THE EXECUTIVE LEADER: IS HE THE SAME IN WARTIME? (U)

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA H'S MILLER

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**The Executive Leader: Is He the Same in Wartime?**

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During Course One at the Army War College students are presented with an image of their future: a complex, ambiguous, and demanding arena that is far different than most officers below general officer rank have experienced. The picture is that of the senior or executive leader. The picture is made more clear by a graphic representation of the environment, the tasks, and the competencies of the executive leader. This graphic representation resulted from research by Dr. H. F. Barber, DCLH, using articles and results of studies relating to the executive leader in a non-military environment. The question is, "do these graphics represent the senior or executive leader in the military?", and more specifically, "do they represent the senior leader in wartime?". This study attempts to draw a parallel between the perspectives drawn by Dr. Barber and those held by senior military leaders who occupied senior positions in past wars. A primary objective of this study is to research the oral histories maintained by the Military History Institute and to attempt to draw the parallel using data from that source. Although there is no rank or position formally associated with the title "senior leader", this study is limited to positions at the three and four star level.

The results of the study indicate that the Senior Leader model does apply to the military senior leader. There are also strong similarities between peacetime and wartime versions of the model. Research using additional sources is needed to further confirm the results.
THE EXECUTIVE LEADER: IS HE THE SAME IN WARTIME?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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30 March, 1988

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ABSTRACT

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During Course One at the Army War College students are presented with an image of their future; a complex, ambiguous and demanding arena that is far different than most officers below general officer rank have experienced. The picture is that of the senior or executive leader. The picture is made more clear by a graphic representation of the environment, the tasks and the competencies of the executive leader. This graphic representation resulted from research by Dr. H. F. Barber, DCLM, using articles and results of studies relating to the executive leader in a non-military environment. The question is, "do these graphics represent the senior or executive leader in the military?", and more specifically, "do they represent the senior leader in wartime?". This study attempts to draw a parallel between the perspectives drawn by Dr. Barber and those held by senior military leaders who occupied senior positions in past wars. A primary objective of this study is to research the oral histories maintained by the Military History Institute and to attempt to draw the parallel using data from that source. Although there is no rank or position formally associated with the title "senior leader", this study is limited to positions at the three and four star level.

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THE EXECUTIVE LEADER:
IS HE THE SAME IN WARTIME?

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Executive Leader. Who is he? In order to give this topic the proper military impact, I will use the phrase Senior Leader. Why? From my perspective the answer is relatively simple. Most work in the area of executive or senior level leadership has been done by behaviorists and social scientists in the laboratory of the corporate executive, therefore the term executive leader. Michael M. Zais emphasizes the lack of study of the senior leader from a military perspective in an article published in ARMY magazine in March 1986 titled Is Leadership At the Top a Neglected Art? He gives credit to the training at the company grade level but effectively, in my opinion, outlines justification for definitive direction and a basis for development at the higher levels.

So, do we know who the senior military leader is? This study is one effort that seeks an answer from a military perspective in both peace and war.

BACKGROUND

During course 1 in the academic curriculum at the Army War College, one of the major objectives is to shift the
mindset of the student from his past to that of the senior leader. It is from that perspective that the remainder of the academic requirements and, subsequently, most student's future assignments are focused.

As part of the effort to provide a clearer picture of the senior leader, a graphic model has been developed by Dr. H. F. Barber. This model addresses in a graphic format the environment that the senior leader works in, the tasks he is asked to perform and outlines the competencies he should possess to be successful.

The primary basis of the Dr. Barber's Senior Leader model is derived from the corporate arena. It is, however, tempered with recent studies of and from within the military structure. Dr. Barber has also shaped the model from his own experience gained from observing, studying and working within the military structure. The model is not based on any specific historical perspective and clearly does not include a deliberate wartime leadership perspective. At best, then, the model may represent only the senior military leader in a peacetime environment. If one assumes that the model correctly represents the peacetime senior leader, then it begs the question that is the basis of this study. Is the senior leader the same in wartime?

Why should there be a question of the validity of the model's relationship to the senior leader in the wartime versus the peacetime environment? Is it possible that the
leaders who are in position when a war starts are not the ones best able to apply the military force properly? There are indications, based on a historical perspective, that a significant number of peacetime leaders may not be able to make the transition. Russell F. Weigley sums it up best in his preface to *Eisenhower's Lieutenants* \(^2\). He borrows a few lines from Douglas Southall Freeman's foreword to his first volume on *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command* \(^3\). Freeman had said in essence that the search for capable lieutenants, or in this case, senior leaders immediately subordinate to the supreme commander, was one of the major difficulties that had to be resolved before the army was qualified to take on the task at hand. Weigley transposed that same belief and applied it to the conditions facing the Army in the early days of WW II. Freeman had also written that the successful selection of these subordinates is conditioned by the "capability, fair-mindedness, and diligence of the supreme command". I think it is important to note that the Eisenhower's and Bradley's were Lieutenant Colonels as late as November, 1941. It is also fair to say that there were officers in many of those senior leadership positions in 1940 who were apparently successful in peacetime but found lacking and replaced "before the Army could get on with the task at hand".

The question of the wartime/peacetime application of the model occurred to me during classroom discussions with
Dr. Barber concerning his model. In order to get such a perspective, Dr. Barber had already made preliminary inquiries into researching the oral histories and personal papers of past wartime senior leaders that are available in the archives of the Military History Library at Carlisle Barracks. These oral histories became the source of information with which to analyze Dr. Barber's Senior Leader model for wartime adequacy. In many cases the material in the archives is the next best thing to a personal interview with the subject since they are primarily transcripts of taped interviews. Many of the subjects are deceased thereby making the information in the Archives even more valuable.

This project was conducted and the paper is organized into three parts:

a. a review and analysis of the Senior Leader model.

b. an analysis of the Senior Leader model based on data obtained from the oral histories.

c. conclusions and recommendations.

During review of the Senior Leader model it is anticipated that some changes or clarifications may result.

**SCOPE**

The scope of this study is limited to the following constraints. As mentioned earlier the only source of
historical data will be the oral histories available in the archives in the Military History Library at Carlisle Barracks. The availability of some oral histories is also limited due to personal requests of the interviewees, especially in those cases where biographies or autobiographies are possible in the future. I have also limited examination to the three and four star level.

ENDNOTES


2. Russell F. Weigley, EISENHOWER'S Lieutenants, p. xvi.

"It is strange that although our Army has devoted enormous efforts toward leadership development, it remains unable or unwilling to articulate and adopt a meaningful leadership model that applies to senior leaders." Those are the words of LTG. (Ret) Walter F. Ulmer, Jr. published in a recent issue of PARAMETERS. The Senior Leader model, as generally defined in CHAPTER I, is one attempt to overcome the shortfall outlined by LTG Ulmer.

The model is a graphic representation of the senior leader as defined by the current thinking of various study groups and individuals who have looked at the topic from both a military and corporate civilian view. Dr. Barber, an author and instructor in the Dept. of Leadership and Management at the Army War College, has digested and institutionalized the plethora of data available in order to reflect this model of the senior leader in a United States military service environment. By his own admission and the nature of the research data used, the model has not passed the test of a wartime application. The purpose of this chapter is to generally lay out the model, portray the source of the components and analyze its application to the military.
THE SENIOR LEADER

The senior leader is not just a concept whereby the senior person present is termed "the senior leader". Current concepts of the senior or executive leader derive from the idea that "three broadly different types of leadership are needed"² in complex organizations in order to avoid being overcome by the complexity. The concept holds that there are unique, critical tasks to be performed at each level of an organization that are dependent on concepts and guidance that are promulgated at a higher level. Those relative levels of leadership are defined in descending order as systems leadership, organizational leadership and direct leadership. The concept goes on to hold that an individual leader at any level may be required to exhibit the skills of all three levels of leadership to be successful. In the Army, for example, these three levels can be associated with organizations from squad to the Department of the Army.³

Direct leadership is applied primarily at the battalion level and below. At this level leadership has an immediate effect and is usually face-to-face. Organizational leadership represents the integration process whereby the diverse capabilities of a range of units are put together to achieve goals and objectives. This level of leadership is applied primarily at the brigade and division level. Systems leadership is applied primarily above the division level.
At this last and highest level of leadership the systems leader is required not only to exhibit the other levels of leadership but also shape the organization to meet the changing needs of the future. It is this last level of leadership that the Senior Leader model is intended to represent.

The U.S. Army's latest effort to address senior leadership, FM 22-103, differs a little in it's definition of a senior leader. In the preface of the manual the Chief of Staff states that "no specific level or grade of leadership is specified or intended". He goes on to say that if leaders see themselves in the manual then it is appropriate for them to use the manual. The actual definition offered is equally nonspecific. It addresses direct leadership as does the academic example cited earlier. The term indirect leadership is used to represent all other levels. This term would appear to include organizational and systems leadership. The explanation of the definition does offer the concept of "junior" and "senior" leaders but stops short of establishing responsibility.

The Senior Leader model is specifically aimed at the three and four star level and the associated command and staff positions that inherently require the abilities associated with the holders of such rank. This distinct choice of designating responsibility does not preclude
others who may rightfully see themselves "in the manual" but it may eliminate choosing otherwise for the three and four star officers.

![Diagram of Senior Leader Model]

**Fig. 1. Senior Leader Model**

**FORMULA FOR SUCCESS**

The three and four star (or equivalent) senior leaders have been given responsibility in the Senior Leader model for systems leadership or as indicated in FM 22-103, the highest levels of indirect leadership. What general steps must the leader take to be successful? What are the influencing outside factors? What are the internal factors or abilities that the leader must control or develop? In our case Dr. Barber has chosen to address these areas as
tasks, competencies and environment of the senior leader (Fig. 1). The components of each major element of the model, as was stated earlier, are the results of research into a number of studies on executive or senior leadership. An effort is reflected in the model to adjust generic findings of the research into specific terms relating to the senior leader in a military setting.

ENVIRONMENT

The term environment represents the source or sources of influence that have an impact on the activities of the senior leader. That influence could come from something as simple as the common cold. However, more than likely the influence would be much more complex and difficult to resolve.

"Recently, with the explosion of knowledge in our society, complexity has become the rule rather than the exception; suddenly, simple cause-and-effect relationships, are insufficient to explain many phenomena. To understand fully even seemingly simple relationships now requires a much broader perspective."6

This description of the difficulties faced by contemporary senior leaders is indicative of beliefs

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throughout academia and industry. The words on the first page of FM 22-103 reflect a similar thought.

"The changing face of war in the late twentieth century poses special challenges. Two major factors impact on the Army and its senior leadership. First, nations hostile to democracy have increasing capacity to wage war. That capacity requires the Army to prepare for the entire spectrum of conflict—from nuclear war to counterterrorist action. Second, the continued application of technology to warfighting, coupled with changes in threat capabilities and posture, has altered dramatically the human demands of combat." 7

The complexity of the environment for the senior military leader becomes more clear when one considers the implication of the nature of conflict. Army doctrine addresses conflict at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. These levels of conflict generally parallel the three levels of leadership presented earlier, i.e., direct, organizational and systems leadership. That places the leader not only in the national environment but in the international environment as well.

Stephen Clement cites the work of Peter Vaill, an organizational theorist, to emphasize the impact of the "environmental demands and opportunities". Clement credits
the current major changes in organization and structure within the Army as an initial reaction to changing environmental demands. Those readers who have been in or observed the Army since 1981-2 can relate to the significant debate and discomfort that has accompanied implementation of the changes that are taking place. There has not been complete agreement on what changes the environment really demands. The impact on the leadership has been significant as they attempt to arrive at consensus both in and outside the Army.

The model attempts to portray the specific environmental influences on the senior leader. The specific
Influences are surrounded by descriptors which emphasize the dynamics of the model (Fig. 2).

NATIONAL/MULTINATIONAL

The model reflects the national and international aspects of the environment as derived from the strategic and operational levels of conflict that senior military leaders manage. The national influence represents those social and cultural organizations and philosophies that come from the mere essence of the American society. The United States role as a superpower inherently demands consideration of the position of other nations. The strategic positioning of forces and posturing of outside support for U.S. interests becomes increasingly more difficult as more and more nations develop economically and militarily.

PRESIDENT

The Executive is established constitutionally as Commander In Chief and thereby is a direct environmental influence as the senior executive. There is virtually no policy area that could not potentially have an impact on military executive decisions. The positions of other federal and even state agencies add to the difficulty of the process.
LEGISLATIVE

The Congress casts a significant cloud in the environment. As the constitutionally mandated virgin mother of the Army, the Congress has ultimate control and thereby a singularly significant influence on the military senior leader. This influence appears to be most evident during peacetime, sometimes to the point of making rather than influencing the action as evidenced by the recent DOD Reorganization Act. Congress also approves the appointment, by promotion to general officer, of all senior leaders within the military.

INTERNAL

The model includes both personal influences and Army unique influences under the term Internal. The senior leader must consider his own organization. The beliefs, values, capabilities and individual attitudes within the organization can have a significant impact on success. As an Army senior leader the value of maintaining a "landpower" perspective and representing what the "Army wants/needs" should not be understated. The Internal personal influences are those that derive from the personality of the individual and the characteristics of the specific position. In a 1986 Army study\(^9\), General officers interviewed indicated that they were reassigned before the results of their efforts
were realized. Many senior leaders find themselves isolated as a result of their own behavior and/or the nature of an organization to protect the boss. Other studies indicate that the senior leader's time is constantly in demand making it difficult to actually perform the long term planning required. Each of these examples indicate the environmental pressures that potentially affect the success of the leader.

THREAT

The last entry that shapes the environment of the military leader is the threat. Although last to be discussed it may be the most significant element of this component of the model. Not only does the military capability of the threat impact the environment but the other elements of the environment can be manipulated. Recent efforts by the Soviets to appear more open and less militant have had a notable impact on the more liberal elements of the U.S. society. Daniel Ortega has been widely acclaimed as playing very successfully to influential segments of the environment. I believe each of these examples have complicated and increased the uncertainty of the senior military leader's environment.

TASKS

II-15
"Successful senior leaders and commanders establish a clear personal vision or concept of what needs to be accomplished. Then, they communicate the concept to their organizations so that the desired intent is clearly understood. Finally, they apply their craft by being tough enough to ensure that their organization executes the actions necessary to make the vision a reality and achieve the desired result."¹² This is the task statement contained in FM 22-103 that establishes the basis for senior leadership in the Army.

Stephen Clement asserts that the systems leader is required to perform the following tasks to be successful:¹³

a. set vision
b. design interdependencies
c. create climate
d. establish information systems.

Another report of the results of study of chief executives in the civilian environment indicate an even more specific set of duties¹⁴. They are:

a. setting direction especially for the long term
b. allocating resources; establishing priorities
c. promulgating value systems
d. organization and key executive selection
e. development and designation of successor
f. relationship with the board of directors
g. key external relationships

h. monitoring and evaluation.

Each of these tasks can be related to the four described by Clement and are refinements of the tasks outlined in FM 22-103. These same tasks were summarized in another article by Clements, T.O. Jacobs, Carlos Rigby and Elliott Jacques. Their explanation of the system suggests an "interlocking effect from the top to the bottom in many areas" and supports the creation of the "interdependencies" mentioned earlier by Clement. They conclude with the declaration that "senior leaders are SYSTEMS LEADERS, understanding a complex world and creating the new organizations and weapons systems needed to deal with an even more complex future world". Their key tasks include:

a. envision the desired future system and its overarching goals and objectives

b. communicate the understanding to all who must share the work of making it happen

c. envision the pieces that need to be created and made to work together to form the desired new system (or change the old one)

d. create the pieces and build interdependencies among them

e. manage the interface between the organization and the external environment to insure the organization has the
Information and other resources needed to function well and that the environment is friendly.

These tasks are reflected at Fig. 3. Again the model attempts to use terms that are indicative of the specific tasks that are associated with the military. In this case the only unique task is the national advisory role undertaken primarily by those senior leaders operating at the highest levels of the services.

![Diagram of tasks](image)

**Fig. 3. Tasks**

**COMPETENCIES**

We are left with one element in the equation for success: the leader or is it manager? I can't resist
repeating a comment by Warren Bennis, a noted authority and author in Leadership and Management who said, "Leaders are people who do the right thing; managers are people who do things right. Both roles are crucial, and they differ profoundly. I often observe people in top positions doing the wrong things well". I believe Bennis says it all. The extreme difficulty of the tasks to be accomplished further complicated by the environment certainly calls for things to be done right. However, it is even more important that the effort be expended on the right thing.

So, what does it take? What skills, abilities and experiences are required for an individual to start and sustain the effort needed for success? As Stephen Clement might put it, "What does it take to insure that all of the parts of the organization mesh properly, not only within the organization but also with the surrounding environment?". As a caution here it should be noted that studies have suggested that no one person has all the skills that we might desire and there is no one best way to succeed. Another observer of senior leaders reflected that "one has only to look at the successful managers (leaders) in any company to see how enormously their particular qualities vary from any ideal list of executive virtues." Initial results of research into the skills required of senior military leaders by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the behavioral and Social Sciences indicate
that the ability to build consensus may be the most important skill at the senior level. According to the same study an important aspect of the ability to reach consensus are the personal skills used over a long period to develop a network of personal and professional contacts. It went on to reveal that the most difficult to establish were the external relationships. Other capabilities revealed were:

a. envision the future (intuition)

b. deal in abstractions

c. establish values/set climate

d. self evaluate

e. sharing frame of reference with subordinates

f. take risk/deal with uncertainty

The accuracy of these findings is difficult to refute since the source was serving three and four star generals.

In an article in the HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW Robert Katz proposed that successful executives demonstrate effectiveness in three basic skills. He defines them as technical, human and conceptual skills. He bases those skills on the assumption that the leader primarily achieves his objectives through directing the activities of other people. He goes on to offer that the conceptual skill allows the senior leader to see the future and provide the proper direction to the organization. Katz's findings are different from those of the previous sources only in the fact that he
believes that the conceptual skill may be the most important skill of all for the senior leader.\textsuperscript{22}

Warren Bennis, quoted earlier, has his own observations on the competencies of successful senior leaders.\textsuperscript{23} He classifies them as:

a. management of attention, the ability to project a vision and enroll subordinates
b. management of meaning, the ability to communicate clearly through all resistance and achieve support
c. management of trust, consistency and focus
d. management of self, knowing and using one’s skills effectively.

Bennis’s view is expressed in a more general manner than others but is consistent with the tasks required of senior leaders in FM 22-103.

An interesting study of executives who failed produced some interesting, but familiar, results. The Center for Creative Leadership compared successful executives with ones who failed and found their abilities very similar.\textsuperscript{24} However, the generalizations derived from the failures indicated that the following characteristics generally support success.

a. sensitive to other people
b. humility
c. integrity
d. single minded
e. technical competence  
f. trusts subordinates  
g. can organize and staff effectively  
h. has vision  
i. adaptable  
j. confident and independent  

One of the most interesting findings concerned the reaction by leaders to mistakes. Those who were a success made just as many as the unsuccessful executives. The difference was the way the mistakes were handled. Successful executives admitted them, learned from them, fixed them and proceeded on. Others became defensive, blamed others and generally acted as if they had failed.
Dr. Barber has blended the results of each of the cited studies to construct this component of the model (Fig. 4). I will not go into an indepth discussion of each item in the model. I believe it is sufficient to note that the model indicates the personal characteristics, capabilities and experience base (Frames of Reference) that a senior leader must possess.

SUMMARY

The Senior Leader model is an synthesis of a series of studies and academic proposals that attempt to portray the idealized senior/executive leader. The model is a reflection of the first attempt to portray the senior leader from a military perspective. Each of the major components reflects the essence of the proposals or findings that were used as background research for the model.

I believe the model includes the proper components and elements to provide a graphic message to an aspiring senior leader. However, the model does not visually display the relationship of the major components. I also am not satisfied that the relationship of the various elements of those components are clear. However, I am satisfied that the model projects a picture clear enough for the purposes of this study. The senior leader faces a very complex environment made up of national, international, cultural,
personal and other strong and dynamic influences. He must accomplish a series of tasks that result in a well organized and staffed team while under these influences and be successful. In most cases he must use years of experience and training, shaped by his ability to see the future, and communicate it to a large number of subordinates in such a way that they join in his vision and proceed to work in a coordinated way to bring it to fruition.

ENDNOTES


3. Ibid., p. 18.


5. Ibid., p. 3.


II-24
12. FM 22-103, p. 6.


22. Ibid., p. 42.


CHAPTER III

WARTIME IMPLICATIONS

We can read military theorists such as Clausewitz, U.S. Army doctrine such as that contained in FM 100-5 and, along with the latest thoughts on senior leadership in FM 22-103, construct a great case that the peacetime systems leaders are the most capable ones for wartime leadership. However, have we missed something? Have we applied the teachings of history to select, train and promote those officers in peacetime who can win in wartime?

The Senior Leader model has presented a good picture of the future planner who successfully energizes the organization to work to meet the requirements of the future. Is this the proper picture of the wartime leader? What, then, is the basis for Freeman's and Weigley's observations concerning the high turnover of senior leaders during the initial stages of conflict?

BACKGROUND

The source of the research was purposely limited to the oral histories available in the archives of the Military History Institute. As I began the research I discovered early that the material available in the archives was
voluminous. Most of the oral histories were not indexed therefore no ready access to the required data was possible. I also discovered that there was no specific portion of any of the histories where leadership was addressed. As a result I had to read each history entirely. Although that made the actual research a slow process, my historical background was improved considerably.

The oral histories and other papers maintained in the archives are a tremendous source of information, especially for factual data to support historical research. Many of the oral histories are accompanied by notes and papers prepared by the subjects and donated to the Military History Institute. Many of the records are still controlled by the subjects and require their approval for use in research. The oral histories are records of taped interviews conducted, usually over several sessions, by students and instructors in the Army War College, historians and others. The oral history of General of the Army (GOA) Omar Bradley was done by his wife.

Each history follows the same basic format. They begin with a review of the subjects boyhood days and why the military was chosen as a profession. The remainder of the history is normally a chronological progression through the life of the senior officer. Controversial periods or events are highlighted along with the most significant periods of the subject’s career.
Although there are just under two hundred oral histories available in the archives only a relatively small percentage are available that meet the needs of this study. Since I have defined the senior leader as three or four star generals, I limited the research to those officers who had served at the senior level in WW II, Korea or Vietnam. Due to the limited nature of Korea and Viet Nam I focused my attention on those who served in WW II. Those officers who served in Korea or Viet Nam had also served in combat in WW II. Some served at the senior level in at least two of the periods.

I read the complete studies of seven officers. The following is a list of those whose oral histories I read.

a. GOA Omar Bradley  
b. Lieutenant General Elwood R. Quesada  
c. General Matthew Ridgeway  
d. Lieutenant General Ira Eaker  
e. General Bruce C. Clark  
f. General William Depuy  
g. Lieutenant General Julian Ewell

Each of these men was a significant contributor to the United States Army and to the country in their era as they reached the highest levels of the military. Their oral history interviews provided great insight into them as individuals and as leaders.
GENERAL

The purpose of this part of the study is to attempt to draw the parallels and differences of the wartime senior leader to the Senior Leader model. Each of the oral histories has been researched for information that will assist to determine the environment, tasks and competencies that each of the interviewees believe existed during their wartime experience. As mentioned earlier, the issue of systems or senior leadership was not specifically addressed by the interviewer in any of the oral histories. In several cases the histories did address specific issues that can be related to the Senior Leader model. However, in most cases, contributions to the model are a result of an overall examination and analysis of the information available in the histories. Since the oral histories are a typed copy of a taped interview, the officers being interviewed often took over and departed from the interviewer's questions. It was generally on these excursions that information useful in this study was presented.

ENVIRONMENT

Two factors that impact the environment in wartime became evident from the readings. The first has to do with
the degree of national involvement in and support of the war. The second is the "popularity" of the conflict.

**NATIONAL/CONGRESS**

The degree of national involvement is a reflection of the threat posed to the strategic position and future of the nation. The almost total commitment of the nation in WW II was due to the direct threat to the United States and its allies. The commitment of the nation and its assets in both Korea and Vietnam were limited from the outset. The term "popularity" reflects the willingness of a nation's citizens to support and become personally involved in a conflict. Support of conflict that is geographically limited and to which less than total involvement of a nation is required becomes very difficult if popular support is not present. Whereas a conflict, popular or not, that poses a direct threat inherently attracts support. The limited conflict may have to succeed on other merits.

The availability of funds, manpower and ability to use the warrmaking assets of the nation are all impacted by the popular support generated by the conflict. In peacetime, there are many other issues such as employment, social problems and the like that vie for the nation's assets. General Ridgeway indicated that politicians are clearly more influential in peacetime¹. LT Gen Quesada felt that

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congressional interference was less in wartime\(^2\). Both of these officers were reflecting on their WW II experience.

On Viet Nam, General Depuy said that "Intellectuals decided that social justice was on the side of the enemy". He went on to say that their position eventually "pervaded the public over time" aided by the efforts of news editors, TV producers and the like. General Ewell commented that the press had to be kept informed on a consistent and accurate basis so that they would not make their own news. General Bradley felt that it was important to let reporters and writers observe and write for the public at home to see who and how leaders were caring for the nation's manhood.

**THREAT**

The threat is an obvious element in the senior military environment. There were no startling findings on the threat's specific influence. However, the number of unknowns concerning the threat are reduced in wartime. Identifications of the actual threat, time and place of conflict, objectives and actual capabilities are more clear in general war.

**EXECUTIVE BRANCH**

The President, as Commander-In-Chief, has a significant influence. Once the decision to go to war is
made, the senior executive establishes a closer, more direct relationship with the senior military leader(s).

MULTINATIONAL

The multinational influence, especially in WW II, was quite evident in the readings. Generals Bradley, Quasada, and Ridgeway all reflected on the difficulties that had to be overcome in order to conduct effective and successful joint and combined operations. General Bradley reflected on the selection of Eisenhower as the senior leader for the invasion of Europe due to his ability to cut through the national differences and ultimate issues that were brought on by the nations involved. The impact, however, does not appear to be significantly different in peacetime.

INTERNAL

There were few specific comments from any of the subjects that directly relate the personal feelings and pressures that could be classified as internal influences. There were general comments in all oral histories that reflected the demands on time. Most, especially in WW II, mentioned absence from family, missed weddings, births and the like. I believe it is fair to say that, if asked, each would have related a list similar to that in the Senior Leader model.

III-32
ENVISION THE FUTURE

The peacetime systems leader sees the future, interprets the vision, converts the plan into reality by developing, adjusting and managing change to meet the future. This process is never ending. In wartime the futures of the opponents collide. It is this interruption of the systems process that I believe suggests another difference in senior leadership in wartime.

General Bradley said that he "began to think of the last step, i.e., the breakout and exploitation while still in England". He mentioned several times that he wargamed the future moves of his forces on almost a daily basis. I cite these only to suggest the relatively short term into the future that the wartime commander was looking. Each of the histories emphasized that the most important demand on their time was being out where the soldiers were, encouraging them on and getting feedback on what the situation was. Both of these also suggest a high concentration on the present or not too distant future. I offer the disarray and condition of the Army that existed after Viet Nam as evidence of the loss of focus on the future that can take place even during a limited war.
The argument is not of the requirement to envision the future but how far into the future that three and four star generals are expected to look. The terms "farsighted", "vision", "imagination", "insight" and phrases like "look ahead", "plan ahead" and "man of vision" were found throughout the oral histories. However, I believe the depth of vision, even at the top, is foreshortened by the requirement to defeat a committed threat and long term implications are either not addressed or are inadequately addressed.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

I will not spend much time on the task to accomplish strategic planning. This task is inherent to the military planner and was the basis for conferences in Tehran, Casablanca and other locations where the senior military and civilian leaders of the allied nations met to discuss and resolve strategic direction. In fact this task seems to be a catalyst that bonds the senior military leaders and civilian leaders during wartime much closer than in peacetime, especially in a general war. Limited war, especially an unpopular one, may cause just the opposite as politicians attempt to extracate themselves from the military involvement.
DESIGN/BUILD ORGANIZATIONS

Generals Bradley and Ridgeway both emphasized the importance of building good staffs and units that are manned, trained and well led. Each of the subjects talked about the mentoring of subordinates and the requirement of the senior leader to monitor the activities of leaders and units. Specific comments on the design of units and building of organizations were very general in the histories. Lessons learned were constantly being fed into the system for change. General Leslie McNair was killed in a foxhole on the front lines by allied bombs as he attempted to observe soldiers in action. That is only important in the context of this paper when you realize that he was responsible for organizing and training all ground forces in the United States before they were sent overseas. He was in the process of monitoring and evaluating the organizations and individuals to determine what future changes might be required.

MANAGING CHANGE

There were only general reflections on the task of managing change above the tactical and operational levels. Since the military forces of the United States went from just over 100,000 in the late '30s to millions of men in
uniform in 1945, the proof of this requirement is in the facts. The tremendous resources that showed up on the beaches of Normandy and the islands of the Pacific are further evidence of the tremendous management required. General Marshall was constantly involved in establishing priorities for units and equipment between Europe and the Pacific.

INTERFACES WITH EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

Each of the oral histories reflected on the interface with external environments, primarily through the press. Generals Depuy and Ewell talked about need to be honest but to control the press in Viet Nam. General Quesada, in reflecting on the development of senior officers, indicated unusual assignment and variety prepared an officer to handle a wide range of problems. He cited persuasion and influence in the same paragraph with Congress and the economy. Again, I believe that the "popular" limited war or general war scenario may reduce the difficulty of this task due to the collective desire to win and/or survive.

IMPLEMENTS/ADVISES ON NATIONAL POLICY

I will only offer that the task of advising and implementing national policy in wartime is the very essence of the military. As Clausewitz said, "war is merely the
continuation of policy by other means. During wartime, the military leader acquires a more prominent role within the national structure. His advice, assistance and capability are, by definition, the tools to solving the political issues.

COMPETENCIES

This component of the model was the best supported by the oral histories. Each of the subjects saw themselves as leaders and seemed to believe that their success was based on their own abilities. They were all complimentary of their contemporaries and provided descriptions that help to gain an insight to the things successful senior leaders must be able to do.

CAPABILITIES

Each interviewee addressed and demonstrated imagination and vision in at least the shorter term of the wartime environment. The consensus building ability of Eisenhower is almost legendary and was cited in several of the histories. General Eaker said that Eisenhower "could make you feel better with a no! than some could with a yes". Eaker also spoke of Arnold with the same praise. The personal relationships and subsequent professional relationships that
had developed between many of the senior leaders of WW II had started when these officers were at West Point or as young officers. General Ridgeway was very strong on bringing in people that he had met in schools, served with or who came highly recommended by people he trusted.

The issue of dealing with mistakes was addressed directly. General Ridgeway suggested that mistakes can be made by saying that "every senior has a blind spot". General Depuy said that military leaders "can and will make mistakes". He went on to indicate that "anything around 80% accuracy in making decisions is doing pretty good".

CHARACTERISTICS

The characteristics of the wartime senior leaders covered by the oral histories covered a wide range but generally fit those of the Senior Leader mode. General Quesada said that "military operations are organized chaos, all have many debacles within". Those who are a success under these conditions must, to some degree, exhibit personal robustness. Quesada cited Eisenhower and Marshall as being intolerant to blind loyalty, inviting dissent. He also commented that "ethics and honesty were the keystones of military service". When asked what makes a good leader General Quasada said "physical and moral courage, common sense and normal intelligence". "War is the realm of danger,
therefore courage is the soldier's first requirement". These are the words of Clauswitz leading to his description of the courage to accept personal danger, and to accept responsibility.

Although the words "consistent and predictable" were not used, this characteristic was a strong element in each of the senior leaders mentioned in the oral histories. I have previously mentioned General Ridgeway's selection of known quantities. That selection of subordinates was primarily based on trust. A significant number of the senior leaders had known each other for many years and had served in assignments together worldwide. Generals Eisenhower and Bradley had the long time confidence of General Marshall and were quickly promoted to significantly higher positions early in the war, bypassing many others more senior. The Air Corps Generals Twining, Arnold, Quesada and Eaker had flown together, in some cases, since they were flight cadets. I believe that this element of trust is the key reason Freeman's and Weigley's observations were possible.

The histories were full of descriptions of senior officers that the subjects of the histories had known and observed. Words such as integrity, honesty, selfless, sensitivity, sincerity and dedicated were common place. Although there were comments by several concerning the apparent degradation of values and ethics in Viet Nam, the
values and ethics of the most successful senior leaders remained a significant part of their character.

FRAMES OF REFERENCE

The perspective of the senior leaders whose histories were researched was, almost to the man, very broad and well developed. Most had served at every level of the military services; some had served in the Washington area as Lieutenants and Captains. Each was very technically qualified and maintained their basic technical skills, even as senior officers. General Bradley talked of going through a retraining program when he went to division command to drive vehicles, know artillery, etc. He said that "it quite often surprises enlisted men, drivers, that you know so much about a truck and that was the purpose of it". Several praised the officer schooling system for the professional knowledge and abilities of the officer corps. The period between WW I and WW II allowed a lot of study and reflection by officers individually and collectively. As I have mentioned, many of the most senior officers had served together for many years. These relationships provided a common perspective that allowed a quick and smooth transition to changing conditions. The frames of reference were an important aspect in selecting senior leaders who had gained a broad perspective of national, international and
military affairs prior to the war. Generals Depuy and Ewell were products of the same era with General Depuy having significant experience up to battalion command level as a young officer in WW II.
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In this chapter I will attempt to draw conclusions from the research and provide recommendations where appropriate. Comments will be addressed to the research material, the Senior Leader model and wartime observations concerning the model.

CONCLUSIONS

Several of my conclusions are a result of my sensings and are not always completely supported by the research material. Additionally, I have not reached specific conclusions in some instances. In each of these cases I leave it to the reader to decide if the conclusions are valid.

RESEARCH MATERIAL

1. The material used as the source for the Senior Leader model was consistent and, regardless of author, supported the same themes. Although most of the studies came from the civilian environment, there were sufficient
observations of the senior military to give credibility to application of the data to a senior military structure.

2. The same source material was focused primarily on the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a unique organization. I believe that a good argument could be constructed that there is not a direct relationship of the CEO to all three and four star positions within the military in times of peace or war. In fact, those positions that satisfy the criteria of the CEO may exist only at the very top of a service or in joint and/or combined headquarters.

3. The oral histories maintained in the archives of the Military History Institute are not adequate as a sole source to support studies of this type. I think it is fair to say that they are not intended to support every possible study for which the subjects may have contributions. However, since leadership was the primary reason that qualified most of the subjects to be candidates for inclusion in the oral history program it would appear that insight into leadership might be appropriate. While some of the histories did get into specific issues the general trend was to address the life of each chronologically and to expand on those portions having the most historical significance. I believe the oral histories would be more complete if additional insights into the senior leadership were included.
SENIOR LEADER MODEL

1. The concept of a graphic Senior Leader model is valid and could be used constructively to identify and/or train people for senior positions.

2. The model constructed by Dr. Barber is based on reliable research data and, with modifications, could serve the role exceptionally well. For example the model does not attempt to show the relationship between the major components. Conversely, many of the elements of the major components are related to other elements. The graphic demonstration of the interrelationships help to emphasize the volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity that exists throughout the environment of the senior leader.

WARTIME OBSERVATIONS

1. The environment of the wartime leader is changed more than the other major components of the Senior Leader model. This conclusion seems almost trite and certainly obvious. But, why? I base this on the assumption that during peacetime the military is not the most popular of the national issues and that periods of popularity such as those in the first of the Reagan years are rare. Even then, there was significant environmental pressure from external sources. More importantly there was significant internal
pressure due to the debates on how to use the dollars that came with the relative popularity. During a declared war, and I emphasize "declared", consideration of the dollar decreases and along with it the pressures from Congress and the public. The senior military leader is expected and allowed to get on with his business. The impact of the threat on the environment is increased and at the same time clarified. He is generally a better known quantity. The focus of the senior leader is now directed almost totally on the threat.

2. The vision of the senior leader is foreshortened and focused on a specific near term goal. That goal is fixed in time and gets closer if the senior leader is successful. The first, and clearly most important, step in the process for a senior leader is to have a vision. In a peacetime environment in the military it is generally assumed that the vision is extended into the future at least 7 and usually 15 to 20 years. On an annual basis, the vision is revalidated and the time period is adjusted an additional year into the future. The wartime leaders vision is based on less uncertainty, ambiguity, volatility and complexity.

3. Many senior leader positions must have occupants who can demonstrate exceptional courage in wartime. The senior leader must have courage to face personal danger and to accept the responsibility of the lives of the soldiers.
that are lost as a result of his decisions. Neither of these are as significant in peacetime.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

1. We do have a pretty good idea of who the senior leader should be. I believe that the model developed by Dr. Barber is a step in the direction. He is not the same in wartime that he is in peacetime. There are many similarities but some significant differences. Can one man be both? Yes, history is full of those who have made the transition. The task is to insure that we select and train officers for senior leadership in war during peace.

2. I believe the Weigleys and Freemans will still be able to make the same observations in the next war that they did in the Civil War and WW II. I believe it will be possible for two reasons:

   a. there will be senior officers who, for one reason or another, are incompetent or are unable to adjust to the pressures of war.

   b. senior leaders will continue to surround themselves with people they know and in whom they have personal trust.

The selection process, training programs, and continuity of a sizable standing Army are current advantages that should reduce these type of changes.
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the definition of senior leader be clarified relative to that of the systems leader.

2. That questions regarding senior leadership be added to the interrogatives that support the oral history program. These questions should focus the subjects on the environment, tasks and competencies of the systems and/or the senior leader. Typical questions are:
   a. What are the important tasks performed by the senior leader (3 star and above)?
   b. Do these tasks differ from those of subordinate levels? How?
   c. Are the tasks different in wartime? How?
   d. What are the environmental influences on the senior leader? Are they different from subordinate levels?
   e. How are the environmental influences different in wartime (from peacetime)?
   f. What are the skills/competencies required of the senior military leader?
   g. How are the skills of the senior leader the same as, the subordinate levels?
   h. Are there any skills required in wartime that are not needed in peacetime?

3. That additional research using other sources be conducted to further clarify the senior leader in wartime.
4. That the Senior Leader model be further developed to:

   a. include a graphic indication of the relationship between the major components.

   b. include some indication of the varying impact of the elements and components from a peacetime environment to a general wartime environment.
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