A Strategy for an United Caribbean Defence

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The Caribbean is an area of the world that historically has had a turbulent past. For centuries the European colonial powers fought over its possession. In today's bipolar world the struggle goes on still, but now another dimension has been added - ideology.

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A STRATEGY FOR AN UNITED CARIBBEAN DEFENCE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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A STRATEGY FOR AN UNITED CARIBBEAN DEFENCE

"A nation's security must begin in the minds of its citizens. Exclusive reliance on external advice and assistance can eventually have shortcomings apart from being to the detriment of developing their own expertise and capabilities....Small does not necessarily mean helpless."1

INTRODUCTION

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

1. Historically the Caribbean is the most fought over region of the world. During the 16th to the 19th centuries the former imperial powers of Great Britain, Spain, France and the Netherlands fought continually for possessions in the area. The Danes too had interest and quite late in the innings, the Americans.

2. In the middle of the 20th century we see the Russians attracted to the lure. This is characterized by their heavy investment in Cuba, Grenada and Nicaragua. The Grenada experience was a bitter pill for the region.

PERCEIVED THREATS

3. When the European powers were fighting over the Caribbean, the area itself had no control of its destiny and threats to any part of it were in fact a threat to the owning European empire and were perceived as such. In much the same way, the Argentine assault on the Malvinas Islands was seen by the UK as an assault on Great Britain.
4. However, with the granting of statehood to the majority of the area, threats are seen from an insular or even a regional viewpoint. The nature of the threats themselves has changed. Now they are either external or internal. And even those which are thought to be internal would at most times be externally driven.

OBJECTIVE

UNITED DEFENCE

5. In the past any attack or insurrection would be attended to in due course by the governing outside power. Now with the exception of Martinique and Guadeloupe - 2 departments of France, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands - dependencies of the United States, Anguilla, British Virgin Islands and Montserrat - dependencies of the UK, no such insurance exits. A notable exception is Grenada which, in the wake of the US invasion of October 1983, has been given a special assurance by the United States. Therefore, the area must fend for itself.

6. The need for defence must be looked at in a much broader sense than defending oneself from aggression external and internal. A country that cannot defend itself, even tokenly, can offer no protection to its citizens and is not worthy of its sovereignty. For, regardless of the constant rhetoric to the contrary, - Might is Right. Even though Chapter VII with Article 51 of the UN Charter declares against armed aggression. But besides defence against armed aggression a country must defend
its core values.

7. When I say core values I mean those political, economic, cultural and social entities which together make up the fabric of the society. Any shift or even substantial threat to them could damage the societal infrastructure. That in turn would cause the country to cease to be as its peoples had fashioned it and to assume a new identity.

THESIS

8. This paper, therefore, would examine the various ways in which the English Speaking Caribbean can come under attack and propose a plausible strategy for an united defence.

DEFINITIONS

CARIBBEAN

9. What precisely is the Caribbean? Aaron Segal the author of Caribbean Realities has described it as the most fragmented region of the world. This becomes apparent when one realises that there is not one but several geographic definitions of the area.

10. Caribbean Archipelago. The Caribbean archipelago is a beaded string of islands in a scythe-like formation from the Bahamas in the north to Trinidad in the south - 2,500 miles of islands and connecting water. These hundreds of islands contain 22 countries, 28 million people, many languages and cultures that hark back to their European colonizers, the indigenous peoples,
and those cultures brought along by the slaves and later the indentured labourers - hybrid societies.

11. The Caribbean. The use of the term 'The Caribbean' normally means the inclusion of one Central American and 3 South American countries - Belize, Guyana, Suriname and Cayenne. This makes 20 countries and 30 million people. Past history has given us some common ground.

12. The Caribbean Basin. The Caribbean Basin is the most recent of terms. It was coined by the Reagan administration when they were considering offering supposed opportunities for economic benefit to the area. The Caribbean Basin Initiative [CBI] included Central and South American mainland states which have Caribbean shorelines and even one, El Salvador, which is litterally Pacific. However, it excludes Cuba and Nicaragua, 2 nations with whom the United States does not enjoy good relations.

   (a) The Commonwealth Caribbean are those islands of former and present British colonies with a population of 6 million. Their British past is seen by many as an unifying factor in a fragmented area. So much so that in 1958 a federation was foisted on them by Britain in her haste to rid herself of her burdensome colonies. It collapsed in disarray in 1962.
   (b) Since then the region has of itself created an economic community [CARICOM]. Then there is a smaller grouping known as the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States [OECS]. And, of course, there is the University of the West Indies [UWI]

4
with campuses on Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Jamaica—all unifying forces, building blocks for a Caribbean nation.

14. Concentric Caribbean. Mr. William Demas, a celebrated economist from Trinidad and Tobago, has suggested that the Caribbean are 3 concentric circles:

a. Outer - The Caribbean Basin.
b. Middle - The Caribbean Archipelago.
c. Inner - The English speaking Caribbean.

15. Focus. The focus of this paper is the Inner Caribbean with Belize and Guyana. Because they fall within the circumference of the circle, and indeed may in time consider their futures to be inextricably woven into the fabric, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands and the Dutch Antilles are accommodated.

16. Similarities/Dissimilarities. The Caribbean a conglomerate of islands and mainland states with main languages of English, French and Dutch with their Creole offshoots and polyglot peoples, have a number of similarities and dissimilarities.

a. Similarities. The similarities that exist include:

(1) Previous Ownership. Previous ownership by the same imperial master. Many of the islands changed hands several times in their past histories - Tobago. Trinidad, which was owned by the Spanish and then the British, nevertheless has a very strong French influence. The French on the invitation of the Spanish
had settled in the island following the French and Haitian revolutions.

(2) **Language.** Most of the islands speak English and in the others it is a second language. Then, too, many of the islands speak a French patois.

(3) **Politics.** The former British colonies all espouse the British parliamentary system. The other countries which were non-British are in any event democratic in outlook.

(4) **Economics.**

(a) The economies of all the states are very fragile. For the most part they have no mineral resources and depend on tourism and agriculture. Their more fortunate brothers of Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago while possessing minerals [bauxite in Guyana and Jamaica and oil in Trinidad and Tobago] depend on prices over which they have no control. Barbados has recently discovered minor oil reserves, and the Dutch Antilles depend heavily on refining imported crude oil for foreign markets. Sugar as a commodity is dead.

(b) The countries would need to diversify and get into areas where they are not only the suppliers of raw material but also the end products. However, the technology is not readily available and when that is obtained at a price, the First World countries wherein lie the markets indulge in
protectionism. You are left holding the baby as it were. Trinidad and Tobago with its steel plant is a case in point. The CBI was touted as the means to overcome that hurdle. But by the time the US special interest lobbies had had their say, it offered very little of what it had promised.

(5) Size and Population. The sizes vary from Guyana, the size of England, to islands which are little more than large rocks. And the population, too, varies. Jamaica has over 3 million, but Guyana has less than one million, and the smallest ones have mere thousands.

b. Dissimilarities. The dissimilarities are:

(1) Politics. The region has been able to accommodate plurality in politics. In the past Jamaica and Guyana have been very left leaning. And of course there was Grenada.

(2) Ethnicity. The area is peopled by a cosmopolitan society. On the whole Africans are in the majority. However in Guyana, East Indians pre-dominate while in Trinidad and Tobago the scales are evenly balanced. While races are represented in their pure forms there has been an intermingling over the years that has produced varieties akin to a human flower garden.

NATIONAL SECURITY

17. Vulnerability, Small States in the Global Society, a Report of a Commonwealth Consultative Group defines national security on
Page 23 as, "The absence of threat to the exercise of the capacity to govern, protect, preserve and advance the state and its peoples consistent with the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states."

18. On Page 14 the same report says, "A well known maxim defines the security of the state as the absence of threat to its minimum core values. But deeper reflection leads to the perception that security is a matter not only of the absence of threats but of the absence of vulnerability. In short the question can be approached from both sides - the elimination of threats or vulnerability. This perception serves importantly to put the question of military power in perspective. The small state does not by definition, have the means to deter threats or repulse an attack. Indeed this approach to the security of small states must inevitably lead to a sense of hopelessness or to the conviction that security can only lie in protection by a major power. On the other hand, it is within the competence of the small state to diminish its vulnerabilities and thus enhance its security."

19. However, the former definition was adopted by the Group as their working definition and I do likewise.

THE THREAT

20. A broad definition of a threat to security could be "... any type of specific action or situation which could damage national integrity." Threats to security are threefold:
a. **Territorial.** Attacks on both military and non-military targets.
b. **Political.** Any number of activities directed at influencing or changing national policies.
c. **Economic.** Attempts to undermine the economy of a state.
   A possible instrument for political interference.

**AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT THE THREATS**

**TERRITORIAL THREATS**

21. **Military.** Small states are particularly vulnerable to military incursions. An occupation in that part of the country or on the island with the nerve centres of business and government would make the state ungovernable:
   a. **Foreign Aggression.**
      (1) Foreign aggression could stem from territorial disputes of long standing or a greater power flexing its muscles. Such aggression might not be aimed at annexation but could be purely punitive to enforce a particular political will. Also attacks could come from foreign based national dissidents intending to overthrow the government, drugs and arms dealers sometimes trying to seize an outlying island as a safe haven for their operations or mercenaries in the employ of any group.
      (2) Examples of national dissidents attempting overthrows in the Caribbean are the threat to Barbados by Sydney Burnett Alleyne in 1978 and the threat to
Dominica by the former prime minister, Stanley John, in 1981. Fortunately both threats were discovered and uprooted before they had had time to germinate. Belize and Guyana both have territorial disputes with a larger neighbour, Guatemala and Venezuela respectively. Both of the former countries have had to withstand political pressure and territorial incursions by the latter two states.

d. **Foreign Bases.** Large powers, particularly super powers, seek to establish military and naval bases in small countries. The financial temptation is great. And states have succumbed in the past to their detriment. There is the danger of:

1. Interference in internal politics by the foreign nation.
2. The possibility of being drawn into a conflict not of your own choosing.
3. The political and social consequences of having on board foreigners who have little or no regard for your ethical, social and moral values.
4. Subversive activities by nationalistic groups which are opposed to the establishment of the facilities.

c. **Secession.** Secession is a common cry in island states. In the Caribbean we had the movement away from the West Indian Federation by Jamaica - a move which led to the dissolution of the Federation. And in the recent past there has been rhetoric aplenty by Tobagonians of secession from
the unitary statehood with Trinidad.

22. **Non-Military.** More often the threats are non-military. Drug traffickers and arms dealers pose serious threats to governments. Of particular concern is the possibility that they might have the wherewithal to declare an outlying island independent and use it for the illicit trade in drugs and arms, and other nefarious practices. "For example the Prime Minister of Belize recently described this problem as a very serious threat to the security of his country, of even greater significance currently than the Guatemalan claim to Belizean territory." Deleterious social effects abound when the population, both youths and adults, become addicted and or are prepared to defend the trade with arms if necessary.

**POLITICAL THREATS**

23. **Political and Economic Pressure.** "Such pressure can be applied directly or indirectly, in the context of bilateral or multilateral relations. Small states located close to a great/super power are especially vulnerable and can even be coerced into agreements, alliances or formal economic relations." These pressures normally manifest themselves when small states allow large ones to establish bases on their territories and thereby find themselves drawn into the global political arena. Also, when small states belong to regional bodies with great/super powers and to international economic and financial institutions, they can very often find themselves coerced by countries with economic and military clout.
24. **Destabilisation/Subversion.** The shrinking world brought about by new modes of travel and communication has exposed small states to the danger of external destabilization and subversion. "If they choose it is also relatively easy for major states to threaten the core social, cultural and political values of small societies by influencing the media and the non-formal education system, coopting sectors of the elites, or forming alliances in particular with the business sector, trade unions or elements of the military. Overseas based national dissidents can often be very effective abroad because of their increased access to the media, publicity, arms and funds as well as clandestine political support which they often receive from official or private sources in the metropoles."7

25. **Policy Changes.** The Caribbean has been tolerantly pluralistic in ideology but the movement of Grenada to the far left [1979 - 1983] worried some of her neighbours. Grenada's refusal to hold free and fair elections further alienated her. The bloody coup by hard-core Marxists in October 1983 with the concomitant murder of the popular PM Maurice Bishop set the stage for invasion by the United States and the return of the country to the western camp.

26. **Unfriendly Media.** A most powerful tool in the hands of an enemy is the news media. Nowadays with the proliferation of home satellite dishes on some islands, home-owners get news first hand, news that can be generated with the sole purpose of destabilizing a country or region. Also the local media depend on the syndicated press to a very large extent, and there too the
information can be coloured accordingly. And what chance does the government of a small country have in effectively countering the misinformation which has the seal of an international news agency. We must remember that the Caribbean subscribe to the principles of human rights and freedom of the media. [Annex A].

27. **Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction.** The great powers by their all pervasive influence can insist that their laws apply to local subsidiaries of metropolitan companies. This would serve to limit the activities of those subsidiaries and cause hurt to the small states. The Bahamas has the experience of the United States trying to force it to divulge confidential information on commercial activities of US subsidiaries. That directly contravenes Bahamas law and openly breaches accepted concepts of national sovereignty. The economy of the Bahamas is dependent on banking. Therefore, its compliance with the United States would seriously threaten its survival as an off-shore banker.8

28. **Subverting Social and Cultural Identities.** The social and cultural identities of small states are fragile. When such cultures come into contact with the forceful penetrating marketing of industrialised nations, marketing designed to change lifestyles and create consumer awareness not taking into account local priorities, disaster looms. Desires are aroused and frustrated. National cohesion and loyalty suffer.9

**ECONOMIC THREATS**

29. Small states have to be ever on the alert for covert attempts to undermine their economic stability and progress.
Their vulnerability makes them easy prey to strong external economic forces.

30. Small Economies. The lack of size of small states is normally accompanied with a lack of resources and/or a lack of manpower and technical knowledge. Therefore, their economic structures are usually undiversified, and any shifting of demand externally can wreak havoc. Nature and the elements also exact a toll on these states: hurricanes, volcanoes, agricultural pests. Then, too, small countries depend too much on food and energy imports - another negative factor.

31. Economic Zones. The recognition of the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone [EEZ] is both a boon and bane for small countries. A boon because they now have ownership of large tracts of maritime territory. A bane because their lack of wealth makes it impossible for them to have the facilities necessary to police it properly, if at all. Thus, ocean going fishing fleets belonging to super/financial powers continually rape their waters without fear of retribution or restitution. In addition it is clearly evident that countries which have the technology to investigate/harness the riches of the sea-bed do not intend to share the technology with their less privileged neighbours. They will continue the exploitation of the weak by the strong.

32. Trade Agreements. Large states now indulge in bilateral agreements with small ones. On the surface this might appear to be of value. However, small states by themselves have so little to bargain with that such agreements are generally biased heavily
in favour of the great power. Multilateral agreements which are being entered into less and less would serve the needs of small states better. In this era of protectionism, small states may wish to enter into special trading arrangements with larger states to ensure stable markets for products and a continual supply of strategic goods. One example of that is the CBI. However, as the CBI demonstrated, sometimes it is nothing more than a mirage. The small states find that their expectations are heightened and then dashed.

33. Tourism and Off-shore Banking. Small states sometimes depend to a large extent on tourism and offshore banking facilities to stimulate economic growth. However, these activities themselves attract unsolicited interest from criminal elements eager to capitalise on fraud, corruption, drug trafficking, commercial crime, prostitution, illegal gambling and political interference. Weak power and administration, so often endemic to small states, cannot cope with these problems. Also, "there is an increasing incidence of criminal intent in foreign business ventures in small states and besides the administrative, economic and political problems this causes, it carries serious security problems." 10

INTERNAL COHESION vs EXTERNAL THREAT

34. Internal Security.

a. Internal security hinges on the stability and well being of a country. So much so that a cohesive country presents a very small target to external threats. "Internal strife can
come from a variety of causes or situations, such as militant political contentions, secessionist ambitions, economic deprivation due to national disasters or government inability to cope with economic problems, the influx of migrant labour or of political refugees and major issues of human rights. 11

b. When small states achieve independence there is a sense of urgency in the populace for rapid betterment. A sense of urgency that in most cases was fuelled by the rhetoric of politicians who in pre-independence days openly criticized the imperial power for keeping them in a state of backwardness. Independence having come, however, the same politicians find that they are unable to deliver the goods as quickly as the people demand. In order to stave off trouble and remain at the helm they sometimes resort to coercive measures, tampering with democratic institutions and sometimes even the law and judiciary, with far reaching results. "Dissension whatever its immediate causes, ultimately stems from the difficulties faced by governments in delivering political, social and economic benefits in such a way as to steadily enhance the quality of life while satisfying the sense of order and justice within the society." 12

c. In addition the speed of modernization, which is difficult for developed countries to cope with, is all but out of control in the effect it has on small countries.
35. **International Climate.** In this interdependent world a country's cohesion and stability depends largely on the international climate. Therefore, in an area like the Caribbean, if the region is harmonious, then the vulnerability of the individual states is considerably reduced. Small states can avoid untoward foreign attention only for so long as their internal strife is not recognised as such. This shrinking world makes that a high impossible proposition. These internal rumblings are then manipulated to the point where the neighbouring superpower can ordain overt external involvement -Grenada. This is only possible because there is usually no counter-power in the international system to preclude it. There is thus a need to look closely at the juxtaposition of domestic and international scenes when examining the security of small states.

**CONCEPT**

**IN SEARCH OF AN UNITED DEFENCE**

**AN ALL ENCOMPASSING APPROACH**

36. When one speaks of security, one looks at it in totality. However, as in all things it is in fact relative, being dependent on a nation's ability to defend itself in all areas. Nations therefore rely on a strategy of deterrence whereby they try to maximise the cost to an intruder making it not worth his while. Security, therefore, is not only a military matter but includes the diplomatic, political, social and economic spheres as well.
37. Small states because of their very limited resources would need help in establishing their deterrence and also substantial continued support to keep it viable. They should also be encouraged to enter into programmes of technical, diplomatic, political and economic cooperation with other regional states.

38. It must be borne in mind, though, that should small states depend too much on security advice and assistance from foreign governments, agencies or individuals, they surrender a proportional amount of their sovereignty. A recent example from without the Caribbean is the agreement forced on Sri Lanka by India in the wake of India's assistance in the putting down of the Tamil disturbances. [Annex B].

39. Outside help might be required, but this must be supplementary as opposed to primary. And should small states demonstrate to the world that they are about the business of their security, the world community is more likely to take notice and assist. The measures thus need to progress from national to regional to international.

40. "A nation's security must begin in the minds of its citizens. Exclusive reliance on external advice and assistance can eventually have shortcomings apart from being to the detriment of developing their own expertise and capabilities." Regardless of size a nation must identify what its security needs are and take steps to achieve them. When that is done the country has a sense of well-being and is better able to cope with international tremors. "Small does not necessarily mean helpless."
41. Singapore, little more than a large rock at the tip of Malaysia in the Strait of Malacca, exemplifies that. It has a well trained, well equipped and well disciplined defence force. That country competes on the world arms market and even manufactures aircraft under licence. Worthy of note is the strong economy brought about by the hard work and dedication of the only resource - the people.

ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL DEFENCE

42. Small states have small economies. Small economies have proportionally larger demands on them than large economies. Small states more so than larger ones thus have to decide just how much of their scarce resources they can spend on national security.

43. Most small nations would want a force appropriate to their defence needs but in the Caribbean the states would find that financially prohibitive. They would need substantial maritime and air forces to police their coasts and EEZs. Therefore, they would need to strike a "happy" balance. This is easier said than done.

RESOURCES

COST

44. Unless a small country is inordinately wealthy, the establishment and maintenance of a security force would impact to a great extent on its economy. Therefore, it behooves every
state to consider just what force is required to meet its needs. Too large a force would have an unequal drain on the state's finances and at the same time raise suspicion among its neighbours.

45. Some states have preferred strictly police forces and paramilitary units - Dominica. Others, police, coastguard and army - Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, barbados. Others police, army, paramilitary, national service, marine and air arms - Guyana. A state's defence reflects its perception of threat, [external and internal], size of country and the amount of the national budget that the state is prepared to expend on its defence.

46. However, it must be realized that a national security establishment embraces not only military, paramilitary and police but all government bodies which have an input in the overall maintenance of law and order. It would thus include: intelligence services, specialist units for fisheries protection, immigration and customs.

47. Morale and discipline are sine qua non for security forces. Since their combat skills would not normally be required often, it is essential that they engage in public works and community services thereby gaining the respect, admiration and approval of the population at large who otherwise might view them as an unnecessary expenditure. Therefore allied to their military training should be a diversity of functions. These might include: disaster relief operations, anti-smuggling, anti-drugs and anti-arms trafficking, anti-piracy, monitoring and
surveillance of EEZs.

48. Another option for small states is the part time military training it could give to its general citizenry. However, this should be initiated cautiously depending on the state's history of stability. Indeed, it is not different from a militia except in scope.

49. The obvious advantage of having a comparatively large citizen force to call upon in a crisis as a back-up to the regulars is that it presents an intruder with the proposition of dealing with a nation under arms - a daunting prospect. It might be even an insurance against internal power struggles.

DEFENCE PACTS

50. "In the Caribbean, on the other hand, there was both a high level of threat perception and a greater willingness to contemplate the possibility of consolidating the collective defence arrangements."15

51. Bilateral.

a. Britain when she withdrew from the Caribbean did not offer to maintain an umbrella of protection for the region. However, Belize who is threatened by the territorial ambitions of Guatemala has asked for and got a continuing British military presence to forestall her neighbour's intentions.

b. Not all such arrangements, though, are designed to protect a small state for its own sake. Some are purely to serve the interest of a larger power. Having regard to the
many dangers previously quoted in respect to having foreign oases, small states even when threatened by an obvious enemy, should weigh carefully all the ramifications involved before inviting a foreign power.

c. A variation of the above is the formation of close political links with a major power. This power then takes care of all the small state's external affairs and security needs. The marked disadvantage is that the small state so concerned willingly surrenders a substantial part of its sovereignty and its right to belong to the international community. Guam in its association with the United States is an example.

52. Multilateral. Some states might wish to seek formal neutrality status. However, in time of open conflict that is no guarantee. Hitler's Germany demonstrated that. It would also have to be mutually beneficial to large states to enter into such arrangements with small states. Even if small states could get such agreements with the 2 superpowers, what is there to prevent a regional power, not party to the treaty, from invading. Nevertheless, a viable alternative would be unilaterally to declare oneself neutral and seek to have neighbours and the international community and organisations recognise and document the fact.

53. Regional. There are already established regional defence pacts by large nations. Some states might consider taking advantage and joining them:

   a. Rio Pact. In the Caribbean there is the 1947 Inter
American Treaty for Regional Assistance - the Rio Pact. It is comprised of the United States, 19 Latin American states and 2 Caribbean states. The Rio Pact which includes the proviso safeguarding the security of its members from attack by other members has not been joined by other Caribbean members of the OAS. This is a demonstration of their principled stand against the exclusion of Belize and Guyana from the OAS.

b. OECS' Treaty. The OECS Treaty of 1981 did consider defence arrangements. Article 8 of the Treaty established the Defence and Security Committee and charged it with, "responsibility for coordinating the efforts of Member States for collective defence and the maintenance of peace and security against external aggression and for the development of close ties among the member States of the Organisation in matters of external defence and security, including measures to combat the activities of mercenaries, operating with or without the support of internal or national elements...."16

It must be remembered, though, that the Organization turned on one of its members when it underwrote the US invasion of Grenada in October 1983 - a horrendous precedent.

c. OECS and Barbados MOU. However the OECS Treaty excluded Barbados. This was partly rectified in October 1982. Then Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St Lucia, and St Vincent and the Grenadines [4 of the signatories to the OECS Treaty] signed a Memorandum of Understanding [MOU]
with Barbados.
The MOU in, "relating to 'security and military' cooperation provided for 'mutual assistance on request' in 'national emergencies, prevention of smuggling, search and rescue, immigration control, maritime policing policies, protection of off-shore installations, pollution control, natural and other disasters threats to national security.' Provision was made for a combined operations headquarters but not, as had been mooted, for a standing regional force, which presented too many financial and other difficulties."17
A detailed analysis of the MOU is attached as Annex C.

d. Security Forces.

(1) The military cooperation aspect of the OECS and Barbados MOU launched the Regional Security Service (RSS). This is a mosaic force. It is composed in the main of para-military troops from the islands with Barbados and Antigua having a military input. The day to day function of the various para-military elements is that of being policemen. Therefore, they do not have a military mindset and their training and equipment are rudimentary.

(2) Add to that the condition that they could be employed only with the prior consent of their individual governments, and a headquarters, based in Barbados, that really does not command and the picture begins to unfold. This situation exists even for
training exercises, much more for an actual operation. (3) To make the RSS viable, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Guyana and Belize [when able] must participate. This immediately raises the question of command and housing the headquarters. (4) One of the very first problems that led to the eventual dissolution of the West Indian Federation, was the vexing question of where to situate the capital. In order to vault the hurdles of command and housing the headquarters, the politicians would have to think regionally and not insularly, and by logical deduction establish the headquarters in the country that would be central, and have the necessary infra-structure to support it. (5) At present, whereby the countries individually and collectively can offer a varied deterrent on land, they lack an equivalent maritime capability. Trinidad and Tobago is probably better off than the others in that respect. But even it does not have the ability to be as effective as it would like, taking into consideration its off-shore hydrocarbon assets. (6) The region would need external help in a number of areas to include supply of expensive materiel. This is addressed later on in the paper. (7) The question of command still remains. There is more than one answer to that question: (a) All the armed forces, military and para-
military can be constituted under a supreme commander. However, this is practical only if there is a political unity with a prime minister or executive president of the Caribbean.

(b) In the absence of political unity, there could be a military council made up of the commanders of the various states' armed bodies, and subordinate to a council of ministers from the various states. The military council would direct a commander Caribbean Defence Forces. This latter post could be rotated on a time basis or made permanent to a country according to some formula or other.

(c) "In the aftermath of Grenada the original idea of a small regional force was expanded into a 'rapid reaction force' of up to 1,000 men which could even be employed to protect governments against military coups by their own forces. Tom Adams of Barbados, the main protagonist of this idea, argued that a single regional military force, properly equipped and trained, could be more effective than a number of separate and necessarily small paramilitary police units and military forces."18

The region would be well advised to examine existing defence treaties during their deliberations.

e. Deterrent Quality. Be that as it may, regional pacts, if properly administered and established could have the
much needed deterrent quality which would cause a would be aggressor to stop and take notice. The individual partners would have an increased sense of confidence. It is important, though, that such pacts not be entered into unless the states are of like mind, "have an appreciation of each other's special individual interests and are prepared to exercise mutual restraint in the conduct of their inter-relationships."¹⁹

54. **Unilateral.**

a. We have examined various types of defence pacts and they have all called for some sort of agreement to act. However, there is an occasion where one can see the United States acting unilaterally in its best interest and as could be claimed, justifiably, in the interest of all the free world. The Caribbean sits astride the trade routes and sea lanes of communication [SLOCs] between the eastern shores of North and South America, Europe and Africa. All traffic through the Panama Canal must pass through the region. [Annex D].

b. A report from the US Department of Commerce says that the US dependence on imported raw materials would rise from the present 20% to 30% by the year 2000. The Caribbean Sea is the route for most of it. The movement of tankers, the lightening of crude oil, the refining and trans-shipping of that commodity, all take place in and through the region. Fifty percent of US oil imports and more than 40% of all US imports pass there. Refineries in the area process 12.5%
of US oil. The United States imports more than 90% of its bauxite from Suriname, Guyana, Haiti, and Jamaica, and iron ore from Venezuela and Brazil. On a global scale, 25% of the world's crude oil and 50% of all refined petroleum products are loaded and unloaded in the region! In addition, the many natural deep water harbours offer facilities to both deep draught and naval craft to include submarines.

c. Therefore any attempt by a foreign power to threaten the security of the region and thus the trade routes and SLOCs would invite the unilateral intervention by the United States. That would undoubtedly draw the Caribbean into a massive power struggle which it would prefer to avoid.

INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE SHARING

55. The fragility of the societies and economies of small states cry out for an enhanced efficient information service which caters to the widest possible range of relevant internal, regional and international news. There must be linkages between governmental and non-governmental bodies.

56. The Caribbean News Agency [CANA] should be supported financially and technically with the provision of data banks, documentation centres and other facilities for collecting and disseminating information.

57. Security Information. In order to free themselves of the yoke of getting information only from the super powers, the small
states must learn where and how to look for information of a diplomatic and military nature. They must train their staffs in missions abroad to be ever vigilant. Their police, immigration, customs and other security agencies must be constantly alert. There must be information exchange relationships among states. Advisers on security matters must be carefully chosen. Sometimes they can have broad portfolios to encompass foreign, defence, economic and general internal policies. They might be civilian. However, sometimes the military is the only organisation that can produce such advisers.

To be effective the advisers must have a thorough working knowledge of their subjects, know their limitations, know where to find supplementary information, advice and assistance and must above all be apolitical.

58. Intelligence Gathering. The procuring of intelligence is a prerequisite for security. Small states more so than large ones might need to have better organs of intelligence gathering. This is so because the impact of an intended/attempted coup or major criminal activity could be far reaching.

Information processing and analysis is an art which has been greatly enhanced by computer systems. Training in the field is essential and then, too, the sharing of information.

59. Inter Regional Cooperation.

a. The establishment of a regional intelligence network would go a long way towards ensuring national and regional security. Such a body must be under the firm political
control of the region's governments. Such a body would be concerned with 3 types of information:

1. "Information on the activities and policies of external actors, both national and sub-national with implications for the region.
2. Information on international relations, both official and unofficial, within the region.
3. Information on internal problems of member states of the region which have broader implications for either the region at large or some part of it."20.

At present the "UK - Caribbean security liaison office acts as a clearing house for the exchange of intelligence information between the islands."21

However, any information that is received from external sources should be carefully scrutinised for any attempts to manipulate the policies of the region. If the task of information gathering is intelligently divided among the states, cost would be kept down. The system of dissemination, possibly through a secretariat, must be under the political influence of the region. There would be problems in the gathering, assimilating and disseminating of the material but it must all be done in an atmosphere of trust. A region that cannot coalesce for intelligence cooperation, must be very insecure and always will be victim to the machinations of external powers and agencies.
60. **Extra Regional Cooperation.**

a. Large states can assist in the providing of facilities and equipment for maritime matters. The United States recently made a gift of a few small craft to the OECS countries. (Annexes E and F). Such materiel is very expensive. In order to police and monitor the EEZ, planes and marine craft are needed to operate more than 200 nautical miles for surveillance purposes, and then you need fast armed craft for interception.

b. It must be remembered though that large states always would seek their own interests in such agreements and small states should be wary of tilting the military balance in the area or inviting in large states with opposing ideological views. An adjunct to the foregoing is assistance in matters military, paramilitary, disaster relief, anti-smuggling, anti-drugs, and anti-arms trafficking. Any state invited in especially to do the your military, paramilitary or police, must espouse democratic values and the tradition of the non-political role of the military. The United States because of the law prohibiting the training of police by the military had to seek assistance from Britain and Canada to train a Grenada police force after October 1983. The sequel is that a former deputy commissioner of police from Trinidad and Tobago was appointed commissioner for Grenada. He is Grenadian by birth.
POLITICAL

61. The first political union of the Caribbean foundered, mainly because the region had not conceived it. However, since then there have been discussions and constant movement towards a political union. It is generally well accepted that CARICOM was the first step in that direction. The OECS went a stage further with their MOU.

62. In order to marshall their forces properly and have better control of their destiny, all the nations of the Caribbean should think positively of a political union. I would not here attempt to prescribe the formula. However, I suggest that it be one which takes the peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of the region into account. The individual countries need to stop thinking insularly and expand their visions to encompass the region.

63. An united region would present a consolidated body to any threat and project with an increased sense of confidence those four elements of power: economic, political, socio-psychological and military.

CONCLUSION

64. The Caribbean, the most fragmented area in the world, a region that men struggle to define, must unite if they are to withstand the vagaries of the external world.
65. It has been demonstrated that smallness is not helplessness, and that national security begins in the minds of the citizens. Therefore, to a man they must think of a consolidated effort to present a unified indivisible whole to a would-be enemy. 
66. However, to be fully effective the region needs to move inexorably to political union and thereby meld into a unified, homogenous whole.

END NOTES

2. Ibid., p.23.
3. Ibid., p.25.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p.29.
9. Ibid., p.27.
10. Ibid., p.35.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p.36.
13. Ibid., p.39.
15. Ibid., p.42.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 20.
13. Vulnerability, p. 47.
15. LtCol A S Franklin, Regional Security in the Eastern Caribbean. what are the Problems Solution and Dilemmas? [Naval Staff College 1987].

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5. Raymond, Nicholas Caribbean Basin Revisited.


9. Interview with Cdre M O Williams, CDS - TTDF.

10. Interview with Col D Hunger (retd) - USAWC.
**ANEX A TO**

**A STRATEGY FOR**

**AN UNITED CARIBBEAN DEFEND**

**DATED 29 MARCH 1988**

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**COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF FREEDOM 1985**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent States</th>
<th>Political Rights</th>
<th>Civil Rights</th>
<th>Combined Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua-Barbuda</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts-Nevis</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent and Grenadines</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dependencies:**

| British Virgin Islands      | 3                | 2            | PF              |
| Guadeloupe                  | 3                | 2            | PF              |
| Martinique                  | 3                | 2            | PF              |
| Montserrat                  | 2                | 2            | F               |
| U.S. Virgin Islands         | 2                | 3            | F               |

**Notes:**  
F=Free; PF=Partly Free

A seven-point scale for both political and civil rights. Places most free are ranked 1 and the least as 7. In the absence of absolute standards, the comparative conditions serve as a guide under the logic that in no state are inhabitants absolutely either free or unfree.

**Source:** Adopted from Raymond D. Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom"
INDIA-SRI LANKA AGREEMENT - AUGUST 1987

I. SRI LANKA WILL CONSULT INDIA IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL.

II. SRI LANKA WILL NOT PERMIT THE MILITARY USE OF TRINCOMALEE OR ANY OF ITS OTHER PORTS BY ANY COUNTRY PREJUDICIAL TO INDIAN INTERESTS.

III. SRI LANKA WILL TERMINATE SINGAPORE CONTRACT FOR OIL STORAGE FACILITY AT TRINCOMALEE AND PROMOTE INDO-SRI LANKA JOINT VENTURE.

IV. SRI LANKA TO REVIEW EXISTING AGREEMENTS WITH FOREIGN BROADCASTING FACILITIES.

V. INDIA TO PROVIDE MILITARY AID, INCLUDING HARDWARE AND TROOP TRAINING.

VI. INDIA WILL NOT ALLOW ITS SOIL FOR USE BY TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AGAINST SRI LANKA.
VII. INDIA TO DEPORT ALL SRI LANKANS FOUND TO BE ENGAGED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY.

VIII. INDIA WILL STATION PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN SRI LANKA TO GUARANTEE AND ENFORCE THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

IX. SRI LANKA WILL DISBAND HOME GUARD AND PARAMILITARY FORCES IN EAST AND NORTHERN PROVINCES.

X. INDIAN ELECTION COMMISSION WILL MONITOR SRI LANKAN ELECTIONS.
ANNEX C TO
A STRATEGY FOR AN
UNITED CARIBBEAN DEFENCE
DATED 29 MARCH 1988

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN REGIONAL
SECURITY SYSTEM MOU

THE FOLLOWING BREAKS DOWN THE MOU INTO VARIOUS ACTION GROUPS AND
LISTS RESPONSIBILITIES OF EACH.
A. PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES:
   - CONTRIBUTE TO CENTRAL FUND (BARBADOS-49%; OTHER COUNTRIES
     DIVIDE 51%).
   - RATIFY IN WRITING NEGOTIATIONS WITH EXTRA-REGIONAL
     AGENCIES CONDUCTED BY THE REGIONAL SECURITY COORDINATOR
   - MAY REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER PARTICIPANTS
   - PAYS QUARTERLY ACCOUNTS DUE TO CENTRAL FUND WITHIN 30
     DAYS
   - SHALL INSURE THEIR INDIVIDUAL SERVICE PERSONNEL AGAINST,
     OR SETTLE AT THEIR COST, CLAIMS FOR DAMAGE OR INJURY ON OFFICIAL
     DUTY
   - SHALL HAVE THEIR FORCES TRAINED IN EACH OTHERS COUNTRIES
     UPON AGREEMENT OF FORCES COMMANDERS
B. COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (COM):
   - COMPRISED OF DEFENCE MINISTERS OF SIGNATORY STATES
   - IS THE CENTRAL POLICY MAKING BODY
   - APPOINTS THE REGIONAL SECURITY COORDINATOR (RSC)
- Appoints advisory committees as required
- Determines need and then appoints Central Liaison Office (CLO) staff upon recommendation of forces commanders
- Fixes salaries of CLO staff
- Approves triennial Central Fund budget estimates and budget modifications submitted by the RSC
- Approves quarterly Central Fund accounting

C. Regional Security Coordinator (RSC):
- Chief officer of the Central Liaison Office (CLO)
- Appointed by the Council of Ministers
- Advises Council of Ministers on regional security matters
- Is authorized to negotiate with extra-regional agencies, but negotiations must be ratified in writing by MOU parties
- Submits information and prepares documents requested by the COM
- Keeps COM advised of pertinent Central Liaison Office matters

D. Central Liaison Office (CLO):
- Coordinates objectives of MOU
- Administers Central Fund
  
  Staff salaries
  
  CLO expenses
  
  Coordinating objectives of MOU
  
  Costs of spares and documentation
  
  Accounting for supplies
  
  Billing requestor country for emergency operations used supplies
SUBMITS QUARTERLY AUDIT TO RSC FOR PRESENTATION TO COM E. FORCES COMMANDERS:
- CONSISTS OF CHIEF OF STAFF, BARBADOS DEFENCE FORCE; COMMANDER OF THE ANTIGUAN DEFENCE FORCE; AND COMMISSIONERS OF POLICE OF THE BARBADOS, ST. LUCIA, ANTIGUA-BARBUDA AND DOMINICA POLICE FORCES
- COMPRISE THE JOINT COORDINATING AND PLANNING COMMITTEE (JCPC)
- RECOMMEND TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS FOR APPROVAL THE STAFF OF THE CENTRAL LIAISON OFFICE AFTER CONSULTING WITH THE REGIONAL SECURITY COORDINATOR
- AGREE UPON THE MANNING OF THE COMBINED OPERATIONS ROOM
- AGREE UPON TRAINING IN EACH OTHERS' COUNTRIES INCLUDING COAST GUARD TRAINING IN TERRITORIAL WATERS
- AGREE UPON TRAINING EXCHANGE BILLETS
- AGREE UPON A JOINT PROCUREMENT PROGRAM

F. REQUESTING COUNTRY:
- REQUESTS ASSISTANCE FROM ONE OR MORE MOU SIGNATORIES
- REIMBURSES CENTRAL FUND FOR CENTRAL FUND SUPPLIES USED FOR ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS
- PAYS FOR ACCOMMODATIONS, VICTUALS AND MEDICAL EXPENSES OF A SENDING COUNTRY
Fig. 3

SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN
**ANNEX E TO**

A STRATEGY FOR

AN UNITED CARIBBEAN DEFENCE

DATED 27 MARCH 1988

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### EASTERN CARIBBEAN NAVAL/COAST GUARD FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Vessels</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Bases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auguilla (Police)</td>
<td>N.A</td>
<td>2-26 ft. Rescue Craft</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Airport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua (Police)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-65 ft. (P.C)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>St. Johns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados (Coast Guard)</td>
<td>11 Officers</td>
<td>1-123 ft. (P.C)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Bridgetown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>81 Enlisted</td>
<td>1-65 ft. (P.C)</td>
<td>2-40 ft. (P.C)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2-75 ft. (P.C)</td>
<td>2-40 ft. (P.C)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Virgin Is. (Police)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-40 ft. (P.C)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Road Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica (Police)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-65 ft. (P.C)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Roseau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-103 ft. (P.C)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2-40 ft. (P.C)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3-29 ft. (Rescue)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadeloupe</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martinique</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrat (Police)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-40 ft. (P.C)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Plymouth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts-Nevis (Police)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-110 ft. (P.C)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Basseterre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-29 ft. (P.C)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-29 ft. (Rescue)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-27 ft. (Rescue)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia (Customs &amp; Police)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2-27 ft. (P.C)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Castries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-65 ft. (P.C)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent (Coast Guard)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-75 ft. (P.C)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Kingstown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2-75 ft. (P.C)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>45 Officers</td>
<td>2-130 ft. (P.C)</td>
<td>1-Cessna</td>
<td>Staubies Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Coast Guard)</td>
<td>541 enlisted</td>
<td>2-103 ft. (P.C)</td>
<td>-Sikorsky PSHeko</td>
<td>876 Helo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4-55 ft. (P.C)</td>
<td>2-Gazelle</td>
<td>Chaguaramas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-55 ft. (Aux.)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2-65 ft. (P.C)</td>
<td>Helo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4-45 ft. (P.C)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Virgin Is.</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jane's Fighting Ships - 1987
Caribbean Cooperation

June 13th is the day the British Commonwealth celebrates the queen's birthday. This year however, the celebration took on a special meaning for the island nations of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The Coast Guard played a major role.

United States Ambassador Paul Russo and RADM Ted Steele, Commander, United States Forces Caribbean, presented the 120-foot patrol boat Captain Mulzac to Governor General Sir Lambert Eustice. The ceremony ended two-and-one-half years of hard work and coordination between the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, the boat builder and the government of St. Vincent. During that time they bought and modified a new oil rig pipe-carrier and turned it into an effective resource for search and rescue, anti-smuggling patrols, fisheries protection, remote area logistics support, refueling smaller patrol craft at sea, and coastal defense. The project was funded under the United States Security Assistance Program and includes ongoing operations and maintenance support for the vessel.

The ship was named in honor of Captain Hugh N. Mulzac, a native of Union Island in the Grenadines. Captain Mulzac became a naturalized American citizen and was the first Black American to earn an unlimited master's license. The Captain Mulzac is the sixth Eastern Caribbean Coast Guard boat delivered since 1984. Previous deliveries included a 65-foot patrol craft to Antigua, Dominica, and St. Lucia; a 106-foot boat to Grenada; and a 100-foot vessel to St. Kitts-Nevis.

A Coast Guard technical assistance team is permanently stationed in Antigua to teach Coast Guard people from six Caribbean nations basic engineering and seamanship. It also prepares them for further training at U.S. Navy and Coast Guard Class "A" Schools.

The Security Assistance Program is part of the Regional Security System formed after the Grenada Rescue Operation. The program helps develop regional coast guards tasked with missions similar to ours. The patrol boat acquisition, operations, maintenance and training processes comprise the cornerstone of the RSS. Training will be emphasized in the future.

Following the time honored tradition of Coast Guard vessels, Captain Mulzac's humanitarian role was exercised on its first cruise when it transported hundreds of boxes of school supplies to Grenadian school children. Later, during a formal luncheon celebrating the delivery, the Captain Mulzac, SVG George Macintosh, Grenadian Coast Guard Cutter Tyrell Bay and the Nuniwac were deployed to respond to an aircraft ditching.

— LCDR Lou Orsini, U.S. Embassy, Barbados