WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY--AND HE IS US

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The Constitution and Common Defense

The preamble to the Constitution tells us that one of the reasons for the writing and signing of that contract was to provide for the common defense. Two hundred years ago, with a baker's dozen newly formed states standing weak but quarrelsome before the European empires, there wasn't much doubt about what the common defense meant. The common defense meant protection against the very real threats of invasion and insurrection.

Two hundred years later, under that same remarkable contract, we find ourselves celebrating the Constitution by asking: What is the common defense? Instead of thirteen states standing weak and quarrelsome before the European empires, fifty now stand strong and united, without any real fear of invasion or insurrection. Yet the military forces provided under the Constitution for the common defense are now deployed around the globe, on the territories of more than a dozen other nations, and wield weapons that few doubt are capable of destroying entire nations in a matter of hours. Is this common defense? Or have we become a militaristic society that has gone well beyond the bounds of anything that could be construed as the common defense?

What does the Constitution say about the meaning of common defense? Not much. It tells us who is responsible for providing it: That

1The expression comes from Pogo, the comic-strip possum created by Walt Kelley, who paraphrased Oliver Hazard Perry's message to General William Henry Harrison announcing the American victory on Lake Erie, 10 September 1813: "We have met the enemy and they are ours . . . ."

This paper was prepared as the keynote address for one of a series of symposia celebrating the bicentennial of the Constitution, sponsored by Mount St. Mary's College at Los Angeles. The symposium was held on 21 November 1987, and was devoted to issues of "the common defense."

2The Constitution of the United States of America, Preamble: "We, the people of the United States, in order to . . . provide for the common defense . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."
Congress shall provide the funds, the rules, and the regulations for military forces. That the President shall command those forces. That the Federal Government is obliged to protect the states against invasion. And it goes on to limit the possession or use of military forces by the individual States and to define treason. But more than that can't be found.

If they didn't write it down, what did the authors of the Constitution mean when they said "provide for the common defense"? Certainly the threats which they faced were evident enough: The motivation for the document they were framing came largely from those threats.

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3 Ibid., Article I, Section VIII: "The Congress shall have power to provide for the common defense . . . ; To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water; To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years; To provide and maintain a navy; To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress . . . ."

4 Ibid., Article II, Section II: "The President shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States . . . ."

5 Ibid., Article IV, Section IV: "The United States . . . . shall protect each [State] against invasion . . . ."

6 Ibid., Article I, Section X: "No State shall . . . . keep troops or ships of war in time of peace . . . . or engage in war unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay."

Article III, Section III: "Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court. The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainer of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture except during the life of the person attained."
threats: Invasion, of course, from without. But also from within—rebellion or insurrection—something they had already experienced in local uprisings and whose shadow urged them toward a union.

Even as they sought protection against these threats, they were concerned about the military excesses of a central government; and so we find them restricting their new government from inflicting those specific insults which they had suffered under the Crown: There would be no confiscation of arms and no quartering of soldiers in private homes. That the Bill of Rights—those sacred ten articles that protect our most basic freedoms—devotes one of its ten to the quartering of soldiers—an issue that has never even come up in any court since—is evidence of how much the authors of the Constitution were concerned with the problems of their day.

If they could have perceived then that the military forces they were creating in the Constitution might be used offensively—to threaten or attack others, to expand American influence and control over others—would they have added prohibitions against such use? The answer is probably not.

Ibid., Amendments, Article II: "A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

Amendments, Article III: "No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law."

Amendments, Article V: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment of indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger..."

The only other reference to the military in the Amendments to the Constitution is found in the post-Civil War Amendments, Article XIV, Section 3: "No person shall...hold any office, civil or military, under the United States or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath as...an officer of the United States...to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may, by a vote of two thirds of each house, remove such disability."

We need to remind ourselves that less than twenty years after the signing of the Constitution—under Jefferson's presidency—America was conducting naval strikes from the Gulf of Sidra (inside Khadafy's "line of death") against Libyan terrorists—then called Barbary pirates. 9 And, of course, their country was then called Tripoli instead of Libya. And instead of the Sixth Fleet, we called it our Mediterranean Squadron. The battle cry then was "Millions for defense, but not a cent for tribute," not much different from the current one: "We don't negotiate with terrorists."

Within another five years—under Madison's presidency—Congress was discussing the feasibility of conquering Canada; and the main objective of three years of American military operations during the War of 1812 was just that—seizing Canada. Many Americans were opposed to that war. In the end, the peace movement in New England was strong enough to threaten a convention to revise the Constitution or, failing that, to make a separate peace.10

Thus, what history tells us about early American attitudes toward the uses of military power—even those of the Constitution's authors—doesn't sound all that different from the views that one can hear now on the nightly news. Then why are we wrestling with the question today? What does, or should, "provide for the common defense" mean today? What makes the question salient? It isn't salient just because we are celebrating the Constitution. The question has been on our tongues now for several decades; and it shows signs of being with us for some time to come. Our celebration of the Constitution provides a frame for revisiting a very contentious issue within our society.

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10 Ibid., pp. 176-181.
The Form of Our Concerns

What concerns underlie the current contentiousness associated with the development, deployment, and use of military force? Is militarism the concern? That seems to be suggested in the title of some readings for this symposium: Is the U.S. a militaristic society? Or is it nationalism? The allocation of the nation's or society's resources? Is it the newer concern of survival in a world full of nuclear weapons?

And however you or I might answer as to our underlying concerns, are they intractable? In the readings for this symposium, John Crane says that war is a cultural habit, while Barbara Tuchman holds human nature responsible. Lyla Hoffman lays the problem at the feet of a sexist culture, while Richard Nixon points to the Soviets. John Alexander and Phyllis Schlafly see moral obligations which would, or should, compel us in exactly opposite directions in our attitudes toward military force.

Was your mind changed by any of those readings? Did you find some that you agreed with and some that sounded like the author had lost track of reality? Let me declare that I liked them all, for they help me to make the point I want to get across in my words today. The point is this: Don't try to decide whether you agree or disagree with any of them. Instead, try to understand what they are saying and look for their vantage point—inside their shoes or their heads—where what they are saying makes sense. If that sounds wimpy or impossible, or both, please stay tuned.

Let me begin with ten issues that appear to be capable of stirring the juices in any debate over the state of militarism in America. For each one, I will express two concerns, reflecting two sides that are frequently taken up depending upon one's prior persuasion.

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1. For the first concern, let's take the U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf. That pairs up nicely with the concern for future Western access to oil.

2. For the second, take Soviet involvement in Nicaragua and Cuba, with the flip side being U.S. support of the Contras.

3. A third is the size of the nuclear arsenals; and it is matched by a concern about the strategic nuclear balance (or imbalance) with the Soviets.

From those three, you get the idea; and we can go a little faster:

4. Are you more concerned about international terrorism or international arms sales and transfers?

5. How about arms control or treaty violations and verification?

6. Technology transfer or nuclear proliferation?

7. Nuclear disarmament or the conventional balance in Europe?

8. The modernization of our military forces or the effect of defense spending on the budget deficits and the economy?

9. Here is a good one: Star Wars--is your concern about an arms race in space or who shall dominate space?

10. And, finally, how about Marxist-inspired unrest and subversion or the overseas basing of U.S. military forces?

Do you find that some of these concerns make your insides jump, while others leave you cold or bored? If so, my message is for you.

If the ten issues or 20 concerns I have just recited were somehow resolved, would there no longer be any saliency to the question of militarism in America? If you think so, we can always season the pot with a few more concerns, such as:

- The Soviet presence in Afghanistan.
- Nuclear winter.
• Allied burden-sharing.
• Nuclear weapons testing.

It would probably be hard to find the end to such concerns. The list appears to go on and on. Where do they all come from? What brings them to our attention? Who speaks out on them? Who argues them before us?

The Source of Our Concerns

The ease with which we can pair up these concerns suggests that the voices we hear are not in the middle of these issues. My reading--and the readings for this symposium--finds the voices coming from the ends, if not the extremes, on these issues. Moreover, the same voice at one end of an issue can often be heard at the ends of other issues--there seems to be a correlation of viewpoints. For those with strong views on these issues, their position on one or two of the issues becomes a remarkably good predictor of where they will stand on the next.

Obviously, that observation isn't original. Those kinds of observations are how we go about labeling people as liberals or conservatives. And a good bet for any Las Vegas gambler would be that liberals would be anti-military while conservatives would be pro-military, or as they would prefer to say, pro-defense. And, if one leaves it there, the shouting goes on from each end, each end trying to woo those in the middle, without any effect on those shouting from the other end except to increase the volume. About the only break in the monotony is when someone comes up with a new argument for their position, which sets those at the other end scurrying to demolish it as quickly as possible.

Yet, for people to line up with remarkable predictability across such a wide range of issues suggests that something much deeper is going on. For example, the Star Wars debate includes two fundamental questions:
1. If they were technically feasible, are strategic defenses politically desirable?

2. If they were politically desirable, are strategic defenses technically feasible?

Even though those two questions address quite different problems, most people will answer both questions with the same answer--both "yes" or both "no." A few may say they are desirable but not feasible; almost none will say that they are feasible but not desirable. That is a vivid illustration of polarization: We are either for it or against it. It is either bad, bad, bad; or it is good, good, good.12

12In a question-and-answer period following this address, I was asked where I stood on Star Wars among the four positions cited here. I replied that I would place myself among the minority that thought it to be politically desirable, but not technically feasible at this time. I went on to explain why:

Freeman Dyson, in Weapons and Hope (Harper and Row, New York, 1984, pp. 200-202), describes how the Quakers in the early 1800s were overwhelmed by the enormity of the problem of human slavery which they had set themselves against. But then they made an important strategic distinction: They took the trading in slaves to be a greater evil than their possession. So they went after the slave trade, even though that didn't solve the whole problem; and by the 1820s, their efforts were rewarded by the closing down of the slave trade. However, the closing of the slave trade then set up new conditions that made attacking the other evil--the possession of slaves--much more promising. Within the space of 50 years, both evils were stamped out.

Dyson's point, of course, is that we shouldn't fail to take good directions just because we can't see our way clearly through to the end of our aims. If we want to deal with the evil of nuclear weapons, then defensive weapons are to be preferred over offensive weapons, even if we can't yet see how those defensive weapons, by themselves, will be successful in overcoming the evils of offensive nuclear weapons. By this reasoning, Dyson favors taking steps toward defensive weapons, arms control, and more discriminating (accurate) weapons--which he considers to be good directions--even though none, alone or as far as we can see, will eliminate the evils of nuclear weapons.

By the same reasoning, I favor Star Wars as a good political direction even though I can't yet see the technical solution. My hope is that steps in that direction will lead to a new and better condition from which we can then see new directions and steps to take.
Thus, while we argue with each other in terms of the issue, the reasons for our taking the sides as we do must lie elsewhere, below the issue, in some deeply held values and convictions. For a long time, I could do no better than to chalk it up to liberal and conservative philosophies clashing wherever they collided on the frontiers of their beliefs. And that didn't help much: Those were labels and really didn't help me to understand why.

But in 1984, I had an opportunity to peer beyond the clashing and clanging over defense issues. I had gone to Avignon in Southern France to meet with other defense analysts to discuss, among other things, strategic defenses--Star Wars. Professor Haley was there too. We met in the most awesome--and incongruous--of places: the French Papal Palace, in chambers of stone, and sat in the semi-enclosed chairs of the bishops. Where the bishops who had sat there before us may have argued about how to save souls, we argued about Star Wars. Theologies across the centuries.

I soon became aware that most of the Americans there were defending the Star Wars concept, while most of the Europeans opposed it. There were exceptions, of course, and some were neutral; but the line-up of Europeans and Americans on opposite sides was too striking to ignore. This wasn't explainable as the usual division between liberals and conservatives.

The next thing I noticed was that the two sides of the debate were hurling arguments at each other like children in snow forts hurling snowballs at each other: One would stand up and let fly with four one-line arguments--like, "Would you rather kill people than save them?" Whereupon, one from the other side would rise and fire off six rejoinders--like, "Why are you trying to take the arms spiral into space?" As with snowball fights between snow forts, neither side's volleys had any discernible effect on the other; but it seemed to make the hurler feel good as he fired off his volleys in front of his comrades in the fray.

Dr. P. Edward Haley, Director of the Keck Center for International Strategic Studies, Claremont, California, who was a panelist at this symposium.
Several things struck me about the snowball fight: First, the intensity with which the arguments were made. The emotions were strong and seemed to go much deeper than the arguments being made. Second, the number of arguments amassed by each hurler couldn't all be his or her reasons for taking the stand. Most of us come to a position for a single, dominant reason or factor. The buttressing arguments come later. The number of arguments used by most hurlers suggested that they had been picking up snowballs along the way, determined to overwhelm their opposition by the sheer number they could throw. I was developing an impression that the debaters instinctively liked or disliked Star Wars, had since the moment they first heard of it, and thereafter had never changed their minds, but only accumulated arguments to support their immediate and instinctive feelings about the idea.

After several days of watching the snowballs fly, I became convinced that the debaters were fighting over deeper issues than those to be found in their snowballs or in Star Wars, and that those issues somehow tended to divide Americans and Europeans. By the last day of the conference, I had found it and could test it against what I heard being said. It became so obvious: The Americans and Europeans had quite different perceptions of how the world worked and who was good and bad in that world. To oversimplify, the Americans saw themselves as being on the side of the good and for peace, while they saw the Soviets on the side of the bad and a threat to peace. The Europeans, however, saw themselves caught between two giants, one of whom they regarded more favorably than the other, but both of whom seemed quite likely to injure innocent bystanders if they continued to jostle and push each other about. For them, the Europeans were the good guys and both of the superpowers were the bad guys.

Those deeper concerns—and the models or perceptions from which they were drawn—never surfaced explicitly at Avignon. Yet they explained, at least for me, what seemed like bizarre behavior for a large group of international defense analysts. Thereafter, I remained on the alert for the appearance of snowball fights and tried to look past the arguments presented and even the issue being debated, to see if
I could find the basic differences in the underlying models of how the world works and what is good or bad in it.

I think I see snowball fights in the arguments over militarism in the American society. Most people instinctively feel that either we have or we haven't become too militaristic for the circumstances we face. Then some, those who feel most strongly about the question or the circumstances, start accumulating and throwing the snowballs about why or whether we are or aren't, should or shouldn't. Underneath the clamor, I see different views of how the world works and who or what is good and bad in it. Different world views and belief systems. Different values and convictions. Different theories of human behavior and events. Of causes and effects.

So then, is everyone right? Since everyone is entitled to their own view, should we leave it at that? Is the argument useless? No, of course not. There is still a middle ground to win over--of people who do not have strong feelings one way or the other about these issues, and who may be influenced by such arguments. I'm not sure how big that middle ground is any more; most people may have decided one way or the other; and then I'm not optimistic about the number who will change sides on the basis of the arguments being presented. But the arguments could be much improved in their content, let alone their form. If the arguments really have their source in differing models of the world and human behavior, let us take a closer look at them.

**Discovering Our Models**

Most people accept the notion that we perceive reality only through our own mental constructs. We all carry around in our heads models, theories, paradigms, hypotheses--call them what you will--that permit us to interpret and understand ourselves and the world around us. Reality only exists for us as these models--which is what I will call them here--allow us to see and appreciate that reality.

Three aspects of these models are important in what I want to say here. First, these models do not always work for us--that is, they are not always adequate to explain the behavior of the world or ourselves in it. If they break down suddenly, we experience what has been called
"cognitive dissonance," a clash between our model of reality and what we observe. If our model holds that banks are a safe place for us to keep our money, and the bank fails, we are shaken in our faith and have to revise our model. Cognitive dissonance is an uncomfortable condition: Our model—our previous understanding of things—has deserted us and we have to develop it anew. We avoid the condition if we can.

Second, these models vary greatly from one person to another. For most of us these models are sufficiently alike on most matters to communicate with each other on the daily events in our lives. But we do find that they are different enough in politics and religion that we can run into trouble discussing those things. Nevertheless, for most of us these models are adequate for us to get along in the world and with each other. Occasionally, of course, we find someone whose models are so different that we can't communicate with them or someone whose models are so inadequate that they can't operate in the world or society that surrounds them. Paranoia could be described as a set of bizarre models, far enough outside the norm as to draw attention to the behavior of their owner.

And third, these models are, for the most part, held subconsciously. They are the basis for our everyday actions and responses, so we have long lost touch with them as we go about life and living. Intellectuals may deal consciously with some models in the field of their professional or academic interests; but psychiatrists and psychologists are probably the only ones to deal with these models broadly and deliberately.

All that is elementary psychology. I want to build upon those three notions to develop some ideas about how we can more productively approach contentious issues such as the one addressed at this symposium.

If most of our models, particularly those that are the sources for our values and convictions, are held only at the subconscious, then in some sense we are the victims of those models. They are the determinants of what we believe, want and know. They are likely to change only through some form of cognitive dissonance, usually accompanied by anguish because our model has failed us. Prejudices are the result of unconscious models: We "just know" that something or
someone is bad or good. "Just knowing" is a clear sign of an unconscious model at work.

If we can bring some of those models into our conscious mind so that we are able to inspect them and understand our behavior and attitudes, we can take some control over those aspects. This is an important step because we are no longer the victim of that model, we have become its owner and can examine it, perhaps even elect to change it--not in the anguish of loss, but in the joy of discovery. And, in the process, we sensitize ourselves to the possible existence of different models in the heads of other people.

If the owners of models can bring them to the conscious mind, and if they are sufficiently secure in their self images, then they can share--even declare--those models with others. Note that you can't communicate your models unless you have first brought them to the conscious mind where you realize and understand them yourself. Communicating our models of how the world works does several things:

- First, it sharpens the models that we hold; they must be self-analyzed and boiled down to their essence in order for them to be communicated at all.
- Second, it enables the listener (or reader) to understand the basis for the speaker's (or writer's) interpretations, judgments, and values--and that avoids confusion or arguments rooted in different and undeclared models. It is simply a more honest or fair way to communicate views.
- And, third, it exposes the models for others to analyze and criticize, facilitating modification and adoption. All that analysis and care in communicating models may be demanding, but the assumption of that responsibility may be the best avenue to useful debate.
Playing with Our Models

Beyond that is a giant step: Playing with models. Could we go so far as to entertain and act on the basis of several alternative models? What I mean, here, is temporarily suspending judgments on different models of the same thing--accepting the validity of several models simultaneously. None is absolutely correct nor absolutely wrong. All have some greater or lesser merit to commend them for our consideration. They represent, collectively, a broader spectrum of perceptions of the society of which we are all a part. To entertain several models simultaneously does not require giving up one's own individuality--it simply allows us to play for a while, to accept and appreciate a broader set of models than we started with. It permits us to expand the perspectives, possibilities, and information available to us. But it can be spooky: If you play with another model, you may find you like it better than the one you started with; and that would mean changing your mind about some things.

Even if we could learn to play with alternative models, how can we act on the basis of differing, conflicting models? Don't we have to decide which one is more correct and go with it? My answer is another question: "When do you have to decide?" Let me illustrate:

Last summer, I had the opportunity to give a seminar for the University of California faculty on the implications of new weapons technologies. Naturally, Star Wars came up. One of the faculty members kept pressing me on whether I thought Star Wars was a good or bad concept. My answers, which evidenced ambivalence on my part, were not at all satisfying to her. I sensed that she needed to know where I stood so that she could decide to listen to me or mount a well-prepared counterattack.

At the end of the seminar, still puzzled, she came up to continue her probing. I asked her why she felt that she needed to decide whether Star Wars was good or bad in a seminar of this kind where we were trying to learn from each other. We weren't deciding anything; we weren't taking any actions. She replied that she was acting every day: She was an activist against Star Wars; she had to know where she stood and take
actions based upon her convictions. I don't know what those actions were—perhaps she was writing, arguing or marching—but I will concede that she felt compelled to act, and therefore, to decide. Unfortunately, by deciding, she may have had to reduce her ability to learn other points of view.

At that moment, I would assert, none of us had to take any actions with respect to Star Wars—unless, of course, one felt compelled to convince others which side to take (i.e., to act as an advocate). If I had been asked to march in a parade against Star Wars the next day, then I would have had to decide on action. Faced with that question, I would have turned the decision over to my intuition for an answer. I can generally trust my intuition if I have been open and receptive to all of the available information and arguments; I don't trust it if I have only heard or understood one side of the argument.

The point of my story is that we don't have to decide or take sides until we have to act. When we do have to act, we can decide quickly, intuitively, if we have been entertaining alternative points of view or models—without prejudice. Deciding isn't difficult; our brains are exquisitely designed for the job. It has been observed that you can find out if you are truly indifferent about a choice by flipping a coin to decide. If you have an unconscious preference, you will know it before the coin lands—by the sudden realization of your hopes for the coin coming up one side over the other. The difficulty isn't in deciding; it is in keeping our minds open to differing viewpoints.

The moment we decide which point of view or model is correct, we tend to close off part of our ability to understand opposing viewpoints and, therefore, the quality of subsequent actions. Thus, I would argue for putting off taking sides on an issue until you feel action is more appropriate than learning. That threshold varies from person to person on any issue, and from issue to issue for any person. But my message is: Hold off deciding on which side to take as long as you can. The longer you can put off deciding, the better your ability to take up and understand alternative models.
But is everything just models? Aren't there facts to be reckoned with as well in these debates? Listen to them carefully. Sure enough, you can find facts. But the arguments are about the meaning of those facts—the relationship of those facts to the problem or its solution—and that meaning flows from theories or models. The models imply cause and effect: If this, then that. And all models are not of the same kind.

Some models are about the causes and effects in physical processes: If the airplane runs out of fuel, we assert or predict that it will descend. If we assemble a certain amount of plutonium quickly enough, a nuclear explosion will result. Those are processes which we have observed or tested often enough to have considerable confidence in our models and their predictive value.

But other models are about the causes and effects in human behavior: If America does this, then the Soviets will do that. Remember this one? If we build MX and show our determination, we will force the Soviets to the arms control bargaining table. How about this one? If anyone starts using nuclear weapons, the war will rapidly escalate to all-out nuclear war. Those are remarkable models: They are about human behavior, one of the least predictable things we have to deal with in this world, including the weather. And the models are sometimes used confidently to predict human behavior under completely unprecedented conditions—circumstances for which we have no human experience.

Many people will treat their models of human behavior as if they were just as confidently predictive as a model of physical processes. They are quite certain about what the Soviets will do if America does or doesn't do something they are concerned about, even though our experience with Soviet behavior on that aspect may be limited or non-existent. The readings for this symposium are abundantly laced with such models if you look for them. Yet these same people may be quite ready to admit that they can't predict the behavior of their children—something with which they (and the human race) have abundant experience.
Tying the Threads Together

I was asked to speak to you today on "providing for the common defense" and on American militarism, I suppose, because I am a defense analyst by trade. So what have I done? Instead of talking about defense analysis, something I'm supposed to know about, I've gone off and tried to lecture you about law, history, and psychology. Thus, the first lesson you should have learned from my lecture is:

Don't trust defense analysts to talk about things they know anything about.

If you learned or relearned that one here today, you got your money's worth. The second lesson is this:

The roots of contention about most security issues--including American militarism--lie deep within behavioral models which are neither explicit nor easily debated. Get in touch with your own roots, even though others may not be able to touch theirs. Your purpose should not be to convert them, but to expand your understanding of yourself and, through that understanding, eventually, others as well. If we all do that, we don't have to worry about converting others to our point of view. Most of us will make better students of ourselves than advocates for our point of view.

So, to return to where I started: What is the common defense that the Constitution is to help us provide for ourselves and our posterity? To provide for the common defense is to provide for our survival, our sovereignty, and our well-being--for our people and our institutions--probably in that order of priority. Survival first, because sovereignty and well-being are nothing if we don't survive to enjoy them. Sovereignty second, because, if we have our sovereignty or freedom under the Constitution, we should be able to secure our well-being. These are the very same ideas captured in the Declaration of Independence--and in the same order: Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Survival, sovereignty, and well-being.
But those are not the contentious aspects of providing for the common defense. The debatable questions are the relative risks we face for our survival, our sovereignty, and our well-being. Is our well-being more at risk than our survival? Or the other way 'round? And what are the relationships between them? Will efforts to insure our survival undermine our well-being? Or the other way 'round? These risks and relationships are to be found in our implicit models of human behavior, not in the calculations of defense analysts.

And finally, is America becoming a militaristic society? To answer that question and be true to what I have said here today, I must declare my underlying model so that you can understand why I see things the way I do. My model of human behavior says Americans love toys. I don't think American militarism is about war—but about boys and their toys. My model fits on the bumper sticker I saw last week:

The one with the most toys wins.

The fun is having the toys, not having them broken or lost in a war. But the toys can only be justified by the prospects of war. That poses a dilemma—a balance between justifying a need for them in peacetime, yet not losing them in an actual war. Unfortunately, the concept of nuclear deterrence provides the perfect paradox to serve as

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14 During the discussion following this address, I had the opportunity to elaborate on my theory that the American interest is in the toys of war, not in war itself. I related the following personal experience:

I spent 1982 in London, the year of the Falklands War. There, it was apparent that a real war was coming. Fully six weeks before the event, it was clear where, and with what, the war would be fought. New weapon types that had never seen combat were about to be used: Nuclear submarines would be used in war for the first time, as would vertical-takeoff-and-landing fighters or "jump jets" as the British call them.

As a defense analyst, I was watching something slowly unfold that I had never seen before—and that I couldn't expect to see again—in my lifetime: A war was coming that could be analyzed before it happened! Here was a defense analyst's opportunity of the century—a chance to analyze a war and then to find out how good the analysis was through the real test of battle. Nothing was missing: There was time to do the analysis; and all of the necessary information about the forces on both sides was available.
the fulcrum for that balance. Worse, we have institutionalized the toy box and licensed the boys for public extortion: "Give us 300 billion dollars for the toy box or the Russians will come with their toys and kill you in your sleep."

As Walt Kelly's Pogo said, "We have met the enemy, and he is us."

That's my model. What's yours?

But when I called my colleagues here in America, to enlist them in seizing this unique opportunity, I was met with apathy: They were too busy doing other things. They had a report to write, or they had other work on their desks. Despite my enthusiastic descriptions of this once-in-a-lifetime chance to analyze a real war, I got nowhere. I suggested they "game" the war, something that wouldn't take much time. Still, no takers. Then I thought my failure to gain their interest might be due to the fact that I offered them no motivation in the form of a client they could help. So I repeated my pleas with the assurance that I would deliver any useful results to the British Ministry of Defense--at a very high level. Nothing.

That experience caused me considerable soul-searching about my chosen profession--about my being a defense analyst. Were we only willing to analyze hypothetical wars because our results could never be checked? Were we too cowardly to have our papers graded? It took me a long time to sort out what I thought was going on (i.e., to find my model). Our analyses weren't really about war; they were about war toys. We did the analyses not to predict how wars would go, but to predict how favored toys would do in war. And those predictions were used to argue for (or against) acquiring the toys. As I looked back upon my own experiences as a defense analyst, I realized that most of the analyses I had seen were motivated by advocacy arguments for toys. Childhood's end comes when we see, for the first time, toys for what they are: Just toys.