MILITARY INTELLIGENCE: 
ITS ROLE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

by

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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
**Military Intelligence: Its Role In Counterinsurgency (U)**

This monograph examines current US Army Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operational concepts for counterinsurgency, doctrinal literature, current practices in Latin America, and lessons learned from Southeast Asia and British Army experiences. This doctrinal and historical base together with its theoretical underpinnings is analyzed and evaluated in light of the military intelligence experiences of the French Army in its counterinsurgency roles from Indochina to Chad, 1946–1984; the Uruguayan suppression of the Tupamaros, 1963–1973; and the Portuguese Army campaign in Mozambique, 1964–1974.

The study concludes that case studies of the French, Uruguayan, and Portuguese forces offer new ISR principles to the US Army. In fact, they lend credence to the traditional British examples, the lessons learned by the US Army in Vietnam and the lessons evolving from Latin America. The enhancements that the study of these armed forces drive home to US ISR doctrine and operations are the dire necessity for governmental legitimacy to include the humane treatment of people, the necessity for improved police-military relations in LIC.
and the primacy of HUMINT among the intelligence disciplines in counterinsurgency. In a larger sense, the study of the French, Uruguayan, and Portuguese confirms that political ends must be translated into military means to achieve operational success in a counterinsurgency. Additionally, their study confirms the notion that an art of war approach to counterinsurgency is valid and substantiates the premise that security stands as the center of gravity for an insurgent force.
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ABSTRACT

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE: ITS ROLE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY.
By Lieutenant Colonel (P) Julian M. Campbell, Jr., USA, 42 pages.

While it is generally accepted that military intelligence plays a key role in low intensity conflict (LIC), there is not a broad understanding as to how intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) systems are organized and employed nor how IEW operations are executed in a counterinsurgency environment. Some recent successes have been achieved within the US Southern Command area of operations and are being documented to form guiding principles to shape US Army IEW doctrine. At the same time, the US Army Intelligence Center and School is rapidly incorporating those lessons learned, newly defined roles and articulated operational parameters of military intelligence into doctrine. One must stop, however, and ask the question whether or not we are focusing in too narrow a manner on US Army experiences in Latin America, its earlier experiences in Southeast Asia and even on our traditional reliance upon British counterinsurgency methods. It is not suggested that these successful and practical exponents of military intelligence in counterinsurgency be discarded, but rather that the recent experiences of other armed forces be examined to ensure not only that the US Army has gleaned all IEW fundamentals, but more importantly, that it has gleaned all innovative means of applying those fundamentals in a LIC environment.

This monograph examines current US Army IEW operational concepts for counterinsurgency, doctrinal literature, current practices in Latin America, lessons learned from Southeast Asia and British Army experiences. This doctrinal and historical base together with its theoretical underpinnings is analyzed and evaluated in light of the military intelligence experiences of the French Army in its counterinsurgency roles from Indochina to Chad, 1946 – 1984; the Uruguayan suppression of the Tupamaros, 1963 – 1973; and the Portuguese Army campaign in Mozambique, 1964 – 1974.

The study concludes that case studies of the French, Uruguayans and Portuguese offer no new IEW principles to the US Army. In fact, they lend credence to the traditional British examples, the lessons learned by the US Army in Vietnam and the lessons evolving from Latin America. The enhancements that the study of these armed forces drive home to US IEW doctrine and operations are the dire necessity for governmental legitimacy to include the humane treatment of people, the necessity for improved police-military relations in LIC and the primacy of HUMINT among the intelligence disciplines in counterinsurgency. In a larger sense, the study of the French, Uruguayans and Portuguese confirms that political ends must be translated into military means to achieve operational success in a counterinsurgency. Additionally, their study confirms the notion that an art of war approach to counterinsurgency is valid and substantiates the premise that security stands as the center of gravity for an insurgent force.
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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE: ITS ROLE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

I. INTRODUCTION

Successful low intensity conflict (LIC) operations depend upon timely, specific, and accurate all-source intelligence. This is true across the entire low intensity conflict spectrum. For just as LIC resides on the continuum of conflict that extends from no conflict (peace) on the one hand, through total nuclear war on the other, so too, is there a spectrum and range of activities within the low intensity conflict environment. Early attempts to define LIC were based on the size of forces engaged, the purpose of the conflict, and level of intensity. Maturation of thinking about the concept, however, has evolved into the notion that the key distinction rests with the character of the conflict.

The current definition of LIC approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is:

... a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, military, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, and psychosocial pressures through terrorism and insurgency. LIC is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints in the weaponry, tactics, and level of violence. LIC involves the actual or contemplated use of military capabilities up to, but not including, combat between regular forces.

Since military objectives and operational ends are derived from national and military strategies, precise definition of the character of the conflict is clouded. US Army missions may include foreign internal defense or counterinsurgency, terrorism counteraction, peacekeeping operations and peacetime contingency operations.
Counterinsurgency, terrorism counteraction and peacetime contingency operations can be found at all levels of conflict. Thus, these general categories are not mutually exclusive, but often overlap.

Military intelligence and electronic warfare operations play a vital role in LIC missions, but the scope, focus and context differs for each mission and at each level of conflict.

Insurgency or revolutionary war can be applied in two contexts; that is, from the viewpoint of a nation-state using this form of warfare to impose its will upon another or from the viewpoint of a revolutionary situation of a state growing within a state. Revolutionary war and politics are inextricably linked for as Mao Tse-tung has written, "War cannot for a single moment be separated from politics; politics are bloodless war, war is the politics of bloodshed." Thus, in an elaboration of the Clauswitzian interpretation that war is an extension of politics, Mao has said that war is politics.

History, particularly in the twentieth century, has shown that this equation of war and politics tends towards greater civil involvement in conflict. Civilians thus pay an increasing price in blood and cash in warfare and at times become instruments of war. Insurgency does not, however, purport a philosophy of mass destruction, for as Sun Tzu wrote in 400 BC:

Generally in war the best policy is to take a State intact; to ruin it is inferior to this....Do not put a premium on killing....To capture the enemy's army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a battalion, a company or a squad is better than to destroy them....To win a hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.
To achieve such an end, an insurgency must be organized to carry out a variety of essential activities. The first is to develop a significant degree of intelligence about the state against which the insurgency is directed—intelligence that thoroughly identifies the internal mechanisms of the state. Only when one has determined the functioning processes of each part of the state can the weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and finally, the state's center of gravity be identified. A strike at the center of gravity will cause the total collapse of the enemy according to Sun Tzu. Based on that same intelligence, the second essential activity or stage of insurgency, subversion, emerges. From this, the last essential, a resistance movement within the enemy state, may finally develop.

Thus, intelligence is a key ingredient of a successful insurgency just as it is crucial to counterinsurgency. As Sun Tzu has said:

One who confronts his enemy for many years in order to struggle for victory in a decisive battle yet who, because he begrudges rank, honours, and a few hundred pieces of gold, remains ignorant of his enemy's situation is completely devoid of humanity. Such a man is no general; no support to his sovereign; no master of victory.

Now the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge....

What is called "foreknowledge" cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation. Now there are five sorts of secret agents to be employed. These are native, inside, doubled, expendable, and living.

What does the study of historical applications of military intelligence in a low intensity conflict environment, more specifically, a counterinsurgency environment, reveal concerning US Army intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) doctrine? This
monograph will explore that question, for while it is generally accepted that military intelligence plays a key role in counterinsurgency, there is not a broad understanding as to how intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) systems are organized and employed nor how IEW operations are executed in a LIC environment. Some recent successes have been achieved within the US Southern Command area of operations and are being documented to form guiding principles to shape US Army IEW doctrine. At the same time, the US Army Intelligence Center and School is rapidly incorporating those lessons learned, newly defined roles and articulated operational parameters of military intelligence into doctrine. One must stop, however, and ask the question whether or not we are focusing in too narrow a manner on US Army experiences in Latin America, its earlier experiences in Southeast Asia and even on our traditional reliance upon British counterinsurgency methods. It is not suggested that these successful and practical applications of military intelligence in LIC be discarded, but rather that the recent experiences of other armed forces be examined to ensure not only that the US Army has gleaned all IEW fundamentals, but more importantly, that it has gleaned all innovative means of applying those fundamentals in a LIC environment.

The methodology of this paper will be to examine current US Army IEW operational concepts, doctrinal literature, current practices in Latin America, lessons learned from Southeast Asia and British Army experiences. That doctrinal and historical base, together with its theoretical underpinnings, will be analyzed and evaluated in light of the military intelligence experiences of selected other armed forces.
in counterinsurgency roles from 1946 to the present date. Framework for the discussion will be an art of war theory of counterinsurgency which has been set forth by the US Southern Command Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD). From this analysis, conclusions will be drawn as to how US Army IEW operations might be enhanced by contrasting the experiences of these armed forces with our current US Army military intelligence and electronic warfare precepts and doctrine.

II. ART OF WAR THEORY OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

The SWORD art of war theory is an expansion of the traditional military estimate and decisionmaking process. It conforms to current US Army counterinsurgency doctrine and provides a theoretical framework for examining counterinsurgency strategic and operational concepts, campaign plans, doctrine, forces and capabilities. The art of war theory simultaneously provides an excellent construct to examine IEW operations and doctrine since it supports an intelligence oriented counterinsurgency strategy.

In brief terms, the art of war approach can be described as follows: (1) It is applied at the national level to develop overall national military strategy and at the operational level to develop long-term operations or campaigns designed to achieve the military objectives necessary to support national objectives. (2) It is designed to eliminate ambiguity of purpose or desired end state by concentrating on clearly defining military objectives in response to both national objectives and threat realities. (3) It emphasizes detailed consideration of threat doctrine, intentions, capabilities,
vulnerabilities and center of gravity while providing clear identification of the state of the enemy at the conclusion of the campaign. (4) It examines friendly doctrine, capabilities and vulnerabilities to determine how best to attack threat vulnerabilities and center(s) of gravity so as to achieve the desired end state rapidly and to identify additional friendly capability requirements. (5) An operational concept and a campaign plan are developed to attain the desired military objectives. The concept of operation carries through to the completion of the campaign even though modifications will, of course, be required along the way. The concept and campaign plan are fed back to the national level for approval, for adjustments to national plans, if needed, and as a method for justifying additional resources. (6) The operational concept and campaign plan need not be written but the entire chain of command from the national to tactical levels must thoroughly understand what needs to be done to achieve campaign objectives. Intent must be adequately clear so that the lowest level that may need to act independently can do so.6

The most critical elements of the process are the determination of objectives and the detailed threat analysis where enemy vulnerabilities and center(s) of gravity are identified which, of course, will affect how friendly forces are organized and the concept of their employment over time to achieve the desired campaign objectives and ultimate end state. From a national perspective, a country threatened by insurgency seeks to restore civil order and respect for law and may use political, economic and social reform, coupled with supporting civil and military actions to counter the

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insurgents. When insurgent objectives are limited to reform of an existing system, negotiated settlement with reconciliation or political recognition may be a viable means for conflict resolution. But when an insurgency is communist led, invariably insurgent objectives far exceed mere reform and include long-term aims to overthrow the existing government and replace it with a communist system. Ultimately, true communist insurgents accept no other solution.7

Governments facing communist insurgencies must understand that even with successful reform, reconciliation through negotiation, is not a viable objective. Strategic and operational level objectives must therefore include elimination of the insurgency with the ultimate goal of freeing a country of insurgent elements capable of disrupting the normal flow of society. Pursuit of the military objective to destroy the insurgency while supporting reform and civil rights is an extremely complex task and particularly difficult for the army of a Third World nation. In light of such difficulties, it is imperative that the strategy, doctrine and tactics used can be executed with limited resources and in minimal time in order to minimize insurgent damage and the socio-economic upheaval caused by a protracted war.8

The art of war approach to threat analysis provides a method for developing appropriate strategies, operational concepts, doctrine tactics, force structures and capabilities. It examines insurgent ends, ways and means, vulnerabilities, and center(s) of gravity while at the same time projecting friendly methods for gaining the initiative, exploiting success and attaining early victory.
The thread that permits an insurgency to develop, grow and succeed is adequate freedom of action through appropriate security systems and measures. Defensive measures include the establishment of remote base areas, the use of multiple and secret routes, the construction of underground bunkers, the use of caches and booby traps, the development of clandestine organizations and support systems, the infiltration of government organizations and the gaining of (willing or intimidated) popular support for manpower, logistics and intelligence. At the same time, insurgents attempt to gain and maintain initiative through actions that distract military forces and weaken the incumbent government. These offensive actions include deliberate acts of terrorism, military attacks against weak police or military installations, propaganda and physical destruction of the country's economic infrastructure.9

The essential ingredient for insurgent success is security because it provides the time to make a protracted strategy feasible, protects vulnerabilities and weaknesses and, most important, security gives the insurgent the ability to exercise initiative. Without adequate security, it is virtually impossible to develop and support a viable insurgency. Security is, thus, the insurgent center of gravity and if that center of gravity is successfully penetrated on a continuous basis by the government, all aspects of insurgent operations are exposed and made vulnerable.10

An appreciation of this concept of security as opposed to the enemy force as the insurgent center of gravity is crucial to a successful counterinsurgent campaign. The United States and the Republic of South Vietnam seem to have lost sight of this fact in
Southeast Asia and despite military operations that compelled Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces to withdraw repeatedly from the battlefield, the insurgents by means of a resilient infrastructure kept coming back and eventually prevailed. A program that fails to understand the importance of an insurgent infrastructure and the support of the populace and that focuses merely on enemy military forces is likely to fail.

In the same manner that the insurgents use security to protect their operations, gain the initiative and achieve their ends, the government must use intelligence to expose vulnerabilities, regain the initiative and destroy the insurgency. An intelligence oriented strategy on the part of the government will enable the superior military forces to be employed in such a way as to reduce insurgent freedom of action, attack insurgent vulnerabilities and focus efforts against his center of gravity. Targets should be attacked both physically and psychologically, in priority, based upon their impact on insurgent capabilities, will and popular support. Objectives and priorities are developed at appropriate echelons by commanders who have at their disposal the intelligence and psychological operations staffs and forces to execute those missions effectively. 11

Sporadic successful operations against insurgent vulnerabilities will have little impact. The government gains the initiative only through a series of successful operations that threaten insurgent security and increasingly expose more vulnerabilities for exploitation. As the government applies unrelenting pressure, the psychological impacts reach far beyond the specific objectives of individual operations. As individuals and capabilities are threatened and infrastructure systems that took years to build are
crumbled, insurgent initiative is lost, fear and discouragement mount, and the entire insurgent apparatus rapidly unravels.12

III. CURRENT IEW DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE

The role of military intelligence in counterinsurgency must be viewed from several perspectives. From the view of the theater commander, military intelligence and IEW systems serve as a primary operational tool. Intelligence provides the theater commander early warning for potential US military operational contingencies as well as assessments with which to advise the National Command Authorities, ambassadors and others on policy options. One must not lose sight of the fact that the US military has a supporting role in all areas of the world today in which we find ourselves involved in low intensity conflict. The military supports programs that have been planned and are being implemented by ambassadors and their country teams or by the host nation. Nonetheless, military intelligence finds itself very much as a committed force in a low intensity environment with maneuver elements most likely not even in the theater. Unfortunately, the organizational and operational concepts upon which military intelligence units are based are framed within the context of deployed combat elements.

IEW operations, in a more visible role, serve as a tangible force multiplier which the theater commander can use in the business of nation-building. US military intelligence supports friendly nations by filling the void that exists until the host nation tactical intelligence capabilities are built. US military intelligence can be reduced as host nation intelligence capabilities improve but the
commitment is planned for the long term because of the protracted nature of counterinsurgency and because most friendly Third World nations are not economically capable of matching the US intelligence collection effort. Thus, military intelligence support provides demonstrable evidence of US commitment and resolve while it supports overall US policy and strategy of helping friendly nations develop democratically without committing US combat forces. In a combined effort, our intelligence supports their armed forces. This is a common role for military intelligence today in Latin America.

On another level, US military intelligence helps host nation commanders understand the importance of tactical intelligence and how to use it. Traditionally in Third World countries, military institutions have used intelligence to manipulate power. Few of them have a corps of intelligence professionals. Police organizations in these countries, as a rule, conduct what we know as military intelligence. Police run informant nets, interrogate suspects and conduct surveillance. Police intelligence is evidentiary, however, intended for use within the legal system and is seldom shared with the military.

The dynamic of US military intelligence support to host nations is, indeed, an interesting one which achieves several purposes during its development. First, it emphasizes the interaction between intelligence and operations; that is, between getting information about an enemy and acting on it to gain tactical or operational advantage. To achieve this interaction, a number of steps must occur. On the intelligence side, collection management must function. The commander states in priority a list of intelligence
questions that need answering in order for him to accomplish his mission. Intelligence collection assets must target those questions and basic analysis carried out to answer them. This operations-intelligence interaction is a continuous process that occurs simultaneously with all the preparatory steps for combat operations. It requires direct involvement by the commander and full staff participation. Its prime vulnerability is dissemination—communicating information to the right persons and elements in time to use it. In Third World cultures where knowledge is power and all power rests with the commander, information tends to be closely held, to move slowly, if at all, and to be funneled through the boss. To achieve battlefield success, these old habits must be changed. US efforts are to a considerable extent spent in moving critical intelligence and information to key persons and places in a timely fashion. The light soon dawns, however, in the heads of those commanders who attribute battlefield success to tactical intelligence and they tend to reinforce success by demanding more intelligence. Not only does US military intelligence help get host nation commanders involved, it also points out the numerous ways that the indigenous military intelligence system must be developed or improved. 15

Additionally, US Southern Command has found that US civilian agencies which produce intelligence do not emphasize intelligence fusion at the tactical military level. As guerilla movements turn a passive nation into an insurgent battleground and as narcotic traffickers and guerillas increasingly work hand-in-hand in a marriage of convenience, military intelligence techniques become a
necessity. Ambassadors do not have the capability on their country team to produce military intelligence. Accordingly, in the USOUTHCOM theater, the trend has been to reinforce a US Embassy with a small team of two or three military intelligence officers who are charged to (1) provide trend analysis and limited target development to the country team (and to the host nation at Ambassadorial direction) and (2) to provide advice and assistance to the country team on theater intelligence collection which can be focused on the Ambassador’s priority requirements. 

The US Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) has been at the forefront of US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) efforts to infuse the Army, particularly intelligence personnel, with LIC doctrine and training. USAICS has played a major role in the Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project directed by the Army Chief of Staff in July 1985. The project’s mission has been to examine world-wide LIC issues with a focus on Central America, to develop a common LIC data base, to develop lessons learned and to identify the implications for national strategies and their impact on military operations for LIC. With participation by the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the armed services, the Central Intelligence Agency and numerous military and civilian government agencies, the project evolved into a permanent Army/Air Force Center for LIC (CLIC) located at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.

Notably, nine intelligence issues were identified which have served as the focus for USAICS training, combat development and doctrinal efforts. Those issues are:
(1) The need for early recognition of growing insurgencies or potential terrorist activity.
(2) The need to identify the unique nature of intelligence in LIC.
(3) The adequacy of intelligence-sharing in support of counterinsurgency operations.
(4) The adequacy of human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities to support LIC.
(5) The adequacy of training of intelligence personnel to operate in a LIC environment.
(6) The need for adequate language training and linguist management to support LIC.
(7) The constraints on efforts to train and advise host country intelligence personnel.
(8) The need to coordinate and integrate intelligence activities at the regional and the country team levels.
(9) The need to develop and/or acquire appropriate intelligence collection systems for LIC.

In the doctrinal arena, USAICS fares rather well, particularly in the HUMINT discipline which has traditionally been a mainstay in successful counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts. USAICS made major contributions to the Army's Field Circular (FC) 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict, dated 16 July 1986. Intended for use by staffs and commanders charged with duties and responsibilities at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, the field circular provides basic principles and direction for the production of other functional and branch doctrinal literature publications.

As the keystone manual for IEW operations, Field Manual (FM) 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, dated July 1987, establishes the doctrinal foundation for IEW operations to include IEW in LIC. A chapter devoted to LIC in FM 34-3, Intelligence Analysis, dated January 1986, details the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process in a LIC environment and prescribes the all-important techniques for pattern analysis of insurgent activity. The HUMINT manuals FM 34-52, Intelligence
Interrogation, dated May 1987; FM 34-60, Counterintelligence, dated August 1985; FM 34-60A (S/NFD), Counterintelligence Operations, dated August 1985; and FM 34-5 (S) Intelligence Collection Operations (draft), dated February 1987, are replete with "how to" techniques for all types of LIC missions with particular focus on terrorism counteraction and counterinsurgency. Topics detailed include terrorism and insurgency indicators, data base management, pattern analysis, targeting, population and resources control, installation security, special operations, surveillance, interrogation techniques, tactical questioning, reporting procedures, advisor and interpreter relationships, and joint/combined intelligence operations in LIC.

Signals intelligence and imagery intelligence doctrinal literature is less extensive in dealing with LIC but, nonetheless, addresses the application of those disciplines across the entire warfare spectrum.

Intelligence training in LIC subjects is totally integrated into all USAICS instruction. All identified intelligence-related LIC critical tasks are taught as are assignment specific modules and a superb two-week course, "Intelligence in Terrorism Counteraction".

These training and doctrinal initiatives are drawn only in part from US Army experiences in Vietnam as the most significant input is derived through continuous dialogue with USOUTHCOM and US Army LIC experiences in Latin America. Additionally, US Army IEW doctrine continues to receive substantive British flavor as we have for years drawn from British experiences in Malaya and Northern Ireland. Significantly, there has for a number of years been a British intelligence officer posted to the US Army Intelligence Center and School and he currently heads the USAICS Low Intensity Task Group.
with teaching and writing responsibilities in addition to liaison officer duties. Thus, the thoughts and techniques of Sir Robert Thompson and Brigadier Frank Kitson permeate US Army IEW efforts in LIC.

IV. HISTORICAL VIEW OF IEW IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

Despite the positive trends shown above, shortfalls are readily acknowledged and work proceeds apace. However, we need to stop and look for a moment at the experiences of other armed forces in their low intensity conflict intelligence efforts to see if they support the art of war theory which we have posited and if there are any lessons to be derived from other than our traditional Latin American, Southeast Asian and British sources. The historical cases chosen represent different geographic settings, insurgency stages and strategies. They range from very successful efforts supported by good intelligence to disastrous failures where insurgency threat and vulnerabilities were not well understood by the governments being challenged.

THE FRENCH ARMY: FROM INDOCHINA TO CHAD, 1946-1984

The French have not enjoyed a great deal of success in counterinsurgency since 1945. They have experienced defeat at the hands of a relatively unsophisticated peasant army in Indochina (1946-54) and faced the trauma of virtual civil war over insurgency in Algeria (1954-62). In the process, they adopted a rigid theory of response known as “guerre revolutionnaire” which not only proved to
be unsuccessful in practice but also led to deep rifts in French society as the Algerian War dragged on, and even provoked attempts by the Army to interfere in the internal politics of the state. Since 1962 there has been an understandable tendency not to become involved too deeply in counterinsurgency situations, leading to an apparent lack of long-term commitment in places such as Chad, where French troops have been deployed on no less than three occasions with little permanent effect. 19

As France attempted to reassert herself in Indochina after having lost her colonial grip between 1940 and 1945, she found herself no longer facing ill-organized colonial rebels. The Viet Minh, communist inspired and strongly nationalistic, were disciplined and dedicated revolutionaries. Coordinated by a central politburo, the insurgents had established an extensive infrastructure in the rural areas of northern Vietnam and built secure bases to which they could retire and from which they could sustain a military campaign against the colonial authorities. The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu after seven years of conflict was attributable first to political ineptitude on the part of the home government who failed to provide either political leadership or adequate resources. It was attributable, secondly, to Viet Minh organizational techniques and infrastructure. And third, attributable to a failure to concentrate on pacification and development of an efficient local administration, but rather to seek a decisive set-piece battle. The French found such a battle at Dien Bien Phu.

The French, despite valiant efforts to defeat what they saw as a rebel movement, totally misinterpreted the nature of the threat and
the stage of the insurgency. Their intelligence was poor, concentrating almost entirely on regular formations of the Viet Minh and failing to portray a complete picture at Dien Bien Phu in terms of the enemy's anti-aircraft and artillery capabilities. Information about the organization and strength of guerilla forces and, more importantly, the political infrastructure of the Communist Party was lacking and no serious efforts were made to rectify the problem. There were no policies, for example, to tempt deserters from the Viet Minh or to turn captured guerillas against their former colleagues.20

The French Army employed both overt and covert intelligence methods in Algeria from 1954-1962. Overt operations consisted primarily of interrogations and analytical effort to identify the insurgent infrastructure for subsequent neutralization. In more covert intelligence efforts, Algiers was divided into sectors, sub-sectors, blocks and buildings, each containing senior inhabitants (usually Moslem ex-soldiers still loyal to France) who would act as informants, reporting suspicious movements and keeping a general check on the activities of local people. The resultant network became a potent arm of the French arsenal of counterinsurgency weapons.

Unfortunately, in the culminating Battle of Algiers in 1956-57, the French resorted to institutionalized torture of insurgent captives and suspects. Such methods were tactically effective and frequently allowed reaction squads to stop a terrorist bombing or break up a terrorist cell. The long-term result was that, although it may have won the battle, it probably lost the war for France
through the violent and persistent reaction it aroused in both the mother country and the world at large. Such conduct eroded the moral position of the Army in the struggle against the insurgency. This, in turn, led to the political decision to withdraw from Algeria even though the Army was winning in the traditional military sense.\textsuperscript{21}

In the 1970's and 1980's, France applied in Chad those hard lessons learned from previous decades in Indochina and Algeria. While there is some question as to whether the French involvement in Chad is truly as a counterinsurgency force or as a military presence to protect vital ground while the politicians seek a long-term solution, there is no doubt that the French Army has learned to think politically and to be politically astute yet not to get politically involved.

The same is true of French intelligence efforts in Chad where the gathering of information extends over a series of complex situations where most military actions have political consequences. Human sources, ground sensors and aerial reconnaissance have been employed in a cohesive blending of strategic and operational intelligence required by the continuous dialogue between political decision makers in Paris and executors in the field. Notably, the French have demonstrated the realization that firm intelligence priorities must be established prior to any intervention in order that rapid, coherent tactical action can ensue and have shown as well an understanding that in LIC operations, civil-military cooperation is one of the most important determinants of success.\textsuperscript{22}
Latin American insurgents have followed the lead of the Che Guevara and Regis Debray adaptation of Mao Tse-tung's rural guerilla warfare theory and have formulated a Latin "foco" theory of rural insurgency. Unlike Mao, who called for a prolonged period of political preparation prior to the commencement of insurgency, the "foco" theory postulates that a minimum level of popular discontent with a government would provide a sufficient political base for the military actions of a small band of fast-moving and hard-hitting guerrillas. The failure of the government to suppress the guerrillas would force it into repression affecting the entire population and thus exposing the corrupt nature of the system as a whole to the populace. The guerrillas would then prove to be the "foco", or focus, for wider insurrection. The "foco" theory worked in Cuba in 1958-59 and in Nicaragua in 1978-79 where the Batista and Somoza regimes failed to understand the insurgent threat and were unwilling to give priority of effort against it. Thus, targets of intelligence operations tended to be personal enemies of the regime and legitimate internal political opposition. Because of this misdirected effort and the lack of concern for human rights, the legitimacy of the regimes came into question. The bonds between the people and their government were broken and both regimes soon fell.

"Foco" has proved of little other success in Latin America for only in El Salvador and Peru have the insurgents rediscovered the virtues of the countryside and the success of those two insurgencies remains to be seen. The price of this flawed thinking on the part of
Latin American insurgents has, however, resulted in a general
suppression of human rights throughout the continent. In Uruguay, we
see a clear example of the dangers of governmental repression but
how, at the same time, "foco" bands may well only succeed in
strengthening the state.

Until the early 1960's, Uruguay had been a model of peaceful
political and social development. But a decline in the world demand
for wool, an economic mainstay, instigated a downward economic spiral
and a significant decline in Uruguay's gross national product. The
problems of unemployment and inflation escalated as did bureaucratic
corruption and the situation was ripe for the birth of the Tupamaros,
Uruguay's first effective insurgent group. From 1963 to 1968,
Tupamaro actions escalated to include armed robberies, sabotage,
kidnappings and murder. The police bore the brunt of dealing with
the emergency although armed forces support was frequently provided.
The police were augmented by a 20,000-man paramilitary force in 1969
but Tupamaro atrocities continued to rise. Finally in 1971, the
armed forces were called into the conflict by a newly-elected
President. Simultaneously, a state of internal war was declared
throughout the country and civil liberties virtually disappeared.

What transpired in Uruguay bears further analysis. With general
prosperity and little relative unrest in Uruguay until the early
1960's, the police force and armed forces alike were ill-prepared to
face an insurgent threat and the leadership of neither of them
aspired to political influence. The emphasis remained until 1972
with the police to hold the Tupamaros at bay as representatives of
civil rather than military power. When it became apparent to Army
leaders that the police were on their own incapable of effective action, pressure grew for the military to enter the fray and it became increasingly difficult for the political command structure to maintain a firm grip on the military chain of command. Military leaders set up a council in 1971 to study solutions to the government crisis and when asked to go into action in 1972, merely took the law into their own hands.24

The armed forces crushed the rebellion heavy handedly and without much worry about close political control, acted with very little regard for the liberal principles of a democratic state. The lack of previous experience in the subtleties of counterinsurgency was very much evident in the area of intelligence. Since the Tupamaros were small in number and never won mass popular support, security forces could easily have exploited the situation to isolate the guerrillas from the bulk of the population. But just as the police before them, at no time did the armed forces evolve a coordinated attempt to gather and collate intelligence on the Tupamaro infrastructure. Instead, they blundered on to Tupamaro hideouts and documents, made no effort to induce Tupamaro defectors and elicited very little information from captives. The result was a blanket response affecting the populace rather than a careful concentration upon the minority causing the problem.

If the Tupamaros had not been eliminated, the "foco" theory might well have worked in this instance. Instead, we view an example of a counterinsurgency which depended on overwhelming force and repression to succeed. Flushed with success, the military refused to return to their barracks in 1972 and a new crisis emerged within the state. In
this case, the accepted form of government was undermined and the principles of democracy destroyed. Only in the last 3 to 4 years as the military has loosened its grip on the reins of power has that near tragedy been overcome. 25

THE PORTUGUESE ARMY IN AFRICA, 1961-1974

Generally, the first reaction of the Portuguese government against insurgencies in the African "provinces" was a series of repressive measures carried out by the Prime Minister's secret police—the "Policia Internacional de Defense de Estade" (PIDE). This was true in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. Eventually the regime instituted civil reforms and assigned the primary counterinsurgency mission to the armed forces, but kept the secret police involved. The intelligence effort was carried out independently by each service and by the police and, depending upon the situation and personalities involved, was largely uncoordinated and unshared. Informant networks were supplemented by interrogation of captured insurgents as well as aerial observation and photography. Additionally, the armed forces established an unusually good rapport with the populace which resulted in a constant flow of information about insurgent activities. 26

The relative success of the intelligence effort was rendered ineffective by a number of other factors. Despite a limited number of forces, lack of equipment and a paucity of mobility assets, the armed forces remained at least on par with the insurgents. Political problems and motivational crises within the military were

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insurmountable, however, and created a situation where the Portuguese, while not defeated, simply could not win. In the political arena, there was significant sympathy for the insurgents and their causes on the part of the military. This was exacerbated by internal strife within the armed forces and the development of problems between the military and the central government. By the early 1970's the military had in effect quit fighting and were themselves embroiled in politics at home. Thus, counterinsurgency operations in Africa ceased.27

HISTORICAL SUMMARY

The cases cited demonstrate some critical factors key to successful counterinsurgencies. Intelligence may be the most crucial but it is followed closely by and, in fact, tightly interwoven with the critical factors of government force capabilities and legitimacy. In short, history suggests that insurgencies can be defeated by nations willing to invest in the appropriate low-level human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities necessary to penetrate insurgent security and gain the initiative for capable government forces.

Intelligence dominates the other factors when considered as a specific and separate government force capability. The historical cases cited support the thesis that the degree of success achieved by counterinsurgency operations relates directly to the emphasis and effectiveness of intelligence operations. The successful counterinsurgencies relied primarily on human source intelligence
with efforts directed toward obtaining specific exploitable objectives with interrogation being a key capability. While other factors may well have superseded the defeat of the insurgency as in the case of Algeria, Uruguay, and the Portuguese in Africa, HUMINT was the key to counterinsurgent success and, clearly, where HUMINT was not emphasized, the insurgents were not defeated.

Friendly capabilities, other than intelligence, such as command and control, mobility, fire support and logistics are seen as critical to the achievement of intelligence and exploitation objectives. With adequate government capabilities, despite intelligence shortcomings, insurgencies were contained but not quickly defeated as in the French and Portuguese examples. Today, Latin America provides a current example where government defeat has been avoided, but the insurgency has not been defeated. There appears to be a balance required for rapid success against insurgents that involves good intelligence, including HUMINT, and at least adequate government forces. The French experience in Chad provides a good example. A balance that is heavy on force capabilities, including what on the surface appears to be good intelligence but which is light on HUMINT capability, does not seem to produce decisive results.

Legitimacy is a factor of tremendous importance to a democratically oriented government. It can be either a strength or a weakness. The positive power of legitimacy, although not demonstrated in the historical examples used in this paper, is evident in the Philippines, Malaya and Northern Ireland where proper treatment of people was a hallmark. And while not critical to near
term success in the Algeria and Portuguese cases, the lack of legitimacy ultimately favored the insurgent. Legitimacy, or lack of it, is far more important as a vulnerability of democratically oriented governments and decadent dictatorships such as those that existed in Cuba and Nicaragua. A repressive organization or government such as the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and now the Vietnamese is capable of subduing a country when it has the intelligence and force capabilities, is willing to implement stringent population control measures and is sufficiently ruthless in its overall conduct. Marxist-Leninist regimes fall into this category, but Uruguay came close to falling in as well.28

V. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE

The principles of operating in LIC and the roles of military intelligence shape the ways IEW operations are conducted. The manner in which military intelligence is employed in LIC is decidedly different from its employment in mid-to-high intensity conflict. (See Figure 1) These differences hold significant implications for intelligence architecture in LIC and also for doctrine. An analysis of these operational realities follows:29

IEW operations in LIC are centrally controlled and decentrally executed. Unlike in mid-high intensity situations where intelligence units are organic to or directly supporting committed combat elements, the LIC environment requires centralized control of disparate intelligence operations which may be executed from various locations. Collection systems normally designed to support a committed Army
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

DOCTRINAL AND ARCHITECTURAL IMPLICATIONS

FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

LOW

CENTRALIZED CONTROL-
DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION

COLLECTION SERVES MULTIPLE
CONSUMERS

INTEL PROCESSING AND
ANALYSIS IS REMOTED

TACTICAL INTEL ORIENTED ON
HOST NATION

TACTICAL HUMINT A MAJOR ROLE

EMPHASIS ON IMPROVING HOST
NATION CAPABILITIES WITHIN
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSTRAINTS

MID-HIGH

DECENTRALIZED CONTROL-
EXECUTION

COLLECTION FOCUSED AT
SPECIFIC LEVEL ON COMMANDER

INTEL DEPLOYED WITH FORCES

TACTICAL INTEL SUPPORTS US
COMMANDER

TECHNICAL INTEL EMPHASIZED

EMPHASIS ON US MILITARY IEW,
DEVELOPMENT, DOCTRINE AND
TRAINING

Figure 1.30
Corps will find themselves supporting all three operational levels—tactical (the host nation), operational (the theater commander and ambassador), and strategic (national level decision makers).

Collection serves multiple consumers. As LIC strategy is carried out by a number of decision makers who have a complex set of relationships—host nations, Ambassadors, Theater Commander, Joint Chiefs of Staff, State Department, and others—intelligence collection requirements tend to proliferate. Priority and focus tend to blur. In LIC, the lack of collection focus tends to place the problem of providing precise intelligence to key decision makers at each level on the analyst rather than having the requirements and priorities articulated by the commander as occurs at the other levels of warfare. Collection management for LIC requires much work.

Tactical intelligence is oriented on the host nation. The rule of thumb in supporting friendly nations with US military intelligence is to work with and through the country team to develop IEW systems that are oriented on host nation capabilities and requirements. The parameters for such a system are that it first must develop a host nation appreciation for tactical intelligence as well as the capability to collect, analyze and use it. Second, an in-country US team under the direction of the ambassador will most likely be required to focus the effort. And finally, for those theaters which, like USSOUTHCOM, have neither the structure nor the organic capability to provide such support, a capability to collect and analyze military intelligence must be established out-of-country with their product provided in support of the country team plan.
Tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) plays a major role in LIC.

Due to the sophistication of the powerful adversary we face in Europe, the US military has placed great emphasis on technology to see the enemy and to provide means to decide and to deploy and keep him off balance by attacking his vulnerabilities. We have found that technology plays a significant role in fighting insurgents as well but the nature of the LIC struggle dictates that technology is not always the best weapon. The struggle is between the government and the guerilla for the loyalty of the populace and it is HUMINT, particularly low-level tactical HUMINT, that can best provide information from that environment. Interrogation, informant nets, troop reports and document exploitation provide parts of a clear tactical intelligence picture. HUMINT is not always as reliable as intelligence derived from technical systems. It is vulnerable to penetration, takes a long time to develop and requires continuous effort to nurture. But it holds the potential to provide crucial warning on an enemy that operates in small numbers, normally avoids confrontation and selects targets based on careful understanding of vulnerabilities. For those same reasons, HUMINT holds the key to unlocking the insurgent's center of gravity—security.

In LIC, the long-term goal is to develop host nation MI capabilities.—US IEW systems designed for the conventional and nuclear battlefield lack the flexibility required by LIC operations because they are not HUMINT-oriented and are organic to divisions and above where little employment can be achieved at the small unit level of LIC. A concerted effort is being made, and must continue, to transfer technical intelligence capabilities to friendly nations and
to design MI units that place the requisite intelligence resources at the appropriate level.

VI. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND EXPLOITATION PERSPECTIVES FOR LIC

While we continually make references to tactical actions and tactical intelligence, it should be pointed out that in LIC the differentiation between levels of war is often quite blurry. Small units conducting tactical operations using tactical intelligence frequently have operational or even strategic implications. On a grander scale, the host nation no doubt perceives itself as being involved in a total war as its survival as a nation is at stake. For the US, however, LIC is not war but, is instead, a series of actions short of war which may risk combat but, hopefully, will avoid the need for war.

Two basic types of operations are required of a counterinsurgency campaign—intelligence and exploitation. The operational commander carefully articulates the desired end state and insures that the intent of operations is based upon his long-term concept of detailed intelligence followed by efficient exploitation designed to maintain the initiative and apply increasing pressure on the insurgents. Holding to the concept of exploitation of intelligence insures that the operational concept does not disintegrate to an attrition or body count mentality in which intelligence is relegated to a secondary role. Little evidence of an intelligence oriented strategy of this sort is seen in any of the case studies of this paper.
The real measures of success are those that relate to disruption or a threat to insurgent security which we have identified as the insurgent center of gravity. Appropriate indicators are the rate of insurgent defections, the availability of volunteer informants, the movement of insurgents to more remote bases, the division of insurgent forces into smaller groups and the reversion to lower level insurgency states. The greatest source of this type of information will be prisoners and defectors.

Intelligence collection operations are key to obtaining and retaining the initiative and are the basis of an intelligence oriented strategy. They are designed with the primary objective of obtaining intelligence and differ considerably from combat oriented operations where intelligence is a secondary mission. Instead of conducting an operation in a disputed area to make contact with the insurgents, a government unit with interrogators, psychological operations and counterintelligence personnel moves into a contested or insurgent-controlled village and remains there several days or considerably longer if necessary. While there, the government unit interrogates large numbers of the population resulting in the revelation of the entire insurgent picture of the village and potential informers are identified. Additionally, government psychological operations are implemented, a census is taken and a thorough reconnaissance of the area is conducted for future reference.

The outcomes of such an operation are considerable. Almost everything of military importance relating to the village is learned including all aspects of insurgent activity, caches, supply, personal
relationships, communications and medical systems. Numerous exploitation targets will be developed for immediate follow-up or for subsequent operations. In addition to pinpointing targets and objectives for future operations, the intelligence operation attacks the insurgent at a higher level as it is a direct challenge to insurgent security. The insurgents will not know what has been divulged but they will know that they will never be as safe in that village or area as they once were. Follow-up exploitation operations further convince them of this fact.31

Exploitation operations include combat and psychological operations conducted to exploit developed intelligence. Although combat operations still have a secondary mission of intelligence, success is measured by the specifics of the mission which are more conventional including attack, ambush, destruction and seizure. Using precise intelligence, such missions can be executed quickly, with surprise and with smaller units than are normally used in sweeps or search and destroy operations. Because many more operations are conducted with greater success, there is a cumulative and increasingly devastating impact on insurgent security and morale. Our historical survey demonstrated how a successful strategy requires that counterinsurgency operations promote rapid destruction of the insurgency in humane fashion.32

Again, we are viewing MI in LIC from the tactical perspective and a review of currentIEW doctrine and training reveals that the techniques for the conduct of both intelligence and exploitation operations are firmly established. It is in the application of these techniques and the translation of the military intelligence role from
the tactical to the operational level that shortfalls are readily apparent.

Not all commanders apply an intelligence oriented counterinsurgency strategy, at least that was the case in Vietnam where an attrition strategy prevailed in the early years of the conflict. One hopes that those lessons have been learned and, fortunately, in Latin America it appears that they have. Unfortunately, it is at the operational level of LIC where MI is used as a conduit for US support to friendly nations, where it is a training mechanism and a visible means of support to be employed by the Theater Commander and the Ambassador that doctrine, training and organizational structure are found lacking. Other than in the special operations forces (SOF) arena, the schooling of intelligence trainers and advisors has received inadequate attention.

In a counterinsurgency, an intelligence capability several steps beyond the usual is required. This capability involves the use of military intelligence operations as a dominant element of strategy, operational art and tactics. Thus, commanders all the way down to platoon and squad level must be responsible for collecting and exploiting intelligence. The lowest echelon where adequate intelligence assets have generally been concentrated is at division or brigade yet counterinsurgency operations are normally conducted independently by battalion and smaller units. More often than not, these operations have strategic, operational and political implications as well as tactical utility.
VII. CONCLUSIONS

In his book, Defeating Communist Insurgency, Sir Robert Thompson laid down five principles for successful counterinsurgency. The first one is that there must be a very clear political aim—that the political ends desired must be well articulated and understood. Second, the whole government side, the army, the police and civil administration, must function in accordance with the law of the land and in accordance with the highest civilized standards. The third point is that there must be an overall plan and an overall strategy for counterinsurgency that covers every single field of government and politics and of the military and society. Fourth, the government must secure its base areas, and fifth, the priority of attack should be the insurgents’ infrastructure, not guerrilla units.33

US Army counterinsurgency methods, to include IEW doctrine, embrace these British principles and have done so for a number of years with varying degrees of success dependent upon the diligence with which those principles were applied. This is not surprising since the British Army has been the most practiced exponent of counterinsurgency since the end of World War II.

The French, Uruguayans and Portuguese in our case studies offer no new IEW principles. In fact, they lend credence to and reiterate the British examples, the lessons learned by the US Army in Vietnam and the lessons being re-learned in Latin America. The enhancements that the study of these armed forces drive home to US IEW doctrine and operations are the dire necessity for governmental legitimacy to include the humane treatment of people, the necessity for improved
police-military relations in LIC and the primacy of HUMINT among the intelligence disciplines in counterinsurgency. In a larger sense, the study of the French, Uruguayans and Portuguese confirms that political ends must be translated into military means to achieve operational success in a counterinsurgency. Additionally, their study confirms the notion that an art of war approach to counterinsurgency is valid and substantiates the premise that security stands as the center of gravity for an insurgent force.

Despite offering no new principles for IEW doctrine, this analysis, nonetheless, provides some requirements for what needs to be done to enhance IEW operations and execution at the operational level of conflict. Notably, within the LIC context MI needs the organizational flexibility to deal with LIC requirements. Tactical intelligence capabilities are required at lower levels than they now exist. Security assistance programs centered on efforts to improve the military intelligence capabilities of friendly nations are far from complete. Intelligence collection management must be enhanced to accommodate a multitude of other agencies and must be framed within a structure that enables a commander to use his intelligence product as a means of tangible support to other agencies as well as to friendly nations. Finally, the capability for military intelligence to help friendly nations build their own multi-disciplined intelligence system, make it operate effectively and enhance it with technology is a continuing need.

The ability to achieve desired counterinsurgency end states rapidly may be the most beneficial assistance the US can provide to threatened friendly nations. It assumes, of course, that we know how
to do it ourselves. Thus, the role of military intelligence is crucial to ourselves and to the friendly nations we may be called upon to support— for military intelligence is always out front.

Toujours en avant!
ENDNOTES


7. Ibid., p. 4.

8. Ibid., pp. 4-5.


11. Ibid., p. 8.

12. Ibid.


15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., pp. 24-25.

18. The author serves as his own source for much of the discussion of USAICS training and doctrine as well as, to a lesser degree, military intelligence LIC efforts in USSOUTHCOM and draws from personal papers, documents and experience. He served as G2/Director of Intelligence, 193d Infantry Brigade (Panama) (now US Army South) from September 1982 to July 1984; as Commander, 2d School Battalion, 111th MI Brigade (Training), USAICS from July 1984 to July 1986; and as Director, Department of Human Intelligence, USAICS from July 1986 to July 1987.


20. Ibid. p. 56.


25. Ibid.


27. Ibid.


30. Ibid., pp. 20-22.


32. Ibid., pp. 45-46.

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