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FOREWORD

As the lead essay in this collection points out, the practical outcome of many a successfully executed strategy calls for revised strategy. Our nation's planners therefore must continually evaluate US strategy to assure it supports national goals as domestic and international circumstances change. The eight essays in this volume reflect the broad range of strategic courses available to our national leaders as they steer the nation toward its goals.

The first essay defines "strategic success" and, in so doing, suggests certain strategic considerations sometimes overlooked. The next two selections deal with how the Strategic Defense Initiative might affect US strategy and what a comparison of volunteer armed forces in the United States and Britain reveals. The concluding five essays offer a discussion of strategic stability and the proposed small intercontinental ballistic missile, a summary of Japanese defense policy with a view toward the future, an examination of China's economic development since 1949, a prescription for how Army officers can better understand the operational art, and recommendations for increasing the effectiveness of armed forces in peacekeeping roles.

The National Defense University constantly seeks out and encourages the writing of excellent essays on strategy, joint and combined military matters, and the aspects of international affairs involving national defense. The essays in this volume reflect the breadth of that search for excellence. Several, written by students at the Senior Service Colleges, earned recognition in the 1986 Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition, hosted by NDU. One was written by an NDU faculty member. Two which bring especially welcome perspectives were written by National Defense University International Fellows. All contribute to the continuing discussion of national security strategy.

Bradley C. Hosmer
Lieutenant General, US Air Force
President, National Defense University
Essays on Strategy
STRATEGIC SUCCESS

Joseph E. Goldberg

TACTICS CONCERNS the arrangement and conduct of single engagements while strategy is concerned with the use of engagement to attain the desired objectives of warfare. Strategy provides the aim for individual engagements and must therefore be evaluated by a standard different from that employed to analyze and judge tactics. As is the case with the evaluation of all concepts and objects, the standard of evaluation of strategy must look toward successful strategy, not its failures. Even ill health must be understood in terms of good health. A doctor can only diagnose an improperly functioning organ if he possesses knowledge of how that organ is supposed to function. An inquiry into strategic success, however, differs from an analysis of the healing arts in that the basic design of the healthy human body does not change. Unlike the object of medicine, considerations of strategy appear in different historical contexts. This fact makes the task of inquiry more difficult. Difficulty, however, does not render the task impossible.

In the following pages I discuss the nature of strategy, its relationship to politics and statesmanship, and I discuss those political and military factors which must be used to evaluate successful strategy. Fully aware that this study does not exhaust the subject, I nevertheless hope my observations contribute to a better understanding which will be useful for both practitioners and students of the strategic art.

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THE WORD STRATEGY, like politics, comes to our language from Greek. Both words refer to the activity or the doing of an official body or office. Politics refers to the activity or the business of the polis, the ancient form of political community, while strategy refers to the activity or the art of the strategus, an Athenian commander-in-chief. Strategy is literally the art of a commander or the business of commanders—generals or admirals.

According to the ancients, the objective of strategy is victory and the general's art is the pursuit of that goal. To achieve victory, the general must have a grasp of those military movements and operations which are the means to this end. Though cavalry officers and bowmen are required to execute particular skills, the responsibility for understanding and directing such actions in the pursuit of victory falls to the general. Stated in slightly different terms, the archer's and cavalryman's actions are directed by the general toward a higher military end which would be impossible without unified operation.

As the bowman's art must be directed by the general, so too is generalship in need of higher guidance. Strategy properly directed results in victory, but victory also must be guided. The use of victory belongs to the realm of politics—for politics, according to the ancients, is the ruler of strategy.¹

The father of modern strategic thought, Karl Von Clausewitz, is in great debt to the ancient teachers. On War classifies war as a political act always arising from a political condition which has been brought forth by a political motive.² As such, the political object for Clausewitz always remains the standard by which to measure the aims of the military action and the efforts required for this end.³ Clausewitz offers, however, an important qualification to the relationship between political objectives and war. A nation must constantly evaluate its resources to determine whether or not its objectives can be obtained. For that reason, the
"political object is not . . . a despotic lawgiver; it must adapt itself to the nature of the means at its disposal." Yet, as Clausewitz also knew, the act of adaptation is a political act confirming his observation that policy always influences the entirety of war.

Strategy, then, must be understood in light of both its military and its political dimensions. Analytically, these dimensions can be distinguished from each other, but strategic thought itself requires that the political and military considerations be coupled. To do otherwise would distort strategic considerations. So, in the realm of practice, strategic considerations call forth not only the art of the military commander but also statesmanship.

Statesmanship is more than leadership. All statesmen are leaders, but not all leaders are statesmen. Nor should a leader be identified as a statesman simply because he has aged well. Statesmen possess an ability as well as assume a responsibility to foresee the consequences of an action or inaction for the future as well as for the moment. Unlike leaders who assume responsibility for the moment and the direct consequences of an action, a statesman must be concerned with the indirect consequences of an action as well. The indirect consequences, in fact, may be of greater significance for a nation than those immediately experienced. Battles may be won but the losses suffered in these tactical victories could ultimately lead to the inability to carry on war. The vision to discern the course of events, perhaps even for decades, distinguishes the statesman from a mere leader.

Statesmen sometimes may be difficult to distinguish from leaders or politicians because the measure of a statesman is dependent upon a long-range assessment of his vision, guidance, and accomplishment, and, because measures of a statesman's actions and accomplishments are controversial by their very nature.

The difficulties faced in evaluating statesmanship are similar to those faced in measuring the success or failure of
strategy. Like the actions and obtainments of a statesman, strategy by its very nature is controversial. Furthermore, strategy, unlike tactics, is fully measured only in light of its long-range consequences. For reasons discussed in this essay, the indirect consequences of a strategic policy may not be entirely evident, understood, or expected by policymakers. Such blurring makes the evaluation of a strategic policy especially difficult.

The task of evaluating strategic success is further complicated if we are to distinguish between strategy and "grand strategy." "Grand strategy" refers to more than the direction of military force—again the activity of generalship—"grand strategy" refers to the broader policy which informs or guides the use of force as well as non-military resources to accomplish objectives. Clausewitz does not explicitly distinguish between strategy and "grand strategy," though he does imply that strategic considerations require knowledge far broader than that which applies solely to military affairs. For that reason, Clausewitz emphasizes that purely military judgments should not guide the conduct of war—let alone political policy. The art of war, he articulates, at its highest point becomes policy. The refinement of the concept of "grand strategy" by later writers on strategy not only emphasizes Clausewitz's concern that military judgments by themselves are too narrow for strategic considerations, but also emphasizes the use of non-military means as strategic resources. Certainly, the later emphasis is consistent with the direction of Clausewitz's thought as well. The concern of this essay is with "grand strategy" as well as that zone where consideration of strategy itself approaches the level of political policy.

"Grand strategy" makes the task of evaluating successful strategy more complicated because the concept of "grand strategy" extends the temporal dimension and properly insists that more factors be examined. Furthermore, the explicit recognition that seemingly non-military factors, such as
STRATEGIC SUCCESS

economic policy and diplomacy, must constantly be balanced with specific military considerations, such as weapon system development and force planning. Forcefully reminds us that historical events do not occur in isolation. The totality of factors cannot be ignored. To isolate particular events while ignoring their relationships distorts reality and provides for poor strategic analysis as well as for strategic failure.

THE FIRST AND MOST OBVIOUS FACTOR in evaluating strategic success is the importance of not being blinded by the immediate consequences—successful or not—of an action. The measure of strategic success requires an evaluation over an extended period—the exact period of time cannot be determined with precision, but that time can be related to the impact of the indirect consequences of an action. Primarily, such assessments require the analyst to think in strategic terms. Events must be related to a wide variety of factors.

In October 1983, a combined US-Caribbean security force landed on and parachuted into Grenada. Operation Urgent Fury, as it was known, rescued American medical students from the Grand Anse campus after mounting evidence that the Marxist regime in control of the Caribbean island had threatened the students’ safety. One Cuban engineer battalion with military training supported two Grenadian battalions of People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces and seven battalions of People’s Revolutionary Militia. Internal violence on the island augured the possibility of mass slaughter. US action was required. The immediate objective of the operation was the rescue of American students. That objective was accomplished. Strategically, however, success must be measured only in part by the physical safety of those particular students. We must remind ourselves that prior to Grenada, US citizens had been held hostage in Iran for 444 days. The strategic importance of the mission in the Caribbean is that the rescue mission manifested the will and ability of the United States to protect its citizens.
The second factor in evaluating strategic success relates back to Clausewitz's observations that strategy is intended to serve political ends. Grand strategy is the architectonic design for utilizing a nation's resources for the pursuit of its ends.

Of course, national survival is one of those objectives, but the full ramifications of national survival must be understood. National survival must mean more than simply self-preservation. If physical survival were the ultimate objective of a foreign policy then it logically follows that a policy which provided the fewest opportunities for conflict would be the policy most desired. A policy of total accommodation to an adversary's demands would ensure a lack of conflict and a minimal amount of physical suffering. But such a policy is an abdication of national defense and could not be the thrust of what is meant by national survival. National survival means the preservation of a way of life as well as the physical security of citizens. In the case of the United States, our way of life is rooted in the principles of liberal democracy and the regime's democratic form is constitutionally determined.

The relationship between physical security and the preservation of a nation's highest values has a number of aspects which can and do influence strategic thought. First, as suggested above, the danger always exists that mere survival will be equated with national survival so that only one dimension of national concern will dominate our strategic considerations. This danger is ever present in debate over strategic nuclear policy. The current debate over the merits of the Strategic Defense Initiative, as a replacement for the doctrine of nuclear retaliation that has guided US and NATO policy in the postwar period, has brought the horrors of nuclear confrontation once again to our minds. Although the United States did establish an operational nuclear plan in 1961, the success of US nuclear policy was measured largely in terms of deterrence and not in terms of implementing a nuclear war. As Carnes Lord has argued, it is not so clear that the Soviets measure the success of their nuclear policy by the
same standard. Because of the emphasis upon deterrence as well as the country's general concern with physical security, the country as a whole has, I believe, been obsessed with nuclear arms control. This obsession does not mean that physical security and the prevention of nuclear confrontation are ill-advised objectives, but, as Lord points out, arms control should not usurp the proper role of strategy. Arms control itself should, rather, be understood in light of strategy.

A second aspect of national survival concerns how strategic considerations affect a nation's way of life. Often such consequences are unforeseen and arise because the indirect effects of an action are not predicted. In Republican Rome, military service to the city was one of the privileges of citizenship. All able-bodied males of the required age came under a compulsory levy and served Rome according to their own ability to equip themselves. The armies of Republican Rome were composed of landowners or independent peasants who possessed the means of providing the weapons of war. The most affluent were those who could provide horses and serve in the cavalry. At the end of a campaign, the armies would disband and the soldiers would return to their homes. Citizens were not paid for their military service.

With its military successes in later years, Rome expanded, and with its growth came a need for more manpower. In addition, Rome's military ventures required longer periods of military service from its citizens. This situation meant that the proletarii or capite censi, whose poverty disqualified them from military life, constituted a greater portion of the population left in Rome. This class contributed very little to Rome's economic well being. Moreover, the wealthier legionnaires were eager to attend to their domestic obligations. For this reason, the legionnaires desired to be demobilized as rapidly as possibly. In the second century there are recorded instances of Roman legionnaires actively campaigning for early discharge. Recognizing that the republic still required legionnaires who could serve in lengthy campaigns, Gaius Marius appealed for volunteers from those
social classes which previously had been prohibited from supplying legionnaires. His enlistment of the poor and slaves opened the Roman army to a vast supply of manpower willing and eager to serve. Once enlisted, the landless classes had little reason to return home. Unlike the army of Rome prior to Marius, the new Roman army consisted of men whose occupation by choice was military. Republican Rome no longer needed to depend upon conscription to fill its military ranks. For all practical purposes, the army of Rome became a voluntary force.

The alteration from a conscription army to a voluntary army brought changes for civilian-military relations in Rome. The new, longer lengths of military service required that legionnaires sever their connections with civilian life for long periods of time. But, because these soldiers were recruited from the landless classes, they had neither farms nor houses beckoning return. In fact discharged soldiers were dependent upon some form of pension from the city as a basis of subsistence. Since Rome prior to Marius’s reforms had not provided for pensions, provisions had to be made. The consequence of this situation was that the soldiers turned to their commanders, who could procure from Rome the passage of lex agraria, a grant of land. Furthermore, it was the general who provided the spoils of combat which constituted a soldier’s savings upon discharge. Loyalty of the soldier, previously directed to Rome itself, transferred to the legion and its commander. The cultivation of loyalty to the general enhanced the commander’s personal power and raised the possibility, then the reality, of generals misusing that loyalty for personal ends at the expense of Rome.

The transformation of Republican Rome to Imperial Rome was not merely a change of boundaries or influence. With the growth of the Empire came a transformation of Roman character and what the city held to be the highest values. It would be simplistic to suggest that Marius’s reforms accounted for all of the changes in Rome, but the unforeseen
consequences of meeting the city's manpower needs by recruiting the lower classes for military service fundamentally altered the role that the military was to play in Rome's social and political future.

The example of Rome leads to the obvious conclusion that strategic considerations can be instrumental in changing the underlying character of a regime.

In modern times we have witnessed the conquest of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union and the transformation of those nations into communist states. We have also experienced the reconstituting of Japan into a democratic nation by American occupation forces following the Second World War. Less often, however, do we recognize that military victories—such as those experienced by Rome—can require strategic decisions which play a significant role in the eventual transformation of a regime.

For this reason, strategic considerations must be made in light of the principles of the regime. At times, though, this approach may pose extreme difficulties and may force strategists to deliberate upon factors which appear extraneous. In recent years, Western democracies have recognized that their conventional forces are inferior in number to those of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations. Demographic projections indicate that there will be fewer males available for military service in the years to come. The immediate issue for force planners and strategists concerns meeting defense needs qualitatively and quantitatively. In liberal-democratic nations, however, issues of equity must be addressed as well. As we learned only too well in Vietnam, a nation which believes that significant segments of its population are unduly burdened with military obligations will be divided. Such divisiveness will weaken the resolve of a nation—a critical factor required for military success.

At the same time, if a single principle of liberal democracy such as equality is carried to its extreme, other democratic principles, such as liberty, may, ironically, be en-
dangered. Liberal democracies must be responsive to the sentiments of the people, but they must also be responsible to the ends for which they were created. As is the case in every aspect of free government, considerations of national security must balance responsiveness against responsibility.

The third factor in evaluating strategic success concerns the ability to define objectives clearly and to place them in a proper priority. Strategists must deal with this issue at a number of levels. Initially it is important to deliberate upon what constitutes the national interest—specifically, in this instance, national security. A clear assessment of the extant dangers as well as future dangers must be made. Again, such assessments must be made strategically, which means that such deliberations must take into account factors which are not purely military but which pertain to economic and political circumstances as well.

To properly establish national objectives, the strategist first must firmly grasp the nature of his adversary. Doctrinairism must be avoided and replaced with sound political understanding. The beginning of political analysis is with analysis of the regime.

By a regime I mean the manner in which a country is organized. It is the ruling of a society by a portion of that society and, consequently, reflects the objectives or goals that the ruling element pursues. It is the regime which gives the society its distinctive character. Regimes differ in kind, but similar regimes share similar characteristics.

To understand the most fundamental political controversy of our time—the conflict being waged between democracy and communism—requires us to return to the principles which inform both kinds of regimes since strategic policy ultimately rests upon the assumptions made about both friend and foe. For example, to enter into arms negotiations with the Soviet Union requires the West to formulate assumptions about that regime. Is it the case that the Soviets are motivated by the same concerns as the West? Do the
Soviets believe that a nuclear confrontation cannot be won? Is the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States one of mere misunderstanding which can be corrected by "dialogue" and demonstrations of good will by both sides? Can Soviet behavior be explained by Soviet concern for security and international acceptance? The answers to such questions as well as their formulation depend upon an understanding of the Soviet Union.

Successful strategic thought also requires an understanding of those regimes which can be considered allies as well as those with whom we have friendly or cordial relations. Again, the strengths as well as the defects of those regimes must be understood if objectives and policies are to rest on political realities. Such calculations are not always easy and are usually difficult to explain to a nation.

American policy in Central America is a good example of the difficulty of explaining policy to a populace as well as an example of the difficulties that doctrinarism pose to a formulation of policy. Central America, for no other reason than its geographical proximity to the United States, is of major concern to the United States. Current debate over US policy has focused primarily on how to restrain Cuban and Nicaraguan activity in the area while supporting Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. Critics of American policy have emphasized the lack of democracy in these Central American nations as well as instances of violations of human rights. Few would argue that these Central American nations exhibit the same institutional safeguards for personal liberties and security that are enjoyed and prized in the United States, or that these nations have established democracy as Americans understand it. At the same time it is also clear that the defects of these four Central American nations are not the same defects as those exhibited by Cuba and Nicaragua. A sound strategic policy cannot rest upon a reductionism blind to differences in political defects. To do so is to fall victim to a doctrinarism which fails to differentiate
between regimes—even defective ones—and fails to account for the difficulty of establishing democratic institutions and procedures. Furthermore, such doctrinairism denies the possibility of adopting a flexible strategic policy.

Needless to say, the establishment of national priorities requires an assessment of a nation's available resources necessary to meet its objectives. In many instances such assessments suggest that resources do not exist to support a desired policy. The lack of available resources does not mean that a strategic objective is less vital, but that an alternative policy must be derived. This point is emphasized not to belabor the obvious, but to emphasize two points which are not always accorded discussion.

First, there is an assumption flowing from the successes of modern science that man has the capacity to control all things. The inability to manipulate events is difficult to explain to modern man, but we would be wise to recall Clausewitz's admonition on this matter:

War is the province of chance. In no other sphere of human activity has such a margin to be left for this intruder, because none is in such constant contact with it on every side. It increases the uncertainty of every circumstance and deranges the course of events.7

The uncertainty of strategic success is due in part to the constancy of chance and in part to the fact that we cannot always control those areas which are not left to chance. Certainly, we cannot avoid strategic planning because of uncertainty and we should not allow this fact to excuse every failure, but neither should we allow failure to undermine a resolve to meet objectives or to seek alternative courses. The fact that military events are not conducted in isolation and are part of a totality indicates that success itself is more than the consequence of individual action. The same observation can be made about the effects of failure.

A second aspect of strategic uncertainty especially salient for liberal democratic regimes is that liberal democracies are
accountable to their citizens. As a consequence, leaders of such democracies have a responsibility to inform their citizens of the direction of policy. How much information the public needs to know is controversial, and is, of course, an issue which has kept the free press and liberal democracies in a constant state of tension. Nevertheless, strategic objectives, especially the ends of grand strategy, must be articulated to the public both to ensure that the citizens are informed and to ensure public support.

The formulation and implementation of national security policy are the responsibilities of public officials, both political and military. The public articulation of strategic objectives is also the responsibility of public officials, but this responsibility calls forth a different art: political rhetoric. Political rhetoric is not simply indoctrination, however; the political rhetorician has a responsibility to move the public as well as to inform the public. Because public discourse addresses a vast audience, domestic as well as foreign, its appeal must be broad. Dependent upon symbolism and example, public address does not lend itself to detailed explications of concepts or problems. At the same time, though, demands will constantly be made for more precision and elaboration of the policy: its objectives as well as directions.

Clearly, there are advantages in broad strategic statements. Such expressions enable strategic goals to be pursued with a flexibility that would not exist if goals were defined narrowly. Moreover, strategic success may require the adoption of alternative means. If strategic means have been publicly identified, such alterations could endanger success by providing a foe with sensitive hints. The current battle against terrorist activities provides a good example of many of these problems.

In recent years, incidents of terrorist activity have increased in number, loss of property, and loss of life. Unlike conventional warfare, the cost of terrorist support by US adversaries is low. Problems in intelligence gathering often
make it difficult to confirm without doubt that a terrorist action was supported by a given state. The terrorist acts themselves are particularly barbaric. Powerful nations, such as the United States, appear unable to eradicate terrorism while at the same time frustration grows among its citizens for a policy to meet this increasing violence. In addition, spokesmen for terrorist organizations make sympathetic appeals to the same public that they endanger in hopes that their causes will win favor through intimidation. The public fears that a military response will result in more terrorist retaliation.

The problem of terrorism must be addressed. Statesmen must place the battle against terrorist groups within a broad strategic context. A policy for dealing with terrorism must be broad enough to include options for holding states supporting terrorist activity accountable while at the same time providing special operations to combat small and independent terrorist cells. Because of differences in terrorist groups, different forms of counterterrorist measures must be available. The public must be informed that terrorism, unlike illness, will not disappear with the adoption of any particular policy, but the incidence of attack can be reduced by adopting specific kinds of measures. Political rhetoric can inform the public of the nature of the threat and how it differs from previous forms of attack. Such official statements must also make clear that a successful strategy in dealing with this new form of warfare may not eliminate all incidents. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of official spokesmen to make sure that the citizen body knows why resistance and not capitulation is the only recourse for dealing with the problem. And to state the obvious, public statements must not endanger any counterterrorist measures despite the desire of the public to be informed.

IN DISCUSSING STRATEGIC SUCCESS as I have, there is a danger in being able to identify strategic failure but never
being able to identify strategic success. In part, this is because the discussion has emphasized that strategic success must be evaluated in terms of long-range and indirect consequences, and that such policies are directed toward political goals. Furthermore, the political goals are regime oriented, which means that they touch upon the fundamental aspects of political life.

The difficulty of discussing strategic success is related to the fact that strategy is without end unless one envisions a world without arms and adversaries. Unlike strategic games, political life is not bounded by innings, periods, or quarters. Confrontations are followed by new antagonisms and antagonists which require new strategic considerations. In some cases former strategic policies are appropriate, but in many instances new foes and new forms of warfare require a constant alteration of strategic concepts. Successful strategy requires that flexibility and adaptation.

The most obvious example of the need to adjust strategic thinking to new political realities concerns the confrontation between the East and the West. Speculation as to the origins of the controversy between the Soviet Union and the West, as well as responsibility for the rise of hostilities between the two antagonists, already provides answers to the very questions it claims to pose. The formulation of such questions assumes that the Soviet Union and the West could possibly have lived comfortably with each other following the defeat of the Axis powers. Or to state the matter in direct fashion, the Soviet Union as a Marxist or communist state has no inherent principles as a regime which should necessarily lead to confrontation with non-Marxist states.

If the Soviet Union is understood in this manner, then explanations other than Marxism or communism must provide the answers for understanding Soviet behavior. And, of course, such explanations have been proposed by understanding the Soviet Union as pursuing the historical strategic objectives of Russia or as reacting defensively to fears of
aggression from surrounding powers. But if the Soviet Union is perceived as hostile to the West because of regime principles, then the confrontation is not a consequence of historical accident but an occurrence which awaited its particular moment.

The above concern with the causes of conflict between the Soviet Union and the West is still the critical question to pose for strategic thinkers, as it was one of the fundamental questions to consider when the Soviet Union was joined in alliance with the Western powers during the Second World War. The realization that the Soviet Union was hostile to the United States and its allies because the communist state was a tyranny was in itself, however, was insufficient to provide proper strategic guidance. Strategic policy toward the Soviet Union had to take into account the political, military, and economic status of the West as well. Of the allied nations, the United States was the only one whose economy did not require total reconstruction—though it should not be forgotten that the Second World War was preceded by the Great Depression.

Unlike the Soviet Union, Western nations had to ensure that their policies were supported by their citizen bodies. Governments of the free world, unlike those of tyrannical powers, must react to the responsiveness of the populations. Strategic planners within Western democracies were required, consequently, to calculate what kinds of sacrifices their populations would accept. The great problem for statesmen is to provide to their citizens sufficient reasons so that they will support those policies necessary to meet the national interests. To no small extent, the post-Second World War period has increasingly been one where the leadership of the West has had to convince its population of the present danger in order to justify to its citizens the required sacrifices.

On the whole the United States and its allies have succeeded. Though the Soviet Union expanded its power significantly after the Second World War and had successes
throughout the postwar period, the West, through its NATO alliance and policy of containment, demonstrated to the Soviet Union and its satellites that the alliance had the capacity to, and would, respond to aggression if necessary. The Berlin airlift, the Truman policies toward Greece, Turkey, and Iran after the Second World War, the Korean conflict, and the Cuban missile crisis all gave demonstration to the Soviets that the West would respond. Coupled with the success of the Marshall Plan, which helped reconstruct the economies and way of life of the European nations, the strategic policies of the West have resulted in neither a nuclear nor a conventional confrontation between the two sides. Is this strategic success? Can strategic success be defined in terms of negative achievements, that is, the absence of direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West?

Yes. Unless we are willing to be misled by two variants of modern doctrinairism, strategic goals and their accomplishment must be understood in light of the limits of politics. Both the Communist World and the Democratic World have their own forms of doctrinairism. For the Marxist, there is the continual promise that the ultimate triumph of the proletariat will usher in those conditions that make both war and states unnecessary. And for the West there is the hope that the enlightenment of people and nations will spread republicanism throughout the world and ultimately usher in a condition of perpetual peace. Statesmen, however, must confront political reality and are themselves responsible for making their citizens aware that the vision of the good can be used to blind us of the realities of the present. The present is rooted not in the abstract but in that which is, and statesmen responsible for the safeguarding of their nations must constantly be aware of the character of political reality. For this reason, strategic success must be measured in light of political reality.

Strategic success is rooted in political understanding. Its success is dependent upon knowledge of the political setting and those nations with which one must live.
NOTES


ON 23 MARCH 1983, President Reagan stunned the nation, its allies, and all but a handful of his closest advisors with his now famous speech calling for a national effort to find defensive technologies to make nuclear ballistic missiles obsolete. The President asked,

Would it not be better to save lives than to avenge them? . . . What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack; that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies? 

The next day, the President signed National Security Study Directive 6-83, tasking two separate studies, one dealing with the technology of strategic defense and the second dealing with strategy. 

With little warning, the President challenged what had been the essence of US policy and strategic doctrine for almost forty years and opened the door for a truly radical change. Whether the impact of his speech was accurately forecast in March of 1983 is not clear, but by 1985 the importance was obviously understood by the President when he told Sam Donaldson during an interview.

William E. Savage, a Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Air Force, wrote this essay while attending the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. The essay won recognition in the 1986 Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition.
SAVAGE

Then there’s the strategic question: what would the development and deployment of effective defense systems do to deterrence, and to the fragile peace-of-a-sort that has been built over the past forty years? This is a very serious question, because the peace-of-a-sort we have maintained is clearly preferable to war. Deterrence has provided a crude, but effective, regulatory mechanism in world affairs; the possibility of mutual destruction has set limits on superpower actions that might otherwise have led to a general war... We should be very careful about altering the strategic regime, to be sure. 3

Events Preceding the President’s Speech

The President’s speech did not come completely out of the blue—but it was close. His proposal for strategic defense was adopted, according to press reports, in a “highly personal, secret, and almost accidental manner.” 4 It was not a new idea for the President, however, who had long been uncomfortable with Mutual Assured Destruction. Shortly before his inauguration, the President discussed the use of space lasers for missile defense with Senator Harrison Schmitt, the former astronaut, who told the President that much could be done given a national commitment. 5

Subsequently the President may have been reinforced in his thoughts on strategic defense by several other sources. Project High Frontier, an independent conservative proposal for nonnuclear missile defense led by retired Lieutenant General Daniel Graham, was briefed to the President early in 1982. Dr. Edward Teller, father of the H-bomb and a longtime critic of the 1972 ABM Treaty, met with the President at the White House to discuss technical prospects for strategic defense, including the use of nuclear pumped x-ray lasers being pursued under Teller’s sponsorship at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. 6
Senior Defense Department officials examined and continued to be skeptical of the missile defense proposals. Without Defense support, it would be difficult to embark on a major strategic defense initiative. The Defense support the President needed seems to have come from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their concern over the future of strategic offensive forces was sparked by difficulty in finding sites for the MX missile. At a meeting in February 1983 attended by the President, Secretary of Defense, Deputy National Security Advisor, and the Joint Chiefs, the topic of MX basing sparked a lengthy discussion of strategic defense as an option. The President's keen interest and the Chiefs' qualified support resulted in the inclusion of a call for strategic defense in the speech delivered a month later.7

Events Since the Speech

In response to the President's directive, separate technology and strategy studies were conducted during the Summer of 1983. Former NASA Administrator James C. Fletcher headed the Defensive Technologies Study Team whose report suggested some promising technological opportunities for strategic defense. Fletcher's report recommended a vigorous research program, funded at $18 billion to $27 billion over five years, to provide the technical basis for an early decision on ballistic missile defense (BMD) development and deployment.8 Subsequently, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) has been formed to manage a five year, $26 billion strategic defense research program.

The Future Security Strategy Study, led by Fred S. Hoffman, investigated the strategy and policy implications of SDI. Some of its findings will be discussed later in this paper. To carry on investigations of the strategy and policy implications of strategic defense, a Policy Strategy Advisory Group (PSAG), under the co-leadership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, has been formed as a rough parallel to the SDIO. Unlike the SDIO,
however, the PSAG has not been a visible source of much activity. The technologists are off and running; the strategists are lagging behind. Colin Gray, President of the National Institute for Public Policy, observes that “Congress is dissatisfied with the policy and strategy story that they have seen thus far.”

Technology and Strategy

It is almost gospel to state that strategy should lead technology. The President knows it, saying that we need to “get the discussion on the right track, which has to do with strategy, politics, and ethics. . . . The crucial thing is to get politics out in front of technology for the first time since the invention of the machine gun.”

The United States has put strategy and policy ahead of technology in the past, even since the machine gun. In 1949, the United States faced a decision whether or not to develop the H-bomb—a decision not unlike the one on SDI today. At that time, the Administration adopted Paul Nitze’s proposal to separate development and production decisions, while studying the technical feasibility and strategic policy simultaneously. The result of the policy study, NSC-68, preceded and supported the H-bomb production decision. The same can be done today for SDI decisions. The purpose of this essay is to examine the strategy implications of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

“The debate over Star Wars is (or should be) primarily one of strategy and objectives, not technology.”

HISTORY OF US NUCLEAR STRATEGY

To understand the implications of the suggested change in strategy associated with strategic defense, we must review the evolution of nuclear strategy from its beginnings at the end of World War II up to the present time. The key terms used in
the lexicon of nuclear strategy are deterrence and stability. Despite Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle’s admonition at the National Defense University’s symposium on low intensity conflict that we should not waste time defining terms because “definitions are the playgrounds of small minds,” time defining deterrence and stability is well spent.

Barry Smernoff, Senior Fellow at the National Defense University Strategic Concepts Development Center, states, “the essence of nuclear deterrence is the sustained capability of the American commitment, as perceived by the Soviet Union, to carry out its part of the mutual suicide pact. . . .” John Weinstein agrees: “The concept of deterrence rests on the assured capability of each superpower to survive an attack by the other with enough weapons to inflict such unacceptable damage on the aggressor that ‘the living would envy the dead’ as Khrushchev once observed.”

Deterrence is a concept of war avoidance based on convincing a potential aggressor that his perceived gains could not be worth the costs. It has been the potential devastation wrought by nuclear weapons that has raised the costs to a level to make deterrence work. Aaron Freidberg cautions us, “It is worth remembering that a nuclear war of virtually any size or conceivable configuration would be destructive almost beyond belief. In the current cycle of nuclear revisionism some of our more enthusiastic armchair strategists have tended to lose sight of those facts.”

Stability is a condition wherein the forces of politics, strategy, and (particularly) the military push movements from a steady state position back toward equilibrium. Crisis stability reduces the probability of war, and arms race stability provides disincentives for arms race expansion. Under assured destruction theories, “deterrence is stable as long as each side’s population and industry remain vulnerable to the destructive force of the other side.” Deterrence and stability have been the cornerstones of US strategy for forty years.
The Truman Doctrine and Containment, 1945-1949

After World War II, the United States enjoyed a nuclear monopoly and used it to resist Soviet expansion without the high cost of maintaining large conventional forces. A policy of containment of Soviet expansion was first officially proclaimed in 1947 by President Truman in what came to be called the Truman Doctrine. US nuclear target lists included enemy urban-industrial areas, not unlike nuclear targeting against Japan during World War II. Although a declaratory policy of Massive Retaliation was not adopted until later, deterrence was clearly based on the threat of nuclear retaliation aimed at countervalue targets.

NSC–68 and Massive Retaliation, 1949-1960

Several events served to increase the fact and impression of the Soviet threat toward the end of the Truman administration. The Soviet Union became the second nuclear power in 1949 with the explosion of its first atomic bomb, followed surprisingly quickly with a thermonuclear hydrogen bomb in 1953. The Korean War made the concept and the price of containment using conventional forces painfully clear. A review of US strategy resulted in issuance of a National Security Council Memorandum known as NSC–68 which called for a “militarization of what had until 1950 been a policy of containing communist expansion primarily through economic and security assistance to threatened states.” It called for increased effort and a tougher stand against the Soviet Union. The tougher stand was taken, but the increased effort, in the form of adequate conventional forces, was not made. Instead, the United States increasingly came to rely on its superiority of nuclear weapons and its policy of Massive Retaliation as a substitute for conventional forces and readiness. Deterrence was based on the threat of immediate and massive nuclear retaliation using simultaneous attacks on Soviet bloc economic and military targets.
Robert McNamara and Assured Destruction, 1960-1969

In 1957, Sputnik demonstrated a Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability which undermined the strategy of Massive Retaliation. The Kennedy administration rejected the concept of Massive Retaliation as too massive, too inflexible, and not credible considering Soviet nuclear missiles. For several years, the Kennedy administration bounced between strategies of Flexible Response, Damage Limitation, and Assured Destruction. General Maxwell Taylor's 1959 book, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, described Flexible Response:

> The strategic doctrine which I would propose to replace Massive Retaliation is called herein the Strategy of Flexible Response. This name suggests the need for a capability to react across the entire spectrum of possible challenge, for coping with anything from general atomic war to infiltrations and aggressions such as threaten Laos and Berlin in 1959. The new strategy would recognize that it is just as necessary to deter or win quickly a limited war as to deter a general war.

In 1962, Robert McNamara declared a strategy of Flexible Response which would require conventional forces adequate to meet conventional aggression and a level of nuclear superiority to dominate escalation. The United States would destroy the enemy's military forces, not his civilian population. To destroy the enemy's military forces, though, would require survivable second strike forces.

Unfortunately, a flexible response-second strike-counterforce-damage limitation strategy came with a high price tag. Requests from the military for forces to implement the strategy were open-ended, and therefore "of little use to civilian officials searching for ways to control the growth of U.S. strategic forces." As a result, the strategy was changed to match the dollars. Secretary McNamara moved toward an Assured Destruction strategy for which a reasonable force structure could be sized. In his 1968 Defense Budget, McNamara rationalized his new strategy as follows:
Damage limiting programs, no matter how much we spend on them, can never substitute for an assured destruction capability in the deterrent role. It is our ability to destroy an attacker as a viable twentieth century nation that provides the deterrent, not our ability to partially limit damage to ourselves.27

So nuclear retaliation continued to substitute for adequate military forces. Indeed, during this period, conventional force levels in Europe were lower than they had been during the era of US nuclear dominance and Massive Retaliation.28

Nuclear weapon targeting during this period, however, was inconsistent with declaratory strategy. Assured Destruction would require prompt destruction of urban industrial targets. The actual targeting was for a counterforce second strike against Soviet military installations. Economic targets were held in reserve.29 So, despite declaratory policy aimed at checking defense budget requirements, McNamara’s nuclear weapon employment plans were more consistent with Flexible Response and Damage Limitation.


The Vietnam War was an enormous resource drain on the United States and resulted in limitations of both nuclear and conventional forces. In 1969, the Nixon Doctrine proclaimed that US allies should shoulder their own responsibility for defense unless threatened by a major power with nuclear weapons; the United States would provide a deterrent nuclear retaliatory guarantee.30 Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had embarked on a massive strategic offensive force expansion. The United States needed to respond to the Soviet expansion, without incurring the expense of an offensive or defensive arms race. The answer came in the form of an update of the Flexible Response strategy. In the popular jargon, that update was tagged with the term Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).
According to MAD theory, the Assured Destruction of the 1960s would become mutual. The Soviet Union could build its offensive forces up to rough equivalence with the United States both of which would be constrained by the SALT I Treaty. MAD was defined as the reciprocal capability of rivals to inflict unacceptable damage on each other during a nuclear war, even after absorbing a surprise first strike. It required US nuclear forces prepared to destroy the Soviet Union as a functioning society, and to do so, those forces should be powerful, accurate, and invulnerable. The concept of superiority no longer seemed relevant in an age when even the inferior nuclear power could inflict damage of such magnitude that it could threaten society. Henry Kissinger asked, "What in the name of God is superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally? What do you do with it?" He argued that imbalances in military power were no longer of significance between nuclear powers, and that degrees of nuclear power were meaningless provided that sufficient parity was maintained to deny the enemy a disarming first strike.

One thing that could upset the mutual terror of MAD would be strategic defenses which would undermine the assured destruction of the side defended. It was in that context that the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was signed in 1972. The Treaty recognized that effective nationwide defense systems could erode deterrence and be destabilizing. To further enhance deterrence and stability, the United States chose to collocate its one allowed ABM site with an ICBM deployment. The US ABM would protect the strategic offensive retaliatory force, thus enhancing the assurance of MAD. The Soviets publicly recognize MAD and the stability afforded by the ABM Treaty. In its critique of SDI, the Soviet Union reminds us that limits on ABM would be a "substantial factor" in curbing the strategic offensive arms race and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.
Schlesinger and Selective Response Options, 1974–1979

During the Ford administration, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger moved the United States toward a Flexible Response strategy. The continuation of Soviet force buildup necessitated US response options between inaction and very large attacks. Schlesinger’s 1975 annual report explained, “Rather than massive options, we now want to provide the President with a wider set of much more selective targeting options.” He emphasized preplanned, limited nuclear options, secure reserve forces, escalation control, and targeting to impede Soviet postwar recovery.

Despite the evolving strategy, however, the forces were just not available for implementation. By the end of the 1970s, the United States had allowed the disparity between commitments and resources to increase to levels unprecedented in the nuclear age. All the while, the Soviets continued force expansion.


In 1979 three events led to a reassessment of US strategic policy and increased emphasis on strategic forces. The Senate debate over the SALT II Treaty revealed the degree of deterioration US strategic capability had suffered in the face of a huge Soviet strategic force build up: the overthrow of the Shah of Iran gave evidence that the Nixon Doctrine of individual responsibility for defense didn’t work; and finally, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. The immediate result was proclamation of the Carter Doctrine during President Carter’s 1980 State of the Union address, when he said,

Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

But Carter did not request the increase in conventional forces required to implement the doctrine. The strategy-forces
mismatch continued. The Carter administration’s nuclear strategy was stated in Presidential Decision (PD)-59, which responded to expanded Soviet emphasis on winning a nuclear war. PD-59 recognized the possibility of a prolonged nuclear war with the attendant need for survivability and endurance in strategic command systems as well as in the strategic offensive forces themselves. Targeting emphasis shifted from war recovery targets, which could never be accurately specified, to logistics, industry, military forces, and political-military leadership targets to impede an enduring Soviet war effort.41

Harold Brown described the strategy of PD-59 as a Countervailing Strategy, the focus of which was deterrence not only by the threat of punishment, but also, and more importantly, by the denial of Soviet objectives, as the Soviets perceive them.44 Sufficient uncertainty in the Soviet assessment of a war outcome would deter aggression, and only “essential equivalence” rather than US superiority was needed to maintain that uncertainty. Deterrence would be based on the threatened disruption of the Soviet war machine, the loss of political-military control within the Soviet Union, and the decapitation of Soviet leadership.45

In actuality, Brown’s Countervailing Strategy was not markedly different from Schlesinger’s Selective Response Strategy, and it suffered from the same strategy-forces mismatch. The United States simply did not have the forces to implement the planned response.46

The Reagan administration essentially accepted the Countervailing Strategy, but recognized that current forces were inadequate to support the strategy. Secretary Weinberger turned his attention to implementing the strategy with an across-the-board expansion and modernization of US nuclear and conventional forces, financed by major, sustained real increases in defense spending.47 A central premise of the Reagan administration was that war with the Soviet Union is likely to quickly spread to other theaters, and that a counteroffensive against Soviet vulnerable points worldwide
should be the US response. Even after the Reagan military buildup, however, the stark reality remains that the United States and its allies don't possess sufficient conventional forces to engage Soviet forces in a global war.48

Ronald Reagan and Strategic Defense, 1983-1986

Prior to President Reagan's "Star Wars" speech, there was surprisingly little criticism of US strategy and few calls for a major realignment toward strategic defense. Following the speech, however, the critics quickly became more numerous and more vocal.

Criticism of the current strategy. The most fundamental criticism was an echo of the President's gut feeling that deterrence based on the threat of retaliation against innocent, undefended civilians was just not right. Henry Kissinger, who negotiated the ABM Treaty under the MAD theory, changed his mind and argued that a deterrence based on retaliation was no longer relevant.44 Critics argued that the Countervailing Strategy implemented only the punishment mechanism of deterrence, not the denial function.45 Thomas Blau best expressed the frustration with the old strategy: "We are ... still trying to preserve peace by threatening to ensure holocaust. ... . The point is, some of the key ideas of current doctrine could only be believed by someone with an advanced degree."46

Although a nuclear MAD strategy had been superceded in the United States by 1974, it remained the focus of intense criticism on moral, political, and military grounds. Some argued that MAD was "inconsistent with Judeo-Christian morality"46 and "morally dubious."55 Others focused on the politics, arguing that MAD no longer had a consensus on either side of the Atlantic.54 Colin Gray explained, "The ABM Treaty rests on a particular theory of stable deterrence that has been rejected in Washington and that never was authoritative in Moscow."55 Finally, the military logic of MAD had long been questioned, and now was openly criticized as "militarily irrelevant."56
Another criticism of the current strategy was that a war could start which neither side wanted or even knew about beforehand. Gray's basic argument against current deterrent strategy was that "the future rests upon a nuclear deterrence system concerning which even a single serious malfunction cannot be tolerated." John Rather put it more bluntly: "Basically, at present, we have put the survival of the world in the hands of the craziest guy around, namely the guy who thinks he can get the drop on the other person."

Inadequate extended deterrence, crisis instability, and eroding credibility due to self-deterrence were also discussed as failings of current US strategy. All arise from the asymmetries or imbalances between US and Soviet forces or situations. Extended deterrence of war in Europe based on the threat of US strategic forces is considered inadequate without a US homeland defense, because of strategic offensive parity and strategic and theater defensive asymmetries favoring the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. What US President is really willing to sacrifice New York and Washington for Frankfurt and Bonn? Others argue that the capability and survivability of Soviet strategic offense forces, the vulnerability and lack of hard target kill capability of US strategic offensive forces, the Soviet advantage in strategic and missile defense, and an inadequate US second strike strategy all motivate a Soviet first strike in a crisis situation. Finally, it is argued that the same asymmetries make current US strategy incredible. Rather than deterring Soviet actions, we deter our own because we know that outbreak and subsequent escalation of nuclear war will destroy our society.

The search for something better. The criticisms of current strategy are well founded, and improvements are certainly desirable. Barry Smernoff asserts, "little doubt exists that Americans are searching actively for what Fred Ikle (now Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) termed 'a new path into the 21st century' insofar as strategic thinking is concerned." Leon Sloss sees four broad options for change: rely
SAVAGE

heavily on arms control, reduce oversea commitments to lessen demand for extended deterrence, increase and modernize non-nuclear forces, or modernize the strategic deterrent. Under the fourth option, he has three approaches: modernize offensive forces, defensive forces, or some mix of the two. The first option hasn't worked well; the second is inconsistent with US geopolitical world views; the third has proven too expensive in manpower and dollars. Sloss recommends modernizing both offensive and defensive forces under the fourth option. Carl Sagan sees a narrower range of options, believing, “The United States and the Soviet Union have gone too far. They have placed in jeopardy our global civilization and possibly even the human species.” He cites only two ways out: massive reductions through arms control or erection of strategic defense shields.

The promise of strategic defense. Consideration of increased strategic defense is not a new idea. Every President since Eisenhower considered substituting strategic defense for offense and, until Ronald Reagan, rejected the idea. Why did strategic defense become a possible answer in 1983? A host of reasons have been proffered.

The primary argument is that strategic defense will strengthen deterrence. The 1983 Future Security Strategy Study states.

A satisfactory deterrent requires a combination of more discriminating and effective offensive systems to respond to enemy attacks plus defensive systems to deny the achievement of enemy attack objectives. Such a deterrent can counter the erosion of confidence in our alliance guarantees caused by the adverse shifts in the military balances since the 1960s.

Credible deterrence would require damage limitation through active and passive defenses; likewise, extended deterrence would require an adequate homeland defense.

Should deterrence fail, strategic defense would limit damage to the United States such that war would not result
in apocalypse. Comprehensive protection using a highly capable defensive shield is the basis for the Assured Survival strategy.

Often, the move toward strategic defense is explained as a response to Soviet efforts. The Soviet buildup of strategic nuclear warfighting capabilities, potential for breakout from the ABM Treaty, and increase in tactical nuclear ballistic missiles aimed at Europe all require some response. US strategic defenses are presented as the answer. The asymmetry in forces that has developed over the past twenty years has resulted, some argue, in an imbalance which can best be redressed by the addition of US strategic defenses.

Other factors suggesting strategic defense as the answer to problems of current strategy are a disenchantment with arms control progress, the increasing vulnerability of US strategic offensive forces, the vulnerability to small third country or terrorist nuclear attacks in an age of nuclear proliferation, and a strong aversion to the absence of morality in any MAD-like strategy. This last reason may have been the most important to President Reagan.

Finally, the matter which moved the strategic defense solution to advocacy in 1983 rather than before is the advance in technology which might lead to effective ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems. The technologists will continue to debate the adequacy of the technology for years to come. Nevertheless, in our analysis of the strategy of strategic defense, we will assume that the technology optimists are right in claiming a fairly effective, albeit not leak-proof, multi-layered strategic defense system is technologically feasible. Our question remains one of strategy.

The Reasons for Change

Over forty years, US nuclear strategy has evolved and matured. Throughout the period, three fundamental reasons can account for most of the change and can be expected to in-
fluence future adjustments as well. The first and probably most significant factor has been the changing nuclear balance caused by an inexorable Soviet buildup coupled with a US reluctance to commit equivalent resources to defense. Technological advancement is the second factor. Nuclear weapons led to the original deterrent strategy: ICBMs extended the Soviet threat to the US homeland; MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) led to decreased crisis stability; and now particle beams or x-ray lasers may allow a shift from offensive to defensive dominance. Finally, US understanding of Soviet doctrine has improved. MAD worked best only if both sides subscribed to it. Understanding Soviet war aims permits the United States to enhance deterrence by devising force postures which deny the Soviets the prospect of achieving those aims.

Although the strategy has changed, two elements—deterrence and stability—have remained the primary goals throughout the nuclear age. Nuclear weapons made the effects of war unacceptable, so that war avoidance rather than victory became the goal. War could be avoided by deterring both sides from ever seeing it as a preferable course of action. Stability would prevent events from taking over from people in following any course of action. The introduction of strategic defenses requires that we evaluate whether deterrence and stability can remain the common threads of future as well as past strategies.

SDI STRATEGY

Since March of 1983, there have been a variety of conflicting views on the strategy associated with the SDI. It seems that, up to now at least, there are no right answers about a new defensive strategy, just some good questions. As W. Bruce Weinrod asked at a Heritage Foundation roundtable discussion to assess strategic defense,
STRATEGY IMPLICATIONS OF SDI

What is the specific theory behind the technology? Is it to directly provide a nearly impermeable shield to the civilian population; or to protect vulnerable retaliatory forces; or to deter by uncertainty, thereby indirectly protecting populations; or perhaps some combination of these or other purposes? The answers are not clear and have by no means been constant.

Evolution

At first the strategy seemed to be Mutual Assured Survival. The President wanted to make nuclear ballistic missiles impotent and obsolete; to kill the things that kill people. The goal was to protect the civilian population. Such a strategy has been espoused by the High Frontier project and was the assumption underpinning the President's speech. Reagan went so far as to offer the SDI technology to the Soviet Union to establish the mutuality of Mutual Assured Survival. Under this strategy, most if not all nuclear weapons could be negotiated away, or even discarded unilaterally. They would no longer be relevant.

It soon became apparent, however, that not even the most enthusiastic technologist could foresee any prospect of inventing systems to implement a Mutual Assured Survival strategy. The emphasis was reoriented toward an element of the existing Countervailing Strategy, deterrence by denial. Under this strategy, deterrence is enhanced by increasing the Soviet uncertainty in accomplishing their war aims. Colin Gray argues that defenses can "promote massive new uncertainties in Soviet attack calculations." Even the internal government view began to change toward deterrence by denial through uncertainty. By October 1983, the US interagency Future Security Strategy Study had recognized that strategic defenses do not have to be near perfect to be useful in deterrence. The study found, "Even a U.S. defense of limited capability can deny Soviet planners confidence in..."
their ability to destroy a sufficient set of military targets to satisfy enemy objectives, thereby strengthening deterrence."75

The deterrence-by-denial advocates do not always agree on the Soviet war aim to be denied, but many want to deny Soviet confidence in destroying US strategic offensive retaliatory forces in a Soviet first strike. In the near term, the defense of strategic second-strike capability may be the only feasible application of SDI technology. Colin Gray sees no choice during the first phase of strategic defenses, arguing that we must continue offense-dominant deterrence using active point defense to complement strategic offensive force mobility, super hardening, penetration aids, and real-time battle management.76 Few argue with this shift in emphasis during the transition. Even Max Kampleman, head of the US arms control delegation in Geneva, has argued for defense of the retaliatory force.77 So in the near term, these SDI advocates make the case for a strategy of deterrence based on retaliation using strategic offensive forces protected by terminal defenses. In 1972 that same strategy was called Mutual Assured Destruction.

Even after very effective strategic defenses are available in the long term, the SDI advocates continue to argue that strategic nuclear offenses will play a role. Keith Payne argues that offensive forces will not become obsolete, because both sides will want to deter through the threat of nuclear escalation, using offense as a "backstop for deterrence."78 Even with good defenses, the Soviets would be deterred through fear of failure of an untested strategic defense system, leakage through the system, tactical surprise negating the effectiveness of the system, and nuclear winter.79 Furthermore, despite mature defenses protecting the United States, the Soviets will need to be deterred from pursuing military solutions elsewhere, and strategic offensive forces will be needed to provide that deterrence.80 So even after we have mature strategic defenses, the threat of punishment using offensive
nuclear forces would continue to contribute to deterrence. Even SDI advocate Colin Gray recognizes, "Shields of various kinds, whether hand carried or in the form of walls, can play an essential part in providing direct physical protection, but they have little utility for the defeat and punishment of invaders able to ignore them."

Most recently, SDI has been linked closely with arms control. The ultimate defensive strategy is to use strategic defenses against threats of attacks from Third World nations or terrorists, having eliminated superpower nuclear weapons through arms control. Ambassador Paul Nitze described the proposed evolution of defensive strategy from one of deterrence through fear of retaliation to "mutual assured security" as follows:

For the near-term, at least the next 10 years, we will continue to base deterrence on the ultimate threat of nuclear retaliation. Today's technology provides no alternative. That being said, we will press for radical cuts in the number and power of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms.

Should a transition be possible, arms control would play an important role. We would, for example, seek continued reductions in offensive nuclear arms. Concurrently, we would envisage the sides beginning to test, develop, and deploy survivable and cost-effective defenses, with particular emphasis on nonnuclear forces. Deterrence would thus begin to rely more on a mix of offensive nuclear and defensive systems, instead of on the threat of offensive nuclear arms alone.

Given the right technological and political conditions, we would hope to be able to continue the reduction of all nuclear weapons down to zero. The total elimination of nuclear weapons would be accompanied by widespread deployments of effective nonnuclear defenses. Were we to reach the ultimate phase, deterrence would be based on the ability of the defense to deny success to a potential aggressor's attack—whether nuclear or conventional. The strategic relationship could then be characterized as one of mutual assured security.
Thus, in Nitze's opinion, it would be arms control more than strategic defense per se that would eliminate the threat of nuclear ballistic missiles.

Some of the open source strategists present conflicting goals and thus suggest a dilemma. Stephen Cambone argues for a final strategy, after appropriate transition, of Mutual Assured Survival in which the superpowers use strategic defense to deny the military utility of offensive forces and, at the same time, to assure survival of residual offensive forces. It is not clear why one would assure survival of any forces whose utility had been denied. Colin Gray poses two desirable options, assured denial/destruction using strategic offensive forces and assured survival using SDI. The dilemma is that Mutual Assured Survival and MAD can't exist simultaneously, and that unilateral Assured Survival of oneself and Assured Destruction of the opponent would never be tolerated by the side asked to lock in its inferiority.

In sum, although the open source strategists have explored a variety of concepts of SDI strategy since the President's speech, a logical, consistent, defendable defensive strategy has not yet emerged.

Evaluation

We now turn to an evaluation of the strategies associated with an increase in strategic defense. The areas for evaluation are the impacts on deterrence and stability, the arms control implications, the effects of US allies, and the interaction with domestic politics.

Deterrence. Earlier, we defined deterrence as a war avoidance concept based on ensuring that any aggressor perceives the costs of war to exceed the potential gains. The first question we must ask now concerns the goal of strategic defense. Is it to fight and win a war using defensive systems, or is it to deter war? Almost all observers argue for deterrence, agreeing with President Reagan's 1984 campaign
slogan, "Nuclear war can never be won, and must never be fought." The reason is that a completely leak-proof defense is technologically unattainable, so if nuclear war occurred, leakage through the shield would be deadly. The Soviets agree, stating in their response to SDI, "Science has irrefutably proved that there can be no absolutely dependable means of defense in a nuclear war for it is practically impossible to create one." According to Carl Sagan, with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons deployed by each superpower, leakage through the most optimistic shields would still result in hundreds to thousands of nuclear explosions, which is enough to produce climatic changes which would trigger global catastrophe—nuclear winter. Thus despite the most optimistic defenses, a nuclear war would threaten the extinction of worldwide society.

Furthermore, Gary Guertner points out an irony of strategic defense wherein good defenses might make it too difficult to kill hard targets forcing a change in targeting doctrine with more weapons aimed at cities and other soft targets. "The irony of strategic defense is that cities and population centers very likely could move from the bottom to the top of targeting priorities for both the United States and the Soviet Union." Accordingly, some would argue that strategic defense could result in more instead of fewer direct casualties, should war occur.

If the goal of strategic defense is to contribute to deterrence, the next question is, what deters? Earlier we described how the mechanism of deterrence has shifted, under the Countervailing Strategy, from one of threatened retaliation to a mix of retaliation and denial of Soviet war aims. The retaliation mechanism requires survival of US strategic offensive forces. As discussed previously, even the SDI advocates agree that the threat of retaliation must be maintained as one element of deterrence, primarily because of potential SDI leakage, the difficulty in realistic testing, and the threat of tactical surprise. The denial mechanism requires that we
understand the Soviet war aims to be denied. Those war aims are currently understood to be the survival of its political-military control functions at home, its war machine including forces and industry, and its leadership.** Again, survivable, flexible US strategic offensive forces are required to threaten the defeat of Soviet war aims in terms of the parameters they value most.

Most recently, the Future Security Strategy Study found a third deterrent mechanism, one based on creating uncertainty in the outcome of a Soviet attack.** Strategic defenses can create that uncertainty, but they must be structured to defend the targets of the Soviet attack. Achievement of Soviet war aims requires the targeting of US strategic offensive forces which threaten the Soviet's most valued items. So even this third element of deterrence requires survivable US strategic offensive forces. Of the three mechanisms of deterrence—uncertainty of success in an attack, denial of war aims, and the threat of retaliation—all lead to a requirement for survival of the US retaliatory forces.

With all three mechanisms of deterrence leading to a requirement for survivable strategic offensive forces, we address the question of how to provide for that survivability. Here, many options are available. Some, like launch on warning or launch under attack, depend on a hair trigger and are crisis unstable. Others, like increased numbers of weapons and delivery vehicles, are arms race unstable. First strike is out of the question. Except for the Safeguard ABM system, passive means have been used to achieve survivability. Silo hardening worked until Soviet accuracies and yields provided a hard target kill capability. Hiding or creating confusion have been the basis of most MX basing schemes. Dispersion and mobility should enhance survivability of the small ICBM, "Midgetman." Active ballistic missile defense is another option. It has been used before to defend Minuteman (with Safeguard), and it was proposed for defense of MX in the "dense pack" deployment. Here, active strategic defenses could make a significant contribution to deterrence.
What kind of active defense is best to assure survival of the offensive forces? Area defense is technologically difficult, expensive, and inefficient since its protects much more than is necessary for deterrence, and is probably both crisis and arms race unstable, as will be discussed shortly. Point defenses of the strategic offensive forces, on the other hand, are feasible in the near term, less expensive, and stable, while meeting the requirement for defending the retaliation force.

My conclusion regarding the relationship between strategic defense and deterrence, then, is that only point defense may play a role in contributing to deterrence. No logical analysis leads to a choice of area defense. Point defense, while it may contribute, must be evaluated against other survivability schemes and found to be a cost-effective solution in order to be pursued. The strategy which underpins these conclusions regarding deterrence remains one of Mutual Assured Destruction, whether we like it or not. Strategic defenses are used to assure the survival of US retaliatory forces, not to deny Soviet capability for destruction of the United States.

Stability. Strategic defense would have major implications on both crisis stability and arms race stability. The views on the impact of defense on crisis stability are mixed, depending more upon the type of defense assumed (area or point) and the period of discussion (transition or ultimate) than upon one's basic leanings as far as defensive strategy is concerned.

Most arguments that strategic defense is stabilizing assume that point defense systems will be used to protect the offensive forces, thus increasing their survivability and decreasing the effectiveness of a first strike. Such was the logic of the ABM Treaty. For area defense, the only arguments for stability apply after a careful parallel deployment leading to an ultimate situation of mature defenses on both sides which can control escalation and introduce uncer-
However, the logic of connecting strategic defense and uncertainty to escalation control and finally decreased probability of war has not been presented.

A variety of arguments that strategic defense is unstable are presented by several authorities. All appear to be discussing area defense of the nation, not point defense of offensive forces. During a period of transition to strategic defenses when the future utility of offensive nuclear forces is being threatened, there may be incentives for the side behind in SDI to use its offensive forces before they become obsolete. The Soviet response to SDI quotes Paul Nitze as stating that even if SDI is technically feasible, the transition period will be long and dangerous. The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies document, Strategic Survey 1984-85, agrees:

if the strategic defenses were to prove feasible, they could damage stability rather than strengthen it. During the transition period, should one side have strategic defenses which the other side does not, a first-strike strategy becomes more thinkable.

SDI advocate Keith Payne cites several of the potential instabilities of a defensive transition, but argues they could be mitigated by using the defensive systems and other active or passive measures to protect and ensure the survivability of US retaliatory forces. While there is no doubt that stability could be maintained by such measures, no transition of strategy would be occurring. As discussed previously, such deployments of defenses support a strategy commonly labeled Assured Destruction, not Assured Survival.

Even after a transition to an ultimate strategy using strategic defense, stability may be weakened for at least three reasons. First is the concern that one side may see an advantage in striking first against the other's offensive forces with a massive attack to overwhelm the opponent's defenses, and subsequently to use its strategic defense to deal with a greatly
diminished retaliatory second strike. This is the concern most discussed by the Soviets who describe SDI as offensive, not defensive.\(^9\) Second, a mature defensive system will be very effective in negating an opponent’s defensive system, particularly those elements based in space. This creates a strong incentive for one side to stage a preemptive strike against the opponent’s defensive systems.\(^9\) Finally, the timelines for operation of a defensive system might require near instantaneous decision making which may only be achievable using automated command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) systems. Such a hair trigger on defensive responses may make their unintended execution against non-threatening enemy actions more likely, with the attendant risks of misunderstanding, response, and escalation.

Our conclusion is that, although limited point defense of strategic offensive forces contributes to crisis stability, area defense of population and urban-industrial targets is profoundly crisis unstable, markedly increasing the probability of war. Such a relationship between the level of strategic defense and the probability of war is depicted in figure 1. The advocates hope, however, that any increase in the likelihood of war caused by the transition to a defensive strategy will be more than offset by a decrease in the consequences of war.

With mature strategic defenses, the number of nuclear weapons which may detonate in a war should be significantly decreased, but it will not be zero. Most competent observers, even the SDI Director, General Abrahamson, agree that even a good strategic defensive shield will be leaky.\(^9\) The inventor of the x-ray laser, Phil Hagelstein, put it this way:

\[
\text{It would be very nice if we could develop a defense network that would blow away all Soviet ICBMs, but I don't think we can do that. We could take out some, but I don't think we could take out all of them.}^{\text{**}}
\]

Without strategic defense, the number of nuclear detonations in a central war could be in the tens of thousands. As more
and more strategic defense is introduced, the number of detonations should come down, as shown in figure 2, but will never approach zero. Even the most robust defense might let a significant percentage of weapons through.

Combining figures 1 and 2 allows us to estimate an expected value of destruction as a function of the amount of strategic defense deployed, as shown in figure 3. The changing probability of war dominates the calculation, since only a small fraction of the nuclear weapons can cause almost as much damage through nuclear winter as can the largest scenario. Nuclear weapons are subject to the law of diminishing returns in a very direct and strong way. It’s the first thousand that devastate society, not the last thousand out of tens of thousands. Strategic defenses have to fight that effect. A 90 percent effective defense is no defense at all, because the leakage can be devastating: “Because it is not clear that damage limiting will do much good, given the potency of nuclear weapons, it should not be allowed to increase the likelihood of war occurring in the first place.”

Thomas Blau argues that with strategic defense, it is acceptable that conflict could become more likely because “little wars are better than big wars.” Barry Smernoff seems to agree saying, “perfectionist demands for zero leakage always will remain unfulfilled. And it goes without saying that the best is the enemy of the good enough.” But is it, when anything short of the best may be no good at all? Carl Sagan argues that even 90 percent effective shields can’t protect civilian populations. “Such a shield is not better than nothing,” he argues, “it is worse than nothing, because it might well engender a false sense of security, bringing on the very event it was designed to prevent.”

Arms race stability is another issue. Would strategic defense deployments tend to accelerate or slow down the arms race? Here, public views are not so mixed. Most agree that increased strategic defense will spur the arms race; the debate is whether that race will be in offensive, defensive, or
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Figure 1. Crisis stability

Figure 2. Effectiveness of strategic defense
Figure 3. Expected value of destruction
STRATEGY IMPLICATIONS OF SDI

both types of weapons. Congress is concerned that the SDI will prompt a defensive arms race. Others think the race would involve both defensive and offensive arms. The Soviets are holding both options open:

The logic of the nuclear confrontation is such that the development of a ramified anti-missile system does not really pursue defensive aims and is an indissoluble element of a drive for military superiority. Such a system would upset the military-strategic parity and destabilize the strategic situation as a whole. In response the other side must, in order to restore the equilibrium, enhance its strategic capability either by directly building up to its offensive forces or by backing them up with means of defense. In either case, this would result in an expansion of the arms race.

In any event, the SDI appears to be a catalyst in expanding the arms race in some dimension.

Arms Control. The interaction of strategic defense with arms control is two-fold, involving both the issue of control of defensive systems and offensive systems. The Soviets have closely linked the two. George Arbatov, Director of the Soviet Union's Institute on the USA and Canada, states that US refusal to negotiate SDI limits "will ruin all arms control negotiations—absolutely destroy them" If, however, SDI were negotiable, the Soviets indicate a willingness to make major reductions in offensive arms:

If the entire family of space strike weapons is banned, the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to the most radical reductions of nuclear weapon systems (strategic and medium range) on a basis of mutuality, not short of their complete destruction, and, of course, with strict adherence to the principle of equality and equal security.

Although some US writers appear to agree with the Soviet view that strategic defense will ruin arms control, they seem to be referring to development and deployment of
defensive systems rather than to the SDI technology program per se. Indeed, it may not be possible to negotiate away the SDI, precisely because it is a technology program. Arms control of the current SDI wouldn't work because such a treaty could stop technology development, could not be verified, and could not be enforced.

In direct contrast to the Soviet view, some have argued that pursuit of deep reductions in strategic offensive systems will require strategic defenses. With deep reductions in offensive forces, a small amount of cheating could make a big difference in the overall strategic balance. Good verification would be required, but is often difficult to achieve. Strategic defenses could hedge against cheating on the offensive limits. Furthermore, the Soviets have traditionally valued damage limitation, which is why they have invested so heavily in counterforce strategic offensive forces. It is argued that they will be unwilling to agree to large reductions in counterforce offensive weapons unless they could introduce strategic defenses to perform the damage limitation function. Thus two forces—the need to hedge against cheating and the Soviet desire for damage limitation—could tend to make strategic defense a necessary condition for deep reductions in offensive forces.

Most observers, however, have argued the reverse relationship—that limitations on offensive forces are needed in order to transition to a new strategy based on defense. The defense job is just two difficult without cuts on the offense side because leakage through even the best of defenses would still cause unacceptable damage. With cuts in offensive forces down to a few hundred, apprehension about leakage would be diminished. Furthermore, using arms control of offensive forces to transition to defense would cause the Soviets no doctrinal difficulty. Even if strategic defense does not prove feasible or practical, constraints on offensive forces would promote arms control and crisis stability.
If, however, arms control must succeed in reducing offensive forces by something like 95 percent for defenses to be effective, one wonders why we can’t negotiate away the remaining 5 percent, thereby saving the billions of dollars required to protect against the last 5 percent of offense.

The three objectives of arms control—to reduce the probability of war, to reduce damage if war occurs, and to reduce the financial burden of peacetime preparation—are all affected by strategic defense. Colin Gray and Keith Payne argue that strategic defense would decrease the probability of war by enhancing deterrence. That is really the issue of crisis stability, however, and as discussed earlier, crisis stability would probably decrease if strategic defense were increased. Gray and Payne also argue that strategic defense would reduce damage if war occurs. While no doubt true, we have previously argued that even the reduced amount of damage is far too large to ever be acceptable. Finally, Gray argues that strategic defense would not increase the cost burden because its costs would be offset by savings on offensive forces. Others, however, including former Defense Secretary Harold Brown, see the cost tradeoff as five or ten to one favoring the offense. Thus it is doubtful if any of the three objectives of arms control are well served by strategic defenses.

Allies. Western Europe’s response to the Strategic Defense Initiative has been mixed, ranging from hesitation and skepticism in some circles to tentative acceptance and participation in others. The primary issues regarding the interaction of a new defensive strategy with the Western Alliance have been the impact on extended deterrence, the effect upon conventional force requirements, and the effect upon the independent British and French nuclear deterrents.

For years the United States has assured its European allies that US strategic offensive nuclear forces provided deterrence not only of Soviet attack upon the United States,
but also of Soviet attack on Western Europe. This concept of "extended deterrence" was most useful early in the nuclear age when the United States had a monopoly and later a dominance in nuclear weapons, and when Europe had not fully recovered from the ravages of World War II. In more recent times, however, Europe has begun to question whether extended deterrence is still credible in a time of Soviet equality or slight superiority in strategic forces. Would the United States launch nuclear tipped missiles at Moscow in response to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe knowing that the Soviets might obliterate New York or Washington in response? The mutual vulnerability contained in what was termed the MAD doctrine gave rise, in Europe's eyes, to more self-deterrence than extended deterrence. Fear of retaliation against the US homeland would deter the United States from attacking the Soviet Union in response to Soviet attack in Europe.

Some forms of strategic defense might enhance extended deterrence. The degree of enhancement would depend on the type, effectiveness, and mutuality of the defense. Were the United States to achieve a very effective area defense, while the Soviets had none, US self-deterrence would be decreased markedly while extended deterrence would become more credible. As the effectiveness of the US area defense decreases, however, extended deterrence is also diminished. For the case of no area defense but significant point defenses of the offensive retaliatory forces, self-deterrence would remain high and extended deterrence low because this MAD-like strategy maintains a hostage US population. SDI would enhance extended deterrence only if the US population were defended. Even with very effective area defenses, however, extended deterrence may not increase if the Soviets also have an effective area defense. In the limit of strategic defense effectiveness, the strategic nuclear weapons of both sides would be "impotent and obsolete" which would undermine nuclear deterrence, extended or otherwise, completely.
In the case of bilateral, effective, area defenses making offensive nuclear weapons less important, albeit not obsolete, the burden of defense in Europe would shift to conventional forces. Large Soviet-Warsaw Pact advantages in conventional weapons in Europe create concern with the Allies that the ultimate result of SDI could be Soviet conventional dominance.\textsuperscript{119} David Wollan of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency expressed concern that with the role of nuclear weapons decreased, the higher burden on US conventional forces to deter Soviet adventurism runs against US policy since the early 1950s.\textsuperscript{120} Indeed, we concluded earlier that one of the threads of US nuclear deterrence since World War II has been the substitution of nuclear deterrence for larger conventional forces which could never be funded. The argument that negation of nuclear missiles will create a net US advantage because the larger US industrial base can sustain a superior conventional force doesn’t track with forty years of evidence that the United States is not willing to create and sustain those forces.

Finally, strategic defense may affect the independent British and French nuclear deterrent forces. Earlier we argued that strategic defense might only be effective against a much smaller offensive force. Britain and France have much smaller nuclear forces than the superpowers, and strategic defense could be quite effective against them. While most observers argue that undermining British and French deterrents will negatively impact the allies,\textsuperscript{121} others feel that Britain and France would be happy to be able to devote their entire defense attention to conventional forces.\textsuperscript{122} Again, with the Warsaw Pact enjoying large advantages in conventional forces, it doesn’t seem likely that Britain and France would want to exchange a relatively inexpensive nuclear deterrent for a costly conventional arms build up.

\textit{Domestic Politics.} The final area for evaluation of a new defensive strategy is domestic politics. Some authors see the political dimension as separate from and more important
than both the technology and strategy aspects. Adam Garfinkle argues that, "notwithstanding the debate among technical experts and strategists, the fate of the Star Wars initiative...will be influenced by the contours of domestic politics, as has every major strategic military decision in the past 30 years." The two domestic political issues with greatest impact on the prospects for a shift to a new defensive strategy are cost and political sustainability.

Most observers agree that effective strategic defense systems will be very expensive to develop and deploy. Furthermore, almost all observers agree that strategic offensive forces must also be retained to contribute to deterrence and hedge against failure of the defenses. Add to this the increased need for expensive and manpower intensive conventional forces to sustain deterrence after a transition to a defensive strategy, and we would have a huge increase in the funding needed for the Defense Department. At the same time, unprecedented budget deficits have led Congress to enact the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation almost assuring significant decreases rather than increases in defense spending for the foreseeable future. Regardless of the feasibility of the technology or the appeal of the strategy, the political willingness to fund strategic defenses at the expense of other priorities may be impossible to achieve. After all, as argued earlier, the United States has not found the political will to fund other, less expensive nuclear strategies for forty years.

Secondly, a transition to a defensive strategy might take twenty or more years, spanning at least five Presidential and ten Congressional elections. Without a national consensus on an issue, sustaining such a change through several administrations would prove extremely difficult. And the national consensus for strategic defense is simply not there. In fact, for a variety of sometimes contradictory reasons, "almost all Democrats oppose the Star Wars initiative...." How, then, can a major shift in strategy, which, arguably, many of the nation's political leaders
oppose, be sustained? The advocates answer that "each step toward deploying defensive technologies should be built from below and be able to stand on its own." That is one reason why we see advocates of the Assured Survival strategy of effective area defenses supporting point defenses of the retaliatory offensive forces, historically a MAD-like force deployment, as a first step toward strategic defense. It's the foot in the door.

Issues

One of the reasons why no comprehensive, logical, and coherent defensive strategy has yet emerged is because many critical issues in the strategy story remain open. Here we describe seven of them, but there are no doubt more. The strategy and policy debate over the SDI must continue to investigate these issues at least in parallel with the SDI technology program, and they should certainly be resolved before any new defensive system development decisions are made.

What is the basis of the strategy? The advocates of strategic defense rhetorically argue for replacement of Assured Destruction with Assured Survival. But practical limits of technology, cost, and system effectiveness drive most of the advocates toward point defense of the retaliatory offensive forces, leaving the population still undefended. Hardly Assured Survival, this is the strategy termed Mutual Assured Destruction in its historic form. Are we to believe that the long-term path toward Assured Survival must first take a step backward? Is the new strategy to be based on morality? On hope? On deterrence? On wartighting? What is an acceptable tradeoff between increased probability of war and decreased consequences?

Can defense deter? For years deterrence was based on the threat of assured retaliation, punishment so severe that the potential gains of aggression were judged not to be worth
the price. More recently, denial of enemy war aims has been added as a second mechanism of deterrence. With the advent of SDI, a third mechanism, that of creating uncertainty in the success of an enemy attack, has been added. Which mechanism or what combination of punishment, denial, and uncertainty works best? How would strategic defense contribute to each one? What do the Soviets really hold most dear—the Motherland, their military forces and political control mechanism, world domination, or something else? To what extent would US strategic defense threaten what the Soviets hold most dear?

Is mutual strategic defense possible? Every concept for effective area defense includes some components based in space. To be able to use space for defense, one must first have space control—the securing of the space arena for oneself while denying it to the enemy. For mutual strategic defense to work, both sides must control space. Is that possible, considering the types of defensive systems envisioned? Can both sides confidently field effective and survivable missile defense systems in space and deny the other’s deployment at the same time?

Is mutual strategic defense stable? If both sides could field defensive systems, they would probably be vulnerable to one another. The side which strikes first against the other’s defense may achieve the enormous advantage of having a defense after the opponent’s defense has been destroyed. Furthermore, a first strike against an opponent’s offensive forces would be much harder to defend against than a retaliatory second strike with a reduced offensive force. Hence there may be a strong double incentive to strike first. How can this be diminished? Are there any defensive deployments which encourage second strike rather than first strike?

Is strategic defense affordable? The cost of strategic defense might be very high, and expensive conventional force expansion may also be required if, indeed, reliance on deterrence through threat of nuclear retaliation is diminished.
Where will the money come from? What other defense and non-defense programs must be sacrificed in order to fund strategic defense? Will the nation be willing to make the sustained fiscal commitment to finance strategic defense?

Who wins conventionally? Since World War II, the United States has used deterrence based on the threat of offensive nuclear weapons as a substitute for adequate conventional forces. If, indeed, offensive nuclear missiles become obsolete, thus throwing the focus of the strategic balance on conventional forces, which side is the net gainer? How does the United States plan to deter or fight a conventional war when the threat of escalation to nuclear conflict has been eliminated? Where will the United States and its allies get the troops, tanks, and planes to match the Soviets conventionally? If a conventional war occurs, who is likely to win? Does strategic defense make conventional warfare more likely?

What is the role of arms control? A transition to a strategic defense strategy will be very difficult and may require that arms control agreements reduce offensive weapons by more than 90 percent in order to make strategic defense possible. Would the Soviets be willing to negotiate away 90 percent of their offensive forces so that the other 10 percent could be made obsolete through defense? To say yes is to argue that the Soviets also want to do away with offensive nuclear weapons. If they do, and if they would be willing to eliminate 90 percent of them through arms control, why would they want to spend billions on strategic defenses against the remaining 10 percent of the offensive forces? Why not use arms control to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely?

WHAT WE CAN CONCLUDE

IT IS MUCH EASIER TO FIND good questions than good answers concerning strategic defense strategy. A shift to a new defensive strategy is such a major change from the offense
dominant strategy which has evolved and matured over four decades that it would be naive to think that we can mature the new strategy in only a few years. We can, however, draw some general conclusions regarding the proposed change.

The move toward strategic defense is cause for concern. The effect of a change to defense on deterrence, stability, and arms control may well be negative; the change may decouple us from our allies; and it may not be sustainable domestically. These issues must raise a danger sign in front of our decisionmakers who should only proceed with the utmost caution. While a defensive technologies development program to resolve the technical issues is appropriate and no doubt useful in its own right, the fanfare associated with collecting all the technology in a centralized and highly visible Strategic Defense Initiative Organization may be premature and is certainly unsettling to some friends and foes alike. Under no circumstances should commitments to systems development be made unless and until both the technology and strategy issues are favorably resolved. If in five years the technologists decree that yes, indeed, the technology for defense is feasible, we should nonetheless refuse to move forward unless we have likewise shown that the strategy makes sense. We need to put the same kind of vigor, albeit not the same financial resources, behind the strategy and policy investigation as we have toward the technology.

Regardless of the outcome of the defensive technology and strategy efforts, arms control of strategic offensive forces always helps. If the United States decides later to go forward with strategic defense, limits on offensive forces will have made the defensive job easier. If the nation decides against deploying defenses, control of offensive arms will limit the arms race, save resources, and if done wisely, increase deterrence and crisis stability as well.

If the United States is to deploy strategic defense systems, from an initial strategy assessment, point defense of the retaliatory offensive forces makes the most sense. Such
STRATEGY IMPLICATIONS OF SDI

deployment does not undermine our current deterrent strategy, could be made within the limits of the ABM Treaty, and could be sustained through a shorter political timespan. Furthermore, it could provide a focus for the technologies in the near term when no other defensive deployment such as area defense is feasible. The United States must recognize, however, that the strategy underlying such a deployment remains similar to Flexible Response of the early 1970s, and that if we want to retain that type of strategy, point defense of the offensive forces is just one means toward offensive force survivability, and must be evaluated against other means.

Lastly, the United States must connect the defensive and offensive arms control efforts. The United States should seriously consider trading limits on far term area defense for deep cuts in strategic offensive forces. Such an agreement would not limit the SDI program, because SDI deals exclusively with technology, and would permit defense of offensive forces, thus providing an operational focus for SDI and enhancing our current strategy. If, in the far term, area defenses prove sound from technology, strategy, and cost perspectives, then the United States can readdress all the treaties involved. Until then, however, the nation should be extremely careful not to undermine a strategy that has served us well in the face of great danger for so many years.
NOTES

5. Ibid., p. 4.
6. Ibid., p. 5.
7. Ibid., p. 6.
21. Ibid., p. 18.
23. Ibid., p. 146.
25. Ibid., p. 23.
27. Ibid., p. 150.
34. Ibid., p. 69.
SAVAGE

38. Ibid., p. 141.
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42. Ibid., p. 37.
72. Ibid., p. 17.
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89. Ibid., p. 18.
92. "Star Wars—Delusions and Dangers," p. 44.
93. Ibid., p. 45.
104. Smernoff, "Images of the Nuclear Future," p. 5.
106. Ibid., p. 27.
107. Ibid., p. 53.
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124. Ibid., p. 251.
125. Ibid., p. 255.
VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCES
EFFECTS ON AMERICAN AND BRITISH SOCIETY
Nigel B. Baldwin

Of all the NATO countries, only the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada do not rely on conscription to provide manpower for their armed forces. Despite some murmurs to the contrary, the US All-Volunteer Force (AVF), in the absence of an obvious external threat, is now firmly established; similarly, in the United Kingdom and in Canada, there are no moves to change the present arrangements. All three countries seem set to continue to rely on their citizens' willingness to enlist and serve (no doubt aided by judicious marketplace incentives), in order to provide their front lines of defense.

The use of non-conscript, military forces poses inevitable questions: are there dangers for democratic societies such as the United States and the United Kingdom in such long-term use of full time, professional, volunteer forces? Does it matter that, perhaps, only certain sections of society will ever serve the country in a military capacity? Does it matter that, as time passes, our civilian leaders will have less and less first-hand experience of military affairs? Can we, indeed, avoid isolating a professional army from the society it serves?

Nigel B. Baldwin, a Group Captain in Britain's Royal Air Force, wrote this essay during his year as an International Fellow at the National Defense University. This essay also appears in *International Essays II* (NDU Press, 1987).
This analysis begins by studying the traditional ways by which civilian leaders of both the United States and the United Kingdom have gained military experience and understanding. This study then examines the present position in the two countries, and then attempts to forecast the future, all before addressing the central question: Is there a danger of polarization between the civilian elite and the military and, if so, does it matter? Indeed, is there anything that can be done about a possible split given the imperatives of modern liberal democracies?

CIVILIAN MILITARY EXPERIENCE IN THE PAST

Today's US and UK military forces are grown out of direct military histories. Therefore, consideration of those forces in their societies requires some background of past military experience in the two nations.

United States

Samuel Huntington argued that the framers of the Constitution did not imagine the development of "a separate class of persons exclusively devoted to military leadership. 'I am not acquainted with the military profession,' George Mason proclaimed at the Virginia Convention. . . . They knew neither [the] military profession nor separate military skills."1 To the newly emerging nation, freed from the shackles of European bondage, there was no need for a standing army and so, instead, emphasis was placed on a part time, citizens' militia. "The standing army with its upperclass officers and lowerclass enlisted men was basically an aristocratic institution. It was associated with the British Crown and with European despotism."2 By relying, instead, on a citizens' militia "the distinction between officers, and enlisted men was minimized, and the line between them did not correspond to any sharp cleavage in the social structure."3 Besides, "the
militia embodied the democratic principle that defense of the nation was the responsibility of every citizen." Having said that, the new nation was, nevertheless, hardly eager to take up arms, either then or in more recent times. Indeed, a recent historian has argued that it is an American characteristic to avoid, and if not avoid, certainly to dislike war.

American leaders are reluctant to involve the nation in war in the first place, are reluctant to compel military service for its citizens, will bend over backwards to avoid loss of American blood, dislike the thought of ground combat particularly, and, to cap it all, expect a "rapid demobilization, particularly for the Army, occasionally resembling unilateral disarmament, after all American wars." This latter comment described the sudden release back into civilian life in 1945 of the largest Army the United States had ever fielded. And its importance for our study is that the Army was, for one of the few times in US history, a truly democratic, citizen militia. From President Roosevelt's son downward, all sections and strata of US society were represented.

Before World War II, America had been its usual isolationist and anti-military self. Its armed forces had been run down and "the regular peacetime military establishment enjoyed small prestige and limited influence upon national affairs." But, after that war, military men were looked upon in a different light. Even the Presidency itself was won by a successful US Army general, and many of his ex-military colleagues took over high positions in government and commerce. By 1969, a worried ex-Marine Corps Commandant, General David M. Shoup, opined,

World War II had been a long war. Millions of young men had matured, been educated, and gained rank and stature doing their years in uniform. In spite of themselves, many returned to civilian life as indoctrinated, combat-experienced military professionals. ... We are now a nation of veterans. To the 14.9 million veterans of World War II. Korea added
another 5.7 million five years later. . . . In 1968, the total living veterans of the United States military service numbered over 23 million, or about 20 percent of the adult population. Today most middle-aged men, most business, government, civic, and professional leaders, have served some time in uniform. 7

Increasingly concerned at the direction the war in Southeast Asia was taking, General Shoup argued that this mass, and also elitist, experience of military service, when combined with the rise of the military-industrial complex that President Eisenhower warned of in his farewell address, had produced a militarism within the American body politic that, by 1969, had turned the precious tradition of the citizen militia on its head. Singling out the generals and colonels, he charged, “It is this influential nucleus of aggressive ambitious professional military leaders who are the root of America’s evolving militarism.”

Shoup, perhaps not surprisingly “Kennedy’s favorite general,” accused his colleagues of an excess of power and influence and warned us to be wary of combining the basic appeals of anti-communism, national defense, and patriotism, for they provide the foundation for a powerful greed upon which the defense establishment can build, grow, and justify its cost. He concluded that militarism, in 1969, was in full bloom and had a promising future “unless the blight of Vietnam reveals that militarism is more a poisonous weed than a glorious blossom.”

But, in another way, the Vietnam experience did more than release the seeds of militarism. Morris Janowitz, in his social and political portrait of American military men entitled The Professional Soldier, reasoned that

Since 1945, and especially since 1960, new trends in social recruitment have developed, particularly for academy cadets . . . . the armed forces have lost their last direct linkage with sons of the upper classes . . . .
[Even] upperclass interest in nautical affairs could no longer overcome resistance to the modest prestige and the realities of a naval career.1\(^1\) Such reluctance by the sons of America's elites is not new. "The American armed forces have never been truly representative of the civilian population,"\(^2\) and "youth from middle-end upper income families have been somewhat underrepresented under the draft and the volunteer force. . . . To the extent that they have served in the active forces, they have been more likely to do so as officers; but, more often than not, they either served in the reserves, or not at all."\(^3\)

Others have given a harsher verdict. Whatever the equality of sacrifice in World War II, in which people of every religion and social class served, by the 1960s "the upper societal strata were often able to avoid military service."\(^4\) The authors of that conclusion go on to analyze the Harvard undergraduate class of 1968: of the 1,203 members of the class, 36 served in the armed forces (26 in Vietnam). Not one was killed in action. For the other Ivy League universities, it was a similar story. "For graduates of Amherst, Yale, or Columbia in the 1950s, military service was the rule; for their counterparts fifteen years later, it was the exception."\(^5\)

Whenever they have served, the American elites have done so in a highly specialized manner. Arguing that the US Army infantry was the cinderella service in World War II, Max Hastings asserted that American commanders made serious errors of judgment in allowing the air corps, the specialist branches, and the service staffs to cream off too high a proportion of the best educated and fittest recruits. This not only reflected an urge to make the utmost use of technology in fighting the war but also touched on

the social attitudes of America's "best and brightest" young men towards military service and that of their counterparts in Europe. In America, a military career has never been honourable in the European manner, outside a few thousand "army families." It has traditionally
been the route by which impoverished young men—not least Eisenhower and Bradley—can carve out a career for themselves without advantages of birth. George S. Patton was a rare exception. It is striking to observe that in the Second World War, privileged young Englishmen still gravitated naturally toward rifle and armoured regiments. Their American counterparts by preference sought out exotic postings in the air corps or OSS, or managerial roles on army or diplomatic staffs. It never became fashionable for young Ivy League Americans to serve as front-line officers.

But at least the overall Second World War military experience was shared by all classes of society. By the 1970s, however, that could not be said with any certainty of the sons of the World War II veterans who served in Southeast Asia. Despite the longest war in American history—some would say because of that war—the evidence suggests that a generation of potential elites had a soured experience of the armed forces. For once, the traditional way of using a war to infuse that experience had failed.

United Kingdom

The British experience has been slightly different. In 1960, Morris Janowitz, in The Professional Soldier, was able to argue,

The [United States] military has been drawn from an old-family, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, rural, upper-middle class professional background. This social setting has operated as the equivalent of the European aristocracy in supplying the cadre of military leaders.

The frequent image of European military elites, on the other hand, has been one of blue blood. The British officer corps, with its traditional background of the aristocracy and the landed gentry, has retained to this day its own distinctive aura, typified by the Brigade of Guards who, says Anthony Sampson, are "rooted in a social structure that predates popular democracy and industrialization."
For most of its long history, the British military has been officered by amateurs. Huntington makes the point that "education for officership was incompatible both with the primitive state of military science and with the aristocratic belief that the only requirements for command were the in-born talents of courage and honor." Noting that it was "an aristocracy of wealth rather than birth or status," he explains this surprising statement by describing the system of purchase of not only the initial commission but also of subsequent promotion:

The purchase system established a property qualification for military rank consciously designed to insure an identity of interest between army and government and to make another military dictatorship impossible in the British Isles. The high price of office, and low pay . . . . the lack of any system for pension or retirement, caused commissions in peacetime to be monopolized by the younger sons of country gentry who possessed some private income. But, despite Huntington's assertion, the true elites of that time, the men of birth and status, were well represented in the officer corps: wealth and poverty had different values 200 years ago.

The great Duke of Wellington, "the fourth son of an impoverished Irish peer," between the ages of 16 and 24 purchased commissions from ensign to lieutenant colonel. He resisted, to his dying day, reform of the system, believing that the resultant mercenary army would inevitably replace the army he knew that was guided by officers who "were men of substance, with a real interest in the preservation of the existing social order."

De Tocqueville noted in 1833, "the English aristocracy has been adroit in more than one respect. First of all, it has always been involved in public affairs." And by retaining the combination of wealth, birth, and status to the twentieth century, with remnants even to this day, there was little
danger of the military elite becoming truly isolated from the rest of the country. Distinctively separate they may have been, but not isolated. Yet, despite his popularity after Waterloo and during his transition to political life (he became Prime Minister in 1828), Wellington presided over an unhappy time for the British Army:

The army . . . . was not destined to become beloved in a nation which might at last accept that it was necessary, but retained considerable antipathy toward it. In the nineteenth century, the army officer was hated by the middle and respectable working classes for his arrogance and assumed incompetence, while the private soldier was despised for his roughness and ignorance. Drawn mainly from the top and bottom tenths of the population, the army had little contact with the eight tenths that lay between.2

Despite this lack of affection, the constant thread of military service had always been present in British elite and aristocratic families. Throughout the nineteenth century, the custom of the younger son spending at least some time in the Army continued. "Her army officers were gentlemen first, landed gentry almost always, professionals almost never," wrote General Sir John Hackett, who goes on to describe perhaps the epitome of elite military service influencing major events later in life: the career of Winston Churchill.

By the time the guns of August exploded in 1914, there was no doubt about where the young sons of British elites were. The next generation was not far behind twenty-five years later. Gabriel and Savage have maintained that "European aristocrats have for centuries paid the military price for their privileged status" and further state that "some 10 percent of male English gentry were killed in action in World War II." The result of this willingness to serve, this noblesse oblige, has been that all aspects of British life in this century have been touched by the military ethos. From the present Archibishop of Canterbury to Prince Philip, Her Majesty the
Queen's husband, from the Law Lords to the majority of the present day Cabinet, all can look back on time in uniform.

Neither has there ever been any doubt—not, at least, since the Cromwellian aberration in the seventeenth century—who remains in command and where the ultimate power lies. Let Anthony Sampson sum up this historical analysis of how the British elites gained empathy with military affairs:

Politicians remain firmly in control of the services. Britain has never had a very separate fighting caste. The youngest son tradition, it is true, has now virtually died out and has given way to a tradition of fighting families; in 1961, out of seventeen full generals, admirals, and air chief marshals who listed their fathers in 'Who's Who', two-thirds were the sons of fighting men. But most service chiefs have (in contrast to the Americans) remained part of a broader society... They are far from the 'war lords' of Marxist imagination. Ever since Cromwell's major generals, Britain has fought shy of giving soldiers too much power... nor has Britain chosen a general to run the country, like de Gaulle, Eisenhower, Nasser or Khan. The last and only Prime Minister was the Duke of Wellington.8

Historical Experience of Elites

So we see, both in the United States and in the Great Britain of the last few hundred years, one major similarity and one minor difference. Elites in both countries have been prepared to shoulder at least equal responsibilities for defending their country whenever the threat has been obvious and overwhelming. It was so in the United States during the Civil War, and in both World Wars; it was so in the United Kingdom in the Napoleonic Wars as well as against Germany. But, while British elites have always served all over the world, indeed wherever the trumpet has sounded, American elites have been much more selective.
And so, while military experience has been a common link between the nation’s leaders of government, industry, commerce, and the professions in Britain, and has helped avoid extreme isolationism for the army of the day, the evidence on the other side of the Atlantic is not quite as solid. In recent years, only those who survived World War II and who later moved into leadership positions have been able to speak of military matters with a confidence born of experience. For both the United States and the United Kingdom, the signs are that the residue of that experience is fading.

THE PRESENT POSITION

I HAVE ALREADY ASSERTED that American elites were reluctant to serve during the Vietnam war. James Fallows, in a 1981 polemic on the state of United States defense, quoted statistics to demonstrate that in 1980, of the 103 members of Congress who were born between 1939 and 1954, and were thus of military age during the Vietnam war, only 14 had served on active duty anywhere, that is, about 14 percent. The comparable figure for the nation as a whole was 28 percent. "While more than two-thirds of all senators born before 1939 had served on active duty, mainly in World War II, only one-third of senators and representatives born after 1939 had served in any military capacity, including the reserves and the National Guard. After the elections of 1980, the number of congressmen with military experience declined further still."

Some have expressed concern, and this concern usually manifests itself in recurring demands to "bring back the draft." While some proponents of United States conscription argue their case because of the difficulty of voluntarily attracting sufficient numbers of suitable young men (and now women, too), many are concerned about a more fundamental
issue: "Conscience tells us that we need a cross section of America in our armed force," maintained Senator Hollings. "Defense is everybody's business. . . . A professional Army is un-American. It is anathema to a democratic republic—a glaring civil wrong." In the other house, Representative Paul Simon pointed out a continuation of the Vietnam inequity: "When blood is shed in Grenada or Lebanon or anywhere else, it is the poor of the country whose blood is shed. There are no sons of members of Congress or members of the Cabinet in Grenada or Lebanon."

But it is an assertion of this paper that a return to a draft in the United States (and, for that matter, in the United Kingdom) will not take place short of an international crisis. In a recent analysis of the progress and prospects for America's volunteer military, Martin Binkin summed up present attitudes succinctly: "Given the contemporary social and political settings, the chances of returning to a peacetime military draft must be regarded as slim." But meanwhile, all is not lost; in a distinctly American way, some influential members of US society, often those in government, are using a device which may turn out to be the most useful in cementing civil and military relations in a democratic society: membership in Guard and Reserve forces. Four modern politicians demonstrate this experience.

Former Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable John F. Lehman, Jr., is a Commander in the US Navy Reserve; the Honorable Lawrence J. Korb, until recently the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Installations and Logistics), is a Captain in the US Navy Reserve, as is Congressman James Jefford, a Republican who represents Vermont. Senator Strom Thurmond, the second-ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, is an Army Reserve Major General. There are other examples. The exposure to frontline units that such service gives is a powerful way for modern elites to savor the experience their older, and now rapidly retiring, colleagues derived from World War II.
Unfortunately, these are not tips of an iceberg. We have noted a declining propensity for elites to serve in the US armed forces. Ideally, it would serve our purpose best if we were able to equate military elites with "the higher echelons of the federal executive and especially the personnel of the foreign service, who are typically drawn from urban, upper-middle class, professional families with strong links to the New England states," but there is no sign of this occurring. Although no one charges the US elites with disloyalty, why is there such a reluctance to serve, especially as full-time professional soldiers? Surely the reason may be found in the long-standing desire of the early settlers, and then the founding fathers, to rid themselves of European militarism. Colonel William Darryl Henderson sums up the difference in attitude on the two sides of the Atlantic in this way:

The great majority of the American elite would generally state that the United States is a primary loyalty. When this loyalty is translated into specific areas, however, support for a military tradition is at best fragmented, a fragmentation that represents lack of a unifying military ethic within American society. Because American armed forces have not played a central role similar to the armed forces of principal European nations, the American elite does not generally recognize responsibilities for military service and leadership. The numbers of the American elite (such as members of Congress and graduates of top universities) who have no record of military service to the nation and who recognize no responsibility for any are large and growing. This situation is in distinct contrast to major countries in Europe where, perhaps because of traumatic histories, armies played central roles in national salvation and destiny, and national elites recognize a distinct obligation to serve.

Just like its American cousin, Britain has always regarded itself "as one of the least military of nations, able to put away the symbols of war as soon as peace is declared."
The links between politicians and the services are slender. Nevertheless, the Parliament of the 1950s was well populated with military expertise. Janowitz, writing in 1960, maintained that "the exclusion of retired professional officers from political life in the United States stands in marked contrast to the practice in Great Britain, where the regular officer is an important source of personnel for the Conservative party." It was common practice for regular officers, mostly the majors and the colonels retiring after twenty years or more of service, to seek office, almost always with the Conservative party. Janowitz continued, "Between World War I and World War II, regular officers were, after lawyers, the second most frequent occupational group in the House of Commons, and although their number declined somewhat from 1945 to 1951, they still held the same relative positions." Janowitz concluded that the British officer, when compared to his American colleague, was more fully integrated into the fabric of society.

But there has been a change in recent years, and in 1986, it is almost unheard of for a retired, long-serving military officer to consider running for Parliament. However, officers having held short service commissions, especially in the army, are a different matter. The tradition of young men joining the army for a few years before beginning their careers "in the city" continues. Although a researcher into the social strata from which the British military officer is drawn was able to write that a third of the middle-ranking army officers came from the top twenty-eight most prestigious British "public" (i.e., private) schools, the air force attracted a much broader cross-section of society into its officer ranks. By 1980, both the Army and the Royal Air Force were looking to attract their best officer recruits by direct entry from universities. Subsequently, there was a radical change in the character of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and the Royal Air Force College Cranwell, both of which are now largely finishing schools. In the army, "the most prestigious regiments began to gather their best officers through the short
service method of entry. " Nevertheless, the long tradition of the British elites for military service, if only for a few years, continues, and is no better demonstrated than in the example set by the Royal Family.

If elites exist in any modern society, they must do so, to an overwhelmingly obvious extent, in any nation that is still headed by a monarchy. Kingship and the military uniform, throughout history, have always gone hand-in-hand; in the few surviving monarchies, that same relationship still exists. King Hussein of Jordan, King Juan Carlos of Spain, King Olav of Norway—all wear their uniforms with pride. In the case of the United Kingdom,

The significance of Her Majesty to members of the armed forces of Britain is immense. Officers hold her commissions, signed personally, and other ranks on enlistment swear a direct, personal oath of allegiance to the Sovereign and to her heirs and successors. This link with the Head of State is not merely symbolic, but normally reflects a close loyalty to the Queen as a person, especially at the officer level. It also affords the nation one of its most efficient forms of protection against military interference in government by ensuring that the armed forces owe allegiance to a person they regard as being above politics."

To the visitor to Britain, the annual Trooping of the Colour ceremony on Horse Guards Parade in London, on the Queen's Official Birthday, may have a Ruritanian quality about it. But she inspects her troops, on horseback, wearing the scarlet dress uniform of an army field marshal. Indeed, she is the very personification of the "Commander-in-Chief." The older male members of her family, all of whom have earned the right to wear uniforms of the British Army, admittedly of the prestigious and still very elitist Brigade of Guards, form up immediately behind her. Her husband, though his army rank is largely honorary, nevertheless has earned naval rank and has command and sea-going ex-
Volunteer Forces and Society

The British Royal Family has a long tradition of close association with the armed forces. Prince Charles has earned his Royal Air Force pilot's wings and his army Parachute Brigade wings, and has commanded a Royal Navy minesweeper. Nobody doubts either his interest in the British military or his competence at the more challenging pursuits within the services. His younger brothers are following suit. Prince Andrew is a Royal Navy lieutenant, a qualified helicopter pilot who, at the time of this writing, is embarked on a frigate. The youngest son, Prince Edward, is still studying at Cambridge University, but has just been accepted as an officer in the Royal Marines. Thus the tradition of close association of the British Royal Family with the armed forces seems fair set.

The ladies, too, play their part: the Queen Mother is the Commandant-in-Chief of the Women's Royal Air Force, and the Princess of Wales is an Honorary Air Commodore. They have similar appointments in the Army and Royal Navy, all of which serve to emphasize and perpetuate the connections and relationship that Her Majesty the Queen has with "her" military; she is no symbolic Commander-in-Chief.

Happily, no British soldier could ask for a better example of leadership than that the present generation of royalty is giving. As a device for preventing a possible division between the civilian elites and the armed forces, it is ironic that the oldest and perhaps the most archaic institution of all, a constitutional monarchy, should turn out to be one of the most useful. It may well be that when the attitudes of the elites toward military service in both the United States and the United Kingdom are compared, this regal factor will be highly significant.

The Reserves, as we have seen on the western side of the Atlantic, also perform a useful function in preventing polarization between elites and a country's armed forces. The British used to look enviously at the National Guard units of
the Army and the Air Force in the United States with their obviously local affiliations. The British Army equivalent, the Territorial Army (TA)—although long a part of the national psyche (they can be traced back to 1181 AD), in the doldrums since World War II—is now in a process of change and modernization. The present government has given special attention to the expansion and operational capability of the TA, which now numbers 72,000, and which will be expanded to 86,000 by 1990. Upon mobilization it would constitute up to about one-third of the total strength of the Army.

The TA has just been joined by a new organization: the Home Service Force (HSF). Designed to provide basic guard forces for home defense so that the more highly trained men can be released for front-line tasks, the HSF is in its infancy. Nevertheless, from a cadre of a mere four companies in 1982, it is now being expanded to take in 5,000 trainees. If successful, further expansion will be considered. Both the TA and the HSF are important for this study. Not only do they give young men and women who would not wish to have a full-time military career the chance to experience military service, but they also involve the civilian community in a less obvious way.

As part of the reforms of 1908 instituted by Lord Haldane, who was given the task of reorganizing the volunteer forces for the nation, Territorial Auxiliary and Volunteer Reserve Associations were formed nationwide. Originally there were 104 such organizations, one for every county. Today there are only 14, but tasked as they are with maintaining the cooperation and support of local communities, they play a vital part in maintaining cohesion between the armed forces and civilian society.

In parallel with the expansion of the ground arms, the Royal Marines Reserve and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force (RAuxAF) are increasing in numbers too. The long moribund RAuxAF has just taken advantage of a captured Argentinian
Skyguard anti-aircraft system as a catalyst to form a new auxiliary squadron. Other ideas are in the wind. Of course, the decisions to expand the territorial and reserve forces are not solely altruistic. Squeezed by a tight monetary policy, the British defense leaders have been pressured as never before to make sure their forces are lean and fat-free. The attractiveness of Reserve Forces is obvious.

The British Inspector General of the TA demonstrated the seductive economics when, in early 1985, he stated that "the Territorial Army makes up 23 percent of the mobilized Army, yet costs only 1.6 percent of the defence vote and only 4.7 percent of the army vote." Such soldiers are exceptionally cost-effective, but there are limitations, and there is a danger in trying to expand the territorial and reserve system at the expense of diluting the regular army. It is the regulars, after all, who train the others, and their hard core of expertise is critical.

Nevertheless, the idea of expanded territorial, and therefore locally generated, army, navy, and air forces is of utmost importance in establishing and nurturing links between the services and the rest of the country. For countries that rely on all-volunteer forces, those links must not be allowed to wither away. But before we try to look into the future and forecast the impact on societies in the United States and the United Kingdom of long-term all-volunteer forces, let us establish the uniqueness of armed forces in society. What sets the military apart from the rest of the country?

WHAT SETS THE MILITARY APART?

MILITARY SERVICE HAS "a distinct place in the society which has brought it forth," wrote General Sir John Hackett, whose The Profession of Arms is the most recent analysis of the position of the soldier in society. The divide between the
military and the rest of society is very real. The degree of isolation depends, to no small extent, upon the nature of the officer corps. I have already argued that, to a certain extent, the US elites and their British counterparts are of different compositions. Morris Janowitz, for example, has stated:

The elite in the United States comprise highly diffuse social elements because of the sheer size of the nation, regional differences, ethnic and religious heterogeneity, and the rapidity of mobility into leadership positions. It is a much less integrated social grouping than, for example, "the establishment" in Great Britain, with its elaborate family ties, common education, and intimate patterns of social intercourse.41

Maintaining there is little evidence that the military forms an integral part of a compact social group constituting a powerful elite in the United States, Janowitz argues that the separation is endemic:

There is no evidence that military leadership since 1900 has become more socially integrated with other elite groups. The broadening social composition of the officer corps, its separate educational system, the military style of life, and the growth in the size of the armed forces limit social integration of the military with older and even newer elite group.42

Transcending the social differences and isolation, the soldier is set apart most obviously from the rest of society by his willingness, at the final count, to lay down his life for the cause. General Hackett is as specific as anyone on this issue:

what, more than anything else, sets the military apart from most other groups—what I call the unlimited liability clause in a soldier's contract. When men are unprepared for this, and it is invoked, the results can be disturbing. The nature of his contract sets the man-at-arms apart. But how far apart? That is an important question today.43

As pressures are applied, in both the United States and in the United Kingdom, to turn military service into just another
occupation and to allow industrial and business management techniques to intrude into the organization, it becomes increasingly difficult to bring home to society at large the awe-inspiring nature of the “unlimited liability” clause. Not until a Falklands War or a Grenada Operation bursts into headlines does the vulnerability of the soldier's life become obvious.

Sociologists have long argued about the degree to which an army should be isolated from the society it serves. It has long been the practice, as it still is in the Soviet army, for soldiers to live lives in complete isolation from civilian influence. The junior leader or non-commissioned officer, and the soldier's unit, platoon, or regiment, become the dominant influences in his daily life. In modern times, two developments, "barrack life and the wearing of uniform, have probably done more to set the soldier apart in society than anything else." 44

But in the United States and the United Kingdom, such institutional values have changed, particularly recently. In the well-paid, all-volunteer armies, more and more officers and enlisted men and women live “off camp” in civilian communities. In London, at the Ministry of Defence, officers wear civilian clothes for work. There seems to be a direct relationship between such events and the closeness of the military to civilian control. The more the military is obviously subservient to the state, the less it needs to emphasize its different standing in society. After all, in the United States and in Britain, there is much public and institutional goodwill. “Even in London or Washington . . . . an atmosphere of candour, self-sacrifice and vigour clings to the armed forces, and from all among the ‘powers that be’ there is a tendency to esteem them as the most noble.” 45

Some argue that the two societies are coming closer together. General Hackett has written,

Military skills are less exclusively specialist. The military community lives less apart. Uniforms are less
worn in civilian society. The working clothes of a
general in the field are very like those of a machine
minder, though he still has something rather more grand
put by for special occasions. All soldiers like to put on
pretty clothes now and then, just as academics do. But there will always be differences, and if, by ignorance and
insensitivity, we try to bring about the disappearance of the
"special nature of the soldier's contract and the importance of
group identifications in armed forces," we will destroy the
essence of the military ethos.

THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY IN THE FUTURE

If only a small portion of a nation's society ever ex-
perience military service, there may be dangers for that soci-
ety. First, the members of the armed forces themselves run the
risk of becoming introspective and self-serving. Second, the
rest of society could become increasingly ignorant of military
matters and, indeed, of the character of the soldier. In the
United States, the military services, which forty years ago
demonstrated a mixing of the social classes and integration of
the races without equal in the rest of society, are in danger,
with the pursuit of the All-Volunteer Force, of becoming
socially divisive. Charles Moskos has not been persuaded
that "any significant number of middle-class youths of any
race would join the Army, under present recruitment incen-
tives, no matter what its racial makeup," and "it is a social
reality that the combat arms especially will never draw pro-
portionately from middle and upper class youths."

It is the Reserve Force and the National Guard that offer
the best chance for elites to gain military experience, as it is
unlikely a full-time military career will be sufficiently attrac-
tive. "The perception among the educated middle class is that
officer ing is not a suitable lifework for the brilliant, the
broadly talented, or the truly ambitious." But there are suf-
ficient examples from elites, particularly those serving in
Congress and in other organs of government, to demonstrate
that the Reserve and Guard forces have an attraction.

The Guardsman or Reservist, by definition, has "a dual
identity." He wants to be recognized by active duty soldiers
as a full-fledged comrade-in-arms while he maintains his individualism and ties to a local community. He is truly the citizen soldier. As such, he may well be our best bridge between the full-time soldier, who may be isolated from society, and that society itself. The signs, in 1986, are that in the future there will be an increasing reliance on Guard and Reserve elements in the US force structure. Many believe that "reserve forces, if properly trained, equipped, supported, and integrated with active forces, are perhaps the best defense bargain available, and could even permit a modest reduction in far more expensive active-duty forces."

As demographic trends reduce the pool of manpower available, not only in the United States but also amongst its allies (by 1993, the number of 19-year-old American males will drop from the present 2,086,000 to 1,622,000), governments will be compelled to look at increasing the number of Reservists and are likely to be seduced by their apparent value for money.

It can be argued that, unlike in the United States, there is less likelihood of the British all-volunteer force becoming isolated from society. Certainly, there is no reason to suppose that the traditional support for the officer corps from the elite families, including the Royal Family, will diminish, at least not in the case of the Army. The other services show no sign of changing their traditional social composition either. Nevertheless, just like in the United States, the attractiveness of using increased numbers of Reserve forces appeals not only to those charged with maintaining the front line but also to those concerned about possible polarization in society. But we must not become too excited. The TA, and the TA local associations, represent a major link between the services and the civilian community, but we must not expect too much of them if only because of the relatively small size of the enterprise.

The British general responsible for his country's Territorial Army, while noting that "only about 2 percent of the
British population have received any form of military training," went on to assert that "in the TA, when we have completed our plans to expand from a current strength of 72,000 to 86,000 by 1990. I believe we shall be very close to, if not at, the ceiling under present conditions." General Akehurst also challenged Senator Hart's recent call for "an increase in strength of our conventional forces within current budget limitations by making greater use of reserve forces," arguing that while British reserve forces give cost-effective defense, we must resist using them further to replace regular forces. "If we do not do so, we may get numbers on the cheap, but it will not be defence." Although reserves give us the best hope for bridging the gap between the military and the society it serves, they are not a panacea.

But in the future, when more and more of the American or British elites have limited (if any) experience of military affairs, will it matter? In 1962, Samuel Finer, in his seminal work on the role of the military in politics, highlighted the influence of the military upon society and differentiated between the two countries and cultures:

In a word, the American governmental system and its tradition of publicity forces the military not only to speak out but to establish relationships with political forces. In Britain, the cabinet system lessens the military's opportunities to mount Parliamentary pressure against the government; and, furthermore, the lobbying of MPs by Service chiefs is a breach of constitutional usage.

Historically, the military experience, more frequently found amongst British politicians compared with their US counterparts, has compensated for this constitutional hesitation. In the United States, the military leaders find themselves arguing with "civilian analysts, most of whom have little or no military experience. . . . [They] perform the functions of a General Staff. These civilian analysts were originally confined to OSD. Now they are in OMB, GAO, and Congressional staffs." The frustrations felt by those in Congress
who have little or no military experience make for an unhappy partnership. Morris Janowitz maintains that this tension between the congressional and military establishment is inevitable, and it makes the task of political control more difficult than it need be. He argues,

Congress fully recognizes its dependency on the expertise of the military professional, and feelings of distrust thrive because members feel they are inadequately "informed" on military affairs. . . . Legislators often feel that they do not have sufficient basis for evaluating the testimony of the military establishment.\textsuperscript{51}

It is a two-edged sword. The military officers feel uncomfortable, too:

Again and again in interviews, ranking professional soldiers seemed unconvinced, with a kind of political naivete, that the "politicians" were doing all in their power to develop public support for national security policies . . . . as an actor in the midst of a complex political process, it is difficult for the professional officer to maintain a sense of balance and detachment.\textsuperscript{54}

As the divide increases, the tensions are likely to increase. Charles Moskos postulated that the divergence will be reflected in the closer and more critical scrutiny of the military’s budgetary and force demands.\textsuperscript{59} De Tocqueville, on the other hand, reportedly said that “in a political democracy, the most peaceful of all people are the generals,” and some now argue that it is the generals, once retired from the front line, who may be the most questioning. Representative Paul McCloskey comments, “There is a great benefit of having a reservoir of ex-military men who will carry to their grave a very deep skepticism of what admirals and generals may advise is the means and necessity of keeping the peace.”\textsuperscript{62} It is the unrestrained civilians, with their lack of military experience, who may be the greater danger and whose reins will need to be checked. Moskos, again, writes,

The imminent danger to a democratic society is not the spectre of overt military control of national
policy, but the more subtle one of a military segmented from the general citizenry, allowing for greater international irresponsibility by its civilian leaders.61

On the other hand, there is a school of thought that argues that a military not broadly representative of society would foster its own rigid ethos and thus weaken civilian control. This professional army—rather than a citizen army—would become isolated from the values of the community and eventually would care less about the ethics of its own use.62 James Fallows explains that if the national leaders have no experience to fall back on, “it increases the risk that they will be buffaled, either by the Services or by equally passionate groups on the left.”63 There will be little possibility that leaders will bring their own, uncoached sense of nuance and perspective to the military reports they hear. Under the volunteer system, the chances are slim that most future leaders will have any experience of military service. We must do all we can to find devices to prevent the armed forces becoming “more distinct and segmented from civilian society.”64

DEVICES TO AVOID ISOLATION

WE HAVE SEEN HOW the Reserves, the National Guards, the Territorial Army, the Auxiliary Naval and Air Services, provide means for elites to savor the military experience while pursuing their civilian careers. This device may turn out to be the most valuable for preventing a split between the two societies. What else can be done?

General Hackett has argued that the tendency for the military to move away from civilian influences has been reversed in recent years; he maintains that the two societies have come closer together.65 And it is the move towards the civilian academic community that has been at the forefront of this closeness.
In the United States, the service academies are still bastions of the military tradition, but once an officer is commissioned, he will probably make little progress to senior rank unless he continues his education to the level of a masters degree, often in what may appear to be specifically civilian skills such as business administration. On the surface, this may seem an ideal way to help the officer overcome Janowitz's fear that "in particular, intellectual isolation from the main current of American university life may be one of the main trends that needs to be avoided." In practice, however, many of the civilian degrees are taken by correspondence or from civilian university offices conveniently placed on the military installations, so intercourse between the two societies is hardly well developed. Nevertheless, large numbers of officers do manage forays into civilian academia. Janowitz has maintained further that the modern US military "entails potentials of greater social separation and new political imbalances and tensions. The danger rests in highly selective linkages with civilian society." He makes the case for even more involvement with civilian universities, including such radical measures as making all academy cadets spend one year in a civilian university. Janowitz would be pleased with the British experience.

The British have gone out of their way to woo the university graduate. There has always been a place—indeed many places—in the officer corps for those who were not attracted to the military academy life at Sandhurst, Dartmouth, and Cranwell. With the demise of conscription and with the expansion of university education after World War II, it became increasingly apparent that the future officer corps would need to be drawn from civilian universities. Unlike in the United States, the military academies could not gain academic recognition for their courses and consequently their aims were radically altered. As a result, the academies are no longer elitist, and all officers are trained there to varying extents. Students arrive with their commissions and,
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usually, degrees from civilian universities. Thus an increasing proportion of British officers have been touched by the civilian university experience.

General Hackett argued that this experience needs to continue throughout an officer's career. "A sizeable cohort of middle-rank officers are doing post-graduate work and I rejoice whenever I find it being done . . . . in what might be called nonmilitary topics".\(^8\) His ideal would be a civilian qualification or at least saleable skills for everyone in the military. General Hackett was particularly concerned with easing the soldier's move back into civilian society at the appropriate time. Without that ease, the spectre of isolation will be raised. By continuing to encourage participation in the intellectual leadership of the country, the military stands a considerable hope of preventing that isolation.

The challenge for the military man will be to be a part of the whole nation while retaining his highly individualistic identity. General Hackett argues that the task must be "to see how close the military can be brought to the civilian without destroying the value of the soldier to society."\(^9\) The British, despite regal example, wear their militarism uneasily. Most would maintain that that unease stems from centuries-old tradition. One present-day British officer has defined his place this way:

The particular tradition which disdains or understates militarism is the genius of the British Army. We encourage a degree of militarism in our soldiers but the Nation prefers officers to be unostentatiously professional and definitely not militaristic. This is a reflection of the special role and position of the Armed Services, which is linked to the tradition of Military authority being subordinate to the Civil power. Men to officer such an army need to be selected in the same tradition.\(^70\)

To this day, rules of British Officers' Messes insist that officers change into civilian clothes immediately after duty; not long ago, it was frowned upon to be seen in uniform out-
side the military base. To this day, officers wear civilian clothes to their offices in the Ministry of Defence in London, a tradition that can be traced back over a hundred years with only the two World Wars providing temporary reason for change. Only recently have they left their bowler hats and rolled umbrellas behind. This reluctance to be seen in public in uniform and this almost desperate concern to hide identity are in sharp contrast to the experience on the other side of the Atlantic.

The more than 20,000 military personnel who make their way to and from the Pentagon every day do so in uniform, and as a result, they stand out. Ironically, by standing out in such a way and advertising their identity, the US officers may well be contributing to the prevention of isolationism. Society recognizes the military officer in his uniform, and it is seen to be normal for him to be a part of that society. There is nothing unusual in him being there amongst the rest of society. His uniform makes him stand out yet, at the same time, he is part of the society.

On the other hand, if the streets of London were suddenly full of military uniforms, the shock to society would be considerable. Perhaps here is a case where, by emphasizing the difference between himself and the rest of society, the soldier in uniform shows himself to be, in a greater sense, an integral part of society. It is a conundrum, surely, that if British officers were to become less shy of showing off their uniforms in public, they might become closer to that public. Perhaps the time has come for a change in attitude.

CONCLUSIONS

BARRING AN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS, the armed forces of both the United States and the United Kingdom are likely to continue to be filled by volunteers. In the history of both
countries, there is nothing unusual in that. Although traditionally the British, from royalty to the common man, have been prepared to serve, across the Atlantic the elite of society have been less willing to volunteer. Even when US elites have served, particularly in World War II, there was concern afterwards that the experience would feed the root of militarism endemic in the then-rising military and industrial complex in the United States. In the United Kingdom today, there are signs of an increasing disinterest in a military career, at least for the "brilliant, the broadly talented, or the truly ambitious." The use of the one device which allows elites to serve while pursuing another career, the Reserve Forces (including the Territorial Army), has recently been given encouragement. Driven by the fiscal difficulty of maintaining a modern volunteer, and thus expensive, armed force, Her Majesty's Government is looking to expand the Reserves. Perhaps the Government has also been impressed by the undoubted success allies, particularly the United States, have had with Reserve forces. The US Reserve and Guard not only make up an essential part of the whole force, but, in doing so, also enable many elements of society to touch the military experience.

Without that military experience, especially within a nation's leadership, political control might become more difficult. Tensions will be inevitable between civilian leaders and military advisers; frustration, cynicism, and suspicion will develop between both sides in Congress and in Parliament. It is not difficult to foresee irritations between Defense Departments and the other departments of government such as that of State, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the respective Civil Services.

Surprisingly, perhaps, some observers think that the dangers will not be at the initiative of the military officers. It is the inexperienced, in military matters, from the other departments that may be more adventurous and unrestrained.
Without even a slight knowledge of the characteristics and limits of military power, the greatest danger may lie in irresponsible action by civilian leaders. On the other hand, some say that an isolated military would foster its own rigid beliefs, and civilian control would be inevitably weakened. This argument maintains that national leaders need military experience to fall back on or else they can be persuaded into action against their better judgment. During the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, Robert Kennedy told us that "the Joint Chiefs were unanimous in calling for immediate military action. They forcefully presented their view that blockade would not be effective." President Kennedy was profoundly disturbed by those recommendations, and by his senior military advisers’ apparent "inability to look beyond the limited military field." Perhaps the Bay of Pigs fiasco a few months before and his own military experience in World War II had given the President a healthy suspicion of the certainty surrounding the use of military power.

How do we avoid at the highest levels a schism developing between a professional corps of military officers and civilian leaders? How do we prevent the armed forces’ distancing themselves from the rest of society? We must do all in our power to prevent the separation. We must encourage all sections of society to serve, if only for a short time; if not in the armed forces, then in the reserve forces. We must encourage the highest leaders to serve and constantly to demonstrate their commitment in, and their enthusiasm for, the armed forces. While acknowledging that the soldier is somebody very special in society, we must integrate him as much as possible into that society. We must encourage the soldier to go out into civilian society rather than remain isolated behind the barrack walls, and, most importantly, we must encourage him not to be shy of his uniform.

In 1973, Bernard Brodie concluded War and Politics with an observation about the frustration military leaders have when their advice is not taken. Arguing that "the new
generation of officers is growing up in a different environment," he finishes with a statement that perhaps more than any other demonstrates why we must not allow the armed forces to become separated from the rest of society:

Yet the civilian hand must never relax and it must without one hint of apology hold the control that has always belonged to it by right.74

If the people of the United States and the United Kingdom wish to continue their apparently preferred course, that of employing relatively small, professional, all-volunteer armies, leaving a minority of society to protect the majority, they must be aware of the potential pitfalls. If the civilian hand is to retain control, it must do all it can to prevent the armed forces' diverging off on their own. Let General Sir John Hackett, who has given more thought than most to the place of the soldier in modern democratic society, have the last word:

What society gets in its armed services is exactly what it asks for, no more and no less. What it asks for tends to be a reflection of what it is. When a country looks at its fighting forces it is looking in a mirror; the mirror is a true one and the face that it sees will be its own.75
NOTES

2. Ibid., p. 166.
3. Ibid., p. 167.
4. Ibid., p. 167.
7. Ibid., p. 52.
8. Ibid., p. 53.
10. Shoup, p. 56.
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17. Janowitz, p. 100
25. Hackett, p. 121.
26. Gabriel and Savage, p. 82.
27. Ibid., p. 221.
31. Ibid., p. 21.
32. Ibid., p. 57.
37. Baynes, p. 16.
38. Ibid., p. 11.
41. Janowitz, p. 205.
42. Ibid. p. 205.
43. Hackett, p. 73.
44. Ibid., p. 69.
46. Hackett, p. 201.
47. Ibid., p. 72.
52. Ibid., p. 91.
53. Akehurst, p. 18.
54. Ibid.
55. Finer, p. 61.
57. Janowitz, p. 359.
58. Ibid., p. 360.
Baldwin

63. Ibid., p. 23.
65. Hackett, p. 201.
66. Janowitz, p. iii.
67. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
71. Proceedings: U.S. Naval Institute, November 1986, Charles A. Leader III.
73. Ibid., p. 119.
75. Hackett, p. 158.
STRATEGIC STABILITY
A ROLE FOR THE SMALL ICBM

Thomas H. Neary

IN APRIL OF 1983, the President's Commission on Strategic Forces (the Scowcroft Commission) elevated the terms strategic stability and Small ICBM to the forefront of national attention. Two excerpts from this widely acclaimed, bipartisan report outline the roles these two concepts were expected to play in future US nuclear strategy:

Whether the Soviets prove willing or not (strategic) stability should be the primary objective both of the modernization of our strategic forces and of our arms control proposals.¹

Over the long run, stability would be fostered by a dual approach toward arms control and ICBM deployments which moves toward encouraging small, single-warhead ICBMs.²

While the Small ICBM represents new thinking in US deterrent planning, the strategic stability concept has been prominent in the US nuclear strategy arena for more than twenty-five years. A look at three important facets of the stability concept will serve as an overview and a subsequent framework for discussion of the SICBM.

¹ Thomas H. Neary, a Colonel in the US Air Force, wrote this essay while attending the National War College. The essay won recognition in the 1986 Joint Chiefs of Staffs Strategy Essay Competition.
First, the concept of strategic stability has been burdened with many different meanings and interpretations. To some, strategic stability meant a narrowly interpreted measurement of the US-USSR nuclear arms race, i.e., the competition related to the strategic balance of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. To others, it related to the desired behavior of superpowers during nuclear crises. Some strategists saw it as the "stabilizing" conditions resulting from the concept of mutual assured destruction. Finally, many saw strategic stability as a hoped-for (but ill-defined) outcome of US nuclear strategy.

This variation in views leads to the conclusion that there appears to be no common definition, indeed very little agreement, regarding the meaning of the term "strategic stability." This lack of common understanding within military, academic and congressional circles has plagued the concept from its modern-day inception in the 1960s.

The second—and perhaps most important—facet of strategic stability deals with the inextricable link between strategic stability and nuclear deterrence. Historically (at least through the 1960s and 1970s), the concept of strategic stability has been closely linked with traditional thoughts on nuclear deterrence. However, a similar linkage to the revised US deterrence philosophy of the late 1970s has not occurred. In fact, when addressing strategic stability, many strategists continue to "mirror image" the deterrence issue, assuming what deters the United States will also deter the Soviets.

In this essay, I review the concept of strategic stability as it has existed over the last twenty-five years. Additionally, I propose a revised framework for this concept based on a more contemporary view of nuclear deterrence. I then look at the linkage between this revised framework and the new US single-warhead ICBM, the Small ICBM (SICBM). My primary goal is to rethink the concept of strategic stability: a companion goal is to look at the role the SICBM will play in this revised framework.
Although the theater nuclear and non-nuclear aspects of deterrence are vitally important today, this essay addresses only "strategic nuclear" deterrence and stability. In addition, it focuses solely on US deterrence and stability concepts, and not on counterpart Soviet ideas. It is not my intent to provide an exhaustive history of the strategic stability issue nor an advocacy statement for the SICBM. Rather, I seek to place the concept of strategic stability in a new, more meaningful context and use it as a background for addressing the SICBM.

A CONCEPT IN EVOLUTION

Describing the awesome nature of the nuclear weapon, Bernard Brodie said in 1946, "Everything about the atomic bomb is overshadowed by the twin facts that it exists and its destructive power is fantastically great." In pointing out this stark reality, Brodie recognized the ultimate need for effective strategies to prevent nuclear conflict. During the remainder of the 1940s and most of the 1950s, this need was overshadowed by US dominance of the strategic nuclear equation. But following the deployment of credible Soviet nuclear forces in the late 1950s, the concept of strategic stability emerged as a key element in the US strategy for peace through nuclear coexistence.

Beginning in the early 1960s, strategic stability was embraced as a key objective of US nuclear policy. In 1978, Yale academician John Steinbruner wrote of its popularity.

As the United States force posture has evolved over the past 15 years, the idea of stability has emerged as the central strategic objective and the asserted conceptual consensus seems organized around that objective.

But as well established in US strategic thought as the concept seemed to be by 1978, no common definition or understanding existed. Defense scholar Colin Gray noted,
It is very important to recognize that for all its populari-
ty, there is no useful consensus upon the meaning of the
idea of (strategic) stability.\textsuperscript{5}

This scholarly lack of consensus stands out as one of the con-
cept's major problems of the 1960s and 1970s.

During this same period, strategic was directly linked to
the idea of mutual assured destruction (MAD). Developed by
Robert McNamara, the MAD principle held that attacks on
the US homeland could be deterred by threatening potential
attackers with massive destruction of population and indus-
tries. Strategic stability based on MAD was described as,
"A situation of mutual neutralization in which both the
householder and burgler know that if one slays the other, the
latter will . . . retaliate posthumously."\textsuperscript{6} Through the begin-
ing of the 1980s, US stability theory relied on the premise
that mutual societal vulnerability was an effective deterrent
concept.\textsuperscript{7}

Another theme for stability during the period placed it in
the context of arms race stability—a condition wherein
neither side would invest in programs that challenge the
other's assured destruction capability.\textsuperscript{8} Former Secretary of
Defense Harold Brown saw this as a function of ensuring that
the world balance of nuclear forces was not overturned by
sudden Soviet technological breakthroughs. From Brown's
perspective, strategic stability could only be maintained by
vigorous strategic research and development and technical in-
telligence efforts.\textsuperscript{9} A similar arms race theme for stability was
provided during the period by arms control expert Paul
Nitze. In particular, Nitze believed a one-sided "instability"
in the deterrence equation existed in 1976. He saw this as a
result of Soviet numerical advantages gained through ad-
vances in ICBM throw-weight (gained after SALT 1) and civil
defense capabilities. With the situation appearing to grow
more instable, Nitze feared the Soviets might use their deter-
rent edge politically to coerse western nations.\textsuperscript{10}
John Steinbruner saw a somewhat different theme:

Strategic stability [is] a characteristic of deterrence based on mutual assured destruction . . . measured largely in terms of the potential vulnerability of strategic force components, notably land-based missiles.\(^{11}\)

Steinbruner’s theme also called for encouraging the Soviets to adopt strategic stability as a goal to avoid an “unending” arms competition. He was also one of the first strategists to quantify strategic stability in the context of MAD. He believed a fundamental condition of stability existed if each side had the retaliatory capability to devastate one-third to one-half of the other side’s population and one-half to nearly three-quarters of the other side’s industry.\(^{12}\)

One final theme popular during the period related strategic stability to “crisis” stability, which Harold Brown defined as a condition where opposing forces were so balanced that neither would feel pressured to initiate an exchange in a crisis.\(^{13}\) Crisis stability was also seen as a situation where an adversary gained no relevant advantage in striking first or an attacked nation was not required to “use or lose” its strategic weapons.\(^{14}\) Noted strategist Thomas Schelling summed it up the best:

> It is not the “balance”—the equality or symmetry in the situation—it is the stability of the balance . . . [It] is stable only when neither, in striking first, can destroy the other’s ability to strike back.\(^{15}\)

Although not all-inclusive, this brief summary of strategic stability between 1960 and 1980 reveals a variety of themes. These themes underscore the concept’s relative popularity among US strategists as well as the lack of real consensus as to its meaning. In the late 1970s, however, important studies on US and Soviet forces and doctrine began to alter US deterrence philosophy significantly. This revised approach to deterrence raised key questions regarding the results of twenty years of US nuclear strategies. Had Soviet
strategic behavior been positively affected by our strategies, or did the Soviet ignore US desires for stability as meaningless and focus on building their own “war winning” nuclear structure? Colin Gray address this question:

American strategic . . . policy, since the mid-1960s, has been misinformed by stability criteria which rested upon a near-total misreading of Soviet phenomena. . . . Soviet leaders are opportunists with a war-waging doctrine . . . self restraint in American arms competitive activity . . . has simply presented the Soviet Union with an upcoming period of strategic superiority. "

Other writings questioned the utility of the strategic stability concept directly. For example, “There is growing agreement within the western defense community that [the concept of] stability cannot rest upon the threat of massive societal destruction . . . such damage is unacceptable to the US, while it may be ‘insufficiently unacceptable’ to Soviet politicians.” Also, “There are no . . . Soviet equivalents to US theories of deterrence [and] stability.”

DETERRENCE AND STRATEGIC STABILITY—NEW DIRECTIONS

TRADITIONAL VIEWS OF STRATEGIC STABILITY were questioned as early as 1980, but few efforts have been made to connect the concept with revised deterrence thinking. To bring the revised US deterrence philosophy into sharper focus, it helps to trace its development from the late 1970s to its integration into US nuclear policy in the early 1980s. The process began in 1977 when President Carter ordered a broad review of US nuclear targeting policy. Both civilian and military strategists took part in the eighteen-month analysis that focused on US forces, plans, and capabilities. The study also looked at Soviet strengths, vulnerabilities, and doctrinal perspectives. A primary conclusions of the effort was that
the best way to deter the Soviets was not to build a capability that mirror-images what deters the United States, i.e., a threat to retaliate against population and industry. Instead, the study concluded that effective deterrence would occur when the Soviets perceived the United States to possess a clear capability to hold at risk their most highly valued assets, their leadership and strategic forces.19

The core of the revised deterrence philosophy was a detailed re-examination of the dissimilar political-military goals of the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet goal of worldwide communism (with the USSR providing leadership) is supported by strategies of subversion, terrorism, and war. Should global conflict occur, Soviet objectives include domination of the postwar world, neutralization and occupation of NATO, and neutralization of the United States and China. To achieve these goals, the Soviets must preserve their leadership elite, supported by critical government and economic control functions, their nuclear forces, and their command and control networks.20 In contrast, the US goal is survival as a free nation with basic values and institutions intact. The United States is supported by a strategy of deterrence and and its economy, population, and government exist to achieve that goal.

Based on radically different goals and strategies, Soviet perceptions of what deters were also found to be very different from American perceptions. The study recognized these differences and proposed a reoriented deterrence philosophy reflecting the Soviet point of view. It also pointed to new deterrent tasks for US nuclear forces. To support the revised deterrence concept and maintain successful deterrence, US forces must reflect the capability to deny (and the Soviets must perceive the nation as capable of denying) the USSR its objectives in a conflict. Similarly, Soviet leaders must perceive that US decisionmakers and strategic forces will combine to hold at risk those assets the Soviets view as
critical—their leadership and control networks and their strategic forces. The Scowcroft Commission summarized this revised thinking:

Deterrence can not be bluff... for [it] to be effective we must not merely have weapons, we must be perceived to be able... to use them effectively against key Soviet elements of power. Deterrence is not... a mirror-image of what would deter ourselves... [but] beliefs [of] Soviet leaders... about our capabilities and will.³¹

The essence of the revised US deterrence concept is that it views the issue of what deters through the eyes of Soviet leaders, not those of US strategists. It adds a Soviet perceptions element to the traditional equation for deterrence:

Deterrence = Soviet Perceptions of (US Capability + US Will)

Prior to the late 1970s, the traditional deterrence equation would have contained only capability and will. Adding Soviet perceptions to the equation meant that, to be relevant, US capability and will must be assessed as credible from the Soviet perspective. The addition of this new element marked a turning point in US deterrence strategy. For example, had the United States continued to view deterrence only from its own viewpoint, it would have risked allowing deterrence to become a hollow, one-way concept. If the threat of population and industry destruction (essentially soft targets) had remained the US basis for deterrence, impetus for a more accurate, capable US strategic forces triad would not have existed. Further, without US modernization, the Soviets stood ready to capitalize on two decades of hardening and dispersal of their strategic forces and leadership. Their most valued assets would have been, in their eyes, in a sanctuary, invulnerable to aging, less accurate US systems. US deterrence would have been degraded, leaving the door open for Soviet adventurism and coercion.

The Soviet perceptions element of the deterrence equation is influenced by the United States in two fundamental
ways. The first is to raise uncertainty in the minds of Soviet leaders regarding their ability to achieve wartime objectives. In other words, the goal is to make the Soviets uncertain they can successfully attack and neutralize their enemies and dominate the postwar world. These uncertainties are fostered by the difficulties inherent in successfully attacking the US strategic forces triad and NATO forces. The second method of influence involves making the USSR certain of the US will, in a conflict, to inflict unacceptable damage to those assets the Soviets value the most. This method of influencing perceptions succeeds when Soviet leaders see highly capable US nuclear forces and decisionmakers with the will to retaliate swiftly and decisively to a nuclear attack.

The capability factor of the deterrence equation relates not only to the number and effectiveness of US triad forces, but to the US capability to employ them as well. For example, the capability of US command, control, and communications (C3) systems to provide decisionmakers with an attack warning and with adequate time to relay key decisions is an equally important factor.22

Without the element of will, the impact of deterrence loses its meaning. Will—in this context—is described as the national resolve of the United States to retaliate quickly and decisively to a nuclear attack. However, other factors of will also emerge. Demonstration, for example, that top US decisionmakers are dedicated to maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent is a prominent factor of national will. Similarly, congressional and public resolve reflected in crucial strategic triad funding decisions are also critical aspects of will as perceived by those we seek to deter.

This revised deterrence philosophy had a significant impact on those who shaped US nuclear strategy and force modernization in the early to mid-1980s. Not only did the Scowcroft Commission reflect the updated deterrence concept, but later NSC, OSD, and JCS directives and planning
documents incorporated it as well. However, strategic stability has yet to show any parallel growth with the revised deterrence concept. As a concept, it failed to evolve.

To develop a new direction for strategic stability, the concept must be viewed from a new perspective, one that gives it meaning and credibility in today's nuclear strategy arena. The key to revitalizing the strategic stability concept lies in linking it to the contemporary US deterrence philosophy. In this new context, strategic stability will describe the health of the US-USSR deterrence relationship. Using Soviet perceptions as a basis, it will provide a needed framework for assessing the most vital superpower relationship: nuclear deterrence. It will no longer be a one-dimensional concept relating to the balance of the US-USSR nuclear arms race or the survivability of land-based ICBM forces. In this new context, strategic stability will apply across the conflict spectrum, not just in crisis situations.

US strategic stability, in its new form, is described as a function of how well the United States achieves, at any point, effective deterrence perceptions in the minds of the Soviets. It reflects, using a Soviet perspective, the credibility of the US strategic triad and the resolve of US decisionmakers to deny Soviet objectives during peacetime or crisis situations. Admittedly, how well the United States achieves deterrence perceptions in Soviet minds is a subjective interpretation. As a framework for addressing strategic stability, however, it can have real value. Its value stems from requiring the United States to look at deterrence through the most relevant channel, the eyes of Soviet leaders.

Perhaps the best way to envision this concept is to view it along a scale. As a starting point, we could define, with some assurance, a condition approaching "maximum strategic stability." This would be a condition where Soviet leaders were—
THE SMALL ICBM

- Certain that US decisionmakers' resolve and congressional and public support for credible deterrence levels are high.
- Certain that the US triad holds at risk their most valued assets.
- Certain that the US C3 system can provide decision-makers with adequate warning for timely decisions and force execution.
- Certain that US leaders can and will make the force execution decisions, ensuring inevitable and decisive retaliation.
- Uncertain they can defeat the US strategic forces triad in a nuclear conflict.
- Uncertain their incentives to attack (their perceived potential gains) are worth the risk.

This upper bound or condition of maximum strategic stability describes a very high level of deterrence perceptions in the minds of Soviet decisionmakers. However, as a point of reference for building an "effectiveness framework," it is a starting point. The framework could be expanded by subjectively identifying Soviet deterrence perceptions that portray strategic stability at less-than-maximum points of the scale. As the framework is expanded, it would show that strategic stability decreases as a function of reduced US confidence in achieving Soviet deterrence perceptions.

An interesting use for this proposed framework would be to compare the level of strategic stability in 1981 with that of today, after five years of strategic force modernization. The snapshot assessment of US strategic stability today would—we hope—find the stability level to be effective and moving in a positive direction. However, these assessments could vary widely over short time spans. For example, fielding only fifty MX missiles and cutting military budgets via the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act would likely lower
NEARY

Soviet perceptions of both US capability and congressional and public resolve for a strong deterrent. On the other hand, US pursuit of SDI would likely increase Soviet perceptions of US resolve.

The new framework for strategic stability gives it utility over the full conflict spectrum from peacetime through crisis. The key here is that when we assess an issue in terms of its impact on strategic stability, the same questions must be asked: What are the effects of this issue (a new weapons system or a crisis situation) on US deterrent capability? Also, how does it affect Soviet leaders' perceptions of their capability to attain wartime objectives and preserve their most valued assets?

This proposal provides a framework, a necessary first step in making the concept of strategic stability meaningful and credible. It challenges us to "ask the right questions" about the health of the US deterrence equation. By looking at strategic stability from this new perspective, the US nuclear strategy community may also be challenged to develop better ways to assess Soviet deterrence perceptions and US capability and resolve. It is a first step toward regaining a sense of usefulness for the strategic stability concept.

THE SMALL ICBM—AN OVERVIEW

To set the stage for assessing the SICBM's impact on strategic stability, we should briefly overview the SICBM program. An outgrowth of the Scowcroft Commission, the SICBM is to have a single warhead, weigh approximately 15 tons (MX weighs 96 tons) and be deployed by the early 1990s. In addition, it is to have a range of 6,000 nautical miles, use the MX warhead, and be deployed in either a mobile or hardened silo. (Figure 1 compares the Small ICBM (Midgetman) with MX.) The SICBM is also designed to survive an enemy nuclear attack, launch rapidly, and destroy hardened targets.
### Specifications for the Midgetman and MX

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<th>Proposed Midgetman</th>
<th>MX</th>
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<td>Length</td>
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Specifications for the Midgetman are approximate.

Figure 1. Midgetman and MX—how they compare
The Scowcroft Commission wanted to move future US ICBM deployments into a "more stable structure." Doing so included providing reduced target values to the Soviets for each launcher and developing survivable basing methods. For example, the SICBM, deployed to survive a Soviet attack, would present the attacker with a relatively low-value target (only one warhead for the SICBM vice ten for the MX), thus enhancing the commission's definition of "stability." 24

President Reagan approved the Scowcroft recommendations in April 1983, and major research and development actions for the SICBM are now underway. These include establishment of an Air Force SICBM Program Office and ongoing competition for missile, mobile launcher, and support systems development and production. The Air Force has endorsed the hardened mobile launcher (HML) as the leading means for deployment, but research is also progressing on super-hardened silos as an alternative method. Early cost estimates for a force of 500 mobile SICBMs were $65-75 billion; recent predictions range from $40 billion to $45 billion. 25

The Air Force completed a detailed examination of missile and deployment alternatives in August of 1985. The results of this effort showed that basing SICBMs in HMLs on existing Minuteman launch facilities was also an attractive deployment option. The study also addressed increasing the weight of the missile from 15 to approximately 18 tons. The increased weight would provide greater operational flexibility, allowing the missile to carry penetration aids or other alternative payloads that may be required by future threats. 26

In summary, the full spectrum of planning and research and development actions are underway for the SICBM. However, potential arms control constraints, strong budget competition from other high-visibility programs, and ever-tightening budget constraints are expected to exert significant pressure on the program.
THE SMALL ICBM AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

HAVING EXAMINED THE CHANGING CONCEPT of strategic stability and briefly described the SICBM program, I now turn to assessing all aspects of the role of the SICBM in the new strategic stability framework. My emphasis is on the impact the SICBM will have on Soviet deterrence perceptions. For this discussion, I assume the SICBM will be deployed in the hardened mobile launcher (HML) mode.

The SICBM, if deployed as our next generation of land-based ICBMs, will introduce new dimensions of survivability and flexibility to the US strategic triad. Because of its mobility, the SICBM will provide the US ICBM force the important dimension of extended survivability. Adding this dimension to the US land-based ICBM force means that all three US strategic force elements (ICBMs, bombers, and ballistic missile submarines) can count extended survivability as a deterrent asset. As a result, the strategic triad will be strengthened in a key area and Soviet deterrence perceptions will be reinforced.

In particular, the survivability of the SICBM will present Soviet war planners with new and complex problems. They will face a highly accurate, rapid reaction ICBM system that can threaten highly valued Soviet assets throughout the conflict spectrum. This availability (made possible because of the missile’s survivability) throughout the conflict spectrum enhances the weapon’s value in terms of deterrence and stability. Soviet war planners must acknowledge that several hundred survivable, quick-responding ICBMs threaten their critical assets in all conflict scenarios. They can never be certain their attack on the triad will be totally successful or that their surviving critical assets (leadership and strategic forces) will be safe. These SICBM capabilities, with the elements of uncertainty they engender, will produce powerful deterrent perceptions in the Soviet mind.
At the lower end of the conflict spectrum, the SICBM's unique flexibility will strengthen Soviet deterrence perceptions in crisis situations. For example, with today's ICBM force, the US ability to signal intent or resolve in a crisis is limited to bringing non-alert assets to alert status or recalling all available personnel to duty. With the SICBM, however, US National Command Authorities (NCA) gain additional crisis flexibility. Segments of the SICBM force could be dispersed as a demonstration of resolve or to increase Soviet uncertainty about the success of any planned attack.

In a large-scale nuclear exchange, the US NCA could use a portion of the SICBM force to supplement the US silo-based ICBM response. With extended survivability and precise accuracy, the SICBM gives the NCA an additional capability to retaliate against vital Soviet targets and disrupt the Soviets' overall attack. As such, the SICBM affects strategic stability positively by building up Soviet perceptions of US deterrent capabilities. It also raises uncertainties for the Soviets about their ability to successfully attack the United States and achieve their wartime objectives.

In the middle and later stages of a nuclear conflict, the SICBM's can attack Soviet relocatable (non-fixed) targets, such as the growing number of Soviet SS-24 25 mobile ICBMs that could be used in a reserve role. Coupled with an improved US C3I network, the SICBM threatens many of these mobile Soviet assets, particularly during and after the initial attack. In this situation, the SICBM actively supports strategic stability by helping the Soviets recognize that their highly valued assets will not survive in a nuclear conflict. It also promotes certainty in Soviet minds that the United States can inflict unacceptable damage to Soviet mobile warfighting assets.

Another aspect of SICBM survivability that will enhance strategic stability is the greatly reduced target value of each missile. To neutralize a mobile SICBM, the Soviets must spend many weapons to barrage large areas, thus increasing
THE SMALL ICBM

the cost of attacking. This complicates Soviet planning, increases the uncertainty of success, and reduces the Soviets' confidence in achieving their war objectives.

A positive aspect of deterrence and stability also occurs when deployment of a mobile SICBM compels the Soviets to add complex, costly CMI programs to their defense budget. At the risk of mirror-imaging, this issue is not unlike the similar US problem of developing a capability to attack the growing number of Soviet mobile systems. The Soviets will find, as Americans have, that development programs for threatening mobile targets are extremely expensive and challenging to current technology. The increased risks, costs, and uncertainties associated with the SICBM result in positive deterrence perceptions in the minds of Soviet leaders. From the US point of view, this is the essence of strategic stability.

A final positive contribution to deterrence and stability comes from the demonstrated national resolve required to develop and field the SICBM system. If the United States fields the mobile SICBM, it will send the Soviets a powerful signal of US governmental and public desire for a strong deterrent. An additional benefit comes from the positive perception among US allies seeing the United States deploy a versatile and costly nuclear deterrent system on US soil. In each case, Soviet perceptions of US national resolve will increase, and deterrence and stability will be served.

The SICBM may also carry with it some potentially negative aspects. For example, Soviet planners might tend to dismiss the addition of only a few hundred SICBM weapons to the US strategic arsenal as an insignificant threat (given today's US total of weapons). In other words, overall Soviet deterrent perceptions might not be affected at all by SICBM deployment. Also, knowledgeable Soviet students of the US defense budget may be confident the United States will never deploy the SICBM because of the high cost per weapon of the system. In either case, Soviet perceptions of US deterrent
capability and national resolve would be weakened as would strategic stability.

The issue of American public acceptance of SICBM deployments might also emerge as a negative factor. The US public acceptance track record, as evidence by past problems with proposed MX deployments, argues against optimism for the SICBM. If public interest groups can also delay or block SICBM deployment, Soviet perceptions of US nuclear deterrent resolve will be reduced.

The role the SICBM may play in future strategic arms control negotiations presents a trade-off dilemma for the United States in terms of deterrence and stability. On the positive side, the recent administration proposal to ban all mobile ICBMs (thereby “sacrificing” the SICBM program) would eradicate the threat posed by Soviet SS-24 and SS-25 mobile ICBMs. This would promote stability by increasing Soviet uncertainty about achieving wartime objectives without their mobile assets. If the ban becomes a reality, an offshoot benefit would be a significant reduction of US problems in targeting Soviet mobile assets.

On the negative side of the coin, bargaining away the SICBM forecloses any benefits in extended survivability and flexibility offered by the system. In essence, the United States would be turning its back on a system that offers relatively high payoffs in terms of increasing Soviet perceptions of US deterrence.

On balance, deployment of the SICBM can make a positive difference in US deterrence and strategic stability. The potential negatives will result, for the most part, if the United States decides against deploying the SICBM. The bottom line for the SICBM rests in a question that parallels situations with other major weapons systems today: With potential benefits (strengthened deterrence and strategic stability) and costs ($40-45 billion) both being significant, are we willing, as a nation, to make the budgetary and political tradeoffs necessary to strengthen the US strategic triad?
NOTES

2. Ibid., p. 23.
12. Ibid., p. 414.


23. Various NSC, OSD, and JCS directives and planning documents reflected the updated deterrence philosophy, for example, National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs) on strategic planning; Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (NUWEP); Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Annex C (Nuclear); and the Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis (JSPDSA).


25. Interview with Major James Burke, SICBM Action Officer, HQ USAF/XOXFS, 16 December 1985.

26. Ibid.
No issue has been more sensitive in postwar Japan than the size, role, and even the existence of Japan's defense forces. The experience of the 1930s and 1940s created deep-rooted antipathy in Japan for all things military. This sentiment was reflected in Article IX of the 1947 Constitution, which found wide support among the Japanese people.¹

The strength of the antimilitary sentiment in Japan was demonstrated in the early 1950s when, after the Chinese revolution and the outbreak of the Korean war, US policy toward Japan changed from disarming an adversary to reconstructing an ally for the struggle against Communist expansion in Asia. General MacArthur, in his capacity as Supreme Commander Allied Powers in Japan, ordered the government of Japan in July 1950 to form a "police reserve" of 75,000 men to replace the US occupation forces shifted to Korea. The Japanese government complied, but later in 1951 when John Foster Dulles, serving as a special negotiator for the US-Japan Peace Treaty, tried to convince Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru to establish a 350,000-man defense force as a condition for the end of the occupation, the Japanese (with MacArthur's support) balked.² Dulles did get a statement into

Bernard J. Lawless, a US Army Lieutenant Colonel, and Rust M. Deming, a Foreign Service Officer with the US Department of State, wrote this essay while attending the National War College. The essay won recognition in the 1986 Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition.
the preamble of the Peace Treaty that "Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression."  

After the end of the Occupation in 1952, and largely in response to US pressure, the police reserve was transformed into the Self Defense Forces and expanded incrementally to its current authorized level of 250,000. In the early 1950s, the Yoshida government made several attempts to change Article IX, but failed because of strong resistance from the opposition parties, the press, and even elements of the ruling conservative coalition (the Liberal Democratic Party—a conservative political party, despite the "Liberal" title—and its predecessors).

Taking a different tack, the next conservative government (under Hatoyama Ichiro) adopted the position that Article IX did not prohibit the "minimum necessary military strength for self defense." This has remained the basic Japanese position ever since, although the opposition continues to contest the constitutionality of the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF).

The Japanese government has carefully avoided defining precisely what constitutes "minimum necessary self defense capability," but over the years the following general principles have evolved:

- No offensive weapons, including ICBMs, IRBMs, long-range bombers, or attack aircraft carriers will be maintained. Nuclear weapons per se are not constitutionally banned, but the government has ruled out development, possession, or introduction of such weapons by virtue of its adoption of the three non-nuclear principles. The public strongly supports the government policy. Additionally, Japan has adhered to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The interpretation of what constitutes an "offensive weapon" has, however, become more flexible over the years. For example, the government, in the early 1970s, gave in to opposition pressure to remove refueling devices from the Air
Self Defense Force F-4 fighters; by contrast, in 1981, the Japanese equipped their new F-15s with such devices without major complaint.

- No oversea deployment of the JSDF. This policy was set out in a 1954 Diet resolution but was subsequently modified to forbid only the dispatch of "armed troops to a foreign country for the purpose of using armed force." The government maintains, therefore, that JSDF participation in UN peacekeeping activities would not be unconstitutional, although such participation would require change in the JSDF law. This is something that the government is not yet ready to propose because of its political sensitivity within Japan.

- No collective security arrangements. This is interpreted as not permitting Japan to come to the defense of another country. The US-Japan security treaty is constitutional since it does not require Japan to defend the United States or its forces except in response to attacks "within the territories under the administration of Japan."

THE CONTEXT FOR DEBATE

In addition to these constitutional, legal, and policy constraints, other factors have been equally important in shaping Japanese attitudes on defense. First, there is no sense of external threat. The United States is the dominant power in the region, and the Japanese have full confidence in the security commitment implicit in the 1952 security treaty and made explicit in the revised 1960 treaty, even if the presence of US bases in Japan annoys some groups. Moreover, because of the dominance of US power, the Japanese government sees Japan's military power as having no real impact on either deterrence or the outcome of a potential war.

Second, the development of a large military establishment is seen by the Japanese government as not only unnecessary to achieve Japan's fundamental foreign policy ob-
jectives (access to resources and foreign markets), but as something likely to complicate achievement of those objectives. A non-threatening Japan with no projectable military power, practicing "omnidirectional diplomacy," is believed to have the best chance of assuring market and resource access. As a result, Japanese defense policy has been based primarily on doing the minimum necessary to satisfy the United States in order to keep the Mutual Security Treaty in place and ensure access to US markets.

However, because of external and internal factors, the attitude of the government and the populace toward defense has shifted significantly over the last ten years. The return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 perhaps marked the culmination of the period when Japan saw defense policy almost exclusively in terms of US-Japan relations. The reversion of the Ryukyu island chain, along with the end of the US involvement in Vietnam, removed the major irritants in the US-Japan security relationship. But as soon as the issue of US bases faded, Japan found itself forced to examine security in a broader context because of a series of external developments.

The Nixon Doctrine, the end of the Vietnam war, and then President Carter's announced intention to withdraw US forces from Korea brought into question the long-term US military presence in the region and the credibility of US commitments. The Japanese government did not react to these events with outward alarm and made no major policy shifts, but in private, Japanese leaders expressed concern about the inconsistency and unpredictability of US policy in East Asia.

In addition, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the general buildup of Soviet forces in the region transformed what the Japanese had regarded as a minimal threat environment into one more threatening. Moscow's occupation of the four islands off Hokkaido, harsh Soviet treatment of Japanese soldiers captured in the closing days of the war, and historical animosities have consistently put the Soviets near the bottom of Japanese public opinion polls.
However, the opposition, the press, and even elements in the conservative establishment had regarded the Soviet Union as lacking both aggressive intentions toward Japan and the capability to threaten the island nation. Not until the invasion of Afghanistan, the development of the Soviet Pacific Fleet into a major blue-water force, the stationing of SS-20 IRBMs within range of Japan, and more recently, the shooting down of KAL Flight 007 over Sakhalin Island did concerns about Soviet intentions and capabilities become an important factor in Japanese defense policy.

A third factor in the change of Japanese defense attitudes was the transformation of Sino-US and Sino-Japanese relations. The Japanese government welcomed these developments as reducing tensions in Asia, and particularly lessening the likelihood of a renewed conflict in Korea. Additionally, the Chinese acceptance of the US-Japan security relationship as necessary to cope with the Soviet threat further undermined Japanese left-wing and press opposition to the treaty. At the same time, the Japanese government found itself in the middle of a much more complex situation, with some Americans talking about a US-Japan-China agreement to contain the Soviet Union, an idea the Japanese found at least unsettling.

A fourth factor affecting Japanese attitudes was the impact of the two oil crises, with the first crisis being the more traumatic. When Japan was included in the 1973 oil embargo, the Japanese public recognized, for the first time in the postwar period, that the country's security could be affected by events in other regions of the world for which the United States could offer no effective protection. The initial response of the Japanese government was to distance itself from US Middle East policy in order to meet Arab demands for restoration of the oil flow. The long-term impact, however, was to broaden the government's perception of its own security interests.
The effect of these developments on Japan's perceptions of its own defense role was ambiguous. Among the Japanese public, media, and middle-of-the-road political parties, there was growing acceptance of the JSDF and the US-Japan security treaty as necessary evils in a complex and uncertain world. On the other hand, there was little sentiment that Japan should assume greater military responsibilities or change the size and orientation of the JSDF. Government officials and defense establishment figures instead looked for non-military ways in which Japan could contribute to its own security to counter US voices saying Japan was enjoying a “free ride.”

It was in this context that the concept of "comprehensive security" was advanced by Inoki Masamichi and other Japanese defense intellectuals. "Comprehensive security" called for Japan to use a blend of military, economic, and political tools to maintain its security. Specifically, this policy argued that Japanese economic assistance to key countries in strategically important areas, such as Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey, should be regarded as a contribution to shared security interests of the United States and Japan. This would compensate for Japan's inability to play a wider military role. At the same time, the policy called for Japan to improve its capability to protect its own territory, and to enhance US-Japan defense cooperation to ensure Japan's strategic protection.

"Comprehensive security" was attacked by both the left and the right in Japan. Those on the left argued that the government was attempting to blur the concept of security in order to gain public support for increased defense spending. Those on the right, including the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) and JSDF officials, argued that comprehensive security gave the mistaken impression that economic and political resources could be substituted for military capabilities, and saw the concept as a device designed to avoid increased military spending or an enhanced Japanese defense role.
In fact, both arguments have proved to be correct. The concept of comprehensive security has gained wide public support and thereby helped the government to increase both its foreign economic assistance and its defense budget at a substantially higher rate than the overall budget. Additionally, Japan has used its foreign assistance programs to counter US pressure for increasing defense spending beyond the one percent of GNP limit set by the Miki government in 1976.

CURRENT JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY

Beginning in 1958, the Japanese government undertook four consecutive four-year defense buildup plans, based on the 1957 "Basic Policy for National Defense." These plans called for specific improvements in JSDF capabilities, but there was neither an underlying concept of the contingencies with which Japan's defense forces should be designed to cope, nor an estimate of the forces necessary to meet contingencies.

In 1976, the government, under pressure from the opposition and the press to clarify where Japanese defense policy was headed, developed a different approach. Instead of another four-year program, the government produced a "National Defense Program Outline," specifying the role that the JSDF should have and setting detailed guidelines for developing an appropriate force structure. The outline was based on the following assumptions: there would be no change in the external threat environment around Japan; the effective US-Japan security system would continue; there would be no major US-Soviet conflict; US relations with China would continue to improve; and the status quo on the Korean peninsula would continue.

The outline set out the mission of the JSDF under the above assumptions. Against a nuclear threat, Japan would continue to rely exclusively on US deterrence. Against a limited conventional attack, Japan would "in principle" repel such external aggression without external assistance. Against
a more substantial conventional attack, the JSDF mission would be to defend Japan until the United States could bring its forces to Japan's support.

To accomplish these missions, the outline first presented the general capabilities that "Japan's standard Defense Force" must possess, and then set out the specific structure of the Ground, Air, and Maritime Self Defense Forces required. In order to develop this force structure, the outline replaced the fixed four-year program with a rolling program to be adjusted annually. This shift away from fixed programs raised opposition concern that there would be uncontrolled growth in defense spending, causing the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government under Prime Minister Miki to pledge that defense spending would not exceed one percent of the GNP for "the time being." This policy was acceptable to both those factions that wanted a stronger defense, who saw the policy as allowing the defense budget to expand as the economy expanded; and to those who feared a stronger military, who were relieved that the policy imposed a ceiling to prevent uncontrolled rearmanent.4

The 1976 outline and the related one percent of GNP limit have remained the basic policies governing the development of Japanese defense capabilities. However in the 1980s, there has been increased pressure, much of it from the United States but some also from elements of the Liberal Democrats, the Defense Agency, and the forces themselves, to review both the defense outline and the one percent limit on the grounds that the assumptions upon which these policies were based are no longer valid.

These pressures increased during the Carter administration when Defense Secretary Harold Brown, citing the swing of US forces into the Persian Gulf region, urged the Japanese government to raise defense spending.10 The Reagan administration has continued to make an increased defense contribution by Japan a high priority, but has shifted away from emphasizing gross increases in defense spending to focus
instead on specific roles and missions that the Japanese could assume. During the Reagan-Suzuki summit on 7 May 1981, the Japanese Prime Minister defined Japan's role as providing for the immediate defense of the Japanese islands, including the associated airspace and territorial seas. This represented a policy that had begun with the 1976 outline, but at a press conference following the meeting, Suzuki amplified this by adding that Japan would defend "sea-lanes up to 1000 miles from Japan."11

Defense Secretary Weinberger and other US officials welcomed this new commitment, but refrained from public comment on US views of the adequacy of Japan's present defense structure to carry out these new obligations. Press reports at the time indicated that US officials had privately suggested to the Japanese that the force levels set out in the 1976 outline were adequate.12

The accession of Yasuhiro Nakasone as the Prime Minister in December 1982 marked a rhetorical if not substantial shift in Japanese defense policy. Nakasone, long considered a "hawk" and a "nationalist,"13 has moved cautiously with respect to such basic defense policies as Article IX and the one percent of GNP defense spending limit. He has, however, been more forthright than any other Japanese Prime Minister in identifying Japan's security interests with those of the United States and the West as a whole, and in supporting an enhanced role for the JSDF within the context of the US-Japan Security Treaty. Nakasone, unlike his predecessor, has not shrunk from the use of the term "alliance" to describe the US-Japan security relationship. Furthermore, at the Williamsburg summit in 1983, the Japanese Prime Minister was instrumental in having a statement included in the political declaration that emphasized the "indivisibility" of the security of the industrialized democracies.

In effect, Nakasone has brought the Japanese government's tatemae (public or formal position) more into harmony with what for some time has been its honne (private or
true position). What has been surprising is not that Nakasone has taken this more forthright approach, but that the public response has been so muted. The socialist party and elements of the press have voiced their usual concerns in response to Nakasone’s “hawkish” stands, but often in a pro forma way. Moreover, the general public reaction has been one of acceptance if not enthusiasm.

This new attitude reflects, we believe, a growing conviction among a majority of Japanese that Japan’s future does indeed lie with the West, and that Japan should do more to support, at least rhetorically, shared interests. The opposition parties, for their part, are well aware that “unarmed neutrality” has lost its earlier appeal in the eyes of a more sophisticated Japanese public and are therefore trying to cultivate a more responsible image to attract voters. Perhaps most fundamentally, Nakasone’s more assertive approach has struck a chord with a new generation, unscarred by war, who would like to see Japan play a much more active international role.

Nakasone’s substantial achievements in the defense area, however, have been limited to achieving a 6.5 percent annual nominal growth (about 3 percent real growth) in Japan’s defense budget over the last three years in the face of strong political and bureaucratic opposition. This opposition has been strengthened by the fact that the government’s overall budget growth has been held to zero because of a budget deficit almost as large, proportionally, as that of the United States. Nakasone has used substantial political capital to achieve these increases, but even at the present pace, the objectives set out in the 1976 Outline will not be achieved until well into the next decade.

In September 1985, the Japanese government gave formal approval to an “estimate” for defense spending from 1986 through 1990 totalling 18 trillion yen (at an exchange rate of 200 yen to the US dollar, about $90 billion), or an average increase of 5.4 percent annually. Nakasone was unable.
however, to obtain approval for a government statement formally removing the one percent of GNP limit on defense spending, although most observers believe that this ceiling will in fact be exceeded in late 1986 or early 1987, depending on the rate of GNP growth. The question of whether the 1976 Defense Outline should be altered (because the assumptions upon which it was based are no longer valid) has been put aside. At a January 1986 meeting in Honolulu of Japanese and American officials to discuss defense issues, Japanese officials reportedly confirmed that there are no present plans to change the 1976 Outline, but indicated that the Outline is flexible on the types of equipment to be procured by the JSDF.

US PERSPECTIVE OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE POLICY

As we have noted, the central elements in Japanese consideration of defense issues continue to be the attitude of the US government. In recent years, however, the United States has not always spoken with a clear and consistent voice, particularly as defense issues have become politicized and as the Congress has become involved. As Nakasone said in 1977, before he became Prime Minister, "some Americans argue that Japan is not doing enough for its own defense. Others argue that a step-up in Japanese defense capabilities would lead to a revival of militarism. Japanese are at a loss to know what to do."14

The Reagan administration has spoken with a more unified voice.15 Perhaps the most complete and authoritative statement of the American position on Japan's defense policy was put forward by Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs on 12 June 1984. In his testimony, Armitage made the following points:

- The administration strongly supports the division of roles agreed to during Prime Minister Suzuki's May 1981 visit
to Washington, with Japan defending its territory from Hokkaido to Okinawa and the adjacent air and sea space. Additionally, Japan would defend selected sea-lanes out to 1,000 miles.

- By coupling Japan's defense role with the larger US mission, Japan could increase its capabilities without worrying its Asian neighbors, "which do not, like the majority of Japanese, want to see Japan play a major military role in the region." Pressing Japan to do more than the role that it has already defined for itself would alarm not only the Japanese, but also Korea, Southeast Asian nations, and even Australia and New Zealand.

- The objective of US and Japanese defense policy in the region is to enhance deterrence. The combination of enhanced Japanese capabilities and a strong US force posture would not match Soviet force levels, but would complicate Soviet planning and create inhibitions.

- Although the United States believes that Japan should determine how to meet its own defense objectives, Admiral Long's (former CINCPAC) recent suggestion that Japan achieve the capability to close three key straits is a sound one, as it would enhance at low cost Japan's deterrence capability. (OSD officials tell us that while the JSDF has some ships and aircraft to carry out such mine-laying operations, it lacks the mines and the necessary air cover. These officials add, however, that if the 1986-1990 defense program is fulfilled, the JSDF will have a greatly increased capability.)

- Present Japanese capabilities in absolute terms are impressive. Japan's defense budget is the eighth largest in the world; its navy has more than fifty destroyers, more than twice the number in the US Seventh Fleet; Japan has almost as many antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft as the United States has in both the Pacific and Indian Ocean; and Japan has more tactical aircraft (400) than the United States has in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines combined.
Nevertheless, this impressive force is inadequate to meet the threat. In particular, none of the elements of the JSDF have the resources to sustain themselves in combat, and "forces which cannot fight cannot deter." The United States hopes that sustainability will be a major emphasis of the 1986-1990 defense program.

Despite these problems, there have been important positive developments in Japanese defense policy in recent years. The Nakasone government has made self-defense a priority matter and has increased the defense budget more than 6 percent annually (nominal increase) in the face of overall fiscal austerity. Consideration is being given to revising the present policy of limiting defense spending to one percent of GNP and reviewing the 1976 Defense Outline. The United States has been given access to Japanese defense technology on a reciprocal basis. And the Japanese spend more than $1 billion annually for costs associated with US bases in Japan, a figure that averages out to more than $20,000 for each member of the US forces stationed in Japan; this figure is higher than that of any other US ally.

With the possible exception of the suggestion that Japan formally undertake the mission to close international straits around Japan (which some in Japan see as unnecessarily provocative toward the Soviets, particularly as a public policy), Japanese officials have expressed no basic disagreement with the position set out by Armitage. In fact Armitage's major point about improving the sustainability of Japanese forces has become a major item of the 1986-1990 budget estimate.

INFLUENCES ON DEFENSE POLICY

The pace and direction of Japan's defense policy over the balance of this century will likely be determined by the interaction of several key external and internal factors.
External Factors

The Soviet military buildup in Asia has had an important influence in changing Japanese defense attitudes. This will continue to be the case. Should the Soviet buildup level off, with the Soviet Pacific Fleet limited to its present size and structure, no expansion of the Soviet deployments at Cam Ranh Bay, no further development of military bases in the four Northern Islands, and at least a freeze on SS-20 deployments in Asia, it may become more difficult for the Liberal Democrats to continue increases in the defense budget. Moreover, should such a leveling-off of the Soviet defense posture in Asia be accompanied by an improvement in overall Japan-Soviet relations (Prime Minister Nakasone stated on 28 November 1985 that the Geneva summit offered Japan “a chance for a breakthrough” in its relations with Moscow and the recent visit of the Soviet Foreign Minister to Tokyo reportedly resulted in Soviet acknowledgement that a territorial issue exists), there would likely be a further erosion of support in Japan for increased defense spending, on the basis that it was both unnecessary and provocative.

Conversely, a continued Soviet buildup or a major Soviet-Japan incident (such as the shooting down of another airliner with Japanese aboard) would stimulate support for increased defense spending.

The other key external variable affecting Japan's defense policy is the overall state of US-Japan relations. To the extent that both countries subordinate their economic complaints to gain broader shared political and security interests, a climate for increased US-Japan defense cooperation and burden sharing will be sustained. If, on the other hand, a major trade war should erupt, US-Japan security ties could not help but be affected, pushing Japan either back toward a more passive defense role or toward a more independent and assertive military posture.

In addition to trade problems, other factors could weaken Japan's confidence in relying on the US security
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shield. A major draw-down in the US presence in Asia, specifically a withdrawal from South Korea, could have this effect. On the other hand, a perception in Japan that the United States was pursuing an overly confrontational policy toward the Soviet Union could cause the Japanese to draw back to avoid being dragged into conflict against its own interests. Additionally, a breakdown in US-China relations, resulting in renewed Chinese attacks on Japan’s security ties with the United States, would also greatly complicate Japan’s ability to maintain its close defense links with the United States.

In addition to the key factors of Japan-Soviet and Japan-US relations, Japan’s defense policy will also be affected by its relations with Southeast Asian states, China, and South Korea. In recent years there has been a direct relationship between trade, investment, and political grievances of Japan’s Asian neighbors and the complaints of these countries about “Japanese militarism.” To the extent that Japan can keep these economic and political ties in good order, the Japanese should be able to pursue a steady buildup of their defense capabilities without significant criticism from their neighbors.

Looking beyond Asia, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf are the areas most directly tied to Japan’s security interests because of Japan’s oil dependence. Japan’s current contribution to the security of this vital area is indirect: economic assistance to key countries such as Egypt and provision of bases to support US Seventh Fleet deployments in the Indian Ocean. Should there be a crisis in the region that threatens Japan’s oil supply, Japan would look to the United States for protection. If the United States was unsuccessful, and if Japan’s ninety-day oil stock and the buffer stock set up through the International Energy Agency (IEA) proved inadequate, we believe that the Japanese would make whatever political deals were necessary to restore the oil flow, just as they did in 1973. The government would almost certainly see
LAWLESS and DEMING

the task of helping to defend the sea-lanes in the Gulf as an impossible proposition because of a lack of forces. Moreover, trying to secure resources by force would represent a return to the totally discredited policies of the 1930s. This seems inconceivable for the foreseeable future.

Internal Factors

Clearly, the key internal factor affecting Japanese defense policy will be ability of the conservative coalition—based on the Liberal Democratic Party but now extending to the middle-of-the-road New Liberation Club (NLC), the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), and the Komeito—to maintain the dominant position it has had in postwar Japanese politics. There is no sign that this will change in the foreseeable future; in fact, the prospects for continuity of policy in Japan are much better than they are in many Western European countries.

More problematical is whether the post-Nakasone leadership of the Liberal Democrats will be as committed as is the current Prime Minister to expanding Japan’s defense capabilities and increasing cooperation with the United States. The three primary contenders, Foreign Minister Abe, Finance Minister Takeshita, and former Foreign Minister Miyazawa, all appear somewhat “softer” on defense issues than Nakasone. However, it is impossible to predict their behavior in office in view of the continuing evolution of attitudes in the LDP and the public at large.

Perhaps as important as the attitude of the next Prime Minister will be the state of the Japanese budget and the Japanese economy. After more than five years of budget deficits proportionately as great as those of the United States, Japan is beginning to get its financial house in order. Nevertheless, just as in the United States, it will be difficult to sustain substantial increases in defense spending if the overall budget is kept at zero or negative growth. More fundamentally, the growth rate of the Japanese gross national product
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(GNP) will have an impact on defense spending. Although the one percent limit no longer appears to be the sacrosanct barrier it once was, it is likely to prove difficult for the government to greatly exceed this limit. Therefore, to the extent that the Japanese economy grows, defense spending should also be able to grow without provoking strong domestic opposition.

A third domestic factor is the way in which popular attitudes toward the JSDF are evolving. The Japanese public has come to accept the legitimacy of the Self Defense Forces, including their increasingly visible role in society. Nevertheless, there remains great sensitivity in Japan (especially among the older generation) to any indication that the uniformed military may be attempting to subvert civilian control or otherwise evade the legal and policy constraints developed in the postwar period. Any intemperate remark by a senior JSDF officer about the need to take “extra-legal” steps in an emergency, or the revelation of a “secret” JSDF plan developed without the knowledge of civilian superiors could complicate government efforts to strengthen Japanese defense capabilities.

LIKELY ALTERNATIVES FOR JAPAN’S DEFENSE POLICY

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT how any variables will develop and interact in the years ahead, but after setting down some assumptions, we believe we can lay out the most likely direction for Japan’s defense policy.

Assumptions

First, we assume there will be relative stability within the East Asia region. We define this stability to include no outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, no major conflict between Thailand and Vietnam or on the Sino-Soviet
border, and no developments in the Philippines that would force the removal of the US bases there. This last assumption is the most tenuous in our judgment, and we will later examine the implications for Japanese security policy and US-Japan security relations should the United States lose its Philippine bases.

Our second basic assumptions is that the United States will continue its current commitments and force deployments in East Asia. A US pullback from the region would naturally force Japan to fundamentally recalculate its security policy.

A third assumption we make is that there will be no confirmed nuclear proliferation in East Asia. South Korea, Taiwan, and North Korea, based on their civil nuclear programs, are all widely considered to have potential nuclear weapons capability, but we are aware of no hard evidence that any of these countries are engaged in a nuclear weapons program. If this should change, it could have a profound effect on Japanese attitudes about defense issues.

The fourth assumption we make is that the US and Japanese leadership will manage bilateral trade problems so as not to lead to a major political crisis.

Finally, we assume there will be no direct armed conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union on either the strategic or local level.

Alternatives

Based on these essentially status quo assumptions, it is not surprising that we believe Japanese defense policy is likely to develop in a fairly linear manner. By this we mean that Japanese defense capabilities will remain within the framework of current law and the Mutual Security Treaty. Defense spending will not greatly exceed one percent of GNP, and will continue to focus on defensive rather than force projection capabilities. Cooperation with the United States will increase, particularly antisubmarine warfare efforts within
the designated sea-lane protection areas. However, Japan is not expected to assume regional defense responsibilities beyond the 1,000 mile limit already established. Indeed, Japan will not be able to assume the 1,000 mile sea-lane responsibility until well into the next decade.

If there are deviations from this course, they are likely to be in one of two directions. On the one hand, Japan might move toward a more autonomous defense capability. There is already some pressure for this from the right wing in Japan. In any event, we might expect some drift in this direction as a natural result of Japan's postwar political maturation. However, it is very hard to visualize a decision by Japan to pursue its security interests outside of the US-Japan security relationship under the assumptions we have established.

Alternatively, Japan might turn again toward the minimalist approach that until recently characterized Japanese defense policy. Under this possibility, Japan's defense spending and cooperation with the United States would level off or decline. Again, this appears unlikely given our assumptions. A combination of weak LDP leadership, fiscal austerity, and improved Japan-Soviet relations (combined with increased tension between the United States and Japan), however, could cause this to occur.

The minimalist position might also again dominate if detente should blossom. Improved Japan-Soviet and US-Soviet relations would make it difficult to sustain public support in Japan for increased defense spending.

The Philippine Problem and Japanese Security Policy

As noted, our assumption that the United States would be able to retain its bases in the Philippines is a tenuous one. The New People's Army insurgency is only one factor bringing into question the US ability to hold on to Subic Bay and Clark Air Base. More immediate threats are represented by the tenuous hold on power of the new Aquino government and calls even by moderates for the removal of the bases.
The Japanese reaction to a US departure from the Philippines would not be a happy one, but the impact of such a development would depend very much on the circumstances. The worst case would be the assumption of power of a strongly anti-American government (as in Iran), which would then force the United States out immediately. This scenario would likely raise strong doubts in Japan about US staying power in East Asia and stimulate concern about the long-term viability of Japan's security policy. Less unnerving to Japan would be a relatively amicable parting of the ways between the United States and a moderate Philippine government involving a phased withdrawal of US forces.

Under either scenario, the Japanese government's major concern would be whether the United States would relocate these forces elsewhere in East Asia, and if so, where. In order to prevent a draw-down of US forces in the region, the Japanese might be willing to help by making available additional facilities in Japan. But finding additional facilities there would not be easy. Present US bases at Yokosuka, Yokota, Iwakuni, and on Okinawa are crowded and hemmed by urban development. Only two, Misawa and Sasebo, might have some potential for expansion. Additionally, it would be hard for the Japanese government to directly finance US facilities outside of Japan since this would be a novel and politically delicate arrangement. However, some indirect arrangement could possibly be worked out. One possibility would be having the Japanese government assume all local labor costs at US facilities in Japan.

**US INTERESTS AND SUGGESTED US ACTIONS**

It clearly is essential to US regional and worldwide interests that Japan's military power develop within the context of the US-Japan relationship and the Mutual Security Treaty. This course of development will—

- Minimize the negative impact on friendly countries in the region of an expanded Japanese defense capability.
• Help spread the burden of containing the Soviet threat and enhance deterrence in the region.

• Preserve US access to bases in Japan which are essential to the US forward deployment strategy in Asia.

• Allow the United States to continue to assist in the shaping of Japanese defense policies, including development of compatible equipment and procedures. Not only does this enhance US-Japanese cooperation in carrying out military missions (intelligence, antisubmarine warfare, air defense), but the interaction of US and Japanese defense officials on a daily basis also provides important support to the overall political relationship.

• Maintain the political benefit of Japan’s dependence on the United States for strategic protection. A Japan that develops its defense policies outside the context of the US-Japan relationship would be a source of concern to its neighbors.

• The Japanese force structure most supportive of US interests is, in our view, the structure that the Japanese government is now trying to construct: a strong emphasis on improving antisubmarine warfare and air defense capabilities, modernization of equipment for the Ground Self Defense Forces, and increased sustainability for all forces. There may be differences between the Americans and the Japanese over the pace at which these objectives are being achieved, but the United States should not push the Japanese to expand the scope of their defense objectives.

In particular, it is not in the US interest to push Japan-Korea defense cooperation, as some analysts occasionally suggest. The two governments may, over time and at their own pace, quietly develop cooperation in such areas as intelligence sharing, antisubmarine warfare, and air defense, but sensitivities on both sides will preclude more active cooperation for the foreseeable future.
Nor should the United States push for a more active Japan-China defense relationship, or a US-China-Japan "triple entente" in the defense area. Both the United States and Japan are developing to some extent bilateral defense relationships with the People's Republic. In the case of Japan, the relationship is limited to the exchange of visits of both civilian and uniformed defense officials, and is not likely to move beyond this for some time to come. The Japanese look at their defense dialogue with Beijing as simply another way to strengthen their political ties with China, and not as setting the stage for an active defense relationship that would be both unsettling to the Soviet Union and other countries in Asia, and a source of domestic political controversy in Japan.

How can the United States influence the development of Japanese defense policy in a manner and at a pace supportive of US interests? As we have noted, US policy will be only one factor influencing the development of Japanese defense policy, but it will be an important factor and the only one primarily under US control.

First and foremost, the United States must maintain the credibility of its strategic deterrence. This does not mean striving to reestablish nuclear superiority (which the Japanese realize is unattainable and would provoke unwelcome tensions in US-Soviet relations). Rather, it means maintaining a stable nuclear balance, ideally at a lower level through successful arms control negotiations.

Second, the United States needs to keep its forces in Asia at near their currently deployed levels as evidence of commitment to the security of Japan and other US allies in the region. To lessen the impact of the deterioration of the Philippine situation on the Japanese government's perception of US staying power in Asia, the United States should portray the Philippines as an "Asian security problem" rather than a "US problem," and make it clear that Americans expect the Japanese increasingly to contribute economic and political resources to help solve the problem.
JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY

Third, the United States should continue efforts to improve cooperation between the JSDF and the US military, including regular high-level exchanges, joint exercises of air, sea, and land forces; and joint planning to improve interoperability. This appears to be well on track with the number and range of joint exercises increasing significantly in recent years.

Fourth, the United States needs to continue its recent efforts to emphasize roles and missions and to avoid public discussion of budget figures. This strategy has lowered the level of acrimony between the two countries on defense issues while still keeping the pressure on the Japanese for more rapid implementation of defense plans. The United States needs to keep up this outside pressure since the Japanese system still needs gaiatsu (outside pressure) to keep defense spending from slipping back.

Fifth, to the extent possible, the executive branch, working with the Congress, needs to try to keep US-Japan trade problems from spilling over into the political relationship and thereby affecting defense ties. This will require continued good-faith Japanese efforts to resolve trade issues. Foreign Minister Abe's recent concessions on forest products demonstrates that Japan is well aware of the importance of resolving trade problems. At the same time, the US administration will need to continue to emphasize to Congress and the American public that trade issues must be dealt with in the broader context of a critical strategic relationship. This may be increasingly difficult as the 1986 congressional elections approach.

Finally, the United States needs to do a better job of consulting with the Japanese on key issues of mutual concern. This is essential to ensure cooperation, avoid shocks, and maintain the health of the political relationship. President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone have an excellent relationship, as do Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Abe.
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and there are frequent working-level consultations on regional and other issues.

Nevertheless, the "full partnership" so often given lip service is still in its formative stage and needs nurturing on both sides. In particular, the two nations need to maintain the closest possible consultation and coordination on such delicate issues as arms sales to China and Taiwan, initiatives toward the Korean peninsula (particularly any steps toward North Korea), relations with the Soviet Union (including arms control), Indochina problems, and the Middle East and Persian Gulf.
1. Article IX of the Japanese Constitution provides,

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the State will not be recognized.


8. The following are the "basic Policies for National Defense" contained in the Japan Defense Agency's *Defense of Japan 1978*, p. 55:

   The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, and once invaded, to repel such aggression, thereby preserving the independence and peace of Japan founded upon democratic principles. To achieve this objective, the Government of Japan hereby establishes the follow-
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...principles: 1. To support the activities of the United Nations, and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace. 2. To stabilize the public welfare and enhance the people's love for country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan's security. 3. To develop progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary for self-defense, with due regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation. 4. To deal with external aggression on the basis of the US-Japan security arrangements, pending more effective functioning of the United Nations in future in deterring and repelling such aggression.


15. This line came out of the Defense Department (the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs), the State Department, and the US Embassy in Tokyo.


CHINA'S ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION

William McDonald

STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT of the Chinese economy since 1949 shows the uneven economic progress made during the battle for power between the left and right wings of the Chinese Communist Party, which resulted in periods of political turmoil and wide swings in economic policies. The fact that the pragmatic right-wing faction is now well established in power supports an optimistic economic forecast for China over the next two decades.

Despite the political turmoil and huge economic difficulties China has faced, both unique in scale, excellent progress has been made. But major problems remain for the Chinese economy to overcome in its efforts to modernize:

- an energy shortage
- inadequate infrastructure
- inadequate agricultural production
- inefficient use of capital
- under-utilization of foreign trade as an "engine of growth"
- deficiencies in foreign capital and technology

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- an ideological requirement that China retain a centrally planned economy, thereby forgoing many of the benefits of a market-oriented economy
- a largely government-controlled pricing system
- an inefficient, large, and rigid bureaucracy
- a huge population

In view of these difficulties, it is probable that China's objective to quadruple its agricultural and industrial output by the year 2000 is beyond its reach. It would require an average annual economic growth rate of 7.2 percent, leading to a per capita income in 2000 of $US 800–1,000. A more moderate annual growth rate of 4–5 percent, resulting in a per capita income of about $US 600 in 2000, is more likely. Nevertheless, given the immensity of China, the opportunities available to other countries of the region even under this forecast growth rate are significant.

1949–1976

CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT since the 1949 revolution can best be characterized as a series of starts and stops, accompanied by a political struggle over development priorities. The left wing, favoring Stalinist emphasis on heavy industrial development and Mao Zedong's egalitarian principles, and impatient with the slow transition to socialism that led to the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, dominated economic decisionmaking until Mao's death in 1976. However, his death, and the removal of the more radical elements of the left, cleared the way for the devolution of power to the right wing and a new, pragmatic approach to economic development.

Domination by either the left or the right by no means implies mutual exclusion. In fact, the pragmatic policies
of the right wing received attention even during the Maoist era; however, each time Mao was able to reassert his influence and quash right-wing policies. Factional struggles have been largely responsible for the varied success and failure of China's economic programs since the founding of the People's Republic. Economic growth has been rather fast in certain phases (1949-56, 1961-65, and since 1976), but interrupted by dramatic, politically inspired reversals (the Great Leap Forward, 1958-60, and the Cultural Revolution, 1966-69). Nonetheless, the basic long-term objective has always been the same: to modernize China economically and militarily.

The economy inherited in 1949 was war-torn, marked by high inflation, disorganized transportation, and diminished, obsolescent industrial capacity. The new leader acknowledged that socialism could only be introduced gradually and set a goal of restoring the economy within three years. To accomplish this goal, they quickly installed a new political and economic system based on the Soviet model, but tolerated some private enterprise. Setting out with the energy and enthusiasm of a new regime, the leaders quickly succeeded in achieving economic rehabilitation. During the first three years, China's leaders restored and modernized industrial facilities and transportation systems, unified the budget under state control, developed a national economic plan, tightened control over government expenditures, began to ration necessities, and introduced price controls. In addition, they were able to consolidate control over key industrial institutions and resource allocations. As a result, inflation was brought under control, and production and the supply of consumer goods were increased.

It was at this stage that the First Five Year Plan was announced to begin on 1 January 1953. Although the plan contained more projections than specific action programs, it
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marked the adoption of the Stalinist model of economic management and rapid industrialization. In 1952, China was not ready for long-term, comprehensive plans as it lacked proper economic data. (The National Statistics Bureau was not established until 1952.) The Chinese were also still negotiating with the Soviets for aid, including complete industrial plants, essential to the new plan. In the meantime, most of China's economic development was based on fuller utilization of existing capacity.

By the end of 1953, negotiations with the Soviets were complete, agricultural productivity had risen, and industry was operating at near capacity. New plants had begun to be built and the state continued to nationalize and collectivize. Hence, in mid-1955, a detailed economic plan was announced to cover the period 1953-57. The plan, preceded by an internal debate over the strategy and pace of development, called for an accelerated drive to agricultural collectivization, socialization, and nationalization of production. State investment rose 60 percent from 1955 to 1956.¹

Initially, production increased; however, the poor harvests of 1956, caused by bad weather, created shortages and bottlenecks. China's leadership was forced to consolidate and retrench. State investment was cut back, mobilization of resources reduced, and pressure on farmers lessened. Nevertheless, by the end of the First Five Year Plan, Mao's economic system was established. Agriculture was collectivized, non-agriculture was nationalized, and institutions were otherwise transformed to conform to the new system. Moreover, the experience of the first few years of the new policies had identified some of the problems that accompanied the development strategy. Although industrialization progressed, agriculture stagnated, causing industry to pause. It was clear that in the predominantly agrarian economy, agricultural production was necessary to feed and clothe a
growing population as well as to provide inputs to industry and exports to earn foreign exchange.

Nonetheless, Mao believed agriculture and industry could be developed together. Out of impatience, to promote the move to socialism, the leadership launched a new drive in 1958 called the Great Leap Forward. Mao thought agriculture could be made more productive through complete collectivization. The commune system was introduced. The Great Leap was designed to expand all sectors of the economy rapidly. Thus, in addition to agricultural communes, so-called “back-yard factories” and “back-yard furnaces” were introduced to increase industrial output.

As with the Big Push in 1955, the Great Leap Forward started out with a good harvest year, 1958. However, the communes, which were very large units with little internal organization and little expertise to handle such large bodies, proved very disruptive to agricultural production. The setting up of communes, combined with bad weather, led to three successive bad harvests (1959-61). Furthermore, many agricultural investments such as dams and irrigation systems suffered from misjudgments and technical errors. In industry, quantity was substituted for quality. Much of the production of the “back-yard” enterprises could not be used because of poor quality.

Within a year, by 1959, problems were apparent. However, the momentum of the campaign carried over into the next year and investment continued to rise. By 1960, the country entered a deep depression. Agricultural production was down, there were major food shortages, and shortages of raw materials reduced the supply of consumer goods. Factories were operating below capacity as the demand for goods declined, and to further exacerbate existing problems, the willful deterioration of relations between China and the
Soviet Union led, in 1960, to the withdrawal of all Soviet technicians and advisers from China. As a result, many industrial projects were suspended, exports declined, imports of grain rose, and unemployment increased.

This experience caused a reassessment. It allowed the State President, Liu Shaoqi, and the Party General Secretary, Deng Xiaoping, to consolidate their control of the direction of the Party. They called for a reorganization of the communes to three levels—commune, production brigade, production team—and emphasized the rights of the production team as the basic unit of decisionmaking. They also reintroduced economic incentives and added projects to assist agriculture, the nation's top priority, such as construction or importation of fertilizer plants, pumping stations for irrigation, farm machinery plants, and most importantly, implementation of a rural electrification program. In addition, between 1962 and 1966, those projects suspended in 1960 were completed. There was a heavy emphasis on self-reliance and defense, and the number of projects aimed at reducing import dependency or contributing to defense was increased. Throughout these efforts, efficiency and management quality were improved.

Early in 1966, Mao, dissatisfied with the new policies because they signified a delay in progress toward socialism, and sensing a slackening in his reins on power, called for a "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," in an attempt to rally opposition to Liu and Deng. Economic principles were renounced explicitly and experienced cadres were replaced. Near anarchy existed for about three years, though the effects of the Cultural Revolution lasted until Mao's death in 1976.

Mao and his supporters attacked top Party and government leaders with charges of taking the country toward capitalism. Supported by bands of Red Guards who terrorized anyone presumed to be taking the "capitalist road," the Cultural Revolution severely damaged the urban and
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industrial sectors. Transportation was disrupted by the Red Guards, causing shortages and reduced capacity. Factional disputes led to work stoppages, and much time was devoted to political study so that there was little time for work. By 1969, the most disastrous effects had dissipated, though it would be a long while before the Chinese people would again publicly advocate change.

The political climate took another turn in 1971. Lin Biao, who supported Mao in the Cultural Revolution, allegedly staged an abortive coup against Mao and died attempting to escape to the Soviet Union. In the wake of this incident, many of the officials purged between 1966 and 1969, including Deng, were rehabilitated.

At the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975, Deng worked closely with Zhou Enlai, who, in failing health, advocated a more pragmatic (less ideological) policy and the development of the Four Modernizations—of agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology—in order to elevate China to the status of a 'front rank' economic power by the year 2000. Later in 1975, Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, and three radical associates, dubbed the Gang of Four, launched a media campaign against Deng and his policies. The resulting disruption in national leadership was not resolved until Deng was reinstated to his previous leadership role in 1977 and unity of purpose was restored.

The death of Mao and the overthrow of the Gang of Four in 1976 made way for the assumption of power by the leading elements of the right wing, long criticized for their emphasis on pragmatism over ideology. In 1976 there was also ample evidence of the problems resulting from the intransigent ideological policies and often skewed priorities of the previous two decades. There were serious imbalances in the economy between supply and demand: factories were plentiful, but they could not operate because of energy
shortages; the transport and communications infrastructure was inadequate and inefficient; industrial and agricultural production were severely disrupted; enterprise management was chaotic; the general standard of living was very low; and although much effort was being expended, it was mis-directed. There had been no steady increase in the supply of basic necessities; the technological gap between China and the modern economies of the region, especially Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong, had been increasing; and the widespread inefficiencies and waste, shortages and bottlenecks were getting worse as the people were not “learning from doing.”

Probably owing to lack of a clear understanding of the degree and nature of China’s economic problems, as well as a desire to blame all of the country’s ills on “sabotage by the Gang of Four,” the government, headed by Hua Guofeng, eagerly set out to make up for lost time. In 1977, two programs were launched in agriculture, an urban wage increase was granted, and planning for an overall strategy for the years ahead began.

THE TEN YEAR PLAN, 1976–1985

The strategy for the next decade was revealed at the first session of the Fifth National People’s Congress in February 1978. In his speech, Hua announced an ambitious Ten Year Plan (1976–85) aimed at achieving the “Four Modernizations” of agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology first advocated by Zhou at the Fourth National People’s Congress in 1975. The plan was an attempt to surge ahead, free from the “corrupting” influences of the Gang of Four. Hua outlined several long-term objectives: grain production was targeted to reach 400 million tons annually by 1985; an average growth rate of the national economy of 4.4 percent was set, compared with 3.2 percent from 1965 to 1977; total agricultural output was to increase by 4 to 5 percent annually.
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1 to 2 percent higher than for 1967-77; industrial production was to grow by 10 percent a year; and steel production was to double from 32 million tons in 1978 to 60 million by 1985. Later in the year it was announced that coal production was to reach 1 billion tons by 1987 and that light industry would grow an average of 12 percent annually compared with 7 and 8 percent over the past decades.¹

Although investment in agriculture was to be increased, with basic mechanization being reached by 1980, the thrust of the Ten Year Plan was still based on the traditional Soviet model of high rates of accumulation and investment in heavy industry. The plan included the building or completion of 120 large-scale projects in industry and transportation, the total capital investment for which was to exceed the total for the past twenty-eight years combined. By mid-1978, even more projects were added.

The most novel characteristic of the construction plan was its reliance on massive inputs of foreign equipment, technology, and even complete plants. In what might be called the "Great Leap Outward," the post-Mao leadership demonstrated an unprecedented readiness to develop closer ties with the West. By the end of 1978, China had sent students and trade delegations abroad, signed long-term trade agreements with Japan, Australia, Canada, and the European Community, liberalized foreign trade and finance regulations, and was in the process of buying $US 40 billion worth of imports, after having contracted for $7 billion.²

Despite this flurry of activity and bright projections, China's new leaders soon learned that the economic problems they inherited were not simply the result of radical policies. Throughout 1978, surveys of resources, construction projects, manpower, and production revealed serious deficiencies in all areas. Bottlenecks in areas such as energy and transportation were crippling, as were the results of poor planning and management. Contacts with the West further illuminated
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the country's backwardness and dearth of technical expertise. Although agriculture had shown signs of recovery, the growth rate of heavy industry had leveled and actually declined by the end of 1978. It had become clear that China lacked the basic infrastructure necessary to sustain rapid economic growth, a realization that prompted a reassessment of the country's medium-term priorities. Hua Guofeng's preference for heavy industry over agriculture, and his unrealistic growth and production targets, which contributed to his subsequent political demise, had served to exacerbate the basic deficiencies in China's economic infrastructure.

THE THIRD PLENUM, DECEMBER 1978

THE THIRD PLENUM, conducted December 1978, marked a watershed, not only in China's economic history but also in its political history. The Plenum was to "shift the emphasis of [the] Party's work and the attention of the people of the whole country to socialist modernization." and it was the forum in which the right wing, led by Deng Xiaoping, consolidated its control of the Party. Throughout the debate within the Party over the strategy of modernization in the preceding decades, Mao had generally been able to step in and impose his will. However, with Mao gone, and in the face of mounting evidence of the failure of his policies, the Party seemed ready to look in a new direction.

Deng had succeeded in forming a coalition intent on moving beyond the legacy of Mao and placing in its stead policies based on "objective economic law." The Chinese leadership had learned that the Stalinist model of economic management, which they had copied from the USSR in the 1950s and 1960s, would not solve their economic development problems, would finally exhaust their resources and their people, and was clearly not conducive to attaining their national objectives. Being pragmatic, they turned away from
the Soviet model and began experimenting with a more decentralized, market-oriented system. The tone of future growth was set as the Plenum reviewed the economic history of the People's Republic and summed up its experience:

> It has been shown in practice that whenever we maintain society's necessary political stability and work according to objective economic law, our national economy advances steadily and at high speeds; otherwise, our national economy develops slowly or even stagnates and falls back.  

The Plenum focused on correcting immediate problems, rather than developing long-term goals. An annual plan for 1979-80 was worked out as part of a three year plan, 1978-80, and an eight year plan, 1978-85, for the "Development of the National Economy." The policies adopted at the Third Plenum included a shift in focus of resource allocation from heavy industry to light industry and agriculture, and a change in methods of planning and management. In addition, material incentives were introduced; for example, an emphasis on quality and skill of effort, and income paid for effective effort, created a new climate. An increased reliance on foreign investment and trade, the elimination of waste, and an end to the past emphasis on political struggle were all stressed. These policies were aimed at correcting imbalances in the economy while generally raising the people's standard of living.

In addition, the Plenum reaffirmed the rights and responsibilities of each of the three levels of organization in collectivized agriculture, which had been frequently ignored or violated in the 1960s and 1970s. Most important was the reaffirmation that the production team was the basic level of decisionmaking, accounting, production, and income distribution. It was declared that higher authorities were not to assign plans or quotas without consultation with the team, or without consideration of its circumstances; nor could they
requisition resources or income without proper compensation. This reversal to decisionmaking by family units was welcomed by the peasantry, who comprise 80–85 percent of China's population and whose rights were commonly usurped by communes and local Party cadres. As a further boost to agriculture, the procurement price for grain was raised 20 percent with an additional 50 percent increase offered for above-quota production. At the same time, the procurement quota for grain was to remain fixed at the 1971–75 level.

Some of the policies adopted by the Third Plenum were being implemented in early 1979. By February, actions to eliminate projects which were poorly planned or which had long lead-times to production were initiated. In line with the findings of the Plenum, Beijing cited shortages of power, construction materials, and skilled manpower, together with lack of coordination, as the reasons for the inefficiencies. In general, the metals, machine building, and chemical industries were most affected, while the energy, transportation, and building materials industries were least affected. Light industry, agriculture, and projects which could produce quickly were to be developed rapidly. Increased attention was to be given to public housing and utilities, education, health, and science and technology. These policies, approved by the Third Plenum in December 1978, marked the beginning of the shift toward balanced growth and improved living conditions.

THE EIGHT CHARACTER PROGRAM

There were many policies still to be implemented, and plans to incorporate them into an economic program were worked out at the Central Party Work Conference in April 1979. The "eight character program" was announced at the second session of the Fifth National People's Congress in
June. It was a program of readjusting, restructuring, consolidating, and improving the economy, to begin in 1979 and extend for a period of three years. It was designed to tap the country’s under-utilized potential at both the planning and implementation levels.

Readjustment, the most important of the new policies, was aimed at structuring the economy by readjusting investment and consumption to achieve a better balance between supply and demand. To restore equilibrium, a greater sectoral balance between agriculture and industry, and between heavy and light industry, was given top priority. The major objectives of readjustment were an agricultural growth rate in line with population growth and the needs of industry; a growth rate in light industry equal to or slightly greater than that of heavy industry; the alleviation of pressures in energy, transportation, and communications; a reduction in the scale of capital construction and increased efforts to improve living conditions; and the better integration of China’s economy into the world market.

The policy of restructuring was concerned primarily with reform of the economic system itself. Measures adopted included an attempt to facilitate supply flow, production, and marketing through decentralized decisionmaking; replacement of the egalitarian pay system with one based on material incentives, linking reward to performance; and the assignment to local authorities of more autonomy in areas of economic planning, capital construction, resource management, and foreign trade.

Consolidation attempted to close down or amalgamate inefficient or overlapping enterprises or departments. Geared toward eliminating waste, this policy also sought to reorganize existing enterprises by introducing competent and responsible management functionaries, and to achieve greater specialization in production.

The principal thrust of the effort of improvement was to raise the level of technology and managerial skills and practices in China’s economy. It was aimed at generally
upgrading the quality, efficiency, and variety of the country’s goods and services while at the same time reducing waste and duplication.

The policies adopted by the Third Plenum and the reforms outlined in the “eight character program” led to fundamental changes in the institutions and priorities of China’s economic system. New economic strategies were aimed at restoring a balance between consumption and growth. Mao’s authoritarian style, with its emphasis on charismatic authority, self-sufficiency, and normative incentives for economic development, was replaced by an emphasis on routine bureaucratic authority, merit, specialization, material incentives for economic effort, and responsible leadership. The centrally planned, command nature of the economy was altered in important areas through decentralization and the introduction of market incentives (profits).

Additional reforms targeted enterprise organization and management, called for a greater role of market forces, and incorporated an increased use of material incentives. Whereas Mao’s policy of enforcing adherence to the central Party line stifled any real management initiative, the new policies sought to reintroduce a technically competent director charged with running the day-to-day operations of an agricultural, industrial, or commercial enterprise free of Party interference. Moreover, these new managers were to become responsible for profits and losses under the system of economic accountability. Restoring competent and responsive leadership to enterprises was essential in carrying out the new policies.

However, the priority clearly was (and is) to set the economy on a path of equilibrium and sustained growth (readjustment). Experiments in economic reform (restructuring) were (and are) only to supplement the unified and centrally controlled sector. National interests were still to have dominance over local and individual interests. Therefore, the shift in economic policies was not a complete rejection of the
Soviet model. There was to be no widespread systemic reform. The economic management system was to be reformed, but the pricing and budgeting systems were to remain unified. These shifts in economic policies reflect the search of a socialist economy for a combination of central control and objectives with decentralized enterprise and individual initiative, to achieve efficient and steady economic growth.

The pragmatic leadership in China is finding that the introduction of market elements into a planned economy is leading to much inconsistency and friction "which makes the dividing line between the systems a battlefront." The government must deal with these "battlefront issues" if they are to be perceived as the legitimate leaders of the movement toward economic and military modernization.

REASSERTION OF CENTRAL CONTROL, 1981-1982

IN 1981, CHINA'S LEADERS RESOLVED that their goals of reducing the rate of capital accumulation and balancing the budget could not be achieved by individual units at the local level. Profits were artificially high because of fixed input costs and the freedom to raise sales prices; capital interest rates were too low because there was no capital market to respond to higher capital demand. It was decided to stop any further expansion of the experiments until an economic balance was reached.

Central control was reasserted. Local units were instructed to carry out the policies and measures adopted by the central government. The State Planning Commission was to have unified control and management of all construction and investment at the local level, and was also to control local finance, tax, credit and cash management, prices, wages, bonuses, and foreign trade. Furthermore, 4 to 5 billion yuan of treasury bonds were to be sold to those local governments or enterprises with surplus funds.
That year, 1981, was a year of austerity. Efforts were aimed at curbing inflation and balancing the budget. Further, it was announced that the policy of readjustment would be extended to 1985. Much attention was devoted to renovating existing facilities and exploiting energy and mineral resources. Considering the sharp decline in investment, the economy fared better than expected. Total output grew by 4 percent, as did agricultural and industrial outputs. Heavy industry declined while light industry grew, marking the first time in two decades that the growth of light industrial output surpassed that of heavy industry. China's "open door" policy continued as foreign trade increased by 20 percent, though exports were still less than 10 percent of gross national product (GNP).

In an effort to reserve the downward trend of revenues produced by austerity measures, the State again set out to endorse a program to allow enterprises to retain profits. A new system of profit contracts was initiated in mid-1981. Under this system, the enterprise and its supervisory body negotiated a profit "base figure" which the enterprise was required to deliver to the State. Production above that target gave the producer an increased share of the profit. Because base figures could be kept low or arbitrary, this form of profit sharing was prone to abuse. Nevertheless, it was retained until 1983.

In 1982, the goal again was to continue readjustment while keeping investment spending under control. However, Beijing's lack of control over spending was demonstrated, as investment reached an all-time high. Investment spending grew to 81 billion yuan, up 21.3 percent over 1981. Of this 81 billion yuan, only about 25 percent of the funds were under State control. Investment in capital construction, planned to decline, grew by 23 percent and local investment increased by 26 percent. As a result of this infusion of capital, heavy industry, scheduled to grow by 1 percent, instead grew by 9.3 percent. However, much of heavy industry's output was wasted. For example, production of rolled
steel reached an all-time high of 29 million metric tons, yet 18 million tons was already stockpiled. At the same time, light industry's rate of growth declined to 5.6 percent, short of the 7 percent target. Record harvests in agriculture prevented a disaster. With agricultural output up 8.1 percent, the deficit was reduced, State revenues increased marginally (reversing a downward trend), and there was a healthy trade surplus.

Apart from the good weather, success in agriculture was largely a result of the break-up of the communes and the widespread use of the "household responsibility system." This system is similar to the "contract responsibility system" in industry, in that the peasants are responsible for providing a fixed quantity of goods to the production team. However, under the household system, productive resources such as fields, tractors, fish ponds, and orchards are contracted on a household basis. The contracting household is then responsible for meeting certain production quotas, paying taxes, and making certain payments to the administrative unit. The household is wholly responsible for meeting these requirements, providing its own inputs and making decisions about labor. Anything produced above the quota is kept by the household. Thus, while State ownership formally prevails, the right to use the land and assets has effectively been transferred to the family. Today, more than 90 percent of Chinese peasants are involved in this type of system. The adoption of responsibility systems (in agriculture and industry) is promoting differences in wealth between regions and between families, which in turn will have a social consequence. Although a de facto decollectivization of agriculture has taken place, the system is still very much responsible to the production team, which in turn is responsible to its higher administrative unit. The production teams continue to make production plans and goods are, in turn, delivered, with some exceptions, to the team. As long as production resources remain the property of the State, and as long as the peasants are required to fulfill quotas, the responsibility for
which follows a hierarchical line to Beijing, the fundamental essence of a command society will not be altered. However, the household system in agriculture offers many of the rewards of private ownership and, in doing so, has greatly increased peasant productivity.

Therefore, the reforms have supplemented the system of centralized control and planned allocation of resources with incentive schemes and market forces. They are not a rejection of the basic system of central control. In fact, the dominant role of central control and planned allocation of resources was emphasized many times throughout 1982. For example, Zhao Ziyang said in March 1982,

We have domestically implemented the policy of activating our economy, delegating some power to the local authorities and enlarging the enterprise's decision-making powers for the purpose of whipping up the enthusiasm of the local authorities. . . . Ours is a unified socialist nation. We must have a unified plan and a unified domestic market. . . . In order to strengthen centralization and unification in economic work, we must adhere to the overall plan on major issues while allowing freedom on minor issues. . . . The commodity price and revenue system must be centralized and unified. . . . No matter what reform is to be carried out, the general guideline is to combine the strengthening of centralization and unification with the activation of the economy and to bring into full play the initiative of localities, departments, enterprises and people under the guidance of state planning and the principle of taking the whole country into account.25

Experiments with economic reform will continue, with the purpose of adapting China's Soviet-style system to improve its economic results, not to replace it with a completely different economic system.

It is important to the Deng government that the reforms meet with continuing success. If the "household responsibility system" continues to increase output and therefore the standard of living in the rural areas, it will lead to increased
support for the Party. If the system fails, the Party will be discredited. The peasants can be expected to support the system because of the flexibility it gives them in using their resources as they wish. The problem lies with the local Party cadres. They have some resentment against the system, because its success poses a threat to their jobs. The "purification" program of late 1983 into 1984, "to get rid of the corrupt and those who stubbornly resist Deng’s package of economic and political reforms since he returned to power in 1978," could well have been aimed largely at clearing out resentful cadres in rural areas.

THE SIXTH FIVE YEAR PLAN, 1981-1985

THE PARTY CHAIRMAN, Hu Yaobang, announced the general objective of China’s economic construction at the Twelfth National Party Congress in September 1982. The objective was to quadruple the gross output value of industrial and agricultural production by the year 2000—from 710 billion yuan in 1980, to 2,800 billion by 2000.

This will place China in the front ranks of the countries of the world in terms of gross national income and the output of major industrial and agricultural products; it will represent an important advance in the modernization of her entire national economy; it will increase the income of her urban and rural population several times over; and the Chinese people will be comparatively well-off both materially and culturally. Although China’s national income per capita will even then be relatively low, her economic growth strength and national defense capabilities will have grown considerably, compared with what they are today.

To achieve the objective, an average annual growth rate of 7.2 percent would be required. Chinese planners have adopted a two-stage development scheme, each stage covering a ten-year period. For the first decade (1981–90), the annual growth rate is set at 4 percent for the first five years and
at 7 percent for the second five years. In the 1991-2000 period, the annual growth rate is set at over 8 percent. The major provisions for the first period (1981-85), the Sixth Five Year Plan, were outlined by Zhao Ziyang in December 1982 at the fifth session of the Fifth National People's Congress. The 4 percent planned annual growth rate of national output is more moderate than previous plans. The focus of the plan is the development of energy and transportation, with a lesser emphasis on the steel industry, and a reliance on increasing output by increasing labor and capital productivity.

Toward achieving the increase in productivity, there was quite extensive industrial reform and reorganization throughout 1983. A “tax for profit” system was introduced in all State-owned enterprises. Designed to replace profit sharing and profit contracts, the new system involved a series of taxes paid directly to the State. These included charges on fixed and circulating capital; a sales tax, or industrial commercial tax; an income tax, usually 40-60 percent of profits; and an adjustment tax, to compensate poorer enterprises for any unfair advantages enjoyed by the more richly endowed enterprises. However, in 1984, enterprises need only pay a 55 percent income tax, or progressive income tax in the case of smaller enterprises, directly to the government. After this tax is paid, a profit-share ratio is worked out which leaves enterprises at very much the same level of retained profits as before. The enterprises are not much better off, but it does improve the position of the central government, to which the increased revenues must be channelled. In addition, managerial powers have been strengthened through the introduction of renewable employment contracts for new employees, linking pay to performance, rather than the system of guaranteed lifetime employment. However, decentralization of investment decisions, in the absence of a proper capital market and modern financial system, continues to cause problems for the country.

The major problem with continued local investment is the diversion of scarce capital and resources to many small,
local projects at the expense of key industrial projects deemed essential to modernization. Strained supplies further exacerbate problems through illicit price increases reflecting high demand. To correct this situation, the State Council issued a strong directive banning illicit price increases and tightening credit at the People's Construction Bank. A capital construction ceiling was imposed. Localities were called upon to suspend any projects outside an official plan, halt those within a plan but for which raw materials were not yet guaranteed, and generally cut low priority investment spending. As a further effort, priority access to funds and raw materials was guaranteed for 120 key projects, mainly in energy supply, transport, communications, and essential raw materials. Seventy of those projects were scheduled to begin in 1983 and 50 in 1984.

Although these measures are designed to correct some of the problems created by local investment, the State must continue with follow-up policies if the measures are to have any effect. During 1983, the State cancelled more than 5,000 unauthorized local projects, yet they continued to emerge. Until something is done about genuinely reforming the price system, the State is likely to continue to have difficulties with its investment policies. For as long as the profit margin on consumer items such as cigarettes remains artificially high, investors will be tempted to "turn a fast yuan."

Growth in all sectors exceeded targets in 1983, leading once again to shortages, disruptions, and waste. Heavy industry, targeted at 3.9 percent growth, grew at 13 percent in 1983. Light industry grew 7.5 percent as opposed to the planned 4.1 percent. Moreover, another record harvest yielded 370 million metric tons, 20 million tons more than the 1982 record.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

THE OBJECTIVE OF MODERATE, STEADY GROWTH of 4 percent per annum of the Sixth Five Year Plan seems to be achievable.
though there are immediate problems. Energy and capital are lacking, and the Chinese leaders will have to control the economy and greatly reduce waste and duplication. However, the long-term objective as set down by Hu Yaobang in September 1982, to quadruple the country’s total industrial and agricultural output by the year 2000, requiring an average annual growth rate of 7.2 percent, seems to be beyond China’s reach. There are too many substantial problems for the Chinese economy to overcome to achieve and sustain such a high rate of growth over the next two decades.

Among the major problems for the Chinese economy to overcome are the following:

**Energy.** The energy shortage is caused by the inefficient extraction, distribution, and use of energy. Although China has vast oil, water, and coal resources, “poor coordination, planning and management, underinvestment in future capacity, and over-extraction from existing reserves have together caused stagnation in energy output in recent years.”

Coal is abundant, but outmoded techniques of extraction combine with a poor transportation system to render production and distribution inefficient. It will take some years to increase China’s coal production through technical improvements and the opening of new mines, and to increase oil production, principally from offshore fields. Although much of the offshore reserves and their potential production levels are not yet fully proven, it is generally considered that prospects are good and that significant offshore production could begin in the latter half of the 1980s or the early 1990s, provided the large amount of necessary capital investment is forthcoming.

While the growth of energy supply has levelled off, China’s energy demand has been rising. Further, China’s energy demand elasticity coefficient—that is, the ratio of the percentage change in energy consumed to the percentage change in industrial and agricultural output value—is high, at about 1.3. This ratio means that for every percent increase in total industrial and agricultural output value, the energy
consumption on the average grows by 1.3 percent. If the economic growth rates are maintained and no energy saving can be achieved, and there is no energy output growth, China will have an energy shortage, and soon would have to import energy. To avoid such a shortage, China must strive to initiate an energy saving program to reduce the energy demand elasticity coefficient and will have to increase its output of energy.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (The World Bank) estimates the average growth rate of energy supply required to avoid importing energy in the near future to be 2.2 percent per annum. To save energy, China will have to concentrate on more efficient commercial and industrial use, as about 80 percent of total energy is used in those sectors. The per capita household consumption of energy is very low. To raise efficiency in energy use, China will need to (1) improve management of energy consumption, (2) renovate or replace high energy consuming industrial boilers, machinery, and equipment, (3) convert boilers from oil to coal, (4) introduce foreign energy saving technology on a large scale, and (5) raise the cost of energy to users.

Present indications are that both an inefficient use of energy and a shortage of energy supplies will be a constraint on China's economic growth throughout the 1980s.

Infrastructure. China's communications and transportation infrastructure is constraining exploitation of its energy and mineral resources. Coal is moved mainly by rail: inadequate railway facilities therefore are a bottleneck to the development of industry, particularly the energy industry. The inadequate railway capacity and inefficient distribution has resulted in excessive stockpiles of coal at producing centers and shortages in coastal areas. Most major rail lines in the coastal areas are inadequate, and railway extension and upgrading should concentrate on lines linking the energy sources to the heavy industrial areas. Ports are congested and the handling capacity of small berths needs to be extended.
Although the inland waterways have a useful capacity, roads have been neglected and the network is limited and of poor quality, especially in rural areas. There have been cases where surplus grain in the interior of the country could not be moved to the coastal cities in the east, which had to import grain to satisfy their needs.

The deficiencies in interprovincial transport and communications are the consequence not only of insufficient hardware, but of poor bureaucratic organization and management as well. For example, utilization rates of railway carriages are very low because, there being no rental for freight carriages retained by factories, users tend to hoard them.

Agriculture. The task of the agricultural sector is to feed over a billion people utilizing 247 million acres of arable land. This acreage represents one-quarter of an acre per capita, compared with just under two acres per capita in the United States (413 million acres of cultivated land). According to present trends, agriculture will not be able to cope with the growth of the rural population. The World Bank estimates that the output of grain could grow in the 1980s at 2 to 2.5 percent per year and, even so, the food grain balance would remain precarious. Also, rural per capita income has risen because of deliberate policies to improve farmer incentives. These policies have increased the procurement prices of agricultural products compared to the near constant prices of industrial goods sold in rural areas. Further, commune- and production brigade-managed enterprises have been given greater emphasis as a non-agricultural income source, adding to collective savings.

The Chinese Communist Party is an urban-based proletarian party and it has neglected agricultural development. Rural communities have been left to finance their own development from local savings while government savings have gone to (heavy) industry and communications. Unless investment in agriculture is increased, per capita grain output
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will decrease and large quantities of food will have to be imported. The government's policies of greater producer autonomy through the "household responsibility system," remuneration linked with output, greater specialization of production in line with local comparative advantage, and emphasis on agricultural research should be continued. The use of chemical fertilizers is important in increasing output, but restricted energy supplies limit the rate of increase in their use. Although an adequate amount of machinery is available, there are limited opportunities for using it to increase yields rather than displace labor. The challenge facing the leadership will be to introduce technology throughout the agricultural sector which increases output and which is labor-using, not labor-saving. The prospects are that China will have to divert investment to low-return agricultural projects and also increase its imports of food.

Capital efficiency. There is widespread and visible waste of capital in China. This waste is caused by inefficient use and uneven distribution. The repression of private consumption over the past thirty years has led to the growth of a bloated heavy industry sector and low efficiency of capital use. The government is reducing the rate of investment to make room for an increase in the domestic consumption, so that rising consumer expectations can be met. China will need massive amounts of capital to develop its energy sector (particularly offshore oil exploration and development, and coal) and will have to renovate and modernize existing enterprises. Foreign capital and expertise will be necessary for these developments.

The capital distribution problem arises because of the structure of the Chinese economy. Actually, it is misleading to speak of "a Chinese economy" and to compare it with other large national economies. China is not a monolithic society or economy. It has a cellular structure with little inter-regional mobility of labor or products. Economic policies vary dramatically between provinces, and wide differences in
standard of living and income levels between provinces are evident. These striking inequalities of capital availability and of the existence of affluence as well as poverty, are surprising in a socialist egalitarian regime. But as the economy has been modernizing, the tendency has been for its cellular nature to evolve into a more complex system of relationships. And, given the size of China, the surprising thing is not the amount of provincial autonomy, but the extent of central control.

Given regional autonomy, one of the most difficult challenges of economic reform will be to raise capital efficiency by improving the allocation of capital.

*Foreign trade.* China's foreign trade accounts for a small proportion of national output compared with most other countries. Expressed as a proportion of gross national product, China's trade in 1981 was less than 10 percent. Nevertheless, the real value of China's exports and imports has been expanding rapidly. Growth can be attributed to China's expansion of trade relations with many countries, including Australia, Japan, and the United States, following its admission to the United Nations in 1971.

Until a few years ago, China tended to view exports as a means to earn the foreign exchange required to pay for necessary imports, and to emphasize the need to balance the external trading accounts. In recent years, however, there has been more recognition of the role in growth, modernization, and foreign relations. Accordingly, China increasingly accepts foreign credit in purchasing grains, machinery, and equipment, and acknowledges the need to import up-to-date Western technology for its modernization plans. The relative share of agricultural goods in exports fell from about 60 percent in 1976 to about 25 percent in 1981. Exports of mineral fuels and oils rose from 14 percent of total exports in 1978 to 24 percent in 1981. Exports of light manufactures, particularly textiles, increased over this period.
manufactures accounted for around 50 percent of exports in 1981, with light manufactures accounting for 32 percent.

China's exports have become increasingly directed toward Western and developing economies. Japan and Hong Kong have become particularly important destinations. In the 1970s, China developed four Special Economic Zones in Guangdong (located near Hong Kong and the South China Sea) and Fujian Provinces. Twelve more zones in coastal regions were announced in April 1984. The Special Economic Zones are designed to attract foreign investment into export-oriented light manufacturing enterprises. Preferential tax treatment, infrastructure, and services are being provided for such enterprises.

Continuing growth of trade will be important for increases in China's gross domestic product (GDP). To maintain a steady GDP growth rate, an increase in domestic consumption of oil and agriculture will be necessary. This increase in domestic consumption and a slow agricultural growth, together with a decrease in oil production, domestic energy wastage, and transport bottlenecks, might create severe pressure to increase manufactured goods for export in order to earn foreign exchange. However, it is unlikely that China will become a major new exporter of industrial products by the year 2000.

It is expected that the bulk of the economy will remain under the central plan bureaucracy. The adaptive and innovative potential of the Chinese economy will continue to be limited to below its real capacity. The technical and resource potential for a successful export drive may be present, but there are administrative limitations to the flow of economic information, to risk-taking for the sake of innovation, to industrial adjustment, and to the development of a service infrastructure for industrial growth.41

The likely strategy China will follow for the growth of manufacturing exports into the mid-1990s will probably be to develop a mix of textile and footwear industries (a strategy
that has been successfully pursued by other newly industrialized countries in the region, although it has created trade conflicts between the United States and ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, supported by simple machinery and metal products where China has excess capacity and skilled labor. This strategy has three main problems:

1. Trade conflicts may arise where Western protectionism limits the expansion of traditional textile and footwear markets. Countries such as the United States and Australia can expect to meet demands to accept textile and footwear imports when they want to export more wheat to China.

2. There will be a need to guarantee spare-part supplies and to build up service networks in oversea markets for machinery made in China.

3. There is an apparent inability to overcome the shortcomings of Chinese manufactured goods in terms of quality, product design, and flexibility of delivery schedules.

The prospect is for an overall real growth rate in exports of manufactured goods that is restricted by bureaucratic rigidity and competing domestic demand. Real exports of manufactured goods could grow by about 6 to 8 percent per annum to the year 2000 (greater than the expected increase in agriculture, energy, and minerals exports).

China's need for imports will be great. Imports of raw materials will be required to maintain steady industrial growth. No reduction of food imports can be expected because of pressure to increase domestic consumption and constraints on agricultural production, and because of increasing population. Capital goods and technology imports will be necessary for China's modernization program. In view of these constraints and needs, foreign capital and technology are likely to play an increasingly important role in China's economy.
Foreign capital and technology. Foreign capital and technology will of great value in relieving bottlenecks in such priority sectors as energy, transportation, machinery, and the electronics industry. Accordingly, since 1979 China has been encouraging foreign economic cooperation, and commercial cooperation policy is a rapidly evolving part of China's overall economic and trade policies. Because of a shortage of foreign exchange, China has preferred to import equipment by various types of commercial cooperation which need not involve direct cash payments for the imports. At present there is an emphasis on technology transfer as a means of modernizing China's industry and commerce.42

Some problems can be expected in cooperation projects between China and Western (capitalist) foreign firms:43

1. Lack of quality control may make products difficult to market overseas by the foreign partner.
2. The requirement to export products under many cooperative projects limits the foreign partner's access to China's domestic market.
3. Rules of a centrally planned economy (for example, output quotas) may be applied, with questionable results, to profit-oriented ventures.
4. Adequate protections may not exist for the foreign investor's existing market, patents, and technology.
5. Management methods and labor discipline will differ between China and Western countries.
6. Value must be established for each party's investment, especially for land and raw materials, as well as the price of products sold on the domestic market.
7. Legal uncertainties exist.

These problems are diminishing as Chinese authorities become more familiar with Western commerce, and as China's commercial laws and regulations are developed.
In deciding among borrowing options, China must consider the need to keep the ratio of debt service payments to foreign exchange earnings low enough to maintain the confidence of lenders and so avoid refinancing crises. The World Bank Report on China considers illustrative cases under high and moderate borrowing conditions. Provided that the debt service ratio can be kept within management bounds, the government's borrowing decisions should depend on the value of the additional resources obtained in relation to the real cost of borrowing.

In 1981, China, considering the relationship between the cost of foreign borrowing and the returns on investments, cancelled import contracts for several large investment projects. The cancellations included a number of major capital construction projects and reflected the readjustment of China's investment priorities from heavy to light industries. The cancellations also reflected efforts to ease inflation and avoid energy and transport bottlenecks. Some of the projects were cancelled because they were badly prepared, which indicates China's shift to basing the management of foreign trade and capital on economic considerations, a shift that will be welcomed by potential exporters and lenders to China. Some of the projects are now being revived, though often on a smaller scale than originally planned, and with firmer central government guidelines. Between 1979 and mid-1983, China approved more than 50 joint ventures using Chinese and foreign capital, more than 300 contracts for cooperative production, and about 600 projects involving compensation trade. About $US 2 billion in foreign capital was absorbed during this period.

The main constraint on China's future intake of foreign capital and technology is its ability to absorb it. To avoid an over-dependence on foreign capital and technology, China will want to develop matching domestic assets. The development of transportation and other infrastructural facilities, and of skilled manpower, will be a gradual process, thus no
large-scale intake of foreign capital and technology can be expected before the late 1980s. In the short term, it is likely that compensation trade projects will be increasingly relied upon for China’s foreign capital needs. They are self-financing because the foreign firm accepts the Chinese cost component in produced goods as payment, and since the foreign firms accept and market the products, they can be expected to help China to absorb the technology.

Since replacing Taiwan as a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in 1980, China has increased its efforts to acquire development assistance. It has also received increased aid from some of its trading partners, particularly Japan. Through the Government Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, Japan has given China large loans (about $US 2 billion for the 1980s, for thirty years at 3 percent interest per annum) to purchase equipment for infrastructure projects such as rail and hydroelectricity development, and improvement of telecommunications. Loans from the World Bank have totaled more than $US 1 billion since 1980, and the Bank expects to loan China about $US 2 billion a year during the final years of the decade. China is also a big user of the Bank’s technical assistance, such as economic planning and development experts.

Because of China’s reluctance to take on more foreign debt than it can service, it seeks as many low-rate loans as it can obtain from the World Bank’s affiliate, the International Development Association (IDA). The IDA provides concessional assistance—that is, loans with long payback periods and low interest rates. Interest charges on standard World Bank loans are made at rates close to market, although the payback period is far longer than it would be if the loan were from a commercial bank. Of the $US 1 billion in World Bank loans China has already taken out, about $US 500 million are from the IDA.

China can be expected to continue with its modest approach of being unwilling to take risks in foreign borrowing.
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and preferring low-interest loans from international organizations. This approach will keep China’s foreign debt down, but it may also slow down the rate of economic growth. The IDA, which gets its funds from the industrialized countries, has a limited ability to lend. The donor countries, particularly the United States, argue that the world’s most impoverished regions should get first call on IDA money. As a result, China may have to take out more high-cost World Bank loans than it would like.

The dilemma for China is that it should become more involved in international organizations such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to assist in its modernization efforts, part of which is to be a respected member of the international community. However, in doing so, China allows itself to be seen by the other developing countries (for example, India) as a competitor, taking large amounts of limited loan funds. Such perceptions could result in friction between China and other developing countries.

Strategy for economic development. The economic system in China is essentially a modified centrally planned economy with major commodities subject to centralized planning and control, the market mechanism playing only a supplementary, but increasing, role. In view of the conservative nature of the economic planning system and the difficulties of combining central planning with free markets, the beneficial effect on productivity is likely to be limited. To achieve the modernization targets of such a large economy, free markets would need to have a much wider range of operations; however, official statements have made it clear that the market will not play a greater role in regulating economic activity.

The experiments with the market place are seen as a great success, but they cannot disguise the fact that most of the Chinese economy will continue to be run by the central
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plan of a totalitarian regime. Incompatibilities and friction between the plan and the market will continue to emerge and dominate discussion of economic policy in China over the next decade. Such friction will arise over "battlefront issues" such as the market giving rise to profiteering, corruption of "pure" socialist standards, and income inequalities; the market creating problems of inflation (and the Chinese do not have anything like a macro-economic stabilization policy in place); and bureaucratic-military control over the economy and industry limiting innovation, risk-taking, and the development of a service infrastructure for industrial export growth. Meanwhile, the highly centralized trade decision-making structure will make rapid adjustment to changing world market conditions very difficult. The distorted prices will likely preclude precise measurement of China's comparative advantage to guide its trading decisions, while the limited role of the marketplace will mean that commodity prices will often not reflect costs, leading to inefficiencies in production. The inability of the central government to control production and distribution efficiently in such a huge economy will lead to big imbalances between supply and demand, and thus to inequalities.

The dilemma facing the Chinese leadership is, therefore, one of where and how to draw the line between using "objective economic laws" to stimulate activism at lower levels while ensuring that Party authority maintains firm control.

Pricing. Prices have been set largely to generate government revenue and so do not reflect either relative costs or relative scarcities. Arbitrary prices have "led profit-motivated enterprises and production teams to make socially suboptimal production and investment decisions, and in particular to waste scarce inputs and fail to produce a sufficient amount of scarce outputs. Provincial governments, with their newly increased interest in expanding profitable enterprises and closing those that operate at a loss, may also be influenced by wrong prices away from social cost effectiveness and the matching of supply and demand."\(^{47}\)
This mixing of market elements in a planned economy has resulted in some interesting "battlefront issues":

1. As high inflation lowered the people's faith in the government, the government stepped in and set grain prices. It then bought grain at the fixed price and sold it at a lower price to lower the inflation rate. This practice led to a large budget deficit. Therefore, the government allowed the market greater sway, which led to prices rising to meet supply and demand balances, and to inflation.

2. Enterprises brought their raw materials and energy at low and fixed prices and sold their products in free markets where scarcity had driven prices up. Under these circumstances it was easier to make a profit than in a genuine capitalist economy. "Whilst most managers complained about the inadequacy of raw material supplies by centrally planned agencies, they did not welcome the thought of high market prices for raw materials that would eliminate supply problems!" 48

As long as local governments and enterprises continue to opt for investing in sectors in which they can turn a quick profit (thanks to low state-fixed input prices) and not for those sectors such as energy and transportation which require a high level of investment but yield low returns (because of fixed output prices), the goal of adjustment (balance) will not be met. China's planners are aware of this fact and have been experimenting with small-scale price reform since 1979. However, moves toward the implementation of large-scale price reforms have been slow in coming. While most of the past experimentation has been with low value, high use commodities, China's leaders are concerned that if prices were actually to reflect scarcity, many items, including staples and energy, would increase rapidly in price. This increase could lead to widespread inflation and unrest.
Given the desire and necessity of the current leadership to maintain a stable political and social environment, reforms are likely to be implemented gradually. This way, the Chinese hope to be able to balance price increases in one area with decreases in another, avoiding drastic changes. Notwithstanding the difficulties, price reform cannot be neglected because it is crucial to the success of other reforms. In the meantime, the central government will continue to use economic levers such as sales and value added taxes, bank credit, and subsidies in an attempt to contain the problems of fixed pricing. Nevertheless, these provide only partial and short-term solutions.

The basis for the price reform to be carried out in the final years of the 1980s was laid out in 1982 with the adoption of a three-tier price system of state-fixed prices for many staple items, floating prices for many producer goods, and free prices in the rural areas, primarily on supplementary production. New prices are being calculated, and will be implemented as described in this system throughout the rest of the decade. The success of these efforts will depend largely on the ability to implement them gradually without causing panic among consumers. The benefits will include a decreasing dependence on state subsidies, freeing funds for other areas, and an environment in which management and labor reforms can be carried out.

Bureaucracy. Although price reform is necessary in order for the new policies to work, continued reform of the bureaucracy is necessary to ensure the policies are carried out. Since Deng took over control of leadership in 1978, many of his strongest opponents such as Hua Guofeng have been replaced or have retired. They have been succeeded by Deng supporters such as Ju Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. The transformation and consolidation have involved almost all of the top positions in the Party and government. Nevertheless, there still remain, at the provincial level, many cadres...
elevated to power during the Cultural Revolution who con- 
tinue to engage in passive, and sometimes active, resistance 
to the post-Mao policies. Such interference has severely 
hampered reform efforts. Thus, it is against these "vestiges of 
leftism" that the right wing should direct its rectification pro-
grams.

The pragmatists are likely to continue to exercise control 
for the foreseeable future, as their pragmatic policies enjoy 
widespread popular support, and they have successfully con-
solidated their leadership. Nevertheless, as efforts to raise liv-
ing standards and strike a balance between light and heavy 
industries have some success, heavy industry bureaucracies 
are likely to re-emerge, pressing demands. Others likely to 
exert more influence are military officers if concern about the 
liberalized policies and cutbacks in defense grows. As these 
various groups, neglected during the initial years of reform, 
start pressing their demands, they are likely to create prob-
lems for the right wing.

Bureaucratic rigidity will continue to be a limitation to 
economic growth. The "battlefront issues" of whether prov-
inces or Beijing should control certain decisions and the 
desirable mix between the Soviet system of physical planning 
and allocation and the role of market forces will continue to 
be played out within the bureaucracy. The system of control 
by a large, central, rigid bureaucracy will provide, as stated 
previously, administrative limitations to the flow of informa-
tion, will limit the innovative potential of the Chinese 
economy, and will restrict the overall real growth rate of 
manufacturing exports. Planning and management problems 
for the bureaucracy will increase as the economy develops 
and becomes more complex and affluent.

Success in dealing with bureaucratic and political prob-
lems depends on the ability of the post-Mao leaders to show 
progress with various reforms, to motivate young talent and 
backing, and to continue to elevate program supporters to
power while removing detractors. In order to achieve this result, China's leaders should adopt a moderate position, following Marxist principles but emphasizing balance and education, and concentrate on establishing a leadership able to transcend individual personalities. To this end, Deng resigned many of his official positions to allow his proteges to exert control, thereby lessening the impact of his eventual death. Even as the Chinese Communist Party, as the supreme political institution and the main instrument of policy, is modernized, the bureaucracy will remain as the source of bottlenecks that will stifle innovation and initiative in political and economic work. Bureaucratic inertia will affect the modernization efforts of Chinese society in general and the economy in particular.

**Population.** The most formidable difficulty China faces in its economic development is its huge population, which is now over a billion. Because of the high birth rate during the Cultural Revolution, half of China's population is now under twenty-one years of age. Increasing numbers of young people, therefore, will reach marriageable age each year. Following current trends, and despite severe birth controls, China's population will exceed 1.2 billion by the year 2000.49

The implications of such a burgeoning population are serious. Already, the population has nearly doubled since 1950, while total cultivated land has declined. "Landholding per capita dropped by half, equal to only one-seventeenth of that in Canada and one-eighth of that in the United States. The steady decline of landholding per capita makes the increase of food production per head extremely difficult. The country now has to import 8 to 10 million tons of food grains a year, reducing its capacity for importing machinery and technology."50

Ironically, the policies designed to raise the standard of living work against the government's strict policy of one child per couple. Under the "household responsibility" system, land
is assigned to peasant households according to family size. Also, because peasants are permitted to profit from sideline operations, they want more hands to assist in those operations and in multiple cropping. As their disposable income increases, they feel they can afford to have more children. Decentralization policies will continue to make enforcement of population policies in rural areas difficult. In times of drought, it is the family, not the state, that comes to the aid of the farmer. Therefore, the population growth rate in rural areas will continue to be higher than in urban areas.

Another facet of the problem is that, because the working age population is growing at about 2 percent a year, there is large-scale unemployment and underemployment. "The utilization ratio of working hours is only 50 percent, and sometimes less than 30 percent. Still, more than 10 million people are unemployed [1982]. As the labor force increases at a rate of 20 million people per year, unemployment will become even more severe in the years ahead." The need to provide additional productive employment will often conflict with the need to increase efficiency. To combat this conflict, the government should send new workers to faster growing sectors, increase inter-sectoral labor mobility, use labor-intensive techniques in agriculture and industry, and concentrate the drive for greater efficiency on energy, materials, and capital.

The lack of sufficient numbers of well-trained personnel in the mechanical and management fields is another aspect of China's population problem. "Although China had some 3.5 million scientific and technical personnel in 1982, they accounted for only 1 percent of the total labor force." The education system is unable to meet the demand for an additional million or so technicians per year needed to close the gap between supply and demand.

It appears that population pressures will slow down increases in the people's standard of living, unless China can
generate enough foreign exchange to import increasing amounts of food to meet rising domestic demands. There will also be increased demand for consumer durables. Control of population will continue as a top priority to 2000 and beyond, since failure in this area will negate the government's reforms.

CONCLUSIONS

IN VIEW OF THE NUMBER of substantial problems that China has to overcome, the objectives of the "Four Modernizations Program" seem beyond reach. No major breakthrough can be predicted and only modest, but steady, gains can be expected. However, small, steady improvement would represent a noteworthy achievement for a country with the largest economic development problems in the world.

But problems are not something new to China, and it has done well since 1949 in achieving a per capita income of about $US 300 per annum for a population of over a billion. The present leadership, with its reasonably modest objectives of the Sixth Five Year Plan, appears determined to avoid past mistakes, particularly that of setting unrealistic, over-ambitious production targets. However, it is doubtful that China possesses the technical and material resources to achieve the longer-term objective of quadrupling the country's agricultural and industrial output by 2000.

There are two major variables that affect China's plans for modernization. The first is whether the present leadership can consolidate its hold on power and implement its economic policies. Political stability is a key assumption and the most difficult to predict. Deng's pragmatic development policies need to result in steady economic improvement for his leadership to maintain its legitimacy. The Chinese have had enough of a perpetual revolution. They do not want a return to the
Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, but have a desire for stability and steady development. Therefore, the outlook for political stability and continuity is judged to be favorable.

The second variable is whether the policy of placing a low priority on Chinese military modernization by linking it to the eventual development of a modern industrial base can be continued. While a deterioration in relations with the Soviet Union and Vietnam could lead to an increase in allocation of resources to the military at the expense of economic development, the outlook for a continuation of present policies seems auspicious. About one-third of the Central Committee members come from the People’s Liberation Army, and Deng’s retention of personal leadership of the military will help ensure this continuity. The challenge to China is to maintain political and social stability while making the economic progress necessary to support military modernization; and military modernization is vital to Beijing’s long-term national objectives.

The government’s policies on foreign trade will be a key determinant of its success. The trade and technology of Western countries is essential to China in its modernization efforts. To become integrated and competitive in the international system, China must meet certain efficiency, technological, and behavioral standards. Meeting these standards would mean institutional changes in the Chinese system. The government will probably not be prepared to implement these changes and China will remain essentially under centralized planning, with the free markets playing only a subsidiary role. The “open door” strategy for the country as a whole will not go far enough for international trade to be the “engine of growth” that it has been for other Asian newly industrialized countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Economic modernization is the top priority objective of the government’s present plans because it is a precondition for the achievement of the long-term

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political objectives. These economic objectives will continue to be subsidiary to political objectives, and this policy will limit the growth rate in the Chinese economy.

China had an increase in gross domestic product of about 2.8 percent per year for the period 1950-80, but since 1978 the increase has been about 5 percent per year. The government's target is to achieve a growth rate of, on average, 7.2 percent per year to the year 2000, and to increase the 1984 per capita income of about SUS 300 to about SUS 800 in 2000 (the original target in September 1982 was SUS 1,000). However, there are major impediments - including the need to feed and to meet the increasing expectations of a huge population, the probability that China will not use its full foreign trade and borrowing potential - and the emphasis on central planning - which will limit growth potential. Therefore, a more moderate economic growth rate of 4 percent per year is forecast, leading to a per capita income of about SUS 600 in 2000.

To achieve this rate of growth, China would need a stable domestic and political environment and international cooperation from other developing countries and the Western industrialized countries. China needs to cooperate with other developing countries much more than are present leading to nations. Therefore, trade relations between industrialized countries and developing countries from China's operation will improve both economi and politically.
NOTES


2. Almost all grain in China is produced within the communes. There are about 5,300 communes, 690,000 production brigades, 5 million production teams and 181 million households. The communes average about 15,000 persons and 1,800 hectares. They function as the basic unit of local government, responsible for collecting taxes, providing public security and education, and sending statistical reports to higher administrative levels. The main structural features of the commune system are—
   - The means of production are collectively owned.
   - Economic decisions are made primarily by government and Party cadres.
   - Risk-taking in the system is borne by households.
   - The purchase of inputs and sale of outputs is controlled by the government.
   - The use of land is restricted.
   - Entrance into or exit out of farming by economic entities is restricted.


5. Ibid., p. 7.


8. Ibid.

9. The "eight character program" refers to the four sets of two Chinese characters that are rendered in English as "readjusting, restructuring, consolidating, and improving."


12. Ibid.


15. Ibid.


20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.


30. Ibid.


32. Ibid.


37. Ibid., p. 157.


39. World Bank Report, p. XIV.

40. Ibid., p. 80.
41. See pp. 225–27 for further illustrations of bureaucratic limits to growth.

42. Australian Department of Trade, Prospects for Trade Between Australia and China. Vol II (submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Trade and Commerce) Canberra, October, 1983, p. 28.


44. World Bank Report, p. 175.

45. Ibid., p. xix.

46. Australian Department of Trade, Prospects for Trade, p. 10.

47. World Bank Report, p. VII.


51. Ibid.

52. World Bank Report, p. 144.

LEARNING OPERATIONAL ART

John E. Turlington

For me as a soldier, the smallest detail caught on the spot and in the heat of action is more instructive than all the Thiers and the Jominis in the world.
—From Battle Studies by Ardant Du Picq

If operational art is as important to successful warfighting as our leaders and schools say it is, and if operational art is to be learned in the manner that it is now being taught, then I believe, as the old saying goes, “You can’t get there from here.”

There is no criticism intended. On the contrary, the reintroduction, after many years in the closet, of operational art and the concept of an operational level of war indicates a renaissance in warfighting doctrine. Nowhere is the renaissance more pronounced than in the changing curricula of our staff and war colleges and in the pages of our professional journals. One only has to look at the index of recent journals to see the proliferation of thoughtful, visionary, and challenging articles on the subjects of military strategy and doctrine.

John E. Turlington, a Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army, Field Artillery Branch, wrote this essay while attending the US Army War College. The essay won recognition in the 1986 Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition.
The seminal work of this change in doctrine is the 1982 version of US Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, the Army's statement of its AirLand Battle doctrine—how it will fight and win in war. What is new is the concept of the operational level of war. It is certainly not new in world military history, nor is it new in American military history. But you have to look back more than thirty years to find it, so it is new to the current generation of officers whose rapidly waning warfighting experience is confined to the tactical victories and strategic defeat of Vietnam.

Just what exactly is "operational art"? It is the expertise required of a leader and his staff to fight successfully at the operational level of war. A draft of the 1986 revision to FM 100-5 does a much better job of definition than the 1982 version: "Operational art defines the sequencing of tactical activities and events to achieve major military objectives. Its central concern is the design, organization and conduct of major operations and campaigns."

FM 100-5 describes three levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical. Military strategy is derived from national policy and establishes goals, provides resources and imposes constraints to secure policy objectives by applying or threatening to apply force. It is not discussed further in FM 100-5 and is mentioned only because it provides context and the basis for warfighting.

Of the two fighting levels of war, operational art is the skillful translation of strategic goals into achievable military objectives and the subsequent planning, positioning, and maneuvering of forces to achieve these objectives. Usually it is the bringing of corps and larger forces to bear at the appropriate time and place on the battlefield to impose our will on the enemy. Tactical art is the skillful employment of forces, normally division and lower, to fight those battles at the place and time the operational art has chosen.
Operational art is the link between strategy and fighting battles. It is what gives substance to strategy and meaning to the inevitable loss of life and materiel on the battlefield. It is the highest purely military activity in the three levels of war. It is Alexander the Great in Persia and Hannibal in Italy. It is Genghis Khan in Asia and Gustavus Adolphus at Breitenfeld. It is Frederick the Great at Leuthen and Napoleon at Austerlitz. It is Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley and Moltke at Königgrätz. It is Rommel in North Africa and MacArthur at Inchon. All of these great captains conducted campaigns that were, in their time, decisive. All were masters of the operational art.

Operational art is what wins wars and is what the profession of arms is all about. It is an art the citizens of our country pay us, in the interest of national security, to apply with skill in wartime.

In these words about the primacy of the operational art to the professional soldier, I do not mean to sell short the value of tactics. Without good soldiers, well equipped, well led, and well supported in good combat units, and employing sound tactical doctrine, skill in operational art will count for nothing. Moreover, the ability to fight at the tactical level is this country's strong suit. We have good soldiers who are well equipped and well led. There is room for improvement in all aspects of the tactical level of war, of course, but on the whole this country has great tactical strength. It has always been a part of our doctrine, and has always received the most emphasis.

We have plenty of good musicians, each skilled in his own instrument, but do we have an orchestra? No matter the skill of the individuals, an orchestra is only as good as its conductor. The conductors of the Army are those middle and senior grade officers—large unit commanders and their joint staffs who will orchestrate the tactical fighting elements through military campaigns to achieve military objectives in support of strategic goals.
In a recent article entitled "Training for the Operational Level," Lieutenant Colonel L.D. Holder says, "Over the years we have watched operational levels of command disappear...joint training programs [have slipped] almost out of existence." Tactical jobs were more desirable than corps and higher level assignments, and joint operational assignments were treated with disdain by officers with the greatest demonstrated potential. "Our schools have not troubled themselves too much with campaign studies until very lately, nor have we made time for or encouraged professional reading concerning large unit operations in the officer corps. In sum, we have to recover a lot of ground before we can convert the ideals of doctrine into a real operational capability."

Holder echoes what most current writers suggest. He says that "only when we have taught the principles of operational art to our leaders and staff officers and trained the force in its practice" will we see real effect from this momentous change in our doctrine.

If operational art is as important to winning as FM 100-5 says it is, and if FM 100-5 is "the most important doctrinal manual in the Army" as General Richardson, Commander of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) claims it is, then surely one of the most hotly debated questions facing Army leadership today should be, How do we teach operational art to our officers?

It is clearly not a hotly debated subject. On the other hand, it is not being ignored. Recent graduates and students at the staff and war colleges can no doubt provide a very good definition of the operational art. Moreover, they can cite the operational principles which are the same as those for tactics. All can provide in some detail the example of MacArthur at Inchon as a classic of the operational art in action. Selected students at the School of Advanced Military Studies get even more on the subject. But I suggest that only military
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history enthusiasts can go much deeper into a discussion of the art. Within the current curriculum constraints, this is about all that can be expected, but even this is a major step forward. Four years ago who had even heard of the phrase?

Our schools recognize that the time spent in the schoolhouse is not enough. Here is a sample of what the War College says:

In a special text on the “Operational Level of War” prepared by the Army War College, the Chief of Staff says that because “we should become more expert in these most essential subjects of our military profession,” the special text is being distributed throughout the Army. In the preface, the editor says, “There are not enough hours in our duty days in our various jobs nor formalized schooling to master the vastness [of the] art of war. Thus, our only recourse must be through a self-education process.” Professional reading is the implied principal vehicle for this “self-education” process.

Before returning to the thesis of this article, “You can't get there from here,” let me briefly sum up where we are. Competent warfighting at the tactical level will not, alone, win wars. It is only with competent warfighting at the operational level as well as at the tactical level that an army wins wars. Our whole system of officer accession, basic and advanced schooling, multiple tactical unit assignments, tests, ARTEP’s National Training Center, CPX, FTX, terrain walks, CALFEX, etc. institutionalizes the development of competent tactical warfighters. And we do it well. But what is the system to institutionalize the development of competent operational war fighters?

Obviously it is a system in transition because the concept is so new to us. The system, however, does appear to have taken on some shape and direction. Staff and war college curricula address the concept in some detail. Augmenting college instruction there only appears to be a renewed emphasis on self-study. The military student and reader have been
inundated with famous quotations from famous people to prove the importance of self-study. My favorite, and one of the more popular quotations being used to sell self-education, is from J. F. C. Fuller: “Until you learn how to teach yourselves, you will never be taught by others.”

By its emphasis on self-education the Army concedes that, however important, its schoolhouse instruction is not enough. If the Army’s goal is, as it should be, institutionalizing competence in the operational level of war, then the question becomes, Will voluntary participation in some kind of self-education program accomplish the goal? I don’t think so, but let us develop the argument a little further. Assuming for the sake of this discussion the best case—that all field grade officers are highly self-motivated to teach themselves the real art of the operational level of war (a desirable state of affairs, but not necessarily reality), how does the Army propose they go about it?

General Richardson says we do it by “thoroughly and systematically searching military history while simultaneously scanning the future for new technology and new concepts.” Lieutenant Colonel Holder says we do it “only through mastery of military history and theory... The individual responsibility for this development will continue throughout the officer’s career.”

I could not agree more with both of these visionary officers who represent the quality of both the Army’s senior and mid-grade leadership. The disconnect comes between what they say and what the Army is doing.

The operative words from General Richardson and Lieutenant Colonel Holder are, it seems to me, “systematically searching” and “mastery.” The War College’s special text on “Operational Level of War—Its Art” is several hundred pages long and, in its preface, states that “No one volume of readings could begin to cover the many facets of operational art. This is only a beginning. We, therefore, hope...
to stimulate your interest in and study of operational art in practice as you pursue self-education in this area." For the busy but dedicated officer this text represents a week or two, at least, just to read—a year, perhaps, to study systematically and master. Suppose, now, that all field grade officers spend the prodigious amounts of nonduty time required to study systematically and master this book and all of its future editions. Will the US Army have in, say, five years a group of operational level officers skilled in the art?

Again, I don't think so. We will certainly have a group of officers who are more widely read and articulate in military matters. Their perspectives will be broader; their depth of understanding and clarity of vision will be enhanced. They will be better officers and even better operators, but they will not have learned, really learned, the operational art. To paraphrase a couple of catchy phrases from my association with the Army’s Inspectors General, these officers will have studied a mile-wide field to a depth of one inch, maybe even a foot. It is my belief that real learning of the art will only take place through inch-wide, mile-deep study.

A dust-covered book found in the Military History Institute will help illustrate my point. The title of the book is *The Franco-German Campaign of 1870*. It is a “source book” printed by the US General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth in 1922. The book is over 700 pages of translations of the actual documents, maps, charts and messages of both combatants. The material deals only with the planning and execution of movements of corps, armies and groups of armies. Tactical material was omitted. With this book it is possible, in a week of intense work, to realistically reconstruct the critical opening weeks of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. It is possible to cast yourself alternatively in the roles of the opposing commanders to see the situation as they saw it. You see only the fragments of the often conflicting information available to the commander at the time crucial decisions were
made or avoided, opportunities taken or missed. You know the state of training and morale of your soldiers, their weapons capabilities, your logistic constraints, the capabilities of subordinate commanders. You know the enemy and the terrain. In other words, with work (and a lot of it), you can get inside the mind of the commander, see the situation as it very nearly was, and make judgments as to what you should or should not do. The object is to train your intuition and your instincts.

These things cannot be learned just by reading. As anyone who has put together a 1,000 piece puzzle can tell you, you cannot find where an obscure piece fits just by "reading" the puzzle picture. You find where it fits by studying the nuances of color, detail and shape of the piece and the puzzle. After you are well into the puzzle, many pieces are fit by sheer intuition alone. The more puzzles you do the quicker your intuition about color, detail and shape develops.

I did an exercise similar to the one suggested by the Fort Leavenworth "source book" on the Franco-Prussian War. It took about sixty hours. When I finished, I was convinced that if the French had had a commander with even average skill in operational art, at best they could have stalemated the overwhelmingly superior Prussian Army. At worst they could have delayed the Prussians long enough to have mobilized additional forces—and who knows what kind of political forces might have come to play in a long, drawn-out struggle. As it was, the war for all practical purposes was over in four weeks. Emperor Napoleon III surrendered; the French Army of over 300,000 soldiers were casualties, prisoners, or bottled up in fortresses under siege. The course of European history was fundamentally changed and the stage was set for the great wars of the twentieth century.

What would the original Napoleon have done, or for that matter, what would I have done with 300,000 soldiers?
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know what I would have done. I felt it intensely; I even dreamt about it for weeks after the exercise. It became, surprisingly, an emotional experience. At times I felt like I was no longer a spectator in the war but a participator. More about this experience later.

I got the idea for the exercise from a recent journal article entitled “Thinking at the Operational Level.” In it the author suggests a method for learning the operational art, and in my view, gives substance to those operative words spoken by General Richardson and Lieutenant Colonel Holder: “systematically searching” and “mastery.” He invokes the wisdom of great military captains and thinkers such as Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Moltke and suggests that if it worked for them, it “is probably still valid.”¹¹ The essence of the article can best be described by a quotation he attributes to an English military critic. The critic reviews Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke’s 1862 history of the 1859 Italian Campaign, a history written for use in instructing students of the kriegsakademie—roughly the Staff and War Colleges of the German General Staff. Moltke was the akademie director. The critic writes that Moltke’s history is a model of . . . positive criticism. At every stage the writer places himself in turn in the position of the commander of each side, and sketches clearly and concisely the measures which at that moment would, in his opinion, have been the most appropriate. This is undoubtedly the true method of teaching the general’s art, and the best exercise in peace that can be devised for those who have acquired its mastery.¹²

The quotation comes from Spenser Wilkinson’s 1890 classic on the German General Staff, The Brain of an Army, a book which Elihu Root acknowledged played an important part in the creation of the Army War College.¹³

Moltke’s own words in the preface to his history of the Italian Campaign are equally instructive. The object of the history is, he says,

to ascertain as accurately as possible the nature of the events in Northern Italy during those few eventful
weeks, to deduce from them their causes—in short, to exercise that objective criticism without which the facts themselves do not afford effective instruction for our own benefit.  

Napoleon describes very plainly why the field grade officer must, in addition to professional reading, probe the depths of history in meticulous but potentially illuminating detail. He says:

Tactics, the evolutions, the science of the engineer and artillerist can be learned in treatises much like geometry, but knowledge of the higher spheres of war is only acquired through the study of the wars and battles of the Great Captains and by experience. It has no precise, fixed rules. Everything depends on the character that nature has given to the general, on his qualities, on his faults, on the nature of the troops, on the range of the weapons, on the season and on a thousand circumstances which are never the same.

Frederick the Great had similar thoughts. He cautioned his officers not to be content with memorization of the details of a great captain's exploits but to examine thoroughly his overall views and particularly to learn how to think in the same way.

There is ample testimony of the great value of intimate study of military history to the professional soldier of today. There is also danger in not studying in this fashion. FM 100-5 contains excellent and well grounded theory about how to fight. The basic tenets of Air and battle—initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization—are discussed. The dynamics of battle—maneuver, firepower, protection, leadership—are described. The US Army's nine principles of war are listed and defined. Although few would question the validity of these theoretical concepts of waging war, the danger lies in unskilled application of theory to practice. There are so many variables in war that no two operations will ever be exactly the same. It follows that no two individual applications of
some principle or rule will produce the same result. A German historian of the late nineteenth century observed, “It is well known that military history, when superficially studied, will furnish arguments in support of any theory or opinion.” The danger lies with the operational commander and his staff who are well read but unexperienced in combat. However competent their judgment, their intuition and instincts are untested. They may be easily betrayed into placing too great a value on theory to produce victory. In his classic, *The Conduct of War*, Baron Von der Goltz talks about the value of experience:

> It is a remarkable yet explicable phenomenon that precisely in those armies where the commander is afforded the fewest opportunities to acquire practical experience, the number of those is great who imagine that they were intended for generals, and who consider the practice of this vocation easy.

> But in the school of golden practice such impressions are, of course, quickly rectified through experience of failure, difficulties, and misfortune.

One final note on the subject of experience before moving on to how to acquire combat experience in a peacetime Army. B. H. Liddell Hart, in his book *Why Don't We Learn From History?* says this about what history can teach us about experience:

> It lays the foundation of education by showing how mankind repeats its errors, and what those errors are. It was Bismarck who made the scurril comment so apt for those who are fond of describing themselves as ‘practical men’ in contrast to ‘theorists’: ‘tools say they learn by experience. I prefer to learn by other peoples experience.’ The study of history offers us that opportunity. It is universal experience — infinitely longer, wider, and more varied than any individual experience.” (emphasis added)

What the US Army has is a new (to the current officer generation) warfighting concept — operational art. It is a
fundamental concept of the AirLand Battle doctrine. It is the skill required to fight at the operational level of war, and it is a skill without which we cannot expect to win. It is a skill that requires, in addition to technical competence, a quality of judgment, intuition and instinct that can be developed only through combat experience. We have no way, and we hope never to have a way, to gain such experience through actual combat. Wars are not provided for training and few leaders in war get a second chance. Therefore, if we are to be able to develop leaders skilled in the operational art we must find a way to approximate, as closely as possible, the experience of combat. We can do this through the systematic study of military history.

Another recent military journal article will help illustrate my point. "Jackson's Valley Campaign and the Operational Level of War," written by three former Army War College students, approaches the kind of learning experience I am talking about. Not for the reader, of course, though it is an excellent work and instructive as to what operational art is. The authors who walked the actual ground and carefully traced the campaign step-by-step are, I suspect, the real winners. I have not spoken to them, but such careful research backed up by on-the-ground reconnaissance must have provided insights into the operational art that the reader of the article will not be able to acquire. The professional benefit to the authors must surely be an order of magnitude greater than to the readers.

Earlier I described an exercise I did using the Franco-Prussian War. The object was to get so intimately familiar with the situation that I could actually picture myself as the commander on the ground, where I could see the situation develop approximately as the actual commander might have seen it. It was very similar to any of a number of war games I have played with the crucial exception that with detailed preparation I felt a part of the action. I felt pressure, frustra-
tion, anger, impatience. I made good decisions and I made fatal decisions. It was by far the most instructive academic experience in the art and science of war that I have ever had. Even though I could not hope to teach the reader the lessons I learned by this exercise—the reader must teach himself these lessons—I will attempt to describe the nature of the lessons in the operational art that can be learned from this kind of study. They are lessons, I believe, that cannot be learned in any other manner, and especially not by just reading about the war. Even reading historian Michael Howard's excellent history, *The Franco-Prussian War*, will not produce the instructional value that a step-by-step, thoughtful reconstruction of the war will yield.

This is how I went about it. I studied translations of original documents such as message traffic and correspondence, G2 estimates, march tables, maps, operation plans, newspaper reports, eyewitness accounts, and to a limited extent, official and unofficial histories written soon after the war to fill information gaps in the primary sources. (Literally, hundred of volumes are available for study on every conceivable aspect of the war.) Using these documents I reconstructed day-by-day, the events that occurred between mobilization in mid-July 1870 through the first battles in early August to the defeat of the French Army at Sedan on 1 September 1870. I concentrated on the French forces in the period 27 July-3 August 1870, just prior to the outbreak of hostilities, when the opportunity for the initiative was equally available to both forces. I arrayed both forces, in turn, to corps level and studied everything I could find about the corps and armies status of mobilization, state of training, commanders' personalities, logistics support, morale, weapons, and lines of communication. I also tried to determine as accurately as possible what the opposing commanders knew about the enemy and friendly situations, when they knew it and what they did with available information.
TURLINGTON

It was tedious work at first, but after getting deeply involved the exercise became very interesting. Advantageous and dangerous situations sometimes jumped out at you. More often, however, there was great confusion and uncertainty on both sides—although more so on the French than the German side. I looked for moments when important decisions were or could have been made and asked myself what I would have done under the same circumstances. I then examined whether what I would have done was supportable in terms of logistics, lines of communication, forces available, terrain and chances of success versus risks incurred.

For instance, on 1 August 1870, the French had more than 3 corps, about 130,000 men, which were sufficiently ready for war to have taken a limited offensive against the flank of the 3d Prussian Army, the southernmost Army in the Prussian array of forces. A limited objective attack could have been launched by 3 August, with a very reasonable chance of success in my view. The objective would have been to convince the Prussians that an attack through the southern flank of Germany was in progress. (Such a grand plan was, in fact, proposed.) Positive results might have been an early French tactical victory which was badly needed for political and morale reasons and the repositioning of the 1st and 2d Prussian Armies if the deception worked. In any event, significant disruption of Prussian plans and mobilization progress could be expected, and an element of uncertainty as to French capabilities and intentions would be imposed on the minds of the Prussian leadership. Additional time for French mobilization would probably have been provided as the Prussians reacted to the French “invasion.” Even if defeated in battle, the French had a protected southern flank and avenues of withdrawal making the risk of destruction of the French Army remote. The French would certainly have succeeded, to some degree, in altering Prussian plans.

The value of this and numerous other “what if” analyses in this exercise lies not in what the student is taught but in
how he is taught. It is the decisions of the operational level leader that ultimately determine success or failure of an operation. All of the frictions, luck, and misfortune of war are set in motion, directly or indirectly, by the implementation of the commander's decisions. The equation is simple—the better the decision, the better the chance of success. This type of exercise improves the student's capacity to make decisions.

Instead of reading about or being told that in war information is often confusing and conflicting, the student grows accustomed to "working" in this type of environment. Through these experiences he gains a certain familiarity with war by his vicarious participation. His already keen intellect acquires an enhanced ability to penetrate the "fog of war" by actually having to do it. By "firsthand" experience the student acquires an enhanced level of understanding of such important considerations as ammunition resupply, reconstitution of reserves, reconnaissance and good maps, space required for maneuver, fire support, the time it takes to concentrate large forces, and so forth. His appreciation of the value of strong reserves, initiative, freedom of maneuver, synchronization, deception, surprise, and so forth, is given added substance by "seeing" value rather than by simply being told such value exists. In the same way, his shortcomings will be highlighted and techniques to compensate for those shortcomings devised.

A leader's perspective is made more reasonable and is broadened by "living" the experience of others. History will not and cannot give us ready-made answers to problems. Situations will never be the same. But the leader, whose intellect has been enriched by a systematically cultivated perspective derived from sharing the experience of others will be more likely to make sound decisions. He will be able to confront a complicated situation filled with uncertainty and risk and more readily discover the best way to achieve the objective.
Colonel G. F. R. Henderson was probably the greatest proponent of this method of learning the operational art. Henderson thought little of most of the military texts of his day. He felt that they "stressed principles at the expense of the 'spirit' of war ... moral influences ... [and] the effect of rapidity, surprise and secrecy."  

Henderson says in one of his books on war training,

The principles [of war] are few in number and simple in theory; they are . . . the guiding spirit of all manoeuvres, . . . but if there is one fact more conspicuous than another in the records of war, it is that, in practice they are as readily forgotten as they are difficult to apply. The truth is that the . . . maxims and . . . regulations which set forth the rules of war go no deeper than the memory; and in the excitement of battle the memory is useless; habit and instinct are alone to be relied upon.  

The above passage and the one that follows are from Henderson's book *The Battle of Spicheren*—a classic which should be on every soldier's bookshelf. Leading with famous words from Clausewitz and ending with words from Baron Von der Goltz on the subject of generals, he says,

"In war all is simple, but the simple is difficult."  

. . . Without practical experience the most complicated problems can be readily solved upon the map. To handle troops on manoeuvres . . . is a harder task: but its difficulties decrease with practice. But before the enemy where the honor of the nation and the judgment of the present and of future generations are at stake, where history is making and the lives of thousands may be the cost of a mistake, there, under such a weight of responsibility, common sense, and even practised military judgment find it no simple matter to assert themselves. "Very frequently," says Von der Goltz, "the time will be wanting for careful considerations. Sometimes the excitement does not permit it. Resolve,
and this is a truth which those who have not seen war
will do well to ponder over, is then something instinctive.”

Du Picq, Napoleon, Frederick the Great, Moltke, Liddell Hart, Clauewitz, Henderson, Von der Goltz, all said it better than I can say it. If we want to be good at warfighting, we have to learn to think at the operational level. We have to train our minds. hone our instincts, and sharpen our intuition by getting as close as possible to the real thing. Nothing else will work. Reading, no matter how voracious and no matter how important, is not enough. Schooltime, no matter how great and no matter how newly-developed is not enough. The Germans have a word for it, *fingerspitzengefühl*. It means, roughly, a feeling in the fingertips. We Americans have a corollary: “I can feel it in my bones.” You cannot teach it—you can only learn it. Perhaps this is what J.F.C. Fuller really meant when he said, “Until you learn how to teach yourselves, you will never be taught by others.”

**CONCLUSION**

*If the US Army expects to win the next war, then it must train for war in peacetime. For the tactical levels of warfighting, the Army has placed functioning, effective systems in the schools and in the field. It has institutionalized tactical excellence. Even the Army’s series of field manuals on training (FMs 25-1 through 25-5) are devoted entirely to training at the tactical level. FM 25-1, *Training*, the Army’s training philosophy, should be retitled *Tactical Training*. To institutionalize excellence at the operational level of war, no such comprehensive system exists. No system at all exists to teach the subjective qualities of the operational art—judgment, instinct, intuition, *fingerspitzengefühl*—qualities without which our operational leaders and their staffs are not likely to be successful in the early stages of the next war. And then it*
may be too late. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger warns that the United States cannot afford the luxury of on-the-job training:

An important lesson derived from past wars is that actual military engagements develop quite differently from what had been expected. . . . Since a future war may not be of sufficient duration to permit much learning, we must study carefully the lessons of those armed conflicts that do occur . . . for clues about tactics and operations.2 (emphasis added)

There are two aspects of the operational art which must be taught. One is the mechanical or scientific aspect. These are the skills and procedures required to supply, maneuver and manage large forces over large, often populated areas; the apparatus to acquire sufficient intelligence data upon which to act; and the command, control, and communications to bring it all together and enable it to work. Lieutenant Colonel Holder's article on "Training at the Operational Level" offers workable, systematic solutions to this half of the operational art training problem.

The other half of the problem, and in my view the more important half, is how operational level leaders and their advisers are taught what maneuver might work and what won't, what's important and what's not, when to strike and when not, what's too much and what's not enough. Without leadership with practiced judgment and well developed instinct and intuition capable of making the right decisions, even the most highly refined operational machine may go charging off in the wrong direction. When "the honor of the nation and the judgment of the present and future generation is at stake, where history is making and the lives of thousands may be the cost of a mistake," we cannot afford to go charging off in the wrong direction.

With the Airland battle doctrine comes a new training imperative for the US Army: to teach officers how to teach themselves lessons that otherwise can be learned only in war.
time. I suggest a multi-level and multi-pronged approach involving officer schools from the basic courses through the war college, individual study, operational level terrain walks, and specialized wargaming.

Officer Schools: All schools should require each student to complete one or more historical studies (roughly forty hours each) similar to that described above and not unlike those accomplished by officers of the German General Staff under Moltke and by US officers of the staff and war colleges before World War II. At the basic and advanced course levels, the study should be tactical. Such a study would not only be immensely instructive but would also teach young officers how to teach themselves. At the staff and war college levels, there should be a minimum of two studies, each oriented on the operational level. It is critical that the studies be done by individual effort, and there must be oral and written feedback and grading provided. Academic reports should note performance with emphasis on the depth and quality of the student’s understanding of the operational situation and options, not on how the student regurgitated the school solution. Students who give the study shallow treatment can easily be identified by careful questioning.

Individual Study: Annually, when not in one of the officer schools, each officer should complete a study similar to those conducted under school supervision. A written report would be forwarded to, and feedback would be provided by, the proponent (either branch school or TRADOC directorate) which issued the individual study packet. Again, quality of performance should be noted on evaluation reports. Local commanders will have to provide time for the study; written reports should be routed through them.

Operational Level Terrain Walks: There should be field grade and general officer level terrain walks (actually flights and drives) over the actual terrain of important historical operations. These would be in addition to current operational terrain walks now conducted by the forward deployed
Corps and Armies. There are many accessible locations in the United States, Europe, and Korea. Guide packets would be prepared by the proponent (again, the branch school or TRADOC directorate) and terrain walks conducted by Corps or Army level "experts." Extensive individual preliminary preparation would be required and before, during, and after operation briefings would be presented by the participants. Ideally, these terrain walks would be over terrain where previously studied campaigns and operations occurred. (It is interesting to note that the Army War College Class of 1936-37 was given a full month to prepare for a terrain walk.)

Specialized Wargaming: While much can be learned from historical campaigns, the nature of future warfare will be very different. Applicability of historical lessons to current warfighting is, therefore, limited in greater or lesser degrees depending on the campaign studied. Hypothetical scenarios based on updated versions of earlier campaigns, providing the same level of background and detail, would have to be developed. A variety of realistic, stressful campaign simulations could be created and played annually by senior officers individually or in very small groups at centrally located wargaming sites. Feedback and evaluation for the record will again be critical.

These suggestions, or similar proposals, will not be cheap or easy to develop. Neither will it be easy for senior officers to find the time—two or more weeks per year when not in school—for systematic study leading to mastery of the operational art. However, if we are going to institutionalize excellence in the operational art as we have in tactics we have to do a lot more than provide reading lists, voluntary self-study programs, and a few hours instruction in our school. There must be a structured, intensive, and comprehensive training program with frequent evaluation with significant promotion impact.
If we prefer, like Bismarck, to learn from other peoples' experience, then we should learn from the German experience. Readers of DePuy (A Genius for War) and van Creveld (Fighting Power: German Military Performance 1914-1945) are quickly convinced that the German armies of World War II and the hundred years preceding that war were in their time the finest fighting forces in the world. "Masterpieces of the military art" was the way van Creveld described German campaigns of World War II. DePuy says that "performance comparable to that of the German armies... can be found only in armies led by such military geniuses as Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Genghis Khan and Napoleon." The Germans' secret, the phenomenon that separated the German Army from all others in excellence, was the German General Staff, and "the special qualities of professionalism that differentiated that General Staff from imitations in all other nations." One of the principal components of the German General Staff development process, and the institutionalization of military excellence which the General Staff accomplished, was an intense emphasis on the study of military history. Staff officers wrote about the significance of military history, and "they invariably emphasized the importance of history for acquiring the theoretical foundations for military science, and for gaining an understanding of human performance in conflict situations." The German Army institutionalized excellence in large part by emphasis on the study of military history and their experience is one from which we should learn.

Another principal component of the General Staff development process was examination. Evaluation as a prerequisite to promotion required German officers to study the profession seriously and contributed to a higher quality of "professional understanding and performance throughout the entire Army." In order to institutionalize excellence in the operational art, systematic operational studies impelled by meaningful evaluations are the only way.
As the US Army and its AirLand battle doctrine mature together, it is without a laboratory of actual wargfighting experience. The only way to gain such experience is to appropriate the experiences of others and to learn from them. With small armies, like Napoleon's, the wellspring of such experience could reside in the head of one or just a few. In large armies like the German Army of World War II or the American Army of the 1980s and 1990s, the wellspring of experience must reside in the heads of many. We cannot make the AirLand battle doctrine work the way we are going about it now. The operational gap between military strategy and tactics is too large and too important to be filled with current training philosophy and practice. You can get there from here only if the need for major change is recognized and progress toward change is forthcoming.

We deter war by being ready to fight and win the war. Skill in the operational art is the bedrock of winning. The potential Napoleons and Pattons in our Army today might emerge given a long enough war. But we may not have that kind of time. Unless we can institutionalize excellence in the operational art, we may be ready to fight, but we will not be ready to win.

The assistant commandant's introduction to the Army War College's "Conduct of War Course" of 1936-37 tells us how we can be ready to win. In his challenge to the students, who were going to have to produce about 100 typed, single-spaced pages of historical analysis during the last four months of the school year, he said:

By the reading and study of history we expand our experience, our possibilities for discovering a satisfactory answer, by taking unto ourselves the experiences of the great commanders of history. Pericles... said it in his funeral oration: "The whole earth is the sepulchre of famous men and their story is not graven only on the
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stone over their native earth, but lives on, far away, without visible symbol, woven into the stuff of other men's lives."

Give us something we can weave into the stuff of our lives.**
TURLETON

NOTES

3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. v.
12. Ibid., p. 5.
16. Ibid., p. 3.


22. Ibid., p. 294.


26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., p. 304.

28. Ibid., p. 303.

Participation by the United States in peacekeeping operations during the past forty years has essentially been indirect, supporting United Nations peacekeeping with funds, logistic support, or small numbers of officers detailed as observers. The most recent US experiences in the Middle East, though, have forced Americans to analyze and discuss the nature and efficacy of peacekeeping operations. These experiences have been shaped by the Sinai Field Missions, the US Marine participation in the Multinational Force (MNF-I and MNF-II), and the US Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps support of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). The US role in these endeavors during the past decade has been outside the framework of UN peacekeeping operations. While continuing our traditional support for UN efforts, the United States also has become a direct national participant; US combat forces have been introduced in support of US peacekeeping objectives. This new use of US forces has highlighted the political nature of peacekeeping operations, as well as the contributions they make to US strategic objectives.

Wolfd D. Kutter, a Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army, Infantry Branch, wrote this essay while attending the US Army War College. The essay won recognition in the 1986 Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition.
A study of peacekeeping reveals that a substantial body of knowledge exists by virtue of the four decades of UN experiences. It even includes conceptual approaches gleaned from earlier operations attempted by the League of Nations. However, very little has been written by US peacekeepers, nor by those associated with the application of the peacekeeping tool toward the attainment of US strategic objectives. Consequently, a gap exists in US doctrinal, training, and strategic literature that is only now being addressed. This essay seeks to articulate a dimension that has not been explored—guidelines for US peacekeeping commanders. Implicit is the assumption that throughout the balance of the twentieth Century, and well into the twenty-first, the United States is very likely to field combat formations for direct participation in peacekeeping operations. Such guidelines are intended for commanders who will have brigade- or battalion-level peacekeeping responsibilities. Those responsibilities are vast. They embrace both a military and a political sphere, and they require cross-cultural empathy and continued reflective study of the art of peacekeeping. Therefore, these guidelines are not intended to be prescriptive or all-encompassing, but to serve as a framework for further analysis to ensure successful accomplishment of peacekeeping missions.

The United Nations' constructive role as third-party peacekeeper during the past four decades highlights the theoretical foundations and limits of peacekeeping. Conflict resolution through impartial, neutral third parties to control or de-escalate crises between states, or within a state, has been the basis for UN commitment to peacekeeping operations. Most were ad hoc, of an emergency nature, relying on the international moral authority of force and armed presence, rather than forceful means to control conflict. As such,

UN peacekeeping is designed to end hostilities through peaceful means, thereby creating a climate within which
PEACEKEEPING FORCES

the peace process may be successfully applied. Peacekeeping is, therefore, not the culmination of conflict, but only the beginning of a new stage of the process in the peaceful resolution of conflict. Ideally, it is the use of noncoercive military measures for the continuation of diplomacy. The importance of a peacekeeping force does not lie in its numerical strength or military capacity. It lies in the political will which it represents and the diplomatic capacity of the peacekeeping members to further conciliation and de-escalation. Thus the underlying purpose of peacekeeping operations is to provide a suitable political climate in which political aims can be pursued through a peace process.

The setting for UN peacekeeping operations has been essentially in areas beyond the immediate dominance of superpowers; "soft areas" on the fringes of the East-West defense alliances, "extremities" of US-USSR power zones, areas of post-World War II decolonization, and newly independent, unstable regimes. Theoretically, conflicts there, as elsewhere, find their roots in an ideological, religious, ethnic, economic, internal, national boundary, or military potential basis. Responding to conflict situations with such varying origins, the United Nations has conducted the following types of peacekeeping operations: investigations, cease-fire or truce supervision, supervision of withdrawals and disengagements, interposition between opposing forces, observation and presence, maintenance and patrol of a buffer zone, maintenance of law and order, arms control and disarmament, and supervision of prisoner of war exchanges. Although establishing credibility and enhancing the peace process, these operations were not without cost.

The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) continued to function in the midst of the Arab-Israeli wars—1956, 1967, 1973—and demonstrated great flexibility as the situation in the respective areas changed. UNTSO
military observers remained on the cease-fire lines, often under fire, and performed an invaluable service as go-betweens and as the means by which isolated incidents were contained. They suffered a number of casualties, but won and maintained a reputation for honest, objective reporting that was recognized by all, even when the findings were to the disadvantage of one of the parties. Similarly, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a buffer between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Lebanon, experienced substantial casualties. In one period alone, January-June 1980, 10 soldiers lost their lives and another 22 were injured. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), an interposition force between Turkish and Greek communities, also experienced such difficulties. But none matched the problems of the UN peacekeeping force in the Congo, Organization des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC).

ONUC’s initial mission in 1960, maintaining law and order, ended up in a coercive peacekeeping enforcement role to preclude Katanga from splitting off from the Congo. In the enforcement process, substantial casualties were incurred while the UN’s peacekeeping enforcement role became a major international issue. The ensuing debate served to highlight the interrelations between the politico-military peacekeeping process and the limits of conflict resolution by international armed third parties. Consequently, no peacekeeping enforcement missions have been attempted by the United Nations since ONUC.

Throughout these UN experiences, extensive efforts were made to capture “lessons learned” to form the basis of doctrine for future UN peacekeeping operations. The results reflected the will of the international community favoring noncoercive operations as the only acceptable endeavor for UN peacekeepers. The key doctrinal principles that emerged require the following:
a. The cooperation and support of the parties to the dispute.

b. The political support of a portion of the international community, ideally including the two superpowers, but at least including the United States.

c. A clear, restricted, and realistic mandate or mission.

d. Sufficient freedom of movement for the force or observers to carry out their responsibilities.

e. An effective communications, command, and control system.

f. Suitable, impartial, noncoercive forces.

An analysis of peacekeeping failures, such as the premature withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force I (UNEF-I) in 1967 or the inappropriate mandate for the US Marines (MNF-II) in 1983, highlight the validity of these principles. The need to carefully study them and to relate them to the specific peacekeeping environment once peacekeeping forces are committed. Each of these six principles has a dynamic of its own. Together they constitute a collective risk function which affects the potential for success of any given peacekeeping operation. That is, if the parties to a dispute are willing to accept a peacekeeping force, a realistic mission is given to that force, and the force is recognized as impartial, then the likelihood for mitigating conflict and facilitating the peace process is indeed high. Crucial is the consent of the disputing countries, their internal cohesion, and their political aims. Aims, cohesion, and consent may all prove to be dynamic over time, and therein lies the risk—risk not only for potential failure of the peacekeeping operation, but also risk to the peacekeeping force itself in terms of loss of life due to hostile actions.

Within the context of the American experience, particularly when operating outside the framework of UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations, it becomes critical to
carefully analyze the impact of these principles on a specific peacekeeping situation. When US combat forces are involved as peacekeepers, then American will, strategy, and national objectives are linked to them in a most visible manner. This visibility in the court of world opinion and the American public tends to sharpen the edge between success and failure in such peacekeeping operations. Thus, "US peacekeeping operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to restore, achieve, or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict" may well be an interim political solution that could constitute a potential disaster without possessing an in a herent formula for a long-term solution.10

THE PEACEKEEPING CONTINUUM

Construction of a peacekeeping continuum as shown below will facilitate understanding of both the political dynamics for conflict resolution and the types of operations to be conducted:

OBSERVATION  PRESENCE  ENFORCEMENT

On one end of the scale are peace observation missions, on the other end peace enforcement, with the center of the scale representing peacekeeping presence operations. Third-party, credible moral authority is vested in peace observer missions. Few in number, lightly armed (if at all), such as found in UNTSO or in the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), these observers reflect the left end of the continuum. Peacekeeping presence, the center of the scale, represents the noncoercive nature of military units participating in such operations. These may be company- to brigade-level forces with a peace guarantee, interposition, or
buffer mission. Their mission is achieved through impartial presence, precise information flow to all parties, tact and diplomacy, and use of force purely as a last resort in self-defense. On the other end of the scale are peace enforcement missions with still larger military units in which specific use of force to achieve peacekeeping objectives is authorized. Peacekeeping enforcement missions encompassed ONUC's Congo operation, the US-Organization of American States involvement in the Dominican Republic (1965), and US operations in Lebanon in 1983-84. The peacekeeping continuum scale can thus be paralleled with a continuum depicting the third party's impartiality or use of force:

Clearly, there is a basic dividing line between third-party impartiality and the use of force. One can also argue that the dynamic of peacekeepers' use of force, once unleashed, places the peacekeepers also in a disputing party role and lifts the mantle of third-party neutrality. More and more force may have to be used to control conflict, and thus the peacekeepers become part of the conflict. In the Dominican Republic, superior peacekeeping forces permitted the Gadoy government to coalesce, grow, and hand over the political reins to the broad based Balaguer government. In Lebanon, unfortunately, limited military means were unable to attain major political objectives once the shooting started. Clearly, the US Marines preferred to be third-party neutrals, but they were not perceived as such after April 1983, and tragic consequences resulted.
From the parallel continuum standpoint it can thus be highlighted that such use of force, falling between presence and enforcement operations, can unleash dynamics that can have far-reaching political and strategic consequences. For the United Nations since ONUC, this potential has meant avoidance of peacekeeping enforcement operations; for the United States, a precipitous withdrawal from Lebanon and all the attendant domestic hand-wringing over this political failure.

There is also a relationship over time of any peacekeeping operation to special risks and the peace process. The six principles mentioned earlier collectively constitute the risk function, are tied to the peace process, and are then related to a time dimension. An assessment can thus be made for any specific peacekeeping operation in terms of risks associated with it. A peace process that is stalemated, with portions of the six principles not met, raises the risks for potential failure early in the process. But as time passes and new diplomatic initiatives take hold, and the six principles are more fully adhered to, then the chances for peacekeeping success increase.

This relationship of risks and the peace process to time can be tied back to the peacekeeping operations and use-of-force continuums. The risks may have become so large in an observation mission that a larger force is required to lend credence to a presence mission. Conversely, an enforcement mission that is effective by stilling violence and permitting the peace process to unfold may over time be reduced to a peacekeeping observer operation. It is within this context then that operational guidelines are suggested.

FORMULATING PEACEKEEPING OBJECTIVES

Recognizing that peacekeeping operations are essentially political extensions of conflict resolution and the peace
process, three fundamental questions come to mind: Where does the peacekeeping force fit in the peace process? To what extent are the doctrinal principles adhered to? And what is the nature of the proposed peacekeeping operation in terms of the use of force?

With respect to the peace process and the MFO peacekeeping operation for example, a focus on the resolution of disputed Taba, the status of negotiations between Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians, and Egypt’s pre-eminence within the Arab world all are factors. Consequently, any new diplomatic initiatives between President Mubarak of Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan are worthy of careful consideration. A positive forward momentum in the peace process would suggest a conducive peacekeeping environment in which all parties would adhere to the mandate; however, this may also unleash the forces of frustrated political splinter groups. The risks associated with the peacekeeping principles should then be evaluated as to the extent the principles have been satisfied. A clear and specific mandate, underwritten by broadly based political support and accepted by cohesive host governments, is obviously far preferable to the opposite.

Yet the warning bells did not ring for US decisionmakers during the execution of MNF-II. The last dimension, the evaluation of the peacekeeping spectrum, suggests that the use of force and the number of troops available to accomplish the stipulated peacekeeping objective are the critical components. Thus, general compliance by the parties to a dispute warrants that force be used by peacekeepers only when directly threatened and in self-defense. On the other hand, as we move from peacekeeping presence to peace enforcement, the use of force to preserve peace is far more likely. The dilemma for the peacekeeping commander arises from the fact that his mission calls for presence, with use of force only as a last resort, when the reality of the situation may dictate
measures under peace enforcement: tactical dispersion and immediate return of fire when fired upon. Worse yet, when involved in US unilateral peacekeeping operations, such decisions may be vested in the National Command Authority rather than the ground commander.

The evaluation of the current or prospective peacekeeping environment should not stop there. It warrants continuous appraisal. Incidents such as at Ras-Burqa (where innocent Israeli tourists were killed by an Egyptian policeman), the *Achille Lauro* hijacking, or the Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis all affect the Arab-Israeli peace process. In turn, US peacekeeping forces assigned to the MFO may be affected by Arab frustrations. Similarly, the political decision by the National Command Authority to rebuild the Lebanese Army had far-reaching, disastrous consequences for US Marine 'peacekeeping' at the Beirut airport. That is the first principle, to have the cooperation and support of all the parties to the dispute, evaporated. And, in the process of losing that support, the Marines' peacekeeping presence turned into a peacekeeping enforcement operation with full-scale company-level firefight.

The lesson to be gleaned from this is that when the peace process or the critical principles trigger dramatic changes, they affect the nature of the ongoing peacekeeping operation and shift it on the peacekeeping continuum. A shift toward peacekeeping enforcement means that limited military forces originally sufficient to execute a peacekeeping mission become inadequate for enforcement operations to achieve political aims. Conversely, a successful military buffer operation tied to substantial political progress can entail the reduction of forces to a point where unarmed observers complete the peacekeeping mission.

There is also considerable value in researching the original basis for commitment of US troops to peacekeeping operations. A rapid presidential decision under Lyndon
Johnson to conduct peacekeeping operations in the Dominican Republic is one thing; the ratification process under the War Powers Resolution for support of the MFO is quite another. The former left itself wide open for criticism; the latter at least built support among the duly elected representatives of the American people. Thus political preconditions, discussion of congressional ratification, and articulated Executive Branch aims must be recognized by the US peacekeeping commander (if for no other reason than to be able to comment on the key issues raised by Congress when congressional staffers visit and want to clarify them).

One can suggest that decisionmaking benchmarks can be constructed after such a careful evaluation of the politico-military environment. The purpose of such benchmarks is not only to anticipate contingencies, but also to begin to focus on preventive measures to ensure the success of the peacekeeping objectives. For example, the extent to which factions within a disputant's populations perceive a US peacekeeper as neutral will constitute such a decision benchmark. In turn, formulated peacekeeping mission objectives are restated in terms of operational requirements.

**DETERMINING OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS**

Operational requirements emanate from a careful analysis of the diplomatic-political environment, the status of the peace process, the type of peacekeeping operation mandated, and specified and implied peacekeeping mission objectives. Peacekeeping objectives vary dramatically in relation to the peacekeeping spectrum. For example, objectives and operational requirements under peace enforcement parallel conventional military operations. They can be couched in terms of the use of force in relation to time, space, and center of gravity. But that is not the case for peace observation
missions. The further left one moves on our peacekeeping spectrum, the more important are the requirements associated with third-party impartiality, moral force rather than the use of military force, negotiations with disputant military forces, relations with the local population, and a strong, accurate reporting system. Preserving immunity, freedom of movement, and legitimacy in the eyes of the disputants becomes a major operational imperative.

Similarly, as one moves from observation or investigation missions executed by a few observers to battalion-sized peacekeeping forces for buffer operations, another set of operational requirements emerges. Again, impartiality and the use of force solely for self-defense are prerequisites, but more is expected. The quality of the communications, command, and control system may constitute a primary operational imperative, as well as discipline, professionalism, and respect by the disputants for the peacekeepers' combat capability and physical fitness. In essence, peacekeeping force credibility is measured on a daily basis by many eyes, of both the disputants' military or security forces and the local population. Within this context, there is little room for error, and therefore, truly the brightest and best personnel are required for such operations.

Another facet is the quality of the peacekeeping organization itself. A multinational force under the command of a third-party senior general officer with an international staff is one thing; a unilateral or semiunilateral force is quite another. Recognizing that peacekeeping operations are political operations, it becomes self-evident that contacts with the diplomatic community, higher command structures, and disputant government officials are the norm rather than the exception. Therefore, US peacekeeping force commanders require considerable sophistication to handle the queries of a visiting prime minister on one day, and on the next the probing questions from a senior US congressional
staffer. With these responsibilities, plus those emanating from operational considerations, augmentations to the basic force structure may be warranted. These may consist of foreign area specialists, linguists, engineers, satellite communications, intrusion specialists, public affairs and liaison personnel, counterterrorist and intelligence specialists.

Finally, if a third-party force commander has been appointed and US forces are assigned, then a careful delineation must be made as to the reporting of incidents or violations, responsibilities for negotiation or adjudication, and the scope of controlled responses to incidents involving US peacekeepers. Decisions about sovereignty, detention power, and methods of dealing with the population and infiltrators in buffer operations become equally crucial. The final goal of the operational requirements assessment is to determine specific measures that must be taken for successful peacekeeping mission accomplishment. Ideally, an all-inclusive, broad operational concept, easily understood by all yet with sufficient specificity, is desired.

ADAPTING PERSONNEL TO PEACEKEEPING

OUR NATIONAL EXPERIENCE with peacekeeping operations has revealed a dichotomy arising out of using highly trained combat formations for peacekeeping operations. Basically, "the peace soldier is one who is able to subscribe to the precepts of absolute minimal force, reliance on compromise and negotiation, and the recognition of the elusiveness of permanent political solutions." In contrast, the combat soldier applies aggressive violence to achieve a military end. Thus the dichotomy in skills at the soldier level, and the mindset at the leader level, place an extraordinary demand on all peacekeepers. For that very reason, nations such as Canada, Norway, and Sweden have specifically trained, equipped, and led peacekeeping forces. One could argue that the
United States should do the same, given the likelihood of continued participation in peacekeeping operations requiring battalion to brigade formations.

Operational commander, then are indeed faced with a dilemma of turning “tigers” into “pussycats.” Examining the dichotomy between combat soldier and peacekeeper skills improves our understanding of the training and retraining issues that emanate from such missions. For the officer-observer, operating on the left side of the peacekeeping continuum, self-defense weapons, or no weapons at all, are carried. The real weapons he carries are precise, impartial observation and reporting, reasoning, persuasion, tact, and diplomacy skills. For peacekeeping soldiers engaged in interposition, buffer, or presence operations, the initial prerequisite is an understanding of each disputant’s customs and mores, and the sources of conflict, so that they can avoid inadvertent offensive cross-cultural actions. In these types of operations it can be expected that our soldiers are thrust not only between two forces geographically, but may also constitute a buffer between two dissimilar cultures.

Additionally, no peacekeeping force can appear to prefer one side over the other and thus find itself almost totally excluded from any social contact with the local population. Just being perceived as partial to one side or the other may entail the loss of cooperation, confidence in impartial presence, and trust that is vital for the peace process to continue. Consequently, complex instructions, detailed rules of engagement, and controlled response to centralized direction characterize such peacekeeping operations. This naturally is the exact reverse of combat operations, where initiative, risk taking, aggressiveness, and mission orders are prized. The peacekeeping leadership must therefore master the art of translating the political goals of peacekeeping into concrete terms that soldiers can understand and adhere to.
Social research and operational peacekeeping experiences conclusively demonstrate that highly disciplined, professional, and well-led combat formations can adapt rather quickly and master flawless execution of peacekeeping missions. It is helpful to recognize that pre-mission training prepares the soldier and his leaders psychologically. Once on site, that training needs to be followed up with continued mission training. Finally, when released from the peacekeeping role, key combat skills need to be re-honed.

Peacekeeping training can be further subdivided into soldier, junior leader, and senior leader programs. For example, soldiers ought to be given a mission handbook and instructed on the background of the disputants, their population, customs, and mores. Rules of engagement and critical mission tasks require special emphasis. The latter may include driver, generator, survival, map reading, and observation training. The former may entail memorization of the rules of engagement and careful follow-up to ensure soldiers clearly and precisely understand the rules.

Junior leaders must be capable of teaching the aforementioned subjects, and they must carefully read, understand, and review peacekeeping mission standing operations procedures (SOP’s). They may even require special leadership instruction on how to handle around-the-clock operations in an isolated outpost with no other leadership present. This instruction may entail altering leadership styles and imparting organizational abilities that a young sergeant has not yet acquired.

For senior leaders, the training issues center around the correct balance between pure peacekeeping mission requirements and follow-on combat training requirements. These leaders must accept only the highest professional standards, and infuse the organization with a sense of pride in mission and training accomplishments. Wargaming what-ifs—confrontations, negotiations, loss of life and limb, dealing
with infiltrators, the population, or tourists, or water and sanitation emergencies—all have a high payoff.

Recognizing that it is the junior officers and senior NCO leadership that reinforce high standards in professionalism, mission execution, and training requires that time be set aside for continued listening and coaching. It is here that the contingencies are reviewed. It is through this training that junior leaders enhance this ability to assess situations and potential dangers that may compromise third-party impartiality.

Thus, part of peacekeeping commandership entails dealing with perceptions, norms, and values of aggressive soldiers required to become highly disciplined, self-reliant, and resolute peacekeepers. If well led, soldiers will invariably take great pride in their unit and in carrying out their assigned peacekeeping orders. Indeed, a unit forges a professional aura and special psychological edge that tends to have a very salutary effect on the disputant parties. This psychological edge needs to be nurtured at all times. It encompasses the way observations are reported, resupply is conducted, outposts are maintained, and impartiality is reinforced. It constitutes that special psychological "defensive" armor that facilitates success and gives added moral authority to the peacekeeper in his role as a neutral third party that uses weapons only in self-defense. Additional credibility can be fostered through bayonet training, physical training, and live fire exercises at squad and platoon level. These tend to reinforce the authority of the junior chain of command and preserve the potential bite of the tiger. If properly executed, the meaning of that resolute professional capability will not be lost on the disputants.

**TAKING CARE OF SOLDIERS AND THEIR FAMILIES**

For the individual soldier, peacekeeping duties entail an around-the-clock commitment until his unit rotates back to
home station. From an Army standpoint, we should insist that soldiers engaged in actual peacekeeping duties (as opposed to logisticians supporting peacekeeping operations) be limited to 180-day deployments. The initial reason is loss of collective training skills, but the paramount one is the stress, isolation, and boredom entailed by such missions. Extensive research demonstrates the basis for this rationale.¹⁸

For the US peacekeeping force commander, the issue becomes one of squarely facing the fact that these conditions will occur and developing a strategy to mitigate them. Institutionally, the initial reaction may well be to create work to fill a soldier's day. However, this may be construed as "make-work" or "make-play" to the detriment of mission execution. Consequently, a strategy that focuses on personal and professional growth, and provides "private" time when feasible, will pay tremendous dividends.¹⁹ Even when dispersed over hundreds of kilometers in the Sinai desert, a quality education program can be conducted (from internal resources) that provides for completion of GED, college, correspondence, and BSEP courses—all for the express purpose of increasing promotion points. Correspondingly, a focus on those skills that lead to skill badge awards (Marksmanship Badge, Expert Infantry Badge, Expert Field Medical Badge) with promotion point impact pays tremendous dividends. Add to this appropriate awards recognition for superb leadership or "followership," and the soldier will quickly recognize the meaning of personal and professional growth.

Dealing with loneliness and isolation may entail enlisting the aid of a caring social worker to augment the force. He or she will be able not only to help the individual soldier, but also to assist the leadership in coping with problems. Neither should spiritual needs be neglected. The most welcome sight on a forsaken or hotly disputed outpost may be the chaplain. In turn, it may be the chaplain and the social worker who will recommend personnel or leadership adjustments for the benefit of squad of platoon cohesion.²⁰
Forthrightness in explaining the need for exceptional sanitation programs and rigorous enforcement of safety procedures, particularly when conducting peacekeeping operations in an underdeveloped region of the world, will ultimately earn the respect of the soldiers. So will any measures taken to improve their habitat and a conscious effort to promptly deliver mail from home. Soldiers will hunger for news and will want to have world events interpreted to them. Consequently, exceptional efforts must be made, especially since events affecting the peace process may in turn affect the soldiers’ peacekeeping duties.

Building support at home and taking care of the families once deployed can also give a tremendous boost to soldier morale. It should be recognized that once a US peacekeeping force is committed, the families of those soldiers also serve. They will be the first ones to ask for information; they will want to assess the risks associated with the mission and have a firm grip on ways of communicating with their spouses, or sons and daughters. Thus, special efforts are recommended. A home station Family Support Group is warranted, as well as adequate family member predeployment preparations.

Finally, taking advantage of cross-cultural opportunities by participating in peacekeeping force-sponsored tours or exchange programs among member nations in a multinational peacekeeping force contributes to the intense pride soldiers exhibit in their peacekeeping service, and their love for country.

**ANTICIPATING TENSIONS AND PITFALLS**

TENSIONS WILL INDEED OCCUR that deserve special attention from a US peacekeeping commander. These fall into three categories:

1. Tension between the political concept and the actual conditions on the ground. That is, the politico-diplomatic
ends of the peacekeeping force simply may not be adequately reconciled with the military means at hand to achieve the professed purpose. This may be due to changing conditions that senior decisionmakers are either being shielded from or do not want to accept.

2. In a multinational force setting, tensions between a force headquarters and its assigned US contingent. Invariably such a headquarters will have a European staff bias, a multinational flavor, and a penchant by virtue of its diverse staff members' background to bureaucratize all actions into concrete procedures. Elite US combat formations tend to pursue staff actions and problems aggressively. This aggressiveness, however, provides the seeds for tensions. Care must be taken to couch requests or actions in terms of previously issued force orders or SOPs. Interestingly enough, one may find that the staff is surprised that US peacekeeping commanders actually comply with orders, while other contingent commanders simply ignore them. Given a double standard, compliance is still the right course, if for no other reason than that it is expected of professionals with high standards.

3. Tensions within one's own organization. These may be triggered by double standards clearly visible within the force, or by expectations on the part of the force commander or his international staff that may not be in consonance with national or professional experience. For example, Americans prize athletic equipment in remote areas to build cohesion, esprit—and to provide entertainment. Such concern for athletic equipment is not necessarily shared by officers with European backgrounds.23

Pitfalls are generated by information stove pipes, force staff officers that can say NO, lack of intelligence, or even lack of support for increased security measures when facing potential terrorists threats. Consequently, a careful assessment must be made of forcefulness and speed of action versus
benign neglect that can be healed with time. Further, development of personal contacts may well be a premier requirement. These tend to have an inordinate value when judgments are passed out about whether ongoing peacekeeping situations have been “correctly handled.”

**RESPONDING TO DIFFICULT SITUATIONS**

Even cursory analysis of peacekeeping operations suggests a commander must expect tough situations and develop techniques to deal with them. The peacekeeping commander must realize that certain situations can be anticipated, simulation exercises can be conducted, and guidance can be articulated before such events occur. What follows, then, is not necessarily a catalog of potential situations, but enough to suggest follow-on research of UNIFIL, UNIFCYP, or International Peace Academy Lessons Learned.24

Entrapment, encroachment, and discredit are three means that have been historically used by disputants to test a peacekeeping force’s capabilities, organizational acumen, and patience. These generic situations may be contrived to determine whether a peacekeeping force is truly impartial, will use their weapons in self-defense, and is capable of accurate information flow, negotiation, and mediation. For example, the Israelis actually entrapped a young US officer in the contested area of Taba by suggesting he see the wonderful view of the Gulf of Aquaba from the top of the Sonesta hotel. Unfortunately, this action was subsequently touted by local Israeli officials as an MFO and US sanction to substantiate their claim for Taba. On the part of the Egyptians the reaction was muted, but stature had been lost. One should therefore expect “trial testing balloons” by disputants to gauge a peacekeeping force’s reactions.

If, then, the peacekeeping force is rotated every six months, the disputants have a clear advantage by virtue of
experience and continuity. They also acquire an expectation of what a peacekeeping force is supposed to do. To further demonstrate that point, the Israelis have in the past made a deliberate incursion into the MFO’s Zone C airspace, which is also Egypt’s airspace, simply to test the US battalion’s reporting procedures—within the first month that a new US battalion rotates to the peacekeeping operation.

Sovereignty and its derivative, freedom of movement, have over the decades caused peacekeeping commanders considerable concern. To have a fence moved sixty feet at the MFO South Camp required approval of the most senior Egyptian bureaucracy in Cairo. Another example involved water—the most critical resource in the Sinai desert. The United States has a small desalination plant at Nuweiba, Egypt. The Egyptian perception was that use of this water, produced in Egypt and transported by an MFO vehicle through Israel to the adjacent Colombian battalion peacekeeping sector, impinged on Egyptian sovereignty. Substantial negotiations were required to reach an understanding on this issue. Similarly, any efforts by disputants to curb freedom of movement by such an innocent method as issuance of a local pass should be vigorously resisted. Accepting such a pass implies acceptance of a sovereign right, which a few weeks later may be applied capriciously be the central government.

When actions do occur that highlight one side’s or the other’s attempt to violate a truce, an armistice, or withdrawal provisions, a clearly defined mechanism should be set up to report, evaluate, judge, and then possibly counter such actions. A suggested method is to label all such actions as “incidents,” throughout the reporting system. Since both disputants invariably listen in on the peacekeeping communications systems, this tends to help maintain a professionally calm atmosphere, rather than fuel inflamed passions. Only the most senior force peacekeeping officials should
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make the judgment that an "incident" is in fact a "violation." Such violations may then be passed to a "Joint Commission" for immediate resolution.25

The act of rendering assistance can be a tough one. An accident involving innocent tourists can, by virtue of peacekeeping force assistance, become an international incident. Pursuing a policy of providing assistance only when life or limb are at stake may still imply unacceptable involvement in the eyes of one of the disputants by virtue of cultural attitudes toward life, medical care, and observation of bureaucratic principles. Similarly, one's own peacekeeping force headquarters may not offer acceptable negotiation positions or mediation services. If contract civilians, initially under the peacekeeping commander's care, are required to be turned over to a disputant side and are known to be classified as "infiltrators," one tends to cast doubt on such orders, particularly if a previous "infiltrator" mysteriously died while incarcerated.26

The recognition throughout this process of responding to situations and expecting the tough ones ought to be the concept of nurturing the peace process. This is, the peace process can be arrested, set back, or totally broken off by the actions of a peacekeeping force. Correct handling of key situations becomes profoundly important for continuing to build trust, set aside disputant apprehension, and maintain—even enhance—peacekeeping force credibility. There may indeed be a price in this. Casualties from accidents or firefight must be expected. Not all peacekeeping environments will be as benign as the MFO. UNIFIL's extensive casualties highlight a peacekeeping commander's dilemma between mission accomplishment and protection of soldiers from disputant actions. For US commanders, the task of marshalling expeditious medical care for injured soldiers in remote peacekeeping areas is a very special challenge. Consequently, drills on how to handle a serious injury or death are a
must. Such drills ensure that the medical evacuation channel is rehearsed, standby cross-border clearances are exercised, and appropriate officials are notified.

ENSURING OPPORTUNITIES ARE NOT MISSED

Virtually every peacekeeping operation that US ground forces have been involved in has entailed special relationships with contingents from other nations. Recent US experiences in the Sinai and in Beirut are no exception, and place emphasis on the role US peacekeeping commanders have in this regard. In fact, guidance from the highest US political levels may well be to foster intercontingent relations when in a multinational peacekeeping setting. Implementing such guidance can lead to some very interesting experiences, that ultimately end up as treasured opportunities for soldiers and commanders alike. Thus, these challenges are not to be missed.

Social requirements in this kind of milieu may, however, tax a commander. Ambassadors, defense ministers, senior political aides, and numerous generals tend to visit US peacekeeping operations. The uninitiated will quickly learn that hosting is an art in itself, and one for which we do little to prepare our peacekeeping commanders. Further, most of these visits are tied to higher political purposes, such as the peace process or international consensus for the peace process. It pays to be reflective prior to hosting such VIP visits. Similarly, visits by political or defense figures of the disputant nations may have substantial significance that ultimately may affect the safety of the US peacekeeping force. All of these visitors may provide clues as to the state of the peace process and the attendant risk factors. Consequently, such visits should never be viewed as burdens, but as opportunities for successful mission accomplishment.
PRESERVING THE SAFETY OF THE COMMAND

ANY CAREFUL READING of the Long Commission report and Secretary of Defense Weinberger's fourth criterion for the commitment of US forces will demonstrate the special requirement levied on US peacekeeping commanders to provide for the safety of their command. Implicit in peacekeeping operation must be the recognition that for the United States such operations are potentially high-risk ventures. State-sponsored terrorism, actions by frustrated terrorist splinter groups, or covert operations by disputants can lead to massive US casualties. This kind of threat is serious and will not abate in the immediate future.

Consequently, one can be on the benign end of the peacekeeping continuum, having no "enemies," yet still be subject to terrorist attacks. Within a multinational peacekeeping setting, a US commander should endeavor to foster a multinational approach in all his actions toward the disputants, the population, and even the overall force. By making visible several member nations of a peacekeeping force rather than just US personnel, by insisting that one speaks for peacekeeping force interests, not a US battalion interest, and by scrupulously maintaining a mantle of third-party impartiality, one enhances the safety of the command.

One can get lulled into a false sense of security. Soldiers on pass (for example in Eilat, Cairo, or Tel Aviv) are vulnerable, and provisions must be made to control and protect them. This is not easy, particularly since some peacekeeping operations are not authorized to collect intelligence information. Consequently, a special effort must be made to develop social contacts among disputants that might be helpful in identifying potential threats. Additionally, a careful review of passive security measures is warranted on a periodic basis. Changing guard, barrier, outpost, reinforcement, patrol, light, and aerial patterns is key for security
enhancements. Carefully interpreting local, national, and international events may suggest increased alert measures long before a higher force headquarters orders them. For the higher headquarters, the bias is to avoid projecting increased military preparedness because the multinational force has "no enemies," only the US battalion does.

Thus a substantial dilemma can exist that places a special burden on the US peacekeeping commander. This can get further complicated when, for example, in response to Jihad threats, US peacekeepers in the Sinai increase security measures. Egyptians in the area perceive these measures as loss of face. To them the US forces appear to challenge their country's ability to maintain the security and safety of US soldiers in the Sinai. Handling these sorts of problems requires knowledge of the peacekeeping mission's context and careful judgment.

RECOGNIZING THE IMPACT OF THE MEDIA

THE IMPACT OF THE MEDIA, "the fourth estate," on peacekeeping operations should never be underestimated. Because of the media's prerogative to question all facets of a peacekeeping operation sponsored by or participated in by the United States, a US peacekeeping commander must be mentally, psychologically, and organizationally prepared to deal with them. If any lesson can be drawn from the Beirut bombings, the Red Sea mining, the hijacking of TWA Flight 874, and the Arrow Air crash in Newfoundland, it is that the media will pursue any angle that is newsworthy, to include the rationale for administration peacekeeping policies or practices. Once the public questioning begins, the congressional investigative process surely follows. Those congressional hearings, too, will be duly reported, along with the ultimate findings issued by the committees or appointed commissions.
In essence, the media has tremendous impact on policymakers who may have committed peacekeeping forces to a trouble spot of the world. The policymakers may not have had the time to build the consensus between the administration, Congress, and the American public needed for such a commitment of forces. Consequently, whatever consensus does exist may be fragile or flawed. The precipitous withdrawal of the Marines following the Beirut bombing amply demonstrates this.

The issue of US peacekeeping commanders dealing with the media is thus far more dramatic when examined in the light of a fragile consensus within the United States for a particular peacekeeping operation. It must be recognized that the American people simply do not suffer casualties amongst US soldiers lightly. Any such casualties become instant news. Incumbent on the peacekeeping commander, therefore, is the requirement to do everything in his power to preclude casualties. Stress on safety, and on projecting third-party impartiality, is absolutely paramount. Otherwise, the American willingness to accept such casualties will directly collide with the administration’s will to facilitate a peace process.

LOOKING AHEAD

IN VOLVEMENT OF US COMBAT FORCES in peacekeeping operations highlights to each participating soldier the nation’s commitment to its deepest moral values. Soldiers therefore willingly endure and serve with pride. However, such service is fraught with risks unparalleled in the experience of US commanders at the battalion or brigade operational level. And it is at this operational level that the linkage to the political peacekeeping objectives and the national strategic objectives must be made evident.

The intermeshing of political, diplomatic, and military concerns requires sophistication and a highly disciplined
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unflappable force. Recognition of this politico-military linkage and the nuances of the peacekeeping environment are crucial for successful mission accomplishment. Most important is the ability to conduct a risk assessment and relate it to the peacekeeping continuum. It is that analytical outcome that structures subsequent decisions, guidance to soldiers and leaders within the command, interrelationships with disputants and other national contingents, diplomats, and any force headquarters.

Ultimately, it must be recognized that a peacekeeping force cannot by itself resolve conflict, but it can manage conflict by quieting things down. It can lower the level of hostilities and prevent further loss of life and property. But it cannot resolve the problems that caused the conflict. Therefore, we are inevitably tied to a political peace process which in itself is dynamic, may last years, and requires continued risk reassessment.

During the past decade of direct US involvement in peacekeeping operations, the myth may have been born that successful peacekeeping operations can be conducted outside the purview of the United Nations and the international will it represents. The success of the Sinai Field Missions and the Multinational Force and Observers may offer significant models for future regional peacekeeping operations sponsored under the aegis of the United States. Both of these operations had the clear consent of the disputants. But in fact, the MFO operation was implemented after the Israeli-Egypt peace treaty had been signed. Thus, stilling conflict while a peace process was in progress was not the issue.

Only in the larger context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process articulated in the Camp David Accords does the MFO peacekeeping operation fit the essence and rationale for such operations. Here the “UN international will” was substituted for by the will of the United States and ten other nations to give the soldiers on the ground the
psychological mantle for the conduct of operations. MFO operations are conducted within the most comprehensively codified framework ever devised to ensure success.

Unfortunately, hastily conceived peacekeeping operations to mitigate conflict are more likely to take place. For US commanders of such operations, the risks will be inherently far greater; and for them, guidelines set forth in this article may be more appropriate. The risk assessment model of the peacekeeping continuum may provide a framework for analysis and guideposts for action.

A final note of caution, worthy of consideration by all US peacekeeping commanders, was best expressed by a senior UN officer who commented on the "superstitious belief in the magic of mere UN presence" by stating,

Soldiers and their political masters see seldom eye to eye on the aims and tasks, and definitely not on the means and methods in the field. When soldiering and politics meet on a more or less ill-defined and impossible mission, the political decisions easily become tantamount to self-deception and the soldiers are left in the lurch.\(^3\)

Secretary of Defense Weinberger, in his article "The Uses of Military Power," stated, "the relationship between our objectives and the force we have committed—their size, composition, and position—must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary."\(^4\) These words take on special meaning in the aftermath of the Beirut bombing. US commanders of operational peacekeeping forces should therefore not voice the UN lament, but actively participate in the reassessment process. The risks of doing otherwise can be very high indeed.
NOTES


17. Extensive discussion between the author, the MFO Force Commander, and the XVIII Airborne Corps MFO action officer centered on preserving the bite of the tiger, July-December 1984.


20. Personal Experience—no squad leader was able to have a cohesive OP operation if three soldiers were out of step with the group. Only the best could cope with two such personnel, but all were able to handle one such soldier.

21. Interview with Frank Huddoba, Major, Executive Officer, TF 3-502, the 8th iteration battalion to the MFO, 18 January 1986.


31. Lawrence, Interview, 27 February 1986.


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