DEVELOPING A UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

By COLONEL HARRY E. COLESTOCK III
DEVELOPING A UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

by

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DISCLAIMER-ABSTAINER

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: Developing a Unified Command Plan
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The organizational structure of the U.S. military today reflects a legacy of history towards unification of the armed forces. A discussion on the development of the Unified Command Plan and the operational commands introduces the unification trend. Various pressures on the development of the unified military structure have influenced the decision making process in ways counter to the goal of a more effective and efficient military organization. To achieve this goal, new criteria are developed to design a future Unified Command Plan. This design is not prescriptive, but rather illustrative of the application of the criteria in the continuing process to best organize U.S. forces in support of national objectives. While the difficulties with these organizing processes are discussed, the need for a dynamic, innovative military structure is emphasized.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel Harry E. Colestock, III, (M.A. in Geography, Michigan State University) has seen the performance of the U.S. military command structure during various contingencies. His expertise in the Middle East and Africa regions have placed him in unique positions at the White House Crisis Management Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Air Staff to observe the functioning of the U.S. military commands. Assignments in Korea, Taiwan, and Crete have helped provide him a broad geographical perspective of command relationships. Colonel Colestock is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1987.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

"...there will only be one supreme commander in a single theater. And a general in control of his own theater of operations will never lack a suitable degree of independence."
Carl von Clausewitz, On War (17:280)

Clausewitz recognized the need for unity of command within a given theater. He defined theater as "a sector of the total war area which has protected boundaries and so a degree of independence." (17:280)

Today, the U.S. military establishment is organized with combatant commands responsible for different "theaters" of war. These commands have been formed functionally and geographically into specified and unified commands. "The Unified Command Plan (UCP) sets forth basic guidance for commanders of unified and specified commands and promulgates their general geographic areas of responsibilities and functions." (46:A-2)

The focus of this research is to portray the Unified Command Plan as an evolving document and to propose innovative views on organizing U.S. forces to be more effectively and efficiently employed in support of U.S. national objectives. In Chapter II, a discussion of the evolution of the document will include a historical look at its origins. The development of the U.S. combatant
command structure will be traced to the present. Chapter III will review criticisms of the existing organizational structure of the military as delineated in the UCP. The need to address not only these criticisms, but also future requirements, will be illustrated through new methodologies for organizing U.S. forces in Chapter IV. Chapter V will summarize and make some general conclusions about the processes for organizing U.S. forces for military action.

This research is a parallel effort with an ongoing review of the UCP by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 went into effect on 1 October 1986 and mandated, among other things, that the CJCS review the UCP for potential changes and report back to the President in less than one year. (40:28) The Congress actually dictated some changes in the UCP which will significantly impact the organizational structure of U.S. forces. Some of these major changes, such as the creation of a Special Operations Command and a Unified Transportation Command, will be taking place as this research is being written.

While these mandated changes and the UCP review processes will heavily influence the form of the next UCP, the methodologies developed in this paper should be applicable in any future reviews of the document. The
roles and missions arguments of the services should not affect the utility of this research.

The importance of organizing the military effectively for achieving national objectives should be self-evident. Writing 2500 years ago, the famous Chinese military author Sun Tzu recognized "...organization, control, assignment of appropriate ranks to officers, regulation of supply routes, and the provision of principal items to be used by the army" as one of the five fundamental factors by which to assess the state's ability in war. (12:63-65) Just thirty years ago, another military author, William Kintner, described the U.S. military: "In terms of organization, we are in a period of crisis, when national survival may well depend on our ability to respond instantaneously but responsibly to enemy moves." (19:236) The process of obtaining such an organization today will require vision, leadership, and decision making with the interests of the entire nation as the primary goal. Any smaller effort unnecessarily risks the future of the state.
CHAPTER II
DEVELOPMENT OF THE UCP AND THE
OPERATIONAL COMMANDS

Unified Command in the U.S. Military

The drive for unification of the U.S. armed services is by no means a new phenomenon. While it is difficult to determine a precise date for the beginning of this effort, "Some date the origins to the Spanish-American War when great dissatisfaction arose because of the failure of the Army and Navy to cooperate fully during the Cuban Campaign." (20:172) The outgrowth of these difficulties was the precursor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Army-Navy Board, aimed at providing a structure for cooperation and coordination in joint activities. Additional impetus was given to unification following World War I when there were the efforts to streamline government; but, at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, U.S. military policy still described "mutual cooperation," not unified command, as the favored method in joint operations. (42:276) The real catalyst for unification of military command in the U.S. was World War II. "Early in World War II, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff came into being as a counterpart to the British Chiefs of Staff, the supreme military body responsible for strategic direction of the war. Also established were unified commands in the theaters of operation,
but neither the JCS nor the unified commands were authorized by law. Nevertheless, both served their purpose well. In his message to Congress in 1945, President Harry Truman observed that 'had we not early in the war adopted this principle of a unified command for operations, our efforts, no matter how heroic, might have failed.'" (9:10)

Probably the strongest proponent for unified command in the modern crucible of war was General George C. Marshall. He realized that the increasing complexity of weapons systems, communication requirements, and multi-service operations required unified command and control functions:

"I am convinced that there must be one man in command of the entire theater—air, ground, and ships. We cannot manage by cooperation. Human frailties are such that there would be an emphatic unwillingness to place portions of troops under another service. If we made a plan for unified command now, it would solve nine-tenths of our troubles. There are difficulties in arriving at a single command, but they are much less than the hazards that must be faced if we do not do this." (13:444; 42:276)

By the end of World War II, the practice of unified command had proven itself, and the JCS decided that the practice would continue in peacetime. "Public and Congressional opinion, influenced by the finding of the Pearl Harbor investigation that laid blame for that disaster in large part on divided command, would accept no other arrangement." (42:276) This World War II arrangement included the "executive agent" concept in
which the JCS would designate from among themselves a service which would be the caretaker for each operational command.

In formalizing the World War II practices, the JCS prepared an Outline Command Plan which President Truman approved on 14 December 1946. This first Unified Command Plan defined the missions and geographic areas for seven unified commands: Far East, Pacific, Alaskan, Northeast, Atlantic, Caribbean, and European. The already existing Strategic Air Command was also included in the Plan. (9:10)

The National Security Act of 1947 was another major step in codifying the organization of the National Military Establishment. The act "provided for unified command and assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility, subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, for establishing 'unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security.'" (42:277)

The Korean War was the first real test of the new defense organization. General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, had not organized his forces with separate land, air, and naval components. He soon recognized his command arrangement
was less effective than he desired. He then established a land component supported by air and naval components under his direction as the theater commander. (9:27) While there were problems, such as Navy unwillingness to place naval air assets under Air Force control (37:66) (not dissimilar from the situation today), the overall unified command functioned quite well.

One of the items that the 1947 Act did not change was the “executive agent” concept developed during World War II for running each unified command. A change did occur under the 1953 Reorganization Plan in which President Eisenhower established that the line of "...responsibility and authority to a commander of a unified command will unmistakably be from the President to the Secretary of a military department." (26:152) The line of authority also ran through the Service Chief, however, and President Eisenhower called the arrangement "...cumbersome and unreliable in time of peace and not usable in time of war." (9:11) In proposing new legislation, President Eisenhower said:

"...separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can
develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service. The accomplishment of this result is the basic function of the Secretary of Defense, advised and assisted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and operating under the supervision of the Commander in Chief. (Message to the Congress, April 3, 1958, in 26:175)

The resulting Reorganization Act of 1958 took the military departments out of the chain of command.

Nevertheless, the changes from 1947 through 1958...

"...did not eliminate the problems of the unified command system. In fact, they did not even meet Eisenhower's goal of streamlining the chain of command, for on the day the act of Congress became effective, Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy promulgated a directive including the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the chain of command. The JCS has at times divided responsibilities for the unified commands among the individual service chiefs, in effect acting as if the 1958 change had not occurred."

(3:115-6)

The 1958 Reorganization Act chain of command arrangement to the combatant commanders is the one that exists today, but clearly...

"...the 1953 and 1958 reforms of the joint military structure fell far short of President Eisenhower's objective of strengthening joint military institutions sufficiently to provide independent, cross-service military advice, planning and operational direction. ...although the creation of separate chains of command for operations and administration enhanced the influence of unified and specified commanders, the services still retained the dominant voice in operational decisions."

(25:47)
The problems of unity of command persisted into the Vietnam era. Warren Trest observes that

"The failure to establish a single, unified theater of operations for the entirety of Southeast Asia seems to have been one of the inexcusable mistakes of the war. General William W. Momyer, who was the senior Air Force commander there during the pivotal years of 1966-68, certainly believed so. The consequence of disunity was a patchwork of command arrangements for air power that were uniquely different for each of the three geographical divisions of the conflict."

(37:68)

The quest for unity of command in the U.S. armed forces is a continuing one. The Congress recognized problems in the 1980's and proposed solutions in the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Future efforts to improve the military command structure and to maintain unity of command in an increasingly complex world are inevitable.

Operational Command Structure

The Unified Command Plan of 1946 mandated that seven unified and two specified commands be established (the term specified command was not officially used until 1951). The structure largely reflected relationships developed during World War II. The only command included at that time was the already existing Strategic Air Command (SAC). Quickly following, was the establishment on 1 January 1947 of the Far Eastern Command (U.S. Forces in Japan, Korea, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, the
Marianas, and the Bonins), the Pacific Command (all the Pacific Ocean and bordering countries minus Far Eastern Command), and the Alaskan Command. European Command, essentially only Army forces in Europe, was included in the UCP on 15 March 1947. On 1 November 1947, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (a specified command) and the Caribbean Command were established. The Atlantic Fleet command also came into being on 1 November, but was superseded by Atlantic Command a month later, "with CINCLANT designated to exercise unified command over all naval forces under CINCLANTFLT and over all Army and Air Force forces 'which may subsequently be directed to report to him.'" (49:3) The final command to be established under the UCP of 1946 was not formed until 1 October 1950. The Northeast Command included forces assigned to Newfoundland, Labrador, and Greenland.

In the succeeding years, numerous command changes occurred in the UCP as new operational requirements emerged. In the 1950's and 1960's, the major changes were the establishment of Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) on 1 September 1954 and the U.S. Strike Command (STRICOM) on 1 January 1962. (42:279) Other changes included the establishment of U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE) as a specified command on 22 January 1951. From 1 August 1952 onward, USAFE was also the Air Force
component of EUCOM before losing its specified command status altogether on 1 July 1956. The Northeast Command was disestablished in 1956 as was the Far East Command in 1957. The latter's forces and missions were placed under PACOM. In September 1958, CONAD was officially changed from a joint command to a unified command. A year earlier, the combined U.S.-Canadian command of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) had been formed. The CINC of the unified CONAD, therefore, was also designated CINC NORAD. In 1963, the Caribbean Command was renamed U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and the U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean lost its specified command status and was placed under EUCOM.

In the 1970's and 1980's, relatively few changes occurred in the command structure. U.S. Strike Command was renamed U.S. Readiness Command (REDCOM) on 1 January 1972. In 1975, the unified command of Alaskan Command lost its status in the UCP in a move to reduce military headquarters around the world. (2:89) Also that year, the U.S. CONAD was disestablished and Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM), a specified command, took over CONAD responsibilities on 1 July. In 1977, Military Airlift Command (MAC), an Air Force Major Command, became a specified command. Following the crisis events in the Middle East and Southwest Asia in the 1970's, the
existing Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was designated a unified command in 1983 and then renamed U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). U.S. Space Command came into being as a unified command in September 1985. Aerospace Defense Command was deactivated on 19 December 1986, and SPACECOM "absorbed most of ADCOM's aerospace defense missions, while the remainder have been assigned to NORAD's air defense components in the Continental U.S., Canada, and Alaska." (1:6)

Two additional unified commands are now in the process of being born. One of these is a unified transportation command. As early as 1969, government groups were recommending a Department of Defense reorganization which included "A logistics command, to exercise for all combatant forces supervision of support activities including supply distribution, maintenance, traffic management and transportation." (22:39-40) In testimony before the Senate in 1982, Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci stated:"The benefits of this integration (of Military Traffic Management Command and Military Sealift Command) fall into two basic categories: first and foremost, operational readiness; and, second, peacetime economies and efficiencies." (44:3) It was not until 1986, however, that the President's Blue Ribbon
Panel evidently spurred Congress to force the issue by stating:

"...loose coordination of strategic lift of military forces throughout the world now constrains military effectiveness. There are demonstrated managerial shortfalls in our ability to allocate available air, land, and sea transportation among many claimants."

Congress reacted by requiring the JCS to consider

"...creation of a unified combatant command for transportation missions, responsibilities, and forces of the Military Traffic Management Command, the Military Sealift Command, and the Military Airlift Command."

The result will be a functioning Unified Transportation Command sometime in 1988. (6)

The other unified command which Congress requested CJCS consider was a Special Operations Command (SOCOM). The SOCOM "...would combine the special operations missions, responsibilities, and forces of the armed forces." (39:100ST36.1017) The need for such a command has been a hotly debated topic in Washington in the wake of increased terrorism worldwide and how to combat this type of "warfare." Some have likened the new command to the creation of a "Fifth Service", putting special forces in direct opposition to conventional forces, especially in budget battles. (34) Despite the many likely technical difficulties of setting up such a command, it
has impetus from Congress and, with a skeletal framework by 1 March 1987, should acquire significant additional assets in future years. (32).
### CHANGES IN THE OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE

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Source: (40:282)
Present Operational Commands

Source: (36;86)
CHAPTER III

PRESSURES ON THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

Critics of the Department of Defense have been vocal on numerous issues in recent years, and the operational command structure has been a significant target. Several authors have identified trends which have given rise to these criticisms. (42:283-288; 36:87-91)

The first category of these trends is the broadening of the missions of the operational commands.

"...the current command structure reflects command arrangements that evolved during World War II to deal with high intensity conflict across vast regions of the globe. However well the layers of the present command structure suit the contingency of general war, they are not always well-suited to the regional crises, tensions, and conflicts that are commonplace today." (38:36)

Since World War II, the strategic environment has transformed from one of defeating the axis powers to one of dealing with conflict across a wide spectrum, from military aid to allies to nuclear weapons use. "Today's military commander emphasizes defense and deterrence; yesterday's oriented on offense and warfighting." (36:88)

The unified commanders must now be concerned with the increasing breadth and complexity of the missions assigned to their areas of responsibility.

Not only are their missions more complex, but operational commanders must be concerned with every corner of their geographic area of responsibility. "The
geographic scope of challenges to U.S. and Western security interests has expanded substantially over the past decade, due in part to the growing reach of Soviet military power." (42:283) Soviet adventurism in exploiting regional conflicts has given rise to competition with the U.S. and the West in Africa, Central America, and Southeast Asia which did not exist prior to World War II. The focus for the unified commander can no longer be a single enemy in a particular part of his region of responsibility; he must be ready for numerous scenarios throughout his region.

Along with the expansion of the threat geographically, the character of the threat has changed with the proliferation of ever increasingly modern weapons to the nations of the world. Low intensity warfare can rapidly escalate into superpower confrontation as new weapons are introduced into a conflict. Such eventualities make the job of the unified commander difficult in having all the resources necessary to plan and execute military missions.

The growth of the military in the nations of the world has been coincident with the rise of numerous centers of power. The predominance of the U.S. after World War II has been followed by multipolarity in political, military, and economic power. The U.S.
remains in the forefront, but the rise of Soviet military strength, Japanese and Arab economic influence, and Third World political clout have altered the environment for the U.S. military decision makers. (42:704) Numerous other national and international players—such as the European Common Market, Brazil, India, Iran, and Islamic Fundamentalism—have influenced the design and functioning of the U.S. military command structures. U.S. Central Command is a prime example of the strategic importance accorded Southwest Asia in the scheme of U.S. priorities in recent years.

The major theme of centralization of command and control is apparent in military functions in recent years. The dangers and benefits of centralization must be weighed carefully before proceeding to organize. Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean describe some of the considerations:

"There seems to be an inevitable tendency in bureaucracies for decisions to be made at higher and higher levels. The forces in this direction are simple and easy to understand, but so powerful that they are almost irresistible even when understood. There are some good reasons for making decisions at high levels. The high level official can take a broader, less parochial view; he perhaps has a better conception of over-all Service or national requirements; the fact that he is at a high level suggests that he may be an abler person. On the other hand, there are excellent reasons for making most decisions at lower levels. Officials on the spot have far better technical information; they can act more
quickly; giving them authority will utilize and
develop the reservoir of ingenuity and
initiative in the whole organization.
Moreover, if large numbers of detailed
decisions are attempted at a high level, or if
decisions first made at lower levels may
readily be appealed to be remade, the higher
levels will become swamped in detail, decisions
will be delayed, the organization will become
muscle-bound, and the higher levels will have
neither time nor energy for their essential
function of policy-making." (16:254 in 31:27)

The trends in technology, especially in
communications, have improved the ability of the
commander to centralize his control.

"The original postwar concept for the unified
commands envisioned decentralized execution of
joint military operations. However, improvements in communications capabilities
have in recent years enabled the National
Command Authority (The President and the
Secretary of Defense) to effectively control
forward deployed forces. Improved
communications have led to operational
centralization that was not anticipated at the
time that the unified concept was developed." (42:284-5)

The examples of this centralization of control are
increasingly evident from the Middle East conflict of
1973 to the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission of 1980. While
there is some indication that the National Command
Authorities (NCA) were not as minutely involved in Grenada
(1983) as in earlier military operations, they indeed
monitored the crisis in detail and had the capability to
interpose themselves at any time. The obvious impact of
centralization trends on the notion of unified command is
that the intermediate levels of command can be and have been circumvented. (45:28)

"Furthermore, the continued evolution of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) has permitted the NCA to cross command boundaries or to bypass intervening commands. This capability will continue to have a significant impact upon traditional military command doctrine." (36:90)

While the trends toward centralization have negative aspects, perhaps the key positive argument for such a process has been "the emergence of a genuine requirement for increased presidential control in efforts to manage crises, primarily those with the potential for superpower confrontation." (42:285) The potential for misunderstanding or "tripwire" reactions takes on a whole new meaning in the nuclear era. A means for short-circuiting the existing military structure is necessary in such an environment. One may then ask how much need is there for a unified command system as national decision makers jump from crisis to crisis. The basic answer is that national-level decision makers need not only the best advice possible from the military commanders on the scene, but they also need the advantage of decentralized decision making when simultaneous crises or other situations require immediate action in the unified commander's area of responsibility. (36:90)
Historically, service-parochial footdragging and bureaucratic inertia have caused small problems to grow into major ones. The character of these trends varies over time, but the following is illustrative.

"Organizational changes, like strategic concepts, are usually compromise positions—lowest common denominators—to which all interested agencies can agree. Because of this bias for consensus, these changes often do not go far enough. Historically, within the military bureaucracy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been reluctant to open up the Unified Command Plan to change because of his concern that it might result in dysfunctional battles between the services. Certainly, suggestions for bold innovative changes will not only encounter the normal bureaucratic resistance, but will also be subject to highly emotional, however well-meaning, attacks by the military hierarchy. Of even more concern is the fact that it will be difficult to differentiate between valid criticism and criticism based on a desire to protect parochial or bureaucratic interests." (36:90-91)

With such forces promoting the status quo, the Chief Executive has recently stepped in to initiate changes in the command structure. The efforts of President Carter's administration to create a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to react to events in Southwest Asia and parts of Africa eventually resulted in creation of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in 1983. U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM-1985) was initially directed into being by President Reagan, paralleling his efforts to promote the Strategic Defense Initiative.
Similarly, Congress has exercised its Constitutional powers to affect the organization of the U.S. military. In the first half of this century, Congress was quite active in considering legislation which would promote unity in the U.S. Armed Forces. From World War II until recently, however, Congress has not been the driving force for change in the nation's military. (15:381-2) Major Wayne E. Whitlatch predicted in 1966 that "Congress has recognized the increasing importance of the unified command and may well turn Congressional allegiance away from the individual Services and towards the unified commands in an attempt to reestablish its Constitutional prerogatives." (51:71) This prediction has taken time to bear fruit, but the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 established the Congress as a major player in the effort to determine the structure of the U.S. military organization. Congress has approved legislation that will establish the nation's 11th Unified Command, the Special Operations Command (1987). (35:4) The impetus for numerous other organizational changes, such as a unified transportation command, is found in the 1986 Act.

**Specifics: Mismatches and Inefficiencies**

Congressional initiatives to get the Chairman, JCS to review the UCP and report back to the President by 1
October 1987 have included specific items for consideration. (40:28; see Appendix) These specific items are being considered in the normal periodic review process, but they are by no means the only items which could be scrutinized for potentially improving the unified command structure.

The functional or regional boundaries are often the major concerns and most contentious issues in UCP discussions. (24;34) Obviously, any adjustment of the boundaries means a power shift or territorial gain for someone and a loss for someone else. A critical review of the unified commands should serve to illustrate the magnitude of the problem.

CENTCOM.

Congress asked the Chairman, JCS to look at the revision of the geographic area for which U.S.CENTCOM has responsibility so as to include both the ocean areas adjacent to Southwest Asia and the region of the Middle East that is assigned to the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). (40:28) Both the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and EUCOM would lose responsibility for territory under their purview. One problem with such a revision would be apparent: some observers believe the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of CENTCOM would have a credibility problem with the Arabs if Israel is included in his area. (34) Other
problems could be worked out through lengthy negotiation and compromise among the services. Perhaps a more productive pursuit, however, might be determining whether the U.S. really needs the separate unified command of CENTCOM--Is CENTCOM still relevant in U.S. strategy? The bureaucracy of a recently created juggernaut of CENTCOM works hard with many hand-picked staff officers to define its mission and justify its continued existence. However, some military cynics who wish to remain anonymous have described it as the brainchild of a beleaguered President Carter who needed a quick fix in Iran and instead got a behemoth of limited military utility. Critics might cite the lack of a CINC or his component commanders based in the region of responsibility (CINC - Florida; Army - Georgia; Air Force - South Carolina; Marines - California; and Navy - Hawaii!). They could criticize the inability of the command to quickly project enough forces to the region to be effective militarily, the difficulty of obtaining permission for military activity from the nations of the region, the fact that the most likely U.S. military action in the region would need significant naval support from PACOM-assigned forces, and that an oil glut has reduced this region's importance in the minds of the American public.
PACOM.

Such difficulties are not unique to CENTCOM. The Air Force has been trying for years to alter the command structure for Alaska to bring portions of it under the control of PACOM. (24) This change would have allowed a more consolidated effort for air activity in the Northern Pacific. The command change has been blocked largely through the efforts of Senator Stevens (Democrat, Alaska and Chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee). Although the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Bill removed the prohibition against altering the command structure for military forces in Alaska, the Continuing Appropriations Bill for FY87 specifically prohibited funds for use to alter the command structure. (40:29;41:120) One can understand an Alaskan's reluctance to have his State's defense in some way dependent on someone in Hawaii who may be more concerned with activities in another arena. Thus, military inefficiencies are sometimes perpetuated for reasons unrelated strictly to military effectiveness.

SOUTHCOM.

Boundary problems in the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) are similar to those of CENTCOM in that there
are no ocean areas in SOUTHCOM; adjacent ocean areas are either in PACOM or U.S. Atlantic Command (LANTCOM).
While Congress has asked the Chairman, JCS to look at the possibility of including water areas in SOUTHCOM (40:28), such an eventuality appears unlikely unless directed from the NCA. The Navy would want to retain its flexibility (under Navy 4-stars at LANTCOM and PACOM) to manage the naval forces involved. An amphibious operation anywhere in Latin America could generate some significant command and control problems between SOUTHCOM and LANTCOM. A Defense Department cynic might say the Navy will just stonewall this ocean issue as long as possible in hopes the demise of SOUTHCOM will come when the Canal Zone reverts to Panama in 1999. Unless a new home is found by then, LANTCOM and PACOM could conceivably divide the responsibilities of SOUTHCOM.

Strategic Command.

Congress would like the Chairman, JCS to also look at a unified strategic command responsible for all strategic assets of the U.S. (39:28) This issue was raised as early as 1969 in the Fitzhugh Report. (22) On the surface, one might say this seems to be a rational move to improve command and control of strategic forces and obtain the benefits of headquarters consolidations. This suggestion has been reviewed several times and found
lacki ., (24) The Air Force and the Navy have different views on command, control, and communications, and a switch could be costly. These differences are transparent to the NCA, which functions as the unified commander of the strategic forces. Perhaps the most important military function of the strategic mission—targeting—is in the "unified" operation of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS). (24) Further integration of the strategic forces may be more costly than the benefits to be derived structurally at this time.

SPACECOM.

The new U.S. SPACECOM also has some boundary difficulties. The lower limit of space is not specifically defined, and, although it poses little problem now, future technological developments are likely to necessitate some better boundary definition. (24) Additionally, as technology progresses into the 21st Century, a better functional boundary definition must be made between any unified Transportation Command and SPACECOM and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration as these entities' functions overlap.

REDCOM.

One command which with its future existence in question is U.S. Readiness Command (REDCOM). (42:320)
REDCOM has no specific area of the world for its unified responsibility. It is responsible for managing mobilization and deployment of reinforcements to overseas commands, developing joint doctrine, conducting joint exercises, and for Army and Air Forces based in the Continental U.S. It is headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, along with the Headquarters of CENTCOM. Evidently, Congress has thought an expanded role for REDCOM may be fruitful. (39:28) They would like the Chairman to consider an enhanced role for REDCOM in securing U.S. borders and in the assignment of regions of the world not currently assigned to any other combatant command. Some authors suggest "...the establishment of joint planning cells for contingency operations at USREDCOM for each unassigned region." (36:92) Historically, however, REDCOM has had little to do with actual military operations in those unassigned areas. The JCS has generally acted unilaterally in those crisis situations. Most of the specialized intelligence expertise for those unassigned areas and access to the NCA decision makers and the State Department is in the Washington, D.C. area. Sequestering such a duplicative effort in Tampa, Florida, seems a little impractical. In fact, it now appears that the JCS will recommend the dissolution of REDCOM in order to help bring on-line the
new Special Operations Command (SOCOM) by its mandated time in April, 1987. REDCOM's functions would then be absorbed by other commands. The Joint Deployment Agency (major dual-hatted role of CINC REDCOM) would be absorbed by the soon-to-be-formed Unified Transportation Command. (24) Other missions could be parceled out while the facilities at Tampa are occupied by the SOCOM.
CHAPTER IV
TOWARDS A FUTURE UCP

Assumptions and Goals

Many types of solutions have been offered to "fix" all the problems of the U.S. military. In fact, some recent innovative studies have recommended the elimination of the Air Force as a separate service. (4) This move would require some fundamental changes in the UCP, Sub-Unified Commands, and component structures. While such an eventuality is possible, this paper has assumed that the service structure formed in 1947 will continue for the foreseeable future. Another key assumption is that the UCP design recommendations of this paper could be adopted, adapted, and revised over several UCP reviews as conditions change.

Now is also an appropriate time to introduce formal definitions for the terms Unified and Specified commands and the criteria for establishing each:

"A unified command is a command with a broad continuing mission, under a single commander and composed of significant components of two or more Services, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or when so authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by a commander of an existing unified command established by the President."
(50:UNAAF 30221)
"A specified command is a command which has a broad continuing mission and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from but one Service." (50:UNAAF 30241)

Although the terms "unified" and "specified" have been part of the military jargon for decades, it may be time to apply more descriptive terms to types of commands in the evolving UCP. The formation of a Special Operations Command and a Unified Transportation Command demonstrate the trend toward functional centralization on a worldwide scale. The increasingly global nature of military functions often leads to a global organizational structure. Several studies have suggested the military look at such structures. (7:8-11; 42:320; 39:28) Some of these suggest that "unified and specified commands should normally be organized in terms of mission, not area, and the scope of a command should be extended to all forces directly relevant to its mission." (18:42) Such a command might rightfully be called a "functional command." The distinction of whether or not a particular service has the bulk of the forces performing the mission has lost much of its relevance.

If one then assesses the remaining combatant commands, one finds these focus on territorial domains. The addition of SPACECOM to the structure necessitates a
more useful term than just unified since many of the functional commands would be multi-Service and unified. Since SPACECOM is not tied to any specific portion of the earth's surface, but involves a unique environment, this study recommends the term "combat environment" command be used to describe these commands. Each of these commands would have boundaries defining the spatial environment in which it would be responsible for military matters.

Before a discussion of the critical determination of command boundaries, a look at the criteria for establishing a unified command would be helpful. These criteria will form the basis for adding other desirable design characteristics for determining the structure for the UCP.

"When either or both of the following criteria apply generally to a situation, a unified command normally is required to secure the necessary unity of effort:

a. A broad continuing mission exists requiring execution by significant forces of two or more Services and necessitating single strategic direction.

b. Any combination of the following when significant forces of two or more Services are involved:

(1) A large-scale operation requiring positive control of tactical execution by a large and complex force.

(2) A large geographic area requiring single responsibility for effective coordination of the operations therein.

(3) Necessity for common utilization of limited logistic means." (50:UNAAF 30222)
The development of a Unified Transportation Command alters the need for the reference above to common utilization of limited logistic means, but the other criteria remain valid. What then might be some additional factors to be considered in designing the U.S. military organizational structure.

One important element in UCP design is how one determines the "largeness" of the region under single control. One way to do this is what might be termed spatial functionality. (29) If one would construct a building, but wait until the paths people take to walk to and from the building are visible before constructing the sidewalks, the principle of spatial functionality would be used to benefit. In the case of the U.S. combatant commands, one would see how actual U.S. military operations function or have functioned and then adjust the command structure to reflect the functional relationships. The practicalities of how one moves forces from point A to point B to perform a mission should be considered. If U.S. KC-10 tanker aircraft must transit the Atlantic, Europe, and the Middle East to increase defensive support to Saudi Arabia, a multitude of command relationships are presently involved: Strategic Air Command, EUCOM, CENTCOM, and possibly PACOM. When such military operations with complex
command relationships become the norm rather than the exception, some thought should be given to a more effective command structure.

Another major contributor to an analysis of the spatial functionality would be political relationships. NATO, the Organization of American States, and numerous bilateral relationships impact the ways in which the U.S. views its strategic world.

One element which needs to be understood in any discussion of the UCP is the nature of boundaries. Boundaries may be defined to allow a great deal or very little of cross-border activity. The Packard commission criticized the restrictive approach, and new proposals have allowed a more liberal interpretation in actual military operations. One of the best descriptions of this concept is in JCS Publication 2:

"In establishing commands, it is not intended to delineate restrictive geographic areas of responsibility for carrying out mission assigned. Commanders may operate assigned forces wherever required to accomplish their missions. Forces directed by or operating under the strategic direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may also conduct operations from or within any geographic area as may be required for the accomplishment of assigned tasks, as mutually agreed by the commanders concerned or as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." (50:UNAAF 30211b)

The ultimate aim of boundary definition in the UCP is to have an understood means of improving command
and control functions and to eliminate duplicative and competing efforts wherever possible.

An important corollary feature of boundaries in combat is that the more boundaries one has, the more potential areas of confusion in command and control responsibility arise. In that, these zones may be exploited by the enemy. An attack along the boundary of any two Army corps requires those corps to effectively coordinate their efforts to defeat the attacker. Similarly, the more UCP boundaries that exist, the more potential areas exist for the enemy to create confusion and command and control problems. The argument may then be made that these boundaries should be reduced wherever possible. The counterargument is that the scope of the combatant command's responsibilities should be within manageable proportions. The definition of "manageable proportions" is highly arbitrary, but the trend toward improved communications on an increasingly global scale should allow an expanded spatial coverage for the combatant commanders.

As the trends of advancing communications technology and command centralization continue, the number of headquarters and expensive bureaucracies theoretically can be reduced. The President's Blue
Ribbon Commission on Defense Management expressed in June, 1986, "...the conviction that, were combatant commanders authorized and directed to do so, they could reduce significantly the numbers of headquarters subordinate to them and their counterparts, as well as the numbers of personnel assigned to staff duties in these headquarters."

(38:36) The efficiencies achieved by adopting these ideas would please most Members of the Congress and the Administration as they look for ways to trim the budget deficit.

Having larger areas of responsibilities for commanders has the side benefit of expanding the potential range of requirements on the conflict spectrum and thus necessitating a more multi-Service approach to military activity within a command. Carrying this argument to its logical conclusion, the best multi-Service approach would be achieved if the drawing of combatant command boundaries would include water and land elements in similar proportions in each command. Individuals serving in these commands would be able to transfer their experience and expertise from one command to another without a major retraining effort or without the
fear of being a minority Service member serving under the dominance of another Service.

The Design

This section of the paper will attempt to design a U.S. military structure for a future UCP using the criteria developed in earlier discussions. These criteria include (1) existing command organizational structures, (2) basic unified command development criteria in JCS Pub.2, (3) command boundary definition using the concepts of spatial functionality and reducing exploitable boundary interfaces, and (4) achieving efficiencies and "jointness" wherever possible while improving military effectiveness. Many of these criteria are contradictory in practice and any weighing of the relative values will be arbitrary.

Thirty years ago, the impact of technology on the military command structure was recognized. A previously classified study concludes:

"As weapons technology has reduced the time and reaction factors in war, the concept of strategic deployment has changed. The geographical span of control capability of one commander has grown. Reaction time can be reduced by consolidating arbitrary geographical commands into functional area commands on the broadest possible scale. For example, all of the Pacific Ocean area, all of Europe, and all of the Atlantic are today consolidated; in a few years perhaps placing all of the Pacific Asian area in one command and all of the
European-Atlantic area in another would simplify command problems and reduce reaction time. In short, the concept of unified command has been handicapped by an outmoded structure which is highly resistant to change." (26:30)

Some analysts have gone so far as to suggest that the U.S. should simply have an Eastern Command and a Western Command in the regional structure. (7:6) While this may be a future design as centralization occurs, a more realistic near-term approach for combat environment commands appears to be a North-South-East-West-Space design. This arrangement would reduce present boundary interfaces. A rough approximation of such design changes in responsibilities would be as follows:

Eastern Command (EASTCOM): This command would be composed of the present EUCOM, CENTCOM, a small PACOM area, and LANTCOM minus Caribbean responsibilities. The eastward focus of this command would include contingency responsibilities in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Any war in Europe would involve a massive resupply effort from the U.S. and protection of the sea lanes would be a major function for the new command. Additionally, a land or air military requirement in the Middle East would stage through EASTCOM. While there could be an argument that Israel and her Arab neighbors should not be included under one unified command's responsibilities, this
problem could easily be solved by the correct mix of subunified commands.

The arguments for retaining Africa in association with any European command arrangement are strong. With an emphasis on functionality,

"In 1964, when hostages in the Congo had to be rescued, USCINCEUR rather than CINCMEEAFSA (of STRICOM) coordinated the operation because USEUCOM provided the transports that carried the Belgian paratroopers. For the same reason, during the Middle East war, USEUCOM arranged the evacuation of Americans from Jordan as well as Libya." (11:23–24)

The ties to former Colonial powers are still strong and access to these powers within Europe is an obvious plus for associating Africa with Europe in the UCP structure. (34)

Only a small area of PACOM in the Gulf of Oman area would be added to EASTCOM. See the WESTCOM discussion below.

The separation of the Caribbean area from EASTCOM would be a contentious issue, but by retaining the Gulf of Mexico and its sea lines of communication in EASTCOM, the basic concerns of an eastward-looking command would likely be addressed. More discussion on this issue is included in the next section on SOUTHCOM.

The creation of EASTCOM would give birth to new efficiencies with the larger command area. More "jointness" would be a natural outcome of the change.
Spatial functionality of the eastward-looking command would be obvious, and scaled-down sub-unified commands would take into account unique political and mission factors. These sub-unified commands could be adjusted as the unified commander needed to realign his assets to more adequately meet his requirements. EASTCOM would thus take advantage of existing structures while gaining the efficiencies of a larger organization.

Southern Command (SOUTHCOM): A new SOUTHCOM would include all the present SOUTHCOM responsibilities in Central and South America land areas plus the addition of the Caribbean. Congress mandated that the JCS look at the possibility of including ocean areas adjacent to Central America in SOUTHCOM's charter. (40:28) Including the Caribbean in the new command would help establish in many minds the U.S. responsibility for the functionality of the entire area in relation to the Cuban and Nicaraguan threats, the inter-American treaties, the drug supply interdiction problem, etc. The unified commander responsible for the Caribbean would not have as one of his primary concerns a potential war in Europe (as is the case now). The drawing of the EASTCOM-SOUTHCOM boundaries could be from Mexico's Southern Atlantic border north of Cuba and then encompassing the Antilles. Such a line would be similar to the NATO boundary in the
area. Nevertheless, by adding a stronger naval component to SOUTHCOM, the command would improve its multi-service approach to potential missions. There might be an argument for including a Pacific ocean area for SOUTHCOM, but the practicalities of maintaining naval assets in the Pacific dedicated to SOUTHCOM would argue against such a move. Basing of forces in SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility would likely remain limited, and NORTHCOM and EASTCOM assets would be used to augment SOUTHCOM in conventional contingencies.

There might be some justification for the afterthought of including Antarctica in SOUTHCOM's area, but such a decision does not presently seem necessary. It is hard to conceive of some future military operation on that continent which would not use South America as a launching point for activities.

The new SOUTHCOM measures up well against the criterion of retaining much of its existing structures. It also would obtain an improved functionality with the addition of the Caribbean area, and, it would increase its jointness with the acquisition of ocean territorial responsibilities. Mexico is still an anomaly which will likely require careful consideration in future UCP designs, especially if political instability increases in our Southern neighbor.
Western Command (WESTCOM): This command would coincide largely with present PACOM responsibilities. While there are suggestions for reducing the ocean area of this command, especially in the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Aden areas (40:28), the only area which would appear to be functionally useful to change is the Gulf of Oman area. Military operations in Southwest Asia, such as protection of the sea lines of communication through the Strait of Hormuz, could be made more effective with more ocean area responsibility directly outside the Persian Gulf. However, the value to WESTCOM of having the flexibility to control naval forces throughout the major portions of the Pacific and Indian Oceans is an overriding factor in maintaining roughly the present areas of responsibility. "Chopping" of naval forces to EASTCOM as the ships go into the Gulf Of Oman would be done on an as-needed basis to accomplish specialized missions.

Although debatable on many counts, WESTCOM would also acquire responsibility for the Aleutians. The proposed NORTHCOM would not have the naval assets required to protect the farflung islands. WESTCOM would not only have such assets, but would also have a vital interest in protecting the transport links in the North Pacific to Northeast Asia.
While WESTCOM would have the advantage of retaining much of its original structure, it would also continue its heavy emphasis on naval forces. Only in sub-unified commands would there be a more joint force structure, e.g., in Korea or a possible Northeast Asia command.

Northern Command (NORTHCOM): As the remaining command with responsibilities for geographic areas, NORTHCOM would incorporate selected military functions of Readiness Command, Air Defense Command, and the Alaskan area. Along with Canada, NORTHCOM would essentially be responsible for the air and land defense of North America. In drawing the Alaskan boundary, the Aleutians should be included in the Pacific region because of their island character well away from the landmass of North America.

In assuming REDCOM's mission of land defense of North America, ..."very special command and control challenges stem both from the diverse nature of the threat to the continental United States, and the variety of civilian and military organizations which must be integrated in a command and control structure for responsive planning and execution." (43:552-553)

Since NORTHCOM would have no ocean areas of responsibility, adequate means of coordination with EASTCOM and WESTCOM would be necessary to accomplish the
NORTHCOM mission. Specifically, early warning and interception of air and other threats to North America would have to be coordinated closely with the other commands.

Although combining existing structures with the NORTHCOM some advantages, the jointness of the command would remain limited to air and land forces. The geographic functionality of North American defense would be better recognized and conceivably enhanced by this reorganization.

**Space Command (SPACECOM):** Boundaries for Space Command will become clear as specific missions and weapons systems are developed. An arbitrary altitude above the earth should be determined at some future date. Presently, a delineation may be artificially restrictive, but the creation of a "National Space Plane" will likely require better boundary definition.

Politically, USSPACECOM may evolve into an allied command component as other countries realize the importance of the medium of space and as technological advances are made.

**Functional Commands:** Strategic Air Command, the Special Operations Command, and a Unified Transportation Command will obviously have a worldwide mission in their functional areas. It will take some time to work out the
command relationships for the new commands with whatever unified command system is adopted. Each of the new commands will be acquiring missions from other existing organizations, e.g., the Joint Deployment Agency at REDCOM is slated to go to the Unified Transportation Command. With the fluidity of the situation, it would not prove fruitful to recommend changes in these commands which are still taking shape. No changes are recommended for SAC, despite the calls for a unified strategic command. (40:28)

These recommendations take advantage of existing or soon to be formed structures. Each command has requisite jointness, and superior functional efficiency is evident in practice or in theory in each.

**Headquarters:** The locations of headquarters of the recommended commands are also very contentious issues. Under the above design, SAC and SPACECOM would remain at their present locations at Offut Air Force Base (Omaha), Nebraska and Falcon Air Force Station (Colorado Springs), Colorado, respectively. The Unified Transportation Command would be at Scott Air Force Base (Belleville), Illinois. WESTCOM would remain at PACOM locations in Hawaii. NORTHCOM would be headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base (Colorado Springs), Colorado, to take advantage of existing command communications structures.
SOUTHCOM would remain at Quarry Heights, Panama, until such time as the 1999 reversion of the Canal Zone to Panamanian control forces a decision to move or obtain a different basing arrangement. Alternatives on a move from Panama might be MacDill Air Force Base (Tampa), Florida, or somewhere in Puerto Rico. The Special Operations Command now appears likely to go to MacDill AFB to take over spaces vacated by a disintegrating REDCOM. The need for the National Command Authorities to sometimes have command direction of certain crisis activities of SOCOM would argue for a Washington location, but the availability of the REDCOM spaces is probably the overriding factor. A Florida location will require superior communications links to the NCA or risk some usurpation of the unified commander's authority in operational crisis activities. The most difficult decision on headquarters might be EASTCOM. Depending on the political message to be sent, budget considerations, and efficient, strategic functionality, the headquarters could be located at Norfolk, Virginia or Stuttgart, Germany.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

"In his Maxims of War, Napoleon in 1831 stated: 'Nothing is so important in war as undivided command.'" (42:57). Napoleon was certainly referring to command in a particular theater of war. This paper has looked at the development of the unified command system in the United States and how theaters of war have been determined. The discussion has included a view of trends such as centralization of control, changing military mission requirements, and political pressures on the Unified Command Plan (UCP). New definitions have been proposed to replace the terms Unified and Specified Commands. Each existing operational command has been scrutinized in terms of problems and opportunities for improvement. Selected criteria have been developed which could then be applied to design a future UCP.

The process of designing a UCP in a laboratory setting is fraught with danger. In the actual process, the decision makers who actually place their stamp of approval on the UCP have many pressures external to the military to consider. Many participants have political baggage and biases which affect the outcome.

The decision maker must consider what political message would be sent to allies and potential adversaries.
if a command change is made. (23) In the design furnished in Chapter IV, reducing EUCOM to a sub-unified command would send a significant message to Europeans concerning where Europe fits in U.S. priorities and perhaps how the U.S. expects the Europeans to share a larger burden of the NATO military effort. Conversely, the Soviets and Warsaw Pact allies would have to assess the structural change vis-a-vis their own strategic positions.

Practical considerations and cost-effectiveness in a particular U.S. budget climate will also play a role in UCP changes. Decisions on moving a headquarters or reducing the size of a command will be influenced by money availability (unless Congress has directed the change).

Congressional power via the budget has recently been accompanied by an increasingly detailed, directive nature of military advice. Laws requiring "jointness" in military operations and organization (40:36-45) will undoubtedly have some influence on future UCP design. (23) In the abstract, military planners will have to consider the advantages and disadvantages of making unified boundaries coincident with Service roles and missions boundaries. In a practical example, the planners must decide if it is more important to make the PACOM area of responsibility coincide largely with
Pacific water boundaries so one Service will dominate the command, or should they create arbitrary boundaries in the ocean be created in order to provide a more balanced, unified military structure for the Command. The traditional philosophy has been that "...organizational integrity of Service components should be maintained insofar as practicable to exploit fully their inherent capabilities." (50:43) And these traditions die hard.

Obviously, there is no guarantee that any of the design changes made to solve one perceived problem of the UCP will achieve the desired goal of improving military readiness and capability in the most efficient manner. There are some writers, such as Peters and Waterman in In Search of Excellence, who would argue that organizational structure does not even necessarily follow strategy, and that flexibility and adaptation are critical to getting the job done. (28:4) Others, such as William Haga, would argue that we too frequently reorganize and restructure and that we treat symptoms rather than the root problems. (14:50-53) Lieutenant General James Gavin summed up by stating

"No organizational arrangement, no matter how skillfully conceived, can by itself solve our defense problems. It takes people and resources to solve them. But the best of people, regardless of the resources made available to them, can be thwarted and frustrated, and finally made ineffective, by a poor organization." (10:258)
The organization of the U.S. military must remain dynamic and responsive to changing requirements. Achieving an effective structure within the numerous constraints will take innovative approaches and the conviction by key decision makers to follow through. The recommendations in this paper should be one step towards obtaining that structure.
Section 212. Initial Review of Combatant Commands

(a) Matters to be considered.-- The first review of the missions, responsibilities (including geographic boundaries), and force structure of the unified and specified combatant commands under section 161(b) of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 211 of this Act, shall include consideration of the following:

(1) Creation of a unified combatant command for strategic missions which would combine--

(A) the missions, responsibilities, and forces of the Strategic Air Command;

(B) the strategic missions, responsibilities, and forces of the Army and Navy; and

(C) other appropriate strategic missions, responsibilities, and forces of the armed forces.

(2) Creation of a unified combatant command for special operations missions which would combine the special operations missions, responsibilities, and forces of the armed forces.

(3) Creation of a unified combatant command for transportation missions which would combine the transportation missions, responsibilities, and forces of
the Military Traffic Management Command, the Military
Sealift Command, and the Military Airlift Command.

(4) Creation of a unified combatant command for
missions relating to defense of Northeast Asia.

(5) Revision of the geographic area for which the
United States Central Command has responsibility so as to
include--

(A) the ocean areas adjacent to Southwest Asia;

and

(B) the region of the Middle East that is assigned
to the U.S. European Command.

(6) Revision of the geographic area for which the
United States Southern Command has responsibility so as
to include the ocean areas adjacent to Central America.

(7) Revision of the geographic area for which the
United States Pacific Command has responsibility so as to
include all of the State of Alaska.

(8) Revision of the missions and responsibilities of
the United States Readiness Command so as to include--

(A) an enhanced role in securing the borders of
the United States; and

(B) assignment of regions of the world not
assigned as part of the geographic area of responsibility
of any other unified combatant command.
(9) Revision of the division of missions and responsibilities between the United States Central Command and the United States Readiness Command.

(10) Elimination of the command designated as United States Forces, Caribbean.

(b) DEADLINE.-- The first report to the President under such section shall be made not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADCOM</td>
<td>Aerospace Defense Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCLANT</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command</td>
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<td>CINCLANTFLT</td>
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<td>CINCMEEAFSA</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, Middle East-Africa-South Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CONAD</td>
<td>U.S. Continental Air Defense Command</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
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<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JSTPS</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Targeting Staff</td>
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<td>MAC</td>
<td>Military Airlift Command</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
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<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Air Command</td>
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<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>Special Operations Command (not yet officially named)</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>SPACECOM</td>
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<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>WWMCCS</td>
<td>Worldwide Military Command and Control System</td>
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BIBLIOGRAPHY


23. Locker, Jim. Senate Staff Member, Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C. Interview. 18 December 1986.


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