Literature Review on Anti-Terrorism and Selected Bibliography on Terrorism

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From: Commanding Officer, Navy Personnel Research and Development Center

Subj: LITERATURE REVIEW ON ANTI-TERRORISM AND SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON TERRORISM

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1. This literature review and selected bibliography were developed in support of a previous strategic research thrust of the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center in the area of anti-terrorism. The purpose of the literature review was to assist in the conceptual delineation of the anti-terrorism research domain. The bibliography updates two other available bibliographies produced in 1984 and not revised since. The Pentagon Library (ANR-PL, Washington, DC) had published Terrorism: A Selective Bibliography, and the Air University Library, Maxwell AFB, Alabama had published Terrorism--Selected References--Special Bibliography No. 240 (Revised) Supplement, 1 April 1984.

Both the literature review and the bibliographic update were undertaken in support of a personnel-oriented anti-terrorism program. Due to a reorientation of research and development efforts, the specific endeavors within that program are now subsumed under several personnel research areas. Suggestions for research germane to anti-terrorism are contained in the appendix.

2. This research was conducted under contract and is being published as a contractor's report. It is expected to benefit Navy management the research community.

JOHN J PASS
By direction

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Literature Review on Anti-Terrorism and Selected Bibliography on Terrorism

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This report reviews the anti-terrorism literature in order to assist in the conceptual delineation of the anti-terrorism research domain. The purpose of the bibliography was to update other available bibliographies. Suggestions for research germane to anti-terrorism are presented.
SUMMARY

Problem

Research on terrorism, anti-terrorism, and counter-terrorism is confounded by the rapid obsolescence of books and scholarly articles, and by the need to restrict access to sources of information that must remain classified. However, it is important to clarify the domain of anti-terrorism and discover how active duty military dependents, and Americans abroad, can be educated to protect themselves.

Purpose

This study was designed to provide a description of what today's terrorist may be likely to do, what the targets are likely to be, and what passive means of anti-terrorism are available to potential victims.

Approach

The literature related to anti-terrorism was searched and commentaries were provided. A supplementary bibliography was included to provide updated references related to anti-terrorism.

Results and Conclusions

Unlike past decades, terrorism today is likely to be state-sponsored and characterized by a cycle perpetuated by the media response to violence. Attitudes toward this cycle are changing, and Americans today approve of measures including allied retaliatory action if the policy generally respects life and international law. Military dependents need training in coping with terrorism and the threat of terrorism, but this area has received little research.
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I. LITERATURE REVIEW ON ANTI-TERRORISM AND SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON TERRORISM

It is useful at the outset to have a working definition of the central concept, terrorism, before discussing anti-terrorism literature and analyses of anti-terrorist actions. While many might apply the term "terrorism" to a core group of incidents, they might differ quite markedly in how they categorize events oriented further toward the ends of the spectrum of politically violent actions.

This review accepts the definition of terrorism provided in "Statistical Approaches to the Study of Terrorism" [Mickolus, 1977], that goes beyond incidents of clear-cut personal and/or property damage. This definition sees terrorism as:

...the use or threat of use of anxiety-inducing extra normal violence for political purposes...intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than that of the immediate victim. (pp. 209-269).

While this definition implies physical damages, such physical damage need not occur. An unsuccessful act of politically motivated violence or aggression, which leaves people mentally or emotionally shaken but essentially unharmed, is nonetheless a terrorist act.

This review will adhere to the conventionally accepted distinction between anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism. As depicted in U.S. Department of Defense Directive 2000.12 [1986], this distinction hinges upon differences between passive/reactive measures and active/retaliatory measures. Anti-terrorism refers to defensive measures taken to reduce individual and property vulnerability to terrorism. Counter-terrorism refers to offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Fuchs (1986) suggests this approach:

Anti-terrorism is defensive and is used to reduce the vulnerability of . . . personnel, their families, facilities and equipment to terrorist acts...counter-terrorism involves offensive measures such as intelligence gathering and threat analysis--actions taken to respond to or prevent the terrorist act. While only specialists should engage in counter-terrorism, everyone should be involved in anti-terrorism [p. 30].

Although often used, these terms are not well understood--headlines featuring "anti-terrorism" are frequently followed by discussions of such "counter-terrorist" topics as the physical security of nuclear weapons, legislation, the responsibilities of field commanders, and hostage rescues [Halloran, 1986].
II. THE CONTEXT FOR RESEARCH

Regrettably, broad-based and comprehensive research on terrorism is quickly outdated because of the frequency with which new events must be listed, catalogued, and analyzed. For example, in the first months of this contract, there were seven major terrorist incidents, five of which affected U.S. properties and citizens (the Basque Separatist group, ETA, July 14 in Spain; the July 21 bombing outside the Office of Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris; the attack on the American University Hospital bus in Beirut, July 19; the hijacking of a PanAm flight in Karachi the first week in September, the bombing of a synagogue in Istanbul, Turkey, and bombings in Paris and West Germany). Since about the mid-1970s, the worldwide number of reported politically-motivated violent events has continued to climb each year.

For the researcher, this condition mandates that the bulk of relevant information be obtained from daily news items and the reports of hastily-convened conferences and task force groups. Even the most timely of journal articles suffers the inevitable publishing lag and is likely to be inaccurate in up-to-the-minute specifics, if not in analytical approach or conclusions. Moreover, classified information, which is the most likely to be timely and accurate, only epitomizes the double-edged sword that terrorism presents in a democratic society: The declassification and release of intelligence materials could involve major compromise, by revealing to terrorists groups our sources and the state of our knowledge, preparedness, and willingness to take action. In return for taking such risks, we could anticipate only the uncertain and long-range benefits that might result from a greater number of investigators being able to contribute to the body of knowledge.

The Rand Corporation’s Brian Jenkins, perhaps the leading authority on the subject, notes that the majority of his data comes from open sources; in only a few cases has he made use of classified material [1985]. This supports Charles Russell’s assertion that virtually all of his information on terrorism has come from the public domain and the press [Dobson & Paine, 1982].

III. THE ANALYSIS

Terrorism, and the responses to it, can be divided into two separate (though not necessarily mutually exclusive) categories [Snitch, 1982]. Indirect terrorist actions are instances of violence, apparently random, aimed at the general population or at some non-differentiable population segment. Typically, such actions propose to create and foster feelings of anxiety and vulnerability throughout society. The terrorist (or, more likely, the terrorist group) attempts to make the target government appear unable to respond credibly to threats to the public security.

Because pure terrorism requires a sustained and prolonged effort by an extremist group, it is both very risky and costly. Relying upon a continuous escalation in the level of violence, this approach faces the ever-present potential—when events reach an unacceptable level, however determined—that violence will drive people toward, and not against, the target government.

Direct terrorism focuses violent action, or the threat of action, on a political institution or individual. The common citizen is spared the immediate effects of this violence, but the objective is similar—to portray the target government as being unable to protect the nation’s most important individuals.

While some may deny that anything so cataclysmic is taking place for the United States, our very existence has changed dramatically. Public buildings have become almost inaccessible fortresses, marring both their form and their

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democratic function, while our political leaders are increasingly protected and isolated [Livingstone, 1986]. At times the cure—protection from terrorists—can endanger the freedoms and political liberties that the terrorists seek to destroy [Weinberger, 1986]. Simple travel arrangements often require that more time be consumed by increased security measures at the airport than in actual travel. And at major foreign transportation centers where terrorist acts have occurred, it has been suggested that U.S. citizens should exercise great caution in revealing their nationality.

IV. THE CYCLE OF TERRORISM

A major difficulty in responding to acts of terrorism is the potential that a vicious cycle may emerge, a spiral of conflict escalation. As suggested above, the major goals of terrorism are to destabilize the target government by using violent acts to undermine its morale, effectiveness, and prestige. This presents a dilemma for the U.S. and has the effect of making our political alliances ever more fragile. On the one hand, the United States wants to support friendly governments as they implement measures to control or avert terrorism; yet, too often, the human rights implications of harsh control measures have created controversy and the potential for backlash [Livingstone, 1986].

There is reason to suppose that the growing technological sophistication of mass media communications has played a role in increasing terrorist activity in recent years. For some terrorist groups, a fundamental goal is to gain public recognition while “educating” society about the group's philosophy and objectives. Under these conditions the media become the terrorist's essential ally. The nature of the terrorist act itself is rendered fairly unimportant; rather, it is the publicity the act can generate that becomes the overriding consideration [Laqueur, 1976]. Advanced communications technology, and television in particular, have thus become primary tools of political violence. In the 1980s, terrorism has been receiving considerable amounts of free air time, and terrorists appear to possess a highly developed sense of which acts are likely to elicit maximum exposure [Livingstone, 1986]. Terrorists want attention above all else [Jenkins & Johnson, 1975].

The following incidents exhibit that the media may be becoming part of the problem, and that terrorists have begun to manipulate the media: (1) the exhaustive coverage of the TWA hijacking in June 1985, highlighted by the ABC exclusive which featured the pilot with a terrorist's gun aimed at his head, (2) the hostage crisis in Iran in 1979-1981, (3) the continuing Lebanese hostage situation, (4) NBC's secret-yet-public interview with Abu Nidal in June 1986, and (5) the publicity in late July, 1986 surrounding Father Jenko's release after 19 months as a hostage in Lebanon. Constant media attention focused on Jenko's visits to the Pope, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and President Reagan carrying a "secret message from his captors" (later denied by both Jenko and his former captors). Such incidents have led political commentators to suggest that the line between news-gathering and news-making is effectively disappearing [Daley, 1986; Zuckerman, 1986; O'Shea & Atlas, 1986]. One senator has recently suggested that reporters should treat terrorists with the same kind of contempt they now show politicians [Kowet, 1986].

A related goal of terrorists is to obtain some sign of official recognition from the target government. A government counter-terrorist campaign may even be viewed by terrorists as a major victory because, perversely, it appears to grant to the group a type of legitimacy, however temporary. Any substantial reaction can convey to the perpetrators that they have been recognized by the government as a credible political force.

If a government overreacts, it may lead to even greater violence and sympathy for the terrorists' goals. Martial law, curfews and massive arrests
are likely to stir popular discontent—in a sense, terrorists become a wedge driven between citizens and their government. If the government does (or appears to do) little or nothing, it might appear to be politically weak (thereby achieving one terrorist objective). Such a perception has the potential to inspire the terrorists to even more drastic measures to get the attention they seek.

A third goal of terrorist groups is to broaden their power base by recruiting civilians for their cause. There can be little hope of precipitating political change without at least the tacit support of a number of civilians who can supply safe havens, money, and weapons.

The potential cycle of terrorism thus runs as follows: a violent act receives media coverage, with its implicit recognition of the terrorist philosophy. Government response grants the group some temporary legitimacy, and the nature of that response can affect the course of subsequent events. Pressured democratic governments must tread a thin line between taking extreme counter-measures and downplaying the situation or appearing to ignore what has happened.

V. WHO ARE THE TERRORISTS?

Researchers make a distinction between today's largely state-supported terrorism and the kinds of terrorist activities that predominated in the past [Pipes, 1985]. As far back as 1905, Lenin espoused terrorism, along with diplomacy and compromise, as part of the weaponry of class struggle. Today, Soviet support for the exportation of terrorism must be recognized and understood in the Western world if it is to be dealt with adequately [Ledeen, 1985]. The Soviets find today's pattern of state-supported terrorism and terrorist alliances to be a cost-effective and low-risk means of disrupting the West [Livingstone & Arnold, 1986; Henze, 1985]. The literature further highlights differences among three major types of terrorist groups: Europeans, Latin Americans, and Middle Easterners [Derrer, 1986]. An understanding of the historical and ideological differences among various groups is essential to serious attempts to respond to and perhaps anticipate their actions. The underlying motivations and goals of communism and Iranian Islamic fundamentalism, for example, might suggest quite different counter-measures to acts of political violence undertaken in their respective names [Ikle, 1986].

Since about 1970, individual, autonomous and homegrown terrorist group activity has been progressively replaced by a form of terrorism that is far more difficult to deal with—state-sponsored terrorism, defined as:

...the deliberate employment of violence or the threat of use of violence by sovereign states (or sub-national groups encouraged or assisted by sovereign states) to attain strategic and political objectives by acts in violation of law intended to create overwhelming fear in a target population larger than the civilian or military victims attacked or threatened [GPO, 1985--99th Congress first Session, cited in Livingstone & Arnold, 1986].

This form of terrorism is characterized by a rapid shift to urban settings and ideological motives, as terrorism becomes a tool of foreign policy [Casey, 1985]. The U.S. now needs to develop a consensual approach to such terrorism in order to respond appropriately.

There are indeed alarming trends. The terrorist groups have splintered and multiplied, with an increasing orientation toward more fanatical and
suicidal actions. Groups are more sophisticated than in the past, and through their alliances are increasingly better financed and have better access to arms. They have shifted to the "soft targets," travelers and innocent bystanders [Weinberger, 1986].

A major force behind anti-Western sentiments is the agenda of the radical Islamic fringe [Pipes, 1985; Wright, 1985]. Splinter groups rapidly coalesce to take action because of perceptions that not enough violence (or the "wrong kind" of violence) has been committed by the others. Such groups are generally committed to violent acts as the only means of addressing or airing their problems. For this reason, some commentators stress retaliatory force as the only effective measure for countering terrorism [Pipes, 1985; Rivers, 1986]. In addition, the Soviet satellites and the radical Arabs use terrorism as a substitute for war, while acting in the name of some higher ideology [Netanyahu, 1986]. While the economic, political and diplomatic sanctions available to the U.S. have by no means been exhausted, terrorism is now aimed at the heart of civilization, and much remains to be done in countering these recent arrivals on the international stage [Casey, 1985].

This goal of weakening and destabilizing the more open, politically pluralist societies is further enhanced by coalitions of terrorist groups, both within Europe and among Arabs, who share communications, training and other resources. These groups are able to lay aside their own ideologies for the temporary creation of a united front to attack Western interests on a much broader and more sophisticated basis [Newhouse, 1985]. Although the battleground has been western Europe, the enemy of the terrorists is America and the values it represents: personal, religious and political freedom, as well as political stability and support for constructive change [Beck, Stanger, Behr, Whitmore & Underwood, 1986; Ikle, 1985]. Unfortunately, European attempts at accommodating and conciliating these violent activists merely perpetuate the problem. Also, inasmuch as five countries (U.S., France, Israel, U.K., Turkey) are the targets of half of the attacks, the problem tends to be viewed somewhat differently by other countries under less immediate threat. Perhaps because of the relatively sudden proliferation of events, the U.S. has had very little communication with and cooperation from its allies. Also, jurisdictional conflicts often prevail and uncoordinated lines of authority may further complicate attempts to present a united front.

In recent years more and more terrorist incidents can be attributed to violent political organizations. During the 1950s and 1960s, more than half the terrorist actions were carried out by unspecified individuals, while extremist groups were a relatively minor factor in overall patterns of political violence. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, the lone assassin has been replaced by the quasi-organized, methodical group of political terrorists who attack only when there is considerable opportunity for success.

While the number of incidents has increased, so has confusion in the reporting process [Kindel, 1986]. Criminal actions and/or guerilla warfare are often categorized as terrorism in today's environment of heightened sensitivity to such acts. Incident reporting is now a regular focus of print and electronic news, but different reports of the same incident often reflect different facts, based upon both the timing of the actual report and the particular emphasis it receives. Because of the rapid growth in terrorist incidents, journals and books are usually outdated by publication time. While a historical perspective can be gained from the chronologies of specific target groups and areas, such as those published by the State Department, these, too, are ephemeral in an era of rapid changes in coalitions and tactics.

Corresponding to the shift in actors, there has also been a marked shift in targets, away from major domestic political actors and toward other individuals, especially multinational corporate executives and members of the diplomatic corps. Of the 824 incidents in 1985, 184 were directed against
U.S. interests (up 40% over 1984) [Koch, 1985]. Latin American countries have a long history of terrorist actions aimed at U.S. corporate executives.

Companies in international markets are accustomed to providing training and counseling to foreign-based employees, corporate executives and families who are subjected to the unique constraints imposed by having to live and conduct business in a high-risk environment [U.S. Department of State, 1986; Weintrab, 1986]. Pro-Marxist terrorists have frequently attacked American corporate representatives on the pretext that such individuals are extensions and tools of a capitalist system, which the terrorists view as the source of all grievances. The targeting of corporate executives is no longer primarily a Latin American phenomenon, however. In the recent past more such incidents have occurred at various sites in Spain, Greece, and Belgium [U. S. Department of State, 1986].

Unfortunately, in some cases these actions are locally well-received, or at least tolerated, by the general population. In addition, terrorist groups are adept at using the legal system to claim equal standing with sovereign governments [Weinberger, 1986]. This helps to give would-be terrorists a relatively risk-free environment in which to operate. The kidnapping of a prominent person (such as Army General James Dozier by the Italian Red Brigades in 1981), or a siege or assassination is a way to elicit governmental response. When such acts are not immediately and wholeheartedly condemned in the host country, and when that country is an ally or nominally friendly to U.S. interests, domestic political leaders are put in the position of responding to the terrorists while simultaneously seeking to placate or maintain harmonious relations with the foreign government.

VI. CHANGING ATTITUDES

RESPONSES TO COUNTER/ANTI-TERRORIST ACTIONS

Historically, counter-terrorist forces have operated outside the normal chain of command of regular police or military forces. Once unwelcome, such groups encountered many failures in the past, but public opinion has now swung toward greater support for these groups. If anything, the U.S. government and its citizens are demanding that offensive actions be taken, to make the statement that we will no longer sit back and appear to tolerate terrorist actions [Motley, 1985]. To emphasize this point, 106 Americans in five cities were interviewed as a part of the Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism. The consensus was that Americans would welcome quick and offensive actions against terrorists, and even accept casualties, if there were a clear-cut policy that reflects respect for life and international law [Horrock & O'Shea, 1986]. However, we must ensure that our responses are both effective and proportionate to the acts triggering them.

Changes of attitude cannot alter the fact that there are no easy solutions to what is now considered a real threat. Planning (taking into account containment, surveillance, reconnaissance, rehearsal, and assault) is essential for determining what means are legitimate in fighting terrorism. The more thought given to planning and executing counter-terrorism actions, the fewer mistakes are likely to be made [Netanyahu, 1986].

This shift in attitudes was abundantly clear in the barrage of articles, editorials and commentary following the Libyan raid in April, 1986 [Morrison, 1986]. Many of these called for countermeasures that would have appeared extreme in times past. Yet a recent poll indicated that students at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government would favor the establishment of a clandestine anti-terrorist network between the U.S. and its allies [McFarlane, 1985].
There are differences of opinion, though, as to just how much force to use. Some believe that terrorists should be dealt with very harshly [Podhoretz, Maynes & Valenta, 1986; Rivers, 1986], while others feel that using diplomatic and economic channels will be more effective [Oseth, 1985; Koch, 1985]. The hard-liners believe that the terrorists have effectively declared war, and they should be treated accordingly and killed. In this view, prisons merely provide recruiting grounds for terrorists. What is needed is coordinated efforts among special forces, followed by surgical strikes [Rivers, 1986].

The other position holds that measures to counter politically motivated terrorism need not employ force, although force should be viewed as an option. International cooperative measures through international law, individual actions by nations, and damage control following diplomatic incidents are all positive avenues of action. In addition, prevention of terrorist damage is possible through better communications, shared intelligence, and defensive education and training. Such measures have been limited in the past due to the volume and quality of intelligence, legal constraints upon the intelligence community, and unprepared counter-terrorist forces [Oseth, 1985].

A paradox emerges, however—as governments get tougher and more sophisticated in combating terrorism, incidents grow in volume. As we communicate more effectively in dealing with terrorism, terrorist groups seek new constituencies [Jenkins, 1985], while continuing to pursue conventional tactics (bombings, armed assaults, hijackings, kidnappings, barricades, and hostage-taking). Therefore, in order to develop effective counter-terrorism policies and plans, consideration must be given to the dynamic interrelationship of practical, political, ideological and psychological factors [Derrer, 1985]. Our ability to cope will be enhanced by incorporating such factors into any concrete action plan for the future [Motley, 1986].

COPING STRATEGIES FOR FAMILIES

Unlike a traditional war where the battleground is usually well-defined, the battleground for terrorism is as ambiguous as the identity of the next victim. To know the targets—say, American military families and business people—is not necessarily to know the victims, who are frequently innocent civilians, and the where, when, and how are always unknowns. Therefore, we must be prepared to deal with psychological as well as security issues in addressing terrorism.

The heart of terrorism is the unknown, unpredictable, and ongoing threat to personal safety. Terrorism has components that create fears and anxieties and produce psychological reactions in people which cannot be ignored. Most policy makers are not attuned to the psychological background of terrorists. Yet in order for anti-terrorist efforts to be effective, policy makers must know what terrorists are thinking and why they are doing what they are doing [Hubbard, 1986].

Military family members have been the most sensitive to the impacts of terrorism and have expressed these fears far ahead of the development of policy to cope with these impacts. It is these families living on bases built over 30 years ago who recognize that the fences built then were made to keep out thieves or wanderers, not terrorists [Halloran, 1986; Anderson & Van Alta, 1985]. Entire families in the military, the diplomatic corps, and international business must cope with these threats over extended periods of time, resulting at times in an atmosphere of near panic [Hunter, 1986].

Family members experiencing this pressure have long been aware of its psychological impact and the need for quality coping strategies and programs. They are also sensitive to the fact that existing programs lack direction [Madison, 1985]. The ability to provide a secure environment to personnel and their families is a key factor in effective anti-terrorism. We know that
terrorism is not new; what is new is the technology of terror, the ability to create pure violence and cause pure terror. Past methods of coping with terrorism have led terrorists to devise new approaches with this changing technology [Derrer, 1986]; therefore, counter- and anti-terrorist activities must consider these new techniques and their psychological effects.

Preparation for dealing with terrorism through counter-terrorist activities, such as simulated attacks on a military post, can at times create almost as much fear as the actual terrorist acts themselves—particularly among family members. Exercises in coping are the crux of anti-terrorism research, yet they are the least understood and the least well covered by written information. Research in this area is one of the newest aspects of dealing with terrorism, and it involves all people affected by terrorism—not just the professionals who participate in offensive counter-terrorism, diplomacy, communications, and intelligence gathering and sharing [Koch, 1985; Derrer, 1985].

VII. RESEARCH ON COPING WITH TERRORISM

The situation should not be viewed as hopeless. Anti-terrorism is far behind because it has been treated as a less important adjunct to counter-terrorism, and certainly it has received a smaller share of the resources being devoted to combating terrorism. There has been no champion, primary spokesperson or even control organization to look to for leadership. For reasons described above, much of anti-terrorism is in an embryonic state.

Understanding the evolution of terrorism, the terrorists, and their goals and methods is the first step towards the proactive—the evolution of realistic, practicable anti-terrorism programs. A Presidential Task Force on Combating Terrorism was established in the summer of 1985 in the wake of the hijacking of TWA Flight #847 in which Navy seaman Stithem was brutally beaten and murdered. The findings of this commission resulted in approximately two dozen recommendations, including the establishment of coordinated counter-terrorist efforts, a consolidated intelligence center on terrorism, international multilateral and bilateral agreements, and anti-terrorism legislation. The Omnibus Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986 set standards for determining the use of the military in retaliation for acts of terrorism [House Foreign Affairs Committee, 1985].

Efforts involving counter-/anti-terrorism are on the rise. Although actions are not coordinated, the topic is being addressed within most government agencies. The Foreign Service Institute of the State Department, The Air Force Inspector General, and The Navy are among the organizations developing anti-terrorist programs. The Defense Department’s major anti-terrorism objective is to reduce the vulnerability of personnel and facilities to attack [Ikle, 1985].

Training in combating terrorism has been integrated into the various service schools and training programs. The immediacy of the concern about terrorism is evidenced by the development of mobile training teams throughout the world, as well as in established programs. Basic training for security police and advanced training programs for those special forces are being integrated into extensive anti-terrorist/counter-terrorist programs [Halloran, 1986]. One of the most comprehensive programs has been developed for American attaches going overseas. Anti- and counter-terrorist courses with hands-on activities are now a substantial part of the program.

Helpful hints for daily life patterns and other anti-terrorism educational materials are just now beginning to surface in public journals and newspapers that reach military personnel and their families [Campbell & Farrell, 1985; Bishop, 1986]. Most of these articles provide “how to’s” on topics such as individual security, workplace security, avoiding patterned behavior, vehicle and transportation security, home security, security
awareness, and plain common sense. Other articles tend to be more specifically geared to the self-protection of the military member, with explicit lists of appropriate and inappropriate behaviors [Derrer, 1985]. Still other publications are prepared for official use and provide more formal protocols for anti-terrorism activities [U.S. Air Force OSI, 1982]. The increasing concern over the impact of terrorism on the family is also demonstrated in Section 1452 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986.

Another resource for developing anti-terrorism information is through video tapes. The State Department's Chief of Diplomatic Security, Robert Lamb, is particularly successful in this area, as are State's subordinate agencies such as AID. Lamb has assigned a former Family Liaison Office director to develop relevant films such as Living with the Threat of Terrorism and Managing Children in Crisis. Whereas there are generally far fewer resources for State Department employees than for the military, State Department employees may have greater access to this information than military members who are moving among bases and posts worldwide. Also, because of their smaller numbers, many State Department employees can go through training in Washington, DC at nominal budgetary cost, prior to being assigned overseas.

Another target, particularly for terrorists in Latin America, is the corporate world, accounting for 30 percent of all terrorist attacks against U.S. interests. This has prompted corporations to establish their own anti-terrorist programs. The indirect costs to the company for protection, in terms of additional insurance (as in ransom insurance for kidnapping) run quite high. A joint effort of the State Department and the Overseas Security Advisory Committee provides for a link between the public and private sectors in dealing with terrorism [Schultz, 1984]. In establishing their own programs, employees of individual industries and firms have had to learn to keep low profiles, submerge their corporate identity, and adopt operational practices that do not rely on shipping high-tech equipment [U.S. Department of State, 1986]. Firms doing international business now routinely provide manuals and articles recommending life-style changes to prepare their employees, as potential victims, to cope with the terrorist threat.

While the corporate world and the State Department have developed unique programs in anti-terrorism, little has been done elsewhere, so anti-terrorism literature is essentially limited to these two sources. Especially lacking is research on terrorism's psychological implications on the military. Therefore, the topic of anti-terrorism bears further research and analysis.
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APPENDIX

SUGGESTED PERSONNEL RESEARCH ON ANTI-TERRORISM
SUGGESTED PERSONNEL RESEARCH IN ANTI-TERRORISM

1. Assessment of the impact of terrorist acts on military recruiting.

2. Assessment of the impact of terrorist acts on civilian government employee recruiting for overseas assignments.

3. Assessment of constraints on personnel assignment caused by potential or actual terrorist acts.

4. Assessment of the impact of terrorist acts, or their threat, on morale of overseas troops.

5. Assessment of the impact of terrorist activities on families stationed overseas, in terms of psychological factors, behavioral anomalies, and biological factors (e.g., stress-related disorders.)


7. Evaluation of the effectiveness of briefings on troop and family morale.

8. Development of coping exercises for troops and family members.

9. Evaluation of the effects of coping exercises on troop and family morale.

10. Evaluation of various media for briefing and coping exercises (e.g., videotape, paper-and-pencil, simulation, etc.).

11. Evaluation of the effects of heightened security procedures and personal and base functions.

12. Assessment of the impact of terrorist activity on the willingness of U.S. family members to support the stationing of their relatives overseas.
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