AN ANALYSIS OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND ITS FUTURE ROLE IN THE MUSLIM WORLD (U) AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLL MAXWELL AFB AL F L MCNEIL APR 88 ACSC-88-1780

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STUDENT REPORT
AN ANALYSIS OF ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM AND ITS FUTURE ROLE
IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

MAJOR FREDERICK L. MCNEIL 88-1780
“insights into tomorrow”
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REPORT NUMBER 88-1780
TITLE AN ANALYSIS OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND ITS FUTURE ROLE IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

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Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of requirements for graduation.

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Since the 1979 Shiite fundamentalist revolution in Iran, the Muslim world has experienced a resurgence in Islamic fundamentalism. This paper examines the future role of Islamic fundamentalism in the Muslim world. To accomplish this, the paper provides an historical review of the role of fundamentalism in Islamic society and an analysis of current trends including root causes of fundamentalism and differences in modern groups.
Throughout Islamic history, religious fundamentalism has played a major role in directing the political, economic, and cultural development of Muslim societies. This paper will provide a historical review of the role of fundamentalism in Islamic society, analyze the current trends of fundamentalism, and assess the future impact of the fundamentalist movement on the Muslim world.
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For the next seven years Major McNeil was assigned as an aircraft maintenance officer with tactical fighter wings at Korat Air Base, Thailand, Hahn Air Base, Germany, and Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico. In 1980 he was assigned to Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces as the Aircraft Branch Chief. In 1984 he returned to the flightline with the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing at Torrejon Air Base, Spain.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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REPORT NUMBER 88-1780

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR FREDERICK L. MCNEIL, USAF

TITLE AN ANALYSIS OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND ITS FUTURE ROLE IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

I. Purpose: To examine the future role of Islamic fundamentalism in the Muslim world.

II. Problem: Since the 1979 Shiite fundamentalist revolution in Iran the Muslim world has experienced a tremendous resurgence in Islamic fundamentalism. Muslim governments have had to deal with the growing power of fundamentalism in formulating their economic, political, and social policies. As the forces of fundamentalism increase and are neither understood nor dealt with correctly, many established governments could be replaced by governments less friendly to the economic and political interests of the West.

III. Discussion of Analysis: To assess the future impact of the fundamentalist movement on established Muslim governments, the investigation is broken down into three areas. The first focuses on the history of fundamentalism within the Islamic culture. The second looks at the root causes behind the resurgence in modern fundamentalism and the differences in modern fundamentalist groups. The final area analyzes the current trends in fundamentalism including the rise of conservative fundamentalism and how Muslim governments have dealt with modern fundamentalist groups.
IV. **Findings:** The results of the three areas of analysis are discussed below.

A. Throughout Islamic history fundamentalist groups have called for a strict adherence to pure Quranic doctrine. All segments of Islamic society have felt pressure for fundamentalist reform. As a community or government moved away from established Islamic beliefs, resistance by fundamentalist groups increased in an effort to bring the community or government back in line with the basic tenets of the Qur'an. Because Islam is a total way of life involving all aspects of the community, fundamentalists believe they are free to scrutinize every facet of Islamic society.

B. There are a number of causes for the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in recent years. Since World War II rising political and economic expectations in most Muslim nations have not been achieved. Many Muslim countries, even those with large oil revenues, have not developed the industrial and service sectors of their economies fast enough to gain the confidence of their people. Politically the Muslim world has moved in a variety of directions from monarchies to social dictatorships, but for most Muslims a feeling of having a legitimate part in the political process has not been realized. The economic and political frustrations in the Muslim world have been overshadowed in recent years by an Islamic identity crisis. With the tremendous influx of western culture a large segment of the Muslim community felt isolated from their heritage and native beliefs. Islamic fundamentalism offers a solution to the economic, political, and most importantly, cultural frustrations that have been mounting in Islamic society. The fundamentalist movement is not monolithic, but channeled into different groups: radicals, conservative, Sunni and Shiite. The conservative groups tend to work within established governments to bring about Islamic reforms, while radicals are more likely to engage in actions that are in direct opposition to established governments. The differences between the Sunni and Shiite sects also plays a major role. The Sunnis with a long history of respect for established government are able to work constructively within the government for Islamic changes. The Shiites place little faith in the established secular government and mainly work outside the government to bring about change.

C. Immediately after the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution, the Ayatollah Khomeini was the central figure behind the growing fundamentalist movement. However, by 1982, with the continuation of the Iran-Iraq War and the failure of Khomeini's revolution to
spread, conservative fundamentalist groups gained the upper hand. Conservatives in most cases were able to work within the established governments to bring about economic, political, and cultural changes. The conservatives offered Muslims an important option between western secular ideas and radical fundamentalism. Muslim governments for the most part reacted constructively to the increased political pressure of the conservatives, adopting some changes in policy, addressing economic issues, and moving away from a policy of westernizing at any cost.

V. Conclusions Conservative fundamentalist groups have offered a pragmatic alternative to western secularism and radical fundamentalism. Because the fundamentalist movement gains its support from within the Islamic community it offers a unique solution to the political, economic, and cultural frustrations of the Muslim world. Since 1982 most Muslim governments have worked with conservative fundamentalist groups, giving them a legitimate voice in the political, economic, and cultural development of their country. Many governments have come to terms with conservative fundamentalist pressure by instituting Islamic reforms and limiting introduction of western secular culture. In the same light many conservative fundamentalists have come to an understanding with their governments that they can effectively work within the government to bring about some degree of Islamic reforms, but they must respect the government and its right to rule. The apparent success of these Islamic governments, with conservative fundamentalist support, in dealing with the economic, political, and cultural problems will determine the future political course of much of the Muslim world.
Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

"At the turn of each century there will arise in my nation a man who will call for a religious revival."
Prophet Muhammad

The Muslim world is at a turning point. The resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism is affecting the total structure of Islamic society. The 1979 Shiite Islamic Iranian revolution provided a gathering point for Islamic fundamentalists from Morocco to Indonesia. This tremendous growth raises the question, what impact will fundamentalism have on the future direction of the Muslim world? The purpose of this paper is to answer that question.

First, to assess the impact of Islamic fundamentalism on Muslim society this paper will examine the historical role of fundamentalism within the Islamic culture. Fundamentalism is not something new. It has played an important role in Islamic religion and society since the time of Muhammad. Throughout Islamic history many different forms of fundamentalism have developed, from Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's revolutionary Shiite brand of fundamentalism, to Saudi Arabian Wabashism and the Egyptian Brotherhoods. The diversity of each group is an important factor in determining the impact fundamentalism will have on future events in the Islamic world.

Second, essential to understanding the impact of fundamentalism on the Islamic world is having a clear understanding of the causes behind the increased popularity of fundamentalism and the differences in fundamentalist groups. The upsurge in fundamentalism is more than a reaction to religious problems, but a result of political, economic and cultural crises within the Muslim community. A variety of fundamentalist groups have been established reflecting this discontent.

Third, since Ayatollah Khomeini came to power, Islamic governments have had to adjust their policies in response to the growing force of fundamentalism. Moslem countries have reacted to the fundamentalist pressure in a variety of ways, from allowing them a limited political voice to complete suppression. Also, government response to fundamentalism has often been a
function of the nature of the fundamentalist pressure on that government.

Finally, after analyzing each area an assessment is made of the Islamic fundamentalist movement and its future direction in Islamic society.
Chapter Two

HISTORY OF FUNDAMENTALISM

The Islamic world covers a region from Morocco in Western Africa to Indonesia in the Pacific. Throughout the region over 800 million Muslims pledge their allegiance to the Islamic faith and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. In order to understand the current resurgence in fundamentalist Islam, a historical assessment of the role of fundamentalism in Islamic society is essential. This chapter traces the growth of fundamentalism in the Islamic faith from its early foundations to today's current resurgence.

EARLY HISTORY

Throughout Islamic history there have been individuals who have called for a strict adherence to the Qur'an and Islamic law or Shari'a as it was practiced by the early community of Muslims under Muhammad's guidance. After the death of Muhammad in AD 632, rivalries within the Muslim community developed, along with differing versions of the ideal nature of the Islamic community. The majority group of Muslims, called Sunnis, emphasized the experience of the community and believed that the caliph succeeded Muhammad as the community leader and was guided by God. The minority group or Shiites, felt Muhammad's son-in-law Ali should succeed Muhammad. They believed that continuing divine guidance comes to the community only through Ali and his designated successors known as Imams. For the Shiites the line of Imams continued until AD 878 when the twelfth Imam disappeared. With his disappearance the Shiites believed there was no truly legitimate government, only temporary governments until the twelfth Imam reappears to rule. The Shiites established a priesthood made up of mullahs of which one is chosen as a temporary substitute for the Imam. In the years after Muhammad's death it was necessary to define the cultural and political implications of the Islamic message to a changing society. Muslim thinkers accomplished this by augmenting the Qur'an with other traditions of the early community leaders known as hadith. Also a number of schools were established, both Sunni and Shiite, to further define Islamic standards to the developing culture.

After the rule of the first four caliphs, divisions in the Sunni community led to civil war enabling the Umayyad dynasty to
gain power. By AD 750 dissatisfaction with the Umayyad dynasty over their laxness in following the Islamic faith sparked opposition from Shiite groups and from Sunni scholars. Islam's first fundamentalist opposition eventually ended the Umayyad dynasty bringing a new line of Caliphs, the Abbasids to power. (14:60,61) Under the Abbasids a new stage in the development of the Islamic community occurred. The Caliphate no longer was the primary focus of Islamic loyalty. The Qur'an and the Shari'a became more important than political or national loyalties. In the past fundamentalism centered on rejecting the materialism of the Umayyads. Now there was an accepted set of rules for judging conditions found in any community to insure compliance with Islam. (11:7-9)

Over the next thousand years Islamic fundamentalist activity centered into three areas. First, fundamentalists organized opposition to popular religious practices that could not be justified in the Qur'an or the Shari'a. The Wahhabi movement in Arabia, as an example, was basically a fundamentalist reaction to Islamic saint-worship that had gotten out of hand. (14:62)

Second, fundamentalism organized opposition to selected scholars and formal religious institutions. As schools for Islamic thought developed, many scholars began to expand the scope of Islamic doctrine beyond the Qur'an and the Shari'a. Fundamentalist scholars would insist on studying the basic tenets of the faith rather than the writings that were created later. (14:62)

Finally, fundamentalism attacked non-Islamic cultural ideas as the integration of Greek philosophy into Islam. (14:62) Throughout this period fundamentalism had a lasting effect on Islam emphasizing a pure Quranic doctrine, ensuring the community of Islam understand the basic tenets of the Muslim faith, and ensuring all changes to Islam were within the teachings of the Qur'an.

18TH CENTURY

By the 18th century Muslim society stretched from Morocco to Southeast Asia. The success of Islam in many areas was accomplished by incorporating local customs, including some religious practices, into the Muslim community. By the 18th century the end result was a condition ripe for Islamic fundamentalism. Two important groups led the fight to a return to the Qur'an. First, a small group of scholars led an intellectual fundamentalist effort from the cities of Mecca and Medina in the Arabian Peninsula. As part of their beliefs Muslims were required to make a pilgrimage or "hiya" to Mecca. During the pilgrimage many started to study with the fundamentalist scholars of the city. When the pilgrims returned to their homelands they spread the
fundamentalist ideas they were taught to their communities. (14:64)

Another 18th century fundamentalist group, known as brotherhoods, developed from Sufism or Islamic mystic tradition. (14:64) The brotherhoods also wanted a return to the values and practices found in the early community of Muhammad. Their desire to end corruption and worldliness however went so far it questioned the authority of the caliphate over the Imam or religious leader. To this challenge the main body of Islam countered the brotherhoods and maintained the power of the caliph to lead his community according to the Qur'an. (14:65)

19TH CENTURY

By the 19th century fundamentalist activity centered on countering European expansion and cleansing Islamic communities from internal cultural developments that were not in line with the Qur'an or the Shari'a. In India, Ahmad Brelivi hoped to create a fundamentalist Islamic society in opposition to integration forces from Hindu and Sikh religious influences and European religious and cultural threats. (14:66) In North Africa another fundamentalist, Amir al Qadir, attempted to form an Islamic community and resist the French invasion of Algeria. (14:66) In Sudan, Muhammad Ahmad established an Islamic community based on the Qur'an in 1881. The state was eventually overthrown by Egyptian and English forces by the turn of the century. (14:67) Although each of these movements ended in failure, the Islamic fundamentalism which sponsored them had a lasting effect on the Islamic religion and its future course.

20TH CENTURY

During the early part of the twentieth century fundamentalism moved in three directions. Some fundamentalists adopted a conservative, status quo policy as the Wahhabi movement in the Arabian Peninsula. (11:12) Under Abd al Aziz Ibn Sa'ud the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia dropped its more reactionary ideas in favor of maintaining political power. (14:68) In Libya, Idris al Sanusi followed a similar fundamentalist course by adopting less reactionary policies in order to maintain formal power. (14:68)

Second, fundamentalism assisted in the development of Muslim nationalism. By providing resistance to the European powers on a religious and intellectual level, fundamentalism helped the nationalist movement within the Muslim world. It was never the intention of the fundamentalists to form a nationalist movement, but because of their historical experience of using the Qur'an and Islamic law as their source of power, they provided legitimacy for many nationalist movements. (14:68)
A third development in the century was the emergence of mass organizations. Many fundamentalists felt it was essential to move out of the intellectual arena and establish popular movements for Islamic renewal to counter the watershed of western religious, cultural, and economic influence. In Egypt the Muslim brotherhood gained mass support by developing a comprehensive public health program that included hospitals, mobile clinics, and schools to train medical doctors. (5:42) The goal of the fundamentalist program was to improve the standard of living for all Egyptians, but along with that came a wave of popular support. A similar mass movement organized by fundamentalists in Iran after World War II countered western modernization until the secular Iranian government under the Shah came to power. (14:69)

By the end of World War I the Muslim world was focused on nationalism. A cross spectrum of conservative, radical, and fundamentalist Islamic groups moved for greater nationalism. With nationalism achieved, after World War II these groups shifted their attention to policies and programs to bring about modernization. Experiments with Arab socialism were undertaken by Nassir in Egypt and the Ba'ath parties in Syria and Iraq. Because rising expectations were not fulfilled, frustration set in. To many in the Muslim world eastern socialism and western capitalism failed. Muslims turned their attention inward toward Islamic ideals. (14:70)

MODERN RESURGENCE OF FUNDAMENTALISM

By the 1970s the world began to witness a tremendous resurgence in fundamentalist Islamic ideals. Muslim nations, whether run by conservative monarchs or radical socialists, expressed their policies and goals more and more in terms of Islamic traditions. In this atmosphere of Islamic resurgence, it was only natural for fundamentalism to gain support. Fundamentalism appealed to a variety of Muslims because it had not been compromised by western culture or money. (14:73)

Recent grass roots support for fundamentalism started after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Many Muslims felt their failure in the war was a result of not following the teachings of the Qur'an. By the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the importance of Islam had been reestablished. Their battle cry was not of nationalism or gaining territory, but Allah Akhbor or "God is great." (16:676) For many Muslims the political success of the Yom Kippur War was a result of their return to Islam, adding to the popularity of fundamentalism. The success of the Shiite fundamentalist movement in Iran in 1979 further inspired other Islamic groups. (16:676) The Iranian Shiite Islamic revolution proved again to both Sunni and Shiite Muslims that belief in the Qur'an was essential to any economic, political, or military victory. In
the Iranian revolution, the mighty empire of the Shah with all its western technology, money, and military power was overthrown by the moral power of fundamentalism under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. (14:70) The most recent incident that has added to the popularity of fundamentalism in Islamic countries came in 1985 when the Shiite minority in southern Lebanon was instrumental in forcing the Israeli Army to withdraw from southern Lebanon. (8:47) The Shiites, with very little outside support, were able to accomplish what the Palestine Liberation Organization had tried to accomplish since 1967. Although this victory was again accomplished by Shiite fundamentalists, they were Arab instead of Persians as in Iran. (16:676) Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Muslim fundamentalism has gained the center political stage in almost every Islamic country. The religious activism of fundamentalism has clearly crossed into the political and cultural arena.
Chapter Three

MODERN FUNDAMENTALISM

In order to provide an accurate assessment of the future of Islamic fundamentalism, the causes of the current rise in popular support of fundamentalist groups must be established. The recent surge in popular support has not been universal to all fundamentalist Islamic groups. Critical differences between Sunni and Shiite, radical and conservative, fundamentalism exist. This chapter will explain the root causes for the current rise in fundamentalism and look at the goals and direction of different fundamentalist groups.

ROOTS OF FUNDAMENTALIST SUPPORT

The recent appeal of Islamic fundamentalism cannot be explained as a result of a single event, political issue, or individual. Its rise however is a result of a number of factors that spread across each Islamic society in varying degrees. These factors can be grouped into three areas of frustration or discontent in Muslim society. (15:659)

First, economic disillusionment is a major factor behind fundamentalist growth in a number of Islamic countries. Over the past 30 years western capitalism or socialism promised to improve the economic situation in most countries. Individuals were optimistic that through hard work and education they could achieve success. Their optimism was evidently unfounded. For a variety of reasons, depending on the country, unemployment, wages, and the standard of living did not improve. The frustration associated with poor economic performance was easily channeled into fundamentalist support. Fundamentalist groups were quick to equate economic discontent with western economic injustice and domination. (15:661) Another disappointment for many Muslims was the inability of formal education to enable a person to find a respectable job. Young Muslims across the Islamic world were told of the importance of Western technology and science and that through education, higher living standards could be achieved. With many Muslim countries facing economic hard times, employment for the newly educated college graduate was hard to find.

Similar to the economic arguments of rising expectations, political rising expectations by many Muslims have not been met. Governments throughout the Muslim world including monar-
radical socialist, or western republics have a history of limiting many channels of discontent. Minority groups are given little political power because unresponsive monarchies and single party systems rule in a number of countries. Facing this frustration many Muslims find the only place to vent political discontent is in the mosque with the fundamentalists. The fundamentalists explain the political frustration as a direct result of outside non-Islamic ideals as socialism or western democracy. In the eyes of the fundamentalist, if Muslims had remained faithful to the Qur'an and not looked for answers in other cultures, the Islamic world would not have this problem. (15:663-665)

Third and probably most important in leading to increased support for fundamentalism is an Islamic cultural identity crisis. (13:35) In the past 30 years western culture has poured into Islamic societies. Everyone, especially the young, wanted to be western. Western dress, education, technology, and culture were all felt to be superior. There was no room to be Islamic. Western culture however could not be a replacement for local Muslim culture and religion. With political and economic frustration high, and a flood of foreign cultural standards grinding at the roots of Islamic society, Muslims, especially the young, turned to their religion for answers. Islamic fundamentalism offered an explanation for the cultural turmoil as well as a solution, a course of action that will lead to self-identification and economic and political fulfillment. (15:65-669)

**DIFFERENCES IN FUNDAMENTALISM**

Modern Islamic fundamentalism is not monolithic, but includes a wide range of groups including Islamic national governments, political interest groups, religious groups, and scholars. Each group has the same goal, to bring a return to Islamic ideals, but they differ in their understanding of what Islamic ideals and how to achieve this goal. With regard to how they want to achieve their goals, fundamentalist groups can be divided into two categories: conservative fundamentalism and radical fundamentalism. Conservative groups tend to work within government institutions to implement their reforms. Conservative fundamentalist groups range from Islamic states, such as Saudi Arabia which is dedicated to its fundamentalist Wahhabi principles, to legal and illegal political opposition groups in most Muslim countries. (2:178)

Radical fundamentalist groups instead of supporting existing governments generate direct opposition toward the established government to bring about reform. (3:82) Radical fundamentalist groups include governments like Iran who supports dissident groups in other Muslim nations to bring about reform, to
political and religious action groups as a portion of the Egyptian brotherhood. (9:25)

The philosophical differences between the Sunni and Shiite communities also play a major part in determining the course of action Islamic fundamentalist groups will follow in achieving their goals. The Sunnis have a long tradition of upholding the established government and submitting to its policies. Only if the government moved radically away from Islamic values have Sunni fundamentalists organized outright resistance to the government. In most nations Sunni religious leaders are drawn into the secular government for their support. (10:26)

The Shiites have a very different history. Since the time of Muhammad the Shiites have believed the secular government is subordinate to the Islamic religious order. In the eyes of the fundamentalist Shiite, the secular government is only temporary until the return of the lost Imam. The Islamic Shiite community, especially in Iran, has a tradition of resistance, even rebellion, against non-Islamic governments. (12:29)
Chapter Four

CURRENT TRENDS

This chapter reviews current trends of Islamic fundamentalism that are essential for providing an assessment of the future role of fundamentalism in the Muslim world. The rise in popularity of conservative fundamentalism and the decline in popularity of radical fundamentalism will be analyzed. Also, the government response to fundamentalism, both radical and conservative, will be analyzed.

RISE OF CONSERVATIVES

Since 1982 support for Islamic fundamentalism has been away from the brand of radical fundamentalism espoused by Shiite Iran and toward a conservative fundamentalist philosophy that is willing to work within established governments. Iran's Islamic revolution definitely shocked the foundations of the Muslim world. (13:35) Ayatollah Khomeini became the champion of many third world and Muslim governments against the western forces of oppression. By 1982 however, Khomeini's revolution made some serious mistakes that isolated his movement from his supporters in other countries. (1:139) The most serious threat to the moral legitimacy of Khomeini fundamentalism has been Iran's seven year war with Iraq. From the start of the war Khomeini stated he would quickly depose the "worthless infidel" Hussan, and that the Arab Shiite minority in Iraq should take up arms against the secular Iraq government. (1:140) Neither has taken place. Prior to 1982 Khomeini could call Muslims to take up arms and it would be done. Since 1982 however he has moved from a divine leader to one that must rely on hard political, military, and economic choices with often questionable results, just like other secular leaders. Further evidence of the failure of the Khomeini fundamentalist revolution to spread outside of Iran was the 1985 Kuwait election in which Muslim fundamentalists lost considerable ground. (1:141) As support for radical fundamentalism continues to decrease conservative fundamentalism has shown a steady increase in grass roots support across the Muslim world. The non-violent, work-within-the-system approach of conservative fundamentalist groups provides an effective voice to vent the economic, political, and cultural frustrations that encompass most Muslim countries. (11:6)
GOVERNMENT REACTION

Depending on the perceived threat to stability, Muslim governments have taken a wide variety of measures to limit, control, or counter the growing political power of fundamentalism. Between 1979 and 1982 most status quo Muslim governments tended to fear the growth of radical fundamentalism and as a result imposed cultural, religious, and political restrictions to limit growth. Turkey and Tunisia, two very western Muslim nations, took action to limit the wearing of the traditional hejab by women. (11:5) Egypt and Syria, feeling threatened by fundamentalist groups, arrested many of the leaders. Saudi Arabia isolated most of its Shiite minority from any outside influences, namely Iran. And Kuwait arrested Shiite fundamentalist leaders.

By 1982 however, most governments came to the realization they had to deal with the growing appeal of fundamentalist Islam by trying to correct the frustrations in their societies that led to grass roots support; economic disparities, political inequalities, and the Muslim cultural identity crisis. Iraq, under the leadership of Hussan, is the best example of a modern Muslim nation confronting these issues. (1:142) Hassan's action to appeal politically and economically to his large Shiite minority succeeded. Other nations under fundamentalist pressure have taken similar actions. Mubark in Egypt has allowed conservative fundamentalists to have a voice in the Egyptian political system from which they have spoken out against many government policies. (1:143) Morocco, Tunisia, Kuwait, and Jordan all conducted relatively free elections enabling conservative fundamentalists to voice their discontent. (1:142)

For Muslim governments the controlled political forum for fundamentalist dissent is far better than the call to revolution by more radical groups with no political voice. Also, Muslim governments to some extent have adopted some Islamic reforms to limit support for fundamentalism. Pakistan and Sudan have started long range programs to move their countries slowly back to their Islamic roots. (4:137) Other countries have taken action to allow fundamentalists to express their religious beliefs in public and allow their traditional dress.
Chapter Five

CONCLUSIONS

Throughout Islamic history fundamentalism has played an important role in determining the direction of economic, political, and cultural development. The degree of fundamentalist influence and its direction will vary from country to country, but certain trends in fundamentalism can be identified that will influence the future direction of the Muslim world.

First, friction between Sunni conservative fundamentalists and their governments will continue to decrease. Most Sunni Muslim nations have a history of government and Islam working together to establish social direction. Sunni religious leaders and government leaders will continue to gain common ground on economic and political issues. The two groups, especially in the face of threatening advances by external Iranian Shiite fundamentalism, have the most to gain by working together. Sunni religious leaders in most Muslim countries have seen a trend by established governments to limit western cultural influence. Religious leaders as well as governments can see the benefits of western culture, but also its shortcomings. By establishing a cultural "pick and choose" policy, government and religious leaders can benefit from the West and still limit its influence. Another common interest between governments and conservative fundamentalist leaders is economic development across a large spectrum of Muslim society. For the educated young, as well as many rural dwellers that have turned to fundamentalism, the government must take action to bring improvements to their economic condition. Conservative Sunni fundamentalists with access to large oil revenues have taken a lead, supporting social and economic development policies in less-well-off Muslim countries. For most Muslim countries economic progress will be difficult in the short term. Any failure however, will be with the realization that the Muslim community controlled its own economic destination.

Second, a similar situation exists in politics. As long as government leaders are not far from the beliefs of fundamentalist leaders, Sunni governments, whether republics or monarchies, and fundamentalist leaders will find common political interests. Governments are quickly realizing they need the support of the conservative fundamentalists and cannot afford to alienate them in the eyes of the people.
Third, as grass roots support increases for conservative fundamentalism, a reverse trend will befall radical Shiite fundamentalists. This group, represented by Ayatollah Khomeini, will continue to lose its most valuable weapon—its moral leadership. (6:10) Khomeini's unsuccessful war with Iraq and reliance on terrorism at home and abroad have reduced his movement, in the eyes of many Muslims, to a political power struggle no different than the political power struggles of other secular leaders. Because of his actions, Iran has isolated itself from other Islamic states and from most of the world. Even if peace is established between Iraq and Iran, the damage to Khomeini's high moral ground cannot be repaired. At best, the theocratic government in Iran could adopt a policy of working with the West. This policy however, would have to be on Iran's terms, picking what they want from the West and rejecting secular and non-Islamic influences.

A critical test of conservative fundamentalism and the Muslim governments they support, is the Palestinian question. In the near future there is no acceptable solution to the problem for the parties concerned. In the past this stalemate in one way or another has led to war. With the rise of conservative fundamentalism a new factor must be considered. The conservative fundamentalists have the ability to create a massive, non-violent movement across many of the Islamic states, including a large segment of the Palestinian people. If this movement can be organized and remain non-violent, it will have a tremendous affect on internal Israeli politics as well as world opinion. Direct opposition by Israel to a non-violent Islamic movement would be too costly, especially in world opinion and in United States support. Under this non-violent pressure the Palestinians, the Israelis, and the Islamic countries might agree to a solution. If the non-violent efforts of conservative fundamentalists and the governments they support fail, a shift to a more radical fundamentalist movement will result.
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