CLIC PAPERS

COMPILATION OF REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY,
VOLUME I : AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT TAKEN FROM THE
JOINT LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT PROJECT
FINAL REPORT OF 1 AUGUST 1986

Army - Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia
Compilation of References and Bibliography, Volume I: An Annotated Bibliography on Low Intensity Conflict Taken From the Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project Final Report of 1 August (con't)

This annotated bibliography derives from the two volumes of the Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Final Report (J-LIC Report) of 1 August 1986. The printed sources that provided the raw material for some of the Project's conclusions and recommendations are the substance of this bibliography; their annotations were the subject of the compiler's work to clarify and simplify in the hope that students of LIC might use the bibliography as a guide and aid in the hope that students of LIC might use the bibliography as a guide and aid in their studies. Under each type of item (book, article, or paper), the bibliography lists entries under the four categories of LIC: insurgency/counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacetime contingency operations, and peacekeeping operations.
COMPILATION OF REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

VOLUME I

AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
TAKEN FROM THE JOINT LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT PROJECT FINAL REPORT
OF 1 AUGUST 1986

by

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CLIC PAPERS

CLIC PAPERS is an informal, occasional publication sponsored by the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict. They are dedicated to the advancement of the art and science of the application of the military instrument of national power in the low intensity conflict environment. All military members and civilian Defense Department employees are invited to contribute original, unclassified manuscripts for publication as CLIC PAPERS. Topics can include any aspect of military involvement in low intensity conflict to include history, doctrine, strategy, or operations. Papers should be as brief and concise as possible. Interested authors should submit double-spaced typed manuscripts along with a brief, one-page abstract of the paper to Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley AFB, VA 23665.

Previous CLIC PAPERS include:

Operational Considerations for Military Involvement in LIC

Logistical Considerations in LIC

Security Assistance and LIC: A Challenge to Excellence

The Role of Reserve Forces in LIC
This annotated bibliography derives from the two volumes of the Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project Final Report (J-LIC Report) of 1 August 1986, whose appearance was timely and stimulating. Low intensity conflict is a complex subject that merits study and reflection, and the J-LIC Report comprises a printed distillation that students of LIC should not ignore. However, underpinning the J-LIC Report itself are the printed sources that provided the raw material for some of the Project's conclusions and recommendations. These sources are the substance of this bibliography; their annotations were the subjects of the compiler's work to clarify and simplify in the hope that students of LIC might use the bibliography as a guide and aid in their studies. While not all of the bibliographical items of the J-LIC Report became entries, most did, and whether they are books, articles, or papers, they constitute useful materials for the study of LIC. Under each type of item (book, article, paper), the bibliography lists entries under four categories (except in two cases in which no items made the bibliography). These categories are: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, Combatting Terrorism, Peacetime Contingency Operations, and Peacekeeping Operations.

The compiler recognizes the essential aid he received from various members of the staff at the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (A-AF CLIC) in preparing this annotated bibliography. In particular, he wishes to recognize his debt to Lt Col James C. Clem, USAF, and Lt Col William F. Furr, USAF, who originally conceived the idea of this bibliography and encouraged the compiler to undertake its preparation. Also, he wishes to express his gratitude to Ms. Barbara Nichols, Ms. Jane Groebe, and Ms. Sherry Roscoe for their combined efforts in helping to proof and edit the bibliography.
Compilation of References and Bibliography

Volume I

An Annotated Bibliography on Low Intensity Conflict
Taken from the Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project Final Report of 1 August 1986

Introductory Remarks

1. The publication of the two volumes of the Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project Final Report (J-LIC Report) on 1 August 1986 was an important event for students of low intensity conflict (LIC). This pair of works, together with their Executive Summary, comprised a recent and concise publication on a timely topic that helped to stimulate thinking all across the Defense Community. However, LIC is a subject with many facets and innumerable factors to ponder. Not surprisingly, different parties hold sometimes contrasting views regarding the various aspects of LIC matters. Hence, materials about LIC deserve attention and study to help in the development of some kind of a broad consensus on the nature of this kind of conflict and the demands it places upon military and other authorities charged with coping with it. Perhaps, this bibliography may aid in the formation of this consensus.

2. The annotations on the items below are edited and refined versions of those in the print-out of the "data base" making up the primary and secondary sources of the final published document known as the J-LIC Report.

3. Not all the items in the J-LIC Report appeared as useful as entries in this bibliography, which includes slightly under 60 percent of the items the Project's researchers used in their efforts (147 items out of 245). Several considerations explain the failure of items from the J-LIC Report data base to earn a place in this bibliography:

   a. Many of the original annotations were inadequate bases for refinement, because they contained nothing really informative about the bibliographical item and so afforded no opportunity for clarification and elucidation.

   b. Many of the original entries in the J-LIC Report referred to "Subject Matter Experts (SMEs)," military specialists in various areas who were available to project researchers but have since moved on to other jobs, and, in some cases, retirement.

   c. Some of the items appeared either outdated or irrelevant for application in current LIC situations; so they did not rate a place in this bibliography.
4. The organization of this bibliography falls into three main parts with standardized formats for entries of items under each part:

   a. The three main parts are those for Articles, Papers, and Books, each of which contains bibliographical items numbered in sequence and listed in alphabetical order by author's last name. If there are two or more authors, the bibliography lists only the first author alphabetically by last name.

   b. Whether Articles, Papers, or Books, each of the three main parts of the bibliography has subheadings corresponding to the categories under which the A-AF Center for Low Intensity Conflict approaches its LIC activities. These subheadings are: Insurgency/COIN (Counterinsurgency), Peacetime Contingency Operations (PCOs), Combatting Terrorism, and Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs). However, no Articles fell out for inclusion under PKOs, and no Papers fell out for inclusion under PCOs. The Insurgency/COIN subheading by far accounts for the most items in the bibliography, thus reflecting the major interest of most writers doing studies on LIC.

   c. A series of "Categories" (e.g., Insurgency, COIN, Guerrilla Warfare, Revolutionary Warfare) precede each item for the purpose of guiding the user to collateral materials in other reference sources (e.g., Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature).

   d. An annotation, or explanation, about the contents of each entry follows the citation containing author/authors, title, publisher, publication date, and, where possible, length in pages. Some annotations are necessarily brief; others are more substantive, since their original annotations in the print-out of the J-LIC Report database readily lent themselves to such treatment.

5. In most instances, the user of this bibliography should be able to find a copy of the annotated item in any good, sizable general library, municipal or academic. In other instances, the user may have to seek access to one of the many good libraries available to officials of the Defense Community. In any case, the A-AF Center for Low Intensity Conflict does not have the items available for lending, and the user should not contact the Center for such assistance.

6. This bibliography is a tool, a guide, a beginning point. It is not a definitive listing, but it can help the user to learn about LIC, to understand its many challenges, and to assist in building a consensus for addressing it.
1. Article, Insurgency.


While somewhat dated, the article's treatment of the Nixon Doctrine (Guam Doctrine) is still valid. Also, the article presents information about the USAF Special Operations Forces and the training of counterinsurgency forces with the Mobile Training Team approach.

2. Article, Insurgency, Guerrilla Warfare.


This is a lengthy article in the form of a Special Issue with a single topic: LIC and limited war. The article discusses LIC and limited war in all the various dimensions that operations in these kinds of strife entail.

3. Article, Special Operations, Air Operations Developments.


This article examines some of the major shifts in emphasis that have characterized the application of air power in recent years. The performance of US air power in the operation on Grenada in October, 1983, in the view of the author, proved the revival of US military attention to the type of warfare that the US waged in Vietnam. Another major shift, according to the author, has been the move from traditional Special Operations Forces (SOF) operations behind enemy lines to missions in COIN, nation-building, and psychological warfare. The article examines these shifts and proffers the recommendation that the USAF SOF should maintain the capability to work hand-in-hand with local forces so that the friendly forces can fully exploit the advantages of air power in COIN guerrilla tactics. The author also delves into the history of air power, British air control methods, air power and the US Marines in Nicaragua, Special Operations in World War II, certain LICs, and the origin and evolution of the USAF SOF.
4. Article, COIN, Guerrilla Warfare.


In this article, the author argues that Latin America is a test-bed for revolutionary doctrine and practice. He examines the evolution of Latin American political culture, the role of the military in Latin America, and the part that revolution and revolutionaries play in Latin American political life.

5. Article, Insurgency.


This article presents a survey of the record of the USAF Special Operations Forces from World War II to the late 1970s.

6. Article, Insurgency.


The authors focus their attention on mobilization and examine it as part of the strategic response to LIC. They see the willingness of the US to mobilize constituting a signal of determination to confront a LIC situation and prevail in it.

7. Article, Insurgency.


This article considers the various ramifications of host nation support and civilian contract support for COIN operations.

8. Article, Insurgency.


The author believes that Soviet activity in Afghanistan offers excellent examples of recent developments in Soviet military strategy and weaponry. For example, to combat their elusive enemy more effectively, the Soviets inaugurated the use of smaller divisions with more mobility. They also increased the political indoctrination of troops. Neither of these measures produced success; in fact, their implementation coincided with a period of setbacks for the Soviet side. The Soviets also
increased the use of chemical weapons and deployed highly-skilled units similar to US Army Ranger units. The Soviet air-supplied ground-support fire, according to the author, was not particularly effective, with the exception of that furnished by the MI-24 Hind D/E helicopter gunship series and the MI-8 Hip C/E series. Interestingly, the strength of the Soviet ground forces ran about 85,000, the size of the Soviet Central Group Force in Czechoslovakia. Likewise interesting was that the Afghanistan fighting made COIN a permanent part of Soviet military teachings with emphasis upon national liberation struggles, defensive anti-Western efforts, and situations in conventional warfare.


The author emphasizes the usefulness of combat intelligence by describing inadequacies in the US forces' techniques in Vietnam. He stresses the value of proper interrogation of captured enemy agents and soldiers.

10. Article, Insurgency, Special Operations.


The author discusses the applicability of LIC for those parties interested in using force to achieve their political ends without resorting to nuclear warfare or major confrontations. He concentrates upon the Soviets and describes the evolution of present day SOF capabilities.

11. Article, Insurgency, Revolution.


The author argues that the US needs an overarching strategy in Central America to bolster the force of nationalism in individual countries against intrusion by colonialism from outside the western hemisphere. He sees such intrusion as a definite threat to the strategic position of the US in the hemisphere, and he believes that the US can strengthen relations with the Latin American states, if it stresses the sanctity of national sovereignty, the right to economic development, and the protection of cultural heritage. The author concludes that these natural, indigenous defenses against Soviet imperialism, even in its covert disguise as "national liberation," will be more effective in keeping the target country safe from political and ideological undermining than will the "strategy of pragmatism," which at the time of writing of the article was seemingly the prevailing policy in Washington, DC.
12. Article, Insurgency, COIN.


The author takes a long look back into US history to find analogies with contemporary events. The subject in the article is the revolution of the thirteen mainland North American colonies against British rule, 1775-1783. The article elaborates on the theme that the US was one of the first countries in modern history to fight its own war of national liberation.

13. Article, Insurgency.


This article follows two tracks: it first examines the Soviet historical writing on LIC and the Soviet involvement in LIC; then it contrasts this historiography and experience with those of the western world. The article presents an interesting insight into Soviet thinking on LIC.


The author discusses the development of Mao's theories of revolutionary war and describes the extent to which Mao's principles have influenced global revolutionary movements. He also addresses the evolution, future, and means of countering rural revolutionary guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism.

In a historical vein, the author traces the the history of the 1949 revolution in China and describes Mao's role as well as the development of the Red Army and Chinese Communist Party. He also examines the evolution of Mao's theories of revolution, discusses the reasons for the increase in revolutionary activity in recent years, and addresses the phenomenon of COIN, which new technology, propaganda, and media exposure have aided.

Little presents Carlos Marighela, the Brazilian terrorist who propagated the doctrines of urban guerrilla warfare, as a leader who used terror effectively. He predicts COIN and terrorism both will be increasingly successful in the coming years, and he is careful to argue that the success of any insurgency is largely dependent upon the support it receives from its society.
15. Article, Insurgency, Guerrilla Warfare.


While technological change has benefited almost every area of human life, some change has had a negative impact. The author believes that the human ability to produce change through technology has outdistanced the human ability to control change. An era of upheaval has arisen with future confrontations of the super powers likely to occur in the Third World within the "low frontier" of warfare that entails such events as taking hostages, doing COIN actions, and performing "peacekeeping actions." New technology has made conventional warfare, like that contemplated in western Europe between the NATO nations and their potential adversaries, almost as costly and complex as nuclear war. Terrorism and guerrilla warfare are cheaper, easily contained, and relatively unsophisticated, and these types of violence are modes of conflict in themselves and no longer simply introductory phases of a much larger conflict. Terrorism aims to demoralize the enemy and attain publicity. The author believes that the US is unprepared for this new arena of warfare and needs to pay attention to the roles of intelligence and elite units, the formation of appropriate national policy about this type of conflict, and the suitable allocation of resources.

16. Article, Insurgency.


The author presents the theme that although superior technology afforded the means by which the western powers easily overcame Third World resistance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, recent developments have changed this situation. Today there are indications that technological and military superiority do not guarantee success in confrontations between the western powers and the Third World. The author uses a "pre-theoretical perspective" within which to explain the outcome of "asymmetric conflicts." In conclusion, the author recommends that analysis of asymmetric conflict must consider not only the tenacity of the nationalist forces, but also it must take into account the domestic opposition to the conflict within the body politic of the more sophisticated enemy.
17. Article, Insurgency, PSYOP.


A common denominator in all Latin American revolutionary situations is Cuban involvement. Castro as an individual has played a psychological role in galvanizing opposition to the US since the 1960s. This article explores the vulnerability of the US to the psychological warfare techniques of Castroism. It also offers suggestions for a psychological counterstrategy for the US, the model for which lies in President John F. Kennedy's "battle for hearts and minds," an approach that Fidel Castro himself in effect appropriated.

What the author specifically suggests is a convergence of thinking of US and Latin American intellectuals to develop a multi-dimensional approach resting on the assumption that Castro's influence in Latin America stems largely from his understanding of Latin American cultural currents.

18. Article, Insurgency, Intelligence.


The authors point out that the US Army's basic operational concept is contained in AirLand Battle and that Field Manual 100-5, Operations, outlines the fundamentals of the operational concept. They argue that, in LIC, the real initiative rests with those who can influence, or exploit, the process of change that modernization with its resultant societal and psychological turmoil has caused.

Reasoning from this premise, the authors recommend that the CINC's and the Foreign Area Officers, the key individuals linking the military and nonmilitary agencies on the staffs of the CINC's, concentrate on the operational level. Their goal should be to restrict the use of force and the level of commitment at the minimum level feasible, and the implication of such a goal is the application of short and decisive actions to obtain the maximum effect. The operational perspective in the LIC context includes such factors as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, total preparation of the conflict area, and the effective use of resources, which depends on the correct identification of the sources of conflict.
19. Article, Insurgency, Guerrilla Warfare.


The author examines the origins, strengths, and weaknesses of the Communist Party of the Philippines. He also explores the nature of the military arm of the Party, the New People's Army, and looks as well into the structure and aims of other insurgent groups in the island nation. He is careful to illustrate the divisive rivalries among various insurgent groups in the Philippines and in doing so indicates that openings for government COIN policies to exploit do exist.

20. Article, Insurgency, COIN.


The article describes intelligence in the LIC environment and explains the obstacles impeding its effective collection and use. In recent years, the US Special Operations Forces (SOF), with their orientation toward flexibility for subconventional wars, and security assistance missions have stressed the need for modernization of intelligence capabilities to support their strategy and operations. Intelligence acquired before the commitment of forces helps policymakers understand US international interests and policy appropriate to those challenges and also instructs military advisers and commanders.

In elaborating upon the importance of intelligence in LIC, the author makes several thoughtful observations. He notes that intelligence support for security assistance missions extends beyond gathering data on hostile military forces to information on the fundamental causes of unrest, any external connections to that unrest, and the general capability and competence of the host authorities. Even more crucial than ever is intelligence support for US forces engaged in combat in LIC, because their vulnerabilities increase as the size of their presence increases.

However, the author sees several hindrances in the way of meeting this challenge. One is the thinking that the traditional way of collecting intelligence for a conventional struggle suffices in a LIC situation. Also, the military has shown in recent years a propensity to favor technological intelligence gathering methods that are inclined to quantify reports. Less emphasis has fallen on the classic human intelligence (HUMINT), the interrogating and questioning of individuals to determine such key information as what kinds of people are leading the government and the armed forces. Good HUMINT is essential to success in COIN.
Also essential to successful COIN efforts is comprehensive knowledge of the cultural environment of the LIC-afflicted area. The US government and forces engaged in LIC need the capacity for sophisticated political-military analysis, an ability that, in the view of the author, is not widely prevalent in the military. Moreover, civilian elements with such skills are preoccupied with larger foreign policy interests and do not address the needs of tactical intelligence. At this boundary between civilian and military efforts, the LIC phenomenon requires intense coordination and expertise.

21. Article, Insurgency, COIN.


The author summarizes the contradiction between the limited-war theorizing of the political leadership during the war in Vietnam and the military thinking at that time. He performs his summary by looking at the theory of limited war that Robert Osgood and Thomas Schelling developed and then showing how a similar approach failed to bring about a successful outcome for US policymakers in the war in Vietnam.

Rosen presents a good analysis of the Osgood-Schelling theory. He points out that the concept rests on the idea of a scale of conflicts graduated in magnitude between the state of classic peace at one end and the state of classic conventional war on the other end. Also a factor in the theory is the application of military pressures on the enemy to force him to seek and respect diplomatic solutions. The upshot is that the limited-war theory constitutes a form of communication with the enemy and a tool for bargaining with him. Moreover, under the theory, as the stakes grow, so does also the supposed importance of an action as a signal.

Rosen next examines the use of the theory in Vietnam. In 1961 and 1962, according to his thesis, the leaders in the United States did not think in terms of limited-war theory but rather strived to beat a guerrilla enemy with a counterinsurgency effort. Then, after the fall of Diem and his government in late 1963, virtually all counterinsurgency activities stopped, and the Viet Cong stepped up their actions. In subsequent months, the "progressive squeeze and talk" stance of the US was a program to increase US pressure against North Vietnam gradually and, at the same time, afford the option of negotiating or escalating according to the opportunities that appeared.

The problem, according to the author, lay in the miscalculation of the US leaders that domestic opinion at home would support the war effort long enough for the decided advantages that the US held in a war of attrition to make their weight felt in North Vietnam. When the North Vietnamese
withstood the pressures and continued to aid the Viet Cong, the structure of US war-making strategy collapsed.

Rosen also saw another element at work in the US failure in strategy with North Vietnam. The desire to keep the war a limited one raised the pressure to centralize the control of the war in the hands of the President. While the Johnson Administration closely monitored the details of defense plans, it did not define a clear and understandable mission for the military in Vietnam, and it did not set a clear limit to the amount of resources allowable for the struggle in Vietnam. Consequently, the military had to define its own mission, and until 1967, it received all the troops it requested. While the Joint Chiefs were unhappy with the notion of coercive diplomacy, they could not change the view of the civilian leaders, who were staunchly determined to keep control over the military and turned more and more to limited-war theory, which enabled them to make strategy without the help of the military.

In closing, Rosen points to a redefinition of limited-war theory, which may have utility in the future. Such a theory would emphasize the government's setting clear military objectives and limits and also continuing to stress the political objectives and limits of the old theory. In addition, the revised theory would emphasize the importance of decentralized control of the conflict once the fighting had begun.

22. Article, Insurgency, COIN.


The author builds his article mainly on his personal assessment of interviews with members of the Nicaraguan regime and quotations of the statements of their opponents. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs and staff member of the CIA, Sanchez draws heavily upon his experience of 30 years' government service in the Defense establishment to make an interesting conclusion: Soviet strategy in Central America, adapted by Cuba, aims at making a grand diversion; it intends to deflect the energies of reform and revolution in Central America from their natural channels of internal improvement and throw them into wider internationalist goals having little to do with the peoples of the region.

Sanchez elaborates his conclusion with the observation that in spite of the uniqueness of each Central American nation, the record demonstrates that broadly-supported revolutions for democracy inevitably lead to the founding of dictatorships—as that in Nicaragua. He sees the Marxist-Leninist regimes as inherently expansionist, and consequently he accepts the thesis that the Nicaraguan government is supplying arms and training to the guerrillas in El Salvador, even though he admits the evidence
for such an id is anecdotal rather than statistical and receives relatively little coverage in the media. Sanchez points out that the former Foreign Minister of Costa Rica has deemed Nicaragua—a small nation armed far beyond its needs for defense—a threat to Panama and Costa Rica as well as to El Salvador. Sanchez refers also to other damning facts about the Nicaraguan government. Refugees have testified to the commission of atrocities by the Sandinista army and secret police. Many veterans of the fight against the Somoza dictatorship have joined in the fight against the Sandinistas whom they believe to be trying to cement their power base rather than addressing the problems of the nation.

23. Article, Insurgency, Revolution.


Sarkesian states that revolutionary and counterrevolutionary phenomena provide a sweeping panorama of violence, conflict, and internal struggles of nation states. Accordingly, the literature on the phenomena reflects the same broad scope and character and contains an intimidating array of concepts, models, and interpretations. Not surprising, therefore, is the fact that the attempts at policy analysis and analytical study in the field are fragile and disjointed.

Such inadequate attempts are unfortunate, because the United States, urgently in need of a comprehensive reappraisal of revolution and counterrevolution, has no guideline for the development of counterrevolutionary policy with its foundations in the specialized literature on the subject. What Sarkesian attempts, therefore, is to analyze the character of revolution and counterrevolution by a systematic and critical assessment of the major themes in the literature and to examine concepts, causes, systems, geopolitical considerations, and outcomes from the perspective of the US policy analyst. In this undertaking, he addresses types of insurgency, counterinsurgency, concepts of revolution and guerrilla warfare, and various political themes. The article is an ambitious effort and comprises an excellent point to begin a study of LIC problems.


The author gives an overview of the role of logistics and makes an analysis of the performance of logisticians in previous conflicts. The value of the article for the student of LIC is that it presents a basis for comparison of the roles of the logistian in conventional conflicts with his roles in LIC.
25. Article, Insurgency, Special Operations.


The author surveys the characteristics of insurgency and revolutionary war strategy and emphasizes the strongly political nature of these kinds of conflicts. He stresses the value of intelligence in any COIN strategy, and he describes the ideal organizational arrangement for LIC intelligence units.

26. Article, Insurgency, Intelligence.

Zindar, John, Capt, "The Tactical Intelligence Officer in Low Intensity Conflict," Military Intelligence, January, 1985, pp. 46-47.

The author describes and defines the LIC environment and depicts the role of tactical intelligence.

27. Article, Insurgency, COIN.


The writer examines the role of counterintelligence in LIC. He argues the need to have a thorough grasp of the total LIC environment. While he focuses on insurgency, he presents material useful for students of all LIC activities.

PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

1. Article, Peacetime Contingency Operations.


This article discusses the logistical weaknesses that emerged during the Rescue Operation on Grenada in October, 1983.

2. Article, Peacetime Contingency Operations.


While deterring Soviet military expansionism has been the main theme of US foreign policy since the days of the Harry S Truman Administration, the methods that the US government has used to implement policy under this theme have varied with each subsequent Administration. These methods, according to the
The article discusses symmetrical and asymmetrical responses as they took shape in different situations in the nation's relations with the Soviet Union after 1945. The author argues that the Ronald W. Reagan Administration has wielded responses that have elements of both types, and hence it has found it necessary to foster a huge defense budget. Additionally, the author poses and explores several questions about "horizontal escalation," and he ends his article with a treatment of the question of the importance of credibility: both sides must believe the US would carry out its revealed strategy and the operations in question would achieve the wartime goals of the US.

3. Article, Peacetime Contingency Operations.


This article deals with the logistical aspects of the British-Argentinian war in the Falklands (or Malvinas Islands) in the South Atlantic in 1982. Looking at the logistical problems of both sides, the author tells how both British and Argentinian logisticians overcame almost insurmountable difficulties to supply the operations in the short, remote conflict.

4. Article, Peacetime Contingency Operations.


The article discusses the type of targets that Special Operations Forces (SOF) can attack best. It refers to examples from history to illustrate what constitutes "good" and "bad" targets. The basic theme is that SOF should attack targets that have a large psychological impact upon the target population. The article highlights the point that target selectors in SOF activities are not used to selecting targets mainly for their psychological importance. Another problem consists in the need for improved human intelligence (HUMINT) to provide meaningful intelligence to the SOF and their target selectors.
COMBATTING TERRORISM

1. Article, Combatting Terrorism.


The author points out that Puerto Rico's strategic importance in the Caribbean makes the island Commonwealth an ideal target for terrorism. Moreover, the issue of statehood for the island has given left-wing groups a focus for their efforts, and terrorism, exacerbated by economic downturns, is on the increase. US shipping and strategic interests, coupled with the perception of Puerto Rico as the US counterpart to the Sovietized Cuba, mean that the island's continuance of its relationship with the US is essential. Puerto Rico's succumbing to terrorism would affect the entire region adversely. In the author's view, island terrorist groups are working together and concerning themselves with three major issues: preventing statehood for the island; lessening US influence in Puerto Rico; and achieving independence for Puerto Rico. Toward these ends, the terrorists are projecting a negative image of the island as the fifty-first state in the Union and attempting to create a sense of intense nationalism among the islanders. The author predicts a rise in the incidence of terrorism, particularly in the face of the curtailment of federal spending on domestic programs.

2. Article, Combatting Terrorism.


The author believes that international terrorism will be the type of low-level conflict confronting the US in the years ahead. He distinguishes the international brand of terrorism from such revolutionary concepts as those associated with the Italian Red Brigade or with more traditional political causes like that of the Irish unification movement. He defines international terrorism as "the threat or use of violence for political purposes when such action is intended to influence the attitude and behavior of a target group other than its immediate victims, and its ramifications transcend national boundaries."

This international terrorism, in the view of the author, is a growing worldwide phenomenon, because an expanding number of mini-states find it useful against their opponents. Within these states, the factors that are conducive to persuading leaders to resort to international terrorism are: social, economic, political modernization accompanied by pervasive feelings of "relative deprivation" within the country; rapid socio-economic
changes within the national community that foster personal insecurity leading to a search for a comforting identity—usually ascriptive in racial, ethnic, or religious terms; increased acceptability of terrorism as having a positive impact on individuals and raising national consciousness; decolonization and terrorism as a manifestation of political and ideological struggles against imperialism and colonialism; belief in "The Myth of the Guerrilla," which holds that any movement that employs the strategies of guerrilla warfare and/or terrorism is bound to be successful; and the impact of new technologies and the skillful exploitation by terrorists of advances in transportation and communication.

On an even more somber note, the author reasons that as conventional and nuclear warfare become more frightening and impractical, international terrorism may become a form of surrogate warfare for volatile nations of the Third World. Such warfare would redound to the favor of totalitarian nations like the Soviet Union and the Chinese Democratic Peoples' Republic, because they are less vulnerable to terrorism than the more open democratic societies of the western world.

Interestingly, the author sees the application of terrorism to achieve political and social ends as a form of guerrilla warfare. Also interesting is the author's outlook regarding a possible solution to the problem of international terrorism. If the nation states of the world could see international terrorism as a serious humanitarian issue instead of just another facet of political disputes, they could unite in eradicating terrorism, disagreeing—so hypothesizes the author—only on the technical questions of how to deal with the problem, and soon the scourge of international terrorism would disappear.

3. Article, Combatting Terrorism, COIN.


The author maintains the mainland states of Latin America, from Mexico to Argentina, continue to play an especially important role in the history of contemporary political violence. He finds it not at all surprising these nations exhibit many of contemporary terrorism's violent episodes, which he believes are natural consequences of their unique combination of social, cultural, and political traits. The author offers a grim prediction: in view of the trends toward terrorism of the international variety, and the increasingly close ties between Latin American and European and Middle Eastern terrorist groups, more practical and operational cooperation between Latin American and other terrorists will occur, and US interests in Latin America will confront greater dangers.
4. Article, Combatting Terrorism, Intelligence.


The author discusses the connection between insurgency and terrorism. Viewing terrorism as a tactic, he examines the "foco-type" of insurgency (Castro's example in Cuba) and compares it with the tactics of urban guerrillas. He also gives a survey of other types of insurgency.

Compilation of References and Bibliography--Papers

INSURRENCE/COUNTERINSURRENCE

1. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.


This paper makes conjectures regarding the relationships between economic development and its political impact, a subject that has played a prominent part in the debate about foreign aid for a long time. By way of introduction and with the use of indicators of political development and a number of economic benchmarks dating from 1950 to 1960, the paper summarizes the various conjectures and then treats several of their hypotheses in a preliminary way. These indicators are: (1) total US economic aid and per capita aid, (2) average annual Gross National Product (GNP) and per capita GNP, (3) annual gross investment and per capita investment, (4) gross investment as a part of GNP, and (5) annual rate of growth in GNP and per capita GNP. In the final part of the paper, there is an important summarization that offers meanings and interpretations for the indicators and benchmarks.

2. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.


This paper consists of twelve individual case studies of insurgencies in different parts of the world between 1909 and 1964. The locations and dates of these insurgencies are: Algeria (1960), Burma (1960), Cameroon (1962), China (1937), Congo (1964), Cuba (1909), Greece (1945), Kashmir (1945), Kenya (1961), Lebanon (1958), Nicaragua (1933), and Mongolia (1921).
Each study is an individual piece and contains a bibliography of some of the works about the particular insurgency. The paper looks into the causes for the outbreak and the reasons for the termination of each insurgency.

3. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.


This article is an expanded version of the one that appeared in the New York Daily News on Sunday, 21 March 1982. The author discusses the policy of the Reagan Administration in Central America and its determination to prevent the further spread of Marxist regimes in Central American countries.

The author argues that the strife in Nicaragua, although originating in legitimate grievances against the oppressive Samoza regime, has long ceased to be a strictly internal or even regional affair and has become--along with the turmoil in El Salvador--a part of a new Soviet offensive against the West in the Third world. After describing the new Soviet strategy of advocating "direct revolutionary action" instead of "peaceful transition," the author uses the example of Nicaragua to illustrate the new Soviet policy. He describes the militarization of Nicaragua and the socialist political transformation of the country. He contends that Nicaragua is becoming a totalitarian-socialist state and believes that if such transformation can take place in Nicaragua, it can happen also elsewhere in Central America.


The paper examines insurgent organization by means of an analysis of the decision making and operating procedures of the Viet Cong Main and Local Forces in Dinh Tuong Province, 1964-1966. The paper points out the Viet Cong believed an efficient, centrally-managed organization was a major tool of revolutionary war. The Viet Cong organization stressed learning, adaptation, and analysis of the enemy's behavior patterns. In operations, the organization gave particular attention to small details and as much attention to logistic planning as to operations planning.

The paper also discusses the tactics of the Dinh Tuong Province's Viet Cong forces. The Viet Cong units followed a defensive strategy of evasion. Tactically they fought at the places and times of their own choosing. The success of this tactic depended upon intelligence, reconnaissance, and properly
distributed labor and food resources, all three of which were forthcoming from the "political infrastructure," the civilian organizations that controlled the population in the hamlets and villages. The concluding observation of the paper is that the US planning and programming efforts should adopt the concept of the enemy as a learning, adapting, and reacting organization.

5. Paper, Insurgency, Special Operations.


This paper focuses on the military perspective about lessons the US learned in Viet Nam that may have universal application.

6. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.

Bell, Raymond E., Jr., "Countering Soviet PSYWAR in the Low Intensity Conflict Environment," Annual Convention of the International Studies Association for the Seminar for Strategic Responses to Low Intensity Conflict to the Year 2000, sponsored by the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, 28 March 1984, no page numbers.

The author states one of the most insidious weapons the Soviets are using against the West is propaganda. Propaganda, he maintains, is the core of the Soviet PSYWAR campaign against the cohesion of the US alliance structure in Europe and the Third World. Bell argues that while PSYOP are a key element of a high intensity war, they are paramount in a LIC, which is primarily a psychological contest of will waged by military means. Indeed, Bell notes, some strategists view PSYOP as the greatest challenge to the US military forces in the near future.

7. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.


This paper makes an assessment of the widely-held belief that military aid exerts a deleterious effect on economic and political development in Latin America. On the one hand—although the data are insufficient and in places contradictory—the statistics in the paper lend credence to the notion that military aid programs are not, in general, conducive to democratic political development. On the other hand, the data seem to contradict the idea that arms sales to Latin America impede economic growth. In fact, the data would seem to show a positive relationship between arms and growth that is difficult to explain clearly.

Department of State, "Misconceptions About U. S. Policy Toward Nicaragua," Published by the Department of State, Publication 9417, June, 1985, no page numbers.

This article treats the misconceptions concerning Nicaragua and the Sandinistas. It then relates the facts about the nation and the revolutionaries who have seized control over Nicaragua and leaves it for the reader to draw his own conclusions about the Sandinistas and their aims.

9. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.

Department of State, "Nicaragua: The Stolen Revolution," Published by Department of State, Current Policy No. 679, 27 March 1985, no page numbers.

This article addresses the Sandinistas' promise to hold early free elections, to establish an independent judiciary, and to uphold human rights. At least down to the date of publication of the article (27 March 1985), no progress on any of these promises was in evidence. Consequently, the Organization of American States withdrew its support from the Sandinista government.

10. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.

Department of State, "The Contadora Process," Published by Department of State, no date, no page numbers.

The article surveys the history of the multinational effort to find a peaceful solution to the strife in Central America. It points out that in January, 1983, the foreign ministers of Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela convened with the aim of creating a multinational mechanism to resolve the various aspects of the political and military difficulties of the region. The US, according to the paper, consistently supported the process, whose originators named "the Contadora Process" after an island where one of the early assemblages of foreign ministers occurred. Moreover, Guatemala, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras proposed alterations to the original proposal, which all parties to the process accepted except Nicaragua, whose representatives withheld approval. The Nicaraguans adamantly maintained their support for the original and weaker draft of the proposed agreement and thereby forced the participants in the process to spend their efforts in trying to reconcile the two drafts to the satisfaction of all parties.
11. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.

Department of State, "Commandante Bayardo Arce's Secret Speech Before the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN)," Department of State Publication 9455, March, 1985, no page numbers.

This paper is the English translation of a speech of Bayardo Arce, a highly-placed member of the Sandinista junta, whose words were preserved by a secret tape recorder. The published Spanish version appeared first in the newspaper La Vanguardia on 31 July 1984. In the speech, Arce talked about the upcoming elections as a means to consolidate the FSLN, the political front organization of the Sandinistas. Arce's speech also gave greater credence to the charges that the Sandinistas desire to establish a one-party state and that they continue to advocate "revolutionary internationalism," a euphemism for interventionism in Central America in behalf of leftist ideology.

12. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.

Department of State, "News Briefing: Intelligence Information on External Support of the Guerrilla in El Salvador," Published by Department of State, 8 August 1984, no page numbers.

This paper consists of a news briefing that the US Ambassador to El Salvador, Mr. Pickering, and GEN Gorman, CINC USSOUTHCOM, gave on 8 August 1984. The intention of the briefing was to show that the guerrillas in El Salvador were receiving external aid and arms. Accompanying the briefing were film footage that an AC-130 surveillance crew took and materiel and arms photographs, some of which augment the paper.


Departments of State and Defense, "The Sandinista Military Build-Up," Published by the Departments of State and Defense, May, 1985, no page numbers.

This paper presents a history of the Sandinista Movement and updates information about the military build-up in Nicaragua. It contains excellent pictures from satellite reconnaissance sources and considerable information about order-of-battle of equipment. The paper discusses the ties between the Sandinistas and such terrorist-inclined entities as the PLO and the Libyan government. In the conclusion, the paper argues that the Sandinistas have militarized Nicaraguan society and have launched a program to export revolution to other Central American nations by training personnel and providing weapons.

Departments of State and Defense, "The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean," Published by the Departments of State and Defense, March, 1985, no page numbers.

This paper is really a booklet that provides information about Soviet and Cuban military power and intervention in Central America and the Caribbean. The emphasis is on events in Cuba, Nicaragua, Grenada, and El Salvador. The paper points to Cuba as the key Soviet proxy in the region and lists examples of the Sandinistas' participation in the drug traffic.

15. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.

US Army, "Nation Building Contributions of the Army (NABUCA)," Published by the Department of the Army, 24 September 1968, no page numbers.

This paper, although now almost 20 years old, furnishes good historical background of the US Army's approach to development.

16. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.


This paper is a study by a Civil Affairs unit of the civil-military roles of indigenous armed forces in developing countries under varying conditions of internal and external threats. The paper proposes principles to guide interaction between indigenous forces and their civilian environment.

17. Paper, Insurgency, COIN, Air Operations.


This paper examines and evaluates the contributions of air power to the COIN efforts of the French in Algeria in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It contains a useful bibliography.

18. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.


This paper stems from the various remarks of speakers at a conference in June, 1968, on lessons and "mis-lessons" from
Vietnam. One of the themes in the paper is that the US' escalation of the war in 1965 resulted not from a theory of limited war but rather from "the American way of war" so strongly reliant on bombing and shelling. The lesson, therefore, would appear to be that a nation that appeals for the US' support in a conflict invites great destruction to its territory and society.

Another theme pertains to the revulsion to the war in the US. The paper maintains that the public's disenchantment with the war stemmed from dislike of the manner in which the US entered the war and not from any cyclical change in the population's attitude toward war in general. Other factors accounting for the public's opposition to the war sprang from the way in which the nation conducted the struggle and from the lack of solid prospects for ending the fighting successfully.

Still another theme touches upon the role of the federal bureaucracy in the Vietnamese conflict. The paper avers that the bureaucracy has to bear much responsibility for the Asian failures. Initially, the bureaucracy showed great ignorance about Vietnam's culture and its problems, and it failed to correct these shortcomings sufficiently. In addition, the bureaucracy persisted in denying and disguising the United States' failures in Vietnam. Two lessons seemingly resulted from these mistakes: the US should not intervene in areas about which it knows very little, and the nation has to study the learning process of the governmental and military bureaucracies to discern their limits and strengthen their inadequacies.

19. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.


In this paper, Gonzalez maintains that Cuba poses a threat that, if it runs unchecked, could fundamentally alter the United States' geostrategic position in the Caribbean Basin and cause severe problems in the event of a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union elsewhere. The complex dimensions of this challenge make effective, viable policy options toward the Cuban government imperative but elusive.

To meet this challenge, this paper proposes a strategy for gaining and applying leverage over Fidel Castro to bring about needed changes in Cuban foreign policy. Part 1 of the paper gives the background against which a new Cuban strategy has to develop. Part 2 discusses a possible leverage strategy against Cuba and demonstrates how it could exploit the vulnerabilities and core interests of the Castro government. The paper assesses and proposes specific policies for the military dimensions of the plan, and it also elaborates the additional political, economic, and diplomatic policies necessary to ensure an effective strategy.
20. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.


This paper examines Central America in the light of US foreign policy interests and discusses the new policy environment of the 1980s, including recent changes and their significance for US policy. It describes US interests in Central America by looking at strategic and security interests as well as moral and institutional values, and it attempts to arrive at a just balancing of these interests and values. Security trends and potential threats appear through the presentation of two scenarios: one in the guise of the MIGs and Cuban combat forces in Nicaragua and the other in the form of a guerrilla victory in El Salvador.

The paper looks at the challenge of Nicaragua's revolutionary government in detail and deals with options for dealing with a Sandinista regime and to prevent a Cuban-Soviet military build-up. Finally, the paper offers general implications for US policy, including the basic guidelines for a long-term policy in its political, economic, and military dimensions.

21. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.

Gorman, Paul F., GEN, USA, Ret., "Stenographic Transcript of Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate," US Senate, 17 February 1985, no page numbers.

This paper contains the record of comments of GEN Gorman to the Senate Committee on Armed Services on 17 February 1985. Formerly the CINC USSOUTHCOM, GEN Gorman is in a good position to make comments on the nature of the threat to US interests in Central America. He also holds good insights regarding what the appropriate response of USSOUTHCOM should be. The general also provides excellent information about how the Hondurans and Salvadorans are receiving US training and advice on the conduct of COIN operations in their countries.

22. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.


The paper examines the historical and contemporary differences between Cuba and the Soviet Union in order to illustrate areas in which the two Communist countries could possibly come into conflict over their joint policies in the Third World. Consequently, the paper presents some intriguing approaches for US policymakers to consider.
23. **Paper, Insurgency, COIN.**


This paper is Part I of a two-part conference record that reproduces the papers of the Seminar on Development and Security in Thailand. In addition, the paper consists of reproductions of the discussions on these papers at this Seminar that The Rand Corporation organized and the Agency for International Development and the Advanced Research Projects Agency jointly sponsored at Santa Monica, California, in November, 1967.

The focus of Part I is on the nature of the insurgency in Thailand and the implications this insurgency has for the aid programming of the US in Thailand. The paper points out that the Communist operations in Thailand during the period under consideration were small, just beginning development, and relatively unsophisticated and inefficient. Yet, the studies showed ample evidence of growth potential, increasing planning, and coordination of activity. The papers designated five problem areas for research priority: (1) the insurgent organization, (2) the insurgent "image," (3) the villagers' perspective, and (4 and 5) the government's information system and strategic options.

24. **Paper, Insurgency, COIN.**


This paper consists of Part II of a two-part conference record that summarizes the conference papers and the discussions of them. The conference was the Rand Corporation's "Seminar on Development and Security in Thailand" that the Agency for International Development and the Advanced Research Project Agency sponsored at Santa Monica, CA, on November 16-18, 1967.

The presentations concern the interactions between development and security in Thailand in the terms in which scholars and policymakers view them, the special features of Thailand that impinge upon development and security, and the conceptual framework and emphasis of the US programs in Thailand. The papers point out that the strategy for development in Thailand required deciding upon those actions that would have long-range effects and concentrating on a few key policy areas.
25. Papers, Insurgency, COIN.


Employing historical empiricism and theoretical analysis, this paper examines various economic-political side effects of private investments of US companies and citizens in foreign countries. These side-effects are those that might have adverse impacts on relations between the host countries and the US. Presuming that large economic benefits do accrue to host economies from the US investments, the paper examines the nature and sources of conflict that can arise between host countries and US investors and lead to the involvement of the US government. Reasoning from this analysis, the paper identifies a number of relevant issues in formulating future US national policy toward the investment of private US interests abroad.

26. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.


The rise of Fidel Castro in Cuba and the spread of his influence in other countries have generated the concern that the overall private investment climate in Latin America has deteriorated, that private capital flows from the US will continue to fall, and that the goals set by the Alliance For Progress for foreign private investment will go unmet. This paper is concerned, first, with investigating the pattern of investment flow in recent years. Second, it treats several possible explanations for the pattern that does emerge from the empirical analysis. Third, it relates this analysis to the role of US private investment in the Alliance For Progress. The statistical analysis discloses that virtually no decline in aggregate direct investment has taken place in recent years.


This paper examines examples of recent major insurgencies and reaches the conclusion that the main causes of insurgencies stem from such political factors as alien rule and foreign invasion rather than from economic deprivation. In elaborating upon this finding, the paper holds that nationalist and peasant-populist aspirations provided the principal motives for joining insurgent forces. Moreover, research into these insurgencies demonstrated that the Communists succeeded in gaining control of insurgencies only when special historical circumstances prevailed. In
insurgencies lacking these circumstances, the positions in control of the insurgencies remained in non-Communist hands.

The paper also treats the problem of complexity in dealing with insurgencies and, to a degree, exculpates US policies. Its thesis on this point is that removing the political causes of insurgencies—the so-called "crisis management" approach—is beyond the capability of any single administrative agency, and, in addition, such removal is an impossible task for any political machinery operating from outside the country. To the extent that an insurgency springs from nationalist or populist origins, so the author argues, Communist aggression is not present in "undeterrable" form, and no fatally crippling threats to US security interests automatically exist. This article is a well-reasoned and useful piece that deserves careful attention from policymakers faced with dealing with an insurgency and its possible menace to the interests of the US.


This paper discusses the Algerian background leading to the conflict with the French administration. It also considers the techniques that the French used to quell the insurgency.

29. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.


This paper consists of an analysis and a comparison, which address the organization, structure, disposition, training status, tactics, logistics, and combat effectiveness of the COIN methods in El Salvador and Guatemala.


This paper presents a suggestion for an alternative to the present US policy of allying itself with regimes that have proved to be inefficient, corrupt, and unable to resist Communist movements. Repeatedly experience has shown that such alliances have either prevented or severely limited the capacity of the US to promote any kind of permanent social-economic change and so have contributed ultimately to the fueling of a new outburst.
The alternative the paper holds forth is simple to state but undoubtedly difficult to implement. It is to unite and to support the best persons within the major social institutions in a cohesive movement opposed to both the corrupt government and the Communist insurgency. This movement would constitute a democratic revolutionary movement that could become the new legal regime. This regime could initiate permanent change rather than continue repression under different labels, and the US would no longer face the dilemma of either having to abide with an unsavory government or acquiescing in a Communist take-over.

31. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.


This paper attempts to discern the trends in the contemporary international environment that make the decade of the 1980's different from the other decades of the recent past. It then follows the delineations of the trends with an attempt to draw conclusions about their military implications.

The hypothetical premises of the paper are provocative. The author suggests mankind may be entering a period of increased social instability and faces the possibility of a breakdown of the global order as the result of several factors: the sharpening confrontation between the Third World and the industrial democracies; the incessantly growing demand for energy and other natural resources; and the incapacity of obsolete forms of government to deal with the complexities of the modern world.

In turning his attention to a prescription for a military approach to containing the perils of such an unstable environment, the author finds little comfort in precedents. In fact, he sees no pattern of experience applicable to the current situation. He suggests that the military develop doctrine, plans, weapons, and force structures suitable for the protection of US interests in the 1980's, a time that could prove to be a period of chaos and anarchy.

32. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.


This paper questions the assumptions and goals of some of the basic concepts that guided US national security policy toward the Third World in earlier years and discusses some conceptual alternatives for assistance planning under the Nixon Doctrine. The authors believe that the concept of self-reliance--neither total-force planning nor regionalism--should guide US security
assistance. They also think that a global system of pluralistic, self-reliant, and independent nations would best serve the United States objectives of the 1970’s.

The authors present an interpretation of the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine in a manner consonant with this view of a pluralistic world. The Nixon Doctrine, in their opinion, should not mean the replication of US-style military establishments abroad, but rather should emphasize the utilization of inexpensive, easily-maintained arms. Heavy infantry forces should give way to light infantry units, and air and naval forces should become secondary concerns. The authors support these conclusions about force structures with an analysis of the likely threats that major Third World recipients of US security assistance may face in the 1970’s.

33. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.


The author discusses the great changes that have come to Latin America since the 1960’s. These changes have altered the context for US-Latin American relations. They have rendered obsolete the view that the Latin American nations have the potential for explosive revolutionary upheaval, and they have made obsolete the theory that Latin American societies are too traditional and conservative to change.

In addition, the author sees another novel factor on the scene in Latin America: a new perception of the complexities of local threats has disturbed the context for US security assistance. That is, there is no longer a consensus about a shared threat that merits major security programs for hemispheric defense. Instead, Latin American governments may occasionally regard certain US interests as a potential threat.

The author posits a solution to the problem these changes have wrought. He calls for the formulation of a moderate "correct" security relationship resting on the political factors of goodwill and interdependence. He discusses the benefits to the US of such a new relationship with Latin American nations.

34. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.


The author presents an interesting thesis regarding the Mexican Army, reputedly one of the least political in Latin America. He believes that the Mexican military may not be so politically inactive as appearances indicate and that the Mexican political system may not be as highly militarized as some
observers have concluded. Elaborating his thesis, he declares that the Mexican Army, as an agency for conflict management, has been involved in many instances of public order and consequently has had considerable impact on local security, political events, and socio-economic conditions—especially in rural areas. Moreover, the author recognizes a continued dependence upon the army in various matters. Some of these are electoral defense, internal political intelligence, enforced subordination of local to presidential interests, and the control of struggles with the opposition. Such partisan political activities have been important for maintaining elite integration and institutional stability, especially at the middle levels of the regime. The author believes that any attempts to eliminate the army’s residual political roles would probably lead to political instability. If Mexico is entering an institutional crisis, so the author concludes, government dependence upon the Mexican Army may well increase.

35. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.


In this paper, the author, a well-known contemporary authority on military strategy and tactics, stresses the importance of agreement on definitions as a prerequisite to the development of joint doctrine for LIC. The resolution of the problem of semantics is essential, because, in his view, the very term "low intensity conflict" is inherently misleading. COL Summers argues that the military needs one definition precisely tailored for the task of "peacetime" support for allies that does not involve the commitment of US combat forces and another separate and distinct definition for the task of commitment of US combat forces under Presidential authority short of national mobilization. Moreover, he argues this restated definition needs a dynamic title that clearly expresses what the nation is about.

COL Summers elaborates his thesis by discussing the elements necessary for the definition of the military's mission in LICs. These elements are: missions, national policies, and US interests. Once the military has received definitions of these elements, it can then establish a framework for doctrinal planning. One guideline for doctrinal planning that Summers suggests is dealing separately with security assistance and insurgency. He believes doctrine should be joint service in its nature. The remainder of the paper deals with the other characteristics the author holds LIC doctrine should possess.
36. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.


This paper examines the increasing capacity and willingness of the Soviet Union to intervene militarily in regions outside the central NATO-Warsaw Pact area in recent years. It terms these interventions "second-area actions" and discusses whether the US should attempt to challenge Soviet clients and allies in second-area actions either to impact upon the overall US-Soviet Union balance or to counteract specific actions that the US finds difficult to meet directly. The paper counsels prudence in acting against the Soviet Union's military activities in second-area actions, but it also stresses that the US should not either overestimate the gravity of such challenges or eschew the opportunities for exploiting the vulnerabilities of the Soviet Union in second-area actions.

37. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.


This paper considers the relationship between military and economic assistance programs. It ponders how planners may mesh their planning cycles for economic and military aid activities to facilitate coordination between the two types of programs. The sources stem from information available up to April, 1962.

38. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.


This paper contrasts two sharply divergent views of the Soviet Union--"mirror-imaging" and "power maximizing"--and of the appropriate US policy for dealing with it. The paper favors continuing the existing containment policy but making it more effective by adding two extensions. One would express and provide US support for genuine and legitimate movements seeking liberation from the imperialism of the Soviet Union in the Third World. The other would develop and apply a policy of "economic realism" in matters of trade, credit, and transactions in technological matters between the East and the West.
39. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.


This paper considers whether US foreign policy is either overweighted with military considerations or excessively influenced by military personnel. Its conclusions are most interesting. It admits that, to a degree, the nation has no option but to militarize its foreign policy. However, the paper emphatically states that military choices require strong scrutiny from the standpoint of their impact on foreign policy, and they also need the firm control of informed and responsible political leadership. In the view of the author, cool minds and a lot of homework are essential to deal with these problems of military impacts on foreign policy, and slogans that simply decry the evils of military influence without proper reflection only detract attention from the serious efforts that political leaders need to devote to the matter. Coolness and information should be the watchwords of these efforts, not emotion and distraction.

40. Paper, Insurgency, COIN.


This paper examines three connections between economic and military aid in order to illustrate the characteristics and problems that the two types of programs share. The first connection arises from the character of US objectives in undertaking aid programs in underdeveloped countries. The second pertains to the role of nonmilitary objectives and criteria in the decision making for military aid. The third connection concerns the problem of incentives for recruiting top-quality personnel to serve in both economic and military aid programs.

COMBATTING TERRORISM


This paper is a report analyzing incidents recorded in The Rand Corporation's "Chronology of International Terrorism for 1982 and 1983." It contains data on international terrorist incidents since 1968. The sources are domestic and foreign newspapers and journals. The authors conclude that large-scale, indiscriminate attacks have become more common, that terrorism remains a worldwide problem without any signs of abating, and that terrorism shows signs of becoming even more bloody.
2. Paper, Combatting Terrorism, Revolutionary Terrorism.

Department of State, "The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals," published by Department of State, August, 1985, no page numbers.

This paper shows the linkage between the Sandinistas and Libya, Iran, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The paper shows that the Sandinistas took part in many terrorist acts (including hijacking aircraft) before coming to power. Since taking power in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas have continued their relationships with the Libyans, Iranians, and the PLO.

3. Paper, Combatting Terrorism, Terrorism Intelligence.


This Conference brought together 144 participants from 13 nations to discuss international terrorism. Composed both of government officials and researchers, the Conference pursued three objectives: first, to examine recent events, to identify any new trends in terrorism, and to exchange information on countermeasures; second, to review the new knowledge of terrorism that had developed during the 1970s and to explore the possible course of terrorism in the 1980s; third, to identify the means by which the responsible officials in various countries could coordinate individual research efforts and share the results.

The Conference addressed four areas: the terrorist environment, the terrorist mindset, the government response, and the future course of terrorism. The paper summarizes the discussion in these four areas and also includes 11 individual papers that the participants in the Conference used as resource materials for their discussions.

4. Paper, Combatting Terrorism.


5. Paper, Combatting Terrorism, Development of Intelligence.


This paper contains the discussions of the implications for US security planning of small-scale crises and conflicts. The recommendation emerging from the discussions was the US should develop a capability to respond appropriately to such situations.

More specifically, the participants agreed upon six measures that they deemed urgent for the serious consideration of the national defense community: (1) the President should designate an organization to plan for crises by preparing contingency plans and identifying ranges of options; (2) the services should more fully develop capabilities for carrying out a variety of operations in crises short of war; (3) the US should consult friendly governments in order to learn from their capabilities and to coordinate actions; (4) the intelligence elements should place greater emphasis on intelligence for low-level conflict; (5) the US should continue working toward safeguards for nuclear materials as well as preventing proliferation of other sophisticated weapons; (6) the United States should promote international laws appropriate to low-level conflicts.

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS


This paper surveys the changes that occurred in the various geopolitical and geostrategic dimensions of the Caribbean Basin between two base years, 1960 and 1980. The paper synthesizes and assesses information from several sources about 1960 and identifies certain trend lines. Then it looks at the information about similar trend lines of the Basin in 1980. It points out changes--some of them quite dramatic--that have taken place during the two decades before the Central American crisis of the 1980's developed and the involvement of the US in the Basin greatly increased. The areas that the paper investigates include those of a political, economic, demographic, and military nature. In addition, the paper delves into some aspects of the impact of the presence of Soviet and Cuban elements in Central America.
Compilation of References and Bibliography--Books

INSURRENCY/COUNTERINSURRENCY


This book examines the history and development of the revolution in El Salvador and concludes the US should adopt a flexible policy in lieu of the traditional Cold War thinking.

2. Book, Insurgency, COIN.


In this book, the author analyzes the causes of revolution in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and also examines the relationship between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and world guerrilla movements.


This book examines seven different guerrilla national liberation movements that fought against the British Empire after 1944. These movements originated in Ireland, Israel, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, and southern Arabia and furnished the author the opportunity to study insurgencies by making revealing contrasts and comparisons. He describes the various revolutionary strategies, the calculated responses to repression, the shifts of tactics under pressure, and the outcomes of the struggles.


This is a book of essays emphasizing the uncertainty and unpredictability in the Third World nations. As a means to cope with such ambiguity in much of the globe, the author commends the resolution of disputes on a regional basis. Regional harmony would, he argues, be the foundation for a more peaceful world.
5. Book, Insurgency, COIN.


This book contains dual vantage points: the author participated in some of the events the book presents, and he subsequently, as a professional analyst, evaluated some of the same policies and programs he had earlier worked to implement.

He describes the danger for the "incumbent elite" involved in aiming counterinsurgency actions just at preventing a Communist takeover. He also points out how self-reform within a nation can complicate US counterinsurgency maneuvers, and he concludes on the dismal note that the US has "no talent" in carrying out effective counterinsurgency measures.

6. Book, Insurgency, PSYOP.


This book is a survey of the field of persuasion from political propaganda, through religious conversion, to commercial advertising. It also presents an appraisal of the intentions and effects of the mass media, and it describes some case histories of indoctrination and confession.


The editor has assembled a book resulting from a series of lectures at Oxford University in England. The central issue of these lectures was coercive interference by outside parties in the internal affairs of foreign states.

8. Book, Insurgency, COIN.


Using episodes from the histories of Spain, Russia, South Africa, Yugoslavia, Greece, Malaya, Algeria, the Philippines and other countries in Asia, the author examines examples of guerrilla warfare dating from 1808 to the 1960's. He separates the narrative of each account and is effective in keeping the reader abreast of the various developments in the evolution of guerrilla warfare. The author also includes a chapter on the nature of successful revolution and counterrevolution.


This book contains a socialist perspective on the problems of national liberation, armed struggle, and the "transitional phase" that theoretically leads to pure socialism. It proceeds on the case-study approach and includes analyses of the liberation conflicts in Algeria, Egypt, Chile, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia.


The contents in this book pertain to the most outstanding guerrilla struggles of the past fifty years, but they are actually less concerned with history than with the strategy of guerrilla wars and its connection to the goal of political change, the final objective of all guerrilla activities. The editor has included material on topics from a variety of perspectives, and his selections deal with guerrilla activities in the Philippines, Vietnam, Algeria, Kenya, Cuba, Greece, and Peru. The authors of the various selections include Bernard B. Fall, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Nguyen Van Thieu, and Chaliand.


The author, a British officer who participated in the anti-guerrilla campaigning in Malaya, explains the British strategy for countering communist insurgency on the strategic peninsula above Singapore. He also compares the situation in Malaya with that in Vietnam. Albeit somewhat dated, the information about counterinsurgency in this book is fraught with useful insights.

12. Book, Insurgency, COIN.


These three volumes contain separate case studies of internal conflicts from virtually every region in the world. In each case study, the author uses a special methodology to analyze the connections and important relationships between military, political, economic, and social factors. Altogether there are 57
selected readings, each of which has a bibliography. These volumes constitute a valuable store of knowledge about insurgency and counterinsurgency and illustrate how the case-study method may contribute both to practical and theoretical knowledge.


This book examines the insurgency in South Vietnam between 1956 and 1965. It discusses the infrastructure of the Communist-dominated movement by analyzing the organizational composition and the paramilitary effort to overthrow the government.

14. Book, Insurgency, PSYOP.


This Army Field Manual comprises a handbook for advisors to a host country. It contains references on doctrine and techniques useful in stability operations. It is an interesting document, because it sheds light on some of the official US doctrine at the time of intensive operations in South Vietnam.


This book consists of a collection of edited transcripts of speeches of various speakers. These speakers either played important roles in government and the press during the Vietnamese War, or they are contemporary scholars specializing in the military and political history of the era of the Vietnamese War. The speakers delivered these speeches to the assembled Public Affairs Officers of the DOD on 18-22 March 1983.

16. Book, Insurgency, COIN.


This book is a compilation of very descriptive accounts of twenty-three revolutions that have occurred since World War II. Each account describes the historical and socio-political environment of the revolution, the form of the movement fomenting
the revolution, and the results that stemmed from the revolution. Also, each account contains a list of recommended readings about the particular revolutionary event. The countries covered by the accounts include: Vietnam, Malaya, Guatemala, Indonesia, Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, Cuba, Tunisia, Algeria, Cameroon, Congo, Iraq, Egypt, Iran, Sudan, Korea, China, East Germany, Spain, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.


This title appeared near the end of US involvement in the Vietnamese conflict. Its purpose was to provide information on territorial security. The main interest of Territorial Security is that it is an official publication containing the doctrinal thinking of the period about some of the problems of insurgencies. Also, as is the case with any older publication about insurgency, the book may contain ideas still valid for application in today's environment.

18. Book, Insurgency, COIN.


This book contains articles authored by twenty prominent specialists who are experts either on the Soviet Union or on the politics of the Third World. Each writer has surveyed the record of the Soviet Union's involvement in the regions and leading countries of the Third World. Consequently, each has his own analysis of the particular factors in each case that have contributed to the successes and failures of the Soviet Union in this important portion of the globe.


This book presents discussions of 15 wars ongoing at the time of writing and representative of the varied nature of contemporary armed conflict. The work examines the character of these struggles, the historical and geopolitical sources of strife, and the strategies and goals of the participants contending for supremacy. Such a motley array of war profiles well explains the reason strategists encounter great difficulties in devising a single overall formula to meet the threat of LIC in the international environment of the late twentieth century.
20. Book, Insurgency, PSYOP.


The author sees psychological warfare as a means of influencing people both within and without the confines of the battlefield. Psychological warfare, moreover, in his view, is not just a tool for wartime usage alone. It is something that may have application in the US in the area he terms "political communication." These notions are indeed provocative, and the reader himself will have to judge whether they have any validity.


The author presents an interesting thesis regarding the origins of revolutionary guerrilla warfare (RGW). He argues that RGW has sprung from two basic sources: Marxism-Leninism from the standpoint of ideology and anti-Westernism from the standpoint of colonial experience. He examines the techniques of guerrilla warfare in Indo-China, Malaya, and Cuba and concludes his work with an essay about the general nature of RGW.


This book of articles presents a wide range of views regarding two facets of one of the ongoing problems that the US faces today in the Western Hemisphere. One facet consists of articles about the global perspective of the national policy in Central America. The other pertains to the El Salvadoran insurgency and the Nicaraguan revolution.


The author offers a broad discussion of guerrilla tactics as they have developed throughout history. To students of LIC, the interesting part of this survey is the author's analysis of the similarities in techniques and tactics of guerrilla fighters from Biblical times to the mid-twentieth century.


This book is a pictorial history. It presents the history of the British Special Air Service (SAS) regiment from its beginnings in 1941 during World War II until the British-Argentinian conflict over the Falklands (Malvinas) Islands in 1982. It offers a good beginning for the study of one of the West's crack terrorist-combatting organizations.

25. Book, Insurgency, COIN.


This book is an analysis and examination of the role of civic action activities in counterinsurgency.


This book consists of a series of essays about the management of ethnic, religious, and other group conflicts in developing nations. The authors are policymakers and analysts who carry out policy-oriented research about such management. The groups they discuss are from the nations of Nigeria, Sri Lanka, India, Malaysia, and Tanzania.


A correspondent of the New York Times in Saigon, South Vietnam, in the early 1960's, the author presents a highly critical analysis of the conduct of US policy toward that Asian nation. In large part, his book is really an indictment of the conduct and leadership of the US advisory effort prior to the introduction of US combat forces.

28. Book, Insurgency, COIN.


Originally presenting the articles in this volume as papers at the Fifth Annual Military History Symposium at the Royal Military College of Canada on 30-31 March 1978, the authors aim
at offering recent historical examples of activities of regular armies in combatting insurgencies. They attempt to discuss the similarities and differences in each situation and, in addition, to analyze the influence of diverse factors, including politics, culture, and economics. Altogether, the authors treat five insurgencies: the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1921, the Irish Insurgency, 1918-1921, the Algerian War, 1954-1962, and the US involvement in Vietnam, 1961-1973.


This book is an historical account of significant actions and events in Vietnam and includes some "lessons learned." The period of time that the account covers is that running from early 1965 through early 1971. The bibliography for this book is on file with the office of the Chief of Military History in Washington, DC, and many of the supporting documents are available at the US Government Printing Office in Washington, DC.


This book is concerned with the patterns of the involvement of the Soviet Union in Third World conflicts. It illuminates the political-military conditions that encourage such involvement, and it explores the possible thrust that the behavior of the Soviet Union may take in the future.

The upshot of the finding of the book is quite interesting. In brief, it is that the policy of the Soviet Union in the Third World during the past thirty years has combined assertiveness with caution. Since the middle of the 1950's, the assertive tendency has sought to exploit any instabilities arising from indigenous Third World political upheavals and conflicts.


The context for the contents of this book is the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 and the resultant Soviet-German conflict, 1941-1945. The emphasis is on the activities of the Soviet guerrilla movement that took an important role in the Soviet attempt to trade space for time until mobilization was complete. The book shows how the Soviet military used and
coordinated guerrilla forces to support and to complement the conventional operations that finally defeated the Germans.

32. Book, Insurgency, COIN.


This work is a collection of essays on the US involvement in the conflict in Vietnam. Although there are several writers, there is a common theme: pacification and counterinsurgency. The book contains chapters on pacification and attrition, Vietnamization, strategy requirements, sources of US frustration in Vietnam, and LIC policy and strategy for the 1980's.


This book constitutes a critical analysis of the post-World War II foreign policy of the US. It includes specific chapters on Zaire, Angola, Iran, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Central America, and it also carries a post script about Grenada. Its conclusion is not comforting, since it argues that United States policy has rarely furthered the cause of the political and economic views it professes to espouse.

34. Book, Insurgency, COIN.


The author presents a strongly critical appraisal of US-Central American relations during the past 150 years. His thesis is the dependency system flowing from US policy--and reflecting the relative weakness, social instability, and traditional dictatorships of the region--has made revolution in Central America's republics inevitable in the context of the rising expectations of the late years of the twentieth century. The implication of the LaFeber interpretation is the US should revise its diplomatic and foreign policies in the region and strive to help the Central American republics improve their economies and establish democratic governments able to negotiate with the US at least upon a theoretical basis of sovereign equality.
35. Book, Insurgency, Combatting Terrorism.


In this book, the author examines the origins of the Hukbalahap movement by analyzing the political, social, and historical backgrounds of the elements supporting the revolt. Of particular interest to the author are the agrarian and nationalist motivations of the rebels, the great diversity among the groups composing the Huk movement, and the rivalries among the Huk dissidents that threatened to destroy the movement.

36. Book, Insurgency, COIN.

Lane, Hubert, Partisan Warfare in the Balkins, Department of Defense, US Army, Office of Chief of Military History, Ft Bragg, NC, 15 September 1950.

This work is a draft translation of a manuscript. The author was General Lanz, the Commanding General of the XXII Mountain Corps, one of the key units of the German Army involved in the savage fighting against the Partisan resistance in Yugoslavia during World War II. Focusing on the combat of 1943 and 1944, the manuscript describes the Partisans' methods of combat, the German operations against the Partisans, and the difficulties of waging war against such fighters as the Partisans in mountainous wooded terrain.


This book, somewhat dated, remains useful to the student of LIC because of the insights its chapters on ideology and doctrine of revolution present.


The book is made up of 10 essays that discuss the origins and causes of peasant rebellions and insurrections in Asia and the relationships between these uprisings and Communist revolutions. The essays touch upon events in eight countries: Vietnam, Thailand, Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Burma, India, and China.


The essays in this book treat the ideology and status of various Communist insurgent movements in Southeast Asia. The movements are those in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand. The elements that receive examination in the various essays are major political issues, combat tactics, changing attitudes, and personnel matters.

40. Book, Insurgency, International Relations.


This book has two major thrusts: presentation of the techniques dissidents may use to seize power in a state, and an examination of political life in underdeveloped states.


The author has two purposes in this book: one is to summarize just- and limited-war concepts, doctrine, and guidelines and apply them to contemporary conflicts and to the continuing controversial issues of defense, deterrence, and intervention; the other is to explore the problems of implementing the prescriptions and guidelines of just- and limited-war theories within the defense establishment of the US.

In addition, the author offers a discussion of the security problems of the US from the standpoint of a citizen holding the traditional values of US culture. In this context, the author intends that the book make a contribution to just-war doctrines and limited-war theories as well as have an application in general policy making. Certainly, he has succeeded in presenting interesting and provocative "food for thought."

42. Book, Insurgency, Revolution, Guerrilla Warfare.


This book is a collection of essays by various experts whose writings fall into three parts under the editors' organization of the work. In part one, the editors provide an analytical framework that synthesizes experiences from insurgencies of the past in terms of five variables: the government's role, the
environment, the popular support, the insurgents' organization, and the kind and degree of external support for the insurgency. The editors then use these categories to explain the successes and failures of insurgencies. The titles of the essays in section one are: "Introduction," "The Success Criteria and Progression of Insurgency," and "The Government Role," all of which are the writings of Bard E. O'Neill.


In the third--and, perhaps, the most important--part of their tome, the editors try to assess the validity of the propositions that have fallen out of the application of their analytical framework to the insurgencies they have considered. They also undertake to offer recommendations that have emerged from the book's case studies.

Finally, the trio of editors admit their harboring additional aims in editing and presenting their collection of essays. They wish to complement existing studies of the subject that have emphasized the quantitative approach; they also desire to provide a useful book for undergraduate college courses in insurgencies; and they hope to furnish a fresh collection of recent articles to replace outdated anthologies on the subject. One may question whether they have fulfilled all these goals, but no one can doubt that they have contributed intellectually to the process of devising a useful hypothesis for meaningful analysis of modern insurgencies, which is really the first step in coping with these complex phenomena.

43. Book, Insurgencies, Guerrilla Warfare, Terrorism.


This book of essays employs an analytical framework for studying insurgencies. It presents outlines for categories of insurgencies, strategies for influencing factors that may determine the outcome of insurgencies, and case studies of recent insurgencies in various parts of the globe. Included in the volume are case studies on insurgencies in Thailand, Oman, Angola, Guatemala, Uruguay, Iraq, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East involving the Palestine Liberation Organization.
44. Book, Insurgency, Revolution.


In this book, the author attempts to make a general survey of revolutionary theory. The initial presentation, "An Introductory Essay: Revolution and Modernity," is of special interest. This stimulating piece examines the current thinking on revolution and its role in society. The whole thrust of the work is toward an analysis of the theoretical issues in revolutions, with some emphasis on Latin American events. In a more specific sense, the book stresses the need to arrive at a conceptual understanding of the revolutionary as an historical figure of significance.

45. Book, Insurgency, COIN.


Writing from the British viewpoint, the author delves into earlier twentieth century attempts to engage in psychological warfare during the Great War of 1914-1918. He also deals with the story of psychological warfare and deception during World War II and the earlier years of the Cold War.

46. Book, Insurgency, COIN, Special Operations, PSYOP.


In this book, the author traces the history of the United States Army's efforts in special warfare from 1941 until 1962, the year in which the Army established the Special Warfare Center during the impetus on this type of warfare encouraged by the Administration of President John F. Kennedy.

47. Book, Insurgency, COIN.


This book contains a detailed examination of the roots of revolution and counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean. It draws on the research of an interdisciplinary team of noted scholars, who give special attention to the institutional and structural causes of stability and instability in the region. In particular, these authorities examine the traditional role of the US, the current economic crisis, the changing role of the Roman Catholic Church, the influence of the
military and security forces, the local and national oligarchies, the business sector, the difficulties of instituting socioeconomic reforms, the politics of subsistence, and the revolutionary opposition.

Following these thematic chapters, the authors use a country-by-country approach to assess the situations in El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Jamaica. They also devote space to a treatment of the international dimensions of the crisis in the region with an analysis of the Mexican, Soviet, Cuban, and US policies toward these nations. In a concluding chapter, the authors explore the prospects for the future of this troubled area of the New World.

48. Book, Insurgency, COIN.
Scott, Andrew M., Insurgency, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 1970

The author has written a basic outline of insurgency and the nature of the conflict insurgency engenders. He defines insurgency, examines its evolutionary aspects, and analyzes the three main categories of insurgencies. He also describes the differences between regular and irregular warfare.


This book examines the attempt to devise rules of guerrilla warfare by adding two protocols to the Geneva Convention of 1949. The author analyzes the politics involved in the attempts to gain agreement on the pair of new protocols.

50. Book, Insurgency, COIN.

The author attempts to probe deeply into the bases of guerrilla conflicts. He examines the guerrillas' sources of power, weaknesses, movements, and leadership. He also considers the causes that move guerrillas to fight, and he discusses other matters peculiar to guerrilla warfare as well as general requirements for guerrilla—or unconventional—warfare.
51. Book, Insurgency, COIN.


This book is an interesting account, because it describes the conflict in Vietnam from the point of view of the Vietnamese. One point that the author stresses is the unwillingness of the US military to model its forces after those of its French predecessor. He sees this reluctance as a harmful thing for the US effort in Vietnam. He attributes this failing to a basic ignorance about guerrilla warfare and not to incompetence. He also makes other observations regarding US policy in Vietnam that should greatly interest students of the Vietnamese conflict.

52. Book, Insurgency, COIN, Combatting Terrorism.


A Colonel in the French Army, the author outlines the tactics and strategies to fight a successful counterinsurgency campaign. He draws on the French experience in Vietnam and Algeria in the 1950's and 1960's and includes observations about combating terrorism.

53. Book, Insurgency, COIN.


The author employs a novel approach to the treatment of insurgencies. He combines historical studies of national revolts in the Third World with a theoretical interpretation about the causes of insurgencies. His aim is to show that these national revolts indeed belong in the context of a study of revolution. The case studies that the author examines are the Hukbalahap insurgency in the Philippines, the Mau Mau revolt in Kenya in East Africa, and the period of the "violencia" in Colombia.

54. Book, Insurgency, COIN.


This book is composed of nine essays, most of which deal with the Communist movement in the small nation states of the region. These states whose political activities are subjects of study are Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, Jamaica, Guyana, and the island states of the eastern Caribbean. Two of the studies are more general in nature and focus on the problem of Cuban and Soviet influence.
PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS


Using an historical context, the author has written an analysis of a strategic, organizational, and logistical planning effort of conventional forces to meet a limited contingency. In doing this analysis, he has raised a central question: Why did the US fail to construct a coherent limited contingency force in the years between 1960 and 1982?

In attempting to answer this query, the author examines a series of comparative case studies and emerges with the conclusion that the strategic concept of the "half war" (or "limited contingency") never received a definition of sufficient clarity to justify specific force planning. He finds the organizations bearing the tasks of overseeing and commanding limited contingency forces faced the handicaps of interservice rivalries and absence of joint doctrine. In addition, these organizations lacked multiservice composition and a unified command structure.

Adding to the list of handicaps, according to the author, were budgetary stringency, low budgetary priority, and Congressional fear that an enhanced rapid deployment capability meant wide-scale global interventionism. These factors contributed in turn to the failure to provide logistical and mobility systems dedicated to the contingency units.

As important as these findings are, they remain distinct from the wider intent of the book. The broad aim of the author is to shed light on the planning process for general purpose forces and to suggest policy guidance as the nation once again embarks on a planning initiative for a major conventional force. The author, a USAF Colonel and Professor of Political Science at the USAF Academy, states a strong case for avoiding the mistakes of the past and making new efforts to meet the needs of vital military interests below the nuclear threshold. Planners, the author cogently argues, must identify "half war" contingencies, structure unified commands capable of directing tailored conventional forces in specific theaters, and provide adequate strategic mobility systems.

While composed of various writings, this book has a central theme. It recommends a national security policy that does not restrict effective actions to the strategic sphere alone but also provides avenues for action in the nonnuclear area as well. It calls for a balanced, flexible military establishment, one capable of rapid deployment in nonnuclear contingencies. Moreover, the writers in this collection show the need for a realistic international policy—one that is directly related to military power and political will. Also stressing the requirement for firm and committed leadership, the book's writers additionally try to clarify the dimensions of US military policy and do not by any means advocate the advisability of military intervention in all situations.


This book is a comprehensive study of the logistical planning and in-country support of the US military intervention in Lebanon in 1958. The ideas in this work are still relevant and are worthy of the attention of students of logistics in LIC.

COMBATTING TERRORISM

1. Book, Combatting Terrorism, International Relations.

This book is a compilation of articles that describe and critique the method of studying international relations known as "the world society approach." The various articles discuss such topics as the origins, themes, strengths, and weaknesses of the approach as well as its applications to developing foreign policy, resolving conflicts, and coping with terrorism.


This book is a Field Circular revising Field Manual 33-1 of August, 1979. It is in effect a new draft of FM 33-1 and acts as the interim doctrine of the US Army in PSYOP as of June, 1985.


This book is a study of the evolution of the US government's organizational approach to developing effective counterterrorism activities. It highlights the problems of this approach that result from bureaucratic frictions and legal restrictions.


This book analyzes the use of terrorism as a political strategy by the National Liberation Front in Algeria in the struggle for independence from French rule in the 1950's and early 1960's.

5. Book, Combatting Terrorism, COIN.


This volume is an account of contemporary terrorism in Ireland and Northern Ireland. To make the events understandable, the author delves into the political and historical background to "the troubles" that have plagued the Irish Republic and its British-controlled neighbor in the enclave on the northeastern part of the island. The author shows the complexities and deep roots of the terrorism and allows the reader to understand the extreme difficulties that any government must confront in trying to resolve the island's conflict.

This work is a somewhat dated but yet useful discussion of the phenomenon of terrorism as it appeared on the international scene at the midway point in the twentieth century. It invites making an interesting comparison between the views on terrorism of this earlier time and those prevalent today in the 1980's.


Schmid has made a tremendous contribution to the current literature on political terrorism. In this book, he brings together the main concepts, theories, data bases, and publications on terrorism. Although the author touts his work as mainly a useful tool for newcomers to the field of terrorism, many established authorities hold this book in high esteem and consult it frequently. One of these authorities, Irving Louis Horowitz, has declared that Schmid's work brings together all the available definitions, concepts, paradigms, and bibliographies pertaining to terrorism into a true "data base" that deserves recognition and use.

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS


This book is the result of a study of the Trade Policy Research Center on the economics of establishing peace between recent belligerents.


This book presents an analysis of the techniques, capabilities, and limitations of peacekeeping. It is interesting and timely, since its author is an Indian military authority who has been directly involved in peacekeeping operations. Using the case-study approach, the book describes the histories of peacekeeping activities in Kashmir, the Congo, the Sinai, Lebanon, Santo Domingo, Chad, and other locations.


The author discusses the role of the International Commission in attempting to supervise and control the peacekeeping attempts in Vietnam between 1953 and 1973. He concludes that peacekeeping is successful only when it undertakes the precisely defined mission of overseeing a military engagement. Peacekeeping fails, he argues, when its activities extend to the political function of resolving a conflict.
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