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STUDENT REPORT
SAC'S B-52 RATED FIELD GRADE RESOURCE AND
THE POSSIBILITY OF REMAINING IN NON FLYING
DUTIES

MAJOR RONALD W. SCOTT 88-2365
"insights into tomorrow"

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19. Abstract (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
This study addresses the possibility of allowing the excess B-52, rated, field grade inventory currently in SAC, to remain in duties other than flying. It may mean missing the 9 or 11 year checkpoint in gate requirements. It looks at the reasons why SAC has the excess and analyzes why it would be better for the US Air Force as a whole to allow these field grade officers to remain away from their MWS. The goal is to produce a much more evenly distributed SAC resource and, at the same time, help the Air Force field grade short fall in certain support areas.
This study discusses options for the management of rated field grade officers in the Strategic Air Command, in particular those associated with the B-52. The basis for this analysis is SAC is overmanned in field grade authorizations in some specialties and they have a large pool of field grade officers in the rated supplement (or other jobs not associated with their MWS) scheduled to return to flying duties. Although there are favorable points for keeping rated personnel identified with a particular weapon system, the question of the good of the US Air Force overall should be addressed.

My experience in SAC rated officer assignments at the Air Force Military Personnel Center (AFMPC) often involved this exact concern. When rated officers complete a tour away from their major weapon system (MWS), the next assignment is usually back to the MWS to either re-indentify or complete gate requirements. If there is no requirement, then why bring them back? Within AFMPC and HQ SAC/DPROR there is certain recognition of the problem, but no formal policy exists of how to deal with it.

The issue of the management of rated officers would involve an entire paper itself; the management of just the rated officers at one bomb wing could be quite an undertaking. This paper does not attempt to do that or suggest MPC and SAC change the current gate management program. It does propose a way to manage this excess field grade inventory until, through attrition, the excess is gone. It is a short term solution and will not adversely affect SAC B-52 manning now or in the future. Before implementing the suggestions, consideration should be given to gate management, field grade manning and overall manning in the B-52. The discussion following does so and then offers possible suggestions.

Many people had a hand in providing the information for this study. First of all, thanks to all the personnel experts in the bomber assignment section at AFMPC. Without their cooperation, this would not have been possible. I have never worked with a better group of guys. Next, the folks at HQ SAC/DPROR, Lt Col Jeff Parker and his crew. A true team of professionals. In addition, I would like to express my appreciation and offer a special thanks to Major Mike Munk, my project advisor, for his assistance and professional advise. Finally, to my wife Carol, thanks for her concern and support, and to my sons Jason and Sean, thanks for putting up with this.
Major Ronald W. Scott came from HQ AFMPC where he served from July 1983 to July 1987 as an action officer for SAC rated officer assignments; Chief of the Bomber Section and finally Branch Chief of the Bomber/Tanker Assignment Teams. While at MPC he was responsible for insuring the manning of SAC’s newest MWS, the B-1B bomber, and was instrumental in such programs as the FB-111 transfer and the KC-135R model build. His operational experience includes tours in the B-52 at Minot AFB ND and Barksdale AFB LA as a navigator and radar navigator. Following his tour at Barksdale AFB, Major Scott was assigned to MPC. Major Scott is a distinguished graduate from OTS and was commissioned in 1974. He completed his undergraduate work in business administration at the University of Texas, Arlington and received his MBA from Louisiana Tech.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface ................................................................. iii  
About the Author ................................................... iv  
Table of Contents .................................................. v  
Executive Summary .................................................. vi  

CHAPTER ONE--INTRODUCTION ........................................ 1  

CHAPTER TWO--BOMBER RESOURCE  
Background ......................................................... 3  
Requirements ..................................................... 4  
Summary ........................................................... 5  

CHAPTER THREE--AVIATION CAREER INCENTIVE PAY  
Utilization of Rated Officers ..................................... 6  
Gate Situation in SAC .............................................. 7  
Summary ........................................................... 8  

CHAPTER FOUR  
Specific Requirements ............................................... 10  
Summary ........................................................... 13  

CHAPTER FIVE  
Considerations ..................................................... 14  
Conclusions ....................................................... 15  
Recommendations ................................................ 15  

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................... 17
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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REPORT NUMBER
88-2365

AUTHOR(S)
MAJOR RONALD W. SCOTT

TITLE
SAC'S B-52 RATED FIELD GRADE RESOURCE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF REMAINING IN NON-FLYING DUTIES

I. Purpose: To determine if B-52 field grade manning will support allowing senior officers (majors and lieutenant colonels) to remain in duties other than operational flying, to explain the need for such a program, and address the benefits of such a program.

II. Problem: SAC is experiencing an overage in field grade authorizations in operational units, and evenly manned or better in authorized slots in headquarters positions. Field grade officers are returning to overmanned units from staff positions to re-identify with their weapon system but, once they are back, the units are finding it difficult to keep them trained. This input of additional experience will affect future sustainment and stability.

III. Data: The excess in SAC's field grade manning is a result of over absorption and the Vietnam build. As operational units became overmanned, the excess was allowed to fill other Air Force requirements. Now MPC and SAC are
returning these rated officer to re-identify with their MWS or complete gate requirements. Many of the positions they are coming from are short in field grade manning; the officers could better serve the Air Force by remaining where they are. In addition, an input of field grade officers not needed would produce a false requirement for sustainment and affect long term manning.

IV. Conclusions: SAC could, without violating any regulations or adversely affect manning, allow certain field grade officers to remain away from their MWS. The program should be implemented as soon as possible. In the short term, the rated supplement will be at a false high until the excess has phased out through attrition.

V. Recommendations: Each specialty should be handled separately, based on the needs of the Air Force and SAC. Each specialty has unique qualifications and cannot be interchanged. Aircraft commanders should have the most liberal policy, based on the excessive inventory. Radar navigators will have to be more closely managed, but the inventory still supports some remaining away from the MWS. Electronic warfare officers will be the most difficult. The population as a whole is very young and the experience and guidance are needed. Until the unit requirements are filled, the viable field grade officers scheduled to return to the MWS should do so. These are not revealing recommendations but, hopefully, they have provided some good rationale for why SAC and MPC should manage their field grade rated force a little differently. The recommendations will produce a much more evenly distributed SAC resource.
Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

The Strategic Air Command (SAC) is currently overmanned in some field grade authorizations in operational units, and evenly manned or better in the authorized slots at the headquarters (15:--). The resource managers at Headquarters, Military Personnel Center (MPC) are facing a unique problem. Field grade officers are completing tours away from their major weapon system (MWS) and due to return; some have completed their flying requirements, some have not. The problem is, these returning officers are, in most cases, filling a critically manned position and are returning to overmanned units. SAC, at times, does not have enough seats in the aircraft (B-52) to keep them trained.

During the past fours years MPC has tried to evenly distribute these returning field graders as equitably as possible. However, in the past year especially, the number returning has increased to the point some units find it difficult to gainfully employ them.

This paper is not intended as a guide to employ these returning officers, but as a suggestion of a better way to possibly manage the resource in the short term--3 to 5 years. Proposals will not adversely impact long term manning but, as will be shown later, will improve it.

The intent of this project is to examine the current population in SAC and analyze it from a gate and an authorized/assigned perspective. Does SAC have the resources to support its requirements? Can SAC afford to allow field graders to remain in duties away from the MWS? Is there a gate problem in SAC that would prevent these returning officers from remaining in these duties? For example, would a large number of officers fail the 9 or 11 year checkpoint should this suggestion be implemented? If so, would it impact the rated force as a whole? In order to accomplish this, the following areas will be analyzed: Chapter 2 will provide some background; how SAC got into this position and a brief discussion on requirements;
Chapter 3 will discuss Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP), the utilization of rated officers and an analysis of the gate situation in SAC; Chapter 4 addresses field grade and specific manning requirements. Finally, Chapter 5 will summarize and offer some suggestions.
Chapter Two

BOMBER RESOURCE

BACKGROUND

The intent of this chapter is to give background on management of the bomber rated force and how it pertains to allowing bomber officers the opportunity to broaden professionally in other career fields. This chapter will begin with a short history of the Rated Distribution and Training Management process, discussing how it has evolved over the past two decades. It will explain some of the terminology and then discuss bomber rated management today. The intent of this discussion is to provide a background of what has transpired in the past, what is currently affecting the bomber force and its impact on allowing bomber resources to remain in support duties.

In the late 1960s the bomber force was relatively balanced. Then, due to our commitment to the growing conflict in Southeast Asia, a higher requirement for additional pilots and navigators was necessary. In response to this requirement, the Undergraduate Flying Training (UFT) production rate was increased.

Then, in the mid-1970s, the US began a drawdown of its involvement in Southeast Asia and subsequently our rated requirement was reduced. However, UFT rates remained high and there was a large number of pilots and navigators coming into a system that could no longer absorb them. The bomber management system did not react to this. The result of the high UFT rate and the reduced requirement was a surplus of pilots, navigators and electronic warfare officers (EW/JO).

The surplus was accounted for by increasing the stated requirements by more than 2000 in 1978. The majority of this increase was in the rated staff and training authorizations. Also, UFT rates were reduced to the lowest level in 30 years. In 1979 retention went to an all time low,
however, in a year that was the worst ever, the bomber force was affected the least. In a time when other major commands, the Tactical Air Force (TAF) in particular, were hit hard and produced somewhat of a deficit, the bomber world kept its surplus, and SAC has yet to recover (5:–). 

Current retention figures indicate somewhat of an improvement in the surplus; this, in combination with the B-1B build, has helped significantly. In some specialties, radar navigators in particular, we are facing a possible shortage. However, currently all SAC bomber units are overmanned in all positions — in addition, all positions, except EWO, are overmanned in field grade authorizations (6:–).

Many of the support fields are experiencing a shortage of field grade officers (11:–); SAC is over in field grade manning. The Military Personnel Center (MPC) and SAC Rated Officer Assignments are working hard to resolve this field grade surplus problem in the operational area but, in the foreseeable future, SAC is going to be in a position of managing from an overage and the Air Force is going to be in a position of filling more requirements than it has people; the two should complement each other.

REQUIREMENTS

In order to ensure a smooth flow of UFT production rates over a five year period (coinciding with the Five-Year Defense Plan) a plan was developed known as the Rated Management (RDTM) concept (10:2). Basically, the concept ties officers to a major weapon system group by using a RDTM code. For example, an officer in the bomber group would be coded "E." The second letter identifies the specific aircraft. A B-52 resource would be coded "EC." The RDTM concept combines similar mission/type aircraft and provides a basis for effective management of all rated resources. One of the most important basis of RDTM is the area of requirements (10:3).

"Rated requirements are statements of the Air Force need for pilots and navigators (lieutenant through lieutenant colonel). They are published following every major budget exercise and are based on the funded Air Force program as of that exercise." (10:3) Bomber requirements can be divided into three main categories: force, pipeline, and training. The composition of these categories in light of this study is not an issue, it is to show requirements for each MWS. Present and expected future inventory show rated requirements must be guarded closely. Because of the extraordinary expense associated with training a rated
officer, it is not cost effective to use them in jobs where a rated presence is not needed. However, MPC has determined there is a need for rated presence in some support areas and this presence is known as the rated supplement. MPC has established a certain level, based on extensive studies, of the rated supplement; it is neither a ceiling nor a floor but, determined by force availability and force requirements (16:--).

**SUMMARY**

This chapter was designed to give some background on SAC’s bomber rated management process, a short history on the bomber force and a brief description on the evolution of the RDTM concept. Next the requirements, as developed under the RDTM concept, was presented. While realizing the necessity of keeping rated personnel flying, the rated presence in support fields has been re-evaluated and it has been determined we do need a rated presence in certain fields.
Chapter Three

AVIATION CAREER INCENTIVE PAY (ACIP)

Many times officers ask "Why do I have to remain flying for any certain amount of time?" This chapter will explain and, in the process, will discuss the ACIP and the Air Force view on completion of flying requirements--or gates (the utilization standard for rated officers).

UTILIZATION OF RATED OFFICERS

In 1974 Congress passed the Aviation Career Incentive Act (ACIA). It was designed to impose a standard to manage all rated officers (pilots and navigators). The standard is commonly referred to as the "gate." It requires rated officers "... be assigned operational flying duties for specific amounts of time by certain career checkpoints to maintain their entitlement to continuous aviation career incentive pay when assigned to nonqualifying duty." (3:12)

The spirit of the law requires that an officer must perform at least 6 years of operational flying by the 12th year of aviation service. Once an officer has completed this 6 years, he can be selected for duties other than flying.

In addition, the Air Force has established a policy of managing as many rated officers as possible to 9 years of operational flying by the 18th year of aviation service. In order to qualify for ACIP until 25 years of officer service (the maximum allowable), rated officers must fly 11 years operational by 18 years of aviation service; not an Air Force policy. In summation, UFT graduates will fly until their first gate (6 years) is complete; the Air Force goal is to manage as many members as possible to 9 years and, as requirements dictate, try to get as many as possible 11 years of operational flying by 18 years of aviation service (5:16).
GATE SITUATION IN SAC

An examination by MPC in early 1987 revealed SAC is not currently facing a gate management problem. The purpose of the study was to see if SAC, due to its large inventory, had the capability to get their resource 11 years of flying and to reveal how many were currently in danger of violating one of their gates. Unintentionally, the study showed SAC could allow some officers to bust their 9 or 11 year checkpoint without fear of impacting experience levels or stability. In fact, as will be explained later, it would help. Of the total bomber pilots and navigators the following data reflects SACs current gate situation (4--):

TOTAL BOMBER PILOTS: 2602
Missed first gate: 0
Missed second gate: 2
Missed third gate: 38

Note: There are 60 pilots currently in jobs other than operational that must return to fly in order to meet their 2d gate.

TOTAL BOMBER NAVS: 2787 (Includes EWOs)
Missed first gate: 0
Missed second gate: 8
Missed third gate: 42

Note: There are 17 navigators currently in jobs other than operational that must return to fly in order to meet their 2d gate. Above includes EWO.

In addition, the following figures indicate the gate inventory SAC has and the total inventory based on rating (RTG) and weapon system group (WSG), an explanation will follow (4:--):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>SUP INV</th>
<th>GATE INV</th>
<th>FLEX</th>
<th>TOT INV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>3411</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>3631</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>3516</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>2953</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>2661</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first category, SUP INV, refers to supportable inventory, or the number of personnel who can acquire their gates. These people are in both flying and nonflying jobs and can rotate between the two. The GATE INV is the number of flying positions that are necessary to allow the supportable inventory. The FLEX category is most important. It shows the flexibility of movement an inventory has in and out of flying positions and still achieve gate requirements. The higher the FLEX the more movement can occur without concern for gates. The lower the FLEX, the force must be managed very carefully. It, in effect, depicts how close the supportable inventory is to the gate inventory. The total inventory is simply all flying and non-flying positions (4:--).

What the above reflects, from a purely statistical perspective, is the supportable inventory and the flexibility figures indicate SAC is not facing a gate management problem; they have the capability to allow every rated officer the opportunity to acquire all their gates. SAC could, in fact, still allow a certain number to flow back and forth without regard to the current field grade officers away from flying duties. The FLEX category indicates now is the time to leave officers in positions other than flying, should SAC choose to do so. However, in FY 91 SAC will begin to experience considerable flexibility problems in both the pilot and navigator force; this is primarily due to forecast force cuts. By that time, the field grade problem should begin to ease through attrition.

SUMMARY

This chapter dealt with aviation career incentive pay and the current gate status in SAC. When considering whether or not to allow an officer to remain in duties other than flying or operational, where he/she will not acquire gate time in, these two factors should be salient points. The intent here is to show SAC is achieving its gate management goal and why SAC brings people back to fly. It also points out SAC could afford to allow some officers to
violate their 9 or 11 year checkpoint without impact on the SAC rated force. They are important factors in the overall health and readiness of SAC and in individual careers.
Chapter Four

SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

One of the reasons SAC should not be so quick to return these experienced field graders is sustainment. Sustainment is the ability to train, experience, and maintain an inventory capable of meeting stated requirements (10:7). This chapter will explain the need for new inputs is necessary to sustain the force and why SAC does not necessarily need to return all of its field grade officers.

It is possible to compute how fast a particular force needs to be replaced and it can be figured in several ways. The two most common are the Total Active Rated Service (TARS) and the Cumulative Continuation Rates (CCR). Both methods are used by MPC. How fast a force turns over determines the number of inputs required to sustain it (11:--).

There are many factors considered in the computation of the TARS of a particular MWS. Retention, retirement, mortality and other reasons for leaving the rated force are considered. Stated in a simple fashion, it is the average time of rated service for the population being examined. TARS is affected by year group size, as in the huge build during the Vietnam conflict which will become retirement eligible during the next 3-5 years. In addition, TARS follows closely with the retention of the 6-11 group, the most important factor. CCR is used in retention and prediction studies. CCR is a percentage of the rated officers entering the 6th year of rated service who will complete their 11th year (4:--). The following indicates the TARS and CCR for SAC at end 1987 and an average over the past five years, 1982 - 1987 (4:--):
PILOTS
TARS (End '87) 13.3
CCR (End '87) 58.5
AVG TARS 13.9
AVG CCR 67.7

NAVS
14.0
70.0
14.2
73.6

Note: Pilots includes co-pilots and Navs include Radar Navs and EWOs.

The preceding figures indicate SAC does not have a problem with stability. Both the TARS and the CCR show a slight decline in the past year, but that can be explained by the extraordinary retention rate the Air Force experienced over the period of the average. That, combined with some retention problems over the past year, has caused a slight decline.

It is very difficult to predict the inventory requirements, but a sustainment rate can be determined by dividing the total requirements by the TARS; this would determine the rate at which UFT would have to produce rated officers in order to sustain the requirement. The possibility to consider is the sustainment rate may not equal what the particular force is able to accept. The ability of a MWS to absorb is the limiting factor.

The "ability of a given force structure to accept new inputs without causing adverse impact to the force itself is absorption." (10:15) The three main factors to consider in computing an absorption rate are experience, stability and actual ability to train more inputs.

SAC's absorption policy is a function of available training seats as well as self-imposed experience and stability goals. In the past, SAC has been willing to absorb beyond its requirements, and in doing so has built an excess inventory (this in combination with the Vietnam build). In order to gainfully employ this excess, SAC has also been willing to allow members to leave the rated force to work in other career fields--career broaden. In the meantime, the absorption has continued beyond requirements; TARS and CCR are high, indicating good stability, and the figures below show experience is at a healthy level (12:--):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>EXP REQ</th>
<th>EXP LEVEL (AVG)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/C</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RN</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The continued over-absorption policy SAC employed in the past (only this year has SAC changed this policy) built
an excessive inventory, but because SAC allowed people to leave the rated force, it did not affect experience or stability. SAC was able to train and experience the force they were bringing on board because they were allowing a portion of their rated force to exit on the experienced end. These people who were allowed to leave have been promoted to field grade, completed their tour away from the MWS and are scheduled to come back. An influx of excess field grade would create a management problem. The chart below is a reflection of the field grade manning in the operational units currently in SAC, they indicate known gains and losses (6:--):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>05</th>
<th>04</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUTH/ASSIGN AC</td>
<td>51/70</td>
<td>169/213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTH/ASSIGN RN</td>
<td>42/37</td>
<td>161/163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTH/ASSIGN EW</td>
<td>16/7</td>
<td>109/35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above numbers reflect combined 8th and 15th Air Force numbers and do not include co-pilots or navigators. They indicate a large overage in aircraft commanders; about even in radar navigators and under in electronic warfare officers. This shortage of field grade officers in the EWO area is a reflection of the population as a whole. They are very young; the one specialty that could use field grade inputs.

In addition to these numbers, the following are forecast gains from the May and June Rated Officers Review Board (RORB), the rated people coming available for assignments in those months. They are not reflected in the above figures (13:--).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PILOTS</th>
<th>NAVIGATORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAY AVAIL</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUN AVAIL</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above figures are not unusual for summer rotation assignments and the next three months of availables should be about the same size. What is important about these numbers are the characteristics. In the May availables 16 of the 20 pilots are field grade, 9 are Lt Colonel; 5 of the 7 navigators are field grade, 2 are Lt Colonel. The June figures are worse. Of the 41 pilots, 35 are field grade, 20 are Lt Colonel and of the 29 navigators, 23 are field grade and 10 are Lt Colonel. The navigator numbers include both RN and EWO.
The preceding figures pertain to field grade officers only; the following figures are overall manning in SAC (61--):

15TH AF and 8TH AF (Total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AC (AUTH/ASGN)</th>
<th>505/546</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RN (AUTH/ASGN)</td>
<td>572/576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW (AUTH/ASGN)</td>
<td>503/576</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What do these numbers mean? The TARS, CCR and experience levels indicate a very stable experienced force that, at the present time is turning over at about the right rate. An injection of field grade officers into a force that is already overmanned in field grade and overmanned overall, will create a false TARS, CCR and experience level, thereby causing a false sustainment figure.

This injection, primarily in the summer months, will continue to occur until this huge overage of field grade officers begin to disappear due mainly to attrition.

SUMMARY

This chapter discussed the sustainment of SAC's B-52 force. The variables MPC and SAC considers when trying to arrive at a sustainment figure were introduced. TARS, CCR and experience levels are all factors affecting the rate at which a force must absorb in order to sustain itself. Unnecessary inputs of field grade officers produce false requirements for sustainment and increase the experience figures. This affects long term manning by showing no need for additional inputs. Finally, the field grade manning in SAC B-52 units and the forecast gains and the affects these inputs could have on SAC's B-52 force were shown.
As briefly alluded to in a previous chapter, the Air Force as a whole began building for the Vietnam conflict and much too late realized the UFT production rate was too high for the requirements after the conflict ended. SAC was one of the commands who agreed to continue to absorb this excess beyond requirements, the reason is of no relevance to this paper. On top of an already excessive inventory, SAC added even more. In the early years this was not a problem because the increase could be initially trained and then allowed to move on to other areas; SAC was essentially banking this resource until needed, anticipating the build of a new MWS. What could not be foreseen was the delay. Had the B-1 come on line when originally planned, SAC might not have the excess field grade resource, at least it would be more evenly distributed between the B-52 and the B-1B.

What is most apparent in the numbers presented is the imbalance in the field grade manning among the different specialties. There is a large supplement in the AC category (both field grade and overall), approximately even in RNs, and, although the EWs are overmanned, they are significantly short in the field grade structure. Unfortunately, the specialties are not interchangeable. This imbalance is not due to improper management, but to several factors such as retention, UFT production, promotion rates, etc. Again, how the imbalance occurred is not important now, but what to do with it.

Each specialty should be managed separately, and MPC and SAC are currently doing so in an excellent manner that should prevent a future imbalance. What can be done with the current situation? As presented, there is nothing to prevent SAC from allowing the field grade officers currently in other fields from remaining there, in fact a large number would be better utilized. The rated supplement positions some of these field grade officers currently hold are critically short in field grade manning. These career areas
would be very willing to retain them (11:--) . By allowing these officers to remain away from flying requirements (each would have to be reviewed individually) SAC would be solving their field grade problem and helping the support problem. This could not be a temporary move. Unless there is an absolute necessity to bring these field grade officers back, they should remain there until retirement, or existing requirements change. This agreement would have to be made between SAC and the using command when the assignment or extension is made. The problem would be solved through attrition, over the next 3 to 5 years.

CONCLUSION

This paper has examined SAC's rated force to evaluate whether it could allow certain field grade officers to remain away from the MWS. SAC could, without violating any regulations (i.e. AFR 36-20), or affecting manning and would be helping the Air Force as a whole.

The solution would, by no means, be simple. The most difficult intangible to overcome will be the action officers at MPC and SAC ingrained mind set that every rated officer must return to the MWS to complete 7 and 11 years of flying or re-identify with the MWS. If the requirement exists, then they should return; if not, they should be allowed to remain where the Air Force can best utilize them. The rated supplement numbers would be at a false high for the next 3 to 5 years until this excess has phased out through attrition. Then, once this problem is corrected, careful management of the current force will prevent it from occurring again.

RECOMMENDATION

As suggested, each specialty should be handled separately and on a case-by-case basis. Aircraft commanders are the most abundant and can have the greatest flexibility. Until the numbers begin to improve (and they must be tracked), SAC should be very willing to allow them to remain in the positions other than operational requirements. In fact, SAC should insist whenever possible. There will be circumstances when the individual will not want to remain out of flying and these should be handled on a case by case basis.

The radar navigators are not as simple but handled much the same way. SAC should not be so permissive but, on the other hand, do not close the door completely. The field grade manning in the RN positions is perfect right now; there is no need to return the excess to the MWS,
especially Lt col. The resource now will perpetuate itself and the number of field graders currently in operational duties desiring to broaden should be allowed to do so on a case by case basis, with a tendency to be on the restrictive side. Care must be taken to insure junior captains are not allowed to exit too early, the 10 year point should be the earliest time to consider. To do so will create the same situation the AC resource is facing.

The most difficult will be the EWOs. As much as possible, until the field grade requirements are met, majors (and to a certain extent Lt cols) should be returned to the MWS upon completion of their tour. Of course there will be extenuating cases, and these should be handled accordingly. The junior force the EWs are currently facing will mature and produce the field grade resource necessary in the next 3 to 5 years and allow a relaxation on professional broadening.

These are not easy tasks, but they are not impossible. Following the above recommendations will produce a much more evenly distributed SAC resource.
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