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DEFENDING THE NATO ALLIANCE
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Global Implications

PETER N. SCHMITZ

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For the last two decades, analysts of the North Atlantic Alliance have noted tensions within NATO, especially between the United States and its European allies. The disagreements have been over strategic questions such as the flexible response strategy or, more recently, the response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Fortunately, despite such disagreements, the NATO nations continue to subscribe to those values stated in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty: "the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples" and "stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area."

While an NDU International Fellow, Colonel Peter N. Schmitz, Federal Republic of Germany Air Force, studied the present disagreements within NATO that began with East-West confrontations outside continental Europe. In his timely book, he considers how Third World nations have influenced the security and economy of the West. He not only calls for a coordinated foreign policy—a global strategy for the Alliance—but also suggests a means for developing such a strategy and outlines advantages—for Europe, America, and the Alliance—of such a joint approach to global security. Colonel Schmitz's thoughtful, nonpartisan position offers a careful and serious approach for expanding NATO's influence and strengthening the Alliance.

Bradley C. Hosmer
Lieutenant General, USAF
President, National Defense University
Preface

This book was written during the time of my fellowship with the National Defense University. I enjoyed the privilege of being the first German, in fact the first European officer, among a handful of participants in the NDU International Fellows program. I am grateful to my authorities, who granted me the opportunity of two years of academic freedom in such a thrilling place as Washington, DC. All those who took part in making such a (from my perspective) wise decision contributed to one of the most fascinating segments of my career in the Bundeswehr. Of course, this fellowship was not just an exciting time in Washington. With it came the study project, the result of which is presented here.

It was nobody's fault but my own that I chose this issue for study, though some persuasive individuals of NDU's Research Directorate encouraged me to continue on a path whose treacherous course I recognized only when it was too late to start all over again. Certainly, Fred Kiley deserves the greatest credit (or curse) for keeping me on course. He also encouraged me to write in English, or at least what I believed to be Eng-
lish. When native speakers of English are able to follow the course of my thoughts, it is because of the merit of my English professor, Fred Kiley, and my editor, Tom Gill.

As regards the substance of the book, I greatly appreciated the critiques and suggestions I received from my colleagues in the Research Fellows program of NDU. In addition, I felt particularly honored that two such experts on Alliance affairs as Professor Catherine Kelleher of the University of Maryland and Stanley Sloan of the Congressional Research Service found it worthwhile to provide me with their professional critique and advice.

I assure my readers that the views and conclusions are solely personal and are not formed by inside experience. In reality, NATO is surely doing better; otherwise, it could not represent the most successful alliance of free and sovereign nations ever seen. So, if I may have created some negative images of this alliance, it may be because of my lack of close experience with it. To give me that experience, another wise decision of my personnel division has placed me right at NATO headquarters in Brussels for my next tour of duty.

That I finally arrived at a complete manuscript was also a product of the merit of my family—my wife, Silvia, and the boys, Oliver, Stefan, and Christian. Without their patience regarding an endeavor so disruptive to family life as the attempt to write a book in a foreign language, I would not have found the tranquility necessary to complete the task.

—P.N.S.
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ALLIANCE
HANS WAGNER, Director General of Political Affairs in the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, put the briefing papers back in his attache case and leaned back in his comfortable seat on board Air France's supersonic flight across the Atlantic. It had taken him only about an hour since the noon take-off from Paris to study the background papers and speaking briefs. He felt well prepared for this week's Alliance consultation, scheduled for this evening at the State Department in Washington.

The agenda was short this time. There was the usual general discussion of the major developments in the world. Wagner was particularly interested in the political intelligence about developments in Iran that Turkey had offered to report. The major topic would be consultation about a new, comprehensive diplomatic initiative for the Palestinian question. The plan, proposed by the European Group, required some flanking action by the United States in negotiations with Israel. Another subject on the agenda was coordination of economic military aid and assistance packages for a number of countries in Southeast Asia.
and Southern Africa. Last, the Group would continue discussing possible counteractions to the Marxist terrorist and guerrilla involvement in narcotics trafficking in Latin America. The United States had announced that it would reveal new evidence.

Looking around the Concorde cabin, Wagner got the impression that most of his colleagues from other European capitals felt as relaxed as he did. Things had definitely changed for the better. He remembered well those times when the consultation routine in Washington about global developments had started and their group, the High-Level Consultative Group, had been established. The North Atlantic Council and subordinate NATO bodies had never had sufficient opportunities to deal with those problems outside Europe that affected allied security. Even the term used then—"out-of-area issues"—reflected the difficulties the allies had in coping with extra-European developments.

In the beginning, of course, the Group's members had spent more time coordinating within their own governments than consulting each other about developments in the world around the Alliance. What a tough start that was, Wagner remembered, when the national delegations to the consultation rounds still consisted of two, at times three or more, officials from various ministries. He knew about the many turf battles within the national bureaucracies before all the allied countries finally accepted as common wisdom that the challenges for the Alliance could not be neatly compartmentalized into foreign, defense, trade, commerce, financial, or whatever boxes to be dealt with separately. Finally, the Alliance's third set of wise men, the Schmidt Commission, with its report about "Future Challenges for the Alliance," had furthered
the conviction in allied countries that the dynamics of the enduring political, economic, and social struggle with Marxism were global and required an overall approach by the Alliance, looking at its security not strictly in the military dimensions.

Wagner always remained puzzled about the American reaction to the Schmidt Report. Not only had the United States endorsed the language of the report, but it had also acted in accordance with its recommendations, even as the report’s promoter, thus convincing even the most reluctant and sagging European allies of good US intentions. Wagner wondered whether the change in the American attitude was a result of the initial swift successes the cooperative and coordinated Alliance approach had produced in out-of-area problems and in some economic issues. The effects on the US domestic scene of forming an Alliance foreign policy may have had even more influence. Arthur Schlesinger was certainly right, in his reflections about “Foreign Policy and the American Character,” in stating that “foreign policy is the face a nation turns to the world.” Probably, the Americans had become weary with the many faces, or with the one lacking distinct features, they had so often shown to the world and their friends, when they suddenly discovered the many advantages of speaking with a single voice on foreign policy.

Whatever had caused this new American spirit for political and economic cooperation, Wagner was sure that without it the Europeans would hardly have been motivated to engage in those broadly based Alliance efforts out-of-area that the Schmidt Report had recommended. And the kind of regular, close, and real consultation the High-Level Consultative Group had developed across the whole range of such issues, in
Wagner’s view, was valuable not so much for what it accomplished as for what it avoided: the disarraying unilateralism, stubborn disengagement, and costly lack of coordination of former times concerning allied policies outside Europe. Then, most of the allied nations often had behaved as if the Western Alliance was an island—complacent about the relatively stabilized status quo in Europe and unconcerned as an alliance with destabilizing developments elsewhere.

Wagner was sure that history would put the long-term consequences of the Alliance’s new overall strategy in line with the other towering Alliance successes: the economic recovery of Western Europe and deterrence of war in Europe since 1945. This strategy for “Global Peace with Freedom, Justice and Prosperity, and Global Cooperation against Tyranny and Terrorism” was having its impact on international developments. It could prove to be a domino strategy in reverse, preventing the further spread of—even reducing—Moscow’s influence in Third World areas....
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The reflections of the imaginary Hans Wagner belong, of course, to the realm of fiction. The sad reality is that the Alliance, as it nears its fortieth year, is closer to a state of disarray, if not crisis, than to pulling together for an overall strategy and cooperation for extra-European developments. Occupied with the stabilization of forces on the East-West line in Europe, the Alliance thus far has widely failed to recognize how its security is and can be affected by diminishing stability around it. There is not the kind of regular, purposeful consultation among all allies about “out-of-area” and non-military issues the imaginary Hans Wagner had in mind. There is no Alliance strategy to deal with undeniable threats to energy and raw material resources required by the West, to cooperate with the Third World, and to work together on the menace of debt problems, communist subversion, and state-subsidized international terrorism. A third set of wise men has not been envisaged. There might not be enough time left even to agree upon a global and overall Alliance strategy before the flow of Persian Gulf oil is cut off, before another Middle East crisis explodes and sends shock waves all over Europe,
before the Third World's economic problems affect the economic and social stability of the West, before yet another strategic Western position falls into the expanding zone of Soviet influence.

Instead, the Alliance appears caught in a struggle with its own identity. Much of the spirit and shared sense of purpose that once inspired the Western democracies in their Alliance seems to be forgotten. Many members appear to believe they are in splendid isolation from an interdependent world around them; they seem to look at their security as if the Alliance indeed could be an island, hardly affected by and well protected against the troubled waters surrounding it. Certainly, none of the Western countries can live today in splendid isolation. But will the Western Alliance, the West's and democracy's biggest lobby in the world, assume a role in safeguarding and defending vital Western interests wherever they might be threatened? Not only does this Alliance deserve that role, but accepting it may be essential for the future endurance and viability of the Alliance as a whole and for the well-being of its individual members.

Some of the reflections of Hans Wagner may be transferable to the realm of reality. This study discusses the potential of the Alliance to achieve political-strategic cooperation and coordination in global policies. It considers why a common and coordinated foreign policy has been an issue in the Alliance from its inception and why the allies are having a hard time finding common approaches abroad, even now when their interests seem more congruent than ever before. The book concludes with suggestions for Alliance political cooperation and an overall strategy; the latter could only result from and make sense in a framework of political cooperation and coordination.
resembling what I advocate here. As a "thinkpiece," the study allows some freedom of imagination about how to remove obstacles and to improve global cooperation in the Alliance. The inherent danger is, of course, that conclusions may appear rather illusory if tested against so-called political realities. But those political realities appear more often than not to be only excuses for a lack of vision vis-a-vis new challenges.

Political cooperation among the allied nations, and particularly between America and the Western Europeans, beyond the military-politico field closely related to Europe's military defense has been the weak spot in the Alliance since its inception. The lack of that cooperation has caused misperceptions and divergencies and has led to disarray in the Alliance time and again. Accordingly, the current state of the Alliance has been characterized by transatlantic political differences—economic issues included, although in public perception strategic and nuclear issues seem to dominate the debate. A credible and publicly acceptable military strategy may be essential for the Alliance, but, in addition, real political cooperation seems to be crucial for NATO's future. To shape this future, an observation in 1956 of the Committee of the Three appears to be more true than ever before: "There cannot be unity in defense and disunity in foreign policy."

Fading unity in Europe's defense

Unity in defense of Europe is fading. This fact may have less to do with the relentless Soviet military buildup in recent years, with occasionally differing assessments of Soviet military capabilities and political intentions in Europe, and with the necessary Alliance
responses, than with developments beyond NATO's blinders, at distant front lines.

Certainly, the already existing imbalance between Warsaw Pact and NATO in-place conventional forces has increased to the further disadvantage of the Alliance. Among experts and professionals, quarreling continues about whether the East-West military balance has shifted decisively or only incrementally. Facts and figures about the in-place military forces of East and West in Europe prove setbacks for NATO in some areas. Not only has the East increased its edge in quantities of weapons, but its inventory also shows increasing quality. However, the overall assessment of the military situation between East and West in Europe requires the introduction of more complex factors into the equation.

Military capabilities include such hard-to-measure assets as reinforcement and reserve mobilization capabilities, industrial bases and economic power, and, last but not least, training standards and morale of troops and reserves. Ultimately, above all capability factors, the overall political assessment of decision-makers will include a sober judgment about the likely intentions of the opponent to use its capabilities for whatever reason. From that perspective, the exorbitant Soviet military buildup in recent years has certainly shifted the overall military balance to the disadvantage of the West, yet no indications point to new intentions of the East for a military confrontation in Europe. The immediate dangers for the security of the Alliance lie elsewhere.

_The distant front line in the Third World_

As Europe gradually achieved calm during the 1970s, existing and arising crisis and conflict areas
outside the Old Continent gained new and greater importance. The Soviets, despite their strategy of "peaceful coexistence," have not forsworn their goal of predominance in areas where it can be promoted without risking a major war between East and West. Below that threshold, Soviet strategy will always be to challenge Western positions and Western determination for resistance and counteraction. An American author gave an excellent, comprehensive view of Soviet strategy:

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Soviets drew the conclusion that the correlation of forces had shifted significantly in their favor and this would, in turn, enhance their ability to encourage instability in the Third World. Once underway, the new policy appears to have directed those charged with implementing it both to take advantage of targets of opportunity that present themselves, and to create such opportunities through the use of various indirect or "active" tactics.  

Soviet and Soviet-backed efforts to this end have certainly become bolder since the Soviet Union has gained considerable capability to lengthen its shadow with a forceful, highly modern, blue-water navy. No longer is Soviet maritime power trapped by Western-controlled straits and the lack of ice-free bases. Base facilities, anchorages, and support agreements around all oceans allow for continuous Soviet maritime presence in all seas. It is this evolution of Soviet naval power that worries political and military strategists in the West. The political cohesion, economic strength, and military balancing capability of the West depend on the availability of free seas and on open and secure sea lines of communication.  

The Soviet Union may strive to reach a counterbalance to Western maritime dominance of the
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Oceans one day; the influence of its maritime enterprises to shift power relations even in the farthest corner of the world can hardly be overlooked today. In global perspective, the Soviet Union has made strategic gains outside the North Atlantic area in such regions of the Third World as Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Dealing with the political and economic challenges building up in these Third World areas, beyond the Alliance's traditional concerns, appears to be the overriding problem. Although East-West relations overall have deteriorated to the lowest point since the onset of the Cold War, the East-West front line in Europe seems still to be a rather safe place. In contrast, it is the area around and somewhat remote from NATO where pressure, Soviet-inspired or not, has built up. The Third World has come to the forefront of East-West confrontation and competition and is more likely than Europe to be the battleground for the clashing social philosophies of East and West. A major aspect of the present discord in the Alliance is shaped out of controversial perceptions about Alliance interests and obligations in these areas more or less remote from Europe. Discord arises from divergent views concerning options and limitations, and concerning the possible need for and necessary constraints on actions and reactions of the Alliance, and those of individual nations, to challenges arising in the Third World.

Theodore Draper noted that past crises in the Alliance have stemmed mainly from doubts about the reliability of the American commitment to come to the aid of Western Europe, whereas "the crisis in the present is about the reliability of an assumed commitment by Western Europe to come to the aid of the
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United States. This reversal of roles has been gradually approaching, and none of the main factors that have entered into it is actually new. What is new is the crystallization of these factors by events that have an immediate, tangible bearing on policy and power."

Because such events have occurred in areas beyond that perceived to be covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, there has been argument about the range of interest of the Alliance and about the "constitutional" competence of the Alliance emanating from the Treaty. Time and again, the basic political consensus in the Alliance is at issue when NATO is confronted with challenges other than immediate military threats in Europe. A chain of events within three years—in Iran, Afghanistan, Poland, the Middle East, and Central America—has caused considerable turmoil within the Alliance.

Allied disunity in policies

Reviewing the nature of past discords in the Alliance, one seldom finds the causes in purely military problems. The military cooperation has largely worked. The underlying issues of allied disunity have been mostly political in nature. And with few exceptions, political crises showed transatlantic bipolarity—views in Europe differing from or contrary to American notions and intentions. The enduring lack of political and economic cooperation has become even more obvious in the more precarious political and economic environment of recent years. Had the scope and structure of this Alliance not also encompassed the political and economic relationships among the allies, political and economic issues could not have seriously jeopardized the "transatlantic bargain."
Given a rather one-dimensional structure of East-West relations focused on Europe in the past, military strategic considerations left the political role of the Alliance rather lean. There was no immediate necessity for over-the-horizon political assessments as an Alliance matter. Over the years, political cooperation and coordination was neglected among the allies; it was merely an exercise in good will on a small scale. The only exception may have been the approval of the Harmel Report in 1967 and, with it, the adoption of a political strategy, the dual strategy of deterrence and detente. While many still think that this strategy has worked successfully, others disagree vehemently, holding it responsible for the unfavorable shifts in power correlations in Third World areas.

During the decade of detente, irritations and frictions in the Alliance seem to have occurred more often, to have become more intense, and to have lasted longer. When crises in the Alliance had surfaced in the past, politicians and diplomats called those differences in opinion quite necessary and useful in the “Atlantic family.” This time, however, the Atlantic partners seem to be divided more fundamentally, despite many official efforts to downplay the differences. The four major, respected Western institutes on foreign relations (the Council on Foreign Relations, New York; Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Bonn; Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris; and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London) warned that the current transatlantic crisis cannot be considered as just one of a series of short-term episodes. It is more far-reaching.... A key characteristic of the current international situation is precisely that the West is undergoing a phase of strain and
dissension at the very time when it also has to deal with a crisis in the East, crisis in the Third World, and a prolonged economic and energy crisis on a global scale." What is different about the current transatlantic problems is that the very future of the Alliance may be at stake, at a moment in history when Western unity appears to be the prerequisite for a favorable future of the West.

It is true, of course, as Walter F. Hahn remarked, speculating about "a world without NATO," that "nothing in history—good or bad—is permanent.... NATO is neither a 'given' nor an eternally binding contract." In Hahn's words, NATO "continues at the sufferance of its members. And under the accumulating circumstances, we [Americans] have to begin thinking—painfully but rationally—about the previously unthinkable.... As an American looking to the future, one must in all prudence begin to contemplate it"—namely, how the United States could get by without NATO. Unfortunately, Hahn is not alone in his speculations. Notably in the United States, but also in Western Europe, more voices have been heard that either suggest or envisage the loosening, if not cutting, of transatlantic ties.

A deteriorating transatlantic political climate

One may wonder about the many voices in the West, and in America in particular, suggesting that this Alliance is doomed—thus forfeiting to the Soviet Union success in its attempts to isolate Western Europe from the United States. So far, the Soviet Union has tried hard but has not managed to dissolve Western cohesion. But the internal turbulence and corrosion in the Alliance, if allowed to continue, would widen the already unmistakable cracks—and
would play right into the Soviets' hands. Some cracks have already widened in a rough transatlantic climate dominated by mutual allegations and reproaches crisscrossing the Atlantic, as if the issues themselves are not divisive enough.

Paradoxically, two remarkable decisions of NATO—unanimously agreed upon without any constraining footnotes, each supposedly a token of NATO's strength, cohesion, and determination—have considerably contributed to the darkening political horizon on both sides of the Atlantic. These once-praised decisions seem now to represent possible sources of fission rather than cohesion and solidarity.

First, at the Washington summit in 1978, NATO heads of state decided to maintain an annual increase of about 3 percent in real terms in their countries' defense expenditures. Allegations among the allies about nonfulfillment by some started as early as the following year and have not stopped since. The issue involves the long-smoldering basic question of what is a fair burden sharing between America and its allies for the common defense of Europe.

The allies have felt American pressures to increase their defense efforts. But particularly among Europeans, it has become a habit to counter American pressures by noting the sagging American defense expenditures during the 1970s, in contrast to the Europeans' steady though slow increase of their expenditures in the same period. Many Americans and the US Congress in particular, however, are not satisfied by the longstanding sharing formulas and are less than patient with European promises; they are more and more inclined to press for a diminished American share in what is viewed as chiefly Europe's defense
and thus very much Europe's own affair. This discontent in America with the present arrangements for Western security is nourished by uneasiness that America’s renewed commitment in the global power balance has stretched its overall capabilities dangerously thin.

The second important decision toward Alliance cohesion was NATO’s “dual-track decision” in December 1979 concerning intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) modernization. At the time of this decision, even the publics in the countries most concerned hardly realized the likely consequences for their countries. It took two years and some irritating Western tactical mistakes in the game of “nuclear poker” (Time) to bring the far-reaching importance of this issue into the public mind, not just in NATO member countries but worldwide.

The deployment track of the decision has been criticized with increasing intensity the more its consequences have crept into public consciousness. The questions arise especially in those European countries slated as host nations for new American nuclear missiles. Out of a marked dismay at the prospect of new nuclear weaponry in some European countries, there emerged a strong European movement against all nuclear weapons. This movement has spilled its peace-movement and freeze-movement waves across the Atlantic and right into the Congress of the United States.

The issue has long since gone beyond argument over a single strategy and armaments problem. Until late 1981, peace and freeze movements in European countries capitalized on alleged American intransigence concerning arms-control and disarmament
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policies in general and the pursuit of the negotiation track of the December 1979 decision in particular. More recently, the critics have charged that the American administration appears to have too little interest in arms control and disarmament. Even when the US government negotiated, it encountered criticism from the East, from the allies, and from its own citizens for inflexibility or alleged lack of seriousness in its arms-control efforts.8

Until the suspension of INF negotiations in November 1983, the Reagan administration made several moves to indicate its readiness for compromises, but the doubts that have developed in Western countries have not diminished. "Thus," observed Raymond Aron, "by an irony of history, a plan conceived in order to strengthen ties between the Old Continent and the United States in order to demonstrate unity between the two parts of the Alliance risks creating a kind of moral divorce between the European governments and Washington."9 In West Germany, which may be the key not only to the INF equation but probably to the Alliance's cohesion in general, a consensus on security policy that has lasted for more than twenty years is rapidly fading in bitter, harmful, and divisive debates between the two major political forces in the country. In Germany, as elsewhere in Europe, debates about Alliance membership benefits appear to be shaped by disappointment and frustration with NATO's seemingly inescapable nuclear dilemma, and with the political, economic, and social costs involved in raising (what has become a catchword) the nuclear threshold.

Political tensions over economics

In addition, economic differences—on a scale hitherto unknown—have contributed to the at-
mosphere of latent tension between American and Western Europe. In the Siberian gas pipeline controversy, the Europeans, in rare unity, complained about an American policy that, in its attempt to curb East-West trade, was seen to intrude into their own affairs. In European eyes, US sanctions against European companies that were either subsidiaries of American firms or users of American technology amounted to an attempt to dictate trade policies beyond US borders. To actually dictate policies in such a way would be a violation of international law, with severe economic and political impact on America’s friends.

Europeans did not fail to point out the inconsistency in the Reagan administration’s attitude toward the East-West trade issue. They reproached the United States for imposing sanctions against its allies while lifting the US grain embargo against the Soviet Union for domestic reasons. Notably, the embargo with the greatest potential to “punish” the Soviet Union for the Afghanistan invasion was that on grain.

The economic problems in most European countries added further to the European notion of America as rather intransigent concerning the economic worries of its allies. Europeans have expected more cooperation from the US administration on monetary policy to correct the distorted currency exchange rates, which they regard as a product of exaggerated interest rates in the United States. Europeans keep complaining that the US administration ignores Europe’s troubles with an overvalued dollar and does little if anything to ease the interest rates down. France in particular has publicly made known European grievances about the Reagan administration’s economic and monetary policy. The French finance minister, Jacques Delors, recalled times when
America's partners had rallied round to help when the dollar's weakness in 1978 disturbed the world economy. With the phenomenon now reversed, in Delors' view, Washington should now do the same in return.10

For many Europeans, the American economic and financial policy, with all its impact on the world economy, appears ambiguous. Although the free play of market forces and fairly unrestricted trade have been officially advocated and supported, adverse domestic currents seem to drive America's legislation to more and more protectionist measures. Hardly any facet of industry seems to be omitted from attempts to achieve legislative protection, be it steel or wine, shoes or arms. Protectionism on one side will likely cause "retaliatory" protectionism on the other, and the economies will only hurt each other; on such a course seem the allied European and American economies at a time when sustained economic growth is desperately needed on both sides of the Atlantic.11 These issues—what Alexander Haig has called "the arcane matters of deficits, interest rates, the value of the dollar, 'non-tariff barriers' and the like"—will remain imminent causes for serious controversies in the Alliance, challenging its viability. Additionally, as economic problems of the Third World increasingly affect an economically disunited Alliance, unilateral attempts by countries to shield their own economies will only drive the allies further apart. As Haig suggested, "basic decisions must be taken now at the highest levels before a crisis forces us to take emergency measures and perhaps unwise ones."12

The choices

American expectations of the Alliance appear to focus less on the nuclear issue and the specific
burden-sharing equation related to expenditures than on perceptions of European willingness to assume a greater share and burden in the global balance of power. If American expectations of the Alliance were to be increasingly disappointed by European reluctance to support Western interests against the changing threats, Western Europe would very likely have to face growing American unilateralism within the Alliance and in global policies. Domestic pressure in America would probably lead to substantial political, strategic, and basic military readjustments of the “transatlantic bargain.” If, as Cleveland suggested, the glue that has held the Alliance more or less together “is a large, complex and dynamic bargain—partly an understanding among the Europeans, but mostly a deal between them and the United States of America,” then it will be first of all America that will examine the political acceptability of the “deal.” This examination will include constant recalculations of the costs involved and the benefits received.

Many observers believe the Alliance in the 1980s is at a crossroads. The Alliance’s basic set of choices, and probably its major source of continuing trouble, could hardly be better described than it was by Richard Rosecrance:

The choice that is involved is essentially between a mixed international system in which allies and potential adversaries are held together in a network of fundamental cooperation, and a system in which lines of conflict are starkly drawn, with the United States and its allies more or less firmly on one side, and its new enemies more or less firmly on the other. It is a choice between a new form of bipolarity and an ambivalent system in which neither cooperation nor conflict is permitted to dominate patterns of alignment.
The outcome, and the degree of further turmoil within the Alliance, will essentially be determined by the tendencies in American and Western European policies either to drift further apart or to move toward a reasonable balance in which cooperation does not mean appeasement and countering adversaries does not mean confrontation and the risk of armed conflict. However difficult, such a balanced approach would be the basis for a global political strategy of the Alliance that would provide for shared responsibilities and burdens, and also for shared policy formulation and decisionmaking regarding those issues. It would require economic as well as political cooperation and coordination to a degree unknown as yet in the Alliance.

It is a choice of identity for the Western Alliance. As a military coalition, the Alliance has been quite successful in shielding Europe against the ever imminent Soviet menace. The Alliance has also guaranteed the longest period of peace and freedom in centuries for the major part of Europe—an accomplishment some critics tend to overlook when they question its continuing value. In the past, East-West confrontation has focused on Europe and on military stability there; allied capabilities and willingness to defend Western vital interests elsewhere were hardly even tested. But during the last decade, the environment of the Alliance has changed profoundly and swiftly. The world is no longer NATO-centric, and this fact will likely pose the main problem for the Alliance.

Strategic parity with the United States apparently has encouraged the Soviet Union to cast its shadow on remote regions of the world—sparking, fueling, and exploiting developments critical for the West’s position. This strategy has created a more subtle and
indirect threat than the more visible Soviet military buildup in Europe. New problems for the West have grown without the disappearance of the old ones.

**Waning transatlantic commonality in purpose?**

The ultimate strategic challenge to peace in the world and to Western interests, ideals, and values has increased dramatically. The West's freedom, political independence, and economic well-being appear to be equally and simultaneously threatened with suffocation by Soviet military power, strangulation at its lifelines of oil and raw material flows, infection by conflict and turmoil in Third World areas, or any combination of the above.

Clearly, the North Atlantic Alliance's identity has not rested merely on the combination of military capabilities in Europe to checkmate the Soviet military threat. From its inception, the Alliance has been perceived also as a transatlantic community unified by common values and common political, economic, and social convictions. After thirty-five years, these expectations may have waned somewhat in public perception. These transatlantic ties grounded on common heritage and beliefs, and reinvigorated and revived after World War II, have endured all the strains inevitable in such a unique linking of sovereign nations. Even if the Alliance were a mere bargain in security interests between the United States and its Canadian and European allies, it would hardly have survived without its being founded on the idea of a community in values and ideals worthy to be commonly safeguarded.

But the Alliance appears to be in a critical state that may well threaten its very basis and the security
interests of all allies. The current Alliance crisis is so manifold in its appearances that hardly one field of allied relationships seems to be spared. At the bottom, one serious problem of the Western Alliance is the inability of its members to cooperate politically and economically beyond the military dimension of transatlantic relations. Latent in earlier internal crises, this political deficiency has become progressively more significant. A political and economic divergence, if not rift, between Western Europe and the United States is widening, but both sides seem to prefer business as usual.

A global partnership between America and its Atlantic allies, as a core of all free nations in defense of freedom and independence, would make political sense. When the vital interests of the West are challenged somewhere other than in Europe, the members of the Alliance become globally involved, even if some may not like it and few appear to be prepared for it. Prominent voices have argued for agreement in the Alliance upon a global concept for Western defense. Such an agreement, in any form, would further protect the common vital interests of free nations. Such defense might include securing the flow of Middle East oil and other raw materials vital for secure existence.

If defense of nations allied for preserving Western values remains the ultimate aim of the Alliance, then the perception of defense should also include political-strategic dimensions beyond a solely military interpretation, and implicitly must not be confined by geographical limitations. That preservation of values must also require the formulation and adoption of a global defense strategy, a grand strategy encompassing more than the military element to deal with
challenges characterized more by political and economic dimensions than by imminent military threats.

Such a global defense strategy should provide for shared responsibilities and burdens among the allies and would require considerable commonality in the policy formulation process. Equal participation of all allies through close political cooperation and coordination in their foreign policy formulation, and particularly between the foreign policies of the United States on the one hand and the Western Europeans on the other, would be the \textit{sine qua non}, an absolute necessity. The prospects for such cooperation remain as dim as they have been in the past. Looking at the past, however, will reveal why a common Alliance policy, although never achieved, has been a continuing issue since the Alliance’s inception.
2
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The history of political and economic cooperation and coordination and of the search for a common policy in the Alliance is one of high expectations and many failures. Over time, and because of many disappointments, Europeans' and Americans' perspectives of the political role of the Alliance and of their particular shares in an Alliance policy have diverged. Furthermore, these divergent perspectives have led to perceptions that may now stand in the way of the Alliance's assuming its proper role in a changing environment. Ironically, America, as the long-dominant leader of the Alliance, has contributed most to developing an Alliance that it now would prefer to be different.

America's emergence as a global power

Not many years ago, the United States was a regional, second-rate power, only remotely concerned...
with matters outside its immediate geographical sphere. It entered into global power politics forcefully, quickly, and effectively. Only a few moments ago historically, the United States staked its claim to influence in the American hemisphere. A moment later it took up the loose ends of power correlations in other hemispheres, which had been turned loose by the decline of European great powers. Consumed by its new commitments reaching around the globe, the United States lacked sufficient time to grow into its new role.

Once in the role of a major power in the postwar world, America swiftly had to adopt a worldwide perspective. It emerged from World War II as a global power, with all the capabilities to form a Pax Americana. The need to deal in terms of global power interests and relations and the ability to do so from an almost uncontested power position contributed in the short term to an American attitude comparable to Britain's self-righteousness at the height of its Empire. America ruled indeed, and although it did not really need allies to retain predominance in its extended area of influence, it chose not only to participate in but actually to construct permanent alliances. Thus, for the first time in its history, it neglected George Washington's warning against "entangling alliances."

Self-assured, dominant in its alliances, America had little incentive to look for partnerships in international policymaking. In its Atlantic Alliance, the United States never really needed Europe, particularly not outside the European hemisphere. This was true even in times of the most serious East-West tensions outside Europe, such as the Korean War and the Cuban missile crisis. The United States did need some passive support from European allies during the
Middle East crisis of 1973 in its efforts to resupply the Israeli forces. But in that instance, America acted first, using its European air bases and its NATO-dedicated weapons and depots, only later informing its partners in the Alliance.

Theodore Draper summed up concisely the traditional American perspective on the North Atlantic Alliance: "The United States, in effect, was perfectly content with an Alliance that formally left it with a free hand outside Europe without allied meddling, as if the day would never come when the United States might need allied support outside Europe."1 "Perfectly content" may be an overstatement, but, in general, Draper's comments is right. His observation applied to the Eisenhower administration in particular, but it applies to the following administration as well, certainly until the last year of the Carter presidency. Then the hostage crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan essentially altered this attitude. More recently, the United States has wanted European participation and support in global political strategy—in contrast to earlier occasions in Korea and Vietnam, when only European military contributions were asked. But the allies have appeared to be sulking, as if the United States had resisted for too long any European share in forming policies.

Efforts to strengthen the political ties among the allies and to aim for more commonality in the formulation of allied foreign policies have accompanied the Alliance from the outset. As early as 1951, the Alliance's first set of "Three Wise Men"—Averell Harriman of the United States, Jean Monnet of France, and Sir Edwin Plowden of Britain—started such efforts to improve foreign policy coordination in the Alliance. They made the following recommendation:
The achievement of a closer degree of coordination of the foreign policies of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty, through the development of the habit of consultation on matters of common concern, would greatly strengthen the solidarity of the North Atlantic Community and increase the individual and collective capacity of its members to serve the peaceful purposes for which NATO was established.

Implicitly referring to the United States, the report of the Three Wise Men also stated that "a large share of responsibility for such consultation necessarily rests on the more powerful members of the Community."\(^2\)

Other major reports followed, such as that of the Committee of the Three in 1956 and the Harmel Report of 1967; these reports included the same notion, emphasizing more distinctly as time went on that the North Atlantic area could not be treated separately from the rest of the world. The Harmel Report stated, "Crises and conflicts emerging outside the treaty area can be detrimental to its security either directly or by affecting the global balance of power."\(^3\)

The American attitude toward coordination of foreign policies within the Alliance, however, remained ambivalent. As the only global power in the Alliance, the United States believed it was justified in keeping all its options open, unrestrained by allied intermingling. In extra-European and global policy, the United States saw itself in a light quite different from that of the other allies, justifying its attitude by alleging limited interests of the Europeans outside their region. But such limitations may have been only a result of American predominance over the allies in matters outside Europe. As Draper observed, "American policymakers complained that Europe was regional-minded, introspective, and provincial, and
then they encouraged Europe to be regional-minded, introspective, and provincial to fit into American policy."

It may even have become an axiom of American foreign policy that the United States was the only power in the Alliance able and willing to bear responsibilities beyond the North Atlantic area. Harlan Cleveland, a former US ambassador to NATO, argued in 1970 that, unlike the United States, "most countries can afford not to worry about how most international decisions come out—except when they threaten worldwide catastrophe." In the American perception of policy and diplomacy, the ability and willingness to "act" on the world scene has always depended, by and large, upon the ability to project power worldwide. This attitude may explain why the United States treated the Europeans in the way Draper described. Indeed, with regard to power projection, the European allies had not much to offer. Most European countries' assessments of political "influence" in the international arena had to be more modest and their policies more subtle. The European tendency to substitute diplomacy for power projection might have conveyed to the United States an impression of only low-key European interests.

**American tutelage**

Another reason for US attempts to keep the Europeans regional-minded was America's rejection of colonialism, and colonial wars in particular. The repudiation of colonialism has certainly accompanied and at times even spurred American intentions to keep the European allies' profile low on the international stage. This notion was apparently supported by two prominent events in the 1950s: France's war in
Indochina and the Suez Expedition of France, Great Britain, and Israel.

When the French got into serious trouble in Indochina, America, although asked for assistance, responded with too little too late. With the surrender of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, France's dominance in the region finally ended, and Western influence decreased. The turmoil in the region, however, did not diminish and soon led to America's direct involvement.

The consequences of the Suez controversy—which, quite apart from its impact on the Middle East, had some grave consequences for the Alliance—were similar. Andre Beaufre, then commander-in-chief of the French contingent of the expeditionary forces, wrote later that France's disappointment with America's policy in the Suez crisis finally convinced the French to pursue a nuclear program on their own, to pull their troops out of NATO, and to distance themselves from American influence on European allies. He also alleged that, in the Suez crisis, the United States primarily had defended the interests of the oil companies, although it pretended to serve the more exalted principle of anticolonialism. Henry Kissinger, probably not as partisan in this case as Beaufre, came to similar conclusions about the consequences of this incident, in which he saw "brutal and unfeeling American actions" aggravating an already difficult situation. In some ways, the later French problem with Algeria was even more telling than Indochina and Suez. In that case, the United States used all available means to force the French to abandon what they had defined as a vital national interest.

For many Americans, these events may have only demonstrated strong US dissatisfaction with European
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colonialist adventurism. For the European allies, however, the deeper issue was that, obviously, the United States not only would decide when and if its allies deserved support, but would also make use of its supremacy in the Alliance to dictate decisions to the entire membership. At any rate, these incidents were likely to be taken by many Europeans as lectures to the effect that they, the European allies, had better look after their military tasks within Europe to improve their own defense, and refrain from involvement elsewhere.

American "tutelage" (Kissinger) of the allies remained an element in US Alliance policy despite the efforts of Europeans, the foremost being Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle, to achieve more European participation in political decisionmaking in the Alliance. In 1956 and 1957, Adenauer repeatedly criticized America's unilateralism in the Near East and Asia and its political neglect of the Alliance. He proposed a "political alliance" with a common foreign policy to make a common security policy more effective. But his ideas for political cooperation in the Alliance were rejected by US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on the grounds that, of the Alliance members, only America had worldwide interests, and that allied countries could not be permitted to constrain these.

Publicly, de Gaulle's approaches became better known than Adenauer's. His question was, "if there is no agreement among the principal members of the Atlantic Alliance on matters other than Europe, how can the Alliance be indefinitely maintained in Europe?" He suggested in 1958 a directorate within NATO in which the United States, Great Britain, and France would shape global policies for the Alliance. The United States rejected the idea, this time on the
grounds that it was an effort "to amend the North Atlantic Treaty so as to extend its coverage beyond the areas presently covered." Certainly, the United States did not want to share power with de Gaulle except on its own terms. Yet, in retrospect, de Gaulle's argument was almost prophetic. He suggested that "at least among the world powers of the West, something must be organized as far as the Alliance is concerned, with regard to the political and occasionally strategic conduct of the Alliance outside Europe, particularly in the Middle East and Africa, where these three powers are constantly involved." The old wise men in European politics seem to have known the future. But when they pointed in the right direction, the United States held back; when the United States finally wanted to go in the same direction, Western Europe seemed to decline.

**From tutelage to equality?**

From time to time, America's allies were impressed by indications of an American guilty conscience and quest for improvement—only to learn that these signs were mainly rhetoric. President Kennedy started out calling the Alliance the "Atlantic partnership and an entity of interdependent parts, sharing equally both burdens and decisions," but he did little if anything to share burdens or decisions in international politics. President Nixon acknowledged that "the United States had led without listening, talked to our allies instead of with them, and informed them of new departures instead of deciding with them." He announced that the time had come to move "from dominance to partnership." But according to his secretary of state, the partnership apparently applied only to European affairs. In his "Year of Europe" speech, Kissinger stated that "the United States has global interests and responsibilities. Our European allies have regional interests."
speech, Kissinger stated that "the United States has global interests and responsibilities. Our European allies have regional interests." 11

Henry Kissinger could be seen as a striking example of the American ambivalence toward the European allies. Probably until 1969, Kissinger was a most sympathetic promoter of the European role in the Alliance and advocated the change "from tutelage to equality." In his book The Troubled Partnership, he called—in 1965—for a common foreign policy if NATO were to retain any vitality. He even proposed "a political body at the highest level for concerting the policies of the nations bordering the North Atlantic," vaguely reminiscent of de Gaulle's directorate proposal.

After Kissinger came into office as national security adviser, however, he soon regarded the Europeans, in Draper's words, as "just as frustrating and exasperating as his predecessors had." 12 In his memoirs, published in 1979 before the hostage crisis in Iran and the Afghanistan invasion, Kissinger wrote that NATO was "an accidental array of forces in search of a mission." 13 Since Iran and Afghanistan, he has been among the many who have called for allied support of American involvement outside the North Atlantic area.

In the earlier years of the Alliance, European-American divergencies were less obvious in the assessments of actual political problems than in the interpretation of America's role in international policies on one side and the allies' role on the other. There was hardly a place for European perspectives within the American scheme of a favorable world order. With the apparent US military and political failures in Southeast Asia and the ripening realization of
the fading of the US global strategic edge over the Soviet Union, many Americans gradually changed their perspective regarding the conduct of global policy. Unilateralism in international politics had become more difficult, and more undesirable as well. Already in 1970, Ambassador Cleveland observed,

We do want credible partners, more than ever. The Vietnam War has produced a much greater desire in American politics for what one writer calls a “sense of joint enterprise with other nations rather than a sense of the American flag in solitude and, often as not, in trouble.”

He concluded that the United States had already crossed the great divide from unilateral and national actions to multinational or international overseas commitments under the flag of NATO, the Organization of American States, or the United Nations.14

The evolutionary change in the American perspective, toward a desire for allied support in global affairs, coincided with European efforts to define a European identity in the international arena. Even if the Europeans had preferred to stay put in their regional sphere, outside developments made it more or less inevitable that they look beyond their region. The world outside Europe perceived an increasing concentration of power in Europe, not only as an economic but also as a political entity, far more than the Europeans themselves did. Economics and politics could not be separated, even if some European countries would have preferred the separation, because economic importance transmutes necessarily into political weight and influence.

With a new Atlantic Charter—the Ottawa Declaration on Atlantic Relations, laboriously achieved in
1974, the year of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Alliance—then Secretary of State Kissinger made the attempt to merge the American perspective with changing realities. This declaration recognized the “further progress towards unity, which the member states of the European Community are determined to make,” and also acknowledged as valuable European involvement in developments outside Europe:

The contributions made by members of the Alliance to the preservation of international security and world peace are recognized to be of great importance.15

Neither Europeans nor Americans would adjust to new attitudes easily, without any reservations or suspicions. Only the course of events, rather than a determined will, could bring the allies politically closer together, closer than the long-held mutual perceptions might suggest.

*The American flag in trouble*

The real desire for closer cooperation with the allies might have emerged only recently in America, from the events of 1979 and 1980. The United States was shocked and frustrated—shocked by the double blow to its image from Iran and Afghanistan, frustrated about its own helplessness in Iran and the allies’ reluctance to follow suit in punishing the Soviet Union after Afghanistan. Since then, there has been much argument about whether Europeans had the same perspective as Americans on Soviet-influenced communist expansionism in Third World areas. Many Europeans, it appears, have the same perception as most Americans of the Soviets’ ruthless opportunism. Even if Angola, Ethiopia, and Yemen had failed to
convince Europeans, Afghanistan should have convinced even leftist Europeans that, in the words of Gromyko, "detente in no way means the freezing of the objective process of historical development. In no way does it eliminate the existence of class antagonism within capitalist states, between the peoples' interests and those of world imperialism, and between the two social systems, nor does it reduce the ideological confrontation." Europeans should be even more sensitive than Americans to communist rhetoric because of their various lines of communication to Moscow through the European communist parties and the more prominent role in Europe's press of overt communist periodicals.

Some Europeans claimed that they had understood the importance of the Angola developments in 1975 even better than Americans had. West German Foreign Minister Genscher remarked, "During the Angola crisis, the American Congress adopted a law making it clear to the whole world that the United States did not intend to become involved in the conflict. The Soviet Union regarded this as a carte blanche for an intervention by Cuban troops." In hindsight, of course, he questioned "how Soviet policy would have developed if the United States, suffering from the double trauma of Vietnam and Watergate, had not itself seriously weakened its capacity ... for putting up resistance..." Most Europeans certainly understood the difficult situation in which not only America but the whole West was put by events in Iran, Afghanistan, and later Poland. In each case, hasty American reactions appeared unnecessary and potentially detrimental to the Western cause. So the hastiness with which the American president reacted to Afghanistan, without
consulting the allies to arrive at a more deliberate, coordinated, and sustainable course of counteraction, proved to be disadvantageous. The Europeans would have preferred some other way, somewhere between a sudden rush to action and business as usual. If anything, the events in Afghanistan, as well as in Iran, might finally have triggered a common policy line in the Alliance, even a common political strategy for other possible critical developments in issues and areas vital to the West. Actions such as the Carter Doctrine and its follow-up measures, however, and than for the adversary. They may also have dimmed the chances of arriving at a common political strategy in the Alliance at a time when the circumstances would have been most conducive to such agreement.

The clashes over perceptions of developments in Southwest Asia and their consequences for the West caused the cracks that issues like Poland, the pipeline embargo, and INF have widened into the present rift in the Alliance. In public perceptions, the complexity of viewpoints on either side of the Atlantic has been reduced to a simple formula of antagonism: many Americans contend that America, in the West’s best interests, is stemming the tide of spreading Soviet influence and the export of tyranny throughout the world. But the European allies refuse to understand the necessities of the global American commitment and are unwilling to look beyond their regional concerns to lend support in securing what are, above all, their own vital interests. Many Europeans tend to believe that their superpower ally unilaterally pursues global power interests at their expense, that the United States is trying to face down the other superpower—as the focus of evil in the modern world—“in a silent war of nerves broken only by bursts of megaphone diplomacy.”18
face down the other superpower—as the focus of evil in the modern world—“in a silent war of nerves broken only by bursts of megaphone diplomacy.”

Such simplifications, however, do not reflect the varied mixture of mutual perceptions and misperceptions that seem so much a part of the strained transatlantic relationship and that seem to influence considerably the capacity of the Alliance for better cooperation. A close look behind those fashionable clichés might reveal that the respective interests and priorities on either side of the Atlantic are not as far apart as is commonly believed, but that the real differences arise from diverging perceptions in pursuit of those similar interests.

**European perceptions of American policies**

James G. Lowenstein, a former high-ranking State Department official, noted how most Americans want to be perceived: “We assume that Europeans understand our altruistic motives and are willing to support them, that they believe in us as leader of the free world and will follow our lead.” Lowenstein put this desire in contrast to the result of a poll among university-educated French that showed almost 70 percent of those questioned understood American foreign policy more or less negatively—in terms of expanding American business and investment interests in the world (49 percent) or of America’s desire to impose its will on the rest of the world (20 percent). Only 25 percent saw US aims positively, either as maintaining world peace (18 percent) or as aiding the development of democracy in the world (7 percent).

This French view may not quite have represented the European “mainstream”—if there is one at all. In
fact, there is nothing like a singular “European” perception. Based upon individual national and joint reactions of the European allies to past events, one may attempt, however, to describe a few generally similar impressions among the Western Europeans. The manifold variations, however, are beyond imagination, even for the European observer.

Most Americans have trouble comprehending Europe, seeing it as a disorganized bunch of states that cannot even settle disputes among themselves about such mundane matters as fish, wine, and milk, to say nothing of greater issues involving their political unity. Paradoxically, Americans tend at the same time to overlook the real differences: there are nuclear and non-nuclear powers; there are sovereign nations and there is a divided one; there are simple UN members and those with veto power; there are nonmembers and full members of the European Community (EC), and others with only one foot in the EC or in the NATO integrated defense efforts. Yet most Americans regard Western Europe as a single entity, which, as a convenience, is how this study must also describe it.

A turning point in American foreign policy

For America as well as for Europe, President Carter's State of the Union Address of 24 January 1980 marked a turning point in American foreign policy after Vietnam and Watergate. Under the fresh stings of the humiliating hostage drama in Iran and the brazen Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States had begun to free itself from what one author called the “philosophical vertigo of the past decade.” President Carter, with the Carter Doctrine, endeavored to crystallize the inchoate feeling in the American public that
called for reconstituting national power and for reestablishing American national prestige. This feeling has gained momentum since Ronald Reagan made it the theme of his campaign for the presidency. With the revival of traditional American values and strength, the Reagan administration pledged to toughen America's stance against the Soviets and to formulate a "new foreign policy." Whether because of elapsed time or because of Ronald Reagan's determination, the political and moral retreat in America of the post-Vietnam and -Watergate era has considerably diminished.

For the Europeans, this development was entirely welcome. A determined and predictable US foreign policy was missed for a long time. The allies had claimed that since the double trauma of Vietnam and Watergate, American weakness, irresoluteness, and lack of leadership for the West's cause in world politics had caused irritations among allies, adversaries, and Third World countries alike. Inevitably, American foreign policy has almost immediate effects on the allies. Each signal from Washington, from rhetoric in public to diplomatic actions, attracts extraordinary attention among America's friends, because their security depends so largely on America's policy. The allies, and other Western countries as well, wish above all for a consistent American foreign policy, without wide swings in its essential elements, predictable for friends and adversaries alike. In the European assessment, this was hardly the case during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations. Particularly the latter confused the Europeans with zigzagging policies and often contradictory signals.

The Times of London, in a description subtly presupposed to be West Germany's view, may have repre-
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sented a rather common European notion of some of the allied difficulties concerning cohesiveness in American foreign policy:

President Kennedy was the last to make any real personal and intellectual contact with Europe. Since his assassination, American foreign policy has been tugged to and fro by a series of internal and external crises. A coherent view of the Soviet Union has been difficult to sustain for any length of time, not only because of changing presidents but because of a tendency to swing between extremes of optimism and pessimism, confidence and fear. One moment the Soviet Union is seen as just another great power with whom the Americans can share global responsibilities; the next it is a relentless adversary whose machinations must be confronted everywhere. One moment it seems susceptible to Western influence; the next it is engaged in a huge and carefully planned conspiracy to delude and undermine the West.20

A lot of wishful thinking, in Europe and elsewhere, was met by the prospects of the new Reagan administration. It promised an end of American weakness, from which the allies had suffered. Its strong determination to restore American military strength and its willingness to provide leadership in the Alliance was widely supported in Europe. The allies would have welcomed “a more robust American leadership, informed by a more sensitive appreciation of their problems” and based upon the “spirit of the new consultative attitude of the Reagan administration,” as the new secretary of state, Alexander Haig, promised.21

The return of the chill

Only too soon, though, doubts and skepticism among the allies rose again, less about cohesiveness
than about the direction of the "new foreign policy." America's allies and friends became increasingly worried that confrontation was at the top of the agenda of this new policy, and that elements of dialogue and cooperation with the East—indispensable in European eyes, despite Afghanistan—fell at the bottom. The intention of the Reagan administration to deal more resolutely with the Soviet Union, especially in the field of armaments control and disarmament negotiations, soon developed as the most contentious issue between the United States and its allies. This issue has remained a source of continuous tension and deep-rooted misunderstandings.

Since the implementation of the Harmel approach as the strategy of detente and deterrence, Europe and America have shared the same assessment of the political development in the world. The differences arose concerning the causes of this development and the conclusions to be drawn for future Western policies and strategies. It has been the key element of the Harmel Report that complementary importance should be given to adequate military deterrence capability and effective policies directed toward a greater relaxation of tensions. The pursuit of this policy directive has been the Alliance's political strategy in East-West relations since the late 1960s.

This "two-legged" strategy could not prevent the Soviet Union from growing equal to the United States as a global superpower, and it could not persuade the Soviets to slow down their relentless military buildup—despite all efforts toward and negotiations on cooperation and arms control. Exaggerated expectations that the Soviet Union would completely abide by the principle of political and military restraint and
moderation everywhere once it was offered opportunities for cooperation did not materialize. As a consequence, disappointment of high but short-lived expectations has resulted in a widespread feeling among Americans that detente has failed once and for all—a notion that finds only little support in Europe.

Like most Europeans, the foreign minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, maintained "that in the early 1970s the concept of detente was 'oversold' in America, and came to be widely interpreted not as an element of a dual strategy but as a self-contained policy of its own." Many Europeans saw the increasing doubts in America about the usefulness of detente as coinciding with the intellectual and political shift in the United States toward reassertion of American power after a decade of weakness. Both strands apparently resulted in a policy striving for military strength first, leaving the East-West dialogue in rather low gear for the time being.

Yet in the divided continent of Europe, this dialogue, detente, and Ostpolitik have initiated a relaxation of tensions, especially about the German question. Trade and cultural relations have been increased, and even though real cooperation may still be far away, at the margins a thin net of ties has been woven and has even endured the big chill in East-West relations. While many Americans may concede that the Harmel strategy has had some success in Europe, they see it as not successful in the broader context of East-West rivalry. The advocates of the two-legged political strategy of the Alliance have argued, however, that it could not work better because, during the 1970s, the US Congress damaged both legs by
Defending the NATO Alliance

cutting US deterrence capability and considerably limiting cooperation possibilities. While the new foreign policy of the Reagan administration stressed deterrence, there appeared to be little room for cooperative incentives toward the East either. The Reagan administration saw weaknesses in the detente policy and advocated a reconstitution of US world power and global responsibilities. The administration insisted on the principle of restraint and reciprocity in East-West relations worldwide. In relation to detente, the administration announced the “broad approach... that is a recognition and a day-to-day assessment of corresponding international Soviet behavior throughout the world.”

**Effects of rhetoric**

Such a linkage in American thinking caused many Europeans to fear that the rather one-dimensional moralism of the 1950s in the American attitude toward the Soviet Union could be revived, thus turning the wheel of East-West relations back to Cold War times. The rhetoric of President Reagan and some top officials may have added to European worries when the president publicly called for a “crusade for freedom” and a “global campaign for democracy.” Although Europeans are aware that American presidents often call for crusades as campaign rhetoric, under the circumstances of rather chilled superpower relations and increasing nuclear arsenals, they may have found those slogans less than thrilling.

Altogether, the allies seem to follow only reluctantly an America that has begun to cast off its defensive position in international affairs, one that has shaken off what Haig called its “reputation for strategic passivity.” The rhetoric of containment of Soviet
expansionism and influence and apparent preparedness for confrontations worldwide have sensitized most allies and mobilized publics. Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau explained the mounting public fears in his country unusually frankly: “They are demonstrating against what they see as the policy of an American president who has, rightly or wrongly, been perceived as warlike or so hostile against the Soviet Union that he can’t be trusted.... Unfortunately President Reagan and some around him have given some justification for those fears.”

George F. Kennan, former US ambassador to Moscow, joined Trudeau in criticizing the prevailing American official view of the Soviet Union as “grotesquely overdrawn” and “highly misleading and pernicious as a foundation for national policy.” His view is representative of the increasing concerns among so many Europeans, who feel that the combination of deepened political hostility and ever more powerful nuclear weaponry “present a shadow greater than any that has darkened the future of Western civilization.”

Rhetoric in public about the possibility of winning a protracted nuclear war and of limiting nuclear war to the European “theater” alarmed most Europeans and provoked doubts in East and West about the direction of American strategic thinking on the highest levels. The Times of London suggested, “the danger is that once an American President sets out to persuade the Russians that he regards nuclear war as thinkable and winnable he could end up persuading himself of the same thing, especially if he already regards the Soviet Union with very deep hostilities.”

There seems to be little trust among Europeans that the Soviets would differentiate between presidential rhetoric aimed at domestic constituencies and the real intentions of the administration.
More assertion, less patience with allies

Allied governments have welcomed stronger global perspectives in American foreign policy. They appeared not as satisfied, however, with an apparent increase in American nationalism. Christoph Bertram, then director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), observed this trend as early as 1980: "the United States has become, in a way, more nationalistic in its objectives, more assertive in the pursuit of its objectives, more impatient with obstacles and more impatient with the difficulties produced by generating support by the allies." For many Europeans, recent experiences, from the pipeline issue to Grenada, seem only to support such apprehensions.

The impact of the Grenada invasion on the Alliance may still not have been overcome. Apart from the action itself, Europeans in unison have deplored American unilateralism, which, it appears, intentionally neglected the rule of consultation in the Alliance. Europeans again seemed plagued by doubts about the predictability of America's foreign policy and its attitude toward its allies.

President Reagan's determined yet measured and balanced response to the shooting down of Korean Airlines flight 007 had allayed some European fears caused by his earlier rhetoric. Those in Europe who have denounced American unilateralism and lack of consultation were surprised by the extensive consultative efforts of the administration to achieve consensus on concerted allied reactions in this case. On the other hand, President Reagan's moderate reaction to the KAL tragedy may have contributed later to his tough decision in the case of Grenada. While many Europeans praised the American president for his
moderate and well-reflected yet firm reaction toward Moscow, many Americans criticized him for not being tough enough. William Safire accused him of “speaking exaggeratedly but swinging only a wet noodle,” recalling the familiar saying, “Speak softly but carry a big stick.”

In an overall look at American policies in the Alliance since the turning point of Afghanistan, it might appear to the allies that the promising words of Secretary of State Haig at the outset of the Reagan administration were overcome only too soon by events. Europeans questioned Haig’s words about a “new direction in US foreign policy” contributing much to “what alliances really mean: shared interests, reliable performance and sensitivity for each other’s concerns.” Similarly, they questioned the intention to “restore consultation as a useful instrument of alliance communication and solidarity” and to make good on the claim that “consultation should mean more than the formal act of soliciting opinions.”*30* If there were more hopes for better transatlantic political cooperation, particularly in extra-European issues, they have faded considerably. Europeans should, however, keep in mind that all new administrations in the United States enter office pledging better cooperation with the allies and find it easier after some time to proceed unilaterally—and not just because of domestic political considerations.

*American perceptions of European policies*

Although many Europeans might still try to understand the changes in the American role in the world and in the Alliance, Americans seem to have already fixed their picture of the European allies; both have found confirmation for some long-lurking suspicions.
The Western Europeans do not like to be seen as cowards, frightened and appeasing in the presence of a ruthless Russian bear—their portrayal in a caricature by The Washington Post's Oliphant, who was referring to reactions following the KAL 007 incident. However, there is a distinct American tendency to see Europeans as The Economist caricatured them: as weak-kneed, with cold feet and no guts, with a blind eye to Russia and the other eye angrily on Reagan. Europeans appear overly susceptible to pressures, one perceived motive for Europe's divergence from the American political line. Another motive seems to be their pursuit of special advantages and lack of understanding of the implications of US global responsibilities. Such subliminal notions in American public opinion may have been fanned by public comments of high-ranking American politicians.

European divergence appeared much earlier than with the Afghanistan issue. As Americans have maintained, a rift appeared when European policies became dominated by the paramount issue of oil access in the wake of the 1973 Middle East war. "The main European allies (and Japan) trimmed their policy sails under Arab pressure in precipitate fashion," noted an American author, who also pointed out that "Europe distanced itself publicly from the United States when the nine member states of the EC issued their own statement of policy toward the Arab-Israeli dispute (the Venice Declaration of June 13, 1980)."

Once Europeans showed their susceptibility to outside pressure, as in the case of oil access Americans preferred to regard Europeans as more inclined to give in than to resist. And were Europeans not also out for special advantages when they disregarded Israeli interests to favor oil-rich Arab interests?
Europeans have replied that the almost unconditional American support for Israel has basically caused this divergence. A pro-Israel bias in America's Middle East policy, induced by an influential domestic pressure group, has hampered an even-handed approach to the region. But Americans tend to believe that European policies also are biased, that the European position on the Middle East and related problems is derived from Europe's dependence on Arab oil. As Henry Kissinger argued, "How is it possible that in the Middle East, two totally conflicting theories on how to proceed are being carried out simultaneously? ... Fundamentally the Europeans are playing one card and we are playing another... One of us has got to be wrong... what is really involved in Europe is an attempt to gain special advantages." Kissinger's allegation may not be so far-fetched after all. Some European attitudes have furthered prejudices in the United States to the effect that, for some in the Alliance, membership means getting a free ticket, enjoying the benefits without assuming obligations. At the same conference where Henry Kissinger scoffed at Europeans striving for special advantages, a prominent European politician, former Belgian Foreign Minister Henri Simonet, presented a view that could justly be seen as an example of European selfishness:

As far as the alliance is concerned, since it is responsible for the security of the North Atlantic area, it is, no doubt, entitled to be informed of and to exchange views on political issues and military initiatives in other parts of the world. But NATO should not be involved in nor vouch for the validity of world strategies, tests of strength, and military ventures out of an ill-conceived loyalty toward the global role of the leading ally.
If this were the prevailing European view, even strongly Alliance-minded Americans would indeed have reason for serious concern. How should Americans perceive the Europeans if the latter demand to be informed completely about the American position and intentions on global issues and then criticize American policy for “tests of strength” and “military ventures,” hardly raising a finger in support of the United States outside NATO’s immediate area? These same European allies would prefer to deal with those issues under the EC flag, thus free from “ill-conceived loyalty,” as if there were no alliance with the United States. Such contradictory allied attitudes, enforcing demands and claims but ducking responsibilities, foster American grievances and disappointment. They strengthen the American tendency to neglect an encumbering alliance with unwilling and selfish partners.

European ambivalence

Many Americans have been concerned about European inputs toward a common Western position on global issues. They have considered those inputs as consisting more of criticism than of constructive alternatives. When Europeans have made real suggestions, they have wanted to give the United States responsibility for running the job, yet have reserved the right of critique. Lowenstein certainly spoke for many Americans in stating that “Europeans have criticized virtually every aspect of American policy. They have complained when the dollar has been high or low, when we have heavily invested in Europe or have retreated, when our relations with Moscow have been relatively warm or comparatively cold, when we have consulted before acting or acted before consulting.”
European voices affirming American suspicions find even more attention in America than American voices. So the former British ambassador in Washington, Peter Jay, is often quoted: "It boosted and boosts European morale to spotlight American errors, to savor its failures, to exploit its market, to resent its overseas investments, to have a critic's ringside seat at its global tribulations, to mock its culture, to deride its leaders and to bewail the 'weakness' of its currency." (As a matter of fact, the strength of the dollar is bewailed as well.) Americans are annoyed by "this systematic European ambivalence, willing to wound but afraid to strike, tempted by the glamour of status and gestures but shy of the responsibilities and burdens of real power."37

In America, close attention has been paid to the recent political and psychological developments in Western European societies. Many Americans are seriously concerned about the younger generations of Europeans as they enter the political arena—generations whose image of America is shaped not by the American aid to Europe during and after World War II but by Vietnam and Watergate and by the seemingly uncompromising US-Soviet antagonism threatening nuclear catastrophe. Some observers have argued, perhaps overdramatically, that generational change in Europe, along with a value change to "post-materialism," may indeed replace the idealized portrait of America with its opposite. On the other hand, in America, the generations formed by an East Coast establishment with emotional attachment to Europe might be replaced by new generations rooted in the Sunbelt, less informed and less concerned about Europe and more oriented toward the Western
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Hemisphere and the Pacific. So there are inherent dangers of estrangement.

The danger, however, may now be reduced, given the relative quietness after the beginning of INF deployments and recent election results in Europe. In Great Britain and in West Germany, probably the European countries where relations with the United States play a more important role than in the others, those very political forces advocating move distance from US policies have experienced setbacks in the 1983 elections. Nonetheless, many Americans fear that even reliable allies will decline to offer preferential cooperation with the United States. Political forces may increasingly seek dividends gained by distancing themselves from American policy in the international arena. At least from Great Britain, Americans have expected, after the Falklands War, a different feeling for oversea responsibilities and for Alliance solidarity. Americans have reminded Britain that they supported the United Kingdom’s case unhesitantly, despite the unavoidable frictions with Latin America and in the Organization of American States. The United States withheld arms sales and normalization of its relations with Argentina long after the war, whereas France, an ally of the United Kingdom in both NATO and the EC, resumed its arms sales to Argentina immediately. In the case of Grenada, however, Great Britain, like the other European nations, denied the United States even moral support for the intervention. In the American perception, the Falklands bill may still be unpaid.

Meanwhile, in West Germany, the country most dependent on the American guarantee for its security, the party of former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, which had backed him for years in his determination to counter the Soviet SS–20 threat, reversed its position almost
completely. Many Americans feel puzzled over this rather abrupt change and fear growing anti-Americanism.

To most Americans, Europeans seem generally too quick to attribute an unfavorable development in the world to American omissions or inadequate actions—even if the charges prove eventually to be correct. Whenever the crucial question of resistance against threats to vital Western interests outside the North Atlantic area has arisen, Europeans have tended to shift responsibility to the United States, claiming for their passivity various objective restraints. To Americans, these limitations seemed to be fig leaves: the so-called “confined boundaries of the Alliance,” the “constitutional provisions,” or the “lack of suitable means.” Yet these issues were claimed in the dispute over securing the Middle East oil flow. In the case of Grenada, where a great many Americans were convinced of a Trojan Horse incursion of Soviets, aided by Cubans, into the “American backyard,” the Europeans stood on the principle of international law and Grenada’s right to self-determination. They closed their eyes to the threat of a possible communist Grenada, an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” that would sit astride vital Western sea lanes through the Caribbean.

Through the smokescreen of European arguments against America’s policies, many Americans view European attitudes as cowardly; they see Europe as too timid to stand up to counter the Soviet bear. Europeans seem unable “to identify foreign policy as something other than pushing us [Americans] from concession to concession.” They angry Kissinger continued, “We have heard all the arguments that counsel why one should not press the issues: that Europe cannot afford
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the extra burden of higher defense budgets; that detente in Europe has to be preserved no matter what happens anywhere else; that Angola was an aberration, Ethiopia was unique, Yemen and Afghanistan temporary setbacks.38

No doubt, Americans want their European allies to stand up to the Soviet pressures and to pay their fair share for the necessary defenses. But many of them, like Henry Kissinger, see in Europeans a "tendency to treat detente as an exercise in psychotherapy, or as an attempt at good personal relations, or as an effort in which individual leaders try to gain domestic support by proving that they have a special way in Moscow."39 For many Americans, Europe seems near appeasement, Finlandization, Denmarkization, Hollanditis, neutralism. Whatever such terribly generalizing terms portray, they reflect an American tendency "to consider Europe in a state of permanent decline—disgruntled, disunited, defeatist, and disrespectful—if not disobedient."40 In April 1980, President Carter, disappointed with allied reactions both to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and to his counteraction policy, gave a classic summation of American concerns about the allies:

Nations ask us for leadership. But at the same time, they demand their own independence of action. They ask us for aid. But they reject any interference. They ask us for understanding. But they often decline to understand us in return. Some ask for protection, but are wary of the obligation of alliance. Others ask for firmness and certainty. But at the same time they demand flexibility required by the pace of change and sublety of events.41

These American woes have certainly not changed, yet nowadays Americans seem to care less about them.
Neglected Elements in Transatlantic Relations

AMERICANS SEEM FIRM AND CERTAIN about the course and pace of change they have set within the global framework. They demand their own independence of action and seem far from asking to be understood. They demand European support but do not seem to want to understand the Europeans' viewpoints in global affairs. To continue this pattern of behavior would continue the history of NATO's failure in cooperation abroad. During the 1950s and 1960s, only a few European allies believed that they could count on American understanding and support for their problems abroad: for example, France in Indochina and later in its territories in North Africa (particularly in Algeria, which by definition in Article 6 of the Treaty was once even part of the North Atlantic area); France and
Britain in the Suez Canal zone; the Netherlands with the Dutch East Indies; and Belgium with the Congo. In each of these problems the United States declined to support and even openly opposed its European allies on the grounds of the ideals of the United Nations and expressed moral outrage about such remnants of "European colonialism."

Despite Adenauer's and de Gaulle's later attempts to convince Americans of the necessity of American-European partnership for global issues, the Suez experience appeared to be the turning point in European perceptions of an Alliance role in Third World areas. When the United States subsequently demanded European support abroad, the Europeans in effect assumed a duplicate of the earlier American attitude. After Suez, European allies increasingly distanced themselves from American involvements overseas, most conspicuously in the Middle East and Vietnam. Many Americans resented Europeans for their reluctance to join in a war for freedom and independence and for their publicly doubting its moral justification.

**From peripheral to vital concerns**

Looking more closely at past failures of allied cooperation outside Europe, one sees common features among them. One is that, from the French in Indochina to the Americans in Vietnam, the member country concerned with the problem refused allied participation in the policy- and decisionmaking processes. Participation of the other allies became desirable only when troubles escalated to military conflict. In past cases, the interests involved were not vital national interests, and these peripheral matters affected only one or two allies. There never appeared to
be a common Alliance concern or a vital Western cause.

With the recent developments in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, however, and to a lesser degree in Central America and Africa, a definite change from individual to common concerns has occurred. The logical common approach would require allied partnership and solidarity in an Alliance foreign policy. It would extend to those troubled areas of the world that pose a different yet hardly less dangerous threat to Western existence in freedom than the central military threat in Europe. Vital security interests of all allies are now more or less equally threatened. Joint approaches, however, appear again to be focused on the eventual military dimension. Allied military commitments, in case these are needed, present again a matter of clashing interpretations. Prospects for common and shared policymaking for the troubled regions seem as remote as in the past.

For many in America, the actuality of the Alliance appears to be the one described by Irving Kristol: "An American foreign policy that tries to cope, on its own, with noxious eruptions all over the globe, and a Western Europe only too anxious to avoid overseas responsibilities or even involvement, whose foreign policy has degenerated into a desperate reliance on the ‘NATO Shield’ to protect it against the Soviet Union, while moving toward nervous appeasement of all other enemies everywhere else." Many in Europe would subscribe to the notion that American policy tries to cope on its own, but they would contend that Europe has offered support and participation in coping with global developments.

In 1981, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt proposed to newly inaugurated President
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Reagan, "I appreciate the fact that President Reagan has repeatedly promised frequent and close consultations with the allies. It would also be desirable to agree on a global concept for Western policy, with shared responsibilities, to face the challenges of the 1980s."

German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has argued along the same lines with his proposal for a global Western policy. Because of their country's unfortunate history, German politicians are probably more reluctant than those of other European countries to participate in global policy. France, Great Britain, and Italy have strongly indicated and proved their preparedness to assume extra-European responsibilities by political and military actions in the Middle East, in Africa, in the Indian Ocean, and in Central America. French Defense Minister Charles Hernu has suggested discussing the content and meaning of the Alliance without formally extending it in geographical terms. Again, as during de Gaulle's tenure, France appears to argue for the global role of the Alliance. France has also decided to build its own rapid deployment force, the Forces d'Action Rapide (FAR), a self-contained corps of about 47,000 troops. According to French officials, this force will be so versatile in training and equipment that it can be used in any contingency, outside or within Europe.

There are many more voices in Europe—political, military, and scholarly—suggesting a common and coordinated Alliance approach to the new global challenges. They all advocate more or less a long-range Western political and economic strategy, including yet not overemphasizing the military aspects.

Nevertheless, many Americans maintain that the nations of Western Europe have opted out of world
politics and prefer to pursue the comfort of domestic prosperity and social welfare. Only France is seen as having some global interests and influence, whereas Great Britain could not have any significant influence on world affairs because it has let its military capabilities shrink dramatically. West Germany seems to enjoy a bit more benevolence in American judgment; its unique situation is widely understood.

Evaluated against the facts, these judgments might be seen to miss the point. Western Europe’s worldwide economic importance and influence, along with a slowly increasing sense of European unity and identity, has inevitably led to a political role in world affairs as well. The success of the common European economic policy led the world, including Europeans themselves, to expect legitimate European foreign policy positions. Hence, the system of European Political Cooperation (EPC) has been designed, and has succeeded to some degree, to coordinate European foreign policies, particularly for Third World areas.

Overconfidence in military force?

The prevailing American perception of Europe’s decline as a force in world affairs, and of its lack of motivation to intermesh in world politics, seems to stem from a profound difference in interpretation of politics—of what policy, diplomacy, and Western strategy is all about. Europeans claim they need not be persuaded that world politics is essentially power politics and that one essential ingredient of power is a sufficiently persuasive military force. But Europeans seem to look more at all the ingredients of power and influence, because they could not and would not rely on military force. In the words of a study of the Congressional Research Service, “European policies
became increasingly dependent on political and economic instruments to influence events in the Third World. The American experience in Vietnam confirmed for many Europeans the wisdom of their skepticism regarding the current utility of military force in the Third World. Most European countries can be expected to look to the use of military power as an instrument of last resort—to be used only when political and economic approaches have failed and vital interests are threatened.

In the opinion of many Europeans, and of some Americans as well, the United States tends to stress the military aspect of any strategy. Kenneth Waltz noted that military capabilities tend to dictate strategy. "The ability to act militarily carries with it the temptation to take military action." And many critics inside and outside the country regard US foreign policy in the Third World as foundering in an over-reliance on military force. They see a distinct American inclination to regard political problems rather quickly in terms of military contingencies and to let military capabilities overly influence any crisis management considerations. Many Europeans, however, may be too reluctant to consider at all the utility of military remedies in certain contingencies, though their reluctance and caution may have some basis. They contend that a foreign policy attempting to ensure lasting political influence with military power as a primary means, overtly or covertly used, appears to have proven not very successful. As a recent example, columnist Joseph Kraft noted that "the application of American force has gone hand in hand with a deterioration of security in both Lebanon and Central America."
Most Europeans understood the vital importance of the free flow of oil and other raw materials from the Middle East and from other more or less equally troubled Third World regions. They also realized the new dimension of threat to their security, as in Helmut Schmidt’s assessment, “There is no doubt about this: our [Western] security depends, among other things, on a secure supply of energy and other raw materials. The Soviet advance in Afghanistan, Yemen, Ethiopia, and Angola affects Western security interests for which the Atlantic Treaty does not give exhaustive geographical definition.” Yet the American reaction to the events in Iran and Afghanistan made many believe that the United States was determined to secure the flow of Middle East oil primarily by military means. The question of whether military means would produce the desired results raised some doubts, particularly in Europe, about the wisdom of such an approach and has caused fears about premature military involvements.

The out-of-area issue

Thus, the question of whether the Treaty would provide for a common defense against the new threats to Western security became burdened by the overriding military context that both the Americans and the Europeans put it in. With the Carter doctrine announced, the issue entered the Alliance debates under the heading of “out-of-area operations,” thus narrowing for the Alliance the complex problem of military contingencies—above all, placing it outside the perceived boundaries of the Alliance.

The publicly announced plans to build up a powerful US interventionary force for deployment primarily to the Persian Gulf region envisaged all
eventualities: further Soviet advances toward oil fields and sea lanes, Iranian attempts to "export" Islamic fundamentalism within the region, and domestic upheavals in Gulf states. Emphasizing a foremost European vital interest in that particular region, the United States has since attempted to gain substantial European military support for its planning. The American position on the issue in NATO has been based upon the notion that primarily Europe depends on Gulf oil. Consequently, the United States has demanded European stand-in forces for those American in-place and reinforcement troops slated for the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), and has expected allied participation in military contingencies in the Gulf region.

The demands have met with European reluctance for various reasons. First of all, the carving of a 300,000-man RDF out of the existing American military structure has considerable repercussions for NATO's defense planning in Europe. Another, yet less articulated, European argument appears to be that the United States would intervene to maintain the free flow of oil in any case, with or without allied participation and support. Interestingly, this argument seems to rely less on altruistic motives of the United States than on American national interests: America could neither afford the collapse of its allies nor get by without Middle East oil. Actually, a recent Congressional Research Service study regarding Western vulnerability to a disruption of Persian Gulf oil indicated that "in the short-term, the United States could suffer economically... in the same approximate range as would our allies in Western Europe and Japan."

Understandably, the European allies might have tried to avoid a more or less automatic military involvement. An American doctrine and contingency
plan, unilaterally formulated without prior consultation with the Europeans, could perhaps be executed one day without their consultation and concurrence. At any rate, the discussion of the imminent and increasingly tantalizing political problem—how to safeguard allied security interests in a wider sense than the mere military and in an area not geographically confined to Europe—has not substantially begun. The initial focus on possible military implications abroad and too many military problems for the Alliance, which apparently resulted from American intentions, may have blocked that discussion.

As signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty, all the allies have pledged to ensure by their close cooperation that the cohesion, strength, and collective will of their democracies, and the well-being of their peoples, would not be jeopardized. Yet there has been a lot of argument about where the constitutional aims of the Alliance could and should be secured and, if necessary, defended. Because of their introduction as “out-of-area operations,” the global Alliance concerns have been displaced by considerations of the “constitutional” boundaries of the Alliance and the role of military cooperation therein.

Former NATO Secretary General Josef Luns stressed “the essentially political nature, the political dimension of our alliance as a power instrument for joint decisionmaking,” and he seemed convinced that the Alliance had the potential for coping with the new challenges from outside its area. However, he made his remarks in 1979, before the sequence of crises that drove NATO from troubled waters into really treacherous currents. And even then many observers would have questioned the secretary general’s rather optimistic view. Only a few optimists recall with him the
rare occasions of successful joint decisionmaking, such as the initial stages of the Harmel strategy and the cases of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations.

The secretary general's rosy notion may have been duty-bound. Nevertheless, his point is valid that even with a view to global problems, the Alliance has a constitutional basis for political cooperation and joint decisionmaking beyond the classical locus of East-West confrontation. Mr. Luns referred explicitly to the Atlantic Declaration of 1974. This declaration did aim at close consultation and cooperation in common interests "affected by events in other areas of the world," but it achieved little if anything to this end, as subsequent controversies in the Alliance have proven. (Nonetheless, this declaration deserves special attention in the context of political consultation in NATO, to be dealt with later.) As the basis for political cooperation, the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 may provide better arguments for the secretary general's point—if not interpreted from a minimalist standpoint. A maximalist approach, on the other hand, may overlook the real limitation set by the "constitution" of the Alliance, the Treaty.

**Constitutional boundaries of the Alliance**

A closer look at the Treaty's language would help in considering the ongoing debate about the purpose, scope, and range of the Alliance. No Council communiqué and no declaration could have the same relevance, the same binding value as the Treaty itself. A close look can reveal how the Treaty relates to out-of-area issues or to global problems for the Alliance in general.
No doubt, the Alliance was created with a view to early postwar Europe's security rather than to the global defense of Western interests. But inherently, the political and economic defense of Europe was also embodied in the idea of a transatlantic Alliance. As British historian Michael Howard explained, the Alliance sprang more from the fear of political and economic disintegration of postwar Western Europe because of its weakness, disunity, and near economic collapse than from fear of a Soviet military attack. Unable to cope alone in case of such an attack, Western Europe needed America: for deterring the Soviets from military moves they might be tempted to use if political means for attaining their European objectives were thwarted. That premise appears not to have changed.

The Alliance has served America's security as well. The collapse of Western Europe and its falling under Soviet control would have deprived America of an ideal buffer area, and the loss would have had, perhaps not immediately but in due course, grave consequences for America's security. Despite some opinions to the contrary, what Henry Kissinger said in 1966 may still hold true for most Americans: “We [Americans] have to make up our minds that no matter how serious may be our involvements in Vietnam and in other parts of the world, our international success or failure will ultimately be determined in the Atlantic area.” As another American, Kenneth Myers, stated, beyond the mutual security interests involved, “the Alliance has been based on a common commitment to democracy and on a shared cultural heritage rather than merely reflecting a military marriage of convenience.”
Nothing reflects the common transatlantic spirit of the early years better than the Preamble of the Treaty:

The parties of this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.16

The supreme aim of the signatories, the raison d'etre for the Treaty, is “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples” and “to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.” No words in the Preamble, or in the subsequent Treaty Articles 1 through 14, indicate that this supreme aim was only seen likely to be threatened by one specific adversary, and from one specific area, and by military means only.

From the Preamble, it could be taken that safeguarding the central values of the signatories is a defense a tous azimuts. Threats would not have to be discriminated by source or kind; only their potential impact on these declared values would really matter. The loss of energy and raw material resources, as well as turmoil in the international system, would have certain impacts on these highly esteemed values for the North Atlantic nations, even without Soviet machinations. Consequently, a threat to these values could
trigger the defense reaction of the Alliance, no matter who is the threatening adversary, no matter where the threat may surface.

The Atlantic Treaty gives no exhaustive geographical definition for Western security interests. The Treaty is geographically unlimited, because it is not directed against a more or less undefined adversary but toward preservation of common values globally. Article 2, expressis verbis, mentions the whole international system, obliging the signatories not only to look after their own stability and well-being but also to promote such conditions in the whole international arena:

The parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.

A legalistic, verbatim interpretation, neglecting the common political interpretation, should not obstruct the view: too often legalistic arguments concerning the Treaty have been used to cloud the political reasoning behind it.

**Defined limitations of the Treaty**

To state it clearly, the only definite geographical limitation of the Treaty is tied to a specific condition: it applies only in case of armed attack against one or more of the member nations. This condition has apparently been overlooked when reference is made in public discussion to NATO's confined area, to the so-called constitutional boundary of the Alliance. Article 5 specifies this condition, the mutual assistance
clause, which has become the basis for the military integration system of the Alliance:

The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them ... will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Article 6 further defines the area meant by “in Europe or North America,” the geographical area where the condition applies:

For the purpose of Article V an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the occupation forces of any party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the parties.

This article was revised twice: first, “on the accession of Greece and Turkey to include the territory of Turkey and expressly the Mediterranean Sea”; second, when France declared to the Council the independence of Algeria. Consequently, from Articles 5 and 6 it is to be taken that the only case in which Alliance members are obligated to provide mutual assistance in case of armed attack is when the attack is within a geographically limited area. (The fold-out map on page 167 shows this geographical area.)

Notably, Articles 5 and 6 deal with the obligation for assistance within a prescribed area. This assistance
is not limited to nor must it amount to the use of military force. In contrast to the obligation, the right to assist each other in whatever way and circumstance is not restrained by the Treaty; the only guidelines are the aims of the Treaty as set forth in the Preamble and in Article 2. Those aims, however, could be interpreted to mean that voluntary mutual assistance, including military aid, may not be limited at all, with regard to the purpose of safeguarding the constitutional aims of the Treaty, no matter from where those aims were threatened. Accordingly, the North Atlantic Treaty does not preclude defensive military action as an Alliance beyond the area defined in Article 6. Legalistically, military presence of the Alliance in, for instance, the Persian Gulf, under the NATO flag and command, would be covered by the language of the Treaty.

In essence, the Treaty does not give exhaustive or constraining geographical definitions for the purpose of cooperative, combined, and coordinated political, economic, and military actions, provided those actions are essentially defensive and compatible with the stated values. There is no constitutional limitation in the Treaty against the allies acting as an alliance in pursuit of the active principles of contribution to and promotion of peace and stability in international relations as described in Article 2. Ways and means, of course, must comply with the UN charter. The understanding of the Treaty may be different in the separate member countries for various reasons, but the law of the Treaty could hardly be cited as an excuse for a lack of Alliance contributions toward solving international problems.
The Alliance at an impasse

There are actual and potential conflict areas with considerable bearing on Western security interests where allied efforts—common, coordinated, or with shared responsibilities—could achieve better results than individual approaches. Yet instead of discussing within the Alliance the opportunities and possibilities for contributing to just and peaceful solution of those issues, the Alliance appears to be in a stalemate concerning European military participation in Persian Gulf contingencies. Officials of the Alliance and of member nations too often argue that NATO’s composition and structure and the diversity of viewpoints within the Alliance prevent action as an alliance on issues outside Europe. Yet the Alliance has formal grounds and structure to deal with global issues. What appears to be lacking are serious political attempts to reconcile the diversity of political and economic viewpoints on such issues. The search for a global Western political strategy should not be proscribed by unilateral policies, preempted by military strategies, or impaired by imprudent scruples against a show of joint and allied military power when appropriate.

That the Alliance is stuck at an impasse with the question of how to deal with those threats to Western well-being emanating from the Third World is revealed by a look at the communique of the North Atlantic Council meeting in Paris in June 1983. It shows that in the three years since the Afghanistan invasion, almost no progress has been made toward a common political basis for dealing with the problem. Positions appear unchanged. The United States still favors a predominantly military approach, plotting RDF deployment contingency plans and seeking assistance
for the immensely difficult task of deploying and supporting such a force. European bases would be needed, as well as other “springboards” in countries closer to the “theaters of operations.” Most of the European allies, however, appear stubbornly reluctant to devote to the issue more than a lip-service acknowledgment of the existing problem. They seem to be fixed on a position of leave-it-to-the-Americans, but they criticize the United States for whatever it does or does not do. They expect American resistance and counteraction to the Soviet Union’s taking chances in the Third World; as Minister Genscher said, “The Soviet challenge is political and military in nature—it can be countered effectively only by political and military means.” But when America thought it had counteracted, as in the case of Grenada, many Europeans seemed only too ready to denounce US actions.

Dealing with American demands for supportive or even joint action out-of-area is considered a matter to be left to individual national discretion. Nevertheless, there are common European political positions for most global issues, often distinctly different from American positions. The European positions are shaped in the EPC, and concepts are worked out in that institution rather than in Alliance forums that would include the United States. In many cases there appears to be a lack of political cooperation and reconciliation of such genuine European positions with those of the United States.

When Europeans fear being dragged into military commitments by a unilateral American policy that they do not or cannot influence, and when America resorts so often to unilateral positions and actions, questions arise about the practicability of that instrument of the
Alliance thought to ensure allied cooperation in all areas: political consultation.

*Is the consultation system adequate?*

There cannot be lasting cooperation in defense and divergence in foreign policies—the allied governments had heard this warning already in 1956 from the Three Wise Men. Could nation-states agree to pool their ultimate means to *guarantee national survival*, their military forces, if they would not agree on policies devised for the same purpose? Military cooperation among the allies and integration of separate national forces in an interallied military command structure could hardly endure without a common basic political understanding. Thus, the member countries originally recognized that political cooperation in a coalition of sovereign democracies seemed obligatory. The Treaty reflects that insight, the necessity of a common foreign policy line as the bedrock for the common defense against Soviet attempts at hegemony in Europe. Political and, to a lesser degree, economic cooperation have been constitutional demands of the Alliance, clearly expressed by the whole text of the Treaty, except the two articles that deal solely with military cooperation. The international environment of the early years, however, required emphasis on establishing military cooperation and on building an adequate organization to this end: NATO.

As long as Europe has been the number one target of communist pressures, a common policy as the basis for common military defense preparations has been widely achieved. Political consultation has generally worked, within the early established NATO system, in the rather narrow European politico-military sense—with CSCE, MBFR, and perhaps the INF
negotiations best representing the achievements of such coordination efforts. Such cooperation has remained adequate not only during the time when America had political, economic, and military domination in the Alliance, but also when intra-Alliance relationships had changed toward a weightier European role—first economically and then politically and militarily. Yet political and economic cooperation and coordination beyond the immediate needs to improve the military defense of Europe have stopped short. Cooperation has been limited in the area of organizational and procedural requirements to implement the Treaty fully in these aspects of allied policies.

The mutual perceptions of the respective roles of America and Europe have played a significant part in the failures of political consultation and cooperation for extra-European issues. But the system itself, political consultation in NATO, may have contributed to some extent to these failures and to the subsequent crises within the Alliance. The organizational structure of NATO and its system for political consultation may not suffice for a wider role. Different structures and instruments in the Alliance may be necessary to attempt more consensus, and hence policy coordination, on issues not closely related to the military defense of Europe.

When political cooperation is necessary to avoid disunity in foreign policies, consultation is an indispensable requisite. In an alliance of sovereign nations, consultation is the only way to build political cooperation and eventually to achieve the coordination of allied foreign policies. It becomes particularly necessary when political issues beyond Europe’s geographical horizon and severe economic problems determine the Alliance agenda. Many of the perceptual
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and institutional problems in the Alliance would not arise or could be overcome more easily if political cooperation and, to this end, consultation worked better.

**Definitional shortfalls**

Consultation in NATO may not work too well simply because it is not mandatory under the law of the Treaty. In reality, consultation is handled as an option rather than as an obligation. Its common definitions are too flexible to enforce the kind of cooperation needed to cope with the political and economic environment of the Alliance today. In addition, appearing at times more as an incantation than as a seriously and meticulously followed diplomatic practice, consultation, when it malfunctions, has often become an issue in itself.

Lack of consultation, or of sufficient and timely consultation, has frequently been alleged by the allies to reproach each other. Over time, the tool of consultation has occasionally appeared to become more important than the product it should bring about: cooperation and coordination. Its mere implementation often seems to be seem as a substitute for successes in political cooperation.

Some authors, like the longtime cabinet director of the secretary general of NATO, S.I.P. van Campen, argue that the consultation system is, as an instrument, sufficient and well organized, and that its failures are merely a result of the "occasional absence of will by member governments" to make use of it. From other accounts of other insiders, however, it is clear that the consultation system is not the well-prepared, well-moderated, and satisfactory
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instrument that it often appears to be in NATO reports. Harlan Cleveland, for example, provided valuable insights into the workings of the Alliance and the "flexibility" of the consultation system.19

Indeed, the Alliance's main problem with the political consultation system appears to be the rather unlimited flexibility it has provided for its use. The Treaty calls for political and economic collaboration; Article 2 explicitly mentions it. But the requirement of a common political position is not a rule of the North Atlantic Treaty; nor is consultation, as the negotiating instrument to avoid conflict or coordinate the foreign policies of the allies, linked to political cooperation. It is even questionable whether the Treaty as international law really sets a requirement for consultation at all. Article 4 contains the only—and rather vague—hint at the principle of consultation: "The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened."

Cleveland and others, though, have noted that the very purpose and structure of the Treaty imply a commitment to consultation. But even with this implied commitment, the meaning of the term consultation and how it should be exercised are not clear. Article 4 defines only the circumstances under which the allies will consult. The invocation of consultation is related to a perceived threat to the political independence and security of any of the parties, thus leaving wide room for the opinion of any of them. Given such a wide range of interpretation left to the discretion of any ally, it hardly matters how much the formula, "will consult," is binding in terms of international law.
Consultation as an option

This flexibility in interpretation can be seen positively, of course. NATO’s official handbook states that the “Permanent Representatives of member countries raise any political problems which their governments, or they themselves, consider merit discussion.” Cleveland’s description reflects quite a different angle:

Consultation can mean imparting information unilaterally; exchanging information bilaterally or multilaterally; notifying others of national decisions already taken, but without expecting any reaction on their part; notifying others of decisions already taken, in such a way as to build consent for them; consulting in advance on national actions that affect the interests of others; consulting internationally to ascertain in advance the possible reaction to a national decision not yet made (that is, as input to the national decision itself); consulting in advance on a matter lending itself to separate parallel national actions by others; or consulting for the purpose of arriving at a decision which by its nature must be taken or carried into action collectively.

In practice, consultation is an option, one extremely flexible in application. This basically optional character of political consultation has inhibited it considerably. Considerations of diplomatic confidentiality, of balancing domestic political forces and bureaucracies, and of keeping national options open are essential ingredients of the national decisionmaking process in foreign policy. One or the other of such concerns will inevitably gain more attention in national bureaucracies when participation of the allies, or of some of the allies, in the process of policy shaping is a matter of choice rather than an obligation. Truly, an alliance may not be reason enough for its member nations to disclose to the others all angles
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and corners of their foreign policies at all times. *Gleichschaltung*—synchronization—of foreign policies has not been achieved even in such a rigid "alliance" as the Warsaw Pact. However, when abundant consultation options are available, as Cleveland has described them, they will be used. Then, questions of whether, when, and with whom to consult about what foreign issues become factors in the national decisionmaking process. These consultation options enter deliberations as intrinsic elements of the policy line for a specific issue and the strategy for its implementation. That is to say, the policy line for the issue at stake is not solely defined by the assessment of its political factors but also by assumed implications of reactions of allies if they were consulted. Under such prevailing circumstances for consultation, the Alliance has found itself time and again wrestling with the lack of consultation as an issue per se, apart from or on top of the debates about the underlying specific political or economic issues.²²

Although it has lacked consultation, the Alliance has never lacked good advice for improvements of its political consultation procedures. NATO has also elaborated its system, adding committees and groups to assist its main consultation forum, the Council, in its multiple tasks. The "Report on Non-military Cooperation in NATO," compiled by the Three Wise Men in 1956, has been unmatched in its effort to define political consultation and link it to distinct purposes. The principles recommended by the Three at that time, and endorsed by all members, still appear as the best guidelines for consultation. They have formed a certain basis for political consultation ever since. In addition, the purpose of consultation, as stated in the 1956 report, has not lost its timeliness: "Where common
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interests of the Atlantic community are at stake consultation should always seek to arrive at timely agreement on common lines of policy and action." But the Harmel Report of 1967 reflected already worrisome experience with, and the dilemma of, those solemn principles: "As sovereign states . . . the allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collective decisions." Overall, the experience in the Alliance has shown that if consultation is merely a recommendation it is subject to the judgment, taste, and style of each government—to how governments decide to move between the minimum expectancy in consultation (that is, to avoid unpleasant surprises for the others) and the maximum (that is, to coordinate national positions and policies with others). Governments may also decide not to move at all, because, as Cleveland noted, "even close allies do not consult each other any more than they have to." Because consultation is not obligatory in the Treaty, "for each government there are clear and present inhibitions to sharing with others its analysis of a delicate situation, its information about diplomatic contacts, and especially the opportunity to influence its own national policy." Governments are inclined to keep all their options open, including the option of consulting.

Numerous attempts at improvement

The strongest effort to put the objective of political and economic cooperation in step with consultation was undertaken with the Ottawa "Declaration on Atlantic Cooperation" of 1974. Its importance for the future of the Alliance and its influence on transatlantic relations were emphasized by the fact that the heads of government had conferred and agreed upon this
declaration. After some successive crises in transatlantic relations, ranging from political and economic to military strategic issues, the Alliance leaders wanted to achieve harmonious political and economic relations, to remove sources of conflict among their economic policies, and to encourage economic cooperation. The highest authorities in the Alliance stated that the fulfillment of their common aims "requires the maintenance of close consultation, cooperation and mutual trust," and that "they are firmly resolved to keep each other fully informed and to strengthen the practice of frank and timely consultations by all means."26

The cooperative spirit reflected in this summit declaration was necessary. Past events like the 1973 Middle East war, or the surprising abruptness with which America had ended, without any consultation, the gold convertibility of its currency in 1971, and, last but not least, the tumultuous Year of Europe in 1973 had seriously strained transatlantic relations and threatened to suffocate cooperative efforts altogether. Finally, with the Middle East and Vietnam settlements, the air seemed to be cleared enough for a renewal of old pledges and a quest for new approaches in Alliance cooperation. And not merely transatlantic relations had to be put in order. Changes in the strategic situation and the impact of events in other areas of the world on the Alliance had created different premises for the renewal of transatlantic cooperative efforts. To this end, a solemn declaration, signed by the leaders of the Alliance, certainly meant more than communiques on the ministerial level. This declaration, therefore, was widely seen as a commitment to consultation as an obligation, although it was not
explicitly stated as such. Failure to consult still would not violate any legal norm of the Alliance.

Some experts in international law maintain, however, that international agreements could well create international obligations for the signatories. In addition, such expectations, reinforced by practice and by affirmations over time of the appropriate decision-makers, could create a norm that would have the force of international law. Should not a declaration signed by the heads of government have that normative character? But shortly after it was signed, Secretary of State Kissinger disclaimed any legal force of the declaration. Kissinger explained to the press that "it had always been the American view that a declaration does not represent a set of legal obligations." Concerning the principle of consultation, he told the press that "it is obvious that no one can be compelled to consult." Asserting a Council statement of 1951 in this regard, Cleveland, as an American and an expert in NATO practice, had concluded that in practice the US government "recognizes with realism and tolerance that it is really up to the big member of the club to set the tone and timing of consultation on big issues." Kissinger knew, of course, about this reality in the Alliance. Nevertheless, he promised that the United States would meticulously implement the principle of consultation. But then he immediately devalued this promise: "You can't wave a paper at somebody and tell him he's obliged to consult if he doesn't want to consult." The "big member in the club" thus set a tone for consultation rather different from the apparent intention of the declaration.

Kissinger's notion could also affect the interpretation of the Treaty itself, because it too is only "a paper." The parliamentary ratification of the Treaty
cannot make that document so much different than the Atlantic Declaration, which did not have to be ratified. And even unratified papers can cause voluntary obligations, as has been proven with the SALT II Treaty—if there is the will to abide by their terms. The declaration could have provided for the obligatory norm to consult, provided there was the will of member governments. That will did not appear. Business as usual soon resumed in the Alliance. No new avenue was devised toward a “gearing of policies” (Kissinger) to address new realities.

Indeed, nothing had changed. Other solemn promises followed. Each American president since 1974 has reaffirmed the American will to improve the process of political consultation, to accept equal partnership in the Alliance, and implicitly to cooperate in all fields of relations between the allies. But all formulas tried after Ottawa failed to reach even the same degree of verbal commitment. They remained slippery enough to mean anything or nothing, for Americans as well as for the Europeans, and thus were mainly ineffective. The founding fathers of the Treaty had left the Alliance with a “legislation,” Article 4 in particular, too indistinct and too open to interpretation to suffice for use in practice. All efforts of the Council, of committees, groups, and wise men to put commonly agreed upon principles, suggestions, and recommendations in place of the missing norm of consultation have deserved some merit but fallen short of one aim: they could not substitute for an obligation to consult. For this reason, successful political and economic cooperation have remained daydreams in the Alliance, whereas the nightmares of frequent failures of such cooperation seem to haunt the Alliance continuously.
Two more Alliance summits—in Washington in 1978 and in Bonn in 1982—convened and issued declarations. At the Washington summit, the leaders of the Alliance rather dilatorily renewed their pledge to consult with one another about the common goals and purposes of the Alliance for the years ahead, then concentrated exhaustively on the prospects of detente and arms control issues and on improvements in defense efforts.

At the time of the Bonn summit in 1982, prospects for detente had suffered serious blows as a result of the events in Afghanistan and Poland. Because of the developments in the Third World, around the Persian Gulf in particular, the stage should have been set for a reassessment of the profoundly changed international situation and for common, operative political planning ranging beyond the Atlantic area. Political cooperation and coordination of Western policies, and to this end effective consultation, seemed more urgent than ever before. All nations in the Alliance, and other Western nations, had to face new threats to vital interests. Nevertheless, the Bonn Declaration had amazingly little to say about this new and major concern for the Alliance. The role of consultation appeared rather played down. In the declaration, the allied leaders stated that “all of us have an interest in peace and security in other regions of the world,” and that “we will consult together as appropriate on events in these regions which may have implications for our security, taking into account our commonly identified objectives.” If the common political aims were still those of the Treaty, “consultation as appropriate” was certainly inadequate in view of the profoundly changed international situation.
In the “Document on Integrated NATO Defense,” attached to the Bonn Declaration, heads of government became more specific about collaboration and consultation on military matters. Noting the threatening developments beyond the NATO area, the need to consult was expressly reaffirmed but essentially limited to “taking full account . . . of the national interests of member countries” and of strictly national competence in this field beyond the NATO area. The message of the rather flowery language dealing with the out-of-area issue and the respective consultation problem amounted to a statement that individual members could and should do out-of-area whatever they deemed appropriate, but according to national—not Alliance—assessment. Should members plan to act militarily, they needed to consult only if their actions would have immediate impact on the defense of the NATO area.

The divergent policies and the rifts in the Alliance after Iran, Afghanistan, and Poland should have made clear the detrimental effects of uncoordinated policies for the common Western cause and the inherent danger for Western political cohesion. In Bonn, it appeared instead as if the heads of government stated publicly their national reservations about a common and coordinated approach toward developments beyond the NATO area. The “need to consult” was not tied to identifying the requirements and the necessary actions for countering the new threats but was meticulously linked instead to maintaining the status quo in the military posture within Europe, within “NATO’s area.” At the Bonn summit, the Alliance appeared to be far away from the objectives of political consultation and cooperation on out-of-area issues.
Increasing lack of consultation

As the frequency of summits has increased since Ottawa, so have the troubles with political cooperation and consultation. The successive crises have amounted to a severe, continuous strain on Alliance cohesion. Lack of political cooperation beyond NATO's horizon has estranged Europeans and Americans more than any other issue. Helmut Schmidt, doubtlessly an Atlanticist and by his long tenure one of the best sources for insight concerning the Alliance, gave bitter-sounding accounts of the development of political consultation since the Ottawa summit. On various occasions, he complained of the lack of consultation and its destructive effects on allied relations, on arms limitation and control issues, on economic issues, on embargoes and boycotts, on Third World policies, and on dealings with the Soviet Union. "As chancellor I worked under four US presidents, and it's quite an experience... I've become greatly troubled by [the American] handling of allies and friends," he said in an interview with The Washington Post. He cited examples of American political actions that affected the common interests of the other Alliance members, who only later learned about those actions through the press. Though other Europeans may not be as candid, they nevertheless are as concerned about the events and their impact on the Alliance.

The deplorable lack of political harmony, cooperation, and understanding may not be a result solely of the neglect of consultation between the United States and Europe, although this is an important factor contributing to the malaise. It cannot be expected that with improved political consultation Europeans and Americans would almost automatically arrive at
common positions and coordinated policies, and that they would forswear unilateral and surprise actions. To reach the best compromise among the positions of sixteen nations, or even between an American and a European position, is a difficult venture. In some cases, compromise may not be possible at all. Consultation should not mean that the Europeans must adopt the American position or that the United States must be convinced by the Europeans. Appeasement of the strongest ally or alignment with the majority must not be the only alternatives, because neither one has a corner on wisdom. The majority arguments are not always wrong because the Europeans, individually and collectively, lack the effective military power to be fully respected. The position of the superpower ally cannot always be wrong just because America has all the elements of power and the intention to rely on them to make its arguments heard in the world.

**Europeans as stronger partners**

Strong allied positions must be ardently debated and negotiated, but reached through timely, frank, and comprehensive discussions and assessments among all allies. A true consultation process would not eliminate the possibility of differing opinions and national reservations, but would probably reduce the frequency of their occurrences, because all members would gain better insights into and more chances to influence the decision-making. Such a process could prove that most Europeans would participate in a global Western policy with responsibilities according to the respective political, economic, and military capacities and sustaining public support.
A common strategy could emerge if the United States would let the Europeans participate more in global policy, would grant them a voice and respect it in the process of shaping global policy, and would still be willing to carry as a superpower the major burden of the policy's realization. With only few exceptions, Europeans will be able to contribute little more than token military support, but they can adopt an active policy of economic and political support to help in stabilizing the unsteady, conflict-threatened regions outside Europe. And in some situations, firm European commitment in those regions could perhaps be more helpful in furthering Western interests than direct, mostly military involvement of the American superpower.

In any respect, European contributions, particularly when coordinated and combined, could have a share in a Western policy strategy for global affairs. As Kissinger observed in 1976, a "vital and cohesive Western Europe is an irreplaceable weight on the scales of global diplomacy. American policy can only gain by having a strong partner of parallel moral purposes." To avoid American policies they do not like would require active and cooperative engagement of the Europeans.

Many Europeans, and Canadians too, seemed startled by the American reactions to Iran, Afghanistan, and Poland. Some uncomfortable feelings have lingered over the conspicuous emphasis of military means in American concepts for a favorable world
NATO, as the organizational incarnation of the Alliance, has its origins in Article 9 of the Treaty:

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles III and V.

That the organization was formed primarily under the compulsion of a commonly perceived military threat is still reflected in its structure. Over time the organization has also been infected by internal proliferation, creating a vast number of committees, boards, working groups, panels, and the like. There is hardly any aspect related to military defense left uncovered by one, or sometimes more, organizational efforts of NATO. However, only about three of the nineteen principal committees of the Council could be related to political cooperation beyond military-political affairs stemming from the common military efforts. Out of five divisions of the International Staff of the secretary general, only the Political Division may obtain a level of abstraction above NATO's military activities, dealing as it does with political cooperation and consultation in broader terms and preparing the ground for the “diplomatic workshop,” the North Atlantic Council. NATO as a whole similarly defines distinct elements in the mechanism of political consultation: the Council, the Political Committee, Regional Expert Committees, ad hoc Political Working Groups, and the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group.
order, as observed in the Middle East, in Central America, and in the Caribbean. On the other hand, the impression among Americans—that the allies' usual insistence on and dedication to close consultations have diminished considerably since the invasion of Afghanistan—may not be so far-fetched. Real consultations can eventually mean engagement and a commitment to share responsibilities and burdens, which is indeed, as stated by Cleveland, the crucial question of true consultation: "When subjects touching the vital interests of all allies become operational, allies must in their own interest consult for real," and "they must be prepared to take the responsibility of being consulted for real—and contracting some obligation to act on (or be restricted by) their own advice." Some Europeans are often quick and loud in demanding more political influence in the Alliance but seem rather shy and reluctant in accepting the consequences in terms of responsibility and burden.

Organizational shortfalls

Procedures and organizations can outlive their usefulness. NATO, the organization, claims for itself that it has always modified its structures and procedures. Perhaps these changes have come about too slowly and inadequately for the urgencies of the moment, yet eventually they have come. In the case of political cooperation and consultation in global affairs, NATO is still a captive of its success in securing peace in Europe. Its basic institutions, their terms of reference, and their negotiating instruments have adapted only little, if at all, to the changed environment. It appears as if NATO has tried to cope with tomorrow's challenges within the structures of yesterday.
With the Council as the decisionmaking institution, the Political Committee represents its working level. Set up on recommendation of the Three Wise Men in 1957, it is charged with “keeping abreast of political trends and developments of interest to NATO in all areas of the world, preparing studies of political problems for discussion by the Council and submitting reports to it on subjects to be debated.” The constraints for this seemingly uninhibited consultation over the whole range of possible issues in the Council and in the Political Committee are to be found in the rule that working papers and reports for political consultation are based upon information more or less willingly supplied by national delegations. The actual issues for discussion and the profundity and timeliness of the consultations are determined by the national representatives in the consultative bodies. So the agendas can be set up only by agreement of all delegations. The excessively optional character of consultation will again limit its use. There are, of course, “hallway consultations” that may involve only specific delegations but perhaps different agendas. This kind of very informal “consultation,” however, is not the subject here.

Undoubtedly, NATO has tried to make the best of the prevailing circumstances. It has tried to intertwine as many activities of member governments as possible with one or the other forum, on either a standing or ad hoc basis. It has even tried to remove some burdens from the governments by addressing specific, at times exotic, themes with specialized expert groups. And yet this extensive conference diplomacy depends for its outcome entirely on the willingness of member governments to give inputs, to consider NATO's
efforts seriously, and to pay attention to the eventual results of consensus reached in NATO headquarters.

**NATO headquarters and capitals: the perception gap**

For those officials involved in the machinery in Brussels—the NATO officials and the members of national delegations—as opposed to those who watch from the distance of the administrations in various capitals, the NATO system may have a different quality and importance. What Cleveland observed for the Americans—that "the advantages of consultation are bound to be more obvious to the full-time consulters, such as an Ambassador at NATO headquarters, than to officials preoccupied with executive decisionmaking and congressional salesmanship in Washington"—is certainly true for other nations too. In addition, the immediate actors in any organization tend to feel stronger about their immediate organizational web than do those acting outside this particular organization and perhaps far away from it. To a large degree, members of organizations tend to link their identity to the importance they attribute to their organization. It is only human for the individuals acting in a particular organization to attribute more importance to it than do others acting as part of another organization, which they in turn hold more important.

Individuals in international and multinational organizations may be even more tempted to develop such organizational identities and eventually to overestimate the function and influence of their organization. The distance from the national reference system can further a need to compensate with more integration in the international organization than would be likely in any national organization. The national
The longer the tour of duty served in an international organization, the more the international environment, what Cleveland calls the "diplomatic community," is likely to fill a perceived identity gap. Not only employees of international organizations, who are supposed to put aside their nationality anyway for the time they serve, are subject to such influences. To a lesser yet still noticeable degree, this phenomenon occurs with members of national delegations attached to international organizations. In NATO's headquarters in Brussels, a specific environment enhances this effect. The Secretariat, the International Staff, and all national delegations are housed in a single building, with the effect that "the unusual degree of political intimacy maintained among the Permanent Representatives on the NATO Council, and among their key functional superordinates, is partly the product of propinquity."  

Officials involved in a multinational organization like NATO may be tempted to overvalue the intra-organizational mechanisms, the results achieved, and their impact back home. Those in the national administrations and thus close to the national decisionmaking centers, on the other hand, are tempted to devalue the views, opinions, and recommendations relayed to them from the NATO outpost. Matters of importance and urgency as seen in NATO headquarters sometimes have different dimensions as seen from capitals. The two machineries are often in different gears. It is questionable whether consultation on global developments, made mandatory and better defined but tied to the existing NATO structure, could alone offset this inherent incompatibility.

The whole NATO organization is streamlined for military cooperation, which, in spite of occasional
differences of opinions, is still a success story. Political cooperation beyond immediate military necessities, however, has remained rather provisional and ad hoc. NATO's important political forums still deal essentially with the political superstructure of common military defense efforts, with related politico-military and defense economy issues, and with East-West relations in Europe. One may argue that the structural and procedural development, some say explosion, of NATO has always responded to the needs of the hour. But whatever structures and procedures have been improved over time, those for political and economic cooperation in the Alliance have received less attention than those for military cooperation.

The few major achievements of the Alliance in political consultation and cooperation needed a specific structure within, or superimposed on, the NATO mechanism, an indication that the existing system may have not been capable enough to support specific political demands. Time and again, high-level groups composed of specially tasked senior officials from various capitals had to facilitate consultation and cooperation among the allies—for example, in the preparatory work for the MBFR talks and the CSCE, for the Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP), and for NATO's dual-track decision of 1979.

More than likely, the dual-track decision could not have been achieved had not two interlinked special groups consisting of high-level officials from allied capitals worked out that double track: the High Level Group (HLG) for the INF modernization part and the Special Consultative Group (SCG) for the arms control part. Both groups, established for some years now, are likely to last for more years to come. NATO headquarters had a share in shaping the decision and in
the follow-up measures, but apparently not the essential one. Examples seem to imply that the established consultation procedures and the organizational framework in NATO might not be adequate for more basic and far-reaching common decisionmaking for political cooperation on a global scale.

**Procedural and organizational evolutions**

The question remains, whether the existing consultative structure in NATO would be capable enough if consultation were more an obligation than a choice and better defined in terms of issues, content and purpose, timeliness, and participants; or whether a different organizational solution would enhance political cooperation and coordination, with consultation left optional and diffuse as it has been.

An examination of the dual-track decision, as an example, seems to reveal that even when governments are firmly resolved to consult each other for politically and strategically vital purposes, they apparently do not rely on the NATO consultation system alone. Although the permanent representatives in the Council are highly capable, high-ranking ambassadors, they are obviously considered to be too far from the national decisionmaking dynamics and the necessary interagency bargaining in capitals to become the sole trustees for interallied negotiating. As representatives, they may act, under the instructions of their respective governments, as spokesmen for all departments of their governments, thus representing not only their foreign ministers but all cabinet officers and heads of agencies concerned with a particular issue. But exchanging more or less official views on certain political questions and developments—even if such views may serve as valuable inputs for the national
policy-finding processes of others—is quite different from consulting about and perhaps even negotiating essential national policy lines on very important issues. By their nature, such positions have to be internally balanced in each country and depend largely on interdepartmental support.

A consultation process relying on the “diplomatic workshop” features of the Council in Permanent Session would, then, be a rather cumbersome process, wherein every suggestion in the consultation process in the Council that could affect a carefully balanced national position would have to be relayed to the capitals for repeated interdepartmental assessment and eventual cabinet-level approval. Therefore, governments seem to favor sending high officials for the more important consultations. In most cases, those officials will also be tasked with the responsibility of achieving interdepartmental compromise; by being empowered to reach into the national departments and agencies concerned, they will have some room to maneuver during consultations. The permanent representatives in the Council and their political advisers in the committees are usually bound by their instructions, with rather narrowly defined power to bend them. So even if consultation were mandatory, the very important or time-critical issues would hardly be handled solely in the Council in Permanent Session.

On the other hand, if consultation remained as optional as it presently is, organizational alternatives would probably cause little improvement. To establish, for instance, regular or case-by-case meetings of high-level authorities with interdepartmental authority and negotiating flexibility would hardly be different from the present system of ministerial meetings. When foreign or defense ministers meet twice a year,
thoroughly prepared by their bureaucracies, they give only final approval to communiques prepared long in advance by the "working levels." Ministers, even heads of government, could, however, meet more often and on short notice when the need arose. So far, the biennial routine for ministerial meetings has not been changed, leaving open the question of how serious a crisis has to be to break this routine. Aside from emergencies, it is of no use to consider more meetings unless real consultation across the board becomes more of an obligation for all member governments.

Despite all criticism, it should not be inferred that an overall assessment of the existing NATO machinery for consultation and cooperation must be negative. There are the many, if small, successes in continuous day-to-day efforts. Far more informal consultation and cooperation among the allies is taking place than is publicly realized. Consultations have already given greater prominence to Third World issues. It appears, however, that official NATO language may paint the present capacity and attitudes of the NATO bureaucracy and the capitals a bit too rosily and to complacently. The future security of the Alliance will likely depend on its ability to arrive at political consensus on developments and actions in areas remote from Europe. Political and economic cooperation, therefore, and to this end consultation, has to be stretched far beyond the present practice and vision to keep this Alliance viable and to establish it perhaps as a nucleus for the cooperation of all Western, Western-minded, or Western-oriented countries. When interests are convergent, this Alliance should find ways to cope with the political, economic, and last but not least, military challenges from outside its military defense perimeter.
To this end, political cooperation in the Alliance on global issues should be sought as an obligation; such cooperation must be the rule rather than the exception. Coordinated political strategies are urgently needed. Coordinated efforts for military contingencies, as an indication of ultimate resolve, have to be included. Neither an improved consultation process nor organizational innovations alone will suffice for these objectives. Both close, timely, meaningful, and almost mandatory consultations and evolutionary procedural and organizational changes in NATO appear indispensable.
Change in the political responsiveness of the Alliance depends upon a greater readiness of the allies to identify the present obstacles to better political cooperation and coordination, which in turn represent most of the causes of the present Alliance difficulties. The beginning of democratization of the defense debate on both sides of the Atlantic has opened the public forums for addressing security issues. But public debate in the West should be somewhat broadened from the single issue of nuclear deterrence to a more balanced discussion of Western security issues, including those old and new questions that public debates have by-passed in the past. Public information and education, on both sides of the Atlantic, are necessary to ensure continued acceptance of the
long-successful transatlantic security arrangements and of their broadening to new necessities.

**Threat perception and Western publics**

Opinion leaders in the West would have to address the global challenges to Western interests and security, neither playing down nor overdramatizing their features and possible impacts. Western publics would have to realize that war is still possible—and still possible in Europe—and that while peace has been preserved in Western Europe for nearly forty years, about a fourth of the world's countries, forty-five nations, are now fighting wars. It should be understood why the West could not accept losing such a war. That Western security, particularly European security, can no longer be geographically limited is also a lesson learned from the oil crises. Many Europeans seem to have too quickly forgotten these shocks. Western Europeans would have to learn that defending Europe will also mean securing their free access to the raw materials and energy resources located in third World areas. Without these resources, Western industrial societies could hardly survive. More than in the past, European governments need to make clear to their publics the impact of disruptions in raw material flows.

Inherent in the increasingly interdependent international system is the danger of local crises and regional conflicts escalating to assume global aspects, inevitably involving nonregional powers, if not for their own self-interest then in the mutual interest of crisis management and containment. In a complex, interdependent world, indifference to conflict in far-away areas could become a dangerous attitude for Western nations.
A realistic understanding of the threat should convey a realistic perception of the Soviet Union’s role in it. This perception should neither minimize communist influence in troubled regions nor ideologically elevate the Soviet Union to the position of being the cause of all unrest in the world. Western publics should be aware, as an American author stated, that “the Soviet Union exploited antiracist and anticolonialist revolutions, as well as political and economic troubles, [that] the USSR often aggravated local and regional conflicts; nowhere did it create the conditions that generated the revolutionary pressures or the quest for Soviet arms.”

There is plenty of evidence that the Soviet Union has used its expanding power-projection capabilities to accumulate influence and power everywhere in the world, including the Third World. These Soviet endeavors may or may not be part of a long-term strategic plan. But before and along with communist exploitation of unstable regions, there are civil conflicts. Violence arises from socioeconomic, cultural, racial, and religious issues that Soviet (or Cuban) machinations do not cause. In any case, the volatile Third World presents a dimension of threat of its own to Western security that must not be regarded with indifference. It may not make so much difference whether the Soviets and their proxies are involved or not.

**Allied security beyond Europe’s defense**

Western publics should be made aware that military defense preparation against a Warsaw Pact aggression in Europe is not all of Alliance security. The big conventional or nuclear war in Europe may also rank rather low in the order of probability, despite the chilled East-West relations. The Third World is a more
likely source of major conflict between East and West. Complacency about the relative stability in Europe and lack of concern with instability elsewhere would amount to dangerous neglect, particularly in view of Western vulnerability to Soviet intentions and opportunism.

Soberly and properly explained, the multifaceted challenge to Western security, independence, and well-being should be well understood by the public in Alliance countries. Member governments have the task of informing, educating, and preparing their people, above all in matters of national security—the issue of INF modernization should be a lesson learned. In democracies, after all, security and foreign policy aims and tasks can be sustained only if they are well understood and supported by the people. The most promising effort in public information and education would be to agree on a common, overall threat analysis in the Alliance. The Alliance has developed, and updates yearly, a commonly agreed upon military threat analysis for the NATO area. A global threat analysis should not be beyond the Alliance's realm. Such a publicly presentable global threat analysis would have more impact by far on the Western public than one-paragraph sections in routine communiques or the overall rhetorical condemnation of the Soviet Union.

Policymaking, as the art of identifying the possible, is also the art of promoting and making possible the necessary. At present, public opinion seems deeply divided over an array of issues in the security debate, no more so in Western Europe than in the United States. It is the specialist's task, on both sides of the Atlantic, to prepare and agree on threat analyses. The politician's art would be to explain the threat
consistently to the public and to draw consistent conclusions from the analyses. Any change in Soviet internal and external behavior in the near future is not very likely, neither induced by Western nations’ opting out of power politics nor coerced by global bipolar confrontation. But when the Soviet Union is persistently trying to influence the international power balance in favor of its kind of socialism, then it may be in the West’s best interest to step on Soviet fingers before the whole hand is extended. As General Bernard Rogers has said, “the way ahead for the West lies neither in acquiescence to the Soviet menace nor in untempered hostility toward and lack of dialogue with the Kremlin. The former course would be a recipe for surrender, the latter a denial of hope for the future.” This message could be reasonably and properly explained to Western publics. The West could tender politically acceptable cooperation offers toward the East and provide firm resistance against persistent attempts by the Soviet Union to widen its sphere of influence.

Europe not self-concerned, America not seeking superiority

In public debate, questions will inevitably be raised about how much real concern there is in Western European countries about international developments and their security implications, and about whether it is really understood in the United States that the allies’ interests and views are as important to them as American interests are to Americans.

Fashionable mutual perceptions tend to typecast the Europeans as self-centered and less and less in tune with the United States in international interests,
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and tend to denounce the Americans as being on a dangerous quest for global superiority and world policing. Too often it is heard that Europeans and Americans have different interests in the world, that European interests are necessarily regional while only US national interests reach globally. It has become common to state differences in interests as unalterably “god-given” and to draw consequences from this “fact.” One names the symptoms without asking why they appear and how to overcome them, as this statement of a high-level American official reflects:

US and European interests are not always identical or even complementary. We are often economic competitors. We often have differing views of Third World or regional crises. We at times have contrasting assessments of the Soviet Union, the threat it poses, and how best to manage East-West relations.4

But are differing views and contrasting assessments really stumbling blocks in transatlantic relations, or perhaps only cobblestones on the way to a common appreciation of allied interests in the world? Global balance of power, stability and peace, and the furthering of all peoples’ well-being are as much in the national interest of Western European countries as in the US national interest. The ideological consensus in America behind a liberal and altruistic position may have weakened as national power and self-service have more often been advocated in open debate. Yet this observation may incompletely and misleadingly portray America. Certainly wrong is the minority, radical-chic contention, heard on both American and European campuses, that “there is no moral difference between the foreign policies of the USA and the USSR.”5 The view is not comprehensive, nor are
the spokesmen representative of their respective societies.

America is not the “ordinary country,” up to imperialist adventures abroad. Despite its many internal contradictions and some failures abroad, America still offers a model to the world, in its unique and successful form of society and government and in its professed opposition to all forms of autocracy, fascism, and Marxist dictatorship. America is not an ordinary, exclusively self-interested state. It is still guided by a vision, which may have been expressed best by Theodore Roosevelt: “We, here in America, hold in our hands the hope of the world, the fate of the coming years, and shame and disgrace will be ours if in our eyes the light of high resolve is dimmed, if we trail in the dust the golden hopes of men.” This vision underlies America’s foreign policies, and it drives a typical American intention to help other people achieve an American-type liberal political system with all its benefits.

The Western Europeans, on the other hand, are neither cowardly nor pacifist, nor as complacent as often portrayed. Yet they are rather weak to be assertive as individual countries in global affairs, and they are still too disunited to do so with one European voice. They need America. They need an America that is not seeking military superiority and world dominance—and only a few, if any, Americans would subscribe to such national goals. In the public debates on both sides of the Atlantic, the commonly shared and promoted values that helped form the Alliance are often lost from view. National interests on both sides of the Atlantic are based on those values. It is not the
interests of Europe and America which differ, but the means to pursue them.

A process of public information and education should correct distorted images of the Atlantic partners, if only to create an atmosphere for reasonable discussions. And discussions in the Alliance about a widened perspective of allied concerns would certainly be facilitated by concentrating more on the political than on the military aspect of international developments. If there appears to be a primacy of military over political considerations, if NATO appears to be merely a logistic tail for American global military operations, European governments will probably have difficulties in shifting the focus from the geographical narrows of the Treaty to the political sea of the Alliance.

Global cooperation: a two-way street

As a prerequisite, the basic political relationship between the United States and Europe in the Alliance has to be clarified. If there is, as indicated, willingness among the Europeans to shoulder more responsibility in world politics, it must be met with American preparedness for allied participation in the policy and strategy formulation process. It has become fashionable in debates among the interested publics on both sides of the Atlantic to suggest all kinds of Alliance reforms—ranging from America's withdrawal from NATO to an independent European nuclear umbrella. Most proposals, be they more or less radical in approach, ponder just the military dimension of Alliance security. Amazingly little has been said about other dimensions such as the foreign and economic policies of member countries.
Many of the suggestions for improving the military defenses of the Alliance deserve attention, so long as they do not envisage solving the problem with the dissolution of the Alliance or with too-radical changes. It is quite possible that American strategic independence and the complete "Europeanization" of Europe's defense would cause more weaknesses and troubles than already exist. It could mean uncertainty for the future in place of at least sufficient certainty now, based on the Alliance's having been adequate for thirty-five years to deter aggression and to withstand political pressure in Europe. Arrangements that have proven so unprecedently successful should not be altered profoundly unless there is an emergency. Surely, problems are gnawing at the Alliance, yet none of the debated issues seems of such urgency as to require radical change that would unhinge the basic Alliance arrangement for common security.

In a global perspective, a solely European defense of Europe, including the crucial issue of a European strategic nuclear deterrent force, could cause more European introversion than ever and a drift away from America. In addition, a strategically independent America, "unencumbered" by the Western Alliance, could hardly exert more and better influence on world politics. After all, a good portion of American influence in the world, as Kissinger assumed, may stem from the world's association of America with its Western allies. An even more independent and unilaterally acting America might be tempted to use military pressure more often, although military solutions, as such, appear more and more outdated in the Third World environment—more harmful for Western interests and less durable than political solutions. An
independent America might also aggravate such intricate Third World problems with intervention, as The Washington Post noted: “As their predecessors learned in Vietnam, the Reagan team discovered in Lebanon that the presence of American troops changes everything. It expands commitments and requirements, and sharply limits room for maneuver.”

A strategically independent United States in a highly interdependent world could in the end be left more impotent, with less influence on international developments, than one imbedded in the Western Alliance.

**Political participation for Europeans**

A more reasonable approach for the United States would be to include the European allies more fully in the international power correlation by means of political participation. Genuine European sharing in the formulation process of Western global policies—in the political, economic, and military dimensions—could contribute to avoiding what Henry Kissinger saw as “the great danger ... a Europe that turns inward, abdicating from international affairs. Such a Europe will in the long run be more dangerous to us than one that engages in a dialogue with us about the kind of world which we want to bring about.” In this context, Kissinger recalled an idea that President Kennedy had already expressed in 1961. Kennedy had told the American people that “the United States is neither omnipotent nor omniscient” and that “there cannot be an American solution to every world problem.” Kissinger repeated, “I do not think that it is healthy for us, or for our allies, that we should be the country to make all the decisions, in every part of
the globe, at every moment of time, over the indefinite future."

Recent history in Indochina, Southwest Asia and the Middle East, and Central America may suggest that American policymakers did more to keep their European allies from all decisions in global policy than Europeans did to abdicate from any involvement. American efforts to include the Europeans implied that the United States wanted the Europeans to agree to support unilateral US policies rather than to help form and implement a common Alliance approach in foreign policy. Military contributions were welcome from the allies, but not political advice, guidance, or participation. This unbalanced way of looking at cooperation could cause attitudes like those dramatized by Josef Joffe: "If the Europeans are confronted with US faits accomplis they will resist vociferously; if they are somehow cornered into agreement, they will sabotage it later on."

But if Europe wants to be involved in global decisionmaking, there is a quid pro quo. Western Europe should realize that the United States will not pay too much attention to a Europe fractionalized by parochial and narrow national interests. In a world where the resort to force in pursuit of political aims remains a fact, it may also be necessary for the peace-loving to use, or to threaten to use, force to defend common Western interests. It may not be just the United States that denies Europe an equal political status in the Alliance. The Europeans themselves might contribute, as Hans-Dietrich Genscher admonished, "through the inability to unite, i.e., to subordinate national interests, as necessary, to the European interest, and thus through the inability to join
together in formulating and defending European objectives within the Alliance.”

The consequences of persistent European parochialism in world affairs could be reinforced by what some experts call the growing disparity between the American and European economies caused by the new technological revolution, microelectronics. An increasing number of voices in the United States, including officials within the administration, cite this development as a real danger for American-European relationships, yet only a few Europeans seem to see such handwriting on the wall. The German magazine *Der Spiegel* speculated in a series of articles, and in a special book issue, about a shift in America to a new power center—California—accompanied by a gradual ousting of the long-ruling East Coast establishment in American foreign policy by the “Westerners.” Some sources in the Reagan administration have made it no secret that this president and many of his observers look more to the Pacific than the previous administrations have, that this administration in particular considers the Pacific area to be of critical importance to the United States, and that “a shift of the center of gravity of US foreign policy from the transatlantic relationship toward the Pacific Basin and particularly Japan” might be in progress. The consequences seem to be clear and unavoidable. Europe might be pushed a notch downward in America’s order of priorities, below the Pacific Basin, perhaps even below Southwest Asia and Central America. America will probably continue to look after its European interests, but, more than ever, over Europe’s head.

For the present, however, the American desire for allied support and participation in world affairs
may have grown. But the American expectation of the allies seems as yet hardly changed: European participation is demanded, but more for military help than for devising political ways and means and influencing decisions. On the other hand, Europeans only reluctantly grant support to contingency plans for interventions outside NATO’s “boundaries.” They do little if anything to persuade the United States that their participation in decisionmaking is desirable. Most likely, the Europeans should not demand and expect any say if they refuse to contribute even minimally to military operations associated with out-of-area security problems. The American sensitivity in this respect was clearly expressed by Eliot Cohen: “True enough, American intervention in the Persian Gulf would serve the American national interest whether or not European soldiers fought side by side with American troops. Such excessively rational calculations, however, would not convince the American public that their sons, husbands and brothers should die to keep French, Dutch, German and Japanese homes warm and factories running.” Contributions of the Europeans may have to be more or less symbolic, but they should be visible enough to convince the American public and Congress of European preparedness to share risks. Participation and shared responsibility in global affairs should be a two-way street, one far more important than the well-known but also not as yet established one of transatlantic armament cooperation.

Changing attitudes and habits

To think of participation in the decisionmaking and sharing of responsibilities in the execution of a coordinated foreign policy in the Alliance requires
definite changes in consultation attitudes and habits. Cleveland once remarked that it was American "declaratory policy" to use the "Golden Rule of consultation," quoting a 1967 speech of Vice President Humphrey, "that each of us consult as soon, as often, and as frankly as he would wish the others to consult." This golden rule of consultation has proven to be the exception more often than the rule, particularly when extra-European issues were the topics. The recent events in Central America, Grenada, and the Middle East gave more such evidence.

The continuing questions of whether, when, and how to consult in the Alliance appear to be keys not only for shaping Western policies but also for keeping strong the political relationship between America and the European allies. Time and again, the Europeans have gone out of their way to overlook obvious American unilateralism. For their generosity and diplomacy, they are now characterized by Americans as absorbed in "navel contemplation." This characterization could also suggest—in the context of the record of American consultation habits—that the United States assumed a priori European hesitations and inhibitions and used this assumption as a pretext for not consulting. The United States must adhere to its own stated golden rule for a true consultation process. Of course, politicians on both sides of the Atlantic may have certain inhibitions about appearing to consult. Some may fear they would risk domestic vulnerability, acquiring an image of weakness and indecisiveness. Others may not wish to know about decisions across the ocean at all, avoiding guilt by association. But the need remains.
Making consultation in the Alliance more obligatory and more meaningful would not be an easy task. Yet it might take only a new Alliance summit declaration to make the allies consider political consultation morally and legally binding. Parliamentary ratification of such a declaration could be additionally helpful. Such self-obligation to the principle of political consultation could help politicians with image problems as well as helping to avoid those repeated tensions and frictions arising from the lack of communication. It would ensure that the allies discuss policies together, yet without excluding the possibility of acting separately if such action were opportune.

Consultation can only be real and meaningful when it is perceived and used as a virtually continuous process of exchanging information and assessments about the overall political developments in the world. Consultation can only bring about a truly common foreign policy line when used in the earliest stages of policy formulation. It must happen before, as Cleveland observed, the "dynamics of bureaucratic decisionmaking" in national capitals have produced a nationally balanced policy line, because subjecting such an already produced policy to the views of allied governments would "seem a form of madness to the committed participants in the [national] decision." True consultation will start with and accompany the process of decision finding rather than commence late when the making of the decision is required. "There need be no harm in discussing a problem before it is ripe, and there is usually some harm in a record of not discussing it until just before it ripens," warned Cleveland.18
Equal opportunities for all the allies

Real consultation would also mean respect for the principle of sovereignty and equality in the Alliance. Consultation among all and among equals should be the principle. This would not hurt anyone's interests, if the consultation process started early as described, and would always leave the option of arriving in the end at a "coalition of the willing and able." If political cooperation is to be achieved, smaller members must participate from the outset. Their exclusion will be more likely to cause resentment than will later courses of action they cannot or will not join. "The concept of 'key allies' and separate 'understandings' among them is potentially harmful," warned Henri Simonet. He may not only have had in mind the exclusive Guadeloupe system of the "Big Four"—the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and France—but also some practices in NATO's day-to-day work. Simonet also pointed out that "consultation among all allies, at one stage or another, is the price of allied solidarity and cohesion." When consultation begins early enough in the policy process and includes all allies, all members have more opportunities to determine for themselves whether, when, and for what reason they would prefer to choose a role of background observer rather than of participant. The Alliance knows no majority rule, and neither is there a veto power that could preclude single members or a coalition from separate action. But all members should have the chance to convince others or to be convinced rather than be kept in the dark and be faced later with faits accomplis. And no member should be provided with an easy excuse not to concern itself with certain
events and eventualities. After all, such an understanding of solidarity and equality among the allies could eventually be useful in some of the domestic problems smaller members have at times with the Alliance membership.

**What structure is adequate?**

A set of rules for real political consultation may be easier to determine than a suitable structure in the Alliance to allow for its proper use. Real consultation should keep policy options open as long as possible and necessary, nationally as well as commonly in the Alliance. The Alliance needs a structure capable of integrating promptly as much as possible of the political decision-finding process, and of preventing as much as possible the disclosure of the process, which would discourage its use. Early, real, Alliance-wide consultation often has been avoided merely because of its time-consuming nature and the inherent risk of leaks attributed to the present structure of NATO.

The NATO structure may still be adequate to deal with the politico-military and military affairs relevant for the European theater. Yet for looking outside the European perimeter and beyond immediate military issues, the capabilities of NATO headquarters have been questioned. De Gaulle’s proposal for a three-power directorate to coordinate worldwide policy of the Alliance is well known. Probably less well known are Henry Kissinger’s repeated suggestions to establish some kind of steering group or executive committee within NATO, a “political body at the highest level for concerting the policies of the nations bordering the North Atlantic.” These earlier Kissinger proposals resembled the structure of the UN Security Council and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) of NATO, with a core of the big countries as permanent members and a
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rotating membership among the smaller countries. The original NPG membership concept, however, could not be sustained for long; the NPG has practically become the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) in specific functions, and all interested member countries can participate.

The more recent reflections about the Alliance’s top political structure stem from perceptions that the Alliance needs broader avenues of cooperation, for issues beyond the defense posture in Europe. Now-retired German General Gerd Schumueckle, judging from his experience as a deputy of the supreme allied commander in Europe, looked at the top structure of NATO. With reference to crisis management between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, he criticized the cumbersome and time-consuming process of political decision-finding involving the three top institutions of NATO—Council, Military Committee, and SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe)—and the sixteen capitals. Pointing to the immense lead of the US president in information and intelligence in any crisis situation, General Schmückel suggested that the deputy heads of government of the four major European countries and the secretary general of NATO should be present in the White House situation center when a crisis develops. They would act with the US president as an Alliance “crisis cabinet.” According to Schumückle’s proposal, the secretary general should represent the smaller countries in this crisis cabinet. Consequently, the permanent crisis cabinet member countries—the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy—should then not be eligible to provide NATO’s secretary general.22
Kissinger’s latest idea

General Schmueckle’s ideas seemed not to have much resonance, perhaps because he looked only at improved political cooperation during a crisis, a rather late start for close cooperation. Yet Kissinger’s latest plan “to reshape NATO” has gained considerable attention, particularly in Europe. Calling the present controversies in NATO “both unprecedented and unsettling,” Kissinger has proposed some dramatic structural changes in the Alliance that are based on his persistent criticism of the strategic premises of the Alliance and of the alleged European ambivalence therein. Kissinger has urged “a serious and rapid re-examination of NATO doctrine, deployment and policies,” and, like Helmut Schmidt, he has maintained that the Alliance “must urgently develop a grand strategy for East-West problems and Third World relations applicable for the rest of this century.”

In Kissinger’s scheme, Europe should take a more significant role within NATO by assuming the major responsibility for its conventional ground defense and by “Europeanizing” those arms control negotiations that deal with weapons stationed on European soil. Structurally, he would like to see a European officer taking over the traditionally American post of supreme allied commander in Europe so “that planning for Europe’s defense become[s] a more explicitly European task.” In his view, it would also make more sense to have an American secretary general of NATO, with the greater emphasis on political coordination in the new structure. In this “sensible division of responsibilities,” Europe would concentrate on the conventional defense of the Continent, whereas America would contribute to maintaining the global balance of power by emphasizing highly
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mobile conventional forces capable of backing up Europe and contributing to the defense of other regions, such as the Middle East, Asia, or the Western Hemisphere.

Kissinger's proposal, consistent with his views in earlier years, of dividing responsibilities between the European allies and the United States would hardly help establish allied participation in maintaining the global balance of power—something which, in many other Americans' view, appears quite necessary. Kissinger assumed again, as in his "Year of Europe" speech in 1973, that the Europeans, disagreeing with America about the nature of the interests involved in regions outside of Europe, were "less prone to see their immediate interests engaged" in other than their own region. Yet he urged a global grand strategy explicitly for the Alliance "as the ultimate guardian of Western freedom." Dividing the responsibilities in the Alliance as Kissinger suggests could undermine rather than further what he would like to see: agreement on the political purposes and a common approach to global security in the Alliance. Given his premise, his proposals may aim less at granting the Europeans a voice in shaping the policies than at maintaining the preponderant American influence therein.

The four institutes' proposal

The most comprehensive proposal for improving consultation came from the four major foreign policy institutes in the West. Karl Kaiser, Winston Lord, Thierry de Montbrial, and David Watt took the global perspective of challenges to Western, not just Alliance, interests and of overall Western, not just Alliance, reactions. Whereas other proposals concentrated on improvements in the Alliance as the
single coordinating and steering element of Western foreign policies, the four institutes envisaged a broader base for political and economic cooperation and coordination among all Western nations. For NATO, “the four” did not devise major institutional innovations, yet strongly underlined the necessity that the Alliance must broaden its scope to assessments and consultation about extra-European challenges to Western security interests. With the North Atlantic Alliance at center stage, other Western-aligned countries, led by Japan, were viewed for possible roles in a global Western security system. To this end, the institution of the economic summits of the seven major industrial nations was seen as a useful forum, provided its agenda would be regularly extended to geopolitical and security issues.

Yet the four considered neither the present NATO structure nor the summits as forums sufficient for real consultation on political and security problems outside the European perimeter. They therefore proposed an approach of forming groups of “key nations.” The principle for the composition of such numerically small groups should be the preparedness and willingness of the potential members to accept concrete obligations in critical regions, which requires the capability and readiness for responsibility. There would be no fixed rule for the composition of key nation groups except for a core group formed by the United States, Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Japan. Depending on the kind of problem and region concerned, other NATO allies, or Western countries like Australia, could be involved for common assessments and crisis management. Close information links would be established to the North Atlantic
Council and the EC about the activities of such groups.

This approach holds some promise yet leaves areas of doubt. Like all the proposals for directorates, steering groups, or key nation groups, this solution would clearly create first-class, second-class, and even third-class members in the Alliance. Aside from the possible resentments of the nonprivileged members and the domestic problems in those countries, non-NATO countries would likely continue to identify the nonprivileged members with Allied policies even if these were determined by the “key nations” without their formal participation. The experience with the multilateral force in Lebanon seems to support this contention. Whatever the name of the contingent, the fact that four major Alliance members formed it has been seen abroad as an engagement of the Alliance rather than as an action of four individual countries.

Particularly in the case of the Persian Gulf region, the whole Alliance would be regarded as involved in any undertaking there, even if only a few member countries were militarily present. Involved by the policy decisions of their major allies but put outside of the decisionmaking process, the smaller countries in a two-class Alliance could at times find—and indeed have found—it difficult to sustain Alliance solidarity or to provide operational support. Thus it is hardly conceivable that any Western policy and contingency plan for the Middle East or even for the Southwest Asia region would work without Turkey’s support—and if Turkey were in the “club,” Greece could hardly be kept out. When Central and Latin America are on the agenda, Spain’s special relation to the region would be useful, and so might the Portuguese’s cultural links.
American unilateral decisions have frequently been considered causes for European embarrassment. Unilateral decisions of steering groups or key nation groups within the Alliance could likewise create causes for controversies, also straining Alliance solidarity and cohesion, as the Guadeloupe summit did to some extent with the INF decision. Altogether, privileged relationships and special member tickets in the Alliance appear potentially more harmful than useful and should not be established unless a system based on mutual and equal participation in political consultation and cooperation for global issues has proven impossible or impracticable. Thus far, such a system has not been tested.

**The EPC system: model for the Alliance?**

A real consultation mechanism in the Alliance could possibly avoid the tendency to form groups of selected allies for the sake of facilitating decisions. That real consultation with all members can bring about durable decisions has been proven in the process of European Political Cooperation (EPC). EPC has also demonstrated that smaller members can offer valid perspectives and valuable contributions in making political assessments and in finding positions in world developments. In addition, the smaller members sometimes have better capabilities and chances as mediators and brokers in divergencies among the bigger members than do other larger members.

Briefly described, EPC takes shape at two levels: first, that of the heads of state and government (European Council) and of the ministerial meetings, both formal and informal; second, at lower levels with the “Political Committee” in an essential role. This committee, composed of the director generals of political affairs of the foreign ministries, is assisted by groups
of regional experts and maintains intimate and confidential relations with national diplomatic services. The presidency in EPC changes every six months. The presiding government also plays the role of spokesman for the organization, and has the responsibility of ensuring timely consultation. Ministers, if not heads of government, meet at least three or four times each year; foreign ministers, six times in a year. The committee and expert groups meet more frequently, with meeting places changing semiannually in accordance with the presidency. Close observers have found that this organization has developed a certain esprit de corps among the participants. This spirit extends to ministers, director generals and departmental directors, and regional desk officers, who know each other personally and are in almost daily communication.

Certainly, in subjects and in bearing, Alliance political consultation and cooperation would be substantially different. Nevertheless, EPC has brought about a modest kind of common European foreign policy. Thus it could represent a model of how to structure real political consultation and cooperation in the Alliance to arrive at better coordinated foreign policies there.

In particular, its system of rotating the presidency and its system of consultation and cooperation should be of interest for the Alliance. Rotating the presidency has the effect of treating and obligating all members equally, though it does not erase the real differences in importance among the members. It emphasizes informal leadership more than the principle of formal leadership.

In the Alliance, without the formal or informal leadership of the United States, probably nothing
much would happen. Further, nothing much could happen against strong US reservations. Therefore, a formally rotating leader function in the Alliance for dealing with Third World issues would not diminish America's unique role nor the weight of the other major allies. Yet it must have, as in EPC, the effect of integrating and obligating the smaller members, while the indisputable leader of the Alliance would be relieved from the expectations of continuous initiative. The burden of initiating and expediting matters would be more equally distributed among all members, and opportunities for inertia and objections, particularly among the smaller members, could be reduced. American leadership performance would become less subject to criticism and reproaches; European indifference and lack of engagement would be discouraged.

In sum, the rotation principle in initiating and conducting political consultation and cooperation in the Alliance seems to offer some advantages. In this respect, it could probably level out some of the present deficiencies.

A High-Level Consultative Group

Changing a few long-standing principles and accustomed attitudes in the Alliance would not mean overthrowing the existing NATO structure. The existing structure should be essentially maintained. Overall, it has earned outstanding marks in "managing" this unique conglomerate of politically and strategically diverse nations with skill and sensitivity in military and politico-military cooperation. But the organization has been and will be less successful in establishing political consultation and cooperation, particularly for extra-European affairs. Neither the Council nor other committees in NATO headquarters
seem prepared to bring about the kind of consultation and cooperation envisaged. This organization has been designed for different purposes. The extension of its responsibilities and estimation of its capability therefore should be confined to the original intentions and purposes—to establish, maintain, and improve the Alliance's deterrence and defense posture, the military leg of the Alliance. Yet neither new institutions nor rather impracticable and risky renegotiations of the 1949 Treaty are advisable. NATO can grow beyond the emergency that brought it into existence. With a new, additional structure, the consultation and cooperation necessary to deal with political (and economic) issues on the global scale could be established.

Such a structure could be one resembling that of EPC. The key mechanism could consist of a "High-Level Consultative Group," composed of high-level diplomats from the hierarchies of the foreign ministries. They should rank approximately in the middle, between the working and the political-decision levels; it would be best if they were the director generals of political affairs, as in the case of EPC, probably accompanied by their counterparts in the defense ministries. Although this High-Level Consultative Group should be a standing group, its members should not have ambassadorial or special representative status, as is the case with the permanent representatives in the Council and Defense Planning Committee or with the military representatives in the Military Committee. For the purpose of true consultation and closest cooperation, they should remain in the hierarchies of their ministries and thus in the chain of information and decisionmaking in foreign and security policy.

A specifically American problem may have to be considered in this regard. Interdepartmental
coordination and decision-finding appear to take place generally in the National Security Council (NSC) rather than within or among the executive departments. The NSC considers itself not as formulator but as coordinator of policies in the field of national security, because only in the NSC is there the common roof for the four "columns" of national security—foreign policy, intelligence, defense, and international economics. Yet what is practiced in one administration is not necessarily the case with another, and procedural changes may be possible.

Ideally, the European members of the High-Level Consultative Group of the Alliance should be identical with those forming the Political Committee within the EPC. Their dual function could help take the sting out of the separate EPC consultations and would create the perfect interface between Alliance and EPC consultations. That linkage seems at the present to be missing. The more important Third World regions become for Western politics, the more EPC has to commit itself to these issues. This kind of political consultation and cooperation in international relations of a group of Alliance members has already brought harmonization problems. NATO is supposed to establish and maintain political consultation and solidarity among all members for essentially the same kind of issues. In the judgment of an informed observer, though, "there has been neither harmonization nor cooperation, except in one or two cases, and it may even be said that a certain degree of antagonism can be observed."17

Harmonization between EPC and NATO

As yet, problems of defense are not supposed to show up on the agenda of EPC. The gradual realization that the defense of Europe has more dimensions
than the military and that it cannot be confined solely to the European region might lead the Europeans to give way to the necessities of political realities. Moreover, defense responsibilities and functions have been envisaged in a European framework somewhat different from that of the Eurogroup caucus within the Alliance. New interest in President Kennedy’s vision of the two pillars of Alliance security, North America and a united Europe, has developed. Some proponents see roles for the EC and EPC in security policy; others look at the prospects of the dormant West European Union (WEU) as a nucleus for enhanced European defense cooperation.

The discussion in Europe appears to be in rather early stages. A joint study by some prominent members of the foreign policy institutes of France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, published in 1983, offered probably the most comprehensive approach in proposing an EPC responsibility for security policy and integration of the WEU in that framework. In the authors’ view, their approach, along with Spain’s and Portugal’s accession to the EC and accession of all EC members to the WEU, would not only further European identity and interests in security policy but also shore up the imminently collapsing unification process in Western Europe. Sensitive questions would remain, however, about the positions of the neutral EC member, Ireland, the NATO member opposing EC membership, Norway, and the NATO member with little chance to be admitted to the EC in the near future, Turkey. At any rate, whether Western Europe would look at the established organizations, like the EC, the WEU, and the Eurogroup, or at others yet to be created, it faces the problem of overlapping memberships and proliferation of European organizations, neither of which is helpful in the process of political unification.
neither of which is helpful in the process of political unification.

In whatever configuration the Europeans eventually arrange for a strengthened and more coherent European position in their immediate defense and in overall Western security policy, they must avoid what an insider feared from EPC: "if EPC has not substantially damaged NATO, this is in particular due to the fact that EPC has not become what it should have become." Western Europe as a second pillar, politically more united and militarily strengthened but trying to play a more independent role between the superpowers, would probably soon find itself at odds with its transatlantic partner.

The necessity of harmonization between any European grouping and the Alliance thus becomes overriding. An obvious way to harmonize EPC or any other European cooperation efforts in security matters with allied political consultation and cooperation would be to have as many as possible of the same actors on both stages.

An organizational framework

Rather simple organizational problems may often spell success or failure for an enterprise. With the Atlantic and the six-hour time difference between the capitals of Central Europe and the North American East Coast, a system of rotating meeting places as in EPC would become questionable in terms of costs and benefits. In addition, the nature of the real consultation and cooperation considered here would suggest that the High-Level Consultative Group be more a permanent body than an occasional or ad hoc meeting group. If it is composed, as suggested, of high-level officers from within the national bureaucracies, who
would maintain their responsibilities there, their permanent absence from the home office would be prohibitive. The character of a standing group should be maintained, however, by as many meetings as possible or necessary. (The rather close and intensive consultations among the allies in the High-Level Group and the Special Consultative Group concerned with INF modernization and negotiations required at times more than one meeting a month.) The group would have to take over the present, mostly informal responsibilities of the Council in Third World security issues. Yet this shift of concerns must not undermine the authority of the Council, which should emerge more effective in consultation and cooperation in the military-politico affairs of Alliance defense. The valuable experiences with the HLG and the SCG have shown that the NATO organism can adapt to such new organs, despite some resistance within the organization.

Different in composition and task from NATO bodies in Brussels, a High-Level Consultative Group, and assisting expert groups when necessary, should not necessarily be bound to convene in Brussels. Its task of dealing with worldwide political developments, with allied international relations, and with crisis monitoring and management when necessary would rather suggest Washington as its base. The European capitals may be six hours ahead of Washington on the clock, but in terms of information and intelligence about worldwide developments, Washington is more likely to be eighteen hours ahead. When coordination of allied policies is the aim of consultation and cooperation, the best approach would be to place all the sheets of music at the conductor's podium—and that is located in Washington. Besides the usual diplomatic channels of communication, a specific link to the
NATO machinery in Brussels could be maintained. A high-ranking NATO official, probably the deputy secretary general, should be a member of the High-Level Consultative Group. Of course, this suggested arrangement could be read as expressing American dominance. But the decisive factor should be efficiency and adequacy of the structure for the tasks envisaged. Arrangements such as the suggested ones seem both possible and manageable. NATO has had similar ones years ago when the Standing Committee, which later became the Military Committee of today, stood in Washington.

Of course, Washington instead of Brussels as the location for a High-Level Consultative Group would require extensive travelling by fourteen members, as opposed to two in the present configuration. Yet some favorable arrangements could be found for the Europeans, if only there were the will or the force of necessity. Some European countries already have military shuttle flights scheduled once or twice a week to Washington. In the light of the high stakes and the important purposes involved for all allies, it would be a matter of coordination among the allies to arrange for a regular “consultation shuttle.” That the problems posed by the Atlantic Ocean in terms of time and space can be overcome, again, the HLG and SCG have proven. After all, it may not be so long before a consultation conference on whatever level could be established via secure satellite and television communications.

Dealing with the global issues would be easier for the Europeans the more such action took place in close political cooperation with the United States, particularly when the public was better informed about the global challenges. In such cooperation, in
the form suggested here, the Europeans would basically continue what they do now in EPC, yet in the forum of the Alliance and thus with the partner whom they cannot afford to omit anyway. The EPC perspective of world developments is narrowed by the bounds of security aspects and implications, whereas in NATO almost all but the military aspects and implications appear neglected. What seems necessary is a total view of the political-diplomatic, economic, military, and psychological correlations in the global balance of power. The logical forum for achieving such a perspective is the Western Alliance. Then a global Western strategy might be not political theory but a reality.
5

Toward an Alliance Global Strategy

The recognition that security for the Alliance does not rest solely on the military balance in Europe is not a recent development. In fact, the Three Wise Men stated in 1956,

From the very beginning of NATO, then, it was recognized that while defence cooperation was the first and most urgent requirement, this was not enough. It has also become increasingly realized since the Treaty was signed that security is today far more than a military matter. The strengthening of political consultation and economic co-operation . . . can be as important, or even more important, for the protection of the security of a nation, or an alliance, as the building of a battleship or the equipping of an army.

But despite realizing early the multifaceted challenges to its security, the Alliance disproportionately emphasized military factors at the expense of political
and economic ones. It took almost twenty-five years for the allies to realize just how disastrous such neglect of political and economic cooperation could be. And, unfortunately, a caution by the Three Wise Men also went unheeded. They warned that "NATO should not forget that the influence and interests of its members are not confined to the area covered by the Treaty and that common interests of the Atlantic Community can be seriously affected by developments outside the Treaty area. Therefore, while striving to improve their relations with each other, and to strengthen and deepen their own unity, they should also be concerned with harmonizing their policies in relation to other areas...."

The same theme has been reiterated with every later effort at Alliance self-examination, notably in the Harmel Report of 1967 and in the Ottawa Declaration of Atlantic Relations of 1974, but also in numerous communique texts. Nothing did change for the better, however, and the allies sagged into their present difficulties in harmonizing their political and economic courses. The habit of close consultation on matters of common concern has been weakened instead of strengthened, and out-of-area issues have gotten almost exclusively military attention.

So today the Alliance still needs a coherent global concept and strategy. The creation of the best form of political consultation and of the most favorable organizational structure to support it would remain rather fruitless if there were no common concept and strategy for dealing with the global challenges to Alliance security. On the other hand, the conceptual framework would become rather useless if there were not close and continuous consultation and cooperation within it. Thus, the mechanism for true
consultation is indispensable for working out an Alliance concept for dealing with the inevitable global issues challenging Western security and keeping abreast of the necessary courses of action.

The global concept of the Alliance should reflect an integrated view of security policy, synthesizing diplomatic, economic, military, and psychological factors into a coherent operational policy. An Alliance strategy based on such a concept would then make full use of all the appropriate individual means and abilities of each member country in the political-diplomatic field, as well as in the economic and military ones.

The overall strategy needed involves the political and socioeconomic potentials of Alliance nations as well as the military. Such a strategy should be openly discussed; it should be understood and supported by the political publics in the Alliance. Public support and understanding would be more likely if the public were given the complete picture of challenges and their implications for Western security and well-being. Such insight, along with cooperation in the major policy and economic areas of common security, could convince the majorities in member countries that the prudent use of military means to enforce diplomacy may be the only way left in a particular case, if indeed its use can reasonably be expected to accomplish the common policy purposes.

When discussing an overall Alliance strategy, the allies could try to identify the major areas of likely agreement first rather than the many, yet less important, issues of likely dispute. No blueprint for an overall Western strategy is currently available, nor will one be available tomorrow. Hence, it is necessary to
establish soon a real consultative process and to start a frank and energetic dialogue among the allies. Only when this is attempted will agreement on the key elements of an overall strategy appear attainable. This open discussion might in itself bridge some present misunderstandings and misperceptions and might avoid a prolonged crisis in the Alliance.

In such discussions, the overriding necessity for the Alliance may be to reach agreement on a consistent, long-term concept for East-West relations as the basis for the Western strategy. This basic issue also relates to other global strategic problems, from Third World instability to defense of free access to vital resources. In his 1983 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Lord Carrington admonished the Alliance that "we do lack a positive political strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union. And it is this failure of concerted definition which causes the trouble. In its absence, the Alliance can be thrown temporarily off-balance by some essentially peripheral problem." Helmut Schmidt and others have stressed the same point. It would be desirable that Lord Carrington's lecture have an impact on shaping Alliance policy similar to that which Schmidt's famous Buchan Memorial Lecture of 1977 had in paving the way toward the INF dual-track decision of 1979. Other prominent voices on both sides of the Atlantic have emphasized the necessity of a new comprehensive strategy for the West. It might be useful for the Alliance to unite some of these figures in a new committee effort. Names of possible "wise men" for such a task come easily to mind: Helmut Schmidt, Henry Kissinger, Valerie Giscard d'Estaing, Alexander Haig, Henri Simonet, Josef Luns, Pierre Trudeau, James Callaghan.
Central to the issue of dealing with the Soviet Union is what role for detente may be of value in the East-West correlation. As noted earlier, so much of the present transatlantic rift has resulted particularly from differences of opinion over the usefulness of detente efforts. Although never officially abandoned, the Harmel dual strategy of deterrence and East-West cooperation has suffered not only from the Soviets’ taking advantage of Western weakness and failure but also from Western exhaustion with trying to carry out the strategy. Meanwhile, it appears that even the hard-liners will accept the fact that “we have to deal with the Russians simply because they are there” (Carrington). Any Western strategy, should it consider this reality, would be promising only if it distinguished between the desirable and the possible. The Soviet Union, as an opposing force with its adverse ideology, can be neither wished nor forced away, and overall, long-term global stability can hardly be reached by neglecting such an opponent. Still, the most reasonable step would indeed be to adhere to the Harmel concept of securing a balance of power—to deter aggression yet also to offer openness for cooperation with the East. The Harmel concept also appears to be still the most promising approach to coping with the Soviet concept of “peaceful coexistence,” not just in Europe but everywhere in the world. The overall world situation has changed since the Harmel strategy was designed. But the Western response may be more a matter of reassessing global factors and adjusting the Western policy concept and strategy accordingly rather than of doing away with the basic perception: if there is firm Western resolve to check Soviet expansionism, the Soviets, perhaps
also compelled by their internal difficulties, might in the long run consider it futile to pursue a policy of seeking predominance and choose instead to genuinely coexist with the West.

In search of a global Alliance strategy in East-West relations, we should not blame detente for unfavorable developments in the world during the past decade. For strategic thought, the West would do well to use the historical experience and evidence of that period. The allies should analyze the likely mistakes they have made in pursuing the Harmel strategy, such as in the case of Angola, rather than condemn the strategy completely.

In intensive Alliance consultations about global strategy, realistic assessments rather than rhetoric should prevail, in conferences behind closed doors as well as in information for the public. In the West, no illusions should be harbored about a short-term change in Soviet perception of "peaceful coexistence," as Gromyko defined it so frankly. That reality of Soviet practice should be brought home to the public in Alliance countries and documented by case studies from Angola to Grenada without undue exaggeration or papering over of Western mistakes.

Thus, rhetoric about whether detente is divisible or indivisible should cease. Ever since the Soviet Union became an un-neglectable factor in global policy, elements of detente have been present in East-West relations. Such elements have never been eliminated, not immediately after the Afghanistan invasion and not at the peak of hostile rhetoric on both sides. In fact, the West and the United States have maintained such detente elements as negotiation and cooperation with the Soviet Union through all
stages of more or less hostile and chilled relations. Simply because the Soviet Union with its vast nuclear arsenal is a fact, arms control and limitation talks have continued despite rhetoric from both East and West. The superpower dialogue has endured despite Vietnam and Afghanistan and despite all bedeviling of East-West trade relations. As Lord Carrington has said, "America continues to supply [the Russians] with bread and Europe with butter." In reality, detente apparently has been divisible. Why, then, pretend otherwise?

Also detrimental to Alliance purposes are speculation and allegations about to whose advantage, within the Alliance, detente has or has not been. If detente could not and cannot bring about global stability at once, advances in regional stability should be appreciated. That Europe has gained in stability in terms of democracy (Portugal, Greece, Spain), of human rights, and of East-West exchange may benefit America as well as Europe. Surely, Western Europe, particularly the divided Germany, being closest to the East-West frontline, may have tangibly gained more than the United States and Canada. Yet, as Eliot Cohen has reminded us, "detente did, after all, help the United States to contain the diplomatic damage consequent upon its withdrawal from Vietnam, to curtail some costly arms expenditures, and to allow the development of considerable trade with the Soviet Union." American interests have also been served as its formerly rather shaky and endangered dependents in Europe have gained more security in freedom and prosperity. There should be no reason to denounce detente or to denigrate its proponents when it helped to achieve relative stability on a continent that was left unstable and volatile after World War II. The
dynamics of detente may also have had more impact east of the Iron Curtain than critics sometimes realize. It has helped to demonstrate, chiefly in Poland, the fragility of Soviet predominance over Eastern Europe, and it contributed to illumination of the lingering crisis not only of the Polish economy but of the entire communist economic system. That detente has encouraged Poland and other Eastern European countries to seek a more independent voice in their own destiny can hardly be questioned.

Western policy should capitalize on the regional stability effect in Europe, yet should not fail in stressing the increased instability in other regions that need more attention in order to control and contain their infectious conflict potential.

**Regional detente and stability, global resistance**

If Cohen is right that, indeed, one root of the current problem in the Alliance "lies in the European belief that detente can and should continue, and in the American conviction that it cannot and ought not," then it would be advisable to bridge that fundamental difference in views. The dual strategy of deterrence and detente has worked regionally in Europe; perhaps it could be a promising approach for other regions too.

The Soviet Empire seems, from many indications, battered by internal crises; it also seems to have an overriding interest in preventing a major war between East and West under present circumstances, an event that would only multiply the internal difficulties of the Soviets. In the long run, the Soviets, and their client states even more, could be rather inclined
to look to other areas in addition to Europe for more genuine coexistence with the West.

Living at peace with the West, cooperating with each other for mutual benefit, and permitting peaceful and pluralistic changes in a pluralistic world perhaps would be only the second best choice ideologically for the communists. Yet it could be acceptable to the Soviet leadership, and perhaps far more to Soviet clients, when such behavior could avoid the high risks of an East-West confrontation in remote areas of the globe. A Harmel-type strategy, adapted to the widened arena of East-West tensions—a strategy aiming at balance and stability in Third World regions—could make it clear to the Soviet Union and the Third World that the West will not compete with the Soviets for spheres of influences; yet should the Soviet Union continue to take chances, it would have to face appropriate Western resistance and responses involving correspondingly high risks for the Soviet Union. If faced with Western resolve to actively defend Western interests and to preempt and counteract Soviet or Soviet-inspired involvements abroad, and if offered at the same time an alternative—namely, the option of cooperating with the West in the interest of regional stability and common responsibility for quarantining local crises and conflicts—the Soviet Union might ultimately consider cooperation to be in its best interests.

**Strategic priority: the Middle East**

The Middle East might be just such a region where the Soviet Union could now be interested more in cooperation than in confrontation. But Western global strategy must consider the Soviet Union as a global power with global interests, thus accepting the
Soviets’ role and calling on them for responsibility in conflict-containing strategies for volatile regions. Where Soviet interests, like them or not, are involved in local conflicts, solutions could hardly be achieved or sustained without Soviet active or tacit contribution. Western attempts to negotiate regional stability or to seal off local conflicts over the Soviets’ heads might be more likely to fail than efforts to involve Soviet influence and responsibility in multilateral and UN efforts to establish or to keep the peace.

In the Middle East, the world’s most tumultuous region, and perhaps the most likely place for accidentally triggered East-West military conflict, a common Alliance global strategy is desperately needed. There has been hardly any coherent Western approach to the region’s problems, although all the allies have vital interests in peaceful solution of troublesome problems in the region and in enduring stability there. Probably nowhere else is there more commonality, almost congruence, in national security interests, and less commonality in establishing adequate defenses.

The American approach since 1979 essentially has been dominated by military initiatives adorned with diplomatic effort. This approach has produced only limited success, extreme costs, and the smoldering potential to backfire against American and Western interests in the region.

Most of the European allies have relied on rhetoric and more or less double-faceted policies, attempting to court all participants and unavoidably interfering with many of them. Although critical of the American approach and rejecting the idea that military force might be inevitable, many Europeans have developed the complacent habit of relying on American
readiness and ability to intervene forcefully if necessary. Yet US national interests or domestic pressures may create different American attitudes tomorrow. Thus it would not be in the best interest of most European countries to prepare only to fill the gaps resulting from possible redeployments to Southwest Asia of American troops presently slated for the defense of Europe. Americans understandably become increasingly short-tempered with such allies, whose interests reach far but whose preparedness to contribute to their defense seems to stop short at their own borders.

On the other hand, many Europeans become frustrated because American policy for the Middle East, as well as for other regions, has been formulated without European participation or consultation, neglecting the occasionally better information and relations certain European allies may have in certain regions, be it the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, or Southeast Asia.

One need not necessarily share the view that superpower interventions are generally outdated or that superpower influence on regional developments has so declined as to prove futile or even counterproductive—a fashionable argument in the Lebanon development. Yet precipitous and highly visible involvement of one superpower in intraregional differences may well exacerbate the difficulties in the region, may make that region a focal point of superpower rivalry rather than support and enforce regional stability. Particularly zealous military activity may well bring about a corresponding reaction, may bring in the other superpower or its surrogates, and may deepen internal factionalism and friction by driving the moderates to take sides.
Domino strategy reversed

Western global strategy should try for a "domino effect" in reverse: a regionally applied dual-track strategy of detente and deterrence could help stabilize regions one by one, as an alternative to aiming for global detente and stability once and for all.

The expectations of a globally effective detente may have to be buried, yet global confrontation is not a suitable substitute, even if just aiming for the self-preservation of the Alliance. As Kissinger admitted, "Detente is important because we cannot hold the Alliance together unless our allies are convinced that we are not seeking confrontation for its own sake." Western openness to more cooperation with the East should not cease. When there are still areas where detente might be tested and more cooperation might be achieved or maintained, Western policy could exploit such chances region by region, area by area. For that matter, such a policy would not stand in the way of deterring and counteracting Soviet expansionism in some Third World areas when other areas, like Europe, could be shielded from such tensions, when arms control and limitation talks continued, and when East-West economic relations continued under terms that were not likely to hurt common Western interests. (Sanctions and embargoes may harm the Alliance more than they harm the Soviet Union.) Finally, if the United States feels overcommitted and strategically overextended, the Soviet Union feels even greater pressure. The Soviets might thus increasingly be looking to avoid more commitments that may turn into liabilities sooner or later.
Resisting competition for spheres of influence

Instead of competing with the Soviet Union for spheres of influence, the West should strengthen all movements toward genuine nonalignment and should encourage and back regional cooperation and regional unions, associations, and alliances. The global Western concept should take into account the differences within and between various regions and should recognize the variances in threat perceptions and interests that result from indigenous aspirations for sovereignty and independence, political and economic self-determination, and the preservation of religions. The concept should offer fair partnership to forces seeking moderation, confidence building, and long-term stability in the region.

Western strategy should discriminate between the legitimacy of justified socioeconomic change and progress, and machinated revolutionary socialism; and it should support the forces for political solutions to local conflicts rather than those for militancy and upheaval. “We [the West] must not allow ourselves to be abused as protectors of outdated, unjust structures,” warned Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Western strategy also should avoid any resemblance to a Soviet policy of predominance and upheaval in the Third World, being sure not to offer only a mirror image of that policy.6

A rational and even-handed strategy should also be based on the recognition that, much as the West might wish otherwise, it cannot expect to right every wrong from pole to pole. A regional dual-track strategy may thus have a different face in each region and may be far different from the one pursued
Defending the NATO Alliance

successfully in Europe. Its instruments of detente should offer cooperation to all nations of a region, respecting and strengthening their independence and their own—not necessarily smooth—course. Allied strategy should also not attempt to export Western political, economic, and social models, but offer assistance at locally acceptable standards. This is, of course, not a new insight. But such approaches have not really been pursued, certainly never as a concerted Alliance approach.

Furthering and strengthening regional stability will require more economic aid and development assistance from the West, though not equally distributed among all regions and nations eligible but tailored to the specific conditions of the region and linked to the purposes of promoting genuine cooperation and stability there. Political flexibility and effective economic assistance toward Third World regions are strategic assets of the West. The Soviet Union and its surrogates are hardly seen either as guarantors of the right of self-determination or as natural partners for fruitful trade ties. Because Soviet economic and technological resources are rather meager, and because the Soviet Union is mainly regarded as a source of arms and military assistance, Western strategy could effectively minimize the opportunities for such Soviet involvement if it prevented conditions in Third World regions that make dependency on Soviet “aid” an option for insecure nations.

The deterrent track of the global Western strategy should stress the common defense interests of the West and of as many friendly regional states as possible, but it should allow for sovereign pluralism in approaches. Rapid deployment forces and the supporting military infrastructure may not be preferable
solutions to each region and every regional state. Western strategy should seek to bolster indigenous regional defense capabilities in the first place and should promote regional security alliances, yet should be prepared to provide and should offer Western “over-the-horizon” military capabilities as backbone. In a Western global concept, it should be made clear that the West is prepared to defend its own vital interests to ensure its political independence and stability, but that the Western powers are also prepared to assist friendly regional states, upon their request, to preserve their right of sovereignty and independence.

Functional burden sharing in global affairs

So far, the Alliance has only expressed its concern about “outside” developments. The agreed-upon language of the communiques—for example, that of the Paris meeting in 1983—ponders whether common interests of the allies would be involved but wavers on timely consultation and the individual and national character of decisions to eventually engage outside the Treaty area: “Individual member governments who are in a position to do so will endeavor to support, at their request, sovereign nations whose security and independence are threatened. Those allies in a position to facilitate the deployment of forces outside the Treaty area may do so on the basis of national decision.”

What is missing is an expression of the common will of the allies to support the security and independence of other sovereign nations (limitations of individual member nations conceded) in a cohesive, common, and coordinated approach, making it clearly an Alliance matter from planning to execution. And
for a coordinated approach, the Alliance should embark on a concept of functional burden sharing in global affairs.

It has already proven harmful for the Alliance that the United States feels almost solely burdened with the global responsibility for Western interests and with the over-the-horizon deterrence and defense aspect in particular. Many Americans see the United States in the role of the West's "executive agent." Many are also suspicious that America's allies look only for the benefits of detente and shy away from their "fair" share of the common burden. The debate in the United States about the Nunn Amendment has clearly demonstrated the proliferation of such opinions even among stalwart supporters of the Alliance. America has so valuably contributed to guarantee peace and freedom and to aid in the well-being and prosperity of Western European nations, that it may now expect Europe's contribution in its efforts to fend off Soviet expansionism in the Third World. There are, of course, the inalienable human rights and the political rights of freedom and self-determination of free and independent nations that may be threatened by communist totalitarianism—values for which the Atlantic Alliance stands, after all, and which all free and democratic states should actively support. In addition, and all the allies have acknowledged the fact, it may also be the future of Europe—its living in peace, freedom, and prosperity—that ultimately could be at stake in Africa, Latin America, or Southeast Asia, let alone in the Middle East.

The strength of the Alliance to defend its common interests and vital lifelines rests largely on the political solidarity it can muster. Political solidarity
implies, however, political cooperation and coordinated courses of action—political, economic, and military action. Alliance solidarity should not be defined as a requirement to fall in line with policies worked out and solely decided upon in Washington. Political solidarity in the Alliance can only grow from a reciprocal sharing in policy formulation and reciprocal sharing in the pursuit of a Western global strategy.

The individual European states have foreign policy options and capabilities that do allow for valuable contributions in extra-European regions. They also have individual military capabilities that allow for contributions beyond the deterrence task in the North Atlantic area. Alliance solidarity in a coordinated Western global strategy requires a functional sharing of burdens and responsibilities in all facets of the overall strategy—in the political-diplomatic, in the economic, and in the military fields. The Alliance should therefore exploit the special political, economic, and cultural relations and capabilities of one or the other of the allied countries in the Third World. Some nations, even if only third-ranking in the Alliance, may occasionally have more sensitivity, better political intelligence, and better footholds in certain areas than other allies, enabling them to anticipate problems and conflict and to imagine and engineer solutions. Colonial experience and close political, economic, linguistic, and cultural ties of some allies in Third World regions could prove to be valuable assets for the whole Alliance.

**A lower profile for the American superpower**

It may also be of specific advantage at times if the American superpower is not prominently and immediately engaged in the front line. In some foreign
policy issues around the globe, it could prove favorable to reverse the usual “order of battle.” Instead of having the allies more or less willingly lined up behind the United States, the American power could keep a lower profile and back others—France in Africa, for example, or Britain in Southwest Asia. Western diplomacy would still not lack the weight of America. Such diplomacy requires, however, preparedness of “others” to step into the front line and of the United States to support them.

For one or another reason intrinsic in regional relationships, some Third World countries might find cooperation with the West easier when the American superpower stayed more in the background. In addition, the military aspect of Western strategy would be less emphasized if America could stay back at times from immediate involvement, particularly from military involvement. In contrast to the United States, none of its allies could be easily accused of attempts to project its influence by military power around the globe. Yet a coordinated Western strategy would also still be credible in its military deterrence of aggression and guarantee of security for regions and countries in need of Western protection, because American capabilities would back, support, reinforce, or sustain those of other allies. The history of the Alliance knows as yet only rare examples of coordinated allied efforts, such as the cooperation between Belgium and the United States in the Congo in 1964, between France and the United States in Chad, and among the United Kingdom, France, and the United States in Shaba.

A less dominant role for the United States might also be advised in crisis management and conflict containment in certain areas. As proven in the Middle
East, a prominent role of the superpower in mediating and keeping peace and in ensuring regional balance can become extremely difficult. No one, however, particularly the Europeans, should overlook the fact that power politics still plays a decisive role in most crisis areas, be they in Southeast Asia, in Afghanistan, in the conflicts around the Sahara, or, notably, in the Middle East. The allies should not pretend that power has been eliminated from international relations.

To make functional sharing of burdens and responsibilities in a global strategy truly successful, the allies should avoid any application of rigid formulas. The common deliberation of adequately coordinated shares of strategy elements at any given moment and for any given international situation would remain a standing requirement, a permanent task for the suggested High-Level Consultative Group. Coordinated allied military undertakings out of area, particularly at times of rising tensions and deteriorating crisis developments, would hardly be imaginable if the allies could not coordinate and agree on the political-diplomatic pretext and context. Commencing with the former without the political-diplomatic agreement already in effect would very likely lead to failure in both attempts.

**An out-of-area Alliance military profile**

To demonstrate Alliance solidarity among the allies as well as to the outer world—to prove the Alliance as a functioning entity—it would be a necessity for America’s sharing of political control with its allies to be balanced by sustained European participation should developments become crucial. The capability of the Alliance to control international developments before they turn worse would certainly be enhanced
if the military element of the Western strategy would not depend on the United States alone.

The political significance of European military presence alongside that of the United States in critical areas, even if it is just a token of shared purposes and responsibilities, should not be underestimated. A force of a dozen European warships and a brigade-size troop contingent diverted to another area would not decisively alter the NATO defense posture in Europe. But a standing or on-call Euro-American naval force and something similar to the Allied Mobile Force (AMF) could have considerable impact in Third World regions, less for their combat effectiveness than as visible evidence of allied cohesion, common responsibility, and determination.

Such presence would be a signal not only to the outer world but also to the American public and Congress. After Vietnam and Lebanon, any American president has to face substantial reluctance, if not resistance, of the Congress and the American public toward eventual American military presence and perhaps engagement in crisis regions. The decisionmaking process in Washington is extremely pluralistic and always divided. To reach and sustain decisions, it would be of immense help if the administration could convince the American public and Congress of commonality and solidarity with the Europeans in its foreign policy course. If the administration could also claim European cover and risk sharing, more leeway would be likely. But if America is left alone when the preservation of Western interests becomes crucial, the inclination of the Congress and the American public to reconsider uneven shares of risk, burden, benefits, and costs in the Alliance increases dramatically. The Economist neatly summarized why there is
considerable American sensitivity involved in this issue:

Future historians will scratch their heads when asked to contemplate the fact that the United States, with fewer people and less government spending than Western Europe, nevertheless provides most of Europe's nuclear protection, a large chunk of its non-nuclear defenses, and almost all of the men, ships and aircraft which guard the Gulf oil that European industry depends on while Europe provides no reciprocal service for the United States. 6

If, on the other hand, the administration wants the Europeans only to agree to unilateral policies, neither Congress and the American public nor the Europeans would be finally persuaded of the validity of particular approaches.

**Equal rights, equal obligations**

There is no substitute for close political cooperation in the Alliance to determine a common approach to common problems. The principle of equality and commonality implies that the Europeans should not be treated by the American superpower as second-rate partners; it also implies that there must not be first-rank and second-rank European partners for the Americans. Alliance solidarity and cohesion, particularly in crises, could hardly be maintained over time by some exclusive or clandestine arrangements among the bigger members.

A Western global policy and a Western global strategy should, by definition, be planned and supported by as many allies as feasible. The possibility of a "coalition" of the able and willing allies for certain contingencies would remain anyway, but the more
allies were willing to participate in such a coalition, or to support it, the more repercussion it would have domestically and abroad. Excluding certain allies from the political cooperation process for whatever reasons would likely sow the seeds of discord from the very outset and help form a coalition of the “pariahs” who might eventually turn against the “exclusive club” of allies. Success and endurance of the Alliance may after all result from the fact that it has resisted all temptations to form any sort of “kitchen cabinet,” be it de Gaulle’s directorate or Kissinger’s security council. Strains and resentments, on the other hand, have resulted when allies disregarded the franchise of others. The Alliance constitutes a community of free nations with equal status and equal rights but also equal obligations. All allies should contribute, within their objective limitations, to a global Western strategy. The Alliance is a community of shared dangers as well as shared benefits. Not just some but all “European partners must be prepared to assume their share of global responsibility, rather than allocating the role of world policeman to America, while gratuitously offering advice and pointed criticism from the grandstand of history.” So said a German “Atlanticist,” Franz-Josef Strauss.9

With regard to global responsibilities, it would be important that NATO begin with serious efforts as an alliance to assess the global situation together, to arrive at a common global threat analysis, to consider the Western options and opportunities with regard to available resources and capabilities, and finally to plan its overall strategy with functionally shared tasks. It is of preeminent importance for the Alliance to consider all its instruments and resources of influence and power and to tailor them to the specific conditions in
the different regions. Functional burden sharing and sharing of responsibilities would require more—and more in-depth—studies of the international situation and the individual capabilities of allies to contribute to an Alliance global strategy.

Prudent consideration in the Alliance should not just concentrate on the ways and means of how the European allies might offset American forces slated for redeployment from Europe to somewhere else. Such planning is, of course, important and, for the time being, may be of overriding priority in the NATO machinery. However, the overall problem of the Alliance is not just a military contingency in the Persian Gulf or in the Indian Ocean. Other regions will also require increased, active Western presence. Instability and turmoil in Third World regions may be triggered by indigenous regional or national conflict potentials rather than by Soviet subversion or direct involvement. As the 1980 British White Paper stated, it would be in the best interest of the West "to try to remove the sources of regional instability which create the opportunities for outside intervention. In some circumstances, military measures will not be appropriate at all; in others they may form only one component of the total response. Diplomacy, development aid, and trade policies will usually have a greater contribution to make."

The Alliance must be prepared for all circumstances and must consider military force the instrument of last resort when vital Western interests are really at stake. Alliance strategic planning requires, therefore, military contingency planning for the Persian Gulf, for South Asia, for Africa and areas around it, and for the oceans. And it should be common planning, not left to one or perhaps three allies. In military
contingencies, the best contributions possible in good will should be expected from each ally. Those contributions may reach from mere political support—take, for example, Iceland—through passive facilitation of troop deployments and symbolic troop contributions to more substantial roles in combined operations. Even more important than absolute military capability may be the signal that is thus sent to the Soviets and to others. The fact that all the allies stand together and contribute in one form or the other to a potential contingency operation could have a deterrent effect on the Soviets and their clients and could encourage democratic and independent forces in Third World regions. Last, but not least, a common strategy of the Alliance in all aspects would eventually allow the United States to take a lower profile in globally securing Western interests, with all the implications such a less-visible position would have for superpower rivalry, for Third World tolerance of Western engagement, and for worldwide public acceptance of such engagement.

The economic proviso

As regards the economic and trade policies that the British White Paper mentioned, development and economic aid, favorable trade terms, military aid, and arms sales are certainly levers at hand for the Alliance, yet their present uncoordinated usage discounts their value. In an Alliance global strategy, such means of Western security policy in a wider sense would have to be better concerted to make greater contributions. Such leverage might well serve useful purposes in allied strategy, provided the allies were to find better terms for their own economic relations.
The economic dimension of allied relationships has long since transmuted into an issue of Alliance security. Yet it still appears that it is treated in isolation and as beyond NATO’s sphere of competence. It would help Western and Alliance cohesion and solidarity if more economic and commercial cooperation could be substituted for fierce competition and rivalry among the major economic centers. The four major foreign policy institutes, among others, have suggested that the seven-nation economic summits should stretch their agenda to include geopolitical and security aspects. In turn, the Alliance should broaden its scope into the economic area to ease the strains among the European Common Market system and America and to make possible better cooperation with Japan. That is a better use of the huge economic potential of the allies: to enhance instead of constrain Western security.

In a world where markets become increasingly international and interdependent, some of the narrow national orientation and precious sovereignty of economies must be relinquished. Doing so would remove sources of friction and divergence that often swiftly radiate into the overall relationship within the Alliance. Europe has to look for new ways to solve the permanent problems in its Common Market, but it should also envisage new forms of cooperation with the American market. America could then better understand the enormous effects of its economic and financial policies on the world in general and its allies in particular. Ways should be sought to withstand the too-frequent tendency among American politicians to seek campaign advantages from domestic economic
issues at the expense of the allies. Alliance experience has often proved that "cohesion in the political and military fields cannot realistically be expected if satisfactory relations among the allies do not exist on the economic level.""11

**Transatlantic partnership and participation**

An Alliance global strategy would require preparedness on both sides of the Atlantic to think and act in new ways. If America wants a credible partner in looking after world affairs, to preserve and promote freedom and democracy in its own and in the larger Western interest, it must value partnership and participation of its allies over obedience and subjugation. America must grant its allies some voice in policy- and decision-making if it expects those allies to share the eventual military consequences of global policies.

If Western Europe wants to retain influence on a favorable world order and on East-West relations, and if it wants to maintain the American security guarantee, Western Europeans must offer, within their honest limitations, their partnership and participation in all aspects of a comprehensive Western strategy. Their willingness to share with the United States should apply not only to opportunities but also to responsibilities and political consequences. After all, as out-of-area crises more and more often bring conflict in the Alliance, an enduring link between Europe and America may be less dependent on intermediate-range missiles than on intermediating between the polarized mindsets on both sides of the Atlantic.
Endnotes


3. Probably the best comprehensive study in this area was issued by the Atlantic Council of the United States: “Securing the Seas—The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Alliance Options” (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979).


8. One Democratic presidential candidate, Senator Gary Hart, wrote in May 1983, “This administration has refused to
seek ratification of the SALT II Treaty. It delayed for many months any negotiations at all on nuclear arms—and then only went to the table when prodded by public pressure.... What now should give us confidence that this administration is serious about nuclear arms control?” The Washington Post, May 25, 1983, p. A25.


13. Time, January 30, 1984, p. 61. The magazine cites also the chief economist of GATT, who pointed out that 48 percent of world trade is now hindered in some form or other—an alarming trend indeed.


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2. NATO Facts and Figures, p. 319.

3. Ibid., p. 341.


8. De Gaulle, cited by Draper, “The Western Misalliance,” pp. 29-30. Draper’s account of the history of “the question of a broader Alliance” (pp. 28-32) is worthwhile to read against the background of the present correlation.


23. Ibid., p. 46. He argued that "the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson Amendments of late 1974 deprived the Administration of the possibility of offering Moscow broad-based economic cooperation."


36. Lowenstein, “Watching Europe Watch Us.”


40. Lowenstein, “Watching Europe Watch Us.”


5. Not all can be named. The more prominent whose proposals I have encountered during my research are Franz-Josef Strauss; Lord Carrington; General (retired) Schmueckle, and von Senger und Etterlin; Christoph Bertram; and the three major European institutes on foreign policies.


9. Ironically, it appears that American military leaders are among the first to caution against the early use of force.


16. For this and the following quotations from the Treaty, see *NATO Facts and Figures*, p. 302.


22. For instance, the secrecy surrounding President Nixon’s decision to end the gold convertibility of the dollar, the case of the neutron warhead, and the post-Afghanistan and -Poland sanctions issues may stand as examples for use or nonuse of consultation as operational policy on the American side. Giscard’s meeting with Brezhnev in Warsaw, and Schmidt’s visit in Moscow, as well as the Venice Declaration of the Nine, could be put on the European account for that matter.

26. NATO Facts and Figures, p. 344.
34. The three committees are the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), the Political Committee, and the Economic Committee.
35. NATO Facts and Figures, p. 94.
36. Ibid., p. 100.
37. Cleveland, NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain, p. 28.
38. Ibid., p. 29.


4. From an address delivered by Richard R. Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, on April 25, 1983; Department of State Bulletin, August 1983, p. 50.

5. This was the theme of the traditional debate of the Oxford Union Society of Oxford University on February 24, 1984. Defense Secretary Weinberger, confronted with the British peace movement, "won" the debate, as the final vote of the student audience showed. *The Washington Post*, March 6, 1984, p. A15.

6. The visitor to Mount Rushmore in South Dakota reads this quotation of Theodore Roosevelt when he faces the huge likeness of this president together with George Washington's, Thomas Jefferson's, and Abraham Lincoln's, sculpted into the granite of the mountain.


emerging parallelism of strategic interest between China, Japan and the United States, make East Asia the theater offering the most interesting new strategic opportunities.'" Komer, "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense," p. 1139.


17. Time, February 13, 1984, p. 31. Although downplayed, the remarks of Undersecretary of State Eagleburger have stirred considerable anger in Europe. It remains to be seen whether they have also caused some European reflections.


20. Kissinger cited explicitly his fear of leaks that induced him not to inform and consult the allies before the US-Soviet "showdown" during the 1973 Middle East war. See White House Years. Also, a justification for the "Grenada surprise" was the fear of leaks.


25. Cynics may point to other features of the Lebanon engagement bearing NATO characteristics, e.g., the failure to develop some coordination mechanism among the four contingents, even if only for the timing of their withdrawals. Such observations strongly underline the necessity of politi-
cal cooperation and coordination of political moves at least among the allies involved, but preferably among them all.

26. Van Campen, “NATO Political Consultation,” p. 67. For detailed information in brief about EPC, see Wolf-Ruthart Born, Die Europäische Politische Zusammenarbeit (EPZ), in Information fuer die Truppe, June 1984, Bonn (BMVG).

27. Van Campen, “NATO Political Consultation,” p. 68.
28. Ibid., p. 67.

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1. NATO Facts and Figures, pp. 312–13, 316.
NATO Countries and the area within which an armed attack on one ally obligates all other allies to provide mutual assistance.
The area within which an armed attack on one ally obligates the other side mutual assistance. Warsaw Pact Countries.
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