COMBINED ARMS: THE RIGHT BASIS FOR JOINT DOCTRINE

BY

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30 MARCH 1988

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

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Among the major reforms and adjustments of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was a provision making the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for the development of joint doctrine. This Article examines the reasons for congressional concern over joint doctrine, and the role joint doctrine should play in national military operations. A proposal is made that joint doctrine should be based on the established principle of "combined arms", which has found wide application in the internal doctrine of the services but not at the joint level.
USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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COMBINED ARMS: THE RIGHT BASIS FOR JOINT DOCTRINE

An Individual Study Project
Intended for Publication

by

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
30 March 1988
ABSTRACT

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TITLE: Combined Arms: The Right Basis for Joint Doctrine

FORMAT: Individual Study Intended for Publication

DATE: 30 MARCH 1988 PAGES: 25 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Among the major reforms and adjustments of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was a provision making the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for the development of joint doctrine. This Article examines the reasons for congressional concern over joint doctrine, and the role joint doctrine should play in national military operations. A proposal is made that joint doctrine should be based on the established principle of "combined arms", which has found wide application in the internal doctrine of the services but not at the joint level.
COMBINED ARMS:
THE RIGHT BASIS FOR
JOINT DOCTRINE

Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is
gone forever. If ever again we should be
involved in a war, we will fight it in all
elements, with all Services, as one single
concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory
and organizational activity must conform to
this fact. Strategic and tactical planning
must be completely unified, combat forces
organized into unified commands, each equipped
with the most efficient weapons systems that
science can develop, singly led and prepared to
fight as one, regardless of service.¹

Dwight D. Eisenhower
1958

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization
Act of 1986 set into motion a wide array of reforms and changes
throughout the American military establishment. The impact of the new
law has already been the subject of extensive description and analysis
in the press and in military journals.² This article focuses on a single,
but very influential provision of the act which confers upon the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) the responsibility for the
development of joint doctrine.
During the first twelve months after the passage of the law, the CJCS implemented this provision by reorganizing the Joint Staff to increase the number of officers involved in doctrinal development, and by initiating an ambitious plan for developing a family of doctrine publications addressing the full range of joint warfare functions. The purpose of this article is to examine the challenges involved in the formulation of joint doctrine and to propose some directions for the joint doctrine development process which promise to benefit the overall effectiveness of the military services.

BACKGROUND

The joint doctrine effort might very well have developed in due time without Congress's direction. Indeed the Army and the Air Force have been making great strides in bilateral doctrine since the early 1980's. However, many in Congress, and on the congressional staff were unsatisfied and translated their impatience into legislation.

Support in Congress for reorganization and reform was based on two primary impressions. First, the United States had suffered a series of military failures and near-failures as a result of the inability of the services to work with each other. And second, even the good friends of the military establishment and many of its recently retired leaders were convinced that the system for joint cooperation and coordination was badly in need of an overhaul.
The critics of the military in Congress cited as examples of joint dysfunction such operations as the seizure of the Pueblo, the Mayaguez incident, the failure of the Iran hostage rescue attempt, and the inability of forces ashore to communicate with supporting naval elements during the invasion of Grenada. In each of these cases, an inability to communicate between service elements led to poor support or actually resulted in failure of the mission. The entire effort of U.S. forces in Vietnam was also presented as an example of a failure attributable, in part, to poor interservice cooperation.

These views were not limited to those members of Congress who habitually oppose the military and find fault with its actions. In fact, it was Senator Barry Goldwater, a retired Air Force Reserve General and faithful supporter of the military services who opened the debate in the Senate leading to passage of the reorganization act which now bears his name. Other stalwart defense supporters in both houses supported passage of the bill despite the opposition of the Secretary of Defense and the White House. Senator Goldwater's words convey the prevailing sentiment:

"As someone who has devoted his entire life to the military, I am saddened that the Services are still unable to put national interest above parochial interest.

The problem is twofold: first, there is a lack of true unity of command, and second, there is inadequate cooperation among U.S. military
The Congress did not reach these strong opinions on their own. Their position was prompted or at least reinforced by the public testimony of two recently retired senior general officers. The first was General David Jones who served as CJCS from 1978 to 1982. General Jones wrote and spoke widely in support of a stronger role for the Chairman in both peacetime and war.

"Responsibility and authority are diffused both in Washington and in the field. Because of this, we are neither able to achieve the maximum effective capability of the combined resources of the four services nor to hold our military leadership accountable for this failure.

"Individual service interests too often dominate JCS recommendations and actions at the expense of broader defense interests. This occurs not only within the JCS itself but in the unified commands and throughout the multi-layered JCS committee structure where joint issues are addressed."

Another military champion of reform was General Edward C. Meyer who served as Chief of Staff of the Army from 1979 to 1983. In 1985, he wrote of the need for reorganization of the JCS.

"The commanders of the unified and specified commands who must conduct operations with forces provided by the Services play only a secondary role in developing the requirements sent to the Chiefs of the Services, who control
the resources. This, in many instances, precludes the most effective use of forces in joint operations. Because of the Service focus on Service needs, there is a lack of attention to important force multipliers—such as airlift, sealift, and interoperable communications for joint command and control."^6

Convinced that serious deficiencies existed in the joint arena, the Senate Armed Services Committee conducted a two year investigation from 1983 to 1985 to find the causes. The results of this investigation were extremely influential in forming the eventual law. Of special interest here is the degree to which deficiencies in doctrine were blamed for operational failures. In fact, James R. Locher III, the author of the committee's report states:

"The absence of JCS emphasis on joint doctrine means that Service doctrine dominates operational thinking. This becomes a problem because the Services are diverse and have different approaches to military operations. When U.S. military forces are jointly employed, Service doctrines clash."^7

Mister Locher goes on in his study report to quote retired Army Lieutenant General John H. Cushman:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff have themselves published no doctrine to harmonize the operations of tactical air and land forces. Indeed they have published no 'how to fight' doctrine at all. UNARF [Unified Action Armed Forces, JCS Publication 2] is not 'how to fight' guidance but rather guidance on organization and command relationships. Instead, the JCS
... hold the Services responsible for the development of essentially all operational doctrine, with provisions for coordination between the Services and for referring disputes to the JCS for resolution.\(^8\)

Faced with testimony and reports like this, members of Congress justifiably judged that joint doctrine was part of the problem. Thus, the CJCS was specifically charged in the law with "Developing doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces."\(^9\) Were Mister Locher, and General Cushman and the Congress correct in their estimation? Perhaps, yes.

Deficiencies in joint doctrine are real. However, they almost certainly do not reflect intentional malfeasance or negligence on the part of the services or any of their leaders. They do, however, reflect the slowness of the historical process of shifting the focus of the services from their principal internal missions and functions in the direction of cooperation and integrated effort. Critics should remember how far the American military establishment has come in the last fifty years.

Throughout World War II, the Army and Navy operated as independent armed forces, under separate cabinet secretaries, with no common commander except the President himself. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Marshall, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral King, often clashed over war policy and settled their differences
through extensive negotiations. This lack of unity of command, led to unhealthy competition and a remarkable duplication of Army and Navy chains of command in the Pacific Theater throughout the war.\(^\text{10}\)

In part as a reaction to these wartime experiences, the Department of Defense was created under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947. This act, and the subsequent revision in 1949 and 1958, unified wartime and peacetime command of the services, and integrated such functions as budgeting and procurement.

But doctrine was not an area in which joint efforts converged. There are many who would challenge that statement by pointing out the series of 26 Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications (abbreviated "JCS Pub"), listed in figure 1. And in fact the JCS Pubs do represent a significant productive effort which has improved the ability of the services to operate together in wartime. The deficiency in this pre-1987 joint doctrine, however, was in its avoidance of combat functions. There is no better list of these shortcomings than the list of "new starts" in the CJCS's newly implemented joint doctrine master plan (JOMP). These new starts include

- Joint Intelligence
- Joint Operations
- Joint Fire Support
- Joint Rear Area Operations and
- Joint Campaign Planning.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>JCS PUB NUMBER</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
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<td>Unified Action Armed Forces</td>
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<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>TRI/TAC: Joint Tactical Communications Program</td>
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</tbody>
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Figure 1. Current Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications.
A full listing of the doctrinal publications being prepared under the JMP is shown at figure 2.

The JCS Pubs addressed the very important but nonetheless peripheral issues, described above by General Cushman, but they did not tackle the core issues of how the services fight together as a team.

WHAT JOINT DOCTRINE SHOULD ACCOMPLISH

To get a feel for what was missing from joint doctrine, consider the challenge facing the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of a unified command containing forces of all four services. The CINC is an "operational-level commander." In current military usage that means that he receives strategic objectives from the National Command Authority (defined as the President, and the Secretary of Defense with the advice of the CJCS), which he must convert into military missions for the forces under his command. This process of converting strategy into plans for military campaigns has come to be known as the "operational art." There is almost no doctrine in existence to guide the CINC in this process. In practice the CINC almost always plans and would execute his plan through his subordinate component commanders. He assigns a separate mission or set of missions to each of his Army, Navy, Air Force, and, if appropriate, Marine component commanders. These component commanders fight their battles principally as uniservice affairs according to their own service doctrines. The services admirably
The JOMP calls for a hierarchical family of publications. In the list below, an indented title indicates a manual which supports a more general manual above it in the hierarchy.

Joint Doctrine Capstone
Unified Action Armed Forces (JCS Pub 2)
Numerical Index (JCS Pub 0)
DOD Dictionary (JCS Pub 1)
Joint Intelligence
Joint Operations
  Ballistic Missile Defense
  Low Intensity Conflict
  Interdiction
  Fire Support
  Joint Air Movement Operations
  Amphibious Operations
  Riverine Operations
  Counterair
  Chemical Operations
  Nuclear Operations
  Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures
  Tactical Command and Control Planning (JCS Pub 12)
  Special Operations (JCS Pub 20)
  Rear Area Operations
  Space Operations
  Electronic Warfare
  Airspace Control
  Psychological Operations
  Operational Security
  Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition
Logistics
  Airlift Support
  Port Operations
  Joint Logistics Across the Shore
  Mobility System Policies (JCS Pub 15)
  Ammunition

Figure 2. Joint Doctrine Master Plan.
Petroleum Oil and Lubricants
Joint Logistics (JCS Pub 3)

Plans
  Campaign Planning
  Joint Task Force Planning

Communications
  World Wide Military Command and Control Systems Standards (JCS Pub 7)
  Tactical Command, Control, and Communications Standards (JCS Pub 10)
  Tactical Communications Planning Guide (JCS Pub 11)
  (Also Other Technical Communications Doctrine Publications)

Figure 2. (Continued), Joint Doctrine Master Plan
concentrate on improving their ability to fight and win their component battles. This is not surprising, for they are responding to their assigned roles and missions from JCS Pub 2.13 What results, though, is a focus on uniservice doctrine, organization, and equipment which leaves joint action relatively unexplored.

This doctrinal separatism is in one way surprising in the American military because each of the armed services has separately developed a doctrine which stresses the combining and integrating of diverse internal assets. The Army doctrine is centered on the "combined arms team" of infantry, tanks, artillery, and aviation support. The Navy although lacking a centrally published fighting doctrine relies on a similar team of naval air forces combined with a diverse force of surface ships and submarines to form the carrier task force. The Air Force is especially adept at tailoring its formations to each mission to include necessary command and control, intelligence gathering, electronic warfare, and air defense aircraft as well as air units aiming at the primary mission. The Marines are the best example of all, containing in a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) the full range of ground units seen in the army as well as the array of capabilities found in the tactical air force.

It is especially significant to note that each service not only possesses a wide range of units, weapons, and capabilities, but also insists that its commanders employ those assets as a team to better
accomplish their component mission. None of the services would be tolerant of a commander with a narrow outlook focused only on his own primary internal specialty.

It is only at the level of the CINC that this passion for teamwork seems to cool. Joint Doctrine developers need to seriously explore the desirability of expanding the concepts of intraservice teamwork to the interservice joint warfighting environment.

This sort of teamwork has a well-known history under the loosely defined label of "combined arms." Though the term means different things to different people in different historical periods, it has consistently been used to describe the art of combining different types of units and weapons in combat in ways which produce an effect on the enemy which far exceeds the sum of the individual effects.

William Lind proposes an illuminating, though possibly too narrow definition of "combined arms" in his *Maneuver Warfare Handbook*:

"Combined arms hits the enemy with two or more arms simultaneously in such a manner that the actions he must take to defend himself from one make him more vulnerable to another. In contrast supporting arms, is hitting the enemy with two or more arms in sequence, or if simultaneously, then in such a combination that the actions the enemy must take to defend himself from one also defends him from the other(s)."
"Combined arms ... seeks to strike at the enemy psychologically as well as physically. It puts the enemy at the horns of a dilemma... the fact that his problem has no solution strikes at his mental cohesion.

"...The distinction between combined arms and supporting arms is important because combined arms take no more firepower, but will usually be much more effective."  \(^\text{14}\)

This concept of multiplying the effectiveness of forces by clever integration and coordination ought logically to be central to the effort of joint doctrine developers. It is apt to spark some controversy, however. Combined arms concepts almost certainly imply an increase in control of service forces by a joint commander who may be from another service and might make decisions inconsistent with the refined and proven service doctrine. These fears are probably amplified by the expectation that a joint commander will revert to his parent service’s doctrine, since no joint doctrine for combat operations exists. The Air Force might expect a joint commander from an Army background to stress close air support and battlefield air interdiction to the detriment of the battle for air superiority. The Navy might harbor similar suspicions of a bias toward naval gunfire and naval air support of land forces at the expense of sea superiority operations.

The challenge to joint doctrine developers is to recognize these concerns and yet to seek out the benefits of “combined arms.” Inevitably, there will be opposition from those in all services who favor the independent operation of components along with only

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limited mutual support in areas such as close air support, battlefield air interdiction, naval gunfire, airfield defense, electronic warfare, and intelligence collection. These opponents would very probably argue that the individual effectiveness of the services should not be tampered with in the quest for some unproven advantage of joint integration.

Such critics would be in good historical company, including distinguished military professionals of the past who in good conscience opposed many of the doctrinal principles we accept without question today. The entire concept of Blitzkrieg which led to the early victories of German forces in World War II serves as a good example. Blitzkrieg's combining of tanks, and mobile infantry with attack from the air survives today in the doctrine of every major national force. Yet in the early 1930's, its developers faced stiff opposition from the general staffs of the emerging German services.15 The concept's acceptance among German military leaders was hempered to some degree by the fact that its authors were relatively junior officers, basing many of their ideas on the writings of the British visionaries, J.F.C. Fuller and Basil Liddel-Hart. The lesson is that innovative winning concepts for war are sometimes discovered by a small group of individuals, and the value of their ideas is not always immediately recognized by their contemporaries.

An effort to find as yet undiscovered combined arms concepts might be thought of as doctrinal "pure research." As in all pure research it is difficult to convincingly defend the value of the time and
effort invested. The defense will have to depend upon the record of past innovations like Blitzkrieg and the highly successful combined arms doctrine of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF). Defenders can also cite at least some current day indicators that integration of the services has potential for growth as a fighting concept.

Chris Bellamy describes one such example, in his book, *The Future of Land Warfare*, when he describes an operation during the IDF's 1982 invasion of Lebanon:

“At 1400 hours on 9 June... unmanned drones were launched over Syrian air defenses, forcing the Syrians to open up against fake targets... The Israelis also used ground-based weapons against the missile sites: probably 175 mm guns,... MAR 29 rocket launchers... and LAR 160s.... It is also reported that the Israelis used ground launched anti-radiation missiles ... ground-launched rockets carrying chaff were fired at Syrian radar sites.... In coordination with air and artillery-rocket-missile attacks, the Israelis... mounted a commando operation against the main command post for Syrian air defense in Lebanon.... It is clear... that one cannot talk about "land warfare" and "air warfare" as two separate things. Air was critical to the ability of the ground forces to move and fight and ground systems and forces made a passage for aircraft, as in 1973 but in a far more complex and multi-faceted way."16
Bellamy goes on to express his own opinion on the conditions which promote such combined arms effectiveness:

"The degree of ground-air cooperation achieved was greater than even most NATO countries could have achieved, partly because the unified structure of the ... IDF precludes much of the inter-service rivalry which characterises the different services in NATO and perhaps even Warsaw Pact countries."^{17}

WHERE COMBINED ARMS JOINT DOCTRINE MAY LEAD

The ultimate configuration of a joint doctrine focused on such combined arms idea is impossible to predict. Even Fuller and Liddel-Hart could not see with clarity the impact their concepts would have on warfare for the rest of the century. But it is at least interesting to speculate on possible outcomes.

Combined arms joint doctrine might lead to integration of the services at lower levels of command. In almost any conflict under current doctrine, the four-star CINC would be the only true joint commander. The CINC's service components would be kept pure and would be commanded by three or even four-star generals. If our advanced joint doctrine promised enough decisive advantage from concerted application and close synchronization, we might find a willingness to organize joint task forces at the junior general/flag level or even lower. The arguments against such an approach might be less less powerful in the later stages of a successful war effort when air
and naval superiority are in hand and the decisive land effort is converging on the Clausewitzian centers of gravity of the enemy. At this point in a war a CINC might benefit most from the synergy of joint combined arms at the smaller unit level.

If formation of such a joint force is anticipated in the advanced joint doctrine, then consideration should be given to forming permanent joint task forces (JTFs). Although JCS Pub 2 currently authorizes the formation of JTFs, it does not address the problem of how to form a well-trained and practiced joint staff to employ the JTF to maximize its combined arms potential. If the doctrine for joint warfighting is sufficiently promising, it would serve to justify the diversion of personnel and funds to standing JTF headquarters below the Unified Command level.

A strong concept for integrated joint operations might also become the centerpiece for formulation of the entire DOD budget and for its subsequent defense before Congress. At present each of the services has an internal system for using concepts of current and future war fighting doctrine as the basis for planning, programming, and budgeting, as well as for initiating the development of new equipment systems. In the Army's Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS), for example, the centerpiece is called an "umbrella concept." The current umbrella concept is the doctrine of "AirLand Battle," which was promulgated in Field Manual 100-5, first in 1982 and in an updated form in 1986. AirLand Battle is the central doctrinal statement of the
Army. Among its primary principles is a stress on the synchronization of the combined arms. CBRS requires each branch of the Army to periodically show that its current and future organization, training, equipment, and development efforts support the execution of AirLand Battle. A similar system for encouraging and enforcing unity of peacetime effort to prepare for unity of wartime effort would become feasible with a joint umbrella concept focused on the combined arms.

Possibly the best outcome from the formulation of joint war fighting doctrine would be the debate and controversy it might engender. Even an unpopular doctrine can be extremely valuable if it inspires the services to criticize it and then to improve upon it or replace it. The Army's AirLand Battle doctrine, for example, was not developed "out of whole cloth" in a short time by a small group. Rather, it was developed by a long and decentralized process in reaction to a doctrine called the "Active Defense," which had been published in the early 1970's. Such spirited dialogues seldom form, however, unless they are inspired by a doctrine in being. The sooner we have a comprehensive and bold joint doctrine which addresses the tough issue of balancing internal service effectiveness with joint combined arms synergism, the sooner articles will begin appearing on how to improve it.

This last point raises the question of who ought to write joint doctrine in the first place, and who should be charged with revising it periodically. The least costly approach would be to have the doctrine
writers of the services pool their insight and experience in a committee effort. There are dangers in this method, however. It may be too much to ask an officer skilled in formulating concepts for better achieving the major roles and missions of his own service to shift his focus to the viewpoint of a joint commander. Joint commanders, particularly in a combined arms age, may choose to subordinate one service's traditional "interests" to insures the success of the total campaign. Committees of service doctrine specialists are unlikely to feel comfortable exploring such tradeoffs. The Army has for many years realized that doctrine for levels of command charged with combining the various branches in combat is best formulated at a level above the centers of the individual branches (e.g. infantry, armor, field artillery). For this reason manuals prescribing doctrine for the brigade, division, and corps are written at the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Officers at CAC are experienced in the basic branches of the Army, but their focus is on the effectiveness of the combined arms as an overall system.

There probably ought to be an organization analogous to CAC for the joint level of doctrine. At present there is none. Without it, the joint doctrinal product may well be a watered down compromise portraying the lowest common denominator of service acceptability, rather than bold initiatives aimed at maximum combat effectiveness of the total force. Candidates for the "joint-CAC" probably start and end with the joint staff itself and the National Defense University (NDU). The alternative would be to establish a new organization for the sole
purpose of joint doctrine formulation. The important ingredient is an independent focus on the joint application of force. To achieve that focus the best source of wisdom and inspiration is, no doubt, the CINC's of the U.S. Unified Commands who face the current challenges of service component integration.

CONCLUSION

This article has suggested that the emerging program for formulation of joint doctrine should take a bold course.

- It should be independent of the services.
- It should focus on the challenges of the Unified CINC's and other joint force commanders.
- It should focus on the long-term as well as the short-term future.
- It should concentrate on the "combined arms" payoff of joint action at all levels of command.
- It should seek to become the basis of resource allocation throughout the DOD, and the umbrella concept for all service doctrine.

Some perception of the value of such a bold effort can be gained by comparing and contrasting two possible scenes from a future war. The scenes differ in the extent to which United States armed forces exercise combined arms integration at the joint level.

In the first scene, a Soviet Front Commander is settling into his comfortable chair for the nightly 1900 briefing on the day's combat
activities. With his habitual cup of steaming tea in hand, he listens to his staff recount the American efforts of the day. These include

- Multiple brigade-size counterattacks which succeeded in pushing back Soviet advances.
- Fighter/bomber attacks which succeeded in destroying several fuel points, as well as the commands posts of one division and three regiments.
- Intermittent jamming of the command nets of all forward divisions.

This commander has been subjected to a very heavy dose of American military power, but in his mind he is not severely threatened and not alarmed at the prospect of defeat. Because the successes of American forces were spread out over time, the commander and his staff have been able to mentally and emotionally cope and adapt.

Suppose, in contrast, that the American commander had demanded that the art of combined arms govern his day's combat at the operational level. In this second scene, the Soviet Marshal again assumes his comfortable briefing posture, but this time in front of a situation map portraying far less U.S. activity. But as the intelligence officer begins his weather update, the radios begin to crackle. Duty officers struggle to receive spot reports through unexpected radio jamming. Only isolated phrases get through such as "brigade-size attack," "heavy air strikes," "ammunition and fuel destroyed," "command post destroyed," and "division commander killed." As if on cue the telephone link from higher headquarters begins to ring
demanding information. "Confirm reports of heavy losses in your sector." "Explain passage of enemy aircraft through your sector currently attacking the strategic rear area." Answers are not forthcoming because U.S. strike aircraft begin pounding the front command post itself, destroying communications systems and killing key members of the staff.

These two fictional scenes do not differ in the amount of military force employed. They differ only in the degree of integration and synchronization of the service components. The second scene arguably represents a higher likelihood of a U.S. victory.

This improved prospect of victory is the reason that joint doctrine should aim at making combined arms the reality of American warfighting.
ENDNOTES


3 Goldwater, p. 13.

4 Ibid., p. 12.


8 Ibid.


11 Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Directorate for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J7), Joint Doctrine Master Plan, Briefing Charts, undated, pp. 14-15.

12 Ibid., pp. 17-19.


Ibid., p. 28.
