Testing the Effects of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in a Crisis

Two Political-Military Games

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This report presents the results of two political-military games played at RAND in the spring of 1986 to investigate how possible European confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) might affect interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union in a crisis situation. The objective was to examine which of three hypotheses best describes the most likely effects of CSBMs in a crisis: (1) CSBMs can help make crucial distinctions/decisions; (2) CSBMs neither help nor harm decisionmaking; (3) CSBMs can cause more harm than good. The games provided no evidence that CSBMs could reduce the risks of miscalcualtion or misunderstanding. However, neither did the CSBMs appear to exacerbate misunderstandings. The players tended to focus on their own beliefs and to ignore evidence bearing on the intentions of the other side. The study indicates a need for further research on such important issues as the interplay between intimidation and surprise.
Testing the Effects of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in a Crisis

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December 1987

Prepared for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

RAND

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PREFACE

This research was sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

This report presents the results of two political-military games played at RAND in the spring of 1986 to investigate how possible European Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) might affect interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union in a crisis situation. It should be of interest to those involved in conventional arms control, international negotiations, and political and military gaming.
SUMMARY

From January 1984 until September 1986, the United States, Canada, and all European nations except Albania negotiated a package of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) at a conference convened for that purpose in Stockholm. While the negotiations were proceeding, RAND conducted a study that identified three central Western goals for CSBMs:

1. Inhibit the use of force by the Soviet Union for the purpose of political intimidation and coercion,
2. Reduce the likelihood of misunderstanding or miscalculation by any participant regarding the military activities of an adversary, and
3. Make the achievement of surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact less likely.

Western participants in the negotiations disagreed as to the efficacy of the proposed NATO package for meeting these goals. Probably the most serious criticism was that it would fail to sufficiently constrain threatening Soviet military behavior and in fact could provide a new opportunity for concealment of preparations for intervention or surprise attack.

In the spring of 1986, RAND conducted two political-military games to examine how proposed CSBMs would affect European crises that could involve conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. Our interest was crisis decisionmaking.

In both games, the players were divided into two teams: one ("Blue") played the role of the central decisionmaking body of the U.S. government, and the other ("Red") played the role of a central policy planning and recommendation body reporting to the Politburo of the Soviet Union.

The objective was to examine which of three hypotheses best describes the most likely effects of CSBMs in a crisis:

1. CSBMs can help make crucial distinctions/decisions.
2. CSBMs neither help nor harm decisionmaking.
3. CSBMs can cause more harm than good.

“Good" and "harm" were defined in terms of the ease with which the CSBMs could be used to signal nonaggressive intentions and prevent errors of misunderstanding and miscalculation versus the potential for using CSBMs as instruments of intimidation, deception, and surprise.

We examined two packages of CSBMs. Both were derived from CSBMs then (spring 1986) under consideration at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and addressed in the earlier RAND study. Both packages had five basic measures:

1. A reaffirmation of the Helsinki and UN agreement to abstain from the use of force among all signatory nations.
2. An exchange of annual calendars ("forecasts") of notifiable military activities.
3. A specification of what constitutes a notifiable military activity.
4. Provision for observation of notifiable military activities.
5. Provision for verification of such activities by national technical means and on-site inspections.

The packages differed in their stringency. The primary package, used in both games, had more stringent limitations on what military activities had to be notified and more rigorous observation and verification measures. The other package had weaker limitations and verification provisions. Consideration of two packages by the same players was intended to provide some insight into the marginal effect of strengthening key provisions of the agreement.

The games began with the positing of a CSBM agreement concluded in September 1986 at the Stockholm Conference. The agreement comprised the strong package of five measures. Both Blue and Red first prepared their forecasts of military activities notifiable in 1987. Each team was to establish a basic strategy and policies for what it would include or exclude from the forecasts. That is, they were to provide a list of military exercises to be conducted in 1987 and a (not necessarily identical) list of exercises to be reported in advance to the other side. Teams were also encouraged to provide a general statement of their approach to the use of the CSBMs. Following this formal game move, each team discussed informally how its exercise and/or reporting behavior might have differed if the weaker CSBM package had been in force.

2In the jargon of CSBMs, to "notify an activity" means to publicly announce a certain amount of time in advance that the activity will occur.
Player behavior in the first move was similar in both games. The Blue team chose to respect the letter of the CSBM agreement, albeit cautiously and with close scrutiny of Red behavior. Blue was prepared to violate the agreements in minor ways in response to such violations by Red. The Red team chose generally to respect the CSBM accords but to deliberately insert uncertainty by staging as "alerts" some unforecast notifiable activities and by canceling some forecast activities. These activities would not be violations of the letter of the accords; however, neither would they reduce the likelihood of misunderstanding, miscalculation, and surprise.

The threatened dissolution of Yugoslavia formed the nucleus of the scenario presented to the players at the beginning of the second move. The game controllers instructed the Red team to adopt a policy stance that viewed the unrest in Yugoslavia as both an opportunity to expand Red influence and a danger that Blue influence might become more powerful in a sister socialist state. They further instructed the Red team to increase Red influence by political means and to prevent Blue gains by political means if possible but militarily if necessary. The Blue team was neither informed of these instructions to Red nor given policy guidelines of its own. Each team was also given a list of its own and the other team's exercises, based on both teams' first moves.

Both the Santa Monica and Washington Red teams reacted in much the same way. They adopted the position that Yugoslav integrity was important to their position and communicated to the Yugoslav central government Red's assurances of a desire to preserve Yugoslavia's national integrity. In the eyes of the Red players, all Red moves were made within the technical constraints of the CSBM package.

The Blue team in the Santa Monica game was concerned that Red would invade the Western-leaning republics of Slovenia and Croatia. It planned to have troops available should Red actions suggest that possibility and arranged to closely inspect any Warsaw Pact military activities in the region. The Blue team in the Washington game erroneously assumed that Red favored the dissolution of Yugoslavia and oriented its policy toward preventing the Soviets from encouraging dissolution.

In both the Santa Monica and Washington games, both sides avoided moves that might inflame the Central European region. All teams were able to make their moves within the constraints of the CSBM accords because none of the teams felt particularly constrained by those accords. However, teams on occasion misunderstood their opponents' intentions. The use of CSBMs did not reduce these misunderstandings.
In spite of the best efforts of the teams to calm the situation in Yugoslavia, the crisis worsened. The Santa Monica players were told that an independent Croatian republic had come into being with a pro-West orientation; in the Washington game, the situation was not as extreme, but unrest and secessionist sentiment had escalated; and Yugoslav army units of Serbian nationality and other ethnic nationalities had clashed.

During Move 3, neither Red nor Blue took military action in Yugoslavia itself. Instead, this move was characterized by extensive political posturing, attempting to keep the crisis from escalating, accompanied by statements to gain political advantage and to pin the blame for any further deepening of the crisis on the other side. Both Red and Blue did try to position their military forces to counter any move that the other side might make into the Yugoslav region. Almost all of these military actions were within the constraints of the CSBM agreement. Teams were able to take advantage of prenotified activities, or, when necessary, to call an alert. Neither side denied the other any observation or inspection to which it was entitled under the CSBM agreement.

In an attempt to observe what Blue would do in the face of a Red invasion, the Blue team in the Santa Monica game was told in a fourth move (which departed from the Red team’s actual behavior) that Red had invaded Yugoslavia. After deliberation, Blue decided to send U.S. forces to Yugoslavia to preserve Western interests.

For the Washington teams, the fourth move was a continuation of the crisis; both sides were informed that the other had taken military actions (again, not following the other’s actual behavior) that might presage movement into Yugoslavia. Both Red and Blue reacted by building up their own capability for moving into Yugoslavia, but both also attempted to forestall a military confrontation by further political maneuvering.

The games provide insights into two CSBM-related policy issues: (1) the effect of CSBMs on the superpowers’ abilities to contain crises and (2) some problems that CSBMs may pose for the United States and its allies in protecting alliance security.

Of the three alternative hypotheses posed earlier, the second one best describes the most likely effects of CSBMs in a crisis—that they neither help nor harm the decisionmaking process. Although the CSBM agreement did not help alleviate the crisis, neither did it hinder the ability of Blue (or Red) to prepare militarily or politically for contingencies. Neither Red nor Blue found any desired military activities to be infeasible or inadvisable because of the CSBM agreement. Nor did the CSBMs appear to inspire confidence. Instead, the CSBMs apparently could actually hinder the spontaneous reduction of tensions,
as the minimum standards of openness to inspection and observation that are built into negotiated CSBMs became maximum standards in practice. These games provided no evidence that CSBMs could reduce the risks of miscalculation or misunderstanding. However, the CSBMs did not appear to exacerbate the teams' misunderstandings. The players tended to focus on their own beliefs and to ignore evidence bearing on the intentions of the other side.

From the point of view of NATO security, the games brought out several problems that CSBMs might cause. CSBMs appear unable to inhibit the threat of force by the Soviet Union for the purpose of intimidation. NATO's intent for CSBMs is the reduction of misunderstanding, miscalculation, and surprise to reduce tension thereby, but both sides were able to employ exercises within the limitations of the CSBMs when the purpose of those exercises was to intimidate. The "alert" provision offers opportunities to both sides to send threatening signals. By legitimizing large alerts (or augmented forecast exercises), the CSBMs can provide a new tool for overt intimidation.

How nations implement a CSBM regime in peacetime is an important factor that should be studied as the implementation record for the Stockholm CSBMs unfolds. Because the RAND games focused specifically on CSBMs, these measures took on greater importance than would probably be the case in a real crisis; in future games it would be wise to subordinate the CSBMs to the larger policy aspects of the crisis.

Our games, and perhaps any small number of games, could examine only a fraction of the relevant questions. The most important questions in future investigations are the potential role of CSBMs in a Central European crisis (where surprise attack is a crucial issue) and the cumulative effects of a CSBM agreement on the politics and defense posture of Western nations over time, particularly in the conditioning of their responses to ambiguous warning. The present investigation indicates a need for further gaming research to explore the consequences of the recently concluded CSBM agreement, including the effect of different histories of compliance and how the CSBMs will affect crises of various types and severity in various locales. This study also suggests the need for nongaming research on such important issues as the interplay between intimidation and surprise.
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ACE  (NATO) Allied Command, Europe
AFCENT  (NATO) Allied Forces, Central Europe
AWACS  Airborne Warning and Control System
CBM  Confidence-Building Measure
CDE  Conference on Disarmament in Europe
CIA  (U.S.) Central Intelligence Agency
CSBM  Confidence- and Security-Building Measure
CSCE  Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CVBG  Aircraft Carrier Battle Group
FRG  Federal Republic of Germany
GRU  Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye
   (Main Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff,
    Ministry of Defense)
KGB  Komitet Gossudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti
    (Committee of State Security)
MBFR  Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVOCFORMED  Naval On Call Force in the Mediterranean
NNA  Neutral and Nonaligned (countries)
REFORGER  Return of (U.S.) Forces to Germany
SACEUR  (NATO) Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SGF  (Soviet) Southern Group of Forces
SWTVD  (Soviet) Southwest Theater of Military Operations
TRA  Temporary Restricted Area
UN  United Nations
U.S.  United States
USA  United States Army
USAF  United States Air Force
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTVD  (Soviet) Western Theater of Military Operations
I. INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

The precise contribution of negotiated political-military agreements toward the enhancement of European security is very difficult to measure. Some experience has been gained since 1975, when the United States, Soviet Union, Canada, and all European nations except Albania adopted a modest set of confidence-building measures (CBMs) as a result of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Helsinki Final Act. The Helsinki CBMs allow for the voluntary notification of military exercises in excess of 25,000 troops and invitation of observers to those exercises. The intent of the CBMs was to reduce some of the uncertainty and potential misunderstanding previously associated with routine national (and in the case of the alliances, multinational) military training exercises, as well as to provide states with an opportunity to demonstrate the nonthreatening nature of their activities. In general, the signatory states have abided by the Helsinki CBMs, but most would agree that the CBMs have had very little real influence on the manner in which military activities are conducted in Europe; consequently, they have little effect on reducing tension associated with the massive conventional military forces present in Europe.

As experience with the Helsinki CBMs has grown, so has interest in the negotiation of more rigorous CBMs. In January 1984, the CSCE signatory states convened a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) to negotiate a set of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) which, it was hoped, would be more stringent and binding than the existing Helsinki CBMs. In the course of these negotiations, the Soviet Union, Romania, the Neutral and Nonaligned (NNA) states, and NATO advanced proposals. The NATO package of six CSBMs was the focus of a RAND analysis that addressed the degree to which those measures met the objectives proclaimed by the United States and NATO.¹

The RAND study identified a wide variety of objectives for the NATO CSBMs, including maintaining or enhancing U.S.-NATO security, enhancing Western political cohesion by fostering common

assessments of East-West security issues, facilitating united responses to Soviet behavior, and promoting public and parliamentary support for U.S.-NATO positions. Among such varied goals, the following three were deemed core objectives:

1. Inhibit the use of force by the Soviet Union for the purpose of political intimidation or coercion.
2. Lessen the likelihood of misunderstanding or miscalculation by any participant regarding the military activities of an adversary.
3. Make surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact less likely.

In the course of the RAND analysis, it became clear that there was an inherent tension among these objectives, particularly the last two. Measures that might effectively serve one objective, such as reducing misunderstanding or miscalculation, might be ineffective or even harmful with respect to another objective, such as making surprise attack more difficult. Although it was possible to identify measures that might best meet specific objectives individually, as well as combinations of modified measures that appeared to meet the NATO objectives more effectively than those originally proposed, it was not possible to predict just how the various measures would actually function under different conditions, including normal peaceful relations, periods of mounting tension, accidental but potentially threatening military actions, and most important a crisis that could lead to war.

Given the desirability of understanding how a CSBM regime might influence the NATO decisionmaking process in crisis, three alternative hypotheses were considered to best describe the most likely effects of specific CSBMs in a crisis:

1. CSBMs can help make crucial distinctions and aid in the crisis decisionmaking process.
2. CSBMs neither help nor hinder the decisionmaking process.
3. CSBMs can cause more harm than good.

In this context, "good" and "harm" were defined in terms of the ease with which CSBMs could be used to signal nonaggressive intentions and reduce the risk of miscalculation, misunderstanding, and surprise versus the potential for using CSBMs as instruments of deception and intimidation.

As the Stockholm CDE moved toward its scheduled September 1986 conclusion and the participants gravitated toward consensus on specific CSBMs, the need to understand how those CSBMs might actually function in relation to these hypotheses provided the motivation for
this study. Of critical importance to the United States was an understanding of how specific CSBMs might function as crisis management tools. If certain CSBMs appeared to be either particularly effective or unexpectedly risky, it would be useful to make that information available to the delegates as they returned to the closing rounds of the Stockholm negotiations. To address the dynamic elements of the issues at hand, RAND designed and ran two political-military games.

THE TWO CSBM GAMES

This report describes the conduct and findings of the two political-military games played in the spring of 1986 to explore the effects of proposed CSBMs on European (but not Central European) crises that could potentially involve conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. Our interest in these games was primarily on crisis decisionmaking; we did not directly address the potential of CSBMs for deepening peaceful relations during normal times, encouraging arms reductions, or other uses that have been suggested for them.

Each game had two playing teams: "Blue" was given the role of the central decisionmaking body (National Command Authority) of the U.S. government, and "Red" was assigned the role of a central foreign and military policy planning and recommendation body reporting to the Politburo of the Soviet Union. Neither team was further subdivided into roles, although the players could, if they chose, subdivide themselves.

The Santa Monica Game

The first of these games was played 27 and 28 March 1986 at The RAND Corporation offices in Santa Monica, California. The players for this game were all staff members or consultants at RAND and are listed in Appendix A. Leading the Blue team was Dr. Barbara R. Williams, head of RAND's Behavioral Science Department; the Red team was led by Dr. Milton G. Weiner, a senior staff member at RAND with extensive experience in European security matters.

Although the most important objective of this first game was to "shake down" our procedures in preparation for the second game, we believe that major substantive insights are gained by considering it alongside its successor. Consequently, we analyze the two games together.
The Washington Game

The second game was played 8 and 9 April 1986 at The RAND Corporation offices in Washington, D.C. There were very few differences between the first and second game. Some details of the initial scenario were changed in response to comments by the players of the first game, and some minor wording changes were made in the CSBM packages presented to the players. By far the greatest difference between the two games was in the nature of the participants. In Washington, most of the players were government officials with considerable experience in the matters under examination. Appendix A also provides a list of these players. Joining the RAND team of controllers in the Washington game were James Hinds, Principal Director, Negotiations Policy, Department of Defense; and John Matheny, Director of European Security Negotiations of the Department of Defense. Leading the Blue team was John Hawes, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State. The Red team was led by Ambassador Robert Barry, Chief of the U.S. delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

RECORDING AND ANALYZING THE GAMES

The two games were played in “free-form” style, which means that once the players were given their roles and background information, they discussed the problem until they reached consensus on a “move,” which was a formal statement of what they wished to do. There was no prescribed format for this move; instead, the team (typically the team leader) dictated the move to a Control team observer. The observer typed the move directly into a microcomputer set up in the team room and took the disk containing the move to the microcomputer in the Control team room. The moves of both teams were reviewed by the Game Director and other members of the Control team, who determined which of the actions proposed by each team would take place, the consequences of the joint action of the two teams, and how the scenario would change as a result of the moves. The resulting updated situation description was entered into the microcomputer, edited to provide initial information for each team, and printed for delivery back to the teams. In this way, a complete record of the formal moves and procedures of the game was maintained in computer files.

Affiliations of all participants in the game are provided solely for purposes of identification.
Any team queries to the Control team were managed by this microcomputer system. The Control team observer would enter the query into the computer and the Game Director and other controllers would enter their responses after reading the query on their own microcomputer. In addition, the Control team observer present while each team deliberated its move took notes of the deliberations; these too were entered into the computer system. Finally, after the games had been played, each of the RAND participants at the Washington game provided his own impression of what had been learned from the games; these impressions were also electronically recorded.

All of the game moves, the team queries and responses, the observer notes, and the impressions provided the raw material for this report. The use of computerized communications in these games not only streamlined the conduct of the games but greatly facilitated the ensuing analysis. The game moves themselves provided a chart of what happened and provided the answer to questions about team behavior. The observer notes and team queries were used to capture the “reasons” for the team moves, including:

- The teams’ apparent rationales for the moves they made.
- A team’s perceptions of the other team.
- Alternative moves considered but rejected.
- What differences, if any, alternative CSBM packages might make.
- A description of the group structure adopted by the teams: how decisions were made and what leadership structure was used.
- The group dynamics of the team: was it driven by “rational” analysis or carried away by persuasive argument?

Postgame notes further elaborated game findings, including such questions as what elements of the game were unrealistic, possibly deceiving, and might have affected the moves of the players. These postgame notes also discussed the potential effects of CSBMs in other crises.
II. IMPLEMENTING THE CSBM AGREEMENT: MOVE 1

THE PACKAGE OF CSBMS

After an introductory session describing our reasons for conducting the game and the game procedures, the players were presented with an initial set of conditions including the information that the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) had ended in September 1986 with the adoption of a package of five confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).

The first task for the teams was to decide on general guidelines for implementing the package of CSBMs. Specifically, they were told to assume that the date was 1 November 1986 and that the package of CSBMs had been agreed upon at Stockholm. Otherwise, they were to assume that the world looked much the same as it did at the beginning of the year. The guidance given the teams was to prepare a measure-by-measure policy/strategy statement to guide implementation of the CSBM agreement over the next few years. In particular, they were to specify a policy for exercise calendar/forecasts, notification of unforeseen events (including alerts), and both initiating and receiving observations and inspections for the calendar year 1987. That is, the teams were to decide on the number of military exercises of different sizes that they would actually conduct. They also had to prepare a (not necessarily identical) calendar of forecast exercises to present to the other side. This necessitated deciding whether exercises would be placed on the calendar, notified on shorter warning, or given “alert” status. In addition, exercises could be placed on the calendar with no intention of carrying them out. The teams also had to decide how they would implement the observation and verification measures of the CSBM package.

The package of CSBMs was derived from measures actually under consideration at the CDE and reflected the NATO view that CSBMs should contribute to the reduction of the risk of misunderstanding.

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1This introduction consisted largely of the information presented in Sec. 1.
2In CSBM parlance, an alert is any extremely short-notice military exercise whose purpose is ostensibly to test troop readiness without warning. An alert exceeding the thresholds is notified as it commences.
3As a baseline, the Control team provided information about current and planned (1985/86) exercise activity.
miscalculation, and surprise attack. Figure 1 shows the form given in the Washington game.

The package used in the Santa Monica game differed in some very minor ways, largely involving word changes. The only substantive differences between the two packages were:

1. In the Santa Monica game, the advance notification calendar was due on 15 November instead of 1 November and required 45 rather than 40 days prenotification of activities.
2. The Santa Monica game package counted one-half of one division as 6,000 rather than 10,000 troops.
3. The Santa Monica game package did not include the “quick in, quick out” concept for inspections in the verification section.

None of these differences appeared to affect player behavior.

RED’S FIRST MOVE

Red’s first move was virtually the same in both the Santa Monica and the Washington games. Red adopted a general policy of formally obeying the letter of the CSBM accord, reaffirming the Helsinki agreements as required, while interpreting the new accord in a way that allowed it to be manipulated to gain advantage. Red believed that it already had a military advantage in Europe and that the CSBMs could be used as a tool to help maintain that advantage.

The Red team in the Santa Monica game explicitly stated its objectives with respect to CSBMs; these were also reflected in the discussions of the Washington players:

1. Minimize damage to Red.
2. Preserve operational flexibility.
3. Gain propaganda advantage, weaken the NATO alliance.
4. Adopt a long-term perspective.
5. Test the limits of the CSBM regime.
6. Gather information on NATO (minor objective).

The Red team in the Washington game adopted as a goal convincing “Western peace-loving types” that Red meant no harm. Compliance (or the appearance thereof) was a means to the end of other foreign

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4 These issues are treated in greater detail in the RAND study by Ben-Horin et al. Both packages were addressed in both the Santa Monica and Washington games. A CSBM agreement was reached in September 1986.
1. **Nonuse of Force**: Reaffirmation of the Helsinki and United Nations agreement to abstain from the use of force or the threat of use of force between all CSCE states.

2. **Forecasts**: Exchange of annual calendars of notifiable military activities to take place in the CSBM zone.
   - By 1 November of each year, each CSCE state must provide to every other CSCE state an annual calendar of all notifiable military activities in which the state will participate or host in its territory, planned for the following calendar year.
   - Each state will provide a list of the units stationed in the zone, down to the brigade/regiment level. Restricted areas defined as "garrisons" will also be designated. A "garrison" is defined as an area with buildings and structures designed to accommodate one or more military units, installations, military training schools and enterprises of military forces. A garrison usually consists of offices and/or barracks, equipment and housing areas, and fenced areas. Training fields and live fire ranges are usually outside of a garrison.

3. **Notification**:
   - Notifiable activities include:
     - Out-of-garrison activities; excludes troops without equipment.
     - more than one half of one division or 10,000 ground force troops or 250 tanks out of garrison at the same time under the same command;
     - more than three battalions or 3000 amphibious forces out of garrison at the same time under the same command;
     - mobilization of more than 25,000 men or three divisions at the same time.
   - Only ground force and ground-based air forces and those sea and air forces directly participating in a ground force activity are included; independent sea and air activities in the zone are exempt from notification.
   - Information concerning the numbers and types of forces, participating brigades/regiments, with their locations, their command designation, the purpose, location and duration of the exercise, the period the forces will be outside a garrison, and the designation of the exercise (if applicable) will be provided to all CSCE states as part of either the annual calendar or prenotification process.
   - For military activities which require notification but were not included in the annual calendar, notification must be given to all CSCE states at least 40 days before the beginning of the activity.
   - Alert activities which meet or exceed the criteria above must be notified at the time the alert activity commences, including amphibious alerts.

Fig. 1—The CSBM agreement
4. **Observation:** Invitations for observers from all CSCE states must be made for all notifiable military activities in the CSBM zone, including notifiable alerts which are scheduled to last more than 48 hours. The host state must provide the observers with adequate opportunity to verify the non-threatening nature of the observed military activity.

5. **Verification:** Verification will be by national technical means and an on-site inspection regime.
   - Each state will be permitted to make one on-site inspection per year in the territory of other states. These inspections need not be related to a notified activity in the territory of the host state.
   - Only those areas previously designated as restricted areas will be immune to inspection requests.
   - Each state must respond to a request to inspect its territory within 12 hours of receiving the request.
   - Alerts are exempt for 48 hours if declared as ending by 48 hours.
   - The inspecting team must be able to enter the territory of the inspected state within 24 hours after the request has been issued, and the inspecting team is allowed no more than 24 hours at the inspection site.
   - Concept for inspection is "quick in, quick out," with two aircraft and two inspectors per aircraft. One aircraft may land for a closer look to confirm/deny a sighting; surface transportation to be furnished by the embassy/consulate of the inspecting state in case of inclement weather.
   - No state is required to host more than five inspections per year.
   - Activities not included on the annual calendar will be subject to inspection, in excess of the baseline five inspections per state per year.

Fig. 1—continued

Policy objectives such as generating a spirit of detente. Therefore, Red's record of compliance should be generous, not grudging. However, compliance policy should be structured so as not to impinge on Red's ability to fulfill possible political or military objectives (e.g., the ability to coerce recalcitrant allies or to launch a surprise attack if necessary) in Europe or in other theaters.

**Exercises and Forecasts**

Red decided to both schedule and forecast 1987 exercises with roughly the same frequency as in 1985/86. Three large-scale, multinational (Class A) exercises were planned by both the Santa Monica and Washington teams. In Washington, all three were forecast as
planned; in Santa Monica, two were forecast as planned, but the third exercise was not forecast in favor of notifying it later as an “alert.”

In both Washington and Santa Monica, Red adopted a policy of both underforecasting and overforecasting medium size, single nation (Class B) and small-scale, national (Class C) exercises. Underforecasting was achieved by planning exercises in advance but announcing them at the last minute as alerts rather than notifying them; overforecasting was achieved by notifying nonexistent exercises and “canceling” them at the last minute. This provided maximum flexibility while maximizing the appearance of compliance. The forecast was to be as generous as possible for political effect but to provide as little information as possible to Western intelligence. There was no penalty in the CSBM package for overforecasting, and even a potential benefit (cancellation of scheduled exercises suggests a peaceful intent), but the penalty for underforecasting was having to suffer additional inspections. Overforecasting maintained the capability of coercing with military force as well as asymmetrically generating Red forces if necessary. Underforecasting was intended to lull the enemy into believing that the occasional unforecast activity was not a major concern and to establish the legitimacy of notified but unforecast activities.5

The Red team in the Washington game planned to comply with the 40-day prenotification requirement for Class B activities and to update, correct, and amplify upon those activities as required. For Class C activities, however, Red planned to provide as little additional or correct information as possible in its 40-day updates. Red reasoned that its lack of full compliance with (and even its violation of the requirements for) such smaller-scale activities would be impossible for Blue to verify. In fact, Red considered cheating with the Class C exercises simply to test Blue’s verification capabilities.

**Specification of Units and Restricted Areas**

Red’s specification of military units stationed in the CSBM zone and restricted areas defined as “garrisons” within that zone followed a philosophy similar to that developed for the exercises and forecasts. The Red team in the Santa Monica game provided incomplete lists of units that understated the actual number of these units, as well as lists of restricted areas that overstated (and therefore disguised) the actual locations of garrisons.

5Unforecast activities, it might be recalled, are permitted under the CSBM package if they are notified either 40 days in advance or labeled “alerts” and notified simultaneously with commencement.
The Red team in the Washington game adopted a similar but less explicit policy. Restricted areas were deliberately expanded to minimize opportunities for Blue espionage. The team noted that permitting Soviet territory to be inspected was a major concession, and there was a need to insure that such a precedent not be set for future negotiations. It viewed the definition of "garrisons" as the crucial concept; a broad definition of that term was to be used to exclude as much territory as possible from inspection. After extended discussion, it adopted a definition of "garrison" that included: (1) all actual garrisons; (2) all sensitive installations, including storage and staging areas; and (3) training areas to which sensitive units could be sent during an inspection.

Observation and Verification

Again, Red's philosophy of "keep to the letter of the agreements but exploit weaknesses where possible" prevailed. Red wanted to comply with the spirit of the agreement and to allow as much observation and inspection as necessary but did not want to give away any secrets. The Red team in the Santa Monica game explicitly adopted as its goals gaining as much information as possible while providing as little as feasible to Blue. It would request as many inspections as possible, using helicopters and other means to get the maximum amount of intelligence information. It would attempt to impede or prevent any intelligence gathering by Blue that was not specifically mandated by the CSBMs, while planning to use all available means to maximize the intelligence benefits of its own inspections of Blue territory. Both Red teams stated their intentions to control observers as much as possible and to create restricted areas that made inspection more difficult.

BLUE'S FIRST MOVE

The two Blue teams adopted very similar stances in the first move. Blue, like Red, immediately complied with the reaffirmation of the nonuse of force called for in CSBM measure 1. The themes for the Blue players were (1) general compliance, encouraging as much openness as possible, coupled with (2) cautious scrutiny of Red behavior for noncompliance and readiness to respond to unforecast or unnotified military activities in kind if appropriate.

While the Blue team in the Santa Monica game adopted the Control team's instructions to regard itself as the U.S. National Command Authority (NCA), the Blue team in the Washington game tended to be
the NCA and NATO simultaneously, shifting roles as suited its needs. Because the Control team never felt the need to introduce divergences of opinion within NATO into the game, this merged role presented few problems. For its part, the Santa Monica team saw CSBMs as a means to coordinate U.S. plans with those of the allies and to strengthen the alliance.

Blue approached the CSBMs with caution. There was explicit consideration of how Red might use the CSBMs for deception to cover preparations for a surprise attack. Blue generally believed that Red would push any ambiguities in the measures to their limits to increase Blue vulnerability. Some team members held that although CSBMs were more effective in peacetime when they were of little value, their usefulness in a crisis, when the risks from deception are greatest, was limited.

**Exercises and Forecasts**

Blue was fairly scrupulous regarding the annual forecast of exercises. The Blue team in the Washington game adopted a specific policy of notifying all planned exercises above the CSBM-specified thresholds on an annual calendar. It recognized the potential need for short-notice exercises or alerts, but it did not plan any such exercises with the expressed intent to omit them from the calendar. The Blue team in the Santa Monica game, however, reserved some Class B and many Class C events from placement on the annual calendar. The rationale for this behavior was reciprocity for anticipated Red omissions from the calendar and to keep back national and smaller exercises for flexibility in dealing with potential problems. Blue planned to comply fully with the 40-day prenotification requirements.

**Specification of Units and Restricted Areas**

The Blue team in the Santa Monica game did not explicitly address the question of how it should specify units and restricted areas; the Blue team in the Washington game, however, discussed this problem in detail. The policy adopted was that Blue would provide the required list of units down to the brigade/regiment level; Blue would also provide a list of principal garrison locations down to the brigade/regiment level without specifying the units attached thereto. Consistent with the agreement, Blue would not allow observers or inspectors to gain access to those restricted areas. It would further interpret the agreement so as not to require access by observers or inspectors to other sensitive sites or facilities, either civilian or military. This policy
implied that the intent of the CSBM agreement was to permit observation and inspection of out-of-garrison activities in the field; hence observations or inspections conducted inside facilities of any kind were beyond the scope of the agreement.

The rationale for this policy derived from a view of CSBMs as a crisis management tool. The teams believed that NATO did not want the Soviets observing mobilization activities in a crisis; hence, the Federal Republic of Germany in particular would define garrisons very broadly to include various military and nonmilitary restricted areas. If restricted areas were narrowly interpreted to include only military garrisons, NATO might be forced to discard CSBMs in their entirety in a serious crisis because of the potentially harmful effects inherent in permitting Soviet observation of essential mobilization activities. The Blue team in the Washington game noted that the Soviets label huge areas of the German Democratic Republic a “garrison,” simply making the new term of art for the large areas they currently rule off limits under the rubric of “permanent restricted areas”; hence, the entire 3rd Soviet Shock Army could be mobilized but still be technically “in garrison.”

Observation and Verification

The Blue team in the Santa Monica game adopted a policy of being as open to observation as possible and would allow observation and inspection, including air inspection, in an “anticipatory quid pro quo” manner to encourage maximum openness from the other side.

The Blue team in the Washington game dealt with the issue in much more detail and much more formally. Figure 2 shows its three-part policy for observation and inspection.

The Blue team in the Washington game criticized the CSBM observer measure as perhaps permitting the Soviets too much access to sensitive Western territory, with little ability to insist on a reciprocal degree of access for Western observers in Warsaw Pact territory. Unlike the Blue team in the Santa Monica game, which took the initiative in openness to encourage Red reciprocity, the Blue team in the Washington game attempted to match the degree of openness exhibited by Red and to tailor future Blue actions to current Red practice. If Red’s practices concerning observers were considered to be inadequate, Blue would use the inspection measure.

The observation and verification measures appeared to require an overall strategy for their implementation, in that Blue wanted to use its resources in a concerted manner. NATO, consisting of 16 states, has the right to 16 inspections; the decision of when and by whom
1. Those NATO states responsible for hosting or participating in notifiable activities will be responsible for issuing invitations for observers to all CSCE states. It will be NATO policy to provide the most accommodating observation arrangements possible consistent with NATO security. At the same time, NATO will wish to calibrate its implementation of this policy based on its experience with Eastern forthcomingness in hosting activities and providing meaningful observation. NATO will institute a coordinated alliance program to train national observers and inspectors.

2. NATO recognizes that verification is both a national responsibility and a matter for central alliance concern. Conduct of inspections will therefore be a subject of consultation within the alliance to ensure that the limited number of inspections is used most effectively. In deciding on the conduct of inspections, NATO will observe several principles, including the need to reserve adequate inspections against Soviet and other Bloc territory throughout the year; the need to reserve the capability of the most capable NATO inspecting nations for the inspection of ambiguous situations posing the greatest potential threat; the desirability of including all Bloc states in an inspection at least every two years; the desirability of involving all or as many as possible of the NATO nations in inspection activity; and the desirability of respecting the particular geographic concerns of particular NATO members.

3. Although the number of inspections cannot be set in advance, NATO plans to use not less than five inspections in the first year; NATO will also, as a matter of policy, include one inspection each year in a neutral country and will endeavor to conduct its full quota of inspections in the Soviet Union. At least one of the NATO inspections of Soviet territory will be beyond the 250 kilometer limit.¹

¹The 250 kilometer limit refers to the limit on Soviet territory subject to voluntary observation under the CBMs agreed to in the 1975 Helsinki Accords. The proposed CSBM package allows for inspection of all CSCE member states' territory from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains, allowing Western inspectors access to previously inaccessible Soviet territory.

Fig. 2—The observation and verification policy of the Blue team in Washington

inspections would be demanded was to be a consensual act, taking into consideration the ability of the inspecting state to carry out its task effectively. There was some suggestion that NATO inspections could use common equipment and could rotate personnel to meet the CSBM rules on limitations of inspection requests. “Major” partners, such as
the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany, would withhold inspections until late in the year, to hold the most "capable" inspection teams in reserve.

Inspections would be directed at ambiguous activities that could not be anticipated. The more complicated the questionable activity, the more qualified the inspector nation should be and the more the inspections should be able to contribute to Blue's collective security considerations. Red probably would not notify activities intended as elements of political intimidation, and there was agreement that some inspections should be reserved for this contingency. There was explicit recognition that inspections could be used for political or intelligence purposes.

CONSIDERATION OF THE ALTERNATIVE CSBM PACKAGE

Following Move 1, the teams discussed how their exercise and/or reporting behavior might have differed if an alternative, less rigorous CSBM package had been in force. Appendix B presents the alternative CSBM package given the Washington players; the Santa Monica alternative package was similar in nature. The differences between the two alternative packages paralleled the differences enumerated earlier between the primary packages.

The alternative package was not strictly "played" in the sense that the teams prepared moves based on it. Rather, the teams discussed how they viewed the alternative package compared with the primary one and how their move might have differed had the alternative CSBM package been in effect.

Red's View of the Alternative Package

The two Red teams concurred that the alternative package was more favorable to themselves. Although the Class A and Class B exercises (which are readily detectable in any event) would still be notified, the less inclusive aspect of the alternative package's notification requirements would have allowed Red to use the CSBM notifications to greater political advantage. The omission of the smaller exercises from the forecast provides more flexibility without the political cost incurred by failing to notify. A minor disadvantage was the loss of the opportunity to use the CSBMs to spoof or test the opponent's verification capabilities by means of Class C exercises.

*The primary and alternative packages were addressed in both the Santa Monica and Washington games.*
Another major advantage for Red was in the provision of temporary restricted areas (TRAs). These permitted additional restricted areas and opened up the possibility of ambiguity in the specification of unit strengths and identities.

The voluntary nature of inspections received some discussion. It was proposed that Red policy would have permitted inspectors when it was in Red's own interests to send a political signal. Some inspections would have been turned down on principle, but others would have been permitted, especially when the inspectors could be steered by their hosts in a desired direction.

In general, Red believed that its behavior would not have been very different under the alternative CSBM package than under the primary package but that its position would have been relatively stronger.

**Blue’s View of the Alternative Package**

The Santa Monica and Washington Blue teams also concurred in their view of the alternative package. They expressed dissatisfaction with it and labeled it as “toothless” and unlikely to be acceptable to the Western negotiation teams at Stockholm.

The notification measures meant that only the larger exercises would be subject to observation. Consequently, Blue might have revised its force lists upward to the division level. The TRA provision was viewed ambiguously; although it could help the Soviets, it could also help NATO, and especially France, as would the 72-hour waiting period provision for launching an inspection. Generally, the alternative package would have required no change in Blue policy regarding the calendar; it also had the advantage of avoiding debate over the mobilization issue.

Blue's greatest dissatisfaction with the alternative package concerned its treatment of inspections. Because of their voluntary nature, inspections were seen as useless. The package made it hard to detect Warsaw Pact mobilizations; the out-of-garrison notification measure would not work well because the Soviets can mobilize within their garrisons. It was noted that if inspections were made voluntary, Western negotiators would have demanded a tightening up on the alternative package's verification and observer provisions in order to compensate. NATO would also have insisted on a quid pro quo treatment of verification, in terms of the number of inspections permitted and in the treatment of observers and inspectors.

Generally, like Red, both Blue teams indicated that there would have been no difference in its operational behavior under the alternative CSBM regime than under the primary package.
III. A CRISIS IN YUGOSLAVIA: MOVE 2

To examine how CSBMs might be expected to function in a crisis, the teams were presented with a scenario involving unrest in Yugoslavia. The intention was to present a believable crisis that involved the potential for confrontation between Soviet and U.S. forces in Europe, yet was not immediately concerned with the Central Front or the two Germanies. In addition, it was desirable to test the CSBMs in an arena where each side would have an interest in preventing the situation from escalating too steeply but where it could also see opportunities to maneuver developing events to its advantage. Given these objectives, as well as the need for credibility and verisimilitude, a crisis in Yugoslavia was considered to be a good choice.

THE OPENING SCENARIO

Figure 3 presents the description of the Yugoslav crisis given in the Washington game.

Differences Between the Washington and Santa Monica Games

There were three major differences between the Washington and Santa Monica scenarios. The first concerned the timing of the crisis. The Santa Monica game began Move 2 in April 1987. The players believed that this was too soon after the signing of the CSBM agreement in September 1986 and the publication of the first notification calendars to get a good sense of the extent of compliance. Therefore, the move was pushed forward into the summer of 1987 in the Washington game.

A second major difference was in the origin of the Yugoslav crisis. In the Santa Monica game, the focus of the crisis was the Croatian nationalist movement. The Croatians took a strong pro-Western
General Information

The date is 4 August 1987. The political situation in most of Europe is fairly quiet. The world and U.S.-Soviet relations are pretty much as they have been for the past few years. In particular, the geopolitical environment has not been radically altered. The meetings in Stockholm resulted in the 1986 Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) Agreement. There were, however, no major breakthroughs in other arms control arenas.

There have been no significant changes in European governments with the notable exception that the 1986 elections in Austria unseated the Socialist government there in favor of a more conservative one; this government, while tilting a bit more to the West, has scrupulously maintained its mandated neutrality to date. The first six months of 1987 might be characterized as a period of cautious optimism following the signing of the CSBM agreement.

The major exception to this quiet has been in Yugoslavia. In the past several months, a severe economic downturn has sparked a dramatic inflammation of ethnic tensions within Yugoslavia. In particular, the Serbian population blames the other ethnic groups for the troubles and is attempting to reestablish a vanishing sense of primacy. This attempt has been formally protested in Zagreb (Croatia) and Ljubljana (Slovenia) and is being met by popular resistance in varying degrees throughout the non-Serbian parts of Yugoslavia.

The worst problems have been in the autonomous province of Kosovo, whose Shiptar population has revived its pressure to secede from Yugoslavia to merge with Albania. The government in Albania, while not overtly encouraging such a move, has not said no either. In Croatia and Slovenia, in addition to the formal protest, there have been informal hints at secession should Serbian pressure become unbearable. A hitherto weak pan-Macedonian movement in both Greece and Yugoslavia has also been energized by the current crisis. There are in addition some signs of unrest among the Macedonian population of Bulgaria.

In Belgrade, meanwhile, the Yugoslav leadership has declared its firm intent to maintain the nation's integrity. In a speech broadcast throughout the country, the President (a Serb at this time) has called on all factions to reconsider the "dangerous course upon which they have set out." An emergency plenum of the League of Communists is scheduled to begin on 1 September. Moreover, the Yugoslav government, apparently over the objections of Shiptar, Croatian, and Slovenian leaders, has notified a military exercise to be held in Kosovo in 45 days.

Yugoslav leaders of all persuasions have called upon other nations to follow a strict policy of nonintervention in Yugoslavia's internal affairs.

Fig. 3—The scenario for the Washington game
However, a small party of Serbian officials was reported to have visited Bucharest last week, and meetings between Slovenian and Austrian leaders have also been rumored. Meanwhile, the Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow has met several times in recent days with high officials in the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

Information Provided Solely to the Red Team

Privileged Information. Our intelligence assesses the situation in Yugoslavia as one of extreme unrest and potential explosion. Secessionist sentiments among the Shiptar, Slovenian, and Croatian populations are very strong and growing and it is unclear whether the Yugoslav government can manage the intense pressure that will probably be brought to bear on it from many sides.

The Yugoslav ambassador, while insisting that Belgrade is capable of dealing with its own internal affairs, has asked that Red publicly support Serbian efforts to maintain Yugoslavia's unity.

Table 1 presents the Blue exercise history from the beginning of 1987 to the present.1

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Notified</th>
<th>Observed</th>
<th>Inspected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>01 JAN to 02 FEB</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>01 MAR to 01 MAY</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>01 MAR to 20 MAY</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>15 MAR to 01 APR</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>04 APR to 01 JUN</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>01 MAY to 01 JUL</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, by Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>01 JUL (ongoing)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Guidance. The situation in Yugoslavia clearly presents both opportunities and dangers to us. While the weakening of the Belgrade regime certainly provides an opening for the furtherance of our interests in the Balkans, we cannot allow the unrest to spread to our allies in the area; nor can we allow the pro-Western elements in the region to gain the upper hand. We should follow a two-phase course of action in dealing with the situation in Yugoslavia:

1. Implement all appropriate political-military measures to influence the progress of events in Yugoslavia to our benefit.

1 Appropriately forecast Class C exercises were not included in this or other exercise tables provided to the teams in order to avoid clutter and possible information overload.

Fig. 3—continued
2. Should these endeavors fail, we may wish to take direct military action at the appropriate time, probably following the Yugoslav plenum, which is expected to end in late September. This intervention would be aimed at destroying any secessionist rump states or movements and establishing a permanent Red presence within Yugoslavia itself. You should anticipate at least 48 hours of warning prior to the onset of this operation.

Thus, you are asked to make all necessary preparations for these courses of action. Preparations for both contingencies should proceed in parallel, and be carried out in a way which maximizes the element of surprise should we be compelled to forcibly intervene in Yugoslavia.

We should also strive to achieve two objectives vis-à-vis NATO: (a) increase pressure on the West to acquiesce in an appropriate solution to the Yugoslav problem, but (b) reassure them of our nonaggressive intentions.

Information Provided Solely to the Blue Team

Privileged Information. Vienna has informed the United States that Slovenian nationalist leaders met late last week with officials of the Austrian government. While few details of the talks were provided, discussion revolved around possibilities for Austrian aid should Slovenia secede from the Yugoslav federation. The Austrian government advises that it has made no commitments in this regard.

The New York Times reports that the situation in Yugoslavia is volatile and potentially unstable. Ethnic unrest is on the increase, and could spark outbreaks elsewhere in the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

Table 2 presents the Red exercise history from the beginning of 1987 to the present.

Guidance

1. Develop contingency plans for U.S. and alliance military and political actions to counter possible Red efforts to intimidate Yugoslavia.

2. Design policies that will raise the political costs to Red of aggressive actions in Europe.

3. Continue to observe the existing CSBM regime.

Fig. 3—continued
Table 2

RED EXERCISE HISTORY FROM 01 JAN 87 TO 15 JUL 87
(Known Red exercises—notified Class C events not included)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Notified</th>
<th>Observed</th>
<th>Inspected</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>01 JAN to 17 JAN</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>02 APR to 10 APR</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, by FRG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C(?)</td>
<td>10 APR to 17 APR</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>15 APR to 30 APR</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>20 MAY to 01 JUN</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>05 JUN to 17 JUN</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>25 JUN to 09 JUL</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C(?)</td>
<td>04 JUL to 14 JUL</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Red provides only military district of USSR or country location of notified exercises. Red policy for observers appears to be slightly more forthcoming than in the past (observers allowed greater freedom of movement around the delimited exercise area). Red insists on defining restricted areas to include staging areas that are larger than garrisons. Based on German inspection experience, ground-based inspectors have relative freedom of movement around designated inspection areas, but Red limits aerial inspections to restricted altitudes and flight paths.

*Blue intelligence can neither confirm nor deny that this exercise exceeded CSBM notification threshold.

*Blue intelligence detected exercise activity in the Volga military district but at this point can neither confirm nor deny that the exercise was in violation of CSBM agreement.

Fig. 3—continued

stance, while the national government (with Serbian domination) took a stance of maintaining Yugoslav socialism. The precipitating incident in the Santa Monica scenario was the call for a plebiscite on the question of the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation. The Red team was given guidance to dissuade the Croatians from tightening their links with the West. After the Santa Monica game, we decided that the scenario would be more credible and in keeping with current Yugoslav politics to have it unfold as given above rather than as a principally Croatian problem. Corresponding to this change, the capitalist vs. socialist orientations of the competing factions in Yugoslavia were downplayed.

*We wish to thank A. Ross Johnson of The RAND Corporation for his advice in revising the scenario between the two games. Any possible misrepresentation of Yugoslav politics of course rests with the study team and not with him.
The third difference between the Santa Monica and Washington games was the specification of the exercise schedules. These schedules reflected the first moves of the teams and so were not specified before the game began. Move 1 was very similar in both games, and so were the exercise schedules.

In our judgment, the differences in initiating scenarios between the two games made no real difference in how each game was played. In both Santa Monica and Washington, the initiating scenarios were adopted without debate by the players. While details (such as where to hold an exercise of a given size) might have been dependent on the information provided at the beginning of Move 2, we believe that the actual moves, described immediately below, did not reflect these details.

**RED'S SECOND MOVE**

The Santa Monica and Washington Red teams took the same approach, responding militarily to the Yugoslav crisis. In particular, Red focused on planning coercive troop movements in Southeastern Europe that would be technically (or at least detectably) in compliance with the CSBM package and would not invite a Blue military overreaction. Thus, the discussion centered on what military moves might be possible, what effect they would have on the intended parties, and how they could be justified within the CSBM regime. Red's moves may be divided into three classes.

**Moves to Maintain Stability and Decrease Tensions**

The Red team in the Santa Monica game publicly ended a German exercise on schedule to further this goal. It also asked Blue to generally cooperate in reducing tensions, and more specifically to consider shortening or terminating its planned exercises and requested, for purposes of reassurance, to inspect a Northeast Italian exercise scheduled by Blue. The Red team in the Washington game canceled (publicly) a scheduled Class A exercise in the German Democratic Republic and Poland and also canceled (quietly) a planned exercise in the Carpathian Military District. The Red General Secretary made a speech announcing the cancellation of the Class A exercise and challenged Blue to do the same, suggesting in particular the Northeast Italian exercise.
Moves to Place Pressure on Yugoslavia and Surrounding States

The Red team in the Santa Monica game called an alert exercise in Hungary and the USSR involving mostly Hungarian and Soviet troops, but also key elements from other Warsaw Pact nations. It also had the Bulgarians notify a Class B exercise using only national forces to take place around the time of the plebiscite. These military moves were supported by political messages to the Yugoslavs assuring them of Red's cooperation in preserving their national integrity, and to the Romanians reminding them of the necessity of cooperating with Red. The Red team in the Washington game acted similarly in Hungary and Bulgaria. It upgraded a scheduled Hungarian exercise by adding Soviet forces (as an alert activity) and extended the exercise. It also added Warsaw Pact command elements to a scheduled Bulgarian exercise.

General Contingency Moves to Increase Military Preparedness

Both the Santa Monica and Washington Red teams deployed naval forces into the Mediterranean and reinforced their air forces in the appropriate military districts. The Santa Monica team implicitly and the Washington team explicitly did not involve Central Front forces in the Yugoslav-oriented maneuvers. The Red team in the Santa Monica game brought its home-based airborne forces to within-garrison alert status. Without notifying the change, the Red team in the Washington game mobilized Category III divisions as part of a beefed-up scheduled exercise in the Odessa Military District (intended, in part, to intimidate Romania) and surreptitiously retained in-garrison in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland troops normally scheduled to return to the Soviet Union as part of the regular troop rotations.

In preparing its second move the Red team in the Washington game supports this three-class breakdown of CSBM-oriented moves. That team decided that it was in Red's interest to maintain the integrity of Yugoslavia. Therefore, it made moves that would demonstrate solidarity with the Yugoslav government and would warn neighboring states to keep out of Yugoslav affairs. At the same time, Red was concerned that its activities would not be seen as provocative by Blue and so attempted to achieve its ends with minimal displays of force. Finally, for its own security, Red opted to increase the readiness of its forces and to surreptitiously augment its forces along the Central Front, providing it with a measure of extra protection as a contingency. It is clear that these extra forces were not intended as an invasion force of
Western Europe, but were, to be sure, capable of escalation in case Red found that action necessary.

CSBMs played a significant role in Red decisionmaking. Red was aware that the notification of an unforecast exercise subjected it to an extra inspection and it balanced that cost against the benefit of the exercise. It also weighed the costs of calling an immediate alert against the risks of waiting through the required notification period. As a result, the Red team in the Washington game decided to send only command elements rather than a full Soviet division to Bulgaria to avoid the 40-day advance notification required for movements of divisions.

The propaganda and deception values of moves also received some consideration. Standdowns of forces had propaganda value as apparently peaceful moves, yet had the military benefit of resting troops for possible real action. The continuation of Northern European exercises could be used as a cover for activities in the South. Scaling down exercises provided a vehicle for large maneuvers later if they became necessary. Deception planners could make the exercises look large while forces in fact returned to garrison to rest, and logistics assets became available for a possible Yugoslav offensive. The tradeoff between deceptively masking maneuvers versus opening them up through CSBMs as a form of intimidation received extensive discussion and was a major consideration in Red decisionmaking.

BLUE'S SECOND MOVE

In both games, Blue assumed that the Red objective in the Yugoslav crisis was to profit from, and if possible facilitate, the disintegration of Yugoslavia. As one Blue team member in the Washington game put it, it would be easier for Red to swallow Yugoslavia in pre-cut chunks than as a whole. Therefore, Blue's moves were predicated on the anticipation of Red attempts to further foment the crisis in Yugoslavia. That Red adopted the opposite strategy of attempting to preserve Yugoslav integrity led to considerable Blue misunderstanding and misinterpretation. It was important to Blue to make clear that its reactions were balanced ones scaled to the particular threat.

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Red's stance supporting Yugoslav unity was dictated by the Control team in the Santa Monica game; that same stance was taken by the Red team in the Washington game on its own.
Blue’s Approach

An excerpt of the second move of the Blue team in the Washington game accurately describes the approach taken by both Blue teams:

NATO assumes that the Soviet objective in the current Yugoslav crisis will be to profit from and if possible facilitate the disintegration of Yugoslavia. NATO expects the Soviet Union to use political and potentially military pressure to this end. Given the sensitivity of this issue, much of the political and military preparations to counter this pressure will have to be taken by the United States directly or in consultation selectively with certain allies rather than with the alliance as a whole. In this regard, the United States would consult immediately with the United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Italy on Western contingency planning.

Blue’s first approach was political. Blue issued a public statement reaffirming the CSCE principles regarding sovereignty and territorial integrity and making specific reference to the Yugoslav situation. In addition, the CSBM statement on the nonuse of force was reaffirmed; and all powers, including Red, were called upon to observe it. The Blue team in the Washington game further sent coordinated private messages from the United States and the NATO allies to Red, warning against intervention. Belgrade was urged privately to tone down the conduct of its planned Kosovo exercise, minimize its duration and scale, and ensure through international observation that it would not provoke further domestic tension.

The Blue team in the Washington game detailed further its political strategy:

The United States, perhaps in coordination with the United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, and France, would have its consulates in Zagreb and Ljubljana make urgent representations to Croatian and Slovenian leaders not to proceed further with activities that could lead to the disruption of Yugoslavia. The Italians would be urged to make a demarche to the Albanians underscoring the grave implications for Albanian security should Yugoslavia disintegrate and the Soviet Union gain influence in the region thereby, and calling on Albania to urge restraint on its conationalis in Kosovo. A similar demarche could be made in Athens (with regard to the Macedonian situation) and in Bucharest (with regard to the adverse effects of disruption in Yugoslavia) by the United States.

Blue chose a largely reactive military strategy. Heavy emphasis was placed on carrying out business as usual so long as Red behaved similarly, but both Blue teams drew up a set of military contingency plans in the event of Red actions threatening to Yugoslavia. These included movement of U.S. and other NATO forces to Northern Italy in the
event of Soviet exercises in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Bulgaria. The Blue team in the Santa Monica game sent elements of the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, while the Washington team attempted to have NATO send the ACE Mobile Force to Italy. The Blue team in the Santa Monica game, in addition, augmented a summer exercise in Germany to add forces commensurate with the magnitude of the Red exercise. The Blue team in the Washington game designed a set of military contingency moves that would be taken in order of the seriousness of the Soviet action, including:

- U.S. and other NATO country port calls in Yugoslav ports.
- Augmentation of the Sixth Fleet by one additional carrier battle group.
- Dispatch of a high-level U.S. team to discuss economic aid to Yugoslavia.
- Dispatch of a high-level U.S. team to discuss modest military sales to Yugoslavia.
- Organization of a special exercise in the Eastern Mediterranean by NAVOCFORMED (NAVal On Call FORce in the MEDITerranean).
- Deployment of additional AWACS orbits in the Aegean and Adriatic areas.
- Arrangement and notification on short notice of a multinational amphibious exercise in Thrace.

In addition to the political and military contingencies expressed above, Blue would make maximum use of its own and NNA nation inspections to ascertain and publicize the nature of Red activities. To provide maximum political exposure for the Kosovo exercise and to minimize Red interference, Blue planned to send inspectors along with the invited observers, probably from one of the middle-level NATO members, such as Belgium. Blue would also encourage the NNA states to send an inspector, perhaps from Switzerland. It was important to insure observation of all announced Warsaw Pact exercises in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The Blue team in the Washington game, acting as a NATO body, would choose among the member nations the one best suited to inspect any particularly suspicious activity.

\(^{1}\)The Control team judged that NATO would not have permitted that particular movement of forces.
Blue’s View of CSBMs in Move 2

From Blue’s perspective, the main role of the CSBMs was to keep Red from intimidating Yugoslavia. Blue needed to answer such questions regarding Red intentions toward Yugoslavia as, Will Red abide by the CSBMs, disregard them, or use them as a ruse? Blue’s problem was how to determine which of all of these possibilities was most likely. The CSBMs apparently did impose some constraints on Red. Blue’s perception was that Red could not do anything militarily to intimidate Yugoslavia without breaking the CSBM agreement and visibly demonstrating to the world that it was an aggressor.

In general, Blue believed it would have been able to respond more quickly without a CSBM agreement. Blue viewed the agreement as providing warning indicators, but also more uncertainty because of the difficulty of interpreting possible violations of the agreement. Surprise attack was considered to be most likely after a notified exercise. In many respects, CSBMs were seen as making the situation more difficult, by muddying the scene. Blue acknowledged that the CSBMs gave Red a chance to prepare for a surprise attack within the constraints of the agreement.

It was believed that there was not much extra use that the United States could make of exercises without appearing provocative. Unless there was a large-scale action by the other side, Blue was better off not doing anything by itself, thereby avoiding misinterpretation and miscalculation. The Blue team in the Washington game did not believe that the United States would intervene directly, so the use of exercises to show resolve would have had only limited value.

THE SECOND MOVE UNDER THE ALTERNATIVE CSBM REGIME

Blue believed that the alternative CSBM package would not have affected its move in any major ways. Both Blue teams discussed ways that Red might have to package its military activities differently, but there was a consensus that nothing major would change.

If Red were really up to something serious, it would not agree to host an inspection under the alternative package. Such an action would, however, have imposed political costs on Red by requiring it to explain the reasons for that denial.

Blue believed that the higher notification threshold would have made it harder for Blue to do contingency planning, since the smaller Class C exercises in Hungary and Bulgaria would not have been on the calendar, and Blue could not use them as “triggers” to calibrate
appropriate responses. While Red actions involving just under two divisions would probably be insufficient for a surprise attack or other serious military threat, it would be possible to use these small movements for intimidation, and the capacity for such intimidation existed in both CSBM packages.

No important element of Blue's move would have been changed under the alternative CSBM regime. A few of the contingency plans would have changed, but not drastically. Blue would have been less able to use the CSBMs to calibrate responses, but that was considered to be a fine-grained matter.

The Red team in the Washington game believed that the provision in the alternative package requiring notification of "movements" would have helped drive home the various messages of political intimidation Red had been sending. Allowing for TRAs permitted Red to have larger staging areas and reduced problems of evading the CSBMs.
IV. THE CRISIS DEEPENS: MOVES 3 AND 4

The third move was set about two months after the second move, after all of the teams' efforts at containing the crisis had been developed. In spite of the best efforts by Red and Blue, the crisis in Yugoslavia worsened. In addition, pressure was placed on the Red team to attend to possible stirrings among the ethnic populations in the Warsaw Pact states and the possibility of Western assistance to Yugoslavia. The purpose of Move 3, then, was to assess how the teams dealt with increased tension. In addition, a fourth move, not based on the Red team's behavior, was given to the Blue teams to assess how they would react to actual Red military intervention.

THE SCENARIO FOR MOVE 3, WASHINGTON GAME

Figure 4 presents the scenario given for the Washington game.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SANTA MONICA AND WASHINGTON GAMES

Although the scenario to open Move 3 was different for the Santa Monica game because of the different precipitating event for the crisis, the general tone was the same as that of the Washington game. As before, the time frame was slightly different; the Washington game was played in late September 1987, the Santa Monica Move 3 was set in late May 1987.

The main difference followed the attempt earlier by Croatia to secede from the Yugoslav Federal Republic. In Santa Monica, by the third move, following an overwhelming vote for secession in the plebiscite, an independent pro-Western Croatian republic had come into existence. This government had been recognized by Albania and China and had established tentative contacts with several West European states. Slovenia was moving toward union with Croatia, and the other non-Serb Yugoslav republics were themselves moving toward secession. The central Yugoslav government was helpless to prevent all of this.

The remainder of the Santa Monica scenario established the general line followed in Washington. Details of military maneuvers differed as a function of the different game moves, but, as we reported in Sec. III, they were quite similar in nature.
General Information

It is now 20 September 1987. The crisis in Yugoslavia has continued to deepen. Yugoslav army units of Serbian ethnic origin have deployed to Kosovo in accordance with the previously announced exercise and are involved in dealing with the civil unrest there which has increased. Albania and the People’s Republic of China have formally condemned Belgrade’s action, and Albania (notably NOT a signatory to the CSBM treaty) has mobilized troops on its eastern border.

Unrest and secessionist sentiment are now rampant in Slovenia and Croatia in response to the Serbian actions in Kosovo. There are reports of clashes between Croatian and Serbian ethnic army units, especially near the border of the two republics and in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Newspapers in Ljubljana have printed articles openly advocating Slovenian secession from Yugoslavia and Slovenian separatists have increased their ties to other Slovenes in Austria, who have responded with financial support. The Croatians have similarly courted Italian, Austrian, and West German (Bavarian) support, with some success. As the unrest continues, many of the Yugoslav “guestworkers” in Western Europe have been returning home; it is an open secret that some of them are conduits for Western support. Anti-air and anti-tank weapons of Western origin have been observed in both Slovenia and Croatia.

The pan-Macedonian movement has intensified, but there have been no overt civil disturbances to date in either the Yugoslav, Greek, or Bulgarian parts of Macedonia.

The Yugoslav central government appears to be totally hamstrung politically. The emergency session of the League of Communists, intended as a step towards re-instituting central control, turned into an angry and almost anarchic forum for the venting of inter-regional and intra-party disputes. After ten days of charges and counter-charges, the delegations from Croatia, Slovenia, and Kosovo walked out of the conference, declaring that any actions taken by the plenum in their absence would be non-binding. While the senior staff remains loyal to the Belgrade government, the military in general is on the verge of paralysis as Yugoslavia’s armed forces dissolve along ethnic lines. Although the federal government continues to insist that it has the situation in hand, the dissolution of Yugoslavia would seem to be a distinct possibility.

While all Yugoslav leaders continue to call publicly for non-intervention on the part of all other countries, it is rumored that some Serbian leaders have secretly met with the Soviets to discuss assistance in maintaining the integrity of Yugoslavia. Romania has announced publicly that it will not permit transit of military forces by any other country across its territory.

Fig. 4—The Move 3 scenario in the Washington game
The ethnic unrest in Yugoslavia has been mirrored in neighboring states. There have been disturbances in the Magyar region of Romania, and unrest has also been reported in several southern counties of Hungary and Slovakia, although details are sketchy. The Hungarian disturbances seem in part to be related to ongoing military exercises in that country. Finally, the Soviet leader in late August made a highly-publicized speech on the emergent crisis in the Balkans. He announced that a Class A exercise in the German Democratic Republic and Poland, scheduled to commence on 20 August, had been cancelled, and called upon NATO to show similar restraint in return. He especially asked that the NATO exercise in Northeast Italy scheduled to begin on 1 September be cancelled or postponed. That exercise has gone on as planned. Meanwhile, the United States has publicly reaffirmed its dedication to the CSCE/CDE principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the nonuse of force, and has called on all powers, including the Soviet Union, to observe these precepts. These statements were echoed in virtually all European capitals, including Moscow.

Information Provided Solely to the Red Team

**Privileged Information:** Intelligence reports that the United States is engaged in a process of consultation with the United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Italy. Though the topic is unknown, it is clear from the European press that the European NATO countries are reluctant to involve themselves in a confrontation with Red. Blue has also apparently asked that the ACE Mobile Force be deployed to Italy; this request seems to be under consideration at this time.

U.S. officials have met privately with officials of the Yugoslavian government as well as with Croatian and Slovenian nationalist leaders. It is known that the United States is offering some economic aid to Belgrade, as well as arms of unknown quantity and types. Meanwhile, U.S. requests for port calls in Yugoslavian ports have been refused by Belgrade.

Anti-Soviet and anti-government demonstrations demanding national self-determination have occurred sporadically in southern Hungary for the past two weeks; the largest of these involved several thousand protesters. While local security forces have thus far been able to maintain control of the situation, they have been unable to completely end the unrest. Meanwhile, Magyar residents of Romania have taken to the streets to protest their "oppressed" status within that country and are demanding autonomy within their region. Our agents within various other dissident groups in Eastern Europe are reporting an upsurge in anti-Soviet agitation.

Our intelligence estimates that Western aid to secessionist factions in Yugoslavia, a trickle at present, could increase dramatically if any of them succeed in establishing an independent government.

Fig. 4—continued
Observers from Warsaw Pact, NATO, and NNA countries are present at the announced Yugoslavian exercise in Kosovo. An inspection team from Belgium is also on hand. All reports to which Red has access agree that the units involved in the exercise are mostly, if not entirely, Serbian, and that the operation is in fact aimed at quelling unrest in Kosovo.

Red observers at the Yugoslav exercises in Kosovo describe Yugoslav forces as engaging actively in counterinsurgency operations against Shiptar partisans. Morale appears to be very low among the Yugoslav units observed. Non-Serbian personnel are almost entirely absent from the operation. Several scratch units seem to have been hurriedly organized from Serbian cadres. Observers have heard rumors of ethnic violence between Serb and non-Serb Yugoslav Army personnel.

Results of Red's Move 2: The troop rotation within the various Soviet groups of forces in Eastern Europe is proceeding. Available Soviet forces in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland have been substantially augmented. There are no indications that NATO is aware of this event.

On 9 September, Red announced an alert of a single tank division of the Southern Group of Forces stationed in Hungary. This alert coincided with the commencement of a scheduled and notified exercise of the Soviet Ground Forces. Slated to end on 18 September, that exercise has been extended.

A high-echelon Warsaw Pact command element has been deployed in conjunction with the exercise beginning today in Bulgaria.

Mobilization of Category III divisions in the Odessa Military District began in early September in conjunction with notified exercises in that military district. Those forces are approaching operational readiness.

The exercise scheduled to begin 22 August in the Carpathian Military District has been cancelled. Air and ground forces in that district are at a high state of readiness.

Air forces assigned to the Southwest Theater of Military Operations (SWTVD) have been alerted and are configured for a move to Bulgaria. Elements of the Black Sea fleet have increased their patrols along the Romanian and Bulgarian coasts.

There has been no change in status of forces assigned to the Western Theater of Military Operations (WTVD), with the exception of the augmentation associated with the troop rotation.

This last paragraph of intelligence was supplied to the Red team as a supplement, after the main body of information, but before deliberations had proceeded very far.

Fig. 4—continued
The Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia and several officials of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR met last week with Serbian leaders who again emphasized their determination to maintain the territorial and political integrity of Yugoslavia. While continuing to assert their opposition to external intervention, they did request that Red make arrangements for resupply of consumables and equipment should military action be required.

Results of Blue's Move 2: The United States and several European NATO states have sent private messages to Red asserting that they would view any Red action in Yugoslavia "with grave concern."

The U.S. Sixth Fleet has been augmented with an additional CVBG and is currently operating in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean. NAVOIFORMED is currently engaging in a special exercise in the Ionian Sea. In response, Red naval forces deployed into the Ionian Sea have engaged in harassment of these NATO units. Blue AWACS and support elements have deployed to Italy and have established orbits over the Aegean and Adriatic Seas. The ongoing Red exercises in Hungary have been inspected by teams from Italy and Norway.

Table 3 shows the exercise history provided the Red team in the Washington game, for the period between Moves 2 and 3.

Guidance: Our attempts to encourage a favorable outcome in the situation in Yugoslavia have apparently failed. We are forced, therefore, to take stronger measures:

1. Make final preparations for intervention in Yugoslavia. These preparations should be made so as to minimize the chances of effective resistance or interference with our actions. Since the bulk of the loyalist Yugoslav army is currently occupied in quelling disturbances in Kosovo, we have an excellent chance of avoiding large-scale engagements with organized opposition if we act quickly. Also, the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia and elsewhere makes it imperative that we resolve the current crisis rapidly.

2. Decide how to respond to disturbances in fraternal countries should they arise or intensify as a result of our operations in Yugoslavia.

3. Additionally, we must continue to pursue our dual objectives with regard to NATO: applying appropriate pressure to make our resolve in these matters clear while simultaneously reassuring the West, and especially the European NATO countries, of our peaceful intentions.

The West’s actions to this point make it unclear whether or not it intends to intervene in the Balkans. We should take all possible steps

Fig. 4—continued
Table 3
BLUE EXERCISE HISTORY FROM 01 AUG 87 TO 20 SEP 87
(Known Blue exercises—notified Class C events not included)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Notified</th>
<th>Observed</th>
<th>Inspected</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>01 AUG to 15 SEP</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>01 SEP (ongoing)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NE Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>01 SEP (ongoing)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>15 SEP (ongoing)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Information Provided Solely to the Blue Team

Privileged Information: The United States is engaged in a process of contingency planning with the United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Italy. Thus far, the European nations have shown themselves extremely wary of being dragged into a confrontation with Red.

Results of Red's Move 2: The normal troop rotation within the various Soviet groups of forces in Eastern Europe is proceeding.

On 9 September, Red announced an alert of a single tank division of the Southern Group of Forces (SGF) stationed in Hungary. This alert coincides with the commencement of a scheduled exercise of the SGF slated to end on 18 September. That exercise has apparently been extended.

Additionally, Blue intelligence has detected the operation of a high-echelon Warsaw Pact command element in conjunction with an exercise beginning today in Bulgaria. No further assessment is currently available.

Red naval forces deployed into the Ionian Sea have engaged in some harassment of NATO surface units operating in the vicinity.

An exercise scheduled to begin 22 August in the Carpathian Military District has not occurred. Intelligence reports that ground and air units in the area appear to be in a stand-down mode.

Results of Blue's Move 2: Yugoslavia was contacted privately by both the United States and France and urged to tone down its current...
exercise in Kosovo. Belgrade responded that the matter was internal and not subject to foreign interference. Observers from NATO, Warsaw Pact, and NNA countries are present at that exercise, as is an inspection team from Belgium. All reports to which Blue has access agree that the units involved in the exercise are mostly, if not entirely, Serbian, and that the operation is in fact aimed at quelling unrest in Kosovo.

Through its consulates in Ljubljana and Zagreb, the United States has contacted Slovenian and Croatian leaders and asked them to desist in any activities which could promote disunity in Yugoslavia. Through Italy and Greece, similar approaches were made to Albania and Romania. In each case, those contacted expressed agreement with U.S. concerns regarding the situation and stated that they would take the U.S. advice under serious consideration.

In response to the Red alert in Hungary and the detected but unnotified mobilization in the Odessa Military District, the following contingency measures have been implemented:

The United States and its NATO allies have sent coordinated, private messages to Red stating that they would view any Red action in Yugoslavia "with grave concern."

U.S. requests for port calls in Yugoslavian ports have been refused by Belgrade. However, the Yugoslavian government has agreed to the visit of high-level U.S. delegations to discuss possible Blue economic and military assistance to Belgrade.

The Sixth Fleet has been augmented with an additional CVBG, and is currently operating in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean. NAVOCFORMED is currently engaging in a special exercise in the Ionian Sea. Also, AWACS and support elements have deployed to Italy and have established orbits over the Aegean and Adriatic Seas.

The United States has requested that the ACE Mobile Force be deployed to Northern Italy. That request is under consideration by the appropriate alliance bodies at this time.

The ongoing Red exercises in Hungary have been inspected by teams from Italy and Norway, who reported nothing unusual in their conduct. France and The Netherlands have agreed to inspect the exercises just commencing in Bulgaria.

Finally, Greece has refused to cooperate in any amphibious exercise in Thrace.

Table 4 shows the Red exercise history between Moves 2 and 3.
### Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Notified</th>
<th>Observed</th>
<th>Inspected</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>20 AUG to 01 SEP</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C(?)</td>
<td>20 SEP (ongoing)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(c)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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8Activity by SGF tank division notified as alert. Associated with scheduled SGF exercises in Hungary.
9Apparent mobilization of multiple Category III divisions in the Odessa Military District, associated with notified Class C exercise. This activity appears to be in violation of the CSBM accord.

Intelligence identified Warsaw Pact command element operating in conjunction with announced exercise of Bulgarian forces.

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Fig. 4—continued

The third move team instructions in Santa Monica for Red were more directive than we later used for the Washington game; we originally desired to force the Red team to take military action. Therefore, Red was directed to make preparations for military intervention in Yugoslavia with the objectives of the destruction of Croatia and Slovenia as independent entities, the exertion of pressure upon Belgrade to accept a (permanent) Red presence in Yugoslavia, and the reposition of order in the states surrounding Yugoslavia.

### RED'S THIRD MOVE

In part because of pressure inherent in the scenario, and in part because of direct guidance by the Control team, Red's third move was more provocative than the second move. Nonetheless, Red proved quite reluctant to engage its forces in direct military activity and still attempted to use political messages as much as possible. Red's third move had three major objectives: (1) attempting to reassure the West of its peaceful intentions, (2) maintaining order in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries, and (3) preparing for action both in Yugoslavia and elsewhere should the crisis escalate.
Crisis Control Measures

As a show of its noninterventionist intentions, the Red team in the Santa Monica game voluntarily terminated ongoing exercises in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic and invited UN and CSCE observers to watch the return to garrison of the involved units. Red called on Blue to desist in the use of the CIA to foment the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Red strongly protested the augmentation of the Blue exercises, especially in view of its own unilateral cancellation of exercises and its previous request that Blue not increase its exercises. It protested in particular the use of U.S. airborne units in exercises. While taking steps to control the crisis, Red exploited opportunities to take propaganda advantage of Blue maneuvers that might appear aggressive. For example, it created news reports from Bavaria indicating increasing criticism by anti-nuclear and anti-NATO military groups regarding U.S./NATO war preparations in Germany. It also publicly stated that all of its behaviors in the crisis were in line with the spirit as well as the letter of the CSBM agreement and accused Blue of overstepping the bounds of the accord.

The Red team in the Washington game similarly announced its military moves as tension-reducing and invited observers to visit exercises that were not near Yugoslavia, in order to show its intention not to escalate. It engaged in high-level diplomacy with CSCE signatories, calling for steps (e.g., consultations at the Foreign Minister level) to reduce tension in Europe and denounced any Blue military actions near Yugoslavia. It adopted a public posture of defensiveness and resistance to any intrusion into the independence and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Propaganda advantages were not ignored by the Red team in the Washington game either. For example, it sent a message that deployment of the ACE Mobile Force into Italy could so undermine the CSBM regime as to cause its suspension.

Maintaining Order in the Satellites

Red concerned itself with reestablishing order in the satellite nations. The Red team in the Santa Monica game took the more extensive measures, probably because it was presented with a greater threat in that regard. Even though the Hungarian exercise was cut short, Red still maintained Hungarian and Soviet troops in Hungary at the highest level of readiness. The national governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania were informed that they had primary responsibility for the crises in their own countries, but that within the general orientation of Socialist states, Red would provide support (e.g., KGB)
to assist them. Simultaneously, a crackdown on Romanian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian dissidents in their own countries was ordered. The Romanian government was privately informed that Red was considering requesting rights of passage for Soviet troops. Strong disapproval of any Romanian intimation of support for Croatian independence was expressed.

The Red team in the Washington game took fewer actions related to the satellites. It sent a single division to Bulgaria to follow the command unit placed there earlier and notified this as an alert exercise. Airborne and ground troops in the SWTVD were placed at a high state of readiness, to be prepared to move into Hungary or Transylvania if necessary.

Preparing for Possible Action in Yugoslavia

Red took several steps to prepare for possible military action in Yugoslavia. The Red team in the Santa Monica game sent special units (e.g. Spetznaz) to take up positions along the Yugoslav border. Red established covert mechanisms designed to result in a more effective pro-Soviet government in Yugoslavia. Garrison alert for all forces in Bulgaria was declared. Stories were disseminated in the Western press that the CIA was involved in ethnic group unrest in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. On the political front, Red publicly convened a meeting of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers and Senior Military Representatives in Moscow, followed by another meeting adding Yugoslav representatives. Covertly, the KGB worked with friendly Yugoslavs wherever possible.

The Red team in the Washington game took similar steps. Soviet forces in Hungary were prepared to move into Yugoslavia, and three divisions from the Carpathian Military District were sent to Hungary as an alert exercise; Red recognized and accepted this as incurring a Blue right to observe or inspect the action. Other units were quietly brought up to readiness short of calling up significant reserves. Two airborne divisions in the SWTVD were prepared for possible movement to Yugoslavia. There was considerable discussion concerning the sufficiency of these forces to take appropriate action in Yugoslavia, as well as the logistical problems caused by avoiding transit through Romania; but in the end, Red decided that these actions would have to suffice. Naval forces in the Mediterranean were set to execute a spoiling attack on Blue forces if necessary; other fleets were maintained at a high state of readiness but were deployed so as to minimize provocation.

In addition, as a publicly defensive reaction against Red’s expressed fears of a possible Blue intervention in Yugoslavia and further
escalation of the situation, the Red team in the Washington game asked to inspect the Blue exercises in Italy and Germany and deployed its nuclear forces out-of-garrison at the highest normal rates.

BLUE'S THIRD MOVE

The third moves for the Santa Monica and Blue teams in the Washington game were quite different, because of different viewpoints regarding Blue interests and Red intentions in Yugoslavia. Both Blue teams assumed that Red was accelerating military preparations either for military activity or for political pressure against Yugoslavia, but that it was keeping its options open. The primary Blue objective continued to be to prevent Red occupation of Yugoslavia or any portions of the country, while avoiding the outbreak of World War III. Although the Blue team in the Santa Monica game accepted the partition of Yugoslavia as presented in the scenario and wished to keep Red from occupying Croatia and Slovenia, the Blue team in the Washington game maintained its belief that Red wanted a dissolution of Yugoslavia and continued to attempt to keep the country together.

Political Stances

The political actions of the two Blue teams were very different. The Blue team in the Santa Monica game took the public position that two or three neutral states in the Balkans are as good as one and that the joint interests of the superpowers lay in maintaining the neutrality of the region. The Blue team in the Santa Monica game recognized the right of Croatia and the other constituent republics to the Yugoslav constitutional guarantees regarding secession. Although it respected Red security interests in the region, it strongly reaffirmed the CSBM measure regarding nonintervention and the renunciation of the use of force by any state.

The Blue team in the Santa Monica game believed that Red saw the Yugoslav crisis as a threat to Red security and feared that Hungary could be lost. This led Blue to a policy of refraining from involvement if possible. It considered trying to make an agreement with Red over Yugoslavia by which Croatia and Slovenia would stay separate and neutral, while Red would retain hegemony over the remainder of Yugoslavia.

The Blue team in the Washington game took as its first priority the minimization of the internal Yugoslav splits, which were providing the potential excuse for Red intervention. This included U.S. demarches
in Vienna, Bonn, Munich, and Rome to oppose Slovenian and Croatian separatism. These communications were to be supported by contacts in Zagreb and Ljubljana to the same effect, underscoring the disastrous consequences for all concerned should Yugoslav dissolution result in Red occupation. In this context, Blue made maximum possible use of available intelligence on the Red exercise and other military activity in the Balkans and in the nearby Carpathian and Odessa Military Districts.

The Blue team in the Washington game also intensified contacts with Serbian leaders in an effort to isolate any Serbs who might be tempted to invite in Soviet assistance against other ethnic groups. It stressed the long tradition of Western support for Yugoslav territorial integrity and independence and the consequences of potential Soviet occupation along the lines of the Afghan model. With appropriate contacts, it underlined ongoing military assistance and consultation programs.

**Political Actions**

The Blue team in the Santa Monica game took no formal political actions beyond the reaffirmation of the CSBM measure on the nonuse of force. The Blue team in the Washington game devoted the majority of its efforts to political attempts to unify NATO activities and to communicate this unity to Red.

To counter Red propaganda with regard to its military activities, Blue announced that NATO was standing down one preannounced Class B exercise in Southern Germany. The forces involved in that exercise were locally based, thus not requiring the United States to send home any REFORGER units. The standdown was also intended to improve Blue readiness.

Blue requested an immediate inspection of the reported Red mobilization activities in the Odessa Military District. It proposed that the United Kingdom be the inspecting nation and encouraged an NNA state to make an inspection (using U.S. intelligence information as a goad), emphasizing that the mobilization might be a violation of the CSBM agreement.

Blue sent demarches to Red regarding military preparations in the Carpathian and Odessa Military Districts and in particular the apparent violation of the CSBM agreement in the Odessa Military District. At the same time, it reaffirmed notice of a planned and prenotified exercise to begin in Turkey on 1 October. Blue emphasized that this exercise was not planned to be provocative and that its main operations were not scheduled to take place until the middle of October.
Blue reiterated past public statements on the importance of the CSBM agreement in the context of the current crisis in the Balkans. The President underscored in particular the importance of the commitments Gorbachev made to him in the 1987 summit\(^1\) regarding peaceful handling of international disputes.

**Military Actions**

The differences in approach between the Santa Monica and Washington Blue teams were reflected in differences in their military maneuvers. The Santa Monica team, while trying to keep uninvolved in the crisis, nevertheless readied itself for possible direct and unilateral intervention in Yugoslavia. The Sixth Fleet, stationed southeast of Italy, was reinforced. U.S. troops normally based in the United States but exercising in Germany were redeployed in a nearby training area, purportedly in preparation for shipment home, but actually prepared to aid in Yugoslavia if necessary. Although the Blue team in the Santa Monica game saw this deployment as a technical violation of the CSBM agreement, it notified Red that the move was temporary, as the troops were awaiting transportation back to the United States.

The Blue team in the Washington game made great efforts to involve the NATO allies so as to avoid taking actions unilaterally. It continued to press for the deployment of the ACE mobile force into Italy as a symbol of the alliance’s common resolve in this crisis, noting that any Red involvement in Yugoslavia would pose a direct threat to alliance security.

As a contingency, Blue forces involved in the Class B exercise in Italy scheduled to end on 30 September remained in place following the end of the exercise for a “leisurely” cleanup before returning to garrison. In addition, the United States consulted closely with major allies regarding potential operational support of Yugoslav resistance elements.

**AN ESCALATING CRISIS: MOVE 4**

The fourth move was not originally planned by the Control team, but was devised in Santa Monica in order to assess Blue’s reaction to a Red invasion of Yugoslavia. For the Washington game, the fourth move was scheduled in advance for both Red and Blue but, unlike the

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\(^1\)An event created by the Blue team in the Washington game that was not countermanded by the Control team.
earlier moves, was preplanned rather than based on the previous moves of Red and Blue.

The Santa Monica Blue Team

As we noted, the Red team in the Santa Monica game did its best to avoid actual confrontation with U.S. forces. The Blue team in the Santa Monica game believed that if Red could be assured that the satellite countries were not threatened and that part of Yugoslavia could be added to the buffer around the Soviet Union, a partition of Yugoslavia was feasible and a confrontation between U.S. and Soviet forces could be avoided. The fourth move, then, was a forced presentation of that confrontation.

The Blue team in the Santa Monica game was given a brief orally delivered scenario constructed entirely by the Control team, with no regard to Red's actual third move. This information originally indicated no malevolence: Red reaffirmed the principle of nonintervention and began to terminate exercises, inviting observers. However, information was also conveyed that there was continued ethnic unrest, and some rumors were presented that indicated Western (e.g., CIA, Bavarian) involvement in fomenting the unrest. Red called again for nonintervention in the area, reinforcing Blue's predisposition to believe that such an outcome was possible, and even perhaps likely.

The final message to Blue, which drastically altered matters, was a "flash" that Red troops in force had just moved out of Hungary into Croatia, with intelligence indications that there were more to follow.

Blue's original reaction to this "flash" was one of helplessness. It believed that its bluff had been called, and it had to take action or lose in Yugoslavia. Yet such action might initiate an escalatory spiral. Options narrowed down quickly to obtaining allied support for a movement of available troops (primarily U.S. forces moved earlier to Italy) into Croatia to prevent a Red takeover.

Blue's first decision was not to hack down but to act against the Red invasion, if support from the allies (principally Germany and Italy) was forthcoming. Blue also believed that Austria, which Blue perceived as threatened by the Red move, had to cooperate for a Blue action to be feasible. Given this decision, Blue attempted to take action in a way best designed to minimize the chances of escalation. Yet the decision to act carried acknowledged risks, which Blue was prepared to take.

Blue's move was to land U.S. forces at Zagreb before Red arrived at the Croatian capital, in the hopes that Red would attempt to avoid being the first to fire on the opposite superpower. Should Red engage Blue forces, however, Blue was prepared to fight to maintain Croatia's new independence.
The Washington Blue Team

The instructions to the Blue team in the Washington game were designed to make Blue believe Red was going to invade Yugoslavia. However, given the experience of the Santa Monica game, the Control team decided not to give a flash announcement of an actual invasion. Blue was told that Red had done the following:

- Held high-level consultations designed to ease tensions, including meetings with CSCE signatories at the ambassadorial level and meetings with various European governments at the Foreign Minister level.
- Increased its activity within the crisis-management realm, including an inspection of NATO exercises in Italy and Germany, sending its own forces back to garrison in Central Europe, and having the General Secretary deliver a speech denouncing NATO intrusion in Yugoslavia.
- Increased its own military activity, including moving three divisions from the Carpathian Military District to Hungary (announced as an alert), sending one division to Bulgaria (again as an alert), and bringing to increased readiness two airborne divisions in the SWTVD.
- Unilaterally implemented elements of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) proposals agreed to in principle in Vienna regarding no-increase commitments for NATO/Warsaw Pact forces within the MBFR's Central European area comprising the two Germanies, the Benelux nations, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

The Blue team in the Washington game saw the Red movement of forces from the Carpathian Military District as a signal of an impending attack on Yugoslavia but did not believe the Red forces were strong enough to invade successfully unless the Yugoslav army was helpless. It saw earlier Blue efforts to deter the Soviets as a failure. It decided to attempt to develop a measured military response that was clear enough to avoid precipitating Red actions.

This move stopped short of direct military action but included mobilization of the Marine Amphibious Battalion in the United States, alert of U.S. airborne units in the United States, deployment of U.S. air assets into Northeastern Italy, and once again calling on the allies to bring the ACE mobile force into Italy. As before, the use of allied forces was discussed extensively, and it was hoped that several allies would contribute forces to the mobilization. All of this military action was to be done publicly and to be accompanied by both public and
private communications warning the Red team not to take drastic action. The team did not specify, however, whether this action would presage actual Blue involvement in Yugoslavia or whether it was a bluff to talk Red out of taking action.

**The Washington Red Team**

Figure 5 shows the information given to the Red team in the Washington game.²

The Red team in the Washington game reacted to this information both militarily and politically. The basic thrust of its move was to pursue political, not military, steps for the short term while the situation in Yugoslavia clarified. The primary purpose of the political option was to encourage the fissure between the United States and its NATO allies that was apparent in NATO's reluctance to send the ACE mobile force into Italy. Red also considered the failure of the Federal Republic of Germany to mobilize thus far in the crisis as a bellwether for the seriousness of NATO allies' intent. The military steps taken included moving alerted air forces in the SWTVD into Hungary and Bulgaria, preparing a second Odessa Military District division for movement into Bulgaria, and providing assistance to the Yugoslav government to assassinate Croatian leaders. The KGB or GRU forces were to be used for the last task if the Yugoslavs themselves were unable to do the job.

Politically, Red decided to pressure the Polish government to keep dissidents under control and to reopen the rail lines into Germany, to demand an inspection of the Blue alert in the Federal Republic of Germany, and to request the convening of a multilateral chief-of-state level European summit to discuss the provocative U.S.-sponsored attempts to dissolve Yugoslav unity, integrity, and independence and the unprecedented and highly provocative Blue alert. In addition, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany was publicly invited to consult with Red on the crisis.

²In the Santa Monica game, the Red team was not given a fourth move.
NATO has increased considerably its military activity. NATO SACEUR has declared an alert of all AFCENT forces, involving more than 10 NATO divisions. The German Foreign ministry has similarly announced a major alert. The U.S. REFORGER units are in Germany, and further troops are arriving, ostensibly for refresher training. The United States is beginning an exercise in Turkey, although it noted that this exercise is not intended to be provocative. The United States continues to press in NATO for the deployment of the ACE mobile force in Italy as a symbol of the alliance common resolve in this crisis. NATO allies are as yet unwilling to approve such a move. Nevertheless, the United States has expressed its intention to deploy airborne assets to Italy in response to an urgent bilateral request. The flow of Western military support into Slovenia and Croatia via Austria continues and increases, despite Austrian President Kurt Waldheim's protestations to the contrary.

NATO has requested an immediate inspection of the reported mobilization activities in the Odessa Military District. In addition, the United States and its allies have increased political activity against their claimed violation of the Stockholm accord caused by the Soviet military preparations in the Carpathian and Odessa Military Districts.

The United States and NATO have reiterated past public statements on the importance of the CSCE and CDE agreements in the context of the current crisis in the Balkans. The President has underscored in particular the importance of the commitments Gorbachev made to him in the 1987 summit regarding peaceful handling of international disputes. The public statements underscore the seriousness of the apparent Soviet military threats and the implications for Europe and the world should these threats not be resisted. Further diplomatic moves by Blue include demarches in Vienna, Bonn, Munich, and Rome to oppose Slovenian and Croatian separatism. The United States has intensified contacts with Serbian leaders in an effort to isolate any Serbs who might be tempted to invite in Soviet assistance against other ethnic groups.

Intelligence sources showed that the United States is consulting closely with allies to facilitate potential operational support to Yugoslav resistance elements, in the event of Soviet intervention. In addition, these sources report preliminary alerting messages to prepare for a rapid airlift of American forces from the United States.

A successful strike by resurgent Solidarity types in Poland has severely affected rail and sea transportation in Poland.

Advance elements of the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division have arrived in Italy.

Fig. 5—Information given to the Washington Red team for the fourth move
V. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Two games are obviously insufficient to draw definitive conclusions on the benefits and risks of CSBMs. The games did yield insights in the form of tentative conclusions about the CSBM packages we examined and the direction future research on CSBMs should take. These insights fall into four general categories: (1) the effect of CSBMs on crisis control, (2) problems certain proposed CSBMs pose for the United States and its allies, (3) further limitations of the two CSBM games that were played, and (4) directions for future research.

THE EFFECTS OF CSBMS ON EUROPEAN CRISIS CONTROL

One of the principal reasons for conducting the games was to learn more about whether a CSBM agreement would help contain European crises. Some believed that the benefit CSBMs would confer in reducing the risks of miscalculation would exceed any increased opportunities for concealment of a surprise attack. Others believed just the opposite. A third point of view is that the CSBMs made essentially no difference. Our observations tend to fit the third point of view more than the first two, at least under the game conditions that we posited.

The CSBMs Had a Negligible Effect

None of the CSBMs seriously cramped either team’s freedom of action. In no case did a Red or Blue team feel that the presence of CSBMs kept it from taking some action that it believed useful. For example, in Move 2, neither Red nor Blue felt impeded by the exercise calendars it had constructed in Move 1. These calendars were rich enough in exercises that some previously scheduled activity could be used as the focal point for any additional military activity, all without violating the letter of the CSBM treaty.

The scenarios used in our games might be considered permissive insofar as testing CSBMs is concerned. Because of the location of the action, it was necessary for Red to take obvious actions (move forces around etc.) to prepare for any sort of decisive action. Yet the CSBM regime neither deterred Red nor served as an alerting mechanism for Blue; in fact, the presence of the agreement seemed to generate little variance from the behavior that might be expected in a non-CSBM
case involving an identical crisis. If the measures made little difference in a case where Red had to do a considerable amount of preparation, it is likely that they would be equally negligible in a Central European crisis, where the aggressor is in a more developed and prepared posture.

The CSBMs did little to promote confidence. There was no sense of the spirit of cooperation or the hope that these (and subsequent) agreements could lead to a climate in which there was no occasion for war. Both in Santa Monica and in Washington, Red and Blue engaged in a lot of military activity, much of which might have been avoided had the two sides fully understood each others' objectives in Yugoslavia. CSBMs did not help the two sides in Washington clarify or communicate to each other their (essentially similar) objectives regarding Yugoslavia. That is, the CSBMs did not help lessen the risks of misunderstanding or miscalculation. A probable outcome of both games, if we had let them go that far, might have been a military confrontation in Yugoslavia that surprised at least one of the teams. In Santa Monica, Blue erroneously believed that Red would not militarily intervene in Yugoslavia; while in Washington, Red underestimated Blue's willingness to act given the lack of allied support.

CSBMs do not appear to have been a decisive contributor to the misunderstanding that occurred, nor did they do harm in the sense of leaving Blue unprepared for a surprise move by Red. The Blue teams believed that they had enough flexibility and made what preparations were possible; any limitations on their actions were because of resource or coalition politics constraints and not because of the CSBM agreement.

Both sides believed that it was important to keep the crisis from spilling over into other areas, particularly the Central Front. It is moot, though, whether the CSBMs or simply the explicit lack of military activity in that region was the main force in accomplishing that goal.

CSBMs Turn Minimum Standards into Maximum Levels

One possibly negative effect of the CSBMs is that they may tend to transform what are intended to be minimum standards of notification and crisis control into what are in practice maximum levels. By adhering to explicit standards of notification and cooperation, both Red and Blue believed that they had fulfilled their obligations under the agreement and had no need to be more forthcoming. In this way, the measures had a self-defeating quality. CSBMs are, at least theoretically, to be the first step leading to a general lessening of tensions and increase
in openness within the European community. Our observations suggest that the measures are self-limiting and might inhibit what in some circumstances would be security- and confidence-building behavior that goes beyond minimum standards. The extent to which this phenomenon might be an artifact of game playing or might be the result of any CSBM or similar agreement requires further research, both in gaming research and in investigations of the consequences of major deescalating international agreements.

The Players Did Not Look Beyond Their Own Prior Beliefs

Both sides quickly determined what they believed the other's intent was, and then never questioned that determination. This happened in both games. In Santa Monica, both sides were essentially correct, but in Washington they were not. That is, both Red and Blue in Washington believed that the other side favored the dissolution of Yugoslavia while its own interests were best served by preserving the status quo. This error, which might have been cleared up had the teams engaged in nonpublic diplomatic communications, led to a lot of tension building and escalation. If a purpose of CSBMs is to reduce misunderstanding and miscalculation by making the intentions of the conflicting parties clear to each other, they certainly failed in this instance. It is a pervasive finding of the individual and group decisionmaking literature that decisionmakers do not pay careful enough attention to the behavior of other actors in the environment but instead focus on their own assumptions. The extent to which this narrowness of focus can be dealt with by such measures as those in the CSBM agreement is questionable; research is needed to ascertain in what circumstances the parties would or could be motivated to accurately assess others' behavior and how parties can be induced to accurately portray their objectives to the other side.

All teams (but especially in Washington) tended to selectively interpret the CSBMs to meet a team's own needs. This is probably fairly typical behavior and can be expected to occur following any international agreement. It has certainly been the norm for previous arms control agreements. This results in a lack of consensus on how the agreements should be implemented, which could be a major problem with the CSBMs. There is likely to be a range of beliefs concerning implementation among the two alliances and the NNA states. Although one of the goals of the game was to explore how Red and Blue might implement these CSBMs, what we observed probably represents only a narrow range of what is likely to occur in the real
world. It is unlikely that anyone could fully anticipate how all the potential loopholes in a CSBM regime could be exploited, but it is desirable to give this area further attention.

**PROBLEMS POSED BY CSBMS FOR WESTERN SECURITY**

The CSBMs did not pose any obvious direct problems for Blue security in the games we played. However, this could be because there were no direct threats to Blue. We picked a crisis to game that was not in the central region because it seemed more credible to us that, if a crisis were to occur in the central region, it would begin elsewhere and spill over. Our Yugoslav crisis never spilled over, despite modest attempts by the Control team to move the teams in that general direction. Thus, we were not able to examine the critical problem of whether the CSBMs would aid Blue in detecting Red plans for a surprise attack on Blue in Central Europe. We observed the Red team in the Washington game making preparations for a surprise attack when it manipulated the Soviet’s fall troop rotations to beef up the readiness levels of forces already stationed in Central Europe. This maneuver went undetected by Blue, perhaps in part because CSBMs provide no mechanisms for detecting activities within garrison areas.

Initially, it was intended that the game test the utility of the CSBM regime as a means of deceiving and lulling an adversary while preparations for a surprise attack were under way, as well as a means of signaling benign intent and a willingness to prevent escalation of a potential crisis. This was to be accomplished by dividing the Red team into two groups: one would be tasked with using the CSBMs to reassure Blue that Red was interested in containing and deescalating the potential crisis; the other would have the task of mounting a surprise attack while abiding by the CSBMs and using them as tools of deception. The limited availability of the key players made this impossible, and the Red team was not divided for the games.

**CSBMs Are Used for Other Ends than Confidence and Security Building**

Although one purpose of CSBMs is to reduce the risks of misunderstanding, miscalculation, and surprise, Red saw the forecasts of military activities as an opportunity to create surprise by deliberate underforecasting and overforecasting. The Red team in the Santa Monica game in particular immediately seized on the concept of systematic misnotification as a means of lulling Blue into disregarding minor
infractions, which would create an advantage should Red eventually see the need to take aggressive action. The Red team in the Washington game did not state this philosophy explicitly, but it was implicit in much of its deliberations and in some of its actions.

Blue, too, tended to use the CSBMs as a club as well as a tool. Particularly in Washington, Blue invoked various aspects of the CSBMs for the opportunity to coerce, both within NATO and for bringing the NNA states into the fold. This attempt to use the CSBMs to advantage again suggests a somewhat perverse use of "confidence-building measures." Used in this fashion, the CSBMs could be counterproductive.

What the two games showed is that tension existed less between miscalculation and surprise than between miscalculation and intimidation. Red quickly discovered that the CSBMs provided excellent tools for overt intimidation. As a result, in the Washington game, Red consciously chose to use the measures to signal potential hostile intent at the expense of using them to mask a surprise attack on Yugoslavia. Blue understood Red's intent to intimidate but miscalculated its motives for doing so, as well as the sufficiency of the forces Red had massed for intervention.

As a result of this focus on the overt, intimidating possibilities of CSBMs, the Red team in the Santa Monica game even started to look with a certain amount of favor on the inspection measure, reasoning that allowing inspectors to come and look might actually help drive an intimidating message home more clearly. This did not occur as clearly in Washington largely because that Red team did not assume that it could easily handle inspections without coming up with additional provisions to hamstring them (e.g., arguing for de facto expansion of the definition of restricted areas).

The temptation to use CSBMs to send signals to threaten rather than to build security and confidence is probably great. Even Blue used CSBMs as threats. This temptation may even be greater than using the measures to mask a surprise attack. And the two objectives of intimidation and surprise are not inherently incompatible. Both objectives are possible, as our Red teams may have demonstrated. But our Blue teams seemed susceptible to a surprise attack (on Yugoslavia) because they did not expect Red to attack without detectable buildups of forces. They were never confused or "lulled" by the intimidation signals Red was sending by its use of CSBMs.

The question then arises: Was the heavy emphasis on intimidation that we witnessed "real" or simply an artifact of the game scenario? Although this question is not answerable in the present context, historically the temptation to use CBMs for intimidation has been as great
as it was in our game. The Soviets notified Zapad 81, their largest exercise ever held under the Helsinki CBM regime, at the height of the Polish crisis. Interestingly enough, they notified it incompletely, which doubtless sent another intimidating message to the Poles, "Don't think that the USSR takes these measures too seriously." The Red team in the Washington game sent a similar message to the Romanians, ordering a mobilization of which the Romanians were made aware but deliberately choosing not to notify it under the CSBM agreement.

A relevant question, then, is can one imagine a realistic crisis in Europe in which intimidation, in some form, does not play a part? Intimidation will always be a temptation, competing with surprise attack and possibly with accommodation as an objective, and perhaps prevailing because it arises earlier in the evolution of a crisis. Even if an intimidation-free environment that produces a crisis is conceivable, a more likely possibility for the future is an environment that includes opportunities for intimidation.

Red's strategy in the Washington game was interesting: Use CSBMs to intimidate Yugoslavia but to reassure Blue in Central Europe. The strategy appeared to work, at least up to a point. But would it have survived an invasion of Yugoslavia? Blue's reaction to a Yugoslav invasion in the Santa Monica game suggests not. If the strategy had survived—if Red no longer found it necessary to invade because the "political" option (intimidation) seemed to be working—would Blue have been a sitting duck for a surprise attack in Central Europe? Not necessarily, because the use of CSBMs for intimidation had already alerted Blue for whatever else might come. Red might still have been able to launch a surprise attack, but *not because Blue was being lulled into a false sense of confidence because of CSBMs.* On the contrary, Red's use of the measures was making Blue apprehensive and reactive; this is at least better than being passive and complacent. CSBMs, in other words, did not hurt and may actually be helpful in a perverse sort of way.

**A Flaw in the CSBMs**

The games showed that the provision to conduct alert exercises without advance notification can pose a problem. It is true no state would give up its right to conduct "alerts" for training purposes, but the CDE interpretation of an "alert" is another matter. The Blue team in the Washington game had quite a heated discussion about the meaning of the term "alert." The U.S. military definition is restricted to a planned test of troop readiness, while the loose CDE version apparently includes any simultaneously notified exercise that exceeds
the threshold for notification. There is a real possibility for destabilizing or extremely ambiguous actions by states calling large CDE types of alerts that are entirely within the letter of the CDE agreement but likely to increase chances for misunderstanding or misperception. Dealing with this problem will be challenging for the United States and NATO.

LIMITATIONS OF OUR CSBM GAMES

Were we to conduct this game again, we might like to do several things differently, to obtain information that we did not realize to be important.

There Was No Test of CSBM History

As we have already discussed, the constraints of our game prevented us from testing the "conditioning" aspect of the CSBMs, in the sense that we could not establish several years' worth of peacetime behavior for the two sides. In particular, the time constraints on the availability of the playing teams meant that it was more important to "get on with" the crisis rather than establishing patterns of behavior for Red and Blue for several years under a peacetime CSBM regime. The patterns of compliance might well have made a difference in the interpretation of subsequent moves, as the Red team in the Santa Monica game explicitly noted and prepared for. In retrospect, an alternative way to play the game might have been to provide the teams with a CSBM compliance history of several years. This would, perforce, necessitate several replications of the game, one for each type of history considered.

The CSBM Tail Wagged the Policy Dog

A problem of the game as played is that the CSBM tail wagged the decisionmaking dog. In the real world, decisions would be made on bases other than a list of what was possible given the CSBMs in place and the calendar of events. For example, in Move 2, the teams focused on military responses to the Yugoslav crisis, and in particular on what troop movements could be made that could serve as inducements for the countries in the region to behave in a manner consistent with the team's interests, yet would be technically (or at least detectably) in keeping with the CSBM package and would not invite a military overreaction by the other side. Although this behavior would probably
occur in a real-world crisis, it is at least as probable that it would not
have the centrality it had in our games.

This is, of course, an artifact of the game we played and, in some
sense, an unavoidable one if we want to look at CSBMs and if we have
undifferentiated Blue and Red teams. An alternative technique for the
future might be to have the Red Leader and Blue Leader appoint two-
person subteams to be responsible for the relationship of proposed
moves to extant CSBMs, and only examine CSBMs as part of a larger
context.

**Lack of Expert Information by Players**

Certain problems arose because some players were not as familiar
with the implications of the scenario as their “real” counterparts might be. Blue perceived that Red did not have sufficient forces readily
available to contemplate seriously moving into Yugoslavia. It is possi-
bile here that Blue’s assessment was considerably influenced by its prior
misassessment of Red intentions in regard to Yugoslavia. If Red’s aim
was a divided Yugoslavia there could have been some plausible reasons
for Blue believing that Red did not have sufficient forces on hand. But
Red’s objective was the preservation of a unified Yugoslavia (presum-
ably more or less friendly to Red). In this situation (if intimidation of
the anti-Belgrade breakaway factions did not “work”) Red’s force
requirements must be calculated on the basis of a need to supplement
Yugoslav forces, not on the need to deal with all possible military resis-
tance. If supplementing the “friendlies” was all that was needed, then
a Red force requirement calculated on this assumption would indicate
that Red did indeed have sufficient forces on hand.

In assessing the games in this regard, we should be careful. It is not
clear that the Control team provided the teams with enough details
about the internal Yugoslav situation (especially the internal military
situation with its “cast of characters” and component capabilities) to
make any such detailed requirements assessments possible. Even if the
Control team had provided all necessary details, the problem might
have arisen. The teams seemed to be fixated on their assessments of
the others’ intentions, and that alone would significantly influence any
such detailed assessments if they had been made. One might recall
Stalin’s misassessment of Hitler’s intentions before Barbarossa. The
German military capability was present and known. Stalin’s assess-
ment was disastrously flawed by the assumption of intended intimida-
tion rather than a major military attack.
Future Research

The ideas suggested above not only indicate a need for further gaming research to explore alternative paths of CSBMs, histories of compliance, and alternative crises, but also suggest areas of research that are best illuminated by nongaming research, such as the interplay between intimidation and surprise. Our games could test only a fraction of the questions that matter. The most important ones not explored in this instance have to do with the potential role of CSBMs in a Central European crisis (where surprise attack is a crucial issue) and with the cumulative effects of a CSBM agreement on the politics and defense postures of the Western nations over time, as well as the conditioning of their responses to ambiguous warning.

Ideally, the game format could have been used to provide insight into the relative benefits or risks of European CSBMs during normal peacetime conditions, in the event of accidental but ambiguous military incidents, as elements of a negotiation process, and as crisis management tools. In this case, the focus of the games reported in this study was determined by the circumstances under which the games were held. Because of the specific needs and very limited availability of the key players, it was not possible to conduct a longer and more inclusive game that could have tested the benefits and risks of CSBMs along a spectrum of conditions other than crisis. As a result, this study could not seriously address the potential contribution or risk of specific CSBMs under noncrisis conditions, and this suggests an area for further research.

Because we were able to run only one condition, using a less aggressive Red “personality,” we have not assessed how the Soviets might effectively use CSBMs to turn a non-Central-European crisis into an opportunity to invade Western Europe. We had hoped that our teams would progress to that point in our games, but they did not. They were understandably leery of expanding the crisis beyond Yugoslavia. Neither do we have a good sense of how a Central European crisis could be managed in a CSBM era. We do have some insights as to how CSBMs might play in the non-central brushfire situation, and this type of situation is of considerable importance, because brushfires are often the way that larger fires start. But there are other, larger situations that we have not yet explored.
Appendix A

GAME PARTICIPANTS

The following RAND staff and consultants participated in the Santa Monica CSBM game on 27 and 28 March 1986:

Dr. Susan Anderson
Dr. Christopher J. Bowie
Dr. Francis Fukuyama
Ms. Suzanne M. Holroyd
Colonel Robert Howe (USA)
Ms. Marianne Jas
Ms. Mary Morris
Dr. Mark Robbins
Dr. Milton G. Weiner
Dr. Barbara R. Williams

Participants in the Washington CSBM game on 8 and 9 April 1986 were:

Ambassador Robert Barry, Chief of the U.S. delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe
Mr. Yoav Ben-Horin, The RAND Corporation
Major General Jonas Blank (USAF ret.), member of the CDE delegation representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mr. Craig Chellis, Central Intelligence Agency
Brigadier General Lee Denson (USAF), Assistant Deputy Director for International Negotiations, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mr. Douglas Feith, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Negotiations Policy, Department of Defense
Mr. Harry Gelman, The RAND Corporation
Ambassador Lynn Hansen, member of the CDE delegation representing the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Mr. William Harris, The RAND Corporation
Mr. John Hawes, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

1Affiliations of all participants are provided solely for purposes of identification.
Ms. Suzanne Parry, European Security Negotiations, Department of Defense
Mr. Ted Warner, The RAND Corporation
Appendix B

THE ALTERNATIVE CSBM AGREEMENT

Major differences between this agreement and the primary agreement are shown in italics.

1. **Nonuse of Force**: Reaffirmation of the Helsinki and U.N. agreement to abstain from the use of force or the threat of use of force between all CSCE states.

2. **Forecasts**: Exchange of annual calendars of notifiable military activities to take place in the CSBM zone.

   By 1 November of each year, each CSCE state will provide on a voluntary basis to every other CSCE state an annual calendar of all notifiable military activities in which the state will participate or host in its territory during the next calendar year.

   Each state will provide a list of its forces in the zone down to the division level.

   Each state will designate the location of its restricted areas, generally defined as “garrisons.” A “garrison” is defined as an area with buildings and structures designed to accommodate one or more military units, installations, military training schools and enterprises of military forces. A garrison usually consists of offices and/or barracks, equipment and housing areas and fenced areas. Training fields and live fire ranges are usually outside of a garrison.

   Temporary restricted areas (TRAs) of no more than 15% of the state’s territory will be designated at this time.

   Each state will also designate the composition of a division equivalent formation, which will include the number of brigades or regiments.

3. **Notification**:

   [This package does not specify out-of-garrison activities with equipment as notifiable per se.]

   Only ground forces and ground-based air forces and those sea and air forces participating in a ground force activity are included; independent sea and air activities in the zone are exempt from notification.
Information concerning the numbers and types of forces \textit{(divisions only)}, the purpose, location, and duration of the activity, and the designation of the activity (if applicable) will be provided to all CSCE states as part of either the annual calendar or prenotification.

For military activities which require notification but were not included in the annual calendar, notification will be given to all CSCE states at least 30 days before the beginning of the activity.

Notifiable activities include:

\textit{Activities in which any division equivalent formation or 15,000 troops or 500 tanks and/or armored personnel carriers are outside the boundaries of their garrison;}

More than three battalions or 3000 amphibious forces outside a garrison at the same time under the same command;

\textit{Maneuvers and movements of certain kinds are excluded; e.g., REFORGER forces are notified upon arrival in zone at staging site.}

Alert activities which meet or exceed the thresholds above must be notified at the time the alert activity commences, including amphibious alerts.

4. \textbf{Observation}: Invitations to observers from all CSCE states must be made for all activities involving more than two division equivalent formations or 25,000 men. [This package does not explicitly include alerts longer than 48 hours, nor indicate the host state must provide observers with adequate opportunity to observe.]

5. \textbf{Verification}: Any state is entitled to send on short notice observers to another participating state. The request will define the requested observation area and reason for the request.

The receiving state will invite the requesting state to observe within 12 hours of receiving the request.

The requested state will also invite third party observers, and all observers will submit a report to all other CSCE states after completing the observation.

There is a mandatory waiting period of 72 hours for the commencement of inspection.

There is no limit on the number of requests a state may make or receive.
If a state feels it cannot invite observers in light of supreme national security interests, it must explain why it cannot comply within 12 hours of receiving the request.

6. Communications: The participating states shall establish a multinational communications network for exchanges of the information required under this agreement.

Any state is entitled to send, via this network, any communications it deems necessary to facilitate implementation of the agreement.

If it believes the circumstances warrant, any state may also request, via the network, that special consultative meetings of participating states be convened.