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J J GALLIVAN 16 MAR 88
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Does military assistance for disaster relief require...
DOES MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR DISASTER RELIEF REQUIRE JOINT METHODOLOGY?

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES J. GALLIVAN

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16 MARCH 1988

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

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Military Assistance to Civil Authorities for disaster relief often requires responsiveness. The premise of federal assistance to state and local authorities is that it is supplemental. Once it has been determined that the assistance is appropriate, however, all talents should turn toward providing assistance as quickly as possible.

Both international and domestic systems for tasking and reporting assistance are examined. Emphasis is on the systems used or proposed for the Continental United States. Systems and Organizational analyses are conducted to illustrate
the nature of the inadequacies of the current system used to task and report. Special attention is paid to the difficulties of crossing procedural lines between services and the implications for compliance with recent legislation are examined.

The paper concludes that procedures would be amenable to improvement by using automated communications systems, a joint regulation and authority source, and formatted messages.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

Does Military Assistance for Disaster Relief Require Joint Methodology?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Premise</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Scope</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II. BACKGROUND.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Intent of Congress</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Evolution of DOD policy</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III. IMPLICATIONS.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IV. JOINT PROCEDURES.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER V. INTERVIEWS</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Who</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Issues</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VI. ANALYSIS</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Systems Theory</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Organizational Theory</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSIONS.</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Intent of Congress</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Responsiveness</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Compliance/Reinforcement of Joint Methodology</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS.</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Policy</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Procedures</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Preparation</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOSSARY</td>
<td>A-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Does Military Assistance for Disaster Relief Require Joint Methodology?

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

Disaster. People get hurt. Some die. Property is lost or ruined. Whole communities suffer, and recover slowly, if at all. What to do? Institutions, the military for one, rush to offer assistance. Leaders, accustomed to changing the course of events, are not humanly prepared to sit by and allow needless suffering. The nature of participatory government in a land of plenty causes political action to be the norm when there is a conceivable role for government in alleviating suffering.

This paper will look at the role of the federal military establishment in providing assistance to civilian authorities for disaster relief. Especially, it will examine the premises of organization across service boundaries in order to expedite a valid relief effort. There are two impetii for doing so. First, any administrative constraint to responsive, effective relief might well result in loss of life or property. Second, Congress has expressed its intent that the services generally become more coordinated in their endeavors. The question will be: do disaster relief procedures take advantage of joint procedures so that military assistance to civilian authorities for disaster relief will be responsive and effective?
Further, is the spirit of jointness reflected in the standing procedures for providing disaster relief?

Enroute, I will also touch briefly on the difference between domestic and international relief efforts, the nuance of political advantage inherent in humanitarian assistance rendered to a foreign population, and the politics of suffering. Military officers are admonished to be apolitical. The thrust of such advice is usually meant to constrain officers from direct involvement in choosing or becoming political officeholders who would control military forces. The advice is accepted so readily that many officers don't vote. Concern for doing a job well should and can include rendering advice, assistance, and urging to political officeholders so that, based on informed perspectives, they will make decisions that are in the best interests of the country we all wish to serve.

Therefor, it is important to relay to the reader the flavor of what works best, politically. I shall try to include this when it is appropriate, and does not distract from the primary goal of examining the sufficiency of joint procedures applied to the process of disaster relief.

A. Premise

I intend to determine whether use of joint formats for taskings, plans, and reports will increase responsiveness, compliance, adherence to Department of Defense (DOD) directives, the public law, and the efficacy of assistance.
B. Scope

Military Assistance to Civil Authorities is provided under certain conditions both domestically and out of country. It is provided in accordance with public law and DOD directives that date from the 1970's. Review of current procedures indicates they are parochial; they do not lend themselves to cross-service tasking or operation. At least one after action report cites delays in responsiveness caused by inter-service boundaries and methods\(^2\).

This paper will review the literature, to include: laws and directives; organization for disaster relief; and, current procedures. It will also include interviews with Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), appropriate Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) section(s), and military service action officers.
NOTES


2Annex R: Airlift Requirements, SOUTHCOM AAR(Guatemala).
CHAPTER II.

BACKGROUND.

A. Intent of Congress.

The federal government tries not to intrude on the competency and sovereignty of its subordinate governments. Tension exists during (and shortly after) crises between intergovernmental relations and the desire of politicians to be seen as contributing to the relief effort. Most modification to the federal supplemental role of providing disaster relief has occurred as a part of the review process by Congress or Federal Agencies during the aftermath of major disasters.\(^3\) The interlude between major catastrophes is characterized by utilitarian efforts by relief specialists who bureaucratically work at smoothing out the wrinkles in intergovernmental relations so that the next crisis will be assuaged more responsively and efficiently.

Hindsight, the creator of reader interest in sports pages, establishes different parameters for elected political officials during the emotional aftermaths of natural disasters. Adequacy of response is pre-eminent. Congress has consistently approved special bills. They render extraordinary amounts of assistance and reimbursement to specific localities after spectacular disasters.\(^4\)

The outpouring of Congressional concern has tended to increase the scope of federal assistance. It can still be characterized as supplemental, certain continuous forms of assistance
notwithstanding. Yet, expectations for the efficacy of federal assistance have grown as expressed in the intent of Congress with the passage of successive disaster relief legislation. Because my concern is with federal military assistance, the responsiveness and adequacy of that assistance is my focus.

As Congress has institutionalized the premise that the federal government should provide disaster relief, measures have been added to the body of law to mitigate effects of disasters. These have taken three directions. The first, prevention, is not as popular as heretofore, but some long term projects continue. The most famous, very popular in terms of spoils system politics, has been flood control. Dams, levees, aqueducts, all spell money spent in a Congressional district as well as man's attempt to control his environment. The federal effort has leaned heavily on the expertise and organizational ability of the Army's Corps of Engineers. These efforts contributed to the image and precedent of federal military assistance for disaster relief. To this day, one of the agencies to whom the military establishment is required to respond during time of crisis is the Corps of Engineers.

The second direction of institutionalized aid has been that of structural relief. Subsidized, or guaranteed flood plain insurance is an example. Others include small business loans, and provisions in law for the Veterans' Administration to extend mortgages to cover cost of repairs. Congress enacted these provisions during the late sixties and early seventies when government spending for social investment was at its peak. There has since developed a sensing
that programs which reinforce poor choices of places to live are not in the public interest. Privatization and reduction of subsidies have resulted. In 1984, flood insurance was privatized, and government subsidy of flood insurance for property on a flood plain was decreased.

The third direction has involved the evolution of structure. Although the impetus for examination of disaster relief organization has usually come from the aftermath of a spectacular event, the trend in organization has been toward specialization at the federal level. This in turn, has caused two trends: the restructuring of state agencies to mirror the functions at federal level; and, the codification of relationships among disaster relief agencies. This last will be of primary interest as I examine the nature of the procedures used across service boundaries to marshall, command, and control resources.

B. Evolution of DOD policy.

Military assistance to local communities during times of crisis is a time honored institution. It is by no means uniquely American. Military forces have attributes especially suited for crisis action. They are organized, well equipped to improve man's environment in rough terrain, and disciplined to respond despite critical occurrences around them. The leaders are skilled in assessing the situation, collecting resources, issuing orders, and checking to insure proper execution. In many countries, military institutions provide a major thread to keep a nation together
during crises. In the United States, however, there is a fear of subordination to central authority which will result in the loss of individual rights and freedom.

The implication of this concern is that federal assistance for disaster relief has tended to be supplemental. The 1906 experience in San Francisco, when martial law was established pursuant to occupation of the city after the great earthquake, is the exception. State and local governments often have considerable resources at their disposal, to include state military forces. Local commercial establishments have a myriad of equipment and skills reasonably available which can provide the necessary relief.

Federal military assistance has been subordinated to the integrated federal supplemental effort. The Disaster Assistance Act of 1970\(^8\) included the establishment of a federal agency within the executive branch which would coordinate all federal assistance. The Federal Disaster Assistance Agency (FDAA) was the precursor to the current Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Part of the legislation defined the terms under which federal military assistance could be rendered to civilian authorities for disaster relief. There were five key points to the administrative directions\(^9\) which ensued:

1. FEMA was the designated coordinator of all federal assistance;

2. Executive agents within the military establishment were designated to expedite decision-making;
3. Assistance was to be rendered only if alternative resources were not reasonably available;

4. Assistance was only to be rendered for the duration of conditions which presented the likelihood of "imminent danger" of loss of life or property;

5. The federal government was to be reimbursed for the cost of these resources.

This reasonable approach is amenable to codification in service regulations, and to the diffusion of authority to respond; especially between crises. With the diffusion of authority, both within the United States, and internationally, has come the requirement to apply good judgement and sensitivity to competing priorities. The humanitarian concern to be helpful, responsive, and sufficient overlays easily on the military leader's characteristics of decisiveness and concern for the welfare of those for whom he is responsible. Yet, our system of government is multi-tiered. Responsibility exists at many levels. Further, aid is not supplemental if military forces displace a commercial function for which providing disaster relief resources is or could be a major source of income.

The Army, in particular, finds a special complication inherent in the restraints imposed. Federal military forces may not displace a local or commercial capability, and they may render assistance only to prevent or mitigate the imminent danger of loss of life, property, or serious injury. These restraints do not apply to state military forces (National Guard) so long as they are not
federalized\textsuperscript{11}. Much of the populace does not discern a difference between state and federal military forces.

The differences in the conditions of employment can and have caused embarrassment to Army commanders who failed to commit resources or pull them out of a disaster scenario before mid-term cleanup and reconstruction had been completed. At other times, commanders of installations adjacent to communities impacted by a natural disaster have rendered assistance beyond these constraints. Two negative consequences accrue. First, reimbursement cannot be authorized. Second, the problems solved by use of federal military resources are problems not solved (and income not derived) by local resources.
NOTES


4 Hurricane Agnes, Wilkes-Barre Flood, and, of course, Mount St Helen's.

5 Flood insurance.

6 Par 2-11.c.(5), AR500-60. Other Agencies granted the right to task federal military forces include: Boise Interagency Fire Center (BIFC); FEMA; American Red Cross; and US Coast Guard for Oil Spills.


8 PL 91-606.

9 DOD Directive 2500.1.

10 Par 2-1, AR 500-60.

11 Par 1-2 and 2-13, op cit.
CHAPTER III.

IMPLICATIONS.

The calls come in the middle of the night. A small plane is down. Search and Rescue. The Snake River is over its banks. The Air Force, at Grand Forks AFB cannot provide sufficient assistance. Earthquakes. Guatemala. Turkey. Italy. Chile. Hundreds are dead. More are lost, feared dead, or trapped. Mexico City. The calls for assistance are anguished, pleading. Big-time politicians are calling to "help". The media are pouring into the area. Mount St. Helen's. What can we do; what will we do? Who has to approve, how long will it take until help arrives?

Things always look worst late at night. Worse, many headquarters have an all-purpose Staff Duty Officer manning the telephones. That person may be competent, may have comprehensive directions readily available. But, delay will occur. The full-time specialist in disaster relief assistance must be summoned. Return calls must be made to get the request for assistance couched in terms that are within the regulatory discretion enjoyed by that headquarters. Then, if the assistance is allowable, the resources must be located.

Personal experience has taught me that if the requirement includes resources from other than the Army, an educational process will take place with every contact with another service. This process, again, will consume time. Agencies within other
services will have decisions to make about existing priorities. Requests for additional information will flood the net. Major disasters occur infrequently, and operations personnel are usually not cognizant of the Executive Agent\textsuperscript{12} authority that exists. There have been instances when duty officers at department level have refused to provide assistance. These were based on lack of knowledge of tasking authority, were soon rectified, but they occurred. Delay is a much more insidious form of non-compliance.

Everyone works with constraints on resources. Tough choices have to be made about priorities, so resources are guarded jealously. Protocols, in the past, for crossing service boundaries have created dilemmas for those controlling resources. Requests not couched in terms that fit within service tasking systems were somewhat discredited. Discussion between competent action officers could usually speed up the process, but the discussions between the right players had to take place while the clock ticked on.

The potential for cleaning up such a situation is intuitively obvious to the casual observer. Once a decision has been properly made by competent authority to render assistance, that assistance must be responsive. Elements that beget responsiveness include: a common system of communications; a common protocol for priorities; a common format for orders; recognition and use of a common authority; and familiarity with the procedure.
12Department of the Army is Executive Agent within the Continental United States for all federal military assistance for disaster relief.
CHAPTER IV.

JOINT PROCEDURES.

In 1969 Hurricane Camille struck the United States Gulf Coast. Damage to public and private property was extensive. Federal response was inadequate and disjointed. In the aftermath, Congress investigated through a specially formed Special Subcommittee on Disaster Relief. As a result, subcommittee chairman Senator Birch Bayh (D, Indiana) introduced a bill (S - 3619) to create an office of Disaster Assistance.

The Committee concerned was the Senate Committee on Public Works; the Subcommittee was the special committee on Disaster Relief. Hearings were held 27-29 April, 1970. Members of the Administration appeared before Congress to testify in support of the President's plan for reorganization. They included Gen George Lincoln, Office of Emergency Preparedness; OEP was the Federal agency charged with administering the Disaster Relief program at that time. Major administration objectives were adopted in executive session hearings held by the Committee in June.

On 29 September, the Public Works Committee of the House of Representatives, having heard primarily the same witnesses as the Senate, reported out a bill that departed significantly from that of the Senate. It started with the original Disaster Relief Act of 1950 and added amendments to expand the extent of government compensation of individuals and repair of facilities.
What was missing was the intent to reshape the concept of federal aid and the organization to do it right. The bill was passed by both houses after conference, and signed into law on 31 December, 1970.

The desire to reorganize the executive function of the Federal government in natural disasters and other emergency situations had the same genesis as the Congress' dissatisfaction. General George Lincoln had been appointed as director of the newly formed Office of Emergency Preparedness in 1969. The results of Hurricane Camille and the lack of efficacy of the coordination and scope of federal activity caused an assessment which produced the President's request for legislation on 22 April, 1970. That message proposed increased capacity for: structure repair; loans to individuals; unemployment compensation; emergency housing; flood control; planning assistance; and, sophistication of coordination on site.

The Congress had as its primary thrust the increase of aid to individuals, a sentiment much in vogue at that time. There was also a sensing that Civil Defense, growing passé, could provide the organizational assets for integration of functions and proliferation of local disaster relief agencies.

The organizational aspects of Public Law 91-606 pertained to General Lincoln's desires for greater scope and more comprehensive coordination for natural disaster assistance. One document, interestingly, is a directive from director, OEP, through
Department of Defense, to the DCPA, requiring that they proceed to develop a comprehensive tier of readiness plans and procedures for disaster relief\textsuperscript{18}. Apparently, the continuing desire by OEP to obtain a pervasive impact on state and local governmental preparation for disaster finally drew it to the flame of the dying Civil Defense agency in order to acquire the outlets it needed. The result was predictable; Congress resurrected its interest in combining the agencies as the administration, concerned in 1973 with other problems, failed to consider the ramifications of disaster relief falling under the Department of Defense.

It would be determined in later years that too many functions had been decentralized, and HUD's FDAA would evolve into a function-consolidating FEMA. When one examines the directives of the Federal Emergency Management Agency\textsuperscript{19} the concern with intelligent preparation for disaster, coordinated federal agency response, and rapid enablement of presidential prerogatives are all present.

The Disaster relief Act of 1970 consolidated and replaced earlier legislation and utilized agencies already in being. Although attempts were made to modify the bill in 1973, the next changes came in 1974. The Disaster relief Act of 1974\textsuperscript{20} abolished the Office of Emergency Preparedness as part of a reorganization of the executive offices working for the President. It attempted to fold the OEP into DCPA, a civil defence agency. It also included provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961\textsuperscript{21} and included specific constraints and implementing measures for the use of military
forces. This law now constitutes the basic authority for provision of federal military resources for disaster relief.

One of the key constraints to provision of disaster assistance is that, except in instances of imminent danger of loss of life, grievous suffering or loss of property, military commanders authorized to grant assistance will only respond to certain Civilian Agencies. These are covered in detail in Army Regulation 500-60. The intent is to cause state and local authorities to expend their own resources before impacting on what is intended to be supplemental assistance from the federal government.

Tasking authority for domestic disasters rests with the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Within Department of Defense, the Department of the Army has been designated the Executive Agent, and has tasking authority over other services. This authority has been delegated through commander, FORSCOM, to the Conus Army commanders. They are authorized to task headquarters of other services which hold the resource required for alleviation of a particular disaster.

Disasters outside the continental U.S. may receive federal military assistance if directed by the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.). Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff may task to provide assistance, but there are funding constraints. The Ambassador to the affected nation has authority for $25,000. Greater expenditures must be approved by Department of State. The Ambassador may work directly with the Commander in
Chief (CINC) of the US military command which has cognizance over his country.

Forces stationed outside of the continental United States are normally assigned to a Commander in Chief for a geographic theater of operations. These are joint commands, in that they have forces from more than one service assigned to them. A procedure exists within that command which allows clear, unequivocal communications and orders between the headquarters and its various forces. There are two threads of continuity that bear notice for possible use elsewhere. First, a CINC and his forces deal with each other all the time, not infrequently. Second, one format for orders exists, is used, and is understood by all.

Currently, AR 500-60 requires a daily report of activity when disaster operations are active. It is called a TEMPEST RAPID report, and is a stone-age narrative. There are no other provisions either for daily reports or, most importantly, requests or taskings for resources.

There are three opportunities lost here. First, for international relief, forces are already under the authority of the JCS. Use of a JCS format could simplify, clarify, and expedite acquisition of resources from outside of those already assigned to the appropriate CINC. Second, it would do the same for tasking to a CINC to support requests for assistance which emanate from Department of State and cross to the Secretary of Defense. Third, it would promulgate and reinforce use of the JCS Joint Operational
Planning System (JOPS\textsuperscript{22}). In so doing, it would reinforce the mandate inherent in the Goldwater-Nichols Act\textsuperscript{23}. That law directs actions which will cause service operations to become more fully integrated.

Continental U.S. operations similarly suffer from a lack of means to send one tasking or reporting message which can cross service boundaries without transliteration. Time is lost; so is credibility. Service-peculiar requirements, such as the requirement to obtain and cite a SAAM\textsuperscript{24} number before tasking the Air Force for transport, would all yield to JCS formats for orders.

There are two systems currently shared by the services which have potential for use in disaster relief: JOPS and JINTACCS\textsuperscript{25}. JOPS was designed to rationalize planning, execution, and support of efforts starting at the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although there is a crisis action system within JOPS, the focus of the system is strategic and deliberate. Because the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their supporting joint staff were not intended to be an operations headquarters\textsuperscript{26}, the JOPS structure was not intended to be responsive to no-notice events not affecting the National Security.

JINTACCS occupies the other end of the operational spectrum. Its intent is to codify battlefield communications and assist in the ongoing attempts to automate the flow of battlefield information. Over 140 specific formats have already been designed. Each approaches packaged information components in a readily digestible
form by a concerned, oriented reader. The system, and the formatting process also are sufficiently complex that they require frequent use by well trained operators.

Neither system has the flexibility required for unique, unplanned operations, nor the user friendliness required to interface with a stand-in duty officer of another service’s subordinate headquarters during non-duty hours. These failings have the seeds of the solutions which shall be explored shortly. It is also important, however, to consider whether there are current initiatives to correct these problems.
NOTES


17 President Nixon's message to Congress of 22 April, 1970 includes the complete text of General Lincoln's report on 1969 relief activities and his recommendations for corrective action and legislation.


19 Successor, in 1978, to the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, in turn, the successor to the OEP as a result of the corrective Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (PL 93-288).

20 PL 93-288.

21 PL 93-333.

22 JOPS: Joint Operational Planning System.


25 JINTACCS: Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command Control Systems.

26 Section 143, Joint Staff, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.
CHAPTER V.

INTERVIEWS

The Goldwater-Nichols Act is only a year old. The pace of change on the joint scene is rapid. References to disaster relief actions all predate passage of this historic act. My own experience in disaster relief is now eight years old. In order to be assured that I was not attacking a hill which had already been won, I scheduled four telephonic interviews. The interviews all took place on the afternoon of 11 February, 1988. Each person selected was the primary action officer for military assistance to Civil Authorities for their headquarters. Below are listed the four interviewees, the issues, and the responses.

A. Who

- LTC Kenneth D. Clonts, Joint Chiefs of Staff (AV: 227-4161)²⁸.
- Ms. Nell Stemper, FEMA (202) 646-3665²⁹.
B. Issues

• What format is currently used to task other services?

1. Harrison: "None. It's all ad hoc."

2. Clonts: "I do international disasters, not the continental U.S. We usually call. For a big effort, I saw the deployment format from JOPS used once."

3. Stemper: "All I've seen on the big exercises is done as they go along. It gets confused."

4. Stephens: "None."

• What medium of communications is employed to task?


2. Clonts: "Telephone, hard copy backup. We have a lot of commo at JCS."

3. Stemper: "My observations are based on exercises: the telephone."


• What format is used for sitreps?

1. Harrison: "Tempest Rapid, when we use any."
2. Clonts: "External to the headquarters, there is no standard. Internally, we have a nice system under development. Very easy to use, all formatted and ready to go."

3. Stemper: "We're information (on service reports); it's slow."

4. Stephens: "Tempest Rapid, an old tedious format. I'm not sure anyone reads them."

• Are taskings amenable to JOPS? to JCS automated format?

1. Harrison: "I don't know, but JOPS is not used. There is no standardized format or automated system used to task other services."

2. Clonts: "Not really. That's meant for big stuff, hooked to a plan. But, we seem to do okay the way we're doing it. Everyone I deal with is a pro. We understand each other."


4. Stephens: "We sure need something."

• Are sitreps amenable to JOPS? to JCS automated format?

1. Harrison: "I would think so. Only Tempest Rapid is used now."

2. Clonts: "They could be. Usually, though, we get what we need."

3. Stemper: "I don't know the names, but the process is untidy and loses responsiveness. They need something."
4. Stephens: "I'm not sure that those will work, maybe more for sitreps than the tasking"

• Are you aware of instances of refused or delayed response attributable to non-standard format?

1. Harrison: "Yes. We all suffer with lack of familiarity unless we're dealing with someone who does disaster relief full time. Credibility is also a problem. We're all working out of our own separate regulations."

2. Clonts: "No. We only deal with headquarters of CINCs and the military services. They all know what they're doing."

3. Stemper: "Based on exercises, yes."

4. Stephens: "Yes! How's yesterday for my most recent incident?"
NOTES

27 DCSOPS, DAMO-ODS. Military Support Division, Department of the Army Staff.

28 JCS: J-4, Strategic Mobility Division.


30 Director of Operations(XOOTA), Airlift and Rescue Division, Department of the Air Force.

31 JOPS: the Joint Operational Planning System. Includes standardized orders and reports formats.

32 CINC: Commander in Chief. The Officer in charge of a Unified or Specified command. Usually a four star flag officer.
CHAPTER VI.

ANALYSIS

A. Systems Theory

Systems theory has many proponents, and many bases for disagreement between them as to how complex a model must or should be. Notwithstanding, there are some principles that can serve to illuminate this examination of disaster relief procedure. A system consists of inputs (demands), outputs (services), a control mechanism, and, sometimes, a feedback mechanism.

One of the distinguished proponents, Karl Deutsch, characterizes\textsuperscript{33} systems at four levels of proficiency: self-destroying systems; non-viable systems; viable systems; and, self-enhancing systems. He is most concerned with communications and transactions and the ability of a system to move these inputs to the decision-making nodes.

Consider stress in a system not as an emotion which inhibits effective action but as a kind of heat, the by-product of friction in a system. We can see that stress, the differential between more and less viable systems, consumes systemic energy. Classically, the closer any system comes to working at its maximum capacity, the greater the danger of inadequacy if additional demands (inputs) are made. If energy is consumed (stress produced) communicating requirements to the control mechanisms, the system is not working optimally.
This perspective of our disaster relief resource allocation process applies at two levels:

- To the extent that communications are not optimal, an energy drag exists in the system. If the drag or stress is sufficient, or, if the system is somewhere in the spectrum between viable and non-viable, inadequacy in solving disaster-relief tasks could result.

- If the system is taken as the Joint command/control apparatus, non-standard communication (for disaster relief) are mixed with standard communication in the same system. This requires an alternate control mechanism, and is a procedural demand for the system to be self-enhancing. Translated, alternate forms of communication within a system generate a requirement for the system to examine, sort, then deal with the identified form of communication prior to ascertaining the substance. The value of the standard format within the system is diminished.

B. Organizational Theory

Henry Bartlett, a professor at the Naval War College, has proposed a rubric for looking at force planning. In it, he proposes a number of perspectives for various important parameters. If we take the same taxonomy and apply it to force command/control, certain properties of the two tasking and communications systems become apparent. The perspectives in Bartlett's paper include: Top
Down; Bottom Up; Scenario; Threat; Mission; Hedging; Technology; and, Fiscal. Because cost comparison is not measurable between our two systems, Fiscal will be eliminated from use. The values measured are: means versus ends; future versus present; specific versus general; and, quantity versus quality. I have put these approaches and values in a matrix, and assigned a numeric value of one to five for each system (current and JCS) in each block. This produces a relative worth for each system according to perspective.

As you can see from the accompanying matrix, except in the case of the Bottom Up perspective, the JCS communicative format and philosophy present a greater win-win potential. Other conclusions which can be drawn from this my subjective application of a Force planning rubric to the issue of command/control are suspect, but include:

- Difference between the two methodologies is not great for a specific application;
- Disaster relief, a pragmatic concern, weights toward specificity and currency;
- The value of reinforcing the Joint process is not included.
Bartlett Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Top Down</th>
<th>Bottom Up</th>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Hedging</th>
<th>Technology</th>
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<tr>
<td>Specific/General</td>
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</tbody>
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NOTES


34 Bartlett, "Approaches to Force Planning.

35 How does one value the Delta of lives lost(or possibly lost) due to an unquantifiable, possible delay in response in terms of dollars?
CHAPTER VII.

CONCLUSIONS.

A. Intent of Congress

There are two areas of concern with regard to Congressional intent: what was their intention for military assistance to Civilian Authorities for Disaster relief; and, what was their intention for Joint command/control inherent in the Goldwater-Nichols Act?

It is apparent that the evolution of the federal role in providing disaster assistance to local civilian authorities has been in keeping with the congressional intent:

"...special measures are required to expedite assistance and emergency welfare services and reconstruct and rehabilitate devastated areas."

Annual expenditures for relief have increased. The federal agency charged with umbrella responsibility has grown in size and professional competence while consolidating functions from throughout the federal bureaucracy.

The military role, typically in American society, has not grown, and has remained in the background. That is acceptable. What may not be as pleasing is the conclusion that energy expended throughout the military establishment to increase the effectiveness of command and control has not enhanced responsiveness during disasters. Communications and information
management systems have proliferated in recent years. They exist in many of the headquarters which interface for disaster relief. There is no protocol for the interface.

The military establishment scrupulously adheres to the congressional intent that aid be supplemental, and that it be rendered only to avert the loss of life or property, or to prevent or mitigate serious injury. Whether that aid, when rendered is as responsive as desired is another matter.

Compliance with congressional exhortations to consolidate, integrate, and unify the parochial military services requires implementation of techniques that increase effectiveness. If boundaries between services inhibit mission performance, changes should be made. I suggest, in the instance of disaster relief within the continental United States, that condition exists below department level. Further, an opportunity to ingrain joint techniques, useful for other applications, is being lost.

B. Responsiveness

The strong suit of a military force is rapid, effective, decisive action. Responsiveness in disaster relief could save lives and property, a public good. Further, it would reinforce both the role of the military as a force for good in the society, and of the federal government as the safety net for state and local governments during times of crisis. In a real disaster, superior responsiveness will still not avert all suffering. Delays due to poor
administrative techniques, antiquated command/control, and 1940's communications are unfortunate. They occur.

The two analytical approaches indicate that communications systems and credibility of the elements of communication have high potential for enhancing responsiveness. Interviews indicate that, at department level and at JCS, action is effective. These are the levels where credibility is firmly established by professional specialists who all know all of the players. As the level decreases, the need for structural reinforcement of effectiveness grows. Also reinforced by the interviews was the perception that as the level decreases, so does full time professional competence, an understanding of the consequences of compliance with the directives of competent authority, and an appreciation for responsiveness.

C. Compliance/Reinforcement of Joint Methodology

Congress, in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, looked for increased effectiveness between the services. At the Department level, indications are that professional staff officers get the job done effectively on an ad hoc basis. There is, however, no initiative to net subordinate headquarters, take advantage of systems which exist, or even produce a common regulation. The lack of a common reference which could be cited as authority for tasking will continue to deter responsiveness by action personnel not intimately familiar with disaster assistance.
There is a further conclusion, not within the intent of this paper: the JCS command/control system doesn't have a useful orders system for task organization, warning, or execution of an unplanned event. The two current systems, JOPS and JINTACCS are designed for specific purposes, and not amenable to disaster relief. That no system for rapid response to an unplanned event exists may have implications for national security which are far removed from the intent of this study.
NOTES

CHAPTER VIII.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

A. Policy

• Adopt responsiveness as a desirable attribute of headquarters providing or arranging for disaster relief assistance. Paragraph 2-1, Army Regulation 500-60, is the appropriate location.

• Adopt, as a milestone objective, the intent to adapt tasking and reporting procedures to an automated format compatible with WWMCCS.

• Consolidate and coordinate service regulations on disaster relief. Create one reference which cites competent authorities for tasking. Support credibility of tasking headquarters.

B. Procedures

• Crossing service boundaries for aid within the continental United States requires formatted, credible, hard copy format. Include in Joint regulation.

• JOPS formats appear to have had some utility, when used, for additional, Conus-based resources provided to a CINC for international relief. Specify their use in the revised, consolidated regulation.

• Systems for communications exist in large numbers and multiple net configurations. Projects to net between systems are
ongoing. Add the capacity to send tasking/reporting messages for disaster relief\textsuperscript{37} to inter-service interface requirements.

C. Preparation

The prospect of creating a supportive system that looks anything like JINTACCS infers a requirement for operator competency. Hopefully, such complexity will be avoided. Yet, practice smooths procedures, educates players, and fleshes out the written word. The best exercises replicate real conditions. I recommend that disaster exercises be run with participants at their normal place of duty, on their equipment, balancing all priorities. Such scenarios are harder to set up and monitor, but pay off in education and modification of players' procedures.
37 Consider, also, Civil Defense, Civil Disturbance, et al.


3. Congressional Record, 94th Congress, Vol 122, #26, Feb 76.


APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY

AAR
After Action Report

AID
Agency for International Development

BIFC
Boise Interagency Fire Center

CINC
Commander in Chief

CONUS
Continental U.S.

date
5/28/88

DCPA
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency

DOD
Department of Defense

Executive Agent
Department of the Army is Executive Agent within the Continental United States for all federal military assistance for disaster relief.

FDAA
Federal Disaster Assistance Agency

FEMA
Federal Emergency Management Agency
GLOSSARY

FORSCOM
Forces Command

HUD
Department of Housing and Urban Development

Imminent Danger
That time-sensitive period during which, if effective action is not immediately taken, lives or property may be lost

JCS
Joint Chiefs of Staff

JINTACCS
Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command Control Systems.

JOPS
Joint Operational Planning System

OEP
Office of Emergency Preparedness

SAAM
Special Assignment Airlift Mission. Military Airlift Command

SOUTHCOM
Southern Command

TEMPEST RAPID
A daily report of activity when disaster operations are active.

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END DATE
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