terrorism, police forces often have important advantages in intelligence. They are permanent parts of the scene in the urban area, and therefore often develop friends and sources of information that the more transient military forces do not. They are organized to collect information relevant to the types of activities characterized by urban terrorism, whereas typical military staff intelligence arms are organized, equipped, and trained to focus mainly on conventional combat intelligence. Although police are sometimes on better terms with the populace than the military, and are seen as less political, this is not always the case. Sometimes criteria for selection are such that police are under-educated, poorly trained, and poorly motivated. Moreover, assuming a military deployment and assuming opposition of at least one party to that deployment, operating elements of the armed forces have a requirement to conduct their own contact intelligence for physical security purposes.

Like urban counterinsurgency intelligence, urban intelligence relevant to antiterrorism is of a fundamentally different type than that traditionally collected, analyzed, disseminated, and used by the armed forces. In this case, the most useful intelligence concerns individuals and non-tangibles (organizations, roles, activities, financial arrangements, power and leadership responsibilities), rather than classic military intelligence that focuses on collection and assessment of military assets and capabilities.

By the nature of these intelligence priorities, it is evident that they are best collected from people. Overhead photographic support can be of some assistance, but the bulk of the most valuable data is necessarily that which can only be supplied by people. Whether those sources come from inside the insurgent organization, the incumbent must protect them if they are to be exploited.

Human sources of intelligence include agents and informers, of course, but they will usually be innocent citizens, often reporting information they do not see as sensitive. The presence in a modern city opens a wide range of data sources to security forces: credit records, criminal justice records, personnel files, educational and health data, insurance records, telephone records, bills, employment data, hotel registers, and refuse. Both the French in Algeria and the British in Ulster appear to have had a clearer,

more concrete, and more innovative eye to the exploitation of these data sources than either the Uruguayans or the Americans in Montevideo or than the Americans or Lebanese in Beirut. The Long Commission criticisms of U.S. human inteligence appear well grounded.

Communications

Communications can play an important role in the antiterrorist struggle. To date, active communications policies have focused heavily on sterile concepts of "propaganda" and only barely on more sophisticated ideas about motivation and mobilization. This narrow approach to communications is completely inadequate.

Communications is the field of battle of terrorists. They have chosen communications because modern mass media constitute a powerful ally (almost always unwilling) of terrorist groups. Each of the four terrorist groups had a conscious policy to communicate through action or word to a large audience. Yet, the media need not be an ally. Active government policies to assist the media in accurate portrayal of terrorist actions in their real context are essential. A full understanding of the role of the media in terrorist strategy is no less essential, both for the media and for security forces. Since it is in the interest of neither to support terrorist objectives, this understanding can lead to a greater cooperation. It is no more reasonable to expect media personnel to subvert their own values to cooperate with the security forces than it is to expect security forces to compromise their objectives for such cooperation. Active policies of communication that see both sectors working together depend on mutual respect and an understanding of overall social values. The French in Algiers were able to develop a partial relationship along these lines, but the diverse audiences impeded effective cooperation. They certainly never succeeded in developing such a relationship in France. By contrast, the British have been substantially more successful in Great Britain, and to some extent in Ulster.

Communications strategy does not depend on mass media alone. Terrorist groups are clandestine organizations with their own patterns of communications. If the openness of an open society's communications patterns can be exploited, the secrecy of a clandestine society's patterns can also be exploited. Terrorist communications techniques usually involve couriers and mail drops in situations where the government has begun to actively combat the group. This communications process in cities opens a range of possibilities, since inevitably <u>some</u> communications channels are compromised. At times, governments choose to remain quiet about the discoveries and to trace the connections made through surveillance of the communications process. On other occasions, the government uses its penetration to produce defectors and even to re-insert them as turncoats. In yet other cases, government penetration permits the introduction of false messages into the communications system, messages designed to produce dissension, errors, or further compromises. French actions in Algiers demonstrated the effectiveness of this wide range of initiatives.

Tactics and Techniques

Active

The most common active tactic in terrorist situations is patrolling. Yet, the value of patrolling is not self-evident. When terrorist attacks are

inevitable, patrols have a certain preventive effect. When social tension is high, armed forces contribute to the tension rather than to relaxing it, and patrols may generate violence instead of reducing it. Given that violence often builds its own momentum, this generation may significantly hinder reduction of the terrorist threat.

This is not to say that patrols are not a reasonable and important form of security precaution. In addition to their deterrent and disruptive potential, they are a source of valuable intelligence. They may play an important role, depending on the situation. But patrols can be a negative as well as a positive factor.

Population protection is a major element of urban antiterrorism. The ability to protect defectors, to protect administrative and community leaders, and, in the struggle with a well-developed movement, to protect the population from intimidation, lies at the heart of the government effort. Population protection and control measures (such measures as previously described and used notably by France in Algeria) are essential to intelligence operations, and to rapid exploitation of intelligence in operations against the terrorist leadership. In our cases in which defectors and agents played a role, protection of the individuals and their families was critical to success. When security forces are unable to assure such protection, the contribution of such operations to success will be something less than its potential.

Population control presents a major problem in societies with democratic traditions. In addition to the logistical and administrative problems of creating and managing effective systems, such systems may alienate public opinion which can find them oppressive and totalitarian. The French imposed the system in Algeria because they cared little for the opinions of the Algerian masses and because there was no alternative. Less oppressive systems in Uruguay and Ulster could have provoked greater concern, but the governments were able to overcome the issue with force in the one case, with substitute safeguards and assurances in the other.

Population control and protection systems involve identification documentation (usually a photographic ID with other material, a duplicate of which is retained by security organizations and can be used for police work) and control mechanisms such as the *ilot* system used in Algiers. Modern technology provides computer support systems that hasten the data management task, and the control element is imperative given the difficulty of surveillance and observation in the urban environment. Oppressive as the mechanisms may be, effective operation will reduce the level of violence and therefore protect the economic interests as well as the physical property and lives of the residents.

Most autonomous (i.e., not puppets of a foreign government) terrorist organizations are relatively small. They are frequently dominated by one or two charismatic personalities. Elimination of the leadership and penetration of the group have been the two tactics with the most devastating results (e.g., Algiers, Ulster, Montevideo).

Passive

In all cases, passive systems were employed against urban terrorists. These passive approaches included reinforcements of security force installations, detection systems, checkpoints, and barriers.

Technological developments continue to provide a wide range of passive systems to assist in the antiterrorist campaign, from improved body armor for individual soldiers to improved detection and detonation systems for explosives. These developments are individually and collectively useful, but because the terrorist has the initiative, he can always change targets. It is easily demonstrable that all targets cannot be protected. The terrorist has a literally infinite range of immediate victim. He can choose from a wide range of persons and property, since it is he who articulates the symbolic relationship of the victim with the real target. He has the initiative. If 250 targets are protected, he moves to target 251, and in many respects the attack itself makes target 251 much more important and meaningful than it would have been otherwise. Thus, it is demonstrably impossible to provide perfect protection. This is the fundamental flaw of a policy dominated by passive tactics for dealing with <u>significant</u> terrorist threats.

At the same time, such a policy is acceptable for handling marginal terrorist threats. Since it is manifestly impossible to prevent all terrorist attacks, a certain level of terrorist violence should be expected and accepted. The only effective means to end terrorist attacks is to do what the terrorist wishes--allow him to push us into a more totalitarian society. Uruguay brought an end to terrorism by bringing an end to democracy. By contrast, an open society such as Britain's can tolerate some violence, since extremists will garner only little support when the public has no overwhelming grievance against the government.

EQUIPMENT

Equipment development in antiterrorism was not a primary consideration in three of the cases. In only one was a high priority placed on equipment R & D. In that case (Ulster) British officers have indicated they did feel the investment in antiterrorist technology paid handsome dividends at the tactical level. Even in that case, the appreciation of the investment arose several years after it began.

Optics and bomb detonation technologies have made signal contributions to active tactics. Advances in automated data processing have had perhaps a greater impact in their support of intelligence and unobtrusive data collection operations. Detection technologies have supported passive operations, but these have not come as far.

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[44]The exception involves a government that is extremely unpopular and must resort to terrorism to deter opposition from associating.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

POLITICAL, LEGAL, AND STRATEGIC FACTORS

As we have seen in each of the four cases in this study, political, legal, and strategic factors generally govern the resort to terrorism, whether by outside or domestic forces in society. If the government enjoys great popular support, terrorism is a common tactic chosen to force the government into unpopular actions that will isolate it from that support. Terrorism may be used against unpopular governments to stir general discontent which may well be focused on that unpopular government. Thus, the political circumstances do not dictate whether opposition elements will resort to terrorism but rather for what reason and therefore the type of terrorism.

Terrorist groups that are able to receive support from foreign governments in any significant degree can be stopped with only the greatest difficulty unless the umbilical cord linking them to that outside support has been cut. The United States and Lebanon were never able to begin to cut foreign support for Lebanese terrorist groups, nor was any beginning made toward defeating those groups. Foreign governments sponsor terrorist groups for a variety of reasons, but such indirect warfare is invaluable if allowed to persist. Any actions designed to prevent terrorism that do not effectively block significant foreign support are doomed to fail from the outset. There was never a chance to limit terrorism in Lebanon as long as Syria and Iran were allowed to continue to support it at will. Whatever else the government of Lebanon and the governments assisting Beirut accomplished or might have accomplished, they had no chance to prevent the growth of terrorist groups without physically interdicting or otherwise preventing Syrian and Iranian assistance. By contrast, whatever resources France and Britain devoted to the internal terrorist problem in Algiers and Ulster, they never allowed these activities to detract from the maximum feasible isolation of the terrorists from outside sources of support. In the Algiers case, this was effective isolation; in the Ulster case, much less effective. In both cases, isolation was at least effective enough to prevent a foreign government from using terrorist options to wage indirect war. The Irish government understood that the British reaction to the efforts Dublin would have to undertake to overcome British measures would be extreme and far more costly than any conceivable benefit. The Egyptians were never as intimately involved in Algeria as the Irish were with their co-religionists in Ulster. Nevertheless, the powerful French reaction (including the ill-fated Suez affair) persuaded the Egyptians to proceed with some caution, as it did the Moroccans and Tunisians in their support of the FLN.

We do not suggest that the effort to isolate terrorists from foreign support is only or even necessarily primarily a military activity. It is preferable that the terrorist be isolated through external political relations. The security burden on the armed forces is much more difficult in isolating terrorists than it is in isolating insurgents, because a much greater level of support is required for an active insurgency. Terrorists need relatively little to disrupt public life and create political and psychological pressure. Isolation is probably more important for political than it is for security reasons. A terrorist group operating on its own

behalf is inherently different from one operating on behalf of another country's interests. Strategies appropriate to neutralizing the one are quite different from those appropriate to destroying the other. In any case, to the degree that borders cannot be secured and contacts continue, the responsibility to disrupt terrorist links with foreign sponsors, just like other disruptive activities against purely domestic terrorist groups, may shift increasingly to intelligence and special operations elements. In this case, overseas actions such as the French used in the Algerian case may also be required.

Open societies are inherently much more vulnerable to terrorism, as to any subversive activity. Their media may be exploited along with their freedoms. Moreover, the institutions of such societies are often the main goal of the terrorist group; it seeks to provoke a government reaction that will at once destroy the same institutions that protect the public and the terrorists, for the terrorist understands that those institutions <u>are</u> the society and once destroyed, take with them the legitimacy of the government. The more ideologically oriented or foreign-dependent the group, the more acceptable self-destruction is in accomplishing the objective.

The legal institutions of civil liberties in democratic states are, at base, institutions that provide rights <u>against</u> the state. This fact results from the tradition in which such liberties were established, usually in struggle against authoritarianism. Consequently, these institutions are perceived and often treated in law as dichotomous, even though a very great continuum is potentially available and has been extensively if unsystematically developed in most legal systems. In the three relevant cases studied here, France and Britain both developed significant modifications of legal traditions, and in the British case, particularly modifications that recognized legitimate rights.

Emergency exceptions to legal protections have a number of characteristics. In addition to limiting the protections exploited by subversive organizations, they usually also articulate continuing restrictions. These are important in providing means to rally public support behind the government. It is useful to identify the most important symbols and values of the political order and to find means of preserving those symbols and values, even indirectly, to mobilize public support. Legal ambiguity can provide new powers to government and yet preserve social goods.

Abuses of authority and illegal use of violence by security forces must be minimized. Security forces provide proper channels for internal discipline, and these channels should be rigorously exercised. In some cases, governments in our studies publicized punitive action toward violators. Terrorists characteristically seek to exploit abuses and derive benefits from publicity attaching to the abuses to alienate the public from the security forces and to build dissension within those forces. The alternative is vigorous discipline within the system.

In Ulster, terrorists used legal demonstrations and public unrest to draw security forces into situations in which they could be attacked in the hope that the security force response would be an overreaction, further alienating the terrorist constituency, mobilizing it in support of the terrorist group, and de-legitimizing the government. Governments in emergency situations must take care to monitor preparations for demonstrations, to rigidly enforce prohibitions against weapons at such demonstrations, and if necessary, to ban all assemblies.

Public institutions must demonstrate sensitivity to legitimate public grievances. Such action can help divorce the terrorists from their potential public base, neutralizing their appeal and their strategies. In this respect, democratic, open societies have some distinct advantages over their closed, authoritarian counterparts, for the airing of public grievances in and of itself provides some guidance to public officials.

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

Organizational problems relating to purely terrorist or primarily terrorist threats are of secondary importance. When terrorism is part of a well-rooted insurgency, however, organizational issues may be decisive. Division of responsibility for active insurgency operations is dangerous.

There is no "right" or "wrong" organization for combating urban terrorism. British preference for police forces' responsibility has some merit, but cannot be applied in all cases. In principle, police responsibilities for law and order in cities are preferable to armed forces operations, but the level of public support or tolerance of terrorist groups, or the degree to which geographical and other factors facilitate terrorist enforced compliance on elements of the public, or the relative competence and integrity of the police force will certainly be important considerations in determining the roles of the police and armed forces. As the threat recedes to a question of law enforcement, police presence and responsibility are psychologically and politically preferable, and police methods inherently more appropriate.

Trends toward the bureaucratization of military command and control and of armed forces operations generally are worsened by the low intensity nature of terrorist threat scenarios, particularly in cases when the terrorist threat is <u>not</u> part of a nationwide and highly visible insurgency or opposition movement. This distancing of command from the immediate area of operations and layering of responsibility produce highly inefficient and unresponsive conditions in which to exercise military power. These are precisely the conditions in which terrorist groups can prosper. They cannot compete with efficient military and security institutions, but their size and clandestine nature benefit enormously from sluggishness, short-sightedness, and shifting foci, all of which typify the process of bureaucratization of the military function. There is no better example of this problem than in the American chain of command in Beirut.

TACTICS

Modern developments in armed forces have not necessarily been conducive to the struggle against terrorists. Technologies that have added to the quantity of intelligence, that have increased firepower, that have produced larger and faster weapons may have made more negative contributions than positive ones. The terrorist is essentially a criminal, and terrorist groups are in many respects "organized crime." Untimely intelligence is not useful. Quantities of intelligence that cripple efficiency are counterproductive. Bureaucratic trends in armed forces development offer many potential benefits to small conspiratorial groups like terrorists.

The main activity used by antiterrorist forces was patrolling. Yet, patrolling appears to have been of mixed value. Although patrols asserted government presence and to some degree precluded the sense or reality of terrorist territorial control, they provoked confrontations, often confrontations that would not otherwise have occurred and were only marginally related to the security threat.

Another activity practiced in three of the cases (Algiers, Ulster, and Montevideo) was house-to-house searches. These searches netted few weapons but alienated large numbers of people. In general, the smaller and more specific the search (small, individual searches generally resulted from specific intelligence leads), the greater its relative yield and the less it alienated the public.

These cases suggest that the keys to effective antiterrorist operations are (a) a proper understanding of the relationship of the terrorist tactic to the user's overall strategy; (b) isolation of the terrorist from external support if he has been receiving it; (c) development of effective intelligence operations, generally emphasizing HUMINT; (d) development of a strategy to neutralize the terrorist movement through elimination of its leadership, penetration of its infrastructure, insertion of disruptive elements, or some combination of the three; and (e) reasonable passive defenses. All four cases provide good and bad examples of some of these points, but only in Algiers do we find extensive application of all these conclusions.

Terrorist groups in all four of our cases sought to use psychological tools as a force multiplier to overcome their disadvantages in firepower and support. Targets were chosen to erode the credibility of the government as legitimate or effective, as able to protect its citizens or project its power. These are communications themes that, if the target is well chosen, need not even be articulated. To respond to this psychological strategy, government psychological operations programs were developed and employed in Algiers, Ulster, and Montevideo. Even without comprehensive planning, a number of tactics were used that are typical of urban terrorist situations. For example, in Beirut, where no comprehensive psychological strategy was developed, one of the reasons for which the rules of engagement of American forces were presumed was to reduce the possibility of the use of deadly force by American military personnel against innocent Lebanese. This concern reflects a main psychological problem faced by all military forces deployed in urban environments--the fear that accidental killings may antagonize the population. Similarly, the "no-go" areas in Ulster were designated partly to reduce British casualties, partly to reduce the potential for bloody confrontations in which civilians would surely be victimized. A non-exhaustive list of psychological and communications activities in the four cases designed to avoid alienating the population by avoiding adverse media coverage includes the following:

Activity	Case(s)
Develop thorough PSYOP strategy	Algiers
Cultivate cooperative media relations (briefings, etc.)	Ulster, Beirut
Centralize information	Uruguay
Operations stress justice, reform	Uruguay
Off-limits (no-go) areas	Ulster
Rules of engagement	Ulster, Beirut
Strict law enforcement (versus abuses)	Ulster
Humanize victim	Uruguay
Control of media	Uruguay

The importance of the media (of communications) in legitimizing terrorist claims cannot be overemphasized. It does not appear from our cases that any single policy or strategy can be used by the government to counteract this strategy. In part, this reflects the idiosyncracies of individual cases. Some have argued, for example, that the ability to influence or control the media would have no impact in cases of state-sponsored terrorism, since the government supporting the terrorists would presumably be unaffected by this change. The Beirut case suggests that this logic is faulty. While it is clear that U.S. media would not have influenced Syria, Syria was endeavoring to influence the American public. A more effective media strategy, to the extent it prevented Syria from driving a wedge between the public and the executive branch, could certainly have had some influence on the outcome of the Beirut case, since it was public and Congressional opposition to the policy that prevented the executive branch from giving the military a freer hand.

Governments often call for cease-fires or truces in terrorist situations. Cease-fires and truces do not appear to have been very helpful to the realization of the government's interests. Short truces were generally ineffective (which is why they were short); long-term cease-fires were exploited by the terrorist groups (as in the Ulster case).

The importance of the role of special operations forces in a number of the activities deemed key to effective antiterrorist operations is apparent. Many of the activities of the only fully successful military operation among the four cases, Algiers, are essentially special operations. Conducted by the elite units of the French army, these actions were critical to the victory in the Battle of Algiers. In Ulster, British SAS units have played a small but key role in the overall strategy, particularly in more active and violent efforts to reduce the size and cohesion of the IRA. U.S. Special Operations forces and foreign counterparts played an overly limited role in Beirut until the situation was already uncontrollable. Subsequent activities have been instituted as tactical in nature, and have therefore contributed very little to re-establishing order.

One of the main vulnerabilities of terrorist groups is their communication systems. Terrorist groups are naturally sensitive about security, and, as the Algiers case showed, false indications of treachery can produce a significant level of paralysis and self-mutilation into these groups.

While the abundance of intelligence data types and the growth in the quantity of intelligence data available to contemporary military officers constitute significant problems, in our view, for the management of military

operations against small terrorist forces, important new sources of intelligence data should be integrated as soon as possible into standard military intelligence processes for terrorist contingencies. Data about automobiles, residence interiors, traffic patterns, and the like are all manageable with computer support. It is imperative, however, that data management tasks be placed at appropriate levels and that operating forces not be inundated with strategic data at the expense of the tactical information they require, while strategic planners are caught in a snare of detailed information irrelevant to their needs. Among recent cases (computers were not in widespread use for this type of data management at the time of the Battle of Algiers), the British appear to have best organized and managed their intelligence support.

Intelligence organization may take a number of forms, but effective exploitation of intelligence and the most aggressive approach to deploying intelligence assets probably argue in favor of a substantial degree of unity of intelligence assets, at least among the regular armed forces if the terrorist movement has deep or broad roots.

Defensive preparations to protect the security forces and important institutions and installations are likely to dominate much of the consideration of passive operations. That is understandable as a first step. Ultimately, terrorist groups depend on a high degree of coercion even within their support group. Cooperation from the population in third world countries is unlikely to be forthcoming unless population protection and control measures are instituted throughout the group to which the terrorists have access. Without security, little else is possible. Effective population protection in urban environments challenged by well-developed terrorist groups can only go hand in hand with population control systems designed to indissolubly link the populace and the government.

EQUIPMENT

The breakthroughs in active technologies have already provided antiterrorist operators with significant new tools. However, effective management of the benefits of these tools remains elusive. Optics and computer technology changes give the government extraordinary intelligence collection and analysis capabilities, but they yield much more data than can be presently assimilated in a reasonable time.

Effective application of intelligence technology assets to the problem of urban terrorism will probably require the devotion of computer technology to management. Certainly, such an application will require a broader perspective in identification of analytic priorities and tasking. As suggested by the Beirut case, the question of command and control cannot be separated from the question of efficient use of intelligence in antiterrorist operations. Cumbersome command structure impedes the timeliness of intelligence support which is a critical factor in antiterrorist operations.

Sensor and other surveillance technologies offer new and powerful support for passive defense against active and broad-based terrorism in concentrated urban areas. The Algiers case three decades ago already demonstrated the importance of such support. Further progress in these technologies promises to change the game for advanced countries. Such

changes will probably have little impact on the capabilities of third world states that are unable to apply effectively the security resources they already have.

Small, isolated groups involved in terrorist activity will continue to present a problem to which equipment is only marginally relevant.

Equipment has made strides in protection of security forces and key installations against terrorist attack. What equipment progress has not done, and will not do, is make any appreciable progress in protecting private persons and property against terrorist attack except when those persons or that property enter areas considered prime targets (such as aircraft). We are pessimistic about the contribution of equipment in this regard not because of an overly static conception of technology but, rather, because of the infinite variety of targets and the recognition that initiative lies with the terrorist. In all four of our cases, even after extensive defensive measures were taken, terrorists had no problems in selecting lucrative targets. When possible, they chose innovative ways to overcome passive defenses; when this was not possible, they directed themselves toward targets less heavily protected.

CHAPTER IX

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. MILITARY FORCES

THE CONTEXT

Although the United States has experienced domestic urban terrorism, and although U.S. military forces (particularly, the National Guard) have at times been directly affected by this terrorism, there is little or no prospect of U.S. forces being called upon to participate in any major way in combating domestic urban terrorism. In any case, this contingency is not the focus of the present report.

Terrorism in Europe and Japan has known varying levels of intensity over the past decade, but here, too, domestic resources for response are adequate, and there is little the United States military could add, except in the way of specific intelligence, to allied and friendly capabilities for combating terrorism in developed countries of the West. Neither is this a focus of the present study.

By contrast, the likelihood of U.S. military involvement in third world situations where urban terrorism is present is great. This involvement will arise (if recent history is any example) in several contexts in different countries.

U.S. forces have been called upon to assist friendly third world countries in reducing or defeating terrorist threats. This will probably continue.

The presence of American military personnel in numerous third world countries in advisory and assistance roles or in readiness roles (forward basing, exercising, etc.) has already made many of them the target of terrorist attacks, either isolated or as part of a larger terrorist movement. This will probably continue.

U.S. military personnel stationed in foreign countries on security, attaché, or other residual functions have been targeted by terrorist groups. This will probably continue.

U.S. defense real property assets have been targeted by terrorists. This will probably continue.

The United States has been called upon to provide peace-keeping forces, often to separate antagonists or provide a presence when there is no opposition, only to find that changed circumstances have made those peace-keepers terrorist targets. This is less probable, since peace-keeping operations may be less acceptable to the U.S. government in the aftermath of the Lebanon experience (and since government reaction to shifting circumstances may be more swift with that experience in mind), but it is still possible.

U.S. forces may be called upon to extract American nationals from dangerous overseas environments. This is not a common practice, and cannot be seen as a major problem, even though such missions will probably continue. An increasing problem for U.S. military forces as a result of terrorism is

extraction of hostages. This issue is not addressed in the current study since the mission typically involves highly specialized combat personnel in missions of great speed. Such missions cannot be equated with other "noncombat" employments of military force.

As a superpower, the United States unquestionably has important interests throughout the world. These interests have generated a far-flung American presence. The rise of low intensity conflict as a technique of indirect war[45] takes aim at that presence, and terrorism may often be a function of that offensive. Yet, terrorism is merely a tactic, and the use of terrorism involving U.S. forces cannot be considered in isolation from the circumstances in which the tactic is employed. More important, to the extent the focus is on protecting noncombat U.S. forces from terrorism or assisting a friendly government in defeating an urban terrorist threat, it is a capital error to concentrate on the tactic without sufficient appreciation of the strategic circumstances.

THE ROOTS OF URBAN TERRORISM

One main distinction that must early and honestly be made is between terrorism whose roots, however shallow, are internal and autonomous from outside direction, and that which is primarily directed and supported externally. Those who seek pure cases of external control will usually be disappointed, as will those who look for complete autonomy.

> Government sponsors of terrorist groups choose this means precisely to avoid responsibility, a potential for "plausible denial" they would lose if they maintained complete operational direction of the groups. They intend to compensate for what they sacrifice in control by the security of distance. Some governments have invested heavily in terrorist groups that are responsive to but not directly connected to them. The Beirut USMNF compound disaster provides an example of a group that depended for logistic and other resources upon the Syrian government in its attack, but where sufficient distance existed to prevent the appearance of the "smoking gun" the U.S. government felt it required to retaliate.[46]

Terrorist groups with truly autonomous direction tend to seek help where they can get it, including foreign governments.

The strategy appropriate to the two different cases is quite distinct. Terrorism rooted overseas must be severed from the roots that nourish it; without those roots, it will not be sustainable at an intolerable level (though it may continue at a nuisance level.) The strategic focus in cases when terrorism's roots are internal must be on isolating the terrorists internally, on denying them the issues they need, and on developing tactics to penetrate the infrastructure or destroy the leadership of terrorist groups, or both.

In spite of the criticism of the Lebanese government in Lebanon and elsewhere, that government was committed to reform. From a military standpoint, the government was weak, but it had already embarked on policies that might have isolated terrorists, denied them the issues they needed, and

penetrated their infrastructure. These tactics were irrelevant, however, since the driving force behind the terrorists was not Lebanese, it was Syrian and Iranian.[47]

The French in Algiers and the British in Ulster understood well that their terrorist foes received some external support. But they understood as well that the primary focus must be upon the internal political, economic, and social context of the terrorism. While they pursued dramatically divergent strategies, this critical assessment allowed them to devote the resources toward reducing the intensity of the terrorist threat. The French removed terrorism in Algiers, but at a social and political cost that would be unacceptable in a real democratic context; the British have reduced the threat of terrorism in Ulster to tolerable, if still costly, levels.

EXTERNALLY ROOTED TERRORISM

Whereas terrorism's roots are external, these cases suggest that those roots must be severed. If the territory of the country can be controlled, this injunction is unexceptional. However, territorial control is a relative matter. It is almost impossible to isolate a small group from all contact with the outside in democratic countries. The less isolation is possible through defensive means, the greater the need to deter external supporters from pursuing their policies. This approach involves an active policy ranging from diplomatic initiatives to the institution of more coercive measures. The use of force may be practiced openly, where it will often be counterproductive[48], or it may be undertaken covertly, a language that will generally be understood quite well by those who practice it.

It would be wrong to consider such a strategic focus as an exclusive one. On the contrary, this focus is merely the shield behind which an active program to deny social and political legitimacy to groups advocating violence is mobilized. The nature of this program must vary in accordance with the particular characteristics of the problem.

AUTONOMOUS URBAN TERRORISM

In those cases when urban terrorism is autonomous, when urban violence would continue at intolerable levels even without foreign involvement, the strategic focus must be on the internal dynamics of the problem. This report has considered a number of military and security measures employed by several different antiterrorist governments, but it is clear that intelligence is the single key to both active or reactive and passive antiterrorist operations. Effective population protection and control in threat areas constitute the prerequisite to good and timely intelligence, as well as to other elements of a working antiterrorist strategy.

Our cases and others suggest strongly that there are only two means by which a well-rooted terrorist movement can be neutralized: penetration or destruction of its leadership. The cases also suggest that some tactics that have not been widely used (notably, careful introduction of false messages into the channels of communication of clandestine groups) possess the potential if developed to paralyze terrorist organizations when they are still small and conspiratorial in their behavior.

THE U.S. ROLE IN COMBATING URBAN TERRORISM OVERSEAS

The main role of the United States in combating overseas urban terrorism has been cooperation with other governments in intelligence and special operations activities. For this role, the United States is well suited because of the technological sophistication and spread of its intelligence collection assets, and because in some respects those assets have been expanded at the expense of HUMINT that others offer in exchange. This statement should not be taken to excuse the United States from upgrading its HUMINT resources. We have always believed, and recent history has made abundantly clear, that the decision to reduce the priority of HUMINT was ill advised at a time when low intensity conflicts of all types were increasing and when many of these conflicts were specifically aimed at the United States and its interests.

Active Involvement and Commitment

To the extent the United States is directly involved, as in the situations noted at the outset of this chapter, in third world countries where urban terrorism is a problem affecting or requiring U.S. action, U.S. forces can play an important role in an antiterrorism campaign. A positive role in such an undertaking can only evolve from a commitment that is open and blessed with public support, however. And such support has shown itself to be anything but dependable.

> It is clear that in the current situation of public affairs the executive branch is expected to exert extreme caution before the commitment of U.S. military resources. . . . .However, while it is politically realistic to insist upon U.S. public support for overseas military actions, even support [for] actions that do not involve combat forces, it is an error to project public opinion in a linear fashion. . . . . [A]ny adversary is almost certain to focus heavily on shaping American public views...[49]

Terrorist situations are ugly; the measures required to terminate them are often only slightly less repugnant. Open societies based on democratic principles are ill equipped to confront the realities of such conflicts, yet they have succeeded in doing so for centuries when necessary. U.S. participation in antiterrorist campaigns will certainly be required by our global interests, but if and to the extent that participation is a negative factor to host governments, it will also be a negative factor to important strategic interests of the United States overseas.

Command and Control

The Beirut experience demonstrated dramatically and tragically that current command and control of U.S. forces in peacetime or other less than intense conflict situations is seriously flawed. The layering of command has reached proportions that can only be called absurd. The structuring and tasking of intelligence resources were unresponsive to USMNF needs. In part, this problem was inherent in the situation, which is resistant to the kind of intelligence generated by some of the best U.S. assets. But allocation of resources to develop intelligence assets was not ordained by superhumans; it

was the result of human choice. There were collection assets that could have provided better and more relevant support to the Marines in Beirut. There were data that could have helped force reconsideration of security conditions at BIA. The distance of key decisions from the front line forces, and the involvement of senior personnel from non-Defense departments had a direct and adverse effect on threat assessment and other physical security precautions.

Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe the BIA catastrophe was mere chance. Other recent employments of U.S. personnel in low intensity conflict situations that have involved the full command structure reflect parallel deficiencies. This is a serious problem, and resolving it is a prerequisite to effective participation by U.S. military forces on the ground in an antiterrorist campaign.

Doctrine

Doctrine for antiterrorist operations is also limited outside the special operations areas. In a number of areas of traditional military activities, there are special considerations appropriate to situations in which urban terrorism exists that should be available for U.S. forces. Modern technology has provided better than modern doctrine for the new challenges presented by terrorists in an urban environment.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

The implications of the urban terrorism phenomenon for the United States are very significant. Urban terrorism has become a major threat to U.S. interests around the world. Terrorism in cities in which U.S. military assets are deployed poses a number of serious threats to the national interest. Terrorism has been and is being used to undermine American credibility, to reduce the U.S. role in world affairs, to diminish usable U.S. power, to undercut U.S. foreign and national security policy, to injure countries friendly to the United States, to build a momentum of victories for forces hostile to the United States, to confuse and frustrate the American public, and to demoralize U.S. military forces.

U. S. Credibility. The inability of the United States to respond in an appropriate and effectively deterrent manner or to prevent such attacks raises understandable questions in the minds of U.S. friends and allies, particularly those in the Third World whose governments face and may be threatened by such tactics.

The American role and U.S. power. As a result of the credibility issue, regional governments are less inclined to support U.S. policy, to host U.S. facilities or forces, or to acknowledge actual levels of U.S. military capabilities when faced with the possible threat of terrorist actions against U.S. forces.

U.S. foreign policy and national security policy. This decline follows naturally from the foregoing. The purpose of foreign and national security policies assume the continuity of the United States as a preeminent global power. Terrorism strives to reduce or diminish the capacity of the United States to act as a global power by reducing domestic public confidence in

government, domestic public determination to maintain an active global posture, and the confidence in the United States, and risk orientation, of friendly and neutral governments.

The Threat to Friends of the United States. The withdrawal of U.S. forces defending American friends as a result of the threat of urban terrorism or refusal to request such forces (or haste to request their withdrawal) all raise the specter of heightened threat to U.S. friends and allies, either to their existence or to their continued pursuit of policies supportive of U.S. interests.

Inexpensive "wins" for forces hostile to the United States or its interests. Terrorist groups may not be hostile to the United States per se, even though they attack U.S. forces. Nevertheless, it is certainly contrary to U.S. interests to allow forces supporting policies or politics contrary to U.S. objectives to achieve "cheap" wins at the expense of the United States. Moreover, such victories are quite asymmetrical, for they generally involve very significant political losses for the United States, and by definition involve the loss of lives or property.

Public and military morale. The asymmetry of force balances and the self-confident nature of terrorist conflict combined with the difficulty of response have created situations (e.g., Algeria) in which morale of both the military and the public have been adversely affected.

In nearly all cases in which urban terrorism has been brought to bear against deployed military forces, whether national, foreign, multi-national, or international[50], the military forces have responded. The military responses have taken several generic directions, including direct retaliation, increased passive defenses, increased active defenses, counter-terrorist actions, and a range of deterrent actions. The effectiveness of these measures has varied greatly across cases and over time.

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[45]See R.D. McLaurin and R. Miller, Urban Insurgency: Issues and Implications for U.S. Military Forces (Springfield, VA: Abbott Associates, 1986), p. 141.

[46]Actually, careful review of intelligence data after the blast revealed something tantamount to the "gun," but by the time this intelligence was effectively exploited, the "smoke" had dwindled. The most detailed discussion of the attack and of Syrian involvement in it is Bob Woodward, Richard Harwood, and Christian Williams, "Beirut Bombing: Political Warriors Used Men Who Crave Death," The Washington Post, February 1, 1984, pp 1ff. This report is based on intelligence data provided by several countries and is authoritative.

[47]This is not to deny that the terrorists themselves were Lebanese or that they advocated issues in Lebanese terms. That is typical of all terrorist groups regardless of their sources of support. These groups were essentially Lebanese, and grew in size and power in succeeding years to the point that they were much more independent from outside support. Yet, terrorist attacks in Beirut would only have been a nuisance problem without the critical technical support of Syria; it was the Syrian contribution that killed 241 Marines.

[48]Overt force is politically inexpedient and may engender sweeping and unforeseen international political and military outcomes. Particularly in an international environment in which the power seeking the end of terrorist tactics in a third world country is opposed by another power of roughly equal strength, the potential for negative outcomes to this kind of overt show of strength is significant. Even at the more immediate level, Israeli reprisals against Palestinian and nos Shi a settlements have not created deterrence; instead, they have created recruits--generations of Palestinians and Shi as who, with fresh memories of the deaths of their family members, are sworn to revenge.

[49]McLaurin and Miller, Urban Insurgency, p. 143.

[50]For these purposes: national forces are those of the country on whose territory they are deployed; foreign forces are those of countries other than forces on whose territory they are deployed; multi-national forces are those representing several foreign countries; and international forces are foreign units under a single organizational command (whether that command exercises real authority over the units).

CHAPTER X

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Interviews

Algeria.

1. Numerous Algerois (residents of Algiers). Conducted 1964, 1965. Interviews concerned observations on social relations between French and Algerians, between colons and Algerians, and between civilian and combattant FLN.

2. One French senior officer involved in Algeria (not Algiers). Conducted 1965. Interview concerned overall French strategy and operations in Algeria.

3. One senior French civilian official involved in Algerian campaign. Conducted 1967. Interview concerned same subjects as (2) above.

Ireland

1. Interview with field grade officer twice deployed in Ulster.

Beirut.

1. Interviews with Lebanese Armed Forces commanders, head of G-2, former minister of foreign affairs (currently special advisor to president), former national security advisor to president (Wadi Haddad), and their aides.

2. Interviews with Israeli officials then in Mossad (Israeli intelligence), August 1983; September 1985.

3. Interviews with U.S. officials in Office of the Secretary of Defense, Executive Office of the President, Department of the Air Force, Office of Military Cooperation, Defense Attache Office, CTF 61.

4. Interviews with Lebanese Forces Commanders 1982-4 (Frem), 1984-5 (Abu Nadir), 1986- (Ja'ja).

5. Interviews with Israeli military personnel deployed in Beirut in 1982-3.

6. Interview with member of Long Commission and with Long Commission staff member.