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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM

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STAY-BEHIND FORCE FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD, SOLDIERS OR POLICEMEN?

An Individual Study Project
Intended for Publication

by

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INTRODUCTION

The National Guard is in a period of dramatic transition from its historic place as augmentation or back-up force to its new role as a front-line member of America's defense capability.

This added reliance on the National Guard is a reflection of the Army's Total-Force Policy, a policy that places the Reserve Components into vital juxtaposition with the Active force in virtually all of our major war plans. Army National Guard units are totally integrated into and train with Active Component senior commands for contingencies in specified areas of operation throughout the world.

It is very likely that in a full or even a partial mobilization, some states will be faced with the federal activation of most, if not all of their National Guard units. Consequently, some states have expressed a concern with the lack of forces available to the state for local emergencies and are looking at revitalizing the State Defense Force.

The State Defense Force, an organization enabled by federal legislation was created to replace the National Guard upon the latter's federal mobilization. Although the organization of the State Defense Force is along military lines, historically it has performed police or constabulary functions and not military functions. This paper questions the traditional structure of the State Defense Force and suggests the creation of a State Police Reserve with the Federal Emergency Management Agency as the federal executive agent to replace the militarily oriented State Defense Force administered by the National Guard Bureau for the Department of Defense.
BACKGROUND

The concept of a militia predates the Constitution. Colonists had to serve their own military needs as English troops in the New World were scarce. Each colony experimented with its militia, developing local variations to fit its own circumstances. But a basic concept prevailed in all colonies. The militia force was primarily responsive to local colonial or state authorities and secondarily available to federal or royal authority in times of general emergency or war.

Although the militia forces of the various colonies provided the basis for the Revolutionary Army during the initial phases of the war, a federal force raised by Congress was the Army at the close of the war.

The framers of the Constitution wrestled with the militia concept. Those who wished to construct a national government relatively independent of the states wanted a central government armed to provide political leverage in the foreign political arena. Strong opposition from "states rights" advocates forced a compromise. Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution presently known as the "Militia Clause", reflects that compromise:

...to provide for arming, organizing, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;...

The Federal government kept control of the Militia by establishing themselves as the responsible authority for all but appointment of officers and training. This placated the states, as they felt that control of the officer corps was tantamount to control of the force. Although the Second Amendment provided for a Militia: ... a well-regulated militia,
being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed..."; the Militia Act of 1792 was the first national law establishing a Regular Militia within each state. The act required all able-bodied men, 18-45 years of age to enlist in the militia of their home states.

The political issue influencing the organization of the militia during the founding days of our country was the opposition between the centralists and the states' rights protectionists, a philosophical difference of opinion that continues today, especially as it affects the National Guard. What is clear is that both sides wanted the preservation of some military functions for the states.

The militia system established in the Militia Act of 1792 was basically ineffective. Each state varied in its commitment to its militia. Many did not meet their obligations at all. The states Adjutants General were required to report the strength and training of their respective forces. Early records and inspection reports indicated that during the first half of the nineteenth century, only a few states could or would support a militia as provided by the Act. The states, by their indifference, or fiscal and organizational immaturity caused the militia system to fail. The importance of this early history is to recognize how poorly the states supported an organization that was responsible for their internal security. Perhaps they perceived the threat to their security as insignificant.

Another important cause of that failure was the attitude of the citizenry toward membership in the militia. Because of the obligation that the Militia Act imposed on the citizen of the day, service in the system was viewed with hostility, ridicule and contempt. Many of the newly
organized states were unable to administer the unpopular program.

The militia revived in the late 1870's when labor problems of the day create a need for the force to act as strikebreakers. The militia took on the mission and assumed the character of a constabulary or state police force. A constabulary is an armed police force organized on military lines whose unique characteristics and requirements stem directly from the nature of its mission. It is an instrument of civil control with the basic mission of creating and maintaining internal security within a political subdivision.

The Dick Act of 1903 repealed the Militia Act of 1792 and provided for a federally supported militia. The Act reorganized the Federal Militia system by dividing the militia into two groups, the organized militia (National Guard), and the reserve militia. The thrust of the Dick Act was to provide federal assistance to the organized militia, and give to the President the authority to mobilize the National Guard component. This Act also acknowledged that the National Guard function, as anticipated by the Constitution's framers, was as a military reserve, organized with the ultimate purpose of serving the national interest. The Dick Act was the next step in the evolutionary process of nationalizing the Guard. But the legislation that conclusively established the Federal Government's control over the militia was the National Defense Act of 1916. This Act conferred federal status on the National Guard, and enabled the states to organize a replacement force after the National Guard was federalized, but not before.
Two and a half weeks before the National Defense Act of 1916 became law, the President called up the National Guards of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona for duty on the Mexican border. Other states also sent their guards to assist the Active Army during the border crisis. Prohibited from establishing a back-up force before the National Guard was mobilized, the states were without their own security force for several months. On 5 August 1917; just over a year later, the National Guard was called into the Army for service in World War I, and most states were without an organized internal security capability. Several states petitioned the Secretary of War for federal troops to protect key installations, industries and general security. The War Department informed the states that in order not to interfere with the training of the National Guard for their federal mission, municipal and state authorities would be expected to provide necessary protection for important industries and resources. The War Department also created a special body of "U.S. Guards" as part of the Army. (Active duty personnel not fit for overseas duty and newly enlisted men over draft age). While they protected shipyards, supply depots, and other major war related federal installations, they did not replace the security afforded the states by their now federalized National Guard units. (8)

On June 14, 1917 enabling legislation was passed that became known as the Home Guard Act of 1917. This law gave the Secretary of War the authority to provide arms and equipment to "...State troops or militia....". However it was not clear if the states were given the authority to organize a state force. The Home Guard Act prohibited the maintenance of any troops in peacetime except the Guard. The Judge Advocate General issued an opinion in October 1917 that said that states
"...in time of war maintain forces resembling the Army of the United States."
adding that "...whatever the character of such forces,...are capable of being called into service by the nation...."

The question was settled by the Chief of the Militia Bureau in a letter to the Adjutants General of the states, territories, and the District of Columbia, dated, 4 May 1918, where he argued that since the entire National Guard had been federalized, and thereby discharged from the militia, "...the States [were] now at liberty to organize anew a National Guard force under the provisions of the Act of Congress approved in June 1916."<9> Based upon this letter, states reacted by establishing varied forms of forces that spanned the spectrum of well organized troops resembling National Guard units to local-unaffiliated units. These various bodies of militia were given the general designation of Home Guards. Most of the Home Guard units again took on the character of police or constabulary organizations.

After the war the disbandment of the Home Guard varied by state. Some disbanded their organizations rapidly and almost immediately after the war ended, others kept their units for two or more years after the cessation of hostilities. Some units with police orientations were converted into law enforcement organizations after the war. Michigan State troops were retained and became the Michigan State Police.<10>

The types of home defense forces organized during this period varied. A report rendered by the Council of Defense in February 1918 described five types of home defense forces: The strict constabularies, which were authorized to exercise all police powers of the peace officers of the state; second, the home guards used primarily for police duty, a volunteer force sufficiently trained to handle domestic violence; third, a
Home Guard of the military type, a substitute militia taking the place of the National Guard; fourth, forces of special constables who were deputy sheriffs; and lastly, (in a few states), a state secret service under the direction of the Attorney General of the state. <11>

Between the two World Wars, a major policy change affecting the National Guard was the National Defense Act of 1920. The legislation created the three principal components of the Army; the Regular Army, The National Guard and the Organized Reserve. Prohibited from organizing during peacetime, the State Defense Force was inactive until the advent of World War II.

The precedence of mobilizing the National Guard during World War I. and the widespread belief that our enemies would employ sabotage, espionage, and other subversive activities on a large scale, prompted the government to look again to organizing military units to take the place of the National Guard while it was in federal service. In October 1940 the Congress passed an act which amended section 61 of the National Defense Act of 3 June 1916, (modified by National Defense Act of 1920). The act added a proviso which permitted the states to organize units to function as a state militia when the National Guard was in federal service.

As in 1917, the states responded unevenly. However, in November 1940, the Federal-State Conference on Law Enforcement Problems of National Defense, in conjunction with the War Department developed a model State Guard Act to guide the states in establishing their organizations. Early in 1941 the War Department published AR 850-250 which delineated federal policy regarding the State Guards. No command authority was established, the State Guard was solely a state force. Their activities were merely coordinated with federal troops operating in the same area.
The State Guards obtained recognition during World War II. State Guards performed a myriad of duties throughout the War. Most were constabulary or police augmentation in nature. However the Federal Government did encourage some states to train and organize as an augmentation to federal combat forces in the expectation of enemy raids or invasion on the continental United States.<12> Several states placed their militias on active state duty for the duration. California had a force of over 1,000 on full-time duty. The State Guards of World War II were much better organized and equipped than the home guards of World War I. Federal support was increased over that of the first war, and the activities during the second war increased considerably. Although the State Guards' performance was generally considered good during the war, several problems hampered their efficiency and effectiveness. Shortages of equipment and supplies top the list of maladies. High turnover, training shortfalls and lack of coordination with civil defense and civilian police authority were other problems that plagued the state forces throughout the war.

In 1947, Section 61 (b) of the National Defense Act of 1916 was repealed, however a Congressional Resolution enacted on 25 July 1947 retained the wording that authorized organization only when any part of the National Guard was mobilized. The states disbanded virtually all of their units by the end of 1947.<13> From 1947-1950, several states; California, Texas, New York and Kentucky were making plans for their states' forces, the authority for which they believed would be provided eventually.

Although the concept of a state internal security force was being
looked at by state and federal agencies during the late nineteen forties, no decisions regarding structure or mission had been resolved when the Korean emergency escalated to a large scale war. As an interim measure, Public Law 849 enacted on 27 September 1950, secured the federal authorization for organizing the state forces only when elements of the National Guard were mobilized. In 1956 Title 32 United State Code, Section 109, enabled the permanent organization of the State Defense Force.

Civil disorder operations during the sixties in the South, Detroit, Kent State and California spotlighted the law enforcement powers of the dual-missioned National Guard. Few National Guard units were called to duty to serve in Vietnam. Consequently the need for the State Defense Force was minimal.

Activities in the seventies and the early 1980's directed attention to the increased responsibilities of the National Guard as a result of the "total force" policy. This enhanced responsibility will continue to grow, as the Guard continues to receive modern equipment and increased training with Active units to improve its readiness to deploy early. This situation most likely prompted the current interest in revitalizing the State Defense Force.

CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

Published in October 1987, NGR 10-4, "Organization and Functions State Defense Forces National Guard Bureau and State National Guard Interaction" and legislation proposed in 1988 and supported by the National Guard Bureau, would amend Title 32, to authorize federal support of state defense forces. The argument is that the legislation will encourage states to initiate and maintain a State Defense Force. The regulation is an attempt to standardize the force and provide DoD policy regarding the interaction of the National Guard in the nature, status,
organization, missions, and employment of the State Defense Force.<14>

The first issue to address is basic. Is there a real need to maintain a State Defense Force? The argument to maintain a stay-behind force in the event of the mobilization of the National Guard is certainly supportable from an historic perspective. World War II, demonstrated a need based on utilization of the state defense forces. Reports from Adjutants General during the war years indicate a significant use of the State Defense Force for state emergencies. By far the largest amount of activity was related to natural disaster relief, primarily floods and hurricanes.<15>

PRE-MOBILIZATION NEED FOR THE STATE DEFENSE FORCE

The National Guard remains an essential element of the states' ability to respond to natural disasters and civil crises. Helicopters and engineer equipment are called into state service with their National Guard crews in support of wildfire, flood, and earthquake relief operations. To substitute those assets with civilian equipment is cost prohibitive and in some cases the equipment is not available. Unfortunately, with the mobilization of the National Guard, the states will lose these considerable assets for dealing with natural disasters.

It has been suggested that the Guard cannot serve two masters; that is it cannot meet its commitment to the Total Force and concomitantly continue to plan and support its state militia mission. If true, the need for a State Defense Force is crucial and immediate. Without doubt, a guardsman of today must necessarily dedicate more time to his avocation than the Guardsman of the past. Getting ready to go to war on short notice demands the dedication of more time for all Reserve Component members. Officers and non-commissioned officers must keep up with the state-of-the-art to the standards of their active duty counterparts.
Active duty schools, training and leadership conferences, staff and field training exercises superimposed on the twelve weekends and the two week annual training is a heavy schedule.

Most National Guard units called out in natural disaster relief operations do not need any special training in addition to what they receive in performing their federal role. The units merely apply their particular skills to the situation. Combat service support units are naturally suited to perform their functions in a disaster relief environment. Although some training is conducted in civil disorder operations, it does not significantly interfere with training for the federal mission.

Calls to state active duty are generally short duration emergencies and usually structured as small task forces of battalion size or less. Rotation plans are immediately effected that provide for speedy replacements allowing activated guardsmen to return home after a few days of emergency duty. The experiences gained by the guardsmen operating with their unit in disaster relief supports the federal mission by exercising skills, developing cohesion, and building self-confidence by participating in a crisis environment.

There is no empirical evidence that the National Guard cannot perform both state and federal missions simultaneously during peacetime. Thus, the need for a State Defense Force in the pre-mobilization environment is questionable. However, that does not affect the need for such a force, once the National Guard mobilizes.

NEED FOR THE STATE DEFENSE FORCE UPON MOBILIZATION OF THE GUARD

Because of the heavy reliance on the Reserve Components in the Total Force, it is a reasonable assumption that a significant number of National
Guard forces would be mobilized. The present trend to shift more force structure to the Reserve Components as a reaction to budget constraints, places an even greater reliance on the Reserve Component during times of national emergency. The need for some type of replacement force for the National Guard upon its mobilization is clear. But the structure, resourcing, command and control, and an appropriate mission for the force are the questions at issue.

National Guard Regulation 10-4, paragraph 5.a.,(Effective 1 Oct 1987) states:

The mission of a State Defense Force, as conceived by these regulations, is to provide an adequately trained and organized State military reserve force which would be under the exclusive control of the Governor. It would be capable of accomplishing those State emergency responsibilities normally assigned to the National Guard when that force is federalized or otherwise not available to the needs of the governor. In addition, they would be available to perform any such missions as the governor directs, within Federal and State laws concerned.

Paragraph 5.c. of NGR 10-4 describes the potential missions of the State Defense Force:

(1) Assist civil authorities in the preservation of order, and protection of life and property.

(2) Meet such domestic emergencies as may arise within the state.

(3) Guard and protect critical industrial installations and facilities, as determined by the governor, when other means are deemed inadequate.

(4) Prevent or suppress subversive activities in conjunction with, or in support of State or local law enforcement agencies.

(5) Under control of the Governor, cooperate with federal military authorities and forces engaged in active military operations.

(6) Assume control of State armories and property, provide security for any Federal property until relieved by proper authority and assist in the mobilization of the National
Guard when so directed by the governor.

(7) Perform other duties as may be assigned by the Governor, under the constitution and laws of the state.

Clearly, the National Guard Bureau does not intend the State Defense Force to assume the federal combat mission of the National Guard upon the latter's mobilization. Paragraph 6 of the regulation removes any doubt about what the State Defense Force is: "Planning and conducting military operations against hostile military forces are the responsibility of the United States. Operations and activities of State Defense Forces, as envisioned by this regulation, are supplemental to the state mission of the National Guard during peacetime and are considered to be of a constabulary nature and not that of combat forces." Sub-paragraph b. further defines the federal perception of the State Defense Force: "The primary objective of DoD regarding State Defense Forces would be for a cadre-size unit to be established within the state during peacetime. This cadre would represent approximately 10 to 15% of their required mobilization strength, provide a command and control element, representation at each National Guard armory within the state, and allow for rapid expansion if the situation arises...."

WHY NOT USE A POLICE FORCE FOR POLICE DUTY?

It is arguable that basic military training, and a military structure is appropriate for a paramilitary constabulary force. However, it is an instrument of civil control with the basic mission of creating and maintaining civil order within a state.<16>

It is not necessarily logical that this force should be created in the image of the National Guard. An Army G-3 study of April 1950 on State Guards and Internal Security observed that World War II State Guards were
less than satisfactory for continuous guard duty and riot suppression. Further they reported that both roles were more properly police functions and might better be performed by augmented state police organizations. <17>. Studies of Federal and state civil defense responsibilities, conducted by the National Security Council, the Defense Department and other federal agencies during the same time generally agreed that state missions were only semi-military functions. Further, the force established to perform these internal security missions should not mirror the National Guard's combat organization because that structure was derived from the National Guard's federal mission.<18>

A POLICE MISSION FOR SOLDIERS

National Guard Regulation 10-4 attempts to demilitarize the State Defense Force by excluding the combat mission and requires that the uniform be "...unmistakably different from that of any member of the U.S. Armed Forces...". In states with active State Defense Forces, membership is composed primarily of retired military and ex-military. Their orientation is not toward the constabulary role of the State Defense Force, but rather on the military experience they received in the U.S. Armed Forces. Certainly a natural attraction, with their skills being easily associated. The impact on recruiting and retention could be significant. What the NGB is attempting to establish is a paramilitary force with police and security missions as its mainstay. The type of individual that would be attracted by this type of organization would most likely be interested in police work, not unlike the individuals who are members of the police and sheriff's reserves. The NGB model of a State Defense Force will only be able to perform limited duty in support of civil authority during civil disorder and disaster relief, equipment constraints and training being the primary inhibitors.
The NGB envisions a command and control element established at each armory with the ability to rapidly expand when the need arises. Some problems immediately surface. For the expansion force to be effective, extensive training in civil disturbance operations and security is essential for subordinate leaders and line troops. With only a cadre, the ability to conduct this training while recruiting and organizing the expansion force will considerably delay the force's employment. Without adequate training in the proper use of force on citizens, improper actions could result in law suits against the state and more importantly, the wrongful death or injury of its citizens. Lastly, armory space is scarce. Arms vaults are filled with weapons of National Guard units. It is doubtful that present secured storage facilities could accommodate the arms and equipment of the State Defense Force (estimate based on one company size unit per armory).

Maintaining a command and control cadre should not be difficult. The prestige of rank and position will retain those members. However, it is questionable whether the State Defense Force, if organized at full complement, will be able to recruit and retain unpaid volunteers in the rank and file. Competition with the well paid National Guard and Reserves may be too much. Twenty five states presently have some type of State Defense Force. Mainly volunteer, unpaid and minimally supported, the members are dedicated individuals who want to associate with a military organization. Without this close association to the military is doubtful if the new State Defense Force will succeed.

It is also doubtful that without considerable federal support, the number of State Defense Forces would increase to any great extent. Most States could not or would not fund a constabulary force as proposed by the NGB.
The onus should be on the states to prepare for the contingency of the Guards mobilization. Yet, there is no widespread interest in the states to revitalize their State Defense Force.

CREATE A STATE POLICE RESERVE INSTEAD

With the constabulary nature of the recently defined mission, it may be more logical to orient the organization on a civilian emergency preparedness agency or a law enforcement entity. Perhaps the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is a more appropriate federal agency to provide assistance to the states. Incorporating this internal security force within FEMA's Civil Defense responsibilities seems a natural alignment of missions.

Creating a State Police Reserve, coordinated through the state counterparts of FEMA, (state emergency service departments) is an alternative to the State Defense Force. Training of the reservists and control of the State Police Reserve could be coordinated with the State Police, Highway Patrol or other appropriate state level police agency. An organization with this law enforcement orientation creates a state reserve security force that is focused on exactly those missions being proposed for the State Defense Force. Once this force is organized, equipped, and trained, it might well eliminate the need to activate National Guard combat units in support of civil disturbance or internal security missions in the pre-mobilization environment. However, the National Guards' capabilities would still be available to the state.

The State Police Reserve concept has other interesting aspects. The post-mobilization mission of the State Defense Force is clearly more
police oriented than military. The State Police Reserve training with police organizations is more logical than the State Defense Force training in police operations with the National Guard. Simply, an organization with a law enforcement function should be a law enforcement organization.

The question of recruiting rank and file as we change the State Defense Force and exclude them from traditional military functions would be resolved. It would seem that being a peace officer with police powers would appeal to low ranking members and recruiting for the State Police Reserve would be much easier than for the State Defense Force. The State Police Reserve would appeal to men and women interested in law enforcement, who want to gain some training preparatory to a police career. The State Police Reserve would also appeal to citizens wanting the excitement of police work as an avocation.

MILITARY CHARACTER FOUNDED IN TRADITION AND CONVENIENCE

The support of the State Defense Force program by the National Guard Bureau has a traditional foundation. In the perspective of World War I and World War II it was practical to create a substitute for the National Guard in its own image. Military equipment and supplies were readily available and the Army orientation facilitated the organizing and managing of the State Defense Force along military lines. It was also quite natural for the militarily organized State Defense Force to perform police functions, because indeed the National Guard it replaced was used frequently in the same role.

The State Defense Force falls under the authority of the Department of Defense with delegation of responsibility to the Chief, National Guard Bureau as the executive agent. The current activities of the Bureau are
filling the void that exists. The pro-active initiatives are in response to a recognized need to establish, at least a semblance of standardization throughout the states. Further, the recognition that some kind of stay-behind force will be needed in future national emergencies, is the real motivating factor. If the Guard is mobilized, it is likely that Governors' of those states without a State back-up force will seek the assistance of federal troops in state emergencies. Therefore it is prudent to support the maintenance of the State Defense Force, if for no other reason but to avoid diverting federal troops from their war mission.

**FEDERAL FISCAL SUPPORT WILL BE REQUIRED**

Only half of the states have any organized State Defense Force. Six have less than one hundred members, sixteen have memberships that range between thirty to one thousand with the remaining three having over one thousand members. State support is minimal. Without federal resourcing, it is questionable whether the State Defense Force or the State Police Reserve that this paper proposes will be successful. If federal support is designed to encourage states to organize that stay-behind force, then a financial partnership is the more desirable course. Sharing cost on a 50/50 or 75% federal and 25% state basis has been successful in other programs between federal agencies and the states, and may provide the proper incentives and appropriate attention that vested interests tend to elicit.
CONCLUSIONS

Historic precedent is the primary argument for a militarily structured force to replace the National Guard upon their mobilization. Although convenient, reliance on the military establishment to organize, train, and employ constabulary units to perform police functions may be an old concept worn thin by time and circumstance. Inferred from its regulation, even the NGB does not want the State Defense Force to be closely associated with the federal military organization or its mission.

The creation of the State Police Reserve will provide all the capabilities envisioned by the NGB for the State Defense Force, and more. The State Police Reserve training will be oriented on law enforcement responsibilities in civil disturbance and other internal security activities; a specialized force that would be available to the state before and after the National Guard is mobilized. Of course, the states would still have the National Guard's full capabilities for natural disaster relief and civil disorder management during practicetime, if needed.

The organization of the State Police Reserve would eliminate the need to store equipment including weapons in overcrowded armories. Personal weapons (revolvers) of State Police Reserve personnel could be retained in their possession or stored at local State Police Reserve training sites. The cost of uniforms and other personal items, as with the State Defense Force would be borne by the members.

The key to the success of the State Police Reserve will be its ability to attract and maintain members. Even as unpaid volunteers,
membership in an organization that provides certification as a law enforcement official with the probability of being utilized as a police back-up in the near term, is more appealing than membership in a quasi-military force training to replace the National Guard upon its mobilization.

The State Police Reserve is an idea whose time has come. By creating the State Police Reserve rather than revitalizing the State Defense Force, the states will be the beneficiaries of both a strong National Guard that provides the full extent of their capabilities when in a state status while at the same time contributing to national security. They also benefit from having a professional police reserve that can be called on as a specialist in civil disorder and internal security, available to the state whether or not the National Guard is mobilized.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 18.

3. Ibid., p. 21.

4. Ibid., p. 23.

5. Ibid., p. 44.


8. Riker p. 68.


10. Ibid., p. 12.

11. Ibid., p. 12.

12. Ibid., p. 38.

13. Ibid., pp. 83.

14. The proposed legislation is HR 3068 (Skelton) Jan 1988, 100th Congress. If enacted the bill would provide authority for the issue, on a reimbursable basis whenever deemed appropriate, or loan of excess or obsolete military property to the State Defense Force.


18. Ibid., p. 85.

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