WAR IN THE FALKLANDS: 
THE USE AND DISUSE OF MILITARY THEORY

LTC James R. McDonough 
U.S. Army

Army Operational Studies Fellowship 
School of Advanced Military Studies 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Name of Student: James R. McDonough, LTC, Infantry

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Approved by:

[LTC Harold R. Winton, Ph. D.]
Monograph Director

(COL Richard Hart Sinnreich, MA) Advanced Military Studies

(MG Gordon R. Sullivan, MS) Deputy Commandant, Command and General Staff College

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**WAR IN THE FALKLANDS: THE USE AND DISUSE OF MILITARY THEORY (U)**

**和个人作者**

LTC JAMES RICHARD MCDONOUGH

**摘要**

This monograph analyzes the 1982 war between the United Kingdom and Argentina over possession of the Falklands in regard to several of the foundations of military theory. It uses this recent campaign which combines air, land, and sea forces armed with modern technologies as a case study of the applicability of traditional military theory to modern warfare.

The monograph first reviews the general political background leading up to the outbreak of hostilities on 2 April 1982, then summarizes the salient military events of the war. Next it offers analyses of how politics and military action were interrelated throughout the campaign, how tactics, operations, and strategy interacted during the course of the war, and where the centers of gravity were situated for the opposing forces. It concludes with an overview as to the applicability of traditional military theory to this particular campaign.

The monograph concludes that the war in the Falklands was a unique opportunity to contrast two widely divergent approaches to warfare, one which paid heed to military
theory and the doctrinal implications that stem from it and one which ignored many of its foundations. Although both belligerents were affected by the interactions of war and politics, one side effectively integrated all of its arms, while the other allowed disparate actions to dissipate its efforts. Throughout the campaign, the ultimate victor recognized the center of gravity of its opponent and attacked it, while the loser either failed to recognize that of its enemy or elected not to attack it. The indications are that the warring nation that understands military theory and its implications has a decisive advantage over an enemy that does not, even when the latter may have the more advantageous material position.
ABSTRACT

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by LTC James R. McDonough, USA.

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The Falklands War of 1982 between England and Argentina offers a fascinating insight into a number of the complex interrelationships of war: the lines between politics and military action, the integration of air, land and sea efforts, the centrality of logistics to the conduct of the campaign, the range of technology from electronics to the bayonet, and the dominance of terrain and weather in operational concepts, as well as many others. The Falklands War was an almost laboratory perfect model of a campaign, geographically isolated, offering distinct advantages and disadvantages to each adversary, fought with weapon systems remarkably similar for both sides, set against an intense political background, and brought to a clear conclusion with a distinct winner and loser in less than 75 days. Yet it was not without its share of banalities, of confusions in the fog of battle, of opportunities lost, of political ineptitudes, of objectives ill-conceived and undefined, of tactical and organizational failures, as well as operations brilliantly executed, well led, and courageously fought by men seeking to do their duty as they understood it.

This monograph will choose from the rich lore of the Falklands Campaign to explore the relationships of military theory to its application in the hard, cold crucible of reality. While many of the concepts entertained by military theorists are present among the efforts of the combatants of this war, our analysis will be confined to only a few of the key constructs.

Specifically, we will explore the relationship between military means and political ends. The Falklands, although
a minor land mass in the expanse of the South Atlantic with little strategic consequence, became a locale of immense political importance to the governments of both Argentina and the United Kingdom. How this came to be and how that affected the conduct of the campaign will be explored in some depth.

Closely related to the issue of military and political interrelationships is the matter of integrating tactics and operations with strategy to achieve political ends. In the Falklands one belligerent was careful to consider the ways in which tactics and operations would lead to a strategic end. The other belligerent was not. Contrasting the two different approaches and weighing their consequences affords us an opportunity to test the relevance of a theory that imputes necessity to tying tactics, operations, and strategy together. We shall see if that was true in this case.

A third focus will be the centers of gravity of the opposing forces. What were the critical elements of power that could resolve the conflict to a favorable settlement for one side or the other? Were these centers of power the vulnerable points of the combatants as well? Did either side effectively recognize the center of gravity of its enemy and seek to destroy it? These are interesting questions that may prove fruitful to explore.

Finally we will look at operational level warfare as it pertains to the Falklands. Was there a sequencing of battles that capitalized on the realities of conditions in the Falklands? Was there a failure to consider operational
imperatives that resulted in disastrous consequences? In short, did the tenets of operational warfare pertain to the Falklands, and to what extent were they applied? And to what extent did the moral issues of war effect the operational concepts? Although the answers must be conditioned by the unique nature of the Falklands Campaign, they may provide some insight to the general applicability of the theories of war.

This will be the analytical thrust of this monograph. But first we must set the stage with a political and military overview of the events.

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND:

At first blush it seem almost inconceivable that anyone could care who "owned" the Falklands. Situated close to the Antarctic Circle between latitudes 51 and 52 degrees, the Falklands suffered a cold and inhospitable climate which kept them uninhabited until the period of colonial exploration in the New World. The islands were originally sighted by the crew of the English ship Desire in 1592, and not until 98 years later did the crew of the English ship Welfare make the first recorded landing on 27 January 1690. (1)

Argentina did not exist in those days, and the islands remained essentially unclaimed, although frequented most often by the French who gave them the name "les Iles Malouines" after the port from which they sailed in Brittany, St Malo. This conflicted with the British name Falkland rendered by the crew of the Welfare, who had named
them after the Treasurer of the Royal Navy, Viscount Falkland. It is ironic that in later years it would be the Spanish translation of Islas Malvinas that would contend with the original Falklands to precipitate a war over sovereignty. (2)

The islands themselves had little to offer. The terrain is treeless and windswept, and only the grasslands ashore and the fishing of the seas adjacent offer any livelihood to inhabitants. Early French settlers introduced cattle, later replaced by sheep, to feed off the grasse. As is wont of this breed, the sheep further depleted the barren soil. By 1972 the 4700 square miles of the Falkland Islands were supporting a population of only about 2000, over half of them in the main settlement of Stanley.

Shortly after the independence of Buenos Aires in 1816, the Argentine government established a penal colony on the islands, but the strategic concerns of England as a way station on the important route around the Cape of Good Hope into the Pacific and with by now a consistent history of claim to the islands, led Britain to reassert its rights of sovereignty and in 1833 send the frigate HMS Clio to evict the Argentinian administrators and raise the Union Jack over the territory, where it flew uninterrupted until 1 April 1982. (3)

The strategic importance of the Falklands/Malvinas had not increased over the years as wind driven ships gave way to coal and steam. The islands remained a convenient location to refuel and refit, particularly for those ships
just having made the rough passage around the Cape Horn from the Pacific, but certainly not a critical link in the British Empire, and most certainly of no strategic importance to Argentina, which possessed an ideal position on Tierra del Fuego. Of even less importance was the island of South Georgia, some 800 miles east-southeast of the Falklands, first claimed by Captain Cook in 1772 and more recently the site of the British Antarctic Survey. Argentina did not even post a claim to South Georgia until 1927, and then without much enthusiasm. It was to be South Georgia where the first military action of the war took place. Of note here is that while we may accept the Clausewitzian notion that war is merely a continuation of politics, it might be a mistake to assume those politics lie more in the international strategic milieu than they do in domestic political maneuvering. It is to the latter that we must turn to get a clearer picture of the political background of the war in the Falklands, and of the political concerns that would most directly impact on the conduct of the fighting.

Two contending political systems in effect in Britain and Argentina drove its power holders to the same conclusion, that there must be war in the Falklands. For the instigator of the hostilities, the decision was steeped in desperation fed by misinformation and false assumptions. Argentina had long been suffering from the aftermath of Peronism that had devolved into rampant corruption, economic chaos, government sponsored terrorism, and military brokerage of power politics. The military junta in
power, a triumverate of the Army, Navy, and Air Force chiefs, was keenly aware of a need for success, for however much clubs were trump in Argentinian politics, the wielders were still dependent on their public popularity for continued rule. The President, Army chief Galtieri, had only recently cultivated reinvigorated relations with Washington (the Carter Administration had condemned Argentina’s human rights record and imposed an arms embargo under the Humphrey-Kennedy Act), and by 1982 was certain that his nation had become instrumental for furtherance of the Reagan Administration’s Latin American policy.(6)

Spurred on by his close friend and political power sharer, Admiral Jorge Anaya, head of the Argentinian Navy, Galtieri felt he could seize a quick, easy victory in the Falklands, gain U.S. support or at worst non-interference, gain moral and political support in the Third World dominated United Nations, and solidify his position at home by satisfying a long-held nationalistic ambition of the Argentinians, return of the Malvinas.(7)

At the pinnacle of political power in a parliamentary democracy, Margaret Thatcher, head of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister of England, was no less vulnerable to the whims of public popularity. As it was, her Government was severely rocked by the unexpected seizure of the Falklands by Argentinian forces in early April, and the Loyal Opposition led by Michael Foot lost no time in attacking the obvious intelligence and political failure of the Conservative Government.(8) The Prime Minister, showing her political mettle, took immediate political and military
steps to counter this threat not only to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom, but to her political survival as well. The die was cast for war in the islands "...thrown aside from human use."(9)

MILITARY OVERVIEW:

The military maneuvering over the Falkland Islands began in mid-March of 1982 with an Argentinian contractor landing on South Georgia Island. Not officially part of the island, South Georgia was a direct dependency of the United Kingdom, but clearly the incursion there was a precursor to the Argentinian invasion of the Falklands themselves. Within a week, the civilians had been reinforced with over 100 Argentinian troops, although direct confrontation with the contingent of British scientists ashore was avoided.(10) There is no doubt that the British government was immediately aware of the undeniable invasion, and a flurry of diplomatic activity ensued, attempting to forestall escalation of the crisis.(11) This was not to be. Argentina had decided, apparently on the 26th of March,(12) that Stanley was to be seized by force, and put to sea a fleet in the guise of naval maneuvers. On April 2, the first shots of the war were fired as the Argentinians landed on East and West Falkland Islands, overpowered the small British contingent on the latter, and attacked on South Georgia Island the following day.(13)

While Argentina hurried to build up supplies and troops in the Islands, particularly in and around Stanley, the United Kingdom was quick to put forces in motion for
eventual re-taking of the Falklands. By April 7th she had declared a maritime exclusion zone of 200 nautical miles around an imaginary point in the middle of the Falklands, to go into effect on April 12th. Already reconnaissance forces were being assembled to go ashore in the islands to build the detailed intelligence that would be necessary for an invasion, while a fleet was hastily assembled, consisting of not only Royal Navy craft, but also auxiliary ships from Britain's merchant fleet and its cruise liners. The core of the English surface fleet consisted of the small aircraft carriers Hermes and Invincible, while the Argentinians had a recent purchase from the English, the medium sized aircraft carrier, Veinticinco de Mayo. For the British, the carriers would be critical as they were the only means of transporting the fixed wing aircraft that would prove so crucial in the battle to come, the Harrier. The problem was less complex for Buenos Aires as air bases on the continent were close enough to allow ranging by many of their aircraft, although at the extreme limit of that range and only with airborne refueling for several models in the Argentine Air Force.

Ascension Island in the mid-Atlantic immediately became crucial to the British as a forward base. Roughly splitting the difference of the mileage between England and the Falklands, Ascension became a gathering place for the stores, ships, troops, and aircraft that would be essential to an invasion of the islands. The first contact between British and Argentinian forces since the former's humiliation on 2 April took place on the 21st as an
Argentine Boeing 707 conducting a surveillance mission came within 12 miles of the task force and was chased away by Harriers from the Hermes. (18) That same day men from the Special Air Service went ashore at South Georgia, only to suffer immediately from the extreme cold and be forced to evacuate the following day, but not before two Wessex helicopters crashed trying to lift them off. (19)

It was becoming increasingly clear that a diplomatic settlement of the conflict could not be gained, and England further committed on 23 April by landing forces back on South Georgia. In a joint operation these units forced the surrender of the Argentinians on the island on 25 April. (20) Simultaneously, the war at sea was heating up as the British fired on and pursued the Argentine submarine Santa Fe, driving it aground in South Georgia, and put into effect a blockade of all air and sea routes within the 200 nautical mile exclusionary zone on 30 April. (21) The following day a British Vulcan bomber, flying from Ascension Island, bombed the airstrip at Stanley. (22)

On 2 May, in what might have been the major political blunder by the English during the war, a British submarine sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano 35 miles outside the exclusionary zone. The moral support London had been able to build up worldwide as the "victim" in the Falklands altercation was suddenly jeopardized. (23) However, the questionable legality of the attack was obfuscated two days later by a successful Argentine Exocet attack on the HMS Sheffield. Although the one missile out of two fired that hit the British ship did not detonate, the fire that ensued
killed 20 British sailors and wounded 24 more, forcing abandonment of the vessel within 5 hours. (24) Also noteworthy was that Argentina had now expended 40% of the inventory of 5 Exocet missiles with which they had opened hostilities. (25)

Soviet naval writers have divided the struggle into three distinct phases, mobilization and deployment, blockade and counterblockade, and amphibious operations. (26) Using this description, the amphibious operations opened on the 21st of May with the British invasion at San Carlos at the western end of East Falkland. Critical at this juncture were the two remaining amphibious ships in the Royal Navy's inventory, Fearless and Intrepid, both of which had nearly been retired from the fleet. (27) While the Argentinian resistance on the ground was minimal, and while the Argentine Navy had clearly adopted the tactic of staying away in the face of the superior British fleet, the Argentine Air Force took the battle to the British. Throughout the brief day (the sun was up for approximately 8 hours this time of year in the Falklands), the battle between Argentine Air Force and British air, sea, and ground forces raged around San Carlos. It was not a clear-cut victory for either side. What was clear was that the British did not have control of the air, or even command of the sea, the two prerequisites they had set for themselves before launching the amphibious invasion. The following day, 22 May, the Argentines mounted only a token air attack, and British forces capitalized on the opportunity to build up stocks and troops ashore. The British brigade ashore, 3d
Commando reinforced, took no offensive action, seeking instead to prepare defensive positions for the anticipated enemy counterattack, which was expected at this point to outnumber the British by at least 4 to 1.

However, the attack did not come. The following day the Argentine Air Force reappeared in force and the battle of attrition continued throughout the 23rd, 24th, and 25th. Losses were appreciable on both sides, many of the Argentinian aircraft falling victim to the resolute air defense of the British, and several of the British vessels being hit, some sinking, others being abandoned.

By the 28th, political pressure from an impatient public and a critical opposition had built in England for a ground success of some type, precipitating the operationally useless ground attack on Goose Green, a bloody fight for the British 2nd Parachute battalion. While the latter secured the surrender of over 1000 Argentinians around Goose Green and Darwin, two other battalions of 3rd Commando struck out to seize the Northern end of East Falkland and to secure forward positions on the way to Stanley. At this point the second major ground element of the British force, the 5th Infantry Brigade, was brought into the action. However, the loss of the Chinook helicopters designated for transporting the ground forces when the Atlantic Conveyor was hit on 25 May, created a dilemma for the British, as infantry could not be walked into the final battle around Stanley quickly from the beachhead at San Carlos, a distance of some 50 miles. Accordingly, they were landed at Fitzroy and Bluff Cove during 5 to 8 June, a daring move that cost the British
dearly when the Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram were attacked by 2 Skyhawks and 2 Mirages, assisted by the Argentine radar atop Sapper Hill at Stanley. It was the worst single disaster of the war for the British.\(^{(28)}\)

Nonetheless, by this time it was becoming increasingly clear to Argentina that she could not win the war. As early as 29 May, Major General Menendez, commander of Argentinian forces in the Falklands, sent a message to Buenos Aires stating that he could not win.\(^{(29)}\) Perhaps as a reflection of this attitude, his forces did not conduct an aggressive defense of the Stanley area, despite the fact that they still overwhelmingly outnumbered the attackers. Only in the closing hours of the thrusts to Stanley did they make any show of a counterattack. By June 12th virtually all the dominant terrain around the capital was in the hands of the British, who were now pounding their enemy with naval and artillery indirect fire, pressing in with ground attacks, and increasingly dominating the air war. The 12th was in fact the last day of any Argentine air activity, and on the 14th directly after a dawn attack by the two British brigades closed on Stanley, General Menendez surrendered his forces. The fighting for the Falklands was over.

An Analysis of the Operational Level of War.

I. The relationships of politics and military action.

We begin our analysis of the applicability of military theory to the war in the Falklands with a look at the relationships of political issues to military actions. It
is perhaps the most often quoted dictum of Clausewitz that war is merely a continuation of policy by other means. Though eloquently put, the thought implies an overly simplistic continuum whereby politics gradually evolve into military action, the latter taking over as the policy expression. In fact the relationship is much more complex, wherein political needs and military exigencies impact on one another throughout the course of a war, causing each to mold and alternately be molded by the other. The Falkland war gives us a good insight into the intricacies of this relationship.

For the junta in Buenos Aires, the occupation of the Malvinas by the British was a legitimate issue of national pride and personal ambition. Privately, President Galtieri had pledged himself to rid the islands of the British by their 150th anniversary of occupation, namely 3 January 1983. (30) For some 17 years, negotiations had been dragging on between London and Buenos Aires, and the military leaders of the latter as well as the general public had come to believe that no good would ever come of it. Simultaneously, Argentina had been confounded in its rivalry with Chile in the contention over their competing claims to the Beagle Channel Islands in light of their joint pledge to the Pope not to exacerbate the confrontation in exchange for his mediation. (31) As restive as the public was, it would not have been prudent to violate the solemn pledge by the government of a heavily Roman Catholic country to the head of the Church. Having lost faith in the niceties of diplomacy, under pressure from their own constituencies for
a variety of domestic travails (e.g. high unemployment, the "dirty war" of internal suppression that had left thousands dead and missing) and international failures (such as the dispute over the Beagle Channel), and acting under the assumption that Britain would not respond to a fait accompli, the Junta put the forces in motion that would bring about war over the Falklands. Even as the foreign minister was assuring the United Nations that Argentina had only peaceful intentions in regard to the Falklands on 1 April 1982, Argentine forces were storming ashore on remote parts of the islands. (32)

The onset of the winter season in the South Atlantic reassured the Junta that Britain would not respond. Certainly she did not appear disposed to do so. Economic constraint, combined with a focus on Britain's NATO mission, had depleted forces on hand for action in remote regions. Had Argentina waited, it was most likely that forces would be further depleted, as England already had plans for disestablishing 50% of its aircraft carriers and amphibious ships (one of each). But Argentina did not think it had to wait, and most certainly domestic politics dictated that waiting was not prudent. While their military analysis of London's capabilities was good, the Junta's political analysis of the British system was faulty.

Prime Minister Thatcher and her Cabinet had no pretensions that they were militarily prepared to deal with the Falklands crisis, but they understood immediately that some show of force was necessary not only for their domestic political survival, but in order to legitimize their cause.
in the eyes of the world. Even as the task force was hastily being assembled on 2 April, the British government did not believe that the outcome would be war. (33)

Whether they knew it or not, however, both governments were now irrevocably committed to battle. For Argentina, the propensity to pander to the popular press led to early publication of a picture of English troops on Stanley prostrate at the feet of the conquering Argentinians, a picture that was as quick to outrage the British as to deny Argentina any peaceful withdrawal from the islands without public revolt. For Prime Minister Thatcher, press coverage of the departure of British troops and the Royal Navy from home ports equally put her hostage to the expectations of her people.

Whatever international political support Argentina had expected immediately began to unravel. Regionally it received no support from the Organization of American States, while at the United Nations Britain's astuteness quickly isolated Buenos Aires' position. Within days, Security Council Resolution 502 demanded the immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces, and gave the British "...the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense if armed attack occurs...." (34) Perhaps even more importantly, it encouraged the United States, the essential ally to either party, to shift from its neutral position and eventually tilt toward Britain. Militarily, this had significant consequences, not least of which was the probable sharing of intelligence, support of the international arms embargo against Argentina (the lack of
access to replacement Exocet missiles, probably available elsewhere in Latin America, was critical), and the filling of the void left in NATO in the wake of British redeployment (although the latter the United States was compelled to do regardless of its leanings on the Falklands issue).

But as much as the political winds had blown toward London, it was imperative that she move quickly to consolidate her gains. Although it had no military significance, South Georgia was retaken by the end of April. It certainly would have capitulated with the fall of the Falklands a month later, but inasmuch as it was the original scene of invasion, it was politically important to open the reinvansion there. The military near disaster of two helicopters crashing and a reconnaissance element freezing in the teeth of an Antarctic storm was risked so that an early victory could be given to the British public, and to the international bodies monitoring the crisis.

The decision to take Goose Green and Darwin in late May were similarly inspired by the political demand for a victory. As in South Georgia, Argentine forces in these two settlements would surely have capitulated once Stanley had been taken, while their conquest contributed nothing to the subsequent drive on Stanley. Moreover, security concerns (the United States having tipped to England was by now sharing intelligence, but was not eager to let that be known to its Latin American allies, including Argentina) led to the withholding of intelligence from operational commanders concerning the Argentine order of battle in and around Goose Green and Darwin(35) so that while higher headquarters in
England were aware that over 1000 Argentinians were defending, the field commander, anticipating a much smaller force, elected to attack with a single battalion of only 450 men. While bloody enough as it was, a British debacle here could have been a major political setback for London. In both cases, South Georgia and Darwin-Goose Green, political demands were dictating the objectives of specific operations, objectives that were of questionable relevance to the larger military campaign.

Whether or not the sinking of the Belgrano by the British on 2 May was a military or a political expedient is unclear. The official British explanation is that while the Belgrano was clearly out of the tactical exclusionary zone declared by London, she was "...closing on elements of our task force...." (36) It has since been shown that the Belgrano was at least 14 hours away from the nearest British surface vessel. (37) Interestingly, it was just prior to this incident that President Galtieri was showing the first strong signs of seeking a political out from the continued hostilities through the intermediary of President Belaunde of Peru. It is the hypothesis of the authors of the book The Sinking of the Belgrano that the decision to sink the ship was strictly political, to forestall any hopes for diplomatic settlement of the issue short of total and immediate withdrawal by Argentina, something Galtieri could not do. If that was the intent, it succeeded; but it also opened up the Thatcher government to international censure that could have cost it dearly had not the HMS Sheffield been sunk two days later. If nothing else, it was a
reminder to London that the war had best be brought to a conclusion quickly, and not just because of the worsening weather in the South Atlantic. Accordingly, when the amphibious invasion did come on May 21st, it was without having achieved the control of the sea and air that had been originally set as a military precondition. It is clear that for Britain at least, politics was driving the campaign.

For Argentina, politics and political misjudgments may have precipitated the war, but preservation of the political base continued to dictate the course of the campaign. The essential reality was that the military was more than just a means of national security. The Army, Navy, and Air Force were the respective political bases for the leading members of the Junta. Preservation of those bases was essential for continued hold on the political strings since the loss of political power at home was directly proportional to the loss of military power. With that in mind, the military campaign became immediately defensive, the Navy observing the British imposition of exclusionary zones, and the Army retreating into garrison throughout the campaign. Only the Air Force ever undertook an offensive operation after the original lightly opposed invasion by Argentina. It is interesting to note that Air Force Brigadier General Basilio Lami Dozo was the junior member of the Junta. Right up until the end, the Argentine Air Force continued to attack over the Falklands, as well as land supplies in Stanley. Long since, Admiral Anaya, the original hawk who pushed the Junta toward invasion, had concentrated on preserving his fleet.
The husbanding of resources by Argentina went well beyond concerns for economy of force. Concern for human life is similarly a hard case to make. In the preceding years of the "dirty war" in Argentina, over 18,000 citizens had disappeared.(40) Poor tactics may have been part of the reason for the timidity of the armed forces, but the indications are that from the top down concern for maintenance of the political power base became the rationale for military operations or lack thereof. A clearer formula for disjointedness between air, sea, and land operations could not have been devised. Only the professionalism of the air arm, to include the air arm of the Argentine Navy,(41) overrode the internal political concerns of Argentina's armed forces. It probably was a case of being penny-wise and pound-foolish. As it was, the Argentine defeat in the Falklands guaranteed the fall of the Junta and the series of recriminations that befell its leaders later. If there was any hope for a successful conclusion to the Argentine effort in the Falklands, it was that time would make it politically untenable for Britain to re-invade. While it may be the norm for a political issue to be resolved by a military outcome, it is probably not prudent to stake a military campaign entirely on a diplomatic solution that is essentially independent of the outcome of battle. In this regard, the Junta miscalculated, and suffered accordingly.

We see, therefore, that Clausewitz' dictum has applicability in the Falklands war. There is a tight relationship between policy and war. But the nature of that
relationship must be thought through. In the case of the politicized Argentine armed forces, setbacks and attrition in battle had direct and dire political consequences at home since the armed forces themselves were the loci, not merely the implements, of political power. The British, on the other hand, with a professional and apolitical armed force, were able to balance military and political astutely. Consequently, they had greater flexibility in the conduct of the campaign.

If there is a lesson here it is that although military action may be an extension of policy, it is better executed by a non-political military arm. There seems to be an ironclad demand for separation of political and military activity, even though the two may be closely related. War as a continuation of policy is best prosecuted by a non-political arm subservient to the political leaders. At least that seems to be true in this case.

II. The interrelationships among strategy, operations, and tactics.

It is not enough to demonstrate the interrelationship between military and political action. Although the previous section tried to show that such a relationship is quite complex, and how the one affects the other, few in this day and age deny that such a relationship exists. More complex is understanding the way in which strategy, operations, and tactics are intertwined. The Falklands presents a good case study in how one impacts on the others, the wisdom that must be given to establishing an effective
interaction, and the costs of failing to pay heed to the inseparability of their effects.

Whatever motives Argentina had, the essential fact was that her overriding objective prior to 2 April 1982 was to gain possession of the Malvinas; and when the strategy of political deliberation failed, she moved directly to military invasion. After that juncture, the strategy melded into the objective, simply to hold on to the islands. However, it was clear that until the sinking of the Belgrano, President Galtieri might be willing to define loosely what "holding" them meant. Once the traumatic sinking had occurred, Galtieri had no alternative but to keep them occupied. Not to would have been his immediate political downfall. For the United Kingdom there was an absence of strategy prior to the event. If any concerted thought was given to the Falklands problem, it was to stall for time, equivocate, and procrastinate. As for British concern about Argentina's ambitions toward the islands, while rape might be out of the question, seduction might be positively encouraged. After April 2nd Britain's objective solidified to regain possession of the Falklands, and it was clear that military action was the only strategy that applied.

Had Britain had a strategy in the first place, it is possible that the crisis never would have erupted. The Argentine miscalculations must have at least been reinforced by Britain's decision to withdraw the ice patrol ship Endurance, her plans for the retirement of the aircraft carrier Hermes, sale to Australia of her partner
Invincible (44) and early disposal of the only two amphibious ships left in the inventory, Fearless and Intrepid. (45) While London obviously did take precautionary steps after the mid-March incidents on South Georgia by dispatching a task force as early as 5 April from Portsmouth, (46) she clearly failed to signal her resolve to Buenos Aires. England's strategic void and Argentina's strategic oversimplification now compelled both nations hastily to devise operational campaigns to compensate for their lack of forethought.

It has been shown that at various times during April both sides were hopeful for a political solution to the problem, but by early May it was military action was inevitable. In the intervening weeks, both sides scrambled to concoct campaign plans. For Argentina, there should have been ample plans to fall back on. Her military men had been studying invasion plans since at least the late 1960s, one of those students being then Captain Anaya. For Britain planning began at least in March. But realities had changed. Britain's assumption that she would retain the Falklands as a base for whatever crisis arose was erroneous. Argentina's hopes that the invasion would be the culmination of her operations were equally shortsighted.

Both adversaries very quickly deduced the centrality of naval power in the forthcoming operations. The essence of that operational concept, codified by the procurement of the necessary ships, was stated in a meeting of the British Privy Council on 4 April that empowered the Government to "...requisition for Her Majesty's service any British ship
and anything on board such ship wherever the ship may
be."(47) Eventually almost 70 ships would be so
requisitioned. From the outset the military planners and the
politicians were in agreement that naval projection was the
key to an invasion of the islands.

At the same time, the Argentine Navy was reformed and
positioned east of Golfo San Jorge to cover both the
mainland and the Falklands from the approaching Royal
Navy.(48) Had it held this position, the campaign would
have taken a very different form. As it was, the sinking of
the Belgrano caused a major revision in concept by the
Argentinians. Citing as their primary mission the defense
of the homelands, the Admirals pulled the surface fleet to
within 12 miles of the continent (which just happened to
coincide with the limits set by London). From this point
on, the Argentine Navy played a completely passive role,
although its air arm was redeployed ashore and continued to
be a prime combatant in the war. Although the Royal Navy
could not claim command of the sea (it never gained
superiority in the air above it), the complete lack of a
threat from the surface fleet freed critical resources which
could now be husbanded for the amphibious invasion.(49)

By pulling back the fleet, Argentina surrendered the
operational initiative to the British, who by this time had
succeeded in building up adequate resources along the lines
of communication, most notably by capitalizing on the
fortuitous location of Ascension Island.(50) But despite
the sufficiency of resources, any dramatic loss at the hands
of Argentine forces would have had a major political impact on Britain's ability to pursue the war. Intrinsically, Argentina understood this, and sought a tactical solution to what was in effect an operational problem. Its hopes rested on the Air Forces. If a major British target could be found and punished, such as the converted passenger cruise ship Canberra transporting the lead British brigade, the war would be essentially over as the political effect in London would have been so devastating as to make continued operations questionable. Conversely, the British concluded that air superiority was one of the two prerequisites for a successful invasion (command of the sea being the other one). In retrospect, this was an unreasonable objective. Their only aircraft capable of an air superiority role was the Sea Harrier, and husbanding every one they could gave the British a grand total of 20 prior to 18 May, of which 3 were lost before they could be reinforced. Against this force were arrayed almost 150 Argentine fighters, fighter-bombers, and bombers. The result was a battle of attrition in which the British depended heavily on their air defense weapons to equalize the air battle, as well as a commando raid on Pebble Island on 14 May to destroy a number of ground-based aircraft.

Attrition was heavy for the Argentine air forces, but they never wavered in their aggressiveness. If anything saved the British it was not so much the destruction of the Argentine air arm as it was the failure of the many
conventional warheads that hit British ships to explode, as well as the inability of the Argentinians to pinpoint the most cost-effective targets. Both of these were tactical failures, forced on the Argentinians by the necessary low level approaches in the face of British air defense (the fuses on the bombs did not have time to detonate) and their lack of an airborne warning and control system, a serious deficiency of the British as well. The war in the air was strictly tactical, the British having no alternative, the Argentinians failing to consolidate their resources into a coherent operational campaign. Had Argentina had some luck and hit an aircraft carrier, an amphibious ship, or a converted passenger liner (there were only two of each), then these tactics might have had strategic effect. It is too much, however, to stake a strategic outcome on a tactical stroke of luck.

The invasion and land campaign on East Falkland was the culmination of the Falklands War. No matter what course the air and sea campaign took, possession of the Falklands fell to those who dominated on the land. Accordingly, the British resolved that a final combat would be necessary between the Argentine and British armies.

The two critical decisions facing the British were what the ultimate operational objective was to be, and where to come ashore. The objective was clearly the Argentine forces at Stanley, but in the preoccupation with the landing site this was lost from vision.
The choice of San Carlos was the cautious approach, but in hindsight the proper one. Properly gauging the capabilities of their soldiers, the British leaders concluded that the march from San Carlos to Stanley was not beyond their capacity, and that although it might meet with rigorous defenses along the way, such an approach was safer than an all or nothing landing in the vicinity of Stanley. Although the Royal Navy never explicitly acknowledged it to the landing forces, they had failed to gain mastery of the air.(55) The waters between East and West Falkland compensated for this by negating the dreaded Exocet missile, which British intelligence feared might be reaching Argentina from other Latin American sources. But the narrow waters also limited the air defense capabilities of the British who had to wait for the enemy to be close overhead before reacting. Their ace once again was the Harrier aircraft, which they were able to keep on station in pairs throughout the duration of the operation and which exacted a heavy toll on the Argentines.(56)

Most important, San Carlos was undefended, a fact confirmed by the SBS and SAS reconnaissance teams landed earlier in the month.(57) Accordingly, San Carlos was the place where the British could get ashore with minimum risk, and that fact became their primary operational concern. What they were to do once they came ashore got lost in the shuffle; it was assumed they would do something was not specifically addressed.(58)
The political nature of the war had dictated that prudence override military directness. Other landing areas, such as Berkely Sound due north of Stanley (59) would have allowed for a direct thrust on Stanley, but also hazarded a more catastrophic blow to British forces. Were British forces caught ashore before a build-up allowed for an adequate defense, the political and military consequences of a defeat of the force would have been disastrous. Later when Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram were hit at Fitzroy while landing the 5th Brigade (60) the enormity of that risk was underscored. But as prudence became paramount, the clarity of objective was obfuscated.

Even as Brigadier Thompson, commander of the troops ashore, complied with his instructions to improve the beachhead, London became alarmed at the lack of progress in the ground campaign (61). Political pressures emanating from the Opposition, in the press, and among the public at large demanded a positive headline; the directive came to seize Goose Green—Port Darwin, a militarily illogical objective.

As tragic as this side trip was, it shook the military out of its lethargy and spurred it on to the proper objective, the Argentinians at Port Stanley. Here occurred the greatest tactical, operational, and strategic failure of the war, the complete passivity of the Argentinians to the threat to their vitals. The British advanced virtually unopposed all the way to the high ground dominating Stanley, despite the preponderance of Argentine forces and the
The adequacy of their supplies. The only obstacles in the way were unguarded minefields, rugged terrain, and hostile weather.

At the final ring of high ground around Stanley (Mount Longdon, Mount Harriet, Two Sisters, and Wireless Ridge) the Argentinians fought hard from well prepared defensive positions, but it was not enough. Simple tactics of patrolling and fire support planning were overlooked, with the resulting loss of the high ground. At this point it was all over but the surrender.

The Argentine effort was replete with opportunities lost. A decisive defeat to the British wasted effort at Darwin-Goose Green, where Argentina had a greater than 3:1 advantage would have been politically damaging to the British cause. An active defense across the 50 miles of wasteland the British were forced to walk would have greatly slowed their advance and taken the battle deeper into winter, a phenomenon which should have aided Argentina. Even ancillary measures, such as the mining of San Carlos before the invasion or the lengthening of the airfield at Stanley so that fighter aircraft could be based ashore rather than forced to fight at the extremes of their ranges would have handicapped the British effort. That the Argentinians did nothing speaks volumes on the lack of interservice cooperation in the politicized Argentine military, as well as the complete void in their operational planning. For the British who correctly sequenced their
operations, although not without some mistakes, it seemed to come easy. In the end they received much praise (deservedly so) for their leadership, morale, and fitness, but it could have gone much harder on them if only the Argentine leadership had developed an operation plan beyond their invasion of the islands.

Hence we see that the British paid heed to the interwoven fabrics of strategy, operations, and tactics, if not flawlessly, then still sufficiently well to build a logical and ultimately successful campaign. Argentina was backed into a strategy of desperation - hold the Islands but avoid dissipating the source of political power, the armed forces themselves. Confounded at the outset by the internal contradiction of the need to risk forces while at the same time fearing to lose the essence of the political base, Argentina’s leaders were never able to put an operational plan into effect, nor does it appear that one was ever contemplated. Completing the failure was abysmal leadership that saw no integration of air, land, and sea power, and which on the ground shamefully left the soldiers to fend for themselves. A more complete breakdown of the necessary interrelationship of tactics, operations, and strategy is hard to imagine. A more complete defeat is rare, and by its occurrence gives a strong indication of the imperative of an integrated plan.

III. The Centers of Gravity
Both Argentina and the United Kingdom faced a series of challenges in their struggle for the Falklands. Both were fighting a war in a remote region where rugged terrain and climate posed additional hazards to already complex operations. For the British, however, operating along an 8000 mile line of communication, the complexity was much greater.

Yet it was not the solution to the logistics problems that created the conditions for victory in the Falklands. Certainly that was a prerequisite. No force can sustain an operation 8000 miles from its homeland without adequate logistical arrangements. But to state that "...operational sustainment comprised their center of gravity"(64) is an oversimplification. Logistics alone could not guarantee victory in the Falklands. Indeed, the logistics build-up in Ascension Island and aboard the floating supply base in the South Atlantic was itself vulnerable to enemy attack if it were not for the adequate defenses put up by the Royal Navy.(65)

For the British, the center of gravity for the entire operation rested on the two aircraft carriers, Hermes and Invincible. The task force that enabled the logistics line to be established was built around them. The air battle of attrition throughout the campaign, particularly during the early days of the reinvasion, was based on their decks. The invading forces could not have been safely introduced ashore
had the carriers not escorted them to the region and then covered them as they went ashore.

Although the carriers were small, *Hermes* displacing 23,900 tons and *Invincible* 19,500,(66) they were the only available platforms from which to launch and receive fixed wing aircraft throughout the war. The *Atlantic Conveyor* and the *Atlantic Causeway*, two of the requisitioned ships, were "Arapahoed" by having platforms welded to their decks,(66) but they were simply transporters of aircraft and not fighting platforms.(67) As it left England, the *Conveyor* took on 5 RAF Harriers as well a load of helicopters; but by the time she was hit by an Exocet missile on 25 May, she had transferred the Harriers off. However, the loss of the helicopters, particularly the Chinooks, was critical and altered the ground attack plan as the troops would now have to walk from San Carlos to Stanley.(68) The *Causeway* never carried Harriers.

In the heavy air battles of 21 May over Falkland Sound it was the ability of the Harriers to patrol in pairs without letup over the amphibious fleet that saved the day. The carriers, themselves vulnerable to attack from Super Etendards and their Exocets, stayed to the east of the islands, out of range of the Argentine mainland based aircraft but close enough to affect the outcome of the battle.(69) The small fleet of Harriers accounted for 32 of the 102 Argentine aircraft lost during the war.(70) On D-Day alone, 10 Argentine aircraft were destroyed in the air
by Sea Harriers and 5 on the ground by RAF Harriers. (71) On that date the British ships Argonaut, Ardent, Antrim, Brilliant, and Broadsword were hit by Argentine bombs (72), but the majority of the ordnance failed to explode because of the low level approach forced upon the air forces, in part by the patrolling Harriers.

The Argentinians recognized the criticality of the carriers, but could never get to them. Once the carriers moved east of the Falklands, without the presence of the Venticinco de Mayo and without improvement of the airfield at Stanley, no Argentine aircraft could reach them. The submarines did remain a threat, but the British antisubmarine warfare was very good. Argentina began the war with 4 submarines, all of them diesel fueled, but lost one to hostile action and one to maintenance before the fighting ceased. (73) On 5 May the San Luis reported attacking the Invincible, but the torpedo failed to explode and for the following 72 hours the submarine fled for her life. (74) The carriers remained the critical source of offensive power throughout the war.

For Argentina the center of gravity rested in its forces around Port Stanley. As long as they occupied Stanley, the Falklands were theirs. Only when General Menendez surrendered there on 14 June did the campaign successfully end for the British, even though the war did not technically end until a month later. (75) Although the Argentinians can be faulted for not counterattacking the San
Carlos beachhead, their failure to do so reflects their understanding that British troops ashore meant nothing in themselves. However, by allowing the British to close in on Stanley unopposed, Argentina negated its own source of power. As Clausewitz said, although defense is the superior form of war, it is best conducted as a shield behind which a multitude of offensive blows are launched. Menendez never launched any offensive blows. Such as there were came only from the Argentine air forces, and the British Harriers and air defenses compensated for those. No power flowed from the Argentine land force save its status as a force in being in and around Stanley. According, just like the Navy, the only potential it realized was political. But while the Navy was moot and could be left by the British to the safety of their home waters, the Army had to be unseated. This the British did handily, and thereby won the war.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE FALKLANDS WAR FOR MILITARY THEORY

It is noteworthy that the war in the Falklands was being prosecuted just as a rebirth in study of the operational level of war was taking place within the American military. It was almost as if an instant war had been called up to test the tenets of operational war being espoused in the U. S. Army’s new field manual on operations, FM 100-5.(77) The Falklands offered all the time-tested variations of classical warfare, including in its scope operations on land, air, and sea, related its military
operations directly to the political concerns governing them, and offered a close look at the impact of new technology on standard tactics. It is worthwhile, therefore, to reflect on the theoretical foundations of operational warfare as they pertained to the Falklands.

Try as one might, it is difficult to uncover an operational plan in the Argentinian campaign. In trying to deduce a theoretical foundation for the Junta's approach, one would have to turn to the great Russian novelist Leo Tolstoy who posited that all warfare is happenstance, there is no such thing as military art, and certainly no military science. Orders are given by impressionistic generals without regard to a concern for logical sequencing of events, which are themselves randomly resolved by the disparate actions of participants in the battle. In short, there is no theory, and any attempt to build on one is futile. The one brief moment Argentina captured the initiative was during the invasions of the Falklands and South Georgia. From that point on she frittered it away. If there was any relationship of operations to policy it was that a political solution would negate any further need for operations, a reversal of the dictum that military operations are a mere extension of policy. The hope was that policy would now cancel any need for further military operations.
Yet that was not an imperative for Argentine forces, which populated the Falklands in quantity ample to make the campaign much more difficult for the British. Argentina's decision to switch immediately to the defensive was sound. The Argentinains had what they wanted and sought only to hold onto it.

Thus, if we agree with Clausewitz's view that the defense is the stronger form of war, then Argentina should have had some inherent advantages accrue to it by going on the defense. Britain, at the end of a supply line measured in thousands of miles, should have had inherent disadvantages.

Even if one discounts the opportunity for striking at sea by the Argentine Navy there remained ample opportunity to confound the British amphibious invasion of the islands. That opportunity began with the tactical intelligence that Argentina failed to develop for its forces, and perhaps even more importantly, failed to deny to the British. There were only limited beaches across which the British could come. Given the strength of the Argentine Army, it could have dispersed to cover the more likely ones and situate a central force to react to any large-scale amphibious assaults. By failing to do this, by failing to mine any of the more likely approaches, and by allowing enemy intelligence to observe firsthand those failures, the Argentine Army eased the difficulties that would otherwise have faced British planners who would have no second chances on an amphibious invasion attempt.
While it is true that the Argentine Army lacked in morale, leadership, and tactics, it would not have taken much to thwart the amphibious invasion. The difficulties encountered by the 5th Brigade at Fitzroy are indicative of how little it would have taken to throw the British effort into disarray. The strike on *Sir Galahad* with major elements of the 5th Brigade on board was more an element of bad luck for the British than it was tactical acumen by the Argentinians, but true to form it was bad luck (part of the "friction" of war) for which the British compensated by the successful tactical operations of 3 Commando Brigade now closing in on the Argentine defenses around Stanley. The British attack had depth, not because of an abundance of resources (certainly two amphibious ships and two brigades make a thin string on which to mount an invasion 8000 miles from home), but because they seized the initiative with their aggressive march across East Falkland, their professional tactical posture, and their clear understanding of the objective, the Argentine forces waiting for them at Stanley. No resources were wasted so that as thinly as the British were stretched they were able to bring everything they had together for maximum effect, true economy of force.

The Argentinians, who should have had great depth, surrendered several opportunities by husbanding their resources, with the one exception of air forces. In that regard their tactics reflected their operations, lack of synchronization, inadequate preparation, a dearth of plans
and poor execution of those they did have. As terrain feature after terrain feature fell undefended to the 3 Commando Brigade marching across the frozen grasslands the chances for the Argentine Army to stop them slipped away. There were no blows slung from behind the shield of defense, nothing to wear out the slim numbers of advancing enemy, slow them in their race against the oncoming winter, or erode their logistics stretched over an 8000 mile line. In the final defense at the last ring of hills around Stanley, where Argentine forces were well dug in, well armed, and present in superior numbers, there was no integration of combined arms. The great fear of the British was artillery chewing them to pieces as they were held up before the Argentine bunkers; there was no cover, no trees to hide behind, boulders to shield them from shrapnel, or depressions to offer shelter from shot and shell. They lay naked before the expected pre-registered artillery. But it did not come, and after a tough firefight for the bunkers and one concerted counterattack by one of the better Argentine units, the final defenses fell away. The simple tactic of tying in an artillery fire plan to direct fire defenses had been neglected. It was a telling indication that a military force that did not attempt to develop an operational plan also failed to consider basic tactics.

Argentina had been consistent throughout the campaign. There was no unity of effort, no integration of forces, neither among nor within military services. The Navy saved
itself and allowed the Royal Navy free reign on the seas. The Air Force fought a bitter and gallant fight, but never did the ground forces assist them by improving the runway around Stanley, throwing their air defenses into the fight over Falklands Channel, or coordinating an attack on the British under the cover of those air strikes. The defense at Darwin-Goose Green was as isolated from the defense at Stanley as the submarine effort was isolated from the surface navy. The logistical distribution experience was symbolic of the Argentine disjointedness; all the necessary elements were there but they were never brought together at the right time and place.

If Tolstoy's was the model of war for the Argentinians, then they missed one of his major points when he cites in War and Peace Napoleon's view that morale is to the material as three is to one. While Argentine conscripts were uninformed as to why they were fighting (in some cases allegedly not even knowing where they were fighting), the British pressed on, driven by a sense of pride in service, in unit, of purpose, and in self. While Argentine officers were conspicuously absent from the front lines of the fighting, British officers maintained a constant presence and suffered a disproportionate share of the casualties. Accordingly, the elements beat the Argentine forces as much as did the British. Depressed, demoralized, uncared for, and seemingly abandoned, they waited for the end to come.
The end did come, and to the observer it may seem to have been foregone that Britain would win and Argentina would lose. But it did not have to be so. Argentina neglected almost all of the basics of military doctrine; it seemed to be unaware of any theoretical concerns. The Argentinians produced no coherent campaign plan beyond the surprise seizure of the Falklands with overwhelming force. They did not analyze the military vulnerabilities of the British. They never calculated where to strike with the proper effect on their objectives in the campaign. They did not integrate the different arms available, and they neglected the most basic doctrinal principles. Leadership was abysmal.

Where Argentina neglected sound military doctrine and theoretical principles, Britain paid heed. Political and military action were well integrated to produce the requisite force with the appropriate missions to do the job. The three arms, land, air, and sea worked well together under the proper command and control arrangements. The vulnerabilities of the opponent were properly analyzed and attacked in a systematic manner. Tactics were sound and relevant to the operational plan. Leadership was superb. Certainly, the British were not without their errors. But they understood doctrine and paid heed to theory. In the end, facing an enemy that neglected both, they achieved a complete victory. It did not have to be so.
The conclusion can only be that there is merit in military theory, that sound tactical doctrine tied to an operational plan that pursues a strategic objective is a winning combination, that friction is the bane of all belligerents but that the strong and wise can overcome the upsets, the bad luck, and the confusions of battle, and that military operations must be an extension of political policy and not bank on political maneuvers to salvage a poor operational plan. Above all the Falklands War shows that the courage and sacrifice of a great many soldiers, airmen, and sailors, as well as their fellow citizens, can be frittered away by not paying attention to sound theory. That is the lesson of the Falklands.
END NOTES


2. Ibid.


8. Ibid, pp. 72-82


11. Insight Team, *op. cit.*, p. 73.


14. Detailed intelligence on conditions in South Georgia and the Falklands in regard to terrain, weather conditions, and troop activity was seriously deficient in the early going. Fortunately for the British they found a gold mine in Major Ewen Southby-Taylor, a former Marine detachment commander in the islands who had become an enthusiastic student of the region. (See Hastings and Jenkins, *op. cit.*.)
However, there was no substitute for on-site inspection, and Special Air Service and Special Boat Squadron reconnaissance forces were inserted by the British on the Falklands as early as 1 May. (See Insight Team, op. cit., p. 162.) Most likely, British forces were also put ashore on the mainland to observe Argentinian airfields. The Argentine forces, although occupying the ground, apparently did little to develop their own intelligence or to impede that of the British, and suffered badly as a consequence.


18. Watson and Dunn, op. cit., p. 146.


20. Ibid.


27. Watson and Dunn, op. cit., p. 56.
28. The amphibious phase of the campaign, from 21 May to 14
June is well covered from the British viewpoint.
Traditional sources are Hastings and Jenkins, op. cit., pp.
Personalized view are also available in Patrick Bishop and
John Witherow, The Winter War, (New York: Quartet Books,
1983), pp. 71-148, Major General John Frost, 2 Para
Falklands - The Battalion at War, (London: Buchan and
Enright, 1983), and Julian Thompson, No Picnic, (London:
Leo Cooper, 1985). Argentinian sources are scarce. A log
of the "plans" of the war is avaialable in Informe Oficial de
E. J. Ercito.

30. Calvert, op. cit., p. 56.
31. Ibid, pp. 54-55.
32. Ibid, p. 60.
33. Hastings and Jenkins, op. cit., p. 77.
35. Watson and Dunn, op. cit., p. 72.
37. Ibid, p. 112.
38. Ibid, pp. 78-96.
41. Ethell and Price, op. cit., p. 221.
42. Gavshon and Rice, op. cit., p. 92.
44. Watson and Dunn, op. cit., p. 107.
45. Mark Dartford, Falklands Armoury, (New York: Sterling
46. Koburger, op. cit., p. 24
47. Calvert, op. cit., p. 84.

49. Ibid.


52. Ibid, p 231. Additionally, Argentina had another 96 transports, helicopter, and support aircraft.


54. The air war of attrition is well covered in all the standard works on the Falklands War. The most carefully research effort, incorporating the view of both adversaries is Ethell and Price, *Air War South Atlantic*.


60. Ibid, pp. 271-281.

61. Watson and Dunn, *op. cit.*

62. For a while after the fighting, British reports indicated that their foe had been strapped for all classes of supply, a testament to the effectiveness of the blockade. This was not so. The final supply run into Stanley airfield took place the last day of the fighting. The Argentine forces were well stocked; their distribution system failed.

63. Insight Team, *op. cit.*, pp. 262-274.

64. Privratsky, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

65. Ibid, p. 64.


68. Watson and Dunn, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

70. *Ibid*, pp. 244-245.


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