EASTERN EUROPE AND
SOVIET COALITIONAL WARFARE:
DILEMMAS OF ANALYSIS

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EASTERN EUROPE AND SOVIET COALITIONAL WARFARE:
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by

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EASTERN EUROPE AND SOVIET COALITIONAL WARFARE:
DILEMMAS OF ANALYSIS

Western analysts essentially agree that since the early 1960s coalitional warfare has assumed the status of a sacrosanct "permanently operating factor" (to use Joseph Stalin's famous phrase) in Soviet military doctrine. Soviet strategists believe that whether a future war is limited or all-nuclear, short or protracted, it will be fought in the European theater or on a global scale by opposing coalitions of states. The crisis in Poland in the 1980s, however, raised doubts in the minds of some Western scholars about the actual, as opposed to propaganda, validity of the concept. Ross Johnson and Dale Herspring have argued, for instance, that in the 1980s the doctrine of coalition warfare has reached the point of "diminishing returns" due to the political unreliability of East European military elites coupled with the widening technological gap between Soviet and East European military equipment and hardware.¹

Yet, at present, Soviet military theoreticians address coalitional warfare in the new context of theater conventional operations and strategic coordination. For example, in a 1987 authoritative volume of strategic writings, well-known military

scholars contend that an emphasis on strategic offensive operations in the theater of strategic military action (TVD) tasks Soviet military science to "work out ways of preparing for and successfully resolving strategic missions by the joint efforts of fraternal socialist countries in coalitional warfare." Since coalitional warfare has apparently taken on new significance in Soviet military thinking, an evaluation of previous Western research and a closer examination of available primary sources seem timely. This paper seeks to identify gaps in our knowledge about Soviet planning for coalitional war in Europe, and propose a policy-relevant research agenda for future study.

WESTERN SCHOLARSHIP ON SOVIET/EAST EUROPEAN MILITARY RELATIONS.

In a recent review of Western literature, Professor Robin Remington has noted a narrow focus of studies dealing with East European military relations. Indeed, in reviewing Western literature, one observes a striking discrepancy between technical accounts of the military balance, on the one hand, and very broad scholarly treatments of East European political dynamics, on the


other hand. Not surprisingly, debates of the 1960s-1970s between proponents of the "totalitarian" vs. "group" and "conflict" models of the Soviet political system colored interpretations of the Warsaw Treaty Organization as either a bastion of cohesion and military might, or as an alliance in disarray.

On balance, both schools of thought have made a contribution to our understanding of Soviet-East European military relations. Although early studies downgraded cleavages between alliance members and considerably overstated the degree of standardization of the Pact armies, they provided valuable insights into military integration on a broad range of defense matters, to include organization, equipment, civil defense, logistics, security and military intelligence. In the late 1960s, Paul Shirk, an unknown US Army analyst, was the first to draw on the World War II combat experience of East European national formations as a historical model for their modern battlefield employment. During the same period, in what was probably the first military assessment of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Lawrence Whetten observed an emerging asymmetry between military and political aspects of the alliance and introduced an important conceptual distinction between peacetime alliance politics and

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its wartime imperatives. Furthermore, he convincingly argued that, in a strictly military sense, the invasion served to improve WTO's logistical and intelligence capabilities for a possible conventional coallitional warfare in Europe. At the same time, the argument went, the invasion exacerbated political tensions in a peacetime alliance.

The first comprehensive work on East European coalition politics, written in 1971 by Robin Remington, retains its significance for revealing cleavages and tensions between institutions and political actors under the Pact's monolithic facade. However, the study ignored the military dimension of Soviet-East European relations, as well as downplaying the military integration between Warsaw Pact member states. In a similar vein, analyses of Soviet/East European negotiating strategies and behavior at the MBFR/CSCE talks emphasized either cohesion or conflict within the alliance. Characteristically, a U.S. military representative to the MBFR talks viewed the satellites as a "united front", whereas a civilian analyst observed numerous departures in their policies and behavior from the Soviet "grand strategy".

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The Soviet military build-up of the 1970s and the imposition of martial law in Poland served to shift the focus of Western scholarship from political to military aspects of the alliance. By the mid-1970s, defense analysts in and out of uniform started to focus their attention on evidence from Warsaw Pact exercises in order to formulate hypotheses about the alliance's military capabilities and cohesiveness. For instance, in analyzing combined arms and naval exercises against the backdrop of continuing political turmoil in Eastern Europe, Graham Turbiville and Donald Daniel demonstrated close battlefield coordination between air, ground and support elements of all Pact armies and navies. Social and political instability in Eastern Europe notwithstanding, the improved combat effectiveness of satellite armies led the analysts to conclude that East European forces, including the Hungarian contingents, were "earmarked" for wartime use against NATO in the Western Theater, as well as possibly against the dissenting socialist states on the Southern Flank (Yugoslavia and Romania).

Jeffrey Simon's book, based on this methodology and dealing with the Pact command and control procedures, can probably be regarded as one of the best examples of solid military

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In attempting to bring both streams of Western thought on the Warsaw Pact together, Simon treats military command and control procedures during exercises and political decision-making mechanisms during crises historically, over a 25-year period. The study shows empirically that while the Warsaw Treaty Organization consistently failed in its crisis resolution role, the Pact's command and control procedures and military capabilities improved dramatically. In other words, if evidence from exercises can be considered a reliable indicator, then the Pact has proven its utility and effectiveness as a training ground for coalitional warfare.

John Erickson's meticulous study of structure, hardware and operational missions of East European armies essentially supports these conclusions. During the troublesome period of the late 1960s - early 1970s, Erickson argues, East European armies had undergone significant modernization, which improved their capability to conduct joint conventional operations. Erickson's analysis stresses the growing combat role of carefully selected and specially trained elite NSWP units (Czech, East German and Polish airborne and amphibious assault forces) in Soviet-led offensive operations in the Northern flank.11


By the 1980s, the methodological sophistication of Western analyses had grown, in large measure, due to the belated utilization of the inside knowledge and experience of emigres from Eastern Europe. The pioneering work of comparing official East European sources against emigre testimony was undertaken by a group of RAND scholars who collaborated on a volume devoted to East European military establishments of the northern tier states. Although the authors were too concerned with the somewhat nebulous issues of political control and reliability at the expense of more substantative strategic and operational issues, they provided incisive comments on the differences in the NSWP strategic concepts within the general commitment to Soviet doctrine.

John Erickson has creatively used emigre testimonies in order to illuminate aspects of the East European weapons procurement system. He argues that in the process of equipment modernization East European armies have, indeed, sacrificed some of the standardized models in favor of indigenous prototypes, but, in so doing, they have contributed new technologies to Pact hardware modernization programs. In summary, both studies based on emigre evidence have captured the "dialectical process"


underlying Soviet/East European military relations, and often misinterpreted in the mainstream Western literature on the Warsaw Pact. Even though the East European military establishments occasionally depart from the Soviet model in the areas of military technology and military theory, they provide important inputs into joint Warsaw Pact planning for coalitional warfare.

At the outset of the 1980s, Western research of East European military relations was marked by a new interest in the history of coalitional warfare from a Soviet WWII perspective. Based on official Soviet historical writings and recently declassified historical documents, i.e., 1960s - 1970s lecture materials from Soviet military academies for senior officers, two US Army analysts, John Hines and Phillip Petersen, have plausibly reconstructed the wartime command structure of the NSWP forces, and patterns of their possible future operational employment.14 Furthermore, in what remains to date the most perceptive Western analysis of Soviet assessment of WWII experience in coalitional warfare, John Yurechko addresses the controversial issue of the wartime command and control of the NSWP forces.15 "Lessons learned" indicate that the satellite armies would apparently be integrated into a single multi-national force under a highly


centralized Soviet theater command, with coordination provided by joint staffs or special operational groups.

But probably the liveliest scholarly debates of the 1980s centered on the obscure issue of reliability, for which little, if any, empirical evidence is available. Depending on the subjective selection of variables and the relative weights arbitrarily assigned to them, Western scholars predictably reached widely divergent conclusions about WTO reliability in different conflict scenarios. For instance, Daniel Nelson credited the Bulgarian and East German forces as reliable in favorable circumstances;³⁶ Ivan Volgyes and Dale Herspring rated the reliability of all satellite armies as low in case of military failures, and that of Polish, East German and Bulgarian forces as "medium" to "medium-low" in the event of success.⁷

In attempting to provide some empirical basis for the problem of reliability, RAND scholars, Ross Johnson and Alex Alexiev, analyzed the experience and judgments of East European emigres.¹⁸ The study's conclusions, which tend to favor reliability in a blitzkrieg Warsaw Pact attack against NATO, are remarkable in demonstrating support for East European participation in the Warsaw Pact as a counter to Western


"military threat" among the apparently least reliable cross-section of the East European military, i.e., defectors and emigres. However, these conclusions should be regarded with at least some reservation: the authors' sample is fairly small, dominated by Polish officers and servicemen, and, therefore, hardly representative of the NSWP armies across the board.

A more judicious approach to the reliability issue has been to study Soviet response to the problem and assess its effectiveness. John Erickson, for instance, argues that Soviet practices of rigorous force selection, coupled with specialized training in regularly held maneuvers and exercises, serve to "contain" the reliability problem.19 Along the same lines, John Yurechko maintains that, inasmuch as the NSWP armies are to be tightly integrated into Soviet theater command, the effect of possible frictions and deviant behavior on combat performance would be marginal.20 In addition, he argues that Soviet operational plans, designed to use East European forces discriminately, depending on the country, strengths and weaknesses of the Armed Forces, mission-oriented training, and the war scenario, are likely to reduce the impact of unreliability in actual combat. Moreover, East European emigres contend that in the process of continuous training, the East


European military elites develop close personal ties and combat friendship with their Soviet counterparts. Finally, traditional methods of political indoctrination and control exercised by the security troops are believed to have retained their role in reducing the reliability problem.

To reiterate, the approach of assessing the reliability of East European forces in terms of Soviet responses and solutions is commendable, inasmuch as it reduces a scholar's reliance on questionable empirical data and unfounded conjecture.

EMIGRE SOURCES

Western scholarship on coalitional warfare owes much of its insight into the very nature of Soviet-East European military relations to emigres and defectors from Poland and Czechoslovakia. These emigres have not only provided valuable data for mass surveys and background materials for Western scholarly works, but also contributed analyses in their own right.

Western knowledge about the military decision-making process in the Eastern bloc relies, to a great extent, on the testimonies of two high-ranking Czech defectors, Karel Kaplan and General Jan Sejna. Kaplan, the Czech historian and a former member of the Central Committee of the Czech Communist Party, has recently revealed the structure and functions of organizations within the

party apparatus directly responsible for military and security affairs. General Jan Sejna, who served as the Secretary of the Czech Defense Council during 1956-1969, has finally disclosed the role of that organization in governing East European states and the Soviet Union. According to Sejna, the Czech Defense Council, modeled after its Soviet prototype, was officially formed in 1956, twenty years before it was discovered in the West. It represents the highest decision-making authority above the Politburo, with the broadest prerogatives in both military and civilian matters, including foreign policy and economy. Sejna dwells on the Defense Council's role in crisis management and its wartime function as the top national command authority; he then traces the evolution of its composition, and provides an overview of its major decisions during the 1960s. Furthermore, Sejna's account sheds light on the organization of the Czech Ministry of Defense, and on roles and responsibilities of departments within the General Staff. Finally, Sejna describes in detail the complex planning process on national security issues, with an emphasis on the Operation Plan, which delineates procedures for the wartime functioning of the external and home fronts. In outlining these military decision-making mechanisms,


Sejna, predictably, draws considerable attention to coordination in military matters between the Soviet and the Czechoslovak military establishments. Sejna's testimony portrays Czechoslovakia's military relationship with Moscow as that of virtually complete dominance and subordination. Among facets of military coordination within the alliance less understood in the West, he mentions joint Soviet-Czechoslovak political deception and psychological operations, targeting the West and prospective Soviet Third World clients. Sejna underscores coordination in the area of logistics, namely, in construction, maintenance and camouflage of the transportation networks and storage facilities designed for transit and supply of Soviet troops. In this respect, Sejna's testimony leads one to believe that as early as the late 1960s, Soviet strategists had appreciated the role of joint Pact efforts in the peacetime preparation of the continental TVDs for a future coalitional war. Interestingly, this central aspect of military integration between Warsaw Pact allies has not been yet explored in any depth in published Western scholarly literature.

Accounts by Polish emigres of the 1960s differ from these Czech testimonies in their analytical emphasis; they combine personal experiences and evidence, obtained in interviews with other emigres, with perceptive interpretations of official East European sources. Yet, in substance, if not in methodology, studies produced by former Polish officers complement the Czech materials.
A study of the Soviet Defense Council written by Michael Sadykiewicz, a former high-ranking staff and line officer, corroborates Sejna's testimony about its role as the supreme center of power in the Eastern Bloc. Expanding these analyses, Michael Checinski, a former Polish counterintelligence officer and a military expert on the war economy, describes the operation of KOK (Polish Defense Council) at lower levels as an all-encompassing administrative network of interrelated civilian and military organizations.

Checinski's major contribution to the field is an incisive, in-depth analysis of the Polish and Soviet military-industrial complexes. He takes a Western analyst through the labyrinth of organizations and administrative bodies making up the East European armament production system: the Military Industrial Commission, and military groups and departments in the State Planning Commission and within civilian ministries. Not unlike General Sejna, Checinski views Soviet-East European relations in the area of the defense industry as those of nearly total dependence and subordination. Regardless of the numerous departures from Soviet prototypes in equipment standardization, the coordination in military-technical policies between alliance members appears to be close. Checinski draws our attention to


26. Ibid.
another ignored aspect of military integration, namely, a jointly implemented Soviet/East European policy of borrowing the defense-related Western technologies. He further discloses that an intelligence coordination center, responsible for Western weapons technologies, has been incorporated into the WTO structure. 27 Checinski’s latest study, which explores the relationship between the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, indicates that by the 1980s the military cooperation between defense industries of the NSWP members and the Soviet Union significantly increased. Thus, during the period of a technological slow-down and capital stock depletion in the USSR, the Soviets have benefited technologically from the growing sophistication of East European electronics, computer and robotics industries, as well as gained economic advantages by reducing the costs of their own armament production. In other words, contrary to many Western assessments projecting for the next decade reduced Soviet reliance on Eastern Europe, an emigre scholar credibly asserts the growing role of NSWP member states in Pact production of military technology.

Likewise, the work by Michael Sadykiewicz on the wartime missions of the Polish internal front challenges accepted Western analyses. 28 While most Western observers emphasize the missions of Polish forces in a Soviet offensive in the Western TVD, a former senior Polish officer argues that the Polish Internal


28. Michael Sadykiewicz, Wartime Missions of the Polish Internal Front (Santa Monica: RAND, July 1986), N-2401-1-OSD
Front plays an increasingly significant role in Warsaw Pact operational planning. The author traces Polish interest in the concept of territorial defense to doctrinal debates of the 1960s, drawing from his personal experiences as a high-ranking staff officer. He then substantiates his hypothesis with a detailed examination of current Polish military literature, which points to an existing elaborate system of forces and commands designed to protect Polish territory and population in the event of a future war. Sadykiwicz's analysis of the Internal Front's wartime missions lends support to General Sejna's observation about Soviet/East European coordination in preparing the Western TVD for future offensive operations. Soviet/Polish cooperation is believed to be closest in the area of logistical support: the transit and supply of Soviet troops will largely depend on the effectiveness of the Polish transport and communication network.

It follows from this analysis that, since the missions of the Internal and External Fronts appear to be interrelated, the Internal Front, too, can be expected to contribute to successes of Soviet offensive operations.

The memoirs of Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, a former deputy head of the Operations Directorate of the Polish General Staff, offer unique personal insights into the organization of the Polish armed forces, the role of the Polish military in the Warsaw Pact, and the relationship between the two military
establishments during the recent 1980s crisis. Kuklinski discloses the provisions of the Statute of Joint Armed Forces, signed by Poland in the late 1970s, and stipulating the wartime subordination of the Polish armed forces to the Soviet High Commander of the Western TVD. Similarly to other emigres and defectors, he describes Soviet control over the Polish army as virtually complete. The Soviets reportedly determine the numerical strength, organizational structure, wartime missions, and training and mobilization procedures of the Polish divisions, and reportedly have a guaranteed right to inspect their training and readiness. Furthermore, during the MBFR talks, the Soviets had controlled the information submitted by the Polish delegation: the figures on Poland's military capabilities were prepared in Moscow, without consultation with the Poles. Kuklinski's descriptions of Polish/Soviet coordination of logistical support for a planned Soviet invasion during 1980-81 are consistent with other emigre accounts. The Polish commanders reportedly prepared transportation and communications networks for the invasion forces, while Soviet reconnaissance groups monitored their combat readiness.

On the other hand, according to Kuklinski, the Polish leadership had some say on matters of crisis management. Although at the outset the Soviets had apparently favored an invasion, they accepted Polish recommendations for the imposition of

martial law (albeit with some amendments and under Soviet supervision). However, Kuklinski's assertions that the instructions passed by the Soviets to the Polish Defense Minister may be negotiated or rejected, contradict his evidence on the extent of Soviet control. Similarly, Kuklinski's assertions about questionable reliability of the Polish forces is at variance with his testimony about their actual behavior during crises. In 1968, the Polish military successfully encircled the Czechoslovak garrisons, in 1970 they crushed the workers' uprising on the Baltic coast and, finally, in 1980, they endorsed a military solution to the Solidarity crisis. But perhaps, more telling to a Western reader is Kuklinski's personal view of Poland's role in the Warsaw Pact:

I have never questioned the advisability of Poland's remaining in the Warsaw Pact as based on the principle of an alliance between allies of equal rights, but I disapproved of everything that transformed that organization into a tool of Soviet expansionism, which deprived the member states of their sovereign right to command their own armed forces and their own defense.

This statement suggests that Kuklinski's disagreement with the Polish military leadership concerns Soviet treatment of allies rather than the nature of the Warsaw Pact alliance. His demand for Poland's greater autonomy on military matters and broader participation in the Warsaw Pact decisions is not necessarily incompatible with loyalty to the alliance, especially in the event of an external threat. Therefore, Kuklinski's testimony, demonstrating some degree of success in socializing the Polish military elite into the core values of the Warsaw Pact
alliance, is not inconsistent with the findings of the RAND emigre survey of East European reliability.

Kuklinski’s memoirs provide support to Christopher Jones’ hypothesis postulating that a nation’s resolve in organizing an armed resistance to the invading force effectively deters Soviet military interventions in Eastern Europe.30 Thus, during the 1956 Polish crisis, the party leader Edward Ochab reportedly successfully deployed internal security forces against both the Polish contingents, led by Soviet Marshall Rokossovskii, and the Soviet forces moving toward Warsaw. The threat of a protracted guerilla war with the Poles apparently forced the Soviets to accept removal of the pro-Soviet Natolin faction from the Polish Politburo, as well as acquiesce to more liberal policies of the partial decollectivization and greater intellectual freedom pursued by the Ochab/Gomulka leadership. In the light of this historical evidence, Kuklinski’s criticism of General Jaruzelski’s lack of resolve in dealing with the Soviets seems justified: the Polish leader had not only succumbed to the Soviet demand for the state of war but independently initiated and later executed his own plan for imposition of the martial law.

Finally, a methodological flaw of emigre research of the East European military system deserves mention. These analyses, focusing on institutional structures and organizational

principles, emphasize interactions between institutions to the detriment of processes, personalities and historical perspectives. As a result, much too often they tend to downplay the complexities and contradictions inherent in a dynamic Soviet/East European military relationship.

A METHODOLOGICAL SYNTHESIS AND RESEARCH AGENDA

Since the 1960s, Soviet and East European military analysts have been studying coalitional warfare in a systematic fashion. A long-term research plan for the 1980s, adopted by the Institute of Military History at the USSR Ministry of Defense, has defined as top research priority areas the problems of military integration between NSWP forces in peacetime, World War II experience in command and control and strategic coordination of coalitional armies, and joint planning of logistical support for major offensive operations in the TVDs.31 An impressive body of existing literature on coalitional warfare, indeed, reflects these research priorities. Soviet military authors of an authoritative reference work on the Warsaw Pact armies view the benefits of coordination between East European states and their armies in military-technical policy, military theory, and the

training of troops. The Polish and Czech sources on the war economy address directly the integration between branches of the East European defense industries in armament production. Soviet sources, more scarce and less direct, publish military-relevant information under the general heading of economic integration within CEMA. Also, memoirs describing the experiences of Soviet engineers and technicians employed in joint CEMA ventures, are available. Emigre sources in this area have been in large measure under-utilized. According to this author's estimates based on personal observations, a considerable proportion of emigres who have left Eastern Europe since the late 1960s had extensive technical/engineering experience in the defense sectors of the Czech, Polish and Romanian industries. These people may offer unique insights into collaboration between East European and Soviet enterprises engaged in the production of defense-related goods. Among these emigre groups, recent refugees from Romania can be of special value to a Western researcher interested in analyzing patterns of military


34. See, for instance, O. Bogomolov, Kompleksnye programmy razvitiia v stranakh SEVA (Moscow: Mysl, 1970), and B. Diakin, K. Papkov, SEV-- problemy integratsii (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1978).

35. Polpredy druzhby: rasskazy sovetskikh spetsialistov o rabote v sotsialisticheskikh i razvitykh stranakh (Donetsk, 1978).
collaboration of a dissenting Warsaw Pact member state. In other words, materials and sources are available to justify a comprehensive comparative study of the weapons procurement systems in the Eastern Bloc. Soviet and East European sources, both official and emigre, are available for the study of cooperation in defense-related research and development within CEMA and Warsaw Pact. But even though the Soviets have acknowledged the contribution of East European R&D to their space program, little is known in the West about the relationship between the military sections of the East European and the Soviet Academies of Science, and research institutes engaged in military-related R&D projects in space exploration, genetic engineering, laser technology, cybernetics, and artificial intelligence and robotics. A meticulous examination of vast amounts of highly specialized, technical materials in East European languages will be needed to illuminate the links between Soviet/East European projects, research teams and individuals.

Logistics, especially in its current context of economic preparation of the TVDs for strategic offensive operations in a future war, is another neglected area of Soviet/East European military collaboration. Materials for these studies can be

36. For general Soviet works discussing scientific cooperation see, for instance, A. Bykov, Vnychno-tekhnicheskie sviazi stran sotsializma (Moscow: Mysl, 1970) and P. Diakin, Sotrudnichestvo stran-chlenov SEV v oblasti nauki i tekhniki (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1978).

37. Bulgarian, Czech, Polish and Hungarian scientists reportedly took part in designing the telemetric system for a Soviet-launched space laboratory, Soviet News, 4 March 1979.
gleaned from two types of publications. First, civilian economic literature published in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe discusses efforts and achievements in consolidating elements of the infrastructure (transportation and communication networks, gas and oil pipelines) of individual countries into an integrated CEMA/Warsaw Pact system. Second, specialized East European sources, available in English translation, address the key elements of logistical support (storage facilities, transportation vehicles and containers) in a narrow technical context. Since in recent years the Soviets have been developing a system of echeloned reserves of critical supply and equipment items and restructuring the logistics support units throughout the Warsaw Pact, a concentration of Western research effort on the study of coordinated Pact preparations of the continental TVDs for offensive operations seems imperative.

38. See, for instance, B. Gorizontov, Sotsialisticheskia ekonomicheskia integratsia i transport (Moscow: Nauka, 1975), B. Ladygin et al., Problemy sotrudnichestva stran SSHA v razviti toplivno-syr'evoi bazy (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1968).

39. For examples of these sources see G. Tschupin, The Integration of Motor Vehicle Production in COMECON Countries (Charlottesville: Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, 1981) and Karel Voleski, Container Transport System in the CEMA Countries (Charlottesville: Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, 1981).


41. A perceptive analysis of East European energy supplies and the transportation system can be found in Victor Merkin, "Regional Aspects of the Energy Crisis: East European Case Study" (Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, 1985).
Soviet defense planners acknowledge the contribution of scholars from satellite armies to the development of Soviet military theory:

Close cooperation between Soviet military thought and that of fraternal countries allows us to resolve complex problems of military theory in a more coordinated manner, enrich military research and conduct training of troops in a more unified manner.42

A large volume of East European literature on strategic, operational and tactical issues testifies that this statement can hardly be dismissed as merely an exercise in Soviet propaganda. For instance, in the late 1960s Polish strategists had made their views known in the debate on nuclear escalation (they tended to view as inevitable the escalation of a conventional conflict into a nuclear war).43 Moreover, they have developed their own concept of territorial defense, which was likely to have contributed to Soviet thinking and planning of their own civil defense system. Recently, an authoritative Polish military writer has suggested that territorial defense as a concept has evolved into an independent defensive doctrine.44 According to Colonel Longin Mucha, the new doctrine, attributed to General W. Jaruzelski, emphasizes a shift in Poland’s posture towards

42. Volkogonov, 34.
43. Sadykiewicz, 7.
44. Longin Mucha, “Defensive Military Doctrine - The Essence of Changes,” Zolnierz Wolnosci, 13 July 1987. I am indebted to my colleague, Dr. Harold Orenstein of the Soviet Army Studies Office, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for drawing my attention to this article and providing the English translation.
internal front missions. In the light of this evidence, it can be suggested that East European strategic writings go further than merely repeating Soviet statements: they sometimes depart from Soviet formulations but often "take sides" in internal Soviet debates. In any event, Western analysts should pay closer attention to doctrinal debates in Eastern Europe; participants and institutional affiliations need to be identified, and connections traced between East European and Soviet statements of doctrine.

A fairly extensive body of Soviet/East European literature deals with operational aspects of coalitional warfare. Soviet military scholars have treated East European participation in World War II campaigns in book-length monographs, and in numerous essays in the Military-Historical Journal. Furthermore, several case studies, usually stressing the Soviet role in the formation of NSWP armies, are available. In addition, East European historians have compiled histories of their armed forces during World War II and the post-war period.

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45. See, for instance, A. Antosiak, Zarozhdenie narodnykh armii stran-uchastnikov varshavskogo dogovora (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975), I. Zakharov, Druzhba zakreplennaia v boiakh (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1970).


It is interesting to note that analyses by Czech and Polish historians published or mentioned in the *Military-Historical Journal* have subtle nationalistic overtones. Departing from an orthodox Soviet view, Zdenek Prohazka, a Czech military historian, has stressed the contribution of the Czech forces to the 1943 Soviet offensive operations which turned the course of the war in Soviet favor.48 In February 1943, the First Czechoslovak Independent Battalion, formed a year earlier in the Soviet Union under the command of Ludvik Svoboda, was attached to the Soviet Tank Army fighting on the Kharkov axis in the Ukraine. In the fall of 1943, it took part in the battle for Kiev alongside the 38th Army of the First Ukrainian Front. Although, according to John Erickson, the Czechs fought in an exemplary manner, their overall contribution to Soviet victories seems to have been modest.49

The Czech historian has also exaggerated the scale and success of the resistance movement and particularly the role of the Slovak uprising in the liberation of Czechoslovakia from the Germans. According to a more reliable Western account, the Slovak insurrection failed due to the poor coordination of

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guerilla activities between the exile government in London and the Soviet command, as well as due to conflicts between the rebel factions on the crucial issue of the link-up with Soviet forces.\(^5\) It is interesting to note in this context that the Czech historian makes a cryptic allusion to Czechoslovakia's loss of independence following the Soviet occupation in the spring of 1945, stating that a complete liberation of national territory can only be achieved by indigenous forces.

In another historical debate, a Soviet military historian has challenged a Polish interpretation of the battlefield performance of the first Polish infantry division in the 1943 Smolensk offensive.\(^5\) Colonel Iu. Sukhinin has claimed that, contrary to Polish allegations, the Polish unit had received adequate Soviet support and was not made to bear the brunt of the German counterattack. Furthermore, contradicting an earlier positive Soviet assessment of the Polish role in the Smolensk offensive,\(^5\) the author has rated the performance of Polish forces as marginal. Soviet military historians discuss different arrangements for command and control of coalitional forces as practiced during the last phase of World War II. For instance, General A. Gribkov, the Chief of Staff of the Allied

\(^5\) Ibid., 291-307.


\(^5\) For an alternative positive assessment see A. Antosiak, Zarozhdene narodnykh armii stran-uchastnits varshavskogo dogovora (Moscow: Voenizdazt, 1975), 110-112.
Warsaw Pact Command, emphasize operational groups, representing allied forces at the operational (front/army) level, as a model for controlling the coalition in a theater-level offensive operation. General S. Radzievskii, making no mention of this control procedure, stresses the role of regular liaison missions and maintains that "special coalition command and control bodies were not formed either at the strategic or at the operational levels." These discussions suggest the complexity and flexibility of Soviet designs for command and control of the East European forces, depending on the war scenario, and the nature of the theater and strategic mission as well as on the size and operational employment of the committed force. One can only deplore that these historical discussions have been largely neglected by Western scholars, so that a Western history of Soviet World War II experience in coalitional warfare remains yet to be written.

In the early 1980s, Western interest in the East European contribution to Soviet operational art was probably triggered by Christopher Donnelly’s references to Polish and East German sources in uncovering the formation of operational maneuver groups (OMGs) in the Soviet order of battle. As a result,


defense analysts in the United States have been lately
rediscovering the utility of East European sources in signaling
changes in Soviet operational and tactical thinking. From
another perspective, however, East European writings can be
viewed as a valuable contribution to Soviet theory of tactics and
operational art. As a sample of current Polish military writings
shows, Polish military scholars have been developing and
elaborating theoretical concepts of surprise in battle,
commitment of the second echelons, logistical support of the OMG
groups, the use of helicopters, organization of air defense and
other issues crucial to Soviet operational art. In the area of
tactics, Polish military analysts delve, for instance, into
tactical-level combat on mountainous and forested terrain and in
urban locations, the use of computers in command and control of
units, the employment of forward detachments, and the impact of
emerging new technologies (precision weapons, electronic means,
etc.) on the tactics of the ground forces. In addition, the
Soviets have been apparently learning about the tactics of
mountain warfare from the Bulgarians. During the initial phase
of Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan, Bulgarian
tacticians often discussed in Soviet military journals the
problems of conducting and logistically supporting an offensive

55. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Dr. Orenstein
in providing me with selections of current Polish military
materials in the English translation.

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In conclusion, these examples suggest that Western analysts studying coalitional warfare need to pay more attention to the neglected problem of the contribution of East European research to Soviet tactics and operational art.

Lastly, in the area of military manpower, Soviet commanders have been following with interest the development of new training methodologies in the satellite armies. East European experience in resolving disciplinary problems in units, introducing conscripts to computer technology, or in managing stress in battle is potentially useful to Soviet manpower experts and commanders, presently required by Gorbachev to improve the quality of the military cadres. In this connection, the Soviets may benefit from the extensive research in military sociology conducted in the Polish, Czechoslovak and Hungarian armies. East European sociological literature discusses sociological profiles of conscripts and officers, selection of the military profession as well as the problems of drug and alcohol abuse, discipline and morale on the basis of advanced methods of


57. An interview with the Chief of the Main Training Directorate, General E. Molchik, focuses on these issues. Voennyi vestnik 4 (April 1986): 78-86.

empirical research. Although sociological data is more readily available from East European sources and tools of sociological analysis in these countries are far more advanced than those in the Soviet Union, Western scholars have neglected the study of the East European soldier. At this moment, it can only be hoped that studies comparable in scope to Herbert Goldhamer's *The Soviet Soldier* or Ellen Jone's *The Red Army and Society* will be produced in the future. As can be seen from this analysis, the quantitative growth of Western research of East European military relations notwithstanding, the quality of these studies is uneven, the focus fairly narrow, and a substantial volume of primary sources underutilized. Some flaws and failures in the study of coalitional warfare may be identified. First, Western scholars, while ignoring substantive issues for which there is an abundance of untapped evidence, have paid too much attention to questions (e.g., political reliability) that cannot be answered through an empirical investigation. Second, little effort has been devoted to the systematic study of published East European military materials and the data on military experiences of emigres from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania. Third, academic scholars have tended to study the Warsaw Pact as a political institution rather than examine the complexities of Soviet/East European relations broadly conceived. Finally, in the United States, the study of operations and tactics of coalitional warfare, largely confined to government-sponsored
research networks in the defense community, has remained outside the purview of academic scholarship.

To remedy the situation, independent researchers need to draw their attention to military aspects of Soviet-East European relations, namely, defense economy, military history, strategic thinking, operations and tactics, i.e., the areas carefully studied by military scholars in the Eastern bloc. As an initial step, data scattered throughout various East European sources and information from East European emigres need to be collected. Then, well-documented case studies and comparisons can be built upon the assembled data base. If we are willing to devote our efforts to this time-consuming collection and sorting of information, we can hope to start closing the gaps in our knowledge about the East European dimension in Soviet planning for coalitional warfare.
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