SUPPORTING THE CINCs:  
THE ROLE OF THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986  

A Monograph  
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The purpose of this monograph is to examine the implementation of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, and see if it has improved the ability of the CINCs to conduct operational warfare.

First, the reasons for the adoption of the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 are reviewed. Then, the provisions of the act which deal with the combatant commands and their support are investigated. Next the organizations and procedures which implemented the act are reviewed, keying on the actions of the Joint Staff and combatant commands. Finally, an assessment of the effectiveness of the implementation is provided.
Supporting the CINC's: The Role of the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986

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ABSTRACT

SUPPORTING THE CINCS: THE ROLE OF THE GOLDBEATER-NICHOLS
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986
By Major Thomas R. Goedkoop, USA, 47 pages.

Since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, Congress has tried to correct the recurring problem of fractured command authority and poor cooperation between the services. Changes in 1958 and the recent Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 have strengthened the unity of the armed forces, and their ability to conduct joint operations.

Inherent in the ability to conduct joint operations is the requirement for the services to provide the unified commanders the forces, equipment, and doctrine needed to conduct effective warfare. Because of service parochialism and budget battles, needed resources are not always available to support the unified commanders operational plans.

One of the major provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to increase the CINCs input into the budgeting and force generation process.

The purpose of this monograph is to examine the implementation of the Defense Reorganization Act, and see if it has improved the ability of the CINCs to conduct operational warfare.

In this monograph, I will first review the reasons for the adoption of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Then I will highlight those aspects of the Act which deal with the combatant commands and their support. Next, I will investigate the organizations and procedures which implement the provisions of the Act, keying on the actions of the combatant commands and the Joint Staff. Finally, I will assess the effectiveness of the Act to determine whether it has been responsive to the needs of the combatant commanders, thus enhancing their ability to conduct operational warfare.

After extensive assessment, I have determined that the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1985, has significantly improved the ability of the CINCs to conduct warfare.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

"I remain extremely concerned about the continuing failure of Congress to establish an effective process for overseeing our Nation's defense effort."

Sen. Barry Goldwater

No piece of recent legislation has created more debate within military circles than the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. "This landmark legislation mandated comprehensive changes in the organization and procedures of the Defense Department with a focus on strengthening the capabilities of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other joint military structures for fiscal and force structure planning and for the planning and execution of military operations."

This legislation formalized the findings of several studies completed during the previous six years, and continued the evolution of the Defense Department. Since reorganizing the national security establishment in 1947, the Congress has intervened repeatedly (with more than 20 major bills enacted into law) to correct the recurring problems of fractured command authority and poor cooperation between the services. Changes in 1958 and the recent Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 have strengthened the unity of the armed forces, and their ability to conduct joint operations.

Inherent in the ability to conduct joint operations is
the requirement for the services to provide the unified commanders the forces and equipment needed to conduct effective warfare. Because of service parochialism and budget battles, needed resources have not always been available to support the unified commanders operational plans.

Major provisions of the Goldwater - Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 include:
- making the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) the principal military advisor to the President
- creation of the position of Vice Chairman of the JCS
- providing the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) of the Unified and Specified combatant commands increased voice in the establishment of military requirements and in resource allocation decisions
- improving the quality of joint staffs by dictating joint education and duty prerequisites
- providing the combatant commanders authority fully commensurate with their responsibility for assigned missions

As discussed above, one of the major objectives of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to increase the CINCs' input into the programming, budgeting, and force generation process.

The purpose of this monograph is to examine the provisions and implementation of the Act to see if it has provided a more effective way of enunciating requirements, and supplying the CINCs the resources required to prosecute
In this monograph, I will first review the reasons for the adoption of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Then, I will review the most important provisions of the Act itself, highlighting those portions of the Act which deal with the combatant commands and their support. Next, I will investigate the organizations and procedures which implement the provisions of the Act, keying on the actions of the combatant commands and the Joint Staff. Finally, I will assess the effectiveness of the Act to determine whether it has been responsive to the needs of the combatant commanders, thus enhancing their ability to conduct combat operations.
CHAPTER II

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION—AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

"Since the end of World War II, I don't think there is any issue that has permeated the national political scene so universally as that of how we should be organized for national defense." 

General Robert T. Herres

The current framework in which our civilian-military relations are conducted is, in large measure an outgrowth of the experience of World War II. Modern warfare required closely coordinated and mutually supporting operations by air, land, and sea forces. This in turn, required not only a unity of operational command but also a coordinating process to obtain the most effective force mix and structure. 

The National Security Act of 1947 was the first attempt to bring about unification of the armed forces through more centralized direction, stronger cohesion, greater joint effort, and mutual support. Although flawed, it created the position of Secretary of Defense, established the Air Force as an independent service, and formalized the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) apparatus—with the JCS itself composed of each of the service chiefs plus a chairman. It also established the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) within the executive branch of the government.

The Act of 1947 was significantly amended in 1949, 1953, and 1958, each time with the intent of correcting as many of
the continuing defects as the political climate would allow. The Department of Defense (DoD) was created by the 1949 amendment. It also redesignated the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force as military departments under the Department of Defense, but requiring that each be administered separately.

The 1958 reforms established the operational chain of command clearly distinct from the military departments by creating the Specified and Unified Commands, and further strengthened the position of the Secretary of Defense at the expense of the service secretaries. The 1958 amendments also continued the ban against "merging" the separate services, establishing a single chief of staff or overall general staff.

Minor administrative changes were enacted by executive authorities over the years since 1958, but the basic organization and responsibilities of the Department of Defense remained constant during the 28 years prior to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

What then caused the change? Throughout history, defense establishments were normally changed in response to defeat in war. This was not the case however, in 1986.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 can trace its origins to four categories of actions which occurred in the years previous to its passage:

- the catalytic impact of three key events
- the key roles played by two individuals
- the cumulative impact of research and study groups in and out of government
- the lingering impact of media attention

The first event was the aborted Iranian hostage mission of April 1980. This daring and dangerous plan to rescue American hostages from the American embassy in Iran was doomed during the planning stages when all military services insisted on being involved whether or not their participation was appropriate. Both the Holloway Commission and the Senate Armed Services Committee investigations of this tragedy, strongly suggested inter-service rivalries, poorly coordinated joint training, overzealous operations security, compartmentalized planning, and incompatible equipment were at the root of this failure.

The next event was the 1983 invasion of Grenada to rescue 354 American medical students. Although touted as a victory, failures of joint coordination, planning, and execution might have spelled defeat against a more formidable foe. Again, service rivalries and lack of unity of command added to the chaos of the operation, which lead many to believe that the U.S. armed forces have serious difficulties conducting joint operations.

The final event in building support for the 1986 defense reorganization legislation, was the terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut on 23 October 1983. The large loss of American lives, coupled with clouded command
relationships and the dubious policy decisions which placed this peacekeeping force in Lebanon initially, led to strong bipartisan consensus for change.

The cumulative impact of these events when coupled with ongoing procurement scandals and cost overruns, also substantially contributed to the reform movement.

Events by themselves, rarely lead to change. Leadership is the required catalyst for change. Two individuals were especially critical to the passage of the legislation: General David C. Jones, and Senator Barry Goldwater.

General Jones, as the incumbent Chairman of the JCS, initiated the debate which ended with the passage of the 1986 Act in 1982, when before a closed session of the House Armed Services Committee, he raised serious doubts as to the ability of this nation’s armed forces to wage war. "His denunciation of the system he had headed for four years, and in which he had participated for four more years as Air Force Chief of Staff, was an urgent appeal to the nation for fundamental reform -- which evidently not even the nation's most senior military chief could achieve from within."

"His ideas and recommendations immediately brought on an avalanche of news reports, editorials, and commentary, and stimulated the formation of study groups both inside and outside of government. General Jones was thereby the prime mover in initiating the drive that led to the 1986 defense reorganization legislation."

The driving force behind passage of the legislation was
Senator Barry Goldwater. As chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, he utilized his unique position to deliver with Senator Sam Nunn, a series of six Senate floor speeches on what they viewed as the major deficiencies in the organization and decisionmaking procedures of the Defense Department and Congressional oversight of national security. The basis for these speeches was provided by the Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services to the Senate entitled, "Defense Organization: The Need for Change."

Goldwater’s support for reform was crucial. No defense reorganization was possible without the backing of the committee chairman. He had unquestioned integrity, was knowledgeable on defense issues, was a conservative Republican, and was in position to make a last call for political IOUs as he prepared to retire when Congress adjourned at the end of 1986.

During this period, numerous research and study groups, in and out of the government, were publishing numerous works which called for defense reorganization and legislative action. "The most important of the books and studies are Edward Luttwak’s The Pentagon and the Art of War; the report of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) entitled 'Defense Organization: The Need for Change'; 'Toward a More Effective Defense', the final report of the Defense Organization Project of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies; and the chapter on 'Defense Assessment' in the Heritage Foundation's Mandate
The preliminary findings of the Presidential Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, (The Packard Commission), as they became circulated in late 1985 and 1986 came to many of the same conclusions as the works mentioned above. A consensus of the most significant problems within the Department of Defense prior to the passage of Goldwater-Nichols included:

- Imbalance of emphasis on functions versus missions
- Imbalance between service and joint interests
- Inter-service logrolling
- Predominance of programming and budgeting
- Lack of clarity of strategic goals
- Insufficient mechanisms for change
- Inadequate quality of political appointees and joint duty military personnel
- Inadequate joint advise
- Failure to adequately implement the concept of unified command
- Excessive spans of control
- Insufficient power and oversight of the Secretary of Defense

Throughout this period, continual media coverage of the events, the leaders, and the studies, kept defense reform in the eye of the public. The time was indeed ripe for defense reorganization. The stage was thus set for the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.
Overview of Public Law 99-433,
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986

"The heart of the Goldwater-Nichols
bill is the increased authority given
to those in uniform who operate in the
joint arena..." 12

The Goldwater-Nichols Act was an ambitious attempt to
correct many real and perceived problems within the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the combatant commands, and the military departments
as well. The intent of its drafters is outlined below in the
policy section of the legislation itself:

"In enacting this Act, it is the intent of the
Congress, consistent with the congressional
declaration of policy in section 2 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401) --

(1) to reorganize the Department of Defense and
strengthen civilian authority in the department;
(2) to improve the military advice provided to the
President, the National Security Council, and
the Secretary of Defense;
(3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders
of the unified and specified combatant commands
for the accomplishment of missions assigned to
these commands;
(4) to ensure that the authority of the commanders
of the unified and specified combatant commands
is fully commensurate with the responsibility of
those commanders for the accomplishment of
missions assigned to their commands;
(5) to increase attention to the formulation of
strategy and to contingency planning;
(6) to provide for more efficient use of defense
resources;
(7) to improve joint officer management policies; and
(8) otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military
operations and improve the management and
administration of the Department of Defense." 13
Organizationaly, the law is divided into six sections:

- **TITLE I - Department of Defense Generally**
- **TITLE II - Military Advice and Command Functions**
- **TITLE III - Defense Agencies and DOD Field Agencies**
- **TITLE IV - Joint Officer Personnel Policy**
- **TITLE V - Military Departments**
- **TITLE VI - Miscellaneous**

**TITLE I - Department of Defense Generally**

This title contains several provisions designed to clarify the position of the Secretary of Defense toward all DOD components including the JCS and the services. "Title I sets the stage for the following sections of the Act. It delineates the efforts of Congress to achieve:

(a) Realistic fiscally constrained planning
(b) Greater civilian control of the military
(c) Higher quality of people to fill DOD political positions
(d) Greater effectiveness based upon future changes within the office of the Secretary of Defense."

This section requires the SecDef to provide annually to DOD components written policy guidance for the preparation of program and budget proposals. This guidance will be in accordance with our nation's worldwide national security objectives, policies, priorities, and resource levels expected to be available during the period of time that these programs are to be effective.

It also requires the SecDef, with the approval of the President to provide the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff written policy guidance for the review and promulgation of contingency plans. Again, guidance on
specific force levels and resources assumed to be available during the time these plans would be effective must also be provided.

These two requirements will cause the Defense Department to better link strategy, planning and available resources when directing the efforts of the services and combatant commands.

In an effort to enhance civilian control of the military, the SecDef is required to keep the Secretaries of the Military Departments informed of the military operations and activities of the Department of Defense that directly affect their responsibilities. The Act also specifies that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is to assist the SecDef in preparing guidance for contingency plans and in reviewing those plans.

To improve the quality of political appointees within DOD, the SecDef is now required to inform the President of the specific qualifications required to fill each of these positions. These qualifications would also be made available to the Congress for evaluation during the confirmation process if required.

As a continuation of the review process, Congress directed that four different parties -- the SecDef, the Service Secretaries, the Chairman JCS, and an independent contractor -- conduct separate studies on the organization and functions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, using detailed guidance provided in the Act itself.
"Strengthening the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in a variety of ways and strengthening everything associated with multiservice 'jointness' was the heart and soul of the Goldwater-Nichols Act." This concept is found throughout the provisions of Title II to the Act.

Title II is composed of two parts; the first section deals with the organization and function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff while the second is concerned with the Unified and Specified combatant commands.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman of the JCS is now the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the SecDef, but shall as he considers appropriate, consult with and seek the advice of other members of the JCS or commanders of the unified and specified commands. Previously, he had been merely a committee chairman; the advisory role being a function of the corporate JCS.

Other functions previously performed by the corporate JCS or now required to be performed by the Chairman under Title II to the Act include:

- preparing fiscally constrained strategic plans
- performing net assessments
- providing for the review of contingency plans which conform to policy guidance from the President and the SecDef
- advising the SecDef on the critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities

- establishing and maintaining a uniform system of evaluating the readiness of the unified and specified commands

- advising the SecDef on the priorities of the unified and specified combatant commander's requirements

- advising the SecDef on the extent to which the services' budget proposals conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and meet the requirements of the unified and specified combatant commanders

- Submitting alternative budget proposals in order to achieve greater performance with the priorities established

- recommending to the SecDef a budget for activities of each unified and specified combatant command

- assessing military requirements for acquisition programs

- developing joint doctrine

These detailed requirements are intended to give the Chairman, supported by the Joint staff, a new and dominant military role in the iterative stages of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS).

In addition, the Chairman is required to submit a report every three years to the SecDef on the roles and missions of the armed forces. This report is to contain such recommendations for change as the Chairman considers necessary to achieve the maximum effectiveness of the armed forces. In producing this report, the Chairman must consider changes in the threats faced by the United States, unnecessary duplication of effort among the armed forces,
and changes in technology that can be applied to warfare.

Title II also authorized the creation of the position of Vice Chairman of the JCS, who is second in military rank only to the Chairman, but must be from a service different from that of the Chairman. The law directed that the Vice Chairman would participate in all JCS meetings but without a vote except when serving as acting Chairman in the Chairmans' absence. Specific duties and responsibilities of the Vice Chairman are to be directed by the Chairman with the SecDef's approval.

Due to the new legislation, the Chairman is clearly in charge of the Joint Staff. He may select the Director of the Joint Staff. The Chairman is directed to manage the Joint Staff, and prescribe its duties and staffing procedures. It will operate under his authority, direction, and control to assist him in the execution of his duties. The size of the Joint Staff has been limited to 1,627 military or civilian members.

The Act also prohibits the Joint Staff from operation or organization as an Armed Forces General Staff, nor exercising any executive authority.

Combatant Commands. The positions of the commanders of unified or specified commands have also been strengthened by the provisions of the Act.

The changes require all forces except those assigned to carry out functions of a Secretary of a military department (primarily recruiting, training, equipping, mobilizing etc.)
be assigned to a unified or specified command. Traditional support functions of those forces however, still remain with the services. It also specifies that all forces operating within the geographic area of operations assigned to a unified combatant command, shall be assigned to and under the commander of that command.

The Act also reaffirms that the chain of command runs from the President to the SecDef to the commanders-in-chiefs (CINCs) of the unified and specified commands. It assigns the Chairman of the JCS the task of overseeing the actions of the CINCs and allows him to be placed in the flow of communications. The command authority provided the CINCs is greater than in previous legislation. Their authority with respect to subordinate commands allows the CINCs provide authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics; organizing their command and prescribing the chain of command to the commands and forces within their command, and employing forces within the command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned. Furthermore, the CINC must concur with the assignment of subordinate commanders and staff to his command, evaluates their performance, may suspend them from duty, and may request the reassignment of any officer assigned to his command.

The CINCs were also given additional input into the budget and resource management area. With the approval of the SecDef (after consultation with the Chairman, JCS),
separate budget proposals for each unified and specified command may be included. These submissions would include funding requests for joint exercises, force training, contingencies, or selected operations.

Congress also required a study be made of the existing unified and specified command organizations, missions, responsibilities, and area of responsibility boundaries. This resulted in a revision of the Unified Command Plan (UCP).

In short, these changes have solved many of the acknowledged command authority problems. They have also strengthened peacetime relationships which must be on solid ground prior to crisis situations or open hostilities.

**TITLE III - Defense Agencies and DOD Field Activities**

Title III requires the SecDef to assign supervisory responsibility for each Defense Agency and Field Activity (except the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency) to a civilian in the Office of the Secretary Defense or the Chairman of the JCS. The Chairman is also required to develop a readiness reporting system for certain agencies, and advise the SecDef on the ability of these agencies to carry out their wartime support missions. The Chairman is also to ensure the participation of these agencies and field activities, as appropriate, in joint training exercises.
The Act also prescribes that separate studies will be conducted by the Department of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and the military departments on the organizational structure and functions of these agencies. These studies must address an extensive list of options included in the Act, and discuss the effectiveness and efficiency of providing supplies or services to their customers.

Limits to the number of personnel employed by these agencies are also restricted to those civilian and military personnel assigned for duty with these agencies as of 30 September 1989.

**TITLE IV - Joint Officer Personnel Policy**

The intent of this title is to improve the management and quality of the officers assigned to joint positions. Under the provisions of the Act, the SecDef was required to establish policies, procedures, and practices, for the effective management of officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps on the active duty list who are particularly trained in, and oriented toward joint matters. These "joint specialty officers" would be selected by the SecDef from nominees submitted by the military departments. The legislation also stipulated that an officer could not be selected for the joint specialty until he had undergone a joint education program and a full joint duty tour (exceptions excluded).
Fifty percent of the total joint duty positions in grades above captain/Navy lieutenant must be filled by officers who have been nominated or selected for the joint specialty. Of all joint positions, at least 1000 must be designated as "critical", and always filled by a joint specialty officer. Congress also mandated that each officer completing a joint military education school would be immediately detailed to a joint assignment upon completion of the course.

Procedures to ensure equitable promotion of joint specialty officers, and review of promotion board results of all services by the Chairman were stipulated.

The Act also required that subject to a waiver by the SecDef, an officer could not be promoted to flag or general officer rank without having served in a joint duty assignment.

The Chairman must also evaluate the joint duty performance of officers recommended for promotion to three- or four-star rank, and the SecDef must now advise the President on the qualifications needed by officers to serve in three- and four-star positions.

"Taken together, the joint officer personnel provisions of the new law create an historic departure for officer development and management,...and has now legislated the foundations necessary for a joint staff of the armed forces, one that can be trained, and promoted over time to ensure its progression continuity, and freedom of action from undue
influence from the services."

**TITLE V - Military Departments**

The organization and function of the military departments was also addressed under Goldwater-Nichols. The basic changes were designed to strengthen the authority of the service secretaries and to eliminate duplication of effort within the secretariats and service staffs.

The Act delineates the duties and responsibilities of the service secretaries, chiefs of staff, and other senior officials and officers. Each military headquarters staff is now limited to five Deputy Chiefs of Staff and three Assistant Chiefs of Staff. In addition, it reduces the number of general officers assigned to military headquarters staffs by fifteen percent by 30 September 1988.

This title assigned the secretaries of the services responsibility for the accomplishment of the following functions: recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping (including research and development), training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering; construction outfitting and repair of military equipment; and the construction maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures and utilities necessary to carry out the responsibilities in this section. These functions must also be carried out to satisfy the current and future operational needs of the unified and specified combatant commands. Functions of each
service are now aligned with the removal of the missions of naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping from the Department of the Navy, and assignment of forces engaged in these missions to the unified and specified combatant commands.

It consolidates the sole responsibility for the following functions in each service secretariat: acquisition, auditing, comptroller, information management, inspector general, legislative affairs, and public affairs. The military headquarter staffs are now prohibited from conducting these functions. Previously, duplication of effort within the service staffs and service secretariats occurred in several of these functional areas.

Finally, this title requires the chiefs of staff, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the SecDef, to keep the Secretary of their Military Department fully informed of significant military operations affecting the duties of the Secretary of their Military Department.

**TITLE VI - Miscellaneous**

The final title of the Goldwater-Nichols Act deals with issues not covered elsewhere in the previous sections. To reduce the administrative burden on the Defense Department, the number of defense reports required by Congress from the President and the Defense Department were reduced by about two-thirds from the original quantity.
Personnel serving on the lower-level headquarters staffs of the Military Departments and unified and specified combatant commands were reduced by approximately ten percent from existing levels effective 30 September 1988.

The Act requires the President to submit an annual report to the Congress on the national security strategy. This report will include a discussion of worldwide interests, goals, and objectives; worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression; and the short and long term uses of the elements of national power to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives previously discussed. This report will be transmitted to Congress on the same date as the budget proposal for the next fiscal year.

Lastly, the Act requires the SecDef to submit draft legislation for any proposed changes to Title 10, United States Code, or any other provisions of the law needed or recommended by the Reorganization Act.
CHAPTER IV
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACT

"Now the senior corps of professional military officers faced in some respects the greatest challenge and opportunity it was ever given: a chance to develop and express its ideas, to educate and train itself, and then very largely to manage and operate the defense establishment to an unprecedented degree in keeping with the highest form of professionalism..."

Having seen the composition of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, let us next investigate the actions taken to implement the Act, keying on the actions of the Joint Staff and combatant commands to improve the CINC's ability to conduct joint operations. The three major categories to be discussed which impact on this ability are: resource allocation, personnel policy, and doctrine development.

Resource Allocation. Due to the groundswell for military reform in the early 1980's, several actions were taken by the Department of Defense (DOD) prior to the passage of the Act to better integrate the CINC's into the planning process and improve the nations' warfighting capabilities. Too often in the past, the resource allocation process had been dominated by the services, whose primary consideration was modernization and force structure, at the expense of the combatant commands, whose priorities were readiness and sustainability.

CINCs were first invited to participate in the deliberations of the Defense Resources Board (DRB) in 1981.
In 1984, Deputy SecDef Taft endorsed procedures to allow the CINC's a greater voice in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development process and DRB Program Review. These procedures included the CINC's submission of prioritized requirements (the CINC's Integrated Priority Lists [IPL]), visibility of the CINC's requirements in the service POMs, and an enhanced role for the JCS in the review and coordination of the CINC's concerns. The 1986 Act furthered the accomplishment of the objectives of these DOD decisions.

One of the greatest contributions of Goldwater-Nichols in the resource management and allocation process was the creation of the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As mentioned previously, the exact duties of the Vice Chairman are specified by the Chairman with the approval of the SecDef. The five major duties assigned the current Vice Chairman, General Herres, by the Chairman are: resource management, joint personnel policy, joint professional military education, oversight of the defense agencies, and oversight of deliberate war planning. These duties are closely linked to the increased responsibilities of the JCS imposed under Goldwater-Nichols. In the realm of resource management, there are two key arenas in which the Vice Chairman serves: the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), and the acquisition process. In the PPBS, the Vice Chairman participates in the Defense Resources Board, the OSD's
corporate review board, which helps the SecDef manage the PPBS process. His familiarity with the combatant commands' operational requirements, enables him to authoritatively speak to the impact of resource shortfalls and JCS priorities. In the area of acquisition, the Vice Chairman serves as the chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and as the vice chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). The JROC is chartered to provide program oversight and monitoring at the front-end of the acquisition process to determine joint program feasibility. It also emphasizes the requirements of the CINC's, while ensuring interoperability, reducing parallel and duplicative efforts of individual services, and promoting economies of scale. The council, composed of the vice chiefs of the services is not new; but now has a broader framework within the DOD acquisition process as mandated by the Act. As the sole uniformed member of the DAB, the Vice Chairman serves as an advocate for the requirements voiced by the combatant commanders. With the chairman of the Board, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, the Vice Chairman helps define joint weapons requirements for development, assesses their affordability, defines trade-offs between cost and performance, and decides whether to develop the item or purchase or adapt existing military or commercial systems.

Another action of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to formalize the process by which the CINC's provide input into
the PPBS system. New procedures were provided to the unified and specified commands by the Deputy SecDef in October 1987, in response to the requirements of the Act. These procedures were adopted to track theater-specific and small, yet important programs of interest to the CINCs.

Overall policy, procedures, and responsibilities for PPBS are contained in DOD Directive 7045.14. The CINCs' roles are described in JCS Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 136. These are being revised to ensure alignment with the Act. The CINCs currently provide extensive input into the PPBS system. They comment on the draft Defense Guidance during the planning stage. Each may meet with the SecDef and the DRB to discuss their views and recommendations. Each combatant command provides their warfighting requirements to subordinate component commanders for inclusion into their service Program Objectives Memorandum (POM); and also submit an integrated priority list directly to the SecDef, DepSecDef, Chairman JCS, and each service. After service POMs are published, the JCS provides each CINC a copy for comment. Each service must develop separate annexes to their POMs that address CINC IPL's and report how well CINC warfighting needs are met. The CINCs' comments must deal with the adequacy of service POMs and include an assessment of the risks remaining between the requirements of the Defense Guidance and the capabilities of the service POMs. These views are considered prior to the submission of the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM) by the JCS. OSD
then prepares program issue books after the review of the JPAM. Once JPAM issue books are prepared, the CINCs again have the ability to provide input to the JCS and the DRB during the programming phase. During the budgeting phase of PPBS, the CINCs provide an assessment of the Program Budget Decision, and might be called to testify before Congress on the adequacy of the service budgets in meeting their warfighting needs. As you can see, the CINCs are formally involved throughout all phases of the PPBS process. "By one count, there are now 12 opportunities for the CINCs to provide inputs into the resource allocation process, to say nothing of their ability to make informal requests to the Chairman, who is now charged legally with representing their interests." 

The Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate (J-8) of the Joint Staff (formerly the Strategic Plans and Resources Agency) was created as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. This directorate enables the Chairman to execute his statutory requirements in the PPBS, and is responsible for analysis of force structure, resources, cross-service analyses, and net assessment. The establishment of this directorate helps align strategy, plans, and resources, and places these functions on equal-footing with other JCS Directorates.

"In passing the Reorganization Act, Congress expressed concern that the combatant commanders did not have adequate control over budgets for their subordinate forces. To
address those concerns, the combatant commanders were provided with the opportunity to have their own separate budgets." This significant directive has not been accomplished as yet. Although optional, only two specified or unified commands have submitted individual budget proposals as allowed under the legislation. OSD, after consultation with the JCS and the CINCs, felt individual budget submissions were not required. The consensus of opinion was that the current CINC involvement in the PPBS process, and changes to the Chairman's responsibilities, were sufficient to satisfy their needs. The CINCs also believed that shortages in authorized manpower and expertise at the unified and specified commands prevented them from assuming the increased analytical and management functions required to implement the budget provision. Thought should be given to modest increases to the combatant command staffs for purposes of resource planning, taking necessary billets from the staffs of the component commands. Finally, some CINCs felt that preoccupation with the budget process would detract from their warfighting perspective.

In a related action, the 1987 Defense Authorization Act directed the formation of a unified combatant command for special operations. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was established to: develop and acquire special operations peculiar equipment, supplies, and services; provide command and control to all active and reserve special operations forces (SOF), and conduct special
operations activities or missions when directed by the President or SecDef (normally these missions will be controlled by one of the five regional CINCs). In addition, the CINC was given authority to exercise the acquisition functions of the "head of an agency", and was directed to create a special operations force major force program category for the DOD Five-Year Defense Plan. In January 1989, CINC SOC was provided Program and Budget Development Responsibility by the DepSecDef. This requires CINC SOC to build and defend a special operations POM just as the services do. The intent of Congress was to strengthen special operations capabilities and remove their support from parochial service oversight. These POM responsibilities have consumed tremendous staff resources. During non-peak POM periods, approximately 10% of the USSOCOM staff is engaged in POM related activities. As POM deadlines approach, nearly 50% of the staff is active in the POM process!

**Personnel Policy.** Significant actions have been implemented to improve the quality of personnel assigned to joint duty positions.

Formalized Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) programs have been established. Phase I and II programs of instruction are being developed. With the Command and Staff College classes of 1989-1990, all attendees will receive Phase I of the JPME instruction. Beginning ... June 1990, the Armed Forces Staff College will cease producing Military
Education Level (MEL) 4 graduates, and present Phase II JPME instruction to over 1100 students per year in a 9-week, temporary duty assignment. Upon completion of Phase II, all graduates will serve in a joint duty assignment.

Criteria for designation as a Joint Service Officer (JSO) has been approved. Congressional concessions on the length of joint tours, and the establishment of "critical combat skill" positions to better mesh service requirements with the intent of Goldwater-Nichols were included in the Defense Appropriation Act of 1988-1989 (Public Law 100-80).

Joint duty assignments throughout the services have been identified, and "critical" positions requiring the assignment of a JSO have been determined. These positions have further been divided among the services for staffing.

Throughout the services, the understanding of the importance of joint duty has spread. Service assignment personnel are now ensuring top-quality personnel are meeting the "gates" directed by the Act.

Administrative procedures for the review of promotion board results by the Chairman are being executed.

Policies for the approval by the CINC's of personnel assigned to or suspended from their commands are in effect. DOD revision of the Manual for Courts Martial must be completed before the CINC's may court-martial assigned service personnel.

The policies and procedures outlined above will ensure
the assignment of trained, quality personnel within the joint community.

Doctrine Development. One of the prerequisites for the successful conduct of joint operations is the establishment of meaningful joint doctrine. This area has been significantly addressed since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols.

A separate directorate of the Joint Staff, the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7) has been established. Within this directorate, the Joint Doctrine and Education Division is responsible for the management of joint doctrine development. In August 1987, a doctrinal review was conducted by the JCS, the services, and combatant commands, to identify doctrinal voids, evaluate current doctrine, and identify needed publications. A Joint Doctrine Master Plan was approved by the Chairman in February 1988 which laid out the requirements and the agencies responsible for the development of the doctrinal products. This ambitious outline is depicted on the following page.
Publications identified in the master plan have begun to be produced.

As shown, significant activities have occurred thus far to implement the directives of the Reorganization Act. Next, I will assess the effectiveness of the implementation of the Act and see if it has impacted on the ability of the CINC's to conduct warfare.
CHAPTER V
IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT

"Our general conclusion is that in force planning, programming, and budgeting, and also in the planning and conduct of military operations, there has been cautious movement toward effective implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation..." 31

The two and a half years since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, have been a dynamic period within our defense establishment. Significant changes in the way the JCS, the CINCs and their staffs do business have occurred. Many of these changes have occurred in spite of service parochialism and procedures learned through long periods of service. They have also been implemented despite critical changes in the senior leadership of the Department of Defense. Four different Secretaries of Defense, countless deputies and assistant secretaries, six service secretaries, eight chiefs of staff of the services, and several CINCs have passed through the portals of the Pentagon during this period. Concurrent with the changes mandated by this legislation were the equally important changes in the Pentagon acquisition and procurement procedures highlighted by frequent media reports and legal actions. All of these requirements for change were in addition to the normal operation of the Department of Defense-itself no small task!

So how have we done? Recent news reports based on a General Accounting Office draft report on the implementation of the Act have been somewhat critical of DOD progress. An
April 1989 report prepared for the Chairman by the Joint Staff on the "Implementation of Resource Allocation Provisions of the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986," paints a much brighter picture, as does an independent study completed by two former Secretaries of Defense. The truth, lies somewhere in between. In this chapter, I will look at the implementation of the Act, and see if it has improved the capabilities of the CINCs to conduct warfare, and what other actions are still ongoing, or required.

Resource Allocation. As discussed in the previous chapter, numerous procedural changes have occurred to better integrate the views of the Chairman and the CINCs into the decision process. As a result of Title II to the Act, DOD identified 33 actions needed to implement the legislation. As of this date, this author believes all have been accomplished by actions discussed in the previous chapter except one. The Act requires the Chairman to "advise the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets." Department of Defense Directive 7045.7, dated May 1984, which covers the JCS role in the resource allocation process has not yet been revised by DOD. As a result, JCS Memorandum of Policy 136, on JCS and combatant command planning, programming, and budgeting involvement has not been updated, and does not reflect the changes that have been implemented since the Reorganization Act. Note that the directive has not been updated, but the detailed changes mandated by the Act have been accomplished. The letter of
the law has not yet been complied with, but the spirit has!

The Chairman still believes he must receive better input on the requirements needed by the CINCs at the beginning of the PPBS cycle, and has instituted programs to correct this. Currently there is no standardized, institutionalized, reporting, validation, and resolution process for integration of the combatant commands IPL lists. Great disparities exist between combatant commands on the scope and warfighting importance of their submissions. A new system, the CINCs Warfighting Requirements System (CWRS), is being developed to better define the CINCs' critical, operational requirements. This will enable the Chairman to better prioritize requirements between commands and make better recommendations in the PPBS process. It is estimated that this new reporting system will be in place by July 1989.

Another program instituted by the Chairman to better link warfighting capabilities and requirements is the Base Case Plan Assessment Report. It evaluates the global war plans prepared by the combatant commanders, reviews the analyses of these plans conducted by the combatant commands and military departments, and attempts to identify strengths and deficiencies in force capabilities to include manpower, logistics, and mobility. The shortfalls identified during this review will be integrated into Joint Strategic Planning Process and PPBS for resolution. The final report detailing the deficiencies found in each operational plan should be
Throughout the research effort for this monograph, one thing stands clear; the establishment of the position of the Vice Chairman has been critical to the success of the implementation of the Act, and a more efficient operation of the Joint Staff. According to one member of the Joint Staff, the Vice Chairman has made unthinkable progress. Thanks to his efforts, the identification of requirements has been taken out of OSD hands and placed where they belong; with the CINCs and the Joint Staff.

The actions taken to implement the resource allocation requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act have increased the CINCs ability to influence force structure, policy, and resource allocation priorities throughout the PPBS process.

As my study of the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act deepened, one area of great concern arose. The entire PPBS process, and the assignment of operational missions and contingency plans to the unified and specified commanders, is based on an appreciation of our potential adversaries, national security objectives and policies, priorities of military missions, projected resource levels, and the degree of risk deemed acceptable in not matching our ways, means, and ends. As our national leadership has changed, so have many of the programs, policies and funding strategies. The national debt, changes in Soviet rhetoric under Gorbachev, views of Allies, and a Democratic Congress, have also had tremendous impact on our strategies. A review...
of national security strategy is now being conducted. The Chairman, among others will provide his recommendations as the principal military advisor to the President, SecDef, and National Security Council. This review will produce updated National Security Decision Directives (NSDD), the documents "used to promulgate Presidential decisions implementing national policy, and objectives in all areas involving national security." It is upon these NSDDs and the subsequent Defense Guidance, that the PPBS process will be based. Flawed strategy will produce inappropriate decisions, regardless of how well the resource allocation provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act have been implemented.

**Personnel Policy.** After initial "saber rattling" by the services, the decision to upgrade the quality of the personnel assigned to Joint duty assignments, and the resulting education and assignment requirements have been progressively executed. All pieces of the career development paths are not yet in place, but the officer corps has realized that Joint duty is important. The first class to receive Phase II, JPME instruction at the Armed Forces Staff College is more than a year away. Programs of instruction are still being finalized. They must be scrubbed to delete all non-critical joint instruction. Quality joint-qualified officers can only be produced if quality instructors are provided at the institutions. These instructors must be "joint qualified" to produce student acceptance and credibility. It appears that the significant hurdles have
been overcome in implementing the requirements of the Act. "By all accounts, the quality, morale, and independence of the Joint Staff have improved markedly in the past two years. It will be at least three years before any meaningful assessment of the Joint Specialty Officer program can be made, but increased expertise can be expected which will improve the effectiveness of the joint staffs.

**Doctrine Development.** "Before the Reorganization Act, joint doctrine was poorly developed or lacking because service specific interests dominated doctrine development." As discussed earlier, much progress has been made in organizing the doctrinal process, and assigning requirements to the Joint Staff and combatant commands for execution. Few finalized documents have been completed as yet, "because joint doctrines in many areas are outdated or non-existent. Staffing to complete doctrinal requirements also seems insufficient in many cases. Combatant commands are having to accomplish their operational missions in addition to producing the doctrinal products, often "out of the blue". Officials at the Atlantic, Space, and Transportation Commands are not able to meet joint doctrine development and coordination requirements with their existing staff. Many unified commands such as EUCOM, operate on a daily basis within an alliance framework. Often the doctrine used within one theater is a compromise based on differences between nations, and not agreeable to a unified command and alliance provisions in another. This situation impedes doctrinal
progress, and requires JCS action to resolve. Due to the number of players involved, and legitimate differences of opinion in many areas between the services, I believe the doctrinal area will see slow progress towards the ambitious goals set. The initial manuals produced will be rather poor doctrinal compromises, but will serve as a starting point for discussion and review. Optimistically, it will take at least five years to make significant progress in this area.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

"Changing the course of the single largest management organization in the free world must be accomplished deliberately to avoid undue disruption. It is much like changing the course of a large ship moving at flank speed. The orders have been issued and the wheel has been turned; we now need to finish the turn and settle on a new heading before initiating further course adjustments."  

"Americans characteristically expect too much from college, marriage, jobs, arms control, summit conferences, and defense reorganizations."  The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, was the single greatest change in the organization and operation of the Defense Department since its creation in 1947. The intent of the legislation was to strengthen the position of the Chairman of the JCS, the authority of the combatant commanders, and improve the planning and execution of military operations.

The purpose of this monograph was to review the provisions and implementation of the Act to see if it has provided a more efficient way of enunciating requirements and providing the specified and unified commanders the resources required to prosecute operational warfare. The major categories investigated which impact on this ability were resource allocation, personnel policy, and doctrine development. In each area addressed, the Act and its implementation has improved the CINCs ability to conduct
The changes made thus far are sweeping, but not yet complete. Admiral Crowe believes at least three to five years will be necessary for the reforms to take full effect. Not only must organizations and procedures be changed, but the separate services culture must also be altered to a more "joint" perspective.

"In the end, the success of reform will depend on the commitment, the skills, the leadership, and the dedication of the people that make up the defense establishment. Very often the individuals understand the steps necessary to make the department more efficient, but they lack the incentives to "do the right thing." The Chairman, CINC's, and service Chiefs must "do the right thing," and continue the implementation and institutionalism of the reforms directed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
ENDNOTES


5. Ibid., p. 20.


10. Ibid., p. 183.


15. Unless otherwise identified, all information in the following paragraphs is drawn from PL 99-433, pgs. 92-99.


17. Kruzell, p. 188.

18. COL Don M. Snider, "DOD Reorganization, Part I, New


22. Ibid., p. 22.


28. Information provided by LTC Lebershal, USSOCOM, telephonically on 21 April 1989.


32. GAO Draft Report, p. 20.

33. Ibid., p. 33.

34. Information provided by LTC (P) William D. Hubbard, J-7, JCS telephonically on 21 April 1989.


36. This point has been emphasized in many sources: Brown and Schlesinger, pgs. 40, 67; Hubbard fonecon; Crowe Report, p. 9;

37. Hubbard fonecon.


40. GAO Draft Report, p. 41.

41. Ibid., p. 42.

42. Ibid., p. 43.

44. Kruzell, p. 197.

45. Brown and Schlesinger, p. 66.

46. Ibid., p. 72.
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