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INTERNAL SECURITY, KINGDOM OF THAILAND

BY

COLONEL SAROCHNA ROBBAMRUNG

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11 FEBRUARY 1987
This document expresses the fundamental role of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAFs) in helping to secure the national policy objectives and the missions of the struggle to defeat the communists. It is the RTAFs capstone document or research for describing the broad roles and missions which, in concert with allies and free world countries, are the essential underpinning for the national security.
INTERNAL SECURITY, KINGDOM OF THAILAND

A INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
11 February 1987

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ABSTRACT

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This document expresses the fundamental role of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAFs) in helping to secure the national policy objectives and the missions of the struggle to defeat the communists. It is the RTAFs capstone document or research for describing the broad roles and missions which, in concert (agreement) with allies and free world countries, are the essential underpinning for the national security.

I also wish to acknowledge the assistance and suggestions given by the staffs of the US Army War College; COL Hugh Boyd, my sponsor and the Faculty Adviser; COL Neil Hock, the Project Adviser; and COL David G. Hansen, the Department Chairman or Director.
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CHAPTER I

THE POLICY OF THE STRUGGLE TO DEFEAT THE COMMUNISTS
AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THAILAND

ESSENCE OF THE Office OF THE Prime MINISTER'S ORDER
NUMBER 66/23 (66/80), DATED 23 APRIL '80, CONCERNING THE
POLICY OF THE STRUGGLE TO DEFEAT THE COMMUNISTS

Conditions and Situations in the Past:

World Situation: In the past, the world lacked of the energy (oil, etc.), there were conflicts between the Socialist nations; the imbalance-power of the superpowers and the confrontation of the power countries. And it confronted to each other by the resulting cold war affected. The security of Southeast Asia and in particularly, Thailand.

The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) is still holding to the principles of the revolutionary war to gain the state-power by using conditions and the Democratic National Population for the main point to join with the other conditions.

The Royal Thai Government had the pinpoint and intention to maintain the democratic sovereign (system) or independent political authority by the KING is the head of state, reforming the service systems in the effective forms; let the RTAFs going on the role of the national security and the national freedom and liberty.

Objective:

To end the communists revolutionary war situation quickly.

Policy:

To defeat the communists quickly by launching continuous political offensive.
To eliminate and destroy the united front movements and the armed insurgent forces in order to end the communists revolutionary situation.

To carry out the neutral policy in order to stop activities that create the national war situation.

To transform an armed struggle into a peaceful means.

Implementation of the Policy:

To accomplish the mission quickly by becoming aggressive politically to make the people realize that this land is theirs, they are to govern and take benefit from it. The political actions are the governmental factor, and the military operations must be essentially conducted to support and to promote the political goal.

To eliminate the injustice within the society from the local to the national levels.

To formulate actions to compromise and to sacrifice the class interests in order to attain the interests of the majority.

To give the people of all classes and occupations the opportunity to govern themselves and to take part in the politics. The people's needs must be responded to.

To support the establishment of all democratic movements but the attention should be paid to the communist movements in disguise.

To conduct the military operations and the political actions concurrently against the communists.

To treat the captured or defected communist insurgents as the compatriots.

To pay utmost attention to the urbans and suburbs struggle to eliminate the establishment and the expansion of the communist united fronts in the
cities and to deny the creations of the national and revolutionary war situations.

To conduct the intelligence, psychological and public relation actions aggressively in all operational phases.


To defeat the communists and the CPT quickly by launching continuous political offensive, and taking by emphasizing in all operations, to eliminate and destroy the united front movements and armed insurgent forces, to end the communist revolutionary war situation quickly, to restrain the population (mass) war, and to change the struggling policy into the way of peace (peace-line means).

The objective or the target that we have to defeat the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). It means that we have to win the communists war (the CPT has used the revolutionary war and the population war in the form of a struggling).

In the struggling with the CPT we won't delay or extend (contract) because this is the strategy of the CPT. So the policy which should be used is the "Quick War" one, in the struggling and fighting.

The political offensive means that destroying, surprise, getting rid of the political conditions and/or the revolutionary war conditions using for their advantages, to establish the mass (population) for the base of all operations.

"The political offensive is the destroying of the CPT united fronts, the party segregation and to halt the struggling by arms."

The last one is to stop the revolutionary war (RW).
The main points of the RW conditions are the dictatorship power, the local influences to the national levels (by meanings, We, the Government has to respond that causes of persuading to push the people into the jungles to take up arms against the government).

The political offensive is destroying the dictatorship power and the influences in the local to the national levels. Bringing back the sovereignty power to the population and let getting completely of the freedom and human right to the population. This is to ensure that democracy occurs in the form of THAI-STYLE (Model), the democracy in which the "KING" is the leader of the kingdom (Head of the state).

How can we subvert and destroy the united fronts of the CPT?

We have to eliminate and take advantages of their concepts, such as:

To educate and explain in the right way to all levels of the population.

To organize the countrywide (or worldwide) of the democratic movements.

Why do the CPT desire to prepare for the population (mass) war?

The CPT have made the political war for twenty-one years (since 7 August 1965) but they stayed still far away from the last (third) step (phase) of victory (defensive, counter and offensive whole country), and they have a lot of obstacles much more than the former time. So, owing to get the quick victory, they have to change the Civil War becoming to the International War, that it is the same period which is today because of conditions that push THAILAND into the war with Indochina countries. And if THAILAND has to enter a contracted war, the CPT will be backing up by the sponsoring countries or the power countries that they should be used this war-conditions to expand into and govern THAILAND in the last time.
The best method to prevent the population (mass) war is to carry out a neutral policy.

Why do we hope or we want the CPT to change from the struggle concepts to the peaceful concept?

Because, the CPT should be conquered only by their forces, neither in the pattern of war nor arms uprising. They should not conquer in the way of peace. If they were, the situation would be changed the condition in the pattern of democratic party, that is the surrendering of the CPT.

The basic creation that we can not give up is the policy to defeat the CPT, not only the war pattern should be changed in any form but the basic creation must be maintained.

Military operations or armed struggle.
Political operations.
Psychological and public relation operations.

ESSENCE OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S ORDER NUMBER 65/2525 (65/1982), DATED 27 MAY '82, CONCERNING THE POLITICAL OFFENSIVE PLAN

Caused of issuing order number 65/25 (65/82).

Essence of the PM's office, dated 27 May 1982.

Issued to be the guide line of creation in order to agree with the order number 66/23 (66/80), dated 23 April 1980.

It was the proposal of the committee of the policy to defeat the CPT.

Let all official services, that concerning with, must to be created.

What is an element (a consideration) to the role of the political offensive to defeat the CPT and destroy all patterns of dictatorship?

Let development of democracy be the principle guide.
What patterns of democratic development will be used?

Governing pattern of democracy that we have the KING being leader (Head of State).

Have to be democracy more than that CPT offers to do it.

The real democracy uses both strategy and tactics to accomplish as rapidly as we can.

- Strategic democracy is the democracy which is effective (a desired result) result in the long term.
- Tactical democracy is the democracy which is effective result today.

We estimated that CPT had brought about the "slow-down" of our democratic development and the weak points becoming the conditions for propaganda to forestall the population. In just the same time, the CPT should be pretended to give the democracy to the people. But, we thought that democracy of the CPT being of the tactical democracy. The CPT made sure that they disguised it in order to get the state-power, so they could eventually return to socialism and communism in the last time.

In decoration of democracy, what instrument's that we use to?

All official services.

The population that they are democratic idealism.

The objectives of the order number 65/25 (65/82):

- Make sure of consciousness and understanding that sovereignty is of the population.
- Make sure that personal freedom and human right balance with the sovereignty.

The principal policy of the order number 65/25 (65/82):

All patterns of dictatorship must be destroyed.
The democratic society with the KING as leader must be established.

The process for fulfilling the policy:

The process of the strategy.

- To establish leading bureaucrats that there are unity, officials and population that they are democratic idealism for being the "Lead Axis." And bringing about the speed in the games of fighting.

The process of tactics.

- To use the bureaucrats that reorganized for establishing the democracy and protecting the benefits of the population.

The concepts in creating fulfillment of the democratic decoration, what does it emphasize?

To emphasize the basic desires of the population, such as:

- Happiness dwelling, without to tyrannize and to boss (threaten) from the influences. There is saving (security) of human lives and prosperities.
- Pride with honor and glory in allegiance to party and country.
- We do hope with dwelling and we do feel that our nation being firmness (national strength).

The main missions which we have to develop in the democracy:

Making sure about consciousness and understanding that sovereignty is of the population.

- To destroy dictatorship power.
- To eliminate the influences in the local and national levels.

Making sure to complete the human freedom.

- Making sure that laws are effective laws.
- To develop and give up the laws that have limited meanings.

How are they develop democracy? They are:
To create step by step and to continue developing.

To relay on suitable society of extraordinary characters of THAI population.

The possibility is concerning with in that situation.

Who did assign the details of creation in the item 10?

The Committee of the Policy of the Struggle to defeat the CPT. Who assigned the working plan in the suitable period,, and making of annex enclosed the politic offensive plan.

The guide line for creation along with the order number 65/25 (65/82):

To take up the order number 66/23 (66/80).

To establish in trust with the democratic regime.

To accelerate of creation in duty along with the democratic regime and state mechanical means.

To encourage everyone getting into the political conducts of population.

To organize the role of power groups and benefit groups.

Ways of correction to establish the trust for the democratic regime:

To encourage the democratic knowledge in every way, both theory and creation are in the line (agree) with that situation.

To spread informations, datas and to indicate the right situations both overt and covert by using of the state public relation, mass media, and technocrats are of instruments to relay to the whole country.

To encourage acknowledgement and understanding about the democracy to mass media of state and civilians in order to relay the right things to the population.

Let all officials be patterns of democracy and generate trust of the population.
The ways are to correct for encouragement about the officials that they have to create:

Executives Levels: mean to the politic officials, politicians, politic parties and executives (the terminators and leaders who they have to struggle with the CPT).

Regular officials:
- They are very terrific roles, who have to carry out the state policy for creation.
- They are the ones of our country who try to tie the sovereignty into the population.
- They control and supervise in order to take the laws up for being sacred thing.

How do executives find out the way to solve these problems?
- To assign the unity and concise policy for the basic problem solving of nation.
- To create the vigor, concentration and rapidly following up to all situations.
- To accommodate other power forces in policy setting.
- To develop the administrative services, ordering and following up to solve the problems.
- To develop democratic administrative service systems.
- To create the instruments of the Senate for helping problem solving.
- To create the authority and power to suppress the influence gangs or the unfavorable influences.

To accelerate all regular officials creating on their duties along with the democratic regime:
To educate the governmental policy to officials for making understand and providing the responsibilities respectively.

To improve problem solving about corruptions by searching for causes, correction and creation all times.

To create along with regulations and orders strictly, and punishing the illegal officials.

To help the legal officials that they are framed or prosecuted by the authority of the influences gangs or unfavorable influences.

Must not be the "Big-Boss."

Self-development for self-consciousness of their duties and positions.

To decentralize in the service systems quickly to determine and command responsible subjects.

To develop incomes and welfare systems of non-commission officials (officers).

To admire the outstanding officials.

To correct and evaluate the officials' creations.

How do we persuade the population to join in the political activities?

To give experience and educate to people on democracy through house to house or door to door (district council, villagers committee and coordination).

To solve the problems by cooperation of benefits (prevention from breaking away of unity and protection to the CPT becoming to get the benefits).

Authorities must be devoted, be sacrificed, be endured of the political agitation and confusion or frustration with the system.
Let the population create the political party. (Let political party problem solving, bringing about the problems to the Senate and the Local council.)

In this order, how did the mass power and the benefit groups organize?

To organize 6 groups:

- Economic Group: (This group will be break out the unjust society, poor population, establish society (war) conditions and use their influences challenge in the politics.)
- Basic Population: (Labors, farmers and gardeners.)
- Students and school children: (Good intention, lacking of experience, high level in the roles of politics.)
- Progressive Politics Group: (Defectors and searchers who search for the new methods to solve the problems.)
- Mass-Media:
- Military and Arms-holders:

In this order was mentioned that these groups will support or obstruct the democracy.

How can the Royal Thai Government work with these groups to develop democracy?

To create step by step, to enforce by legals and to cooperate by monopoly reducing.

Strict enforcing illegals by adding up of penalties.

Using laws prevent the monopoly system from them.

Devotion and responsibility to society.

To decentralize the benefits to population by currency, finances, laws and executions.

To persuade the basic population to develop democracy:
To organize the democratic mass and take advantages from the organized mass coming back to our side.

To destroy the organization by the CPT and to take advantages for our side.

To give chances and mass moving for the politics in the way of democracy.

To prevent the students and school children from the instruments of the CPT:

To make free from their activities (underneath) of laws enforcement and the institutes regulations.

Let them move for democracy but prevent them from joining the CPT.

Let them join with officials in the problem solving of society (war) conditions.

Let them educate about the politics in the right way for all educational levels.

To prevent the progressive political groups from their moving over to the CPT:

To show concepts within the constitution and laws assigned.

Democratic organizations have to get along with the order number 66/23 (66/80).

To take advantage of their concepts.

To attend them with closing contact and to intercept immediately when their activities endanger.

To create the mass media in supporting the democracy:

To support the mass media that they have the democratic idealism and building up their responsibilities in the news issuing.

To support the concepts struggling for building up the democracy.
To create the state mass media for supporting the democracy by letting weighing over the news which shall be destroy the democracy.

Do not spread of news which shall be affect and/or collide with the democratic regime.

To build up relationship between the high ranking officials and mass media persuading them come to develop the democracy.

The duties of military and arms-holders:

To make sure that they know the democratic regime in the right or correct way.

To support the democratic regime.

ESSENCE OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S ORDER NUMBER 47/2529 (47/1986), DATED 24 MARCH 1986 CONCERNING TO ADD UP TO THE POLICY OF THE STRUGGLE TO DEFEAT THE CPT (66/23 OR 66/80)

General

The situation in the period which we had struggle in order to defeat the CPT was dangerous to the statuses of nation, religion and the Royal Family (the King Status). By inprocess of the Order number 66/23 (66/80), dated 23 April '80, order number 5/24-dated 13 January '81, and order number number 65/25-dated 27 May '82 respectively until today. It completely succeeded in stopping their revolutionary war of the CPT by the basis. It could bring the peace and security to the THAI people for all levels in both country and towns.

These currently are still many conditions that will support the CPT coming back to break out the critical policies, economics, social and military for the turning point of the armed struggle once more, that should have been brought to the conflicts, struggling and destruction of the lives and properties, even though all of resources which would bring the disaster to the
nation. In just the same time that fighting in the Southeast Asia nations are have been still until right now, and the posture of wars are still carrying on the way. Besides, that is the vulnerable situation to the security of THAILAND.

Objective

To extend the victorious effect which we got from the termination of the CPT revolutionary war in order to take the sharp victory for all ways and patterns, in order to bring THAILAND to the final permanent security.

Policy

To develop the democratic regime with the KING as leader (Head of State) in order to agree with the desires of the population and THAI socials, cultures and traditions.

To emphasize about the extension of the personal political liberty and sovereignty that should seen in tangibles of all levels.

Creation

It's still holding strictly along with the order number 66/23 (66/80); 5/24 (5/81); and 65/25 (65/82).

The struggle in order to defeat the CPT, both the Communist Party of Malaya (Malaysia-CPM) and the Terrorists Connections (Movement-PLO, PULO, BNPP and BRP), and also the other gangsters. Presently the first priority is to defeat the CPT which the troublesome missions are in order to defeat the party and the united fronts (forces):

To defeat the party:

• It means to defeat the leading bureaucrats, both the organized infrastructures and the general committee of the CPT. And it has to downgrade to the levels of the village committee and the leading axis to break down the CPT using the armed struggle by changing their ways of the struggling
to the way of peace and democracy along with the constitution and by the KING is the head of state.

To defeat the united front (forces):

- It means that all methods which to correct the causes of conflicts that should have brought the unjust to the nation. To encourage the unity (Esprit-de-corps) and the understanding of both officials and civilians. And in just the same time, it has to get rid of the influence connections, black power and gangsters (desperadoes) that they are the society conditions which it becomes to the reverse united fronts.

- Owing to get the winning above on the united front is meaning to avoid the strong situation that is the cause of nation which should have been occupied by the dictatorship power. And it is an effect to push the population going to the jungles and to join with the CPT strength that they are waiting for the turning point of the revolutionary war because it can lead to fulfillment of the objective. However, the CPT united fronts mean not to the specific connections or groups that they are only cooperation with the CPT, but also the creations of causes of the strong struggling situations, either causes of concept or operation in the term of politics, economics, society and military. So, the intelligence operation for an approving of the united fronts has to circumspect and assignable objective, and the requirement of the clear-cut (concised) information.

To defeat the guerrilla forces (insurgents):

- It means that pressing the weight to the sneaky armed forces units in each region, for the present situation, we will create suitable tactics to the military targets. And we will approve them clearly in order to let them surrender and terminate their armed struggle. Besides that they will come back to join with the local people in order to develop our country is
politics, economics; local governments; society and the nice THAI traditions and cultures.

Because of the situation and environment problems that were blown up inside the CT and a lot of conflictive conflicts. Particularly, the leading bureaucrats in the high levels, so it was the effects to the revolutionary war success. The conditions which were mentioned, that should be supported to ours for destroying the CPT as fast as we could.

The highest phase that could be conquered permanently to the CPT every way and unit, and all forms (organizations) of entire terrorist connections. The most important decisive factor is the development of the democratic government by the KING as leader.

Inprocessing of the fulfillment for the struggling in the present conditions, we have to develop the guideline of educations of the politics into the right way and stand still to the KING is leader, and the main points of the democratic regime are:

To protect the internal security of our country.

All species of population, religions, sexes, ages, professions and levels are important factors in order to buildup and develop the democratic regime by the KING as leader; and to encourage the population building up their consciousness into the tangible conditions.

Even though the sneaky communists and bureaucrats should be defeated in the revolutionary war, they have the thoughts and concepts to struggle by arms forever; they are only waiting for the time (chance) and condition in order that they will get up one more time.

To accelerate all levels of the state - machines by getting rid of the corruptions, bad methods influences and black-power that create danger to the
population in order to let them rely on the life saving (security) and prosperity.

**Execution**

All executions were mentioned in the order number 66/23 (66/80).

All ministries, governmental departments, departments (divisions) and bureaus must be held to this order to create the plans and project assignments concerning them; to assign both offices (units) and/or respondents for creation along with this order. And to make sure that tangibles are effect to all social levels.

The Internal Security Directorate (ISD) responses to create about this order and it is the principal office in coordinating with the ministries, governmental departments, departments (divisions) and all concerning bureaus in order to complete the internal security of our country.

Budgets supporting this order making sure that it is the high priority case.

ORDERING: dated 24 March 1986

GEN. PREM TINASULANONDA.

PRIME MINISTER.
CHAPTER II

CONCEPTS OF THE PLANNING IN ORDER TO DEFEAT
THE COMMUNISTS AND COMMUNIST PARTY OF THAILAND

NATIONAL STRATEGY OFFENSIVE

General

Two Streams (Paths) of the Order Number 66/23 (66/80).

"The research of the Royal Thai Army Role with the Thai Politics:
Specific educating about the Young Turk and democratic soldiers," was in the
February 1980 to January 1981; Dr. CHAI-ANANT of CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY,
gave the high credit and said that the democratic soldiers were supporting the
order number 66/23 by MG HAAN LEE NANONDA and MG. CHAVALIT YONGCHAIYUDH (The
former ranks, now Gen. retired - Agricultural Minister and Commanding General,
TRA; respectively). Who were extra-closing with General PREM TINASULANOND, the
former RTA Commander, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense at
that time. (Now, 1986, the Prime Minister, only.)

In the period that the order number 66/23 was the effective order,
dated 23 April 2523 (1980), MG. CHAVALIT was the Gen. PREM's aide-de-camp and
worked at the RTA Operational Center. And MG. HAAN moved from the Chief of
Staff, the 2nd Army Region to become the Director of the Operational
Directorate.

The other high ranking officers who had known about this order were:
\( \circ \) LTG. WASIN ISARANGKOOK, the Operational Assistant of Chief of
General Staff.

\( \circ \) LTG. RIAN DISABANJONG, Deputy Chief of General Staff.

\( \circ \) GEN. PRAYOOT CHARUMANEE, Chief of General Staff.
GEN. SANHA CHITRA-PATIMA, Deputy RTA Commander, who had experience from the 4th Army Region.

Even though these concepts would be effected in the order number 66/23 and compromised with wide propaganda by passing through the "democratic soldiers" that worked in the INTERNAL SECURITY DEPARTMENT (ISD) and struggled with the CPT in the pattern of "Politics Leading Military" for a long time. The concepts were divided for two streams (paths) as to:

- First Stream (path) was coming from the concept of "Civilian, Police and Military," the initiative concept was proposed to the "Communists Protection and Suppression Command" by the reports of MG. SAIYOOD KERDPHOL, the Director of the Operational Directorate in the period years of 1955-1956.

- By emphasizing that "the struggle with the Communists insurgency is a struggle of the politics, economics, socio-psychologies and military. It is not only a fight of the military."

- This concept was clearly reflected from the "Dove Terminators." They had contact with the influences of the "Hawk Terminators," particularly Gen. SAIYOOD who gave the speeches to the foreign officers which were published in the "Bangkok Post," (3 Mar. 1977). He said that:

The end of 1957, Royal Thai Army received immediately order and unexpectedly responsibility from the Communists Protection and Suppression Command (CPSC). At that time the CPSC was only the administrative and planning department and only had operational power in that area. And at the same time the 1st Army Region had to take part the missions of the Civilian, Police and Military Centre-CPMC, the forward Headquarter at SAKOL NAKORN PROVINCE; in the Northeastern of the 2nd Army Region. So, the operations were emphasized in the pattern of Vietnamized military - operations.

- Due to change the immediate plan "Military Leading Politics," it was effecting the growth of communists in the Northeastern from 1,000 to more than 2,000 men, in the North from 300 in 1957 to 2,000 men in 1960 and in the
South from 400 to 1,000 men in the same year. (Gen. SAIYOD KERDPHOL, "Talk as the Professional Soldier," BHANAKIT PUBLISHING, 1978).

- Second Stream (path) was the summary of the operations of the high-ranking officers in the 2nd Army Region. They were LTG PREM TINASULANONDA, the AR COMMANDER (1978), MG. PATHOM SERMSIN; COL. HAAN LEE NANONDA and COL. LERT KANISTHANAKA; Staff Officers of LTG. PREM.

- On the other way from the experiences which the policy was emphasized about the principal of the military operations, so it was making sure about the suspicion that why the more suppression, the more the Communists - increase. Another way we learned lessons was from the communist defectors.

  First time when I was over there, I watched the communists as the enemy from abroad that we had to kill each other and I looked forward that when we visited the villagers and they tried to escape from us ... we tried to think about the best way that we could do it, asking with them, chatting with them about what they were hating. Someone said that he (she) was threatened and blackmailed or extorted by governmental officials. I could tell that those causes were problems that had to be eliminated immediately. (Gen. Prem's experience.)

- From this point, the THAI VOLUNTEER NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCES (TVNDF) was founded.

- "At least the concept of POLITICS LEADING MILITARY was produced in 1975 and I was promoted to be the 2nd ARMY REGION COMMANDER." Gen. Prem said.

- So, it was not amazing subject about the concept of "POLITICS LEADING MILITARY," and it was pushed up through out from the Office of the Prime Minister in the order number 66/23 (66/80). Gen. Prem created the order by himself since he was the 2nd AR Commander. And when he was the RTA commander, he had Gen SANHA who had a lot of experiences from the 4th AR, helped him as his second in command.

  From Orders 66/23 to 47/29 (1980-1986)
Even though the order number 66/23 was issued on 23 April 1980, it was not a decisive consideration in defending communists and Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). The defending of the communists and the CPT had occurred from many causes; such as the unpleasant crisis in the party of the International Communist-conflicts, conflicts and weakness within the CPT caused by reporting to the foreign communist nations, and because the CPT did not have the real democracy.

But in accordance with this order a welcome arch was issued to the communist forces as they scattered or dispersed from the CPT.

From the statistical official in 1977, there were 252 communist defectors, but in 1978 it increased to 649, and in 1979 after the government had requested to the KING giving the amnesty to the defectors. Because of the conflicts within the CPT; the food and provisions - interception and the effective operations; there were 1995 defectors welcomed to the government.

In 1977, there were 99 apprehended communists, increasing to 233 in 1978 and 765 in 1979, the total defectors and apprehended communists was 3,267 men in 1979. (Dr. CHAI-ANANT, YOUNG TURK and DEMOCRATIC SOLDIERS; BHANAKIT PUBLISHING 1982).

While Gen. ARTHIT KAMLANG-EK was the Commanding General of the Royal Thai Army (since 1982-27 May 1986), the unpleasantness of the Fourth Assembly Conference of the CPT and the wide opportunities of the order 66/23 principles defectors gave up guns and grasped spades. They became the "Thai Compatriots." There was the "LIVE SHOW" on all TV channels of the ceremonies of the defectors surrender and the "Red Flags" delivered.

So, the summary guideline of the INTELLIGENCE JOINT CENTRE (IJC), the Operational Centre and Civic Action Centre of the RTA Operation Centre, and the ISD had commented about the subjects of "The Summary of the Struggle
conditions with the Communists and the CPT and the Strategy after the armed-struggle," by assigning to MG. CHAVALIT, the Director of the Operational Directorate (Now, RTA Commander, 1986). He was describing that:

Presently, the communist base-camps and strongholds were destroyed. The armed-struggle was basically ended. The communist forces that scattered and spreaded down to the countries, towns and cities in the forms of small teams. The dispersible forces confronted with the economics and security problems. If we do not expand the effectiveness of order number 66/23 to all sides and carrying on to the strategic level. Not only may these forces be returned to the CPT, but they may also take part of the population to the CPT.

CONCEPTS OF THE PLANNING AND THE NATIONAL STRATEGY OFFENSIVE.

First of all we should know and understand the directories of THAILAND, such as the directory of the Constitution, the KING, the National Assembly and Emergency power, and so on.

DIRECTORY:

THE CONSTITUTION.

The present constitution was promulgated on 22 December 1978. It consists of 206 sections in 11 provisions, and one transitory provision which ended in April 1983. A summary of the main provisions follows:

THE KING.

THAILAND is a Kingdom, one and indivisible. The KING is head-of-State and is head of the Armed Forces. Sovereignty rest with the people and the KING exercises such power only in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution. The KING exercises legislative power through the National Assembly, executive power through the Council of Ministers and judicial power through the Courts. The person of the KING is sacred and shall not be violated, accused or used in any way. The KING appoints the President of the Privy Council and not more than 14 other Privy Councillors. The Privy Council has the duty to advise the KING on all matters pertaining to his functions.
The National Assembly has the duty to consider and approve Bills. The Assembly is a bicameral legislature with 243 members of the Senate appointed by the KING, on the recommendation of the incumbent Prime Minister. There were 324 members' 1985 and 347 in 1986 (Election day on 28 July 1986), in the House of Representatives elected by the people. A Senator must have Thai nationality by birth and be 35 years of age or older and his term of office is six years. A Senator must not be a member of any political party. A Representative must be a Thai national by birth and be 25 years of age or older and a member of a political party. His term of office is four years. The KING may dissolve the House of Representatives for a new election of members to the House. Members of the House of Representatives and the Senate are immune from prosecution in voting or expressing opinions during sittings of the National Assembly. At a sitting of the Senate or the House of Representatives, the presence of not less than one-half of the total number of members of each House is required to constitute a quorum. The President of the Senate acts as the President of the National Assembly. The Assembly is vested with the power to control the administration of the state affairs.

The King appoints a Prime Minister, the Royal Command being countersigned by the President of the National Assembly. He also appoints not more than 44 ministers to constitute the Council of Ministers on the advice of the Prime Minister. The King may remove a minister on the advice of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister and ministers may not be government employees or members of the Armed Forces, nor hold any position in a private undertaking which operates its business for profit. The Prime Minister and ministers may speak at meetings of the National Assembly but may not vote.
EMERGENCY POWERS.

The KING may enact Royal Decrees which are not contrary to law. All laws and Royal Commands relating to state affairs must be countersigned by the Prime Minister or a minister. In case of an emergency when there is an urgent necessity to maintain national or public safety or national economic security or to avert public calamity, the KING may issue an emergency decree which shall have the force of an act. The emergency decree shall be submitted by the Council of Ministers to the National Assembly as soon as possible. If it is approved, it shall continue in force; if not, it shall lapse.

CONCEPTS OF THE PLANNING IN ORDER TO DEFEAT THE COMMUNISTS AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THAILAND

NATIONAL STRATEGY OFFENSIVE

GENERAL.

The intelligence official summarized situations of the communists and the CPT as follows:

The economical problems should be supported and taken advantage of in the revolution in THAILAND.

We had to admit that the situation inside the CPT was influenced from the outside problems or international problems. Particularly in the case of the CPT compromising for advantages of the Thai Revolutionary Movement for the World Revolution or keeping trust with the International Laborers. That was the adjustment of the CPT with the Communist Party of China (CPC) in order to agree with the situation in Cambodia in the past four years. Now, in the present situation, the cooperation forces of the 3-side Cambodian troops had an effect on the THAI Revolutionary Movement. However, the cooperation forces and the combination of the 3-side Cambodian troops had the objective of
bringing the right foreign policy. That was the neutral status of THAILAND. The missions of Thai people to the Cambodian (refugees, internees, etc.) should be ended, and do not believe or trust in a change (policy) of the sponsor countries that supported the THAI Revolution.

The divisive conflicts in the governmental officials would be a supportive problem and an advantage to the THAI Revolution.

This divisiveness in the country, especially in the Armed Forces, would be the decisive problem of the THAI Revolution in the future. The CPT would be operated at full strength of their capability in order to take advantage from the liberation fronts or the infrastructures, even though in the interim, it is not firm and there are war (society) conditions.

THE WAYS OF THE REVOLUTION OF THE CPT.

The summary mentioned that the CPT is still connected with the Communist Party of China (CPC):

Revolutionary Phases (Steps): This phase is the revolution of the soils and lands of the farmers, liberating the farmers and laborers.

Objective or Main Direction Attack: The imperialists, landlords and the capitalistic noblemen. (Major capitalists.)

Basis Revolutionary Forces: Laborers, farmers, and the minor capitalists.

Cooperational Forces: National capitalists and the patriots.

Revolutionary Objective: Build up the country for liberty, freedom, democracy and prosperity are undertaken by the leaders of the laborers class.

Mean: By forcing.

Method: Suburban villages encircle towns, and propagandize to the farmers. Let the farmers make the population war, build up the guerrilla bases in the suburban villages and then let them encircle towns and cities in
the last period. The armed struggle in the country is the main fighting for cooperation with the other fighting in towns and cities.

TWO-ZONE STRATEGY.

The CPT used the revolutionary methods by the armed struggle and the other fighting patterns in the form of "Two-Zone Strategy, that is the cities zone and the suburban zones (or country - mean to the plains, jungles and mountains),, to besiege the state-power (government) - by force.

The CPT summarized the problems of the armed forces that first of all the zone of the jungle-mountain must become guerrilla basses for the unity of operations and movements.

The adjustment had to be step by step in order to prevent from the "defections." Must be educated to the operators, warriors and pointed to the importance of the "Two-Zone Strategy." They must prevent the overrunning from the Royal Thai Armed Forces or National Armed Forces (NAF). Must be clear to them that the highest target of the enemy was the destruction by the armed struggle. If the enemy could stop the sounds of firing in the jungle-mountain, the revolution in the towns and cities would be shaken and could not carry on the revolutionary mission. At the time if the CPT could not adjust the new strategy for spreading the revolution in the towns and cities, the zone of the jungle-mountain would be dominated or terminated.

Had to engage the main point by armed struggle in the zone of the jungle-mountain, but must be interested in the political struggle and civic actions. The civic actions and the population are very important in the zone of towns and cities because it is the struggle of the political war and the population war.
THE SELF-DWELLING AND ECONOMICAL PROBLEMS.

These problems are very important and basic problems to all sides. Today the THAI society conditions have high expenses, so when the CPT adjusted the concept in the pattern of the 2-Zone strategy that made more problems and more missions. For these problems the communists and the LPT had to help themselves, besides they needed aid from the front-lines and infrastructures, and built up their economies by themselves. The international aid was the second consideration.

In the past the CPT had the concept to wait for the aid from the international sources, but they tried to help themselves, particularly in the last 2-3 years. But they lacked the experience in the business and town and city politics. So they could not help themselves yet, because they were imbalanced.

Economical Directions:

To raise the economical business is another front line. All levels of the bureaucrats and technocrats should have had the economical projects and working teams (groups).

To invest for using the budget in the revolution but do not discredit to the political missions.

To assist the basic population in the projects and organizations.

The general operators must have occupations in the society in order to cover themselves and relate with the population.

To build up the mind-struggling and reduce cost of living.

Each unit has to issue the advance projects, budget and account in order to control and inspect.
THE 10 CATEGORICAL POLICIES.

The regional conference of the northeastern-representatives prepared to propose in the general assembly. These may be listed as follows:

To unite and combine the laborers, farmers, low (minor) investors, bourgeois investors, political parties and the patriots in order to eliminate the reaction and imperialism government, and to reform the democratic government of the people and to establish the new THAILAND.

To give up the laws, declarative documents, orders and regulations that were unfriendly with the population. To let the patriots and others that were arrested out of the prisons.

The population have the right and freedom to give respect in the religions and all religions must be equally protected by the population government.

To free from the foreign affairs policy and to object to the imperialism countries.

To respect and support each other and to develop the economies and education.

To give up the monopoly system of the foreign investors and major investors. To develop the industry, commercial, communication and state enterprise.

To give up the monopoly system and to get rid of all landlords.

To solve the problems and the low wages of the laborers, employee, personnel and the no job workers.

To give the right for the women par with the men both in politics, economics, culture; education and occupations. To aid the families of those who died in the revolutionary war.
To eliminate the cultural imperialism and pro-landlords that deceived the population. Too support the well-cultural arts of the THAIS-nation.

STRATEGY TO DEFEAT THE COMMUNISTS AND THE CPT.

This national strategy was the order number 66/23 (66/80) that was assigned to counter operation of the communists and the CPT. Their operations began from the "nothing to thing," from "the small to big," from "the lower to the upper," and from "the defensive to the offensive." So, the strategy to defeat them must be counter operated against the communists operations. To take offensive to them and to not follow the communists operations - tracks because we will be defeated or waiting for the losses.

In brief, the communists and the CPT used the armed-struggle and we used the "peace-line struggle" in order to destroy them by the order number 66/23 (66/80). All our armed struggle was the tactical operations for the support the "peace-line struggle" in order to complete the national strategy.

According to the order number 66/23 (66/80), the destruction of the armed-struggle forces was the first mission and the destruction of the liberation fronts or the infrastructures was the second mission.

The CPT consisted of the party, fronts and the armed-struggle forces, so, to destroy or to end the war was the destruction of the communist forces and base-camps. It was not necessary to destroy the fronts.

The rule of destroying the communists for the highest level of the struggle must begin by destroying the armed-struggle forces (or the warfighting) and then the fronts or the party. If you did it in the wrong orders (or phases), you should be lost!
Now, the National Armed Forces (NAF) had completed the first mission of the order, so we had to do the second mission, which was destroying the fronts and the party of the CPT.

The Communists fronts are the capitalists and investors, it is not the farmers or laborers because they are allies of ours. Do not confuse to mix allies and the fronts combining together.

There are three types of the capitalists, the minor, the middle and the major. The minor capitalists are the students and the non-commission officials. The middle capitalists are the socialism party and the sub-trading merchants. And the major capitalists are the bankers or the large merchants. The so-called fronts are the low, the middle and the high-level fronts respectively.

The low and the middle fronts of the CPT have not many but they are the major fronts. We studied and searched the students and the socialists who escaped to the jungles not the main forces of the LPT. It showed that the major fronts became the main forces of the CPT. So, the Communists slogan was... From the Jungle to the Capital within five years (1976-1981) with the Liberation Force... it became their dreams.

The revolutionary war in the foreign countries, such as in CHINA, the Communist Party of China (or Red China) had conquered whole main land because of the high fronts, that was CHIANG KAI CHEK and his KOK-MIN-TANG (KMT) Party. The CPC had CHIANG and KMT being the last decisive struggle of the revolutionary war though the CPC would have other high-fronts.

The CPT tried to make coordination (front-line) with some former governments, but it failed because those governments were turned over before the CPT would succeed in its mission.
Generally, the population looked into these governments and they thought that governments were the enemy with the CPT and the CPT fought and counter operated with those governments in every way, but in fact these operations became the favorable war conditions for the CPT. That was the difference from the war conditions of the KMT and CHIANG, because they were the "direct fronts" but those Thai governments were the "indirect fronts." A lot of the high level fronts of the CPT have authority and influence both in the center and the local. So they have the great power more than the low and the middle level fronts. However, the CPT lacked the experience to make the front line with these fronts, so the high level fronts would have appeared by their nature to support the CPT in spite of their actions countering the CPT. They were also the "indirect fronts" of the CPT. For the "direct fronts" would have mentioned that some political parties that had ever helped the CPT in the elections and some of the local influence groups, particularly the groups of the dictators and the black powers.

The order number 66/23 (66/80-item 3) was written that the fronts of the CPT must be destroyed, so the offensive strategy must be carried on in order to destroy these fronts and finally using the legal system to enforce them back into the democratic system.

The concept had stated that "Communism - conquered the Dictatorial system but it was defeated by the Democracy . . .," it was the right concept, so the "direct and indirect fronts" were defeated by the communists in every way. Never happened or had ever known before that these fronts conquer to the communists. Who is the communist front? He is defeated by the communists since his first step. Someone boasts that they are not the fronts of the communists but they will take the communists to be their fronts, so they will fail such as the case of CHIANG KAI CHEK and KMT.
To continue the political offensive from the phase one to the phase two is very difficult because it means a national offensive. The government or the high-ranking officials in the central part shall be created for this mission, but they do not compromise or agree with it immediately because they cannot understand or may be they are the same group of the influential and the dictatorship groups. So, it is the cause that the Army or the local officials cannot run the operations by themselves, because the government or the central officials may misunderstand and it may be dangerous to them. "If you are not certain yet . . . you don’t do anything, wait and see!"

The first item of the order number 66/23 (66/80), to end the communists revolutionary war situation quickly, is very easy in that the government or the central officials shall be supported. The first effective operation is to destroy the communist armed forces, guerrilla base camps, state power zones, insurgencies and sabotages in order to make them compromise for creating the political offensive. The mission for this phase is to complete the defeat of the guerrilla forces. Do not step forward, because the missions of the two phases have to clearly separate from each other.

If the government or the central officials do not offense in the politics one more step in order to decrease the power of the dictatorial and influential groups, how is to destroy the high-level fronts in the local? Do not upset and worry about the low and the middle-level fronts because they are leaving the CPT in case that the CPT was defeated in the war of the armed struggle. So, to destroy the high level fronts is very important target because they can build up the war situation to resurvive to the CPT. It is more difficult to destroy them than the communist armed forces.
THE MEANS (MEASUREMENTS).

If the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAFs) or the National Armed Forces (NAF) can terminate the war and display the victory to the government and the central officials until they compromise to the offense in the politics. The next means is to change the governmental policy to compromise with the NAF. These means may be listed as follows:

- To correct the political party law.
- To correct the law of the election.
- To develop and adjust the senatorial membership.
- To correct and adjust the constitution.
- To give up the laws, declarative papers and the orders that they were rejected to the population freedom.
- To create the politics of the economics and social in order to compromise with the order number 66/23 (66/80).
- To develop and adjust the foreign policy in order to go to the objective.

ALTERNATIVE (COURSES OF OPERATION).

The operations for the military mission fulfillment is necessary to operate more than one way. To destroy the fronts in the second phase and the party in the third phase is the one alternative. Sometime we can select the other alternative by destroying the party in the second phase and let the fronts float.

The party destroying is engaged in the strategic principle of changing the concept of the CPT into the peace means concept.

So, the next operation plan is to select two ways at the same time as to:

Alternative One: To maintain the revolution in order to end the revolutionary war. To end and destroy the high level fronts that was assigned
in capability. To prepare for destroying the party in order to change the armed struggle concept come to be the peace line concept.

Alternative Two: To maintain the struggle to end the revolutionary war. To destroy the party in order to change the armed struggle concept come to be the peace line concept.

Alternative Three: To mix up the alternatives one and two.

In the alternative two may be the short way to end the insurgency situation and to change the armed struggle concept of the CPT come to be the peace line concept, even though we do not offense in the political way (to destroy fronts). That is unnecessary to expand the sovereignty to the population but only expansion one more step of the population rights. Only this phase may change the concept of the CPT, and the insurgency situation will stop or end by itself in spite of the fronts which still exist.

CONCEPTS.

The concepts that use to change the concept of the CPT come to be the peace line concept, it depends on the facts that:

The armed struggle concept cannot create in THAILAND, because it is the worst way to the country and itself. The Marxism-Leninism taught the communists standing on the fact condition and fighting as possible as they could. In addition to fight with arms is not suitable or compromise within THAILAND. How is the communist holding this concept? So it must be changed.

The concept changing from the armed struggle to the peace line concept is the democratic struggle. It is not the new thing of the CPT, but it is returning back to the former days struggle since 1945-1965. The new situations in the present have changed all the times, the CPT had experiences both inside and outside country; as in MALAYSIA, JU-TE', the Red China Army Commander and the second in command of MAO-TSE'-TUNG (DONG), had suggested the
CPM in MALAYSIA to prohibit to use the armed struggle. But the CPM did not believe him, so the CPM was defeated as the same with the CPT in THAILAND. In THAILAND, some leading comrades came back from PEKING so enthusiastic to operate and struggle by armed forces, that they did not consider the facts and the environments, so they completely failed.

In fact some of the CPT members did not agree and accept the order number 66/23 (66/80) because converted, to fact is very difficult the ways to correct the Communism Law, the Political Party Law and the Constitution Law. But the government had displayed the peace line struggle policy within this order. The CPT should agree with the reason that we won't kill each other. The CPT have to make the loyalty to the KING Status that is the highest loyalty of all THAI-people. The CPT should take the advantage from the governmental proposals because they are the right and sincere proposals. If the population does not agree with this reason, the CPT will be terminated because the population desires the peace and they don't need to see the THAI-brotherhoods killing each other.

The CPT should give up the "Two Lines - Three Regions" because it has no change to win, to give up the insane ideas and to assign the new concept in order to agree with the new situation and environment.

There was a man who did not know about the communism at all but he knew something about the military subject, he raised the question that - "now, if the CPT changes to use the Two-Lines-Three Regions Strategy and the former time what the strategy which the CPT create it?"

This easy question was the wisest answer of the nonsensical solution of the CPT, that was some comrades taking this question to deceive some governmental officials until they had to dispute and debate with this subject—so crazy!
There are some who do not believe the reason and the rule of knowledge. They believe the deceitful words of the CPT that are similar to the wounded tiger, because the communists were already suppressed but they still understand that the communists are genius.

The wars of this world since the Jengiskhan period to the communism regime, are there they deploy the one line - one region strategy? They deploy both the military and political strategy, the combat operates in all the jungles, mountains, country and cities.

The CPT takes the normality in the combat rule since long ago in the history till to the nuclear regime, that this is the new invention and it has very effective to destroy the order number 66/23. So, it let some of ours believe that this order is unnecessary, and the communists revolutionary war is more expansion than the former time.

"The rear areas are challenged by the fronts and armed forces, the jungles are peaceful but the cities are full of subversive activity, three losses and six gains. . . ."

Now, the deceased communists have the new fronts that propagates so that the CPT are not defeated in the war, but the CPT changes the strategy from the "Two Lines - Three Regions," this is the nonsensical solution but the most dangerous so that we have to correct it.

When the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV-LAODONG) conquered the ARVN and US ground forces in 1975, LE DUAN (LE YUAN) had summarized within his pocketbook about the tactics and the strategies in the VN war. The CPV members and Vietnamese must read and study this book in order to know what the CPV and NVA did to win the war.

One brief of this book stated in Vietnamese languages that "Two Legs -Three Regions (Zones)." It meant that the CPV and NVA won the war because of
standing on Two Legs - Politics and Military; and in three regions - the jungles, the plains and the cities, or the other meaning was the politics, military, jungles, plains and cities had to cooperate and could not be divided. This five things had to be under the leadership of one party. But the western textbooks had emphasized that these five things were independent strategies. Le Duan did not emphasize this case because these five things were strategies in themselves, but he wanted to emphasize that they must be controlled by the one party and there was real unity of command.

So, Le Duan's briefing was one of general military subjects that referred to the offensive and defensive. It was not a new thing or a new strategy because the military subjects of every country have to refer to the principles of war in the same meaning but may be different in the details.

So the "Two Legs - Three Regions" of Le-Duan was the common strategy and natural one.

Since the Communists and the CPT began to make the revolutionary war until right now, they had never stood on one leg or one region at all. That is they have stood on two legs and three regions all the time in the same way as the CPV (Lao Dong).

We don't need to talk too much about the changing of the tangible problem, particularly the political problem in the CPV (Lao Dong) because it was a NATIONAL WAR. HO-CHI-MINH said only one sentence "... There is nothing equal to the National Liberty...!"

When the French-imperialism sailed the gun boats to the mouth of the CHAO-PRAYA River, all THAIS raised up to fight with the French troops, but the government did not request them to at all. The difficulty of the political leg is prohibiting the THAI people from fighting with the French, and in the second world war prohibiting the THAI people from fighting with the Japanese,
because they were National Wars. So in brief the politics; military jungles; Plains and cities can easily cooperate in the National War because everyone wants to be a patriot. There are some traitors but not many.

The Vietnam War was a National war also. First was the war with France and the next with the US. The vital problem of the CPV at that time was the Military problem because both the French troops and the US Armed Forces were the big Armies and had modern weapons. The problems of the politics, jungles, plains and cities were the sub-problems to consider after having solved the Military problem.

THE VIETNAMIZATION.

In 1974 the US changed the strategic concept from a National War to a Civil War. The US would be removed from SVN and let the Vietnamese fight each other in order to make the war by the Vietnamese or "Vietnamization."

In this period the CPV found many new problems to solve and hurried to do so to continue the national mission. That was the making of the "Vietnamization for all Vietnam" (not for South Vietnam as the US needed). Striking back in the pattern of "Americanization" in order to let American people rise up to counter the American Government, and to make the whole world obstruct the US in the warfighting in SVN. So, in this duration the CPV had a lot to talk about the "Political Legs" instead of saying--"There is nothing equal to the National Liberty." They had to explain how the Vietcong should infiltrated into the ARVN as much as they could in order to make the ARVN become the Vietcong Army after the US forces had departed from SVN. And how to persuade the laborers, farmers, students and all Vietnamese to become Vietcong in the Civil War. And the last concept or the last problem was how to persuade the American people to protest the President Nixon (to nix Nixon), in order to combine all the Vietnamese for the "General Offensive" that was to
occur in the new future, these new problems of the "Political Legs were solved by the CPV (Lao Dong). Le-Yuan had taken pride in his work very much because the "Vietnamization" had completely failed. So it let the CPV stand firm in the "Three Regions" as they had before.

When the NVA and Vietcong began to operate the "General Offensive" in 1975, the SVN and ARVN were easily defeated within 3-4 months (January to April), and the US Armed Forces had to withdraw from SVN. This was the reason why Le-Yuan emphasized "The two legs - three regions" in several places of his memo book.

These problems were displayed, not to change the strategy, but merely to indicate about the tangible problems and the changing of the "Political Leg" and the "Military Leg" altogether with the jungles, the plains and the cities regions.

We should be understand that from past to the present, every country would have used the same principle of escalating up from guerrilla fighting to the strategic problem. For example, the communist countries (China, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, Nicaragua, Cuba and etc.) used the same guerrilla warfare principles. The details of each differed with the environment in each country. For example, China referred to the Three Gems. There were the Party, Fronts and the Armed Forces.

Vietnam referred to the "Considerations of the Victory." These were the Party, Fronts, Army, State Power and International support.

Laos referred to the same as Vietnam but they did not have the last category. So all communist countries used almost the same principles.

Please understand that the "Two Legs - Three Regions Strategy" of the CPV (Lao-Dong) was Le-Yuan's summary after they won the VN war in order for the young generations to study it and for the honorary CPV. It is different.
from the Memo-writings of the CPC (Red China) in that they were written during the Civil War or the Revolutionary War in order to point the warfighting means. The problems of the "Two Legs - Three Regions" were written by the Chinese-warriors in several places during the warfighting, but it is different from the details and the words using which the Le-Yuan's summary did not differ from these principles.

Even though the wars in China and Vietnam differed in the terms that China's was the National War and Civil War but Vietnam's was only the National War. However both countries deployed the political strategy offensive at all times because the Civil War in China occurred in the semi-colonial country and was ruled by the Fascist system.

The CPT and communists were convinced of their failure around the year 1975, because the guerrilla base camps could not expand. They failed with the farmers due to the farmers in Thailand not supporting the revolution about the lands and soils as in China. So they could not establish the base camps on the plains (suburbs and countries).

The former strategic plan was assigned that the revolutionary war must be won in three years and they believed it all the CPT. But the revolutionary war was breaking out since 1969 to 1975, six years ago. The communists (defectors) began to run out from the jungles, as did Jang-Yuan, the deputy of the Political Committee. The students and laborers working plans were taken advantages of by the democratic and the right wing. For example, in the case of "14 October 1973, the CPT did not know anything and they could not follow up the situations, so they knew very well about their losing and being defeated.

At that time Mr. Udom Sri-Suwan (Secretary of the CPT) was in Vietnam and he admired and believed in the highlight of the Le-Yuan's summary. When he
came back to the base camp in Thailand around the end of year 1973, he advised the Political Committee to study about the "Two Legs – Three Regions Strategy" and they had long terms disputing, but at least the Political Committee accepted his proposal.

When the case of "6 October 1976" was broken out and the government had pushed over three thousands laborers, students and the political members into the jungles. So it made the CPT sure that they should win the revolutionary war, but the CPT and communists did not quite understand about the "Two Legs - Three Regions Strategy" as the CPV (Lao Dong) understood. That was raising up the politics, military, jungles areas, plains areas and cities areas to the Strategic Levels. The problems were depended on the cooperation and the unity of command of the "One Party" that the CPT could not conduct in this case. The revolutionary war of the CPT was the "Civil War" against the semi-fascist system, that was the senatorial dictatorship system. It was not quite a fascist dictatorship system. Thailand has freedom and liberty, it is not the semi-colonial country, so the farmers did not want the lands revolution. The Communist Civil War in this situation will be stand for the "Two Legs" in only one region - Jungle. They cannot stand on the plains and in the cities areas, because the great part of the population did not want to cooperate with the CPT. Though they were not satisfied with the government, they did not want to fight with their government. They only wanted to counter by the political democratic means. If the CPT and communists would not be able to take the political leg standing on the plains and in the cities, they cannot win. This rule was written by the famous communist revolution - Che Guvara,

. . . Any country that the leader got the power by the election of the people, whether that election was fair or not, and the government was still keeping the form of the Constitution Law, the guerrilla warfighting could not occur, as the peaceful struggle was not destroyed by the other rules . . . Guerrilla War Theory.
The CPT would like to quote to Che' but hey did not want to talk to this rule.

The Civil War should be won by the only support of the great part people of the country and also the National War that the CPT and communists have to use the decisive fascist dictatorship system to break through this problem. But we did not have this system in Thailand.

So, the CPT and Communists would be made tricky tactics or strategies, and how they did? They would not win the revolutionary war in Thailand, as much as only destroying the economics and the politics as in the past. For example, some governments had even pushed the people to join with the CPT in the jungles, but the CPT had still failed and lost. Because the CPT and Communists began to lose since the first day of the revolutionary war in Thailand, due to they did not believe Che'-Guvara.

If the CPT tried to solve this problem, they should be done from the facts in Thailand or in the pattern of "Thai Style." The more they copied from the foreign countries the more they failed, particularly the theory of the "Two Legs - Three Regions Strategy" of Vietnam that was predicted to the destruction of the CPT.

However, the main point that the CPT was defeated in the revolutionary war in Thailand because the CPT had to defend by way of the political strategy. When the CPT became the defensive side though they would change strategies or make tricky tactics (a hundred legs or a thousand regions), whatever would be lost! . . . on the way!

So, when the CPT and Communists had to struggle with the Order number 66/23 (66/80) they became easily the defensive side and were finally defeated. They would like to quote to the Mao Tse' Tung's thought or concept but they did not talk to the fact words of Mao, as follows:-
A revolution or revolutionary war is on the offensive. A revolution or revolutionary war starts naught to being, from small to big, from emergence to development, from lack of political power to sizer of political power, from the absence of a red army to it's creation, and from the absence Soviet area to the establishment. In all these there is not a single day in which we can be permitted to be on the simple defensive.

"The former statement is politically correct, but incorrect in the military field." (From the book: Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War.)

If there is someone trying to tell you that now the CPT and communists changed to deploy the "Two Lines - Three Regions, then you should ask him in the former time how many lines or regions did the CPT use? It is nonsensical talking because the objective of the one group of guys was to make the deceptive story in order to destroying the order number 66/23 (66/80).

The CPT and Communists became the strategic defensive side and it was very difficult to recover, except it has some governments helping them to take the political strategy offensive. But we believe that any government does not need to do like that because the struggle to defeat the CPT and communists was the mission of the national armed forces.

We can destroy the CPT and Communists by only changing their concept but we cannot make the Communist Party disappear from the world. And we can prevent the Communist Party from the outside to help the CPT occupy our country, that is quite enough.
CHAPTER III

THE ROLE OF MILITARY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

THE NATIONAL POLICY

The Policy of the Struggle to Defeat the Communists is the National Policy

The Royal Thai Government countered the Communists since the Communist Party of Thailand was not founded in this country. The government considered that this problem was the great problem, so the government had issued the Communists Law in 1933, about ten years before the CPT was founded. That Law developed step by step into the present law. The movement to counter the Communists had created for all times, so it made the Thai people feeling and had the consciousness that the Communists problem was the great problem.

When the Communist Party was founded in 1942, it was a small party that consisted of the Chinese members and those in their society, because at that time the great part of the Chinese were members of the KOK-MIN-TANG. Nobody knew the CPT at that time but some of officials and KMT members tried to propagate and counter until it became the big story and built up the importance to the CPT, then the armed struggle war was broken out in August 1965 at RE-NOO NAKORN District, NAKORNPANOM Province, the area of responsibility of the 2nd Army Region.

When the CPT and Communists began to fight, they were like the bandits and the out-law groups, but they maintained their counteraction condition and situation that the government conducts (particularly, the Counter-Communists Law) until it made a lot of people come to the CPT side. And the Thai people might be alleged or condemned by the officials that they Communists. (It seemed like as the Vietnamese were alleged to be Vietcong in the years of 1960-1970.) So, the insurgency condition was changed to the war condition in
1969 until the Communists counteractions became the revolutionary war condition for the CPT, and finally it became the form of the Civil War because the warfighting were broken out in every part of the country in spite of the CPT was the small party and the most junior party of the world at that time.

If the counteractions policy was going on the same condition and the revolutionary war that handled by the CPT and the Communist forces, they might be occupied Thailand, such as the small Communists party of Cambodia (KHMER ROUGE) had successfully completed in Cambodia.

The former Thai Government held the Communists counteractions and the counter-Communists Law was the basic policy, so the communist problem was becoming the real national problem. Some of the responsible officials did not believe that the revolutionary war in Thailand was the war. They did not find the danger of the Communists revolutionary war until the National Armed Force (NAF) operated the great offensive to the Liberation Armed Forces in all parts of country in August 1980.

Firstly, if it calls the "war" nevertheless what kind of war, International war, National war or the Civil War . . . it is promoted to other nations. It is the great problem of that nation because the war problem will be the cover of all problems. If you still have to solve the war problem, it believes that you cannot solve the problems of the economics, the socials, and so on. The war problem must be solved. The war must be terminated; particularly, the Communists Revolutionary War. You have only one way to defeat the Communists War. If you lose in the war, you do not need to talk about the national problem solving.

Secondly, the Communists Revolutionary War is the war of the "Political Armed holding Forces," the revolutionary forces have to make the war for
changing the governmental system and the social system. That is completely of
the political policy of the CPT and the Communists.

The great problem of the country caused of the combined categories that
was mentioned above. The government had written in the Order number 66/23,
item 2, that "the revolutionary war of the Communists is very important and a
danger to the national security of the country."

Normally, the warfighting cannot win by any laws; particularly the war
with the Communists. Even though we shall fight with the basis of the
Counter-Communists Law, instead of we shall win in the revolutionary war, it
became to help the CPT more bigger, it seems all we like to say that . . .
"The more we attack (beat) them the more they grow up. . . ."

For two decades the former governments never changed the policies to
suppress the communists, until General PREM TINASULANONDA was the leader of
the government (since 1979) and he studied this problem before he was the
prime minister. (Since he was the 2nd Army Region Commander.) He knew that
the former policy could not defeat the CPT and the communists. The government
had to buildup the new policy to complete and to cover of all sides of the
National Politics Policy. That was "The Policy of the Struggle to Defeat the
Communists," the essence of the Office of the Prime Minister's Order Number
66/23 (66/1980), dated 23 April 1980. All national problems were written and
mentioned within this policy. That was firstly to win the communists war and
secondly to solve the problems of the politics, economics, socials and the
cultures.
THE GOVERNMENTAL POLICY

The Governmental Policy is the Policy of the Political Party

The National Armed Forces is the Machine of the Government

The Government means to "the administration of the public policy and affairs of an area and rule," or "a system and policy by which a political unit is governed" but it compromises in the meaning of the "CABINET."

Generally, the government consists of the senate, the ministers and the courts. (See the Directory: The Constitution and the King.) The ministers are the principal bureau.

The senate and the ministers consist of the political parties or are controlled by the political parties.

The Party means to the political party that is born by the nature, it is not born by the political party law. The political party has to be born by the natural society of that country neither the law nor the political party. The monarchy was changed to the democracy since 1932, and after that period we had many political parties, such as the People's Party; the Coup D'etat Party; the Revolutionary Party; the Reform Party; the Co-Operative Party; the Democrat Party; the Social Action Party; and so on.

Because the political party controls the government, the governmental policy is the political party policy. The policy of the present government is the combined policies of the Democrat Party, the Social Action Party, the CHAT-THAI Party (Thailand), and the RASADORN Party (Thai People). Sometimes had the exception for the rule in case of the single party was the government, that arty would be created by the total authority to rule the country, such as the Coup D'etat Party and the Reform Party.

The National Armed Forces (NAF) is not the political party but is principal "MACHINE" of the government or the principal state-machine. As
normally it has no policy but it has to follow the policy of the political party. In some cases the policy of the political party is wrong, the NAF has to create its policy in order to solve the national problems. For example, the several governments could not solve the communists problem because of many changes of government. It was necessary for the NAF to build up the new policy for the problem solving; that was the policy to defeat the CPT as mentioned in the Order Number 66/23 (66/80).

So, now Thailand had two policies in order to solve the national problems. First, the policy of the political party that declared in the senate in the form of the governmental policy. Second, the policy of the NAF that was declared by the Prime Minister, General PREM, AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY HALL (kitti kha-jorn hall). But it was different in the conditions and considerations.

The struggle problem in the local levels especially in all four Army Regions was mentioned in the operational summary on 12 May 1982, as briefly:-

To maintain the operation in order to end the war by destroying the guerrilla base camps and the state power zones. (It means that the power of the communists come over the plains or cities which is out of their liberation areas and zones.)

To measure for protection and counterinsurgency by deployment of the rapid forces which can pursue the communists or the insurgents through the plains or cities.

To adjust the forces in order to confront with the enemy in all operational patterns. These forces are organized as the "Low Land Operational Teams," (SANTI - NIMITR). It consists of the Armedholding-Propaganda Unit (:The Population Survey Team, Civic Action Team, Political Team, Psychological Team) and the Rapid forces Unit in order to secure through the
plains and cities. Particularly, in the "CIVIL-POLICE-MILITARY LEVELS" have to control and command their responsibility areas.

To withdraw the regular forces back to their own units and to prepare the "Reaction Forces" for support in the immediate operations.

In the Army level, to end the support for troops from the central part, such as the special forces unit that attached to the Army Regions would be prepared for the general support missions.

In the Army Regions Level, to give up or to develop the responsibility areas in order to compromise with the situations that were changed. It was necessary for the Army and the Internal Security Department (ISD) to cut down the budgets.

All four Army Regions had to consider to give up or to recognize the militia troops, and these troops must be deployed for the general support of the Army Regions.

THE SITUATION SUMMARY AFTER THE ARMED-STRUGGLE WITH THE CPT

The Strategy After the War Ending

This situation summary (in brief) was described by General CHAVALIT, C-in-C of the Royal Thai Army (RTA: The former C-of-GS, RTA), at the Military Academy Hall. These may be listed as follows:

Firstly, the situation summary in order to defeat the Communists and the CPT since they were founded until right now. . . . From the conclusion of the Fourth Assembly Meeting of the CPT, it occurred a lot of conflicts from the low level to the highest level. The new leading bureau of the CPT were convinced that they would convert the situation to become the winner in the
last struggle, and they were convinced under their right estimation that they would not care about the time—how long that they want to wait for it!

The conviction of this leading bureau group depended on their concepts that . . . If there is still struggling in the mankind (people) classes of the society, this condition is going to support the CPT. Because the government cannot solve the problems of the land condition, the land reform, the inside and outside monopoly system, and the condition of the state machine that lacks the development to come along with the society that is changing so fast.

Secondly, the confrontation between the Indo-China Socialism Countries and China will have the effect of revolution success.

The CPT convinced that these conditions were the strategic conditions of the revolutionary war, and it was the first concept of the MARX-LENIN all around the world. But the patterns or the characteristic struggles will differ along with the lands, situations and environments of each country. The rise of the national democracy condition is only the propaganda to enthuse the population in order to join with the revolution.

The considerations in order to point the victory of the CPT depends on:-

The intellect level of the mankind (people) classes struggle.

The intellect level of the international struggle.

The vigorous level of the International Communist Party and the Socialism system of the world.

The correction levels of the strategy, tactics, concepts, policies and the efficient leading of the CPT.

Thirdly, the concepts of JANG-YUAN group and the Communist Party of China (CPC) might be mentioned that:-
To convince in the rule of the revolutionary contraction (or contracted war). The offensive of the Soviet Union in all around the world makes the China deploying the temporary retreat tactics. Particularly, the CPT is necessary to get along with the CPC in Southeast Asia.

To convince in the expansive rule of the intellect level of the mankind (people) classes struggle.

To convince in the expansive rule of the intellect level of the international struggle.

- To convince that the socialism countries will grow-up day by day.
- To convince that the third-world countries will grow-up and more develop.
- To convince that the imperialism countries will decrease to the lowest level, and
  - The crisis will break up to the capitalism countries or frequently increase more and more.

To convince in the rule of the social development.

- To convince in the theory of that the socialism capitals will develop to the socialism system, and
- To convince that China will be the center of the world revolution.

The struggle situation in nowaday might be mentioned that the CPT was defeated in the tactics of the population war, and should be defeated in the strategy in the future, but the Communists and the CPT may still have some strategic conditions that is just enough to counteroffensive in the strategic operation in the same way.

The NAF won in the population war tactics and we have the strategic conditions in order to defeat the CPT and communists in the last opportunity.
The CPT and the Communists fell in the scattered forces condition and they tried to reorganize their forces in the pattern of the strategic retreat, but they could not take "LONG-MARCH" (as in China). So, they had escaped into the cities and on the plains in order to wait for the critical situation and the cooperation of the people.

The concepts of the Fourth Assembly Meeting and JANG-YUAN were mentioned as above alls.

Today, the weak point of the CPT and the Communists is the conflicts in their party. The Political Committee and the Party Committee do not have ability and unity to command and control in the whole party and the communist forces.

The conflicts had more expansion in the Northeastern areas. The Northeastern Conclusion or the "101 st. Conclusion" that had conferred by Mr. WINAI-PERMOONZAP was the president. The "101 st. Conclusion" was concluded that the "Fourth Assembly Meeting" could not lead the revolution until success, which it was the strong conflicts.

The "101 st. Conclusion" pointed that the most danger to Thailand was China. There was one way to avoid the dangerous revolution of the CPT, that was to destroy the Chinese-CPT that would be prevented national destination from the disastrous revolution.

The Royal Thai Government was convinced of this problem, so we had to do the best we could for finding out the "Co-ordination Point" and keeping the "Different Point." This was the main point that we had to consider in circumspect.

An another crisis in the CPT that was displayed in the internal document in order to propose to the Party by Mr. THONG-JAMSRI (one of the Political Committee), that crisis was the "Satisfactor Crisis" in the CPT. In the
document was described that the population and nations that were bossed or tyrannized by the old social rules. They hoped that the new socialism system would help them to meet the new pleasant future, but they met that the communists and the socialism countries had a lot of weak points and there were some countries that they displayed their policies like as the imperialist countries. This was the "Satisfactory Crisis" of the population that watched for the Communists and the CPT as mentioned.

General situation: In the Northern areas, particularly the military interest area is "NAN" province. In the South of the Northeastern area is the areas responsibility between the First Army Region and the Second Army Region. In the Southern areas is the areas responsibility of NAKORN SRI-THAMRAT and SURATTHANEE Provinces. And in the Central areas is KANCHANABURI and U-THAITHANEE-provinces. These areas responsibility must be inspected by the military operations both search and destroy.

Operations (emphasized): To maintain the military operations and suppressions. To develop and adjust the fighting on the plains and in the cities in order to agree with the retreat situation of the Communists and the CPT. To deploy these operations in order too destroy both of direct and indirect fronts in the next phase. To weigh the next operation by destroying the party is the priority mission.

The courses of operation as mentioned was the strategic operation level or the strategy after the armed struggle.

The main point in fighting to destroy the party is carrying on the "Peace-Line Struggle."

In order to make sure and understand about the "Peace-Line Struggle," for example from the --"Bitter War" or the "Vietnam War."
The United States had assigned that the objective of the Vietnam War was to destroy the North Vietnam Army (NVA) in order to force the North Vietnam surrender, so the US Armed Forces killed the Vietnamese for Vietnam. But the objective of North Vietnam was the national independence, the liberty and freedom. So it was clearly that the victory of the US depending on the military victory for the political success, but the victory of the Vietnamese was the political victory by the military operations.

This was the conflict of the strategic objectives, more than this, the Americans' objective had conflicted with the US armed forces, because the Americans wanted peace but the US armed forces wanted war. So it became Nixon's War and Johnson's War in the final.

The communists in Thailand, Thai people want justice and peace, but the communists leader wants the war which is on the contrary of the Thai people. The Royal Thai Government and the National Armed Forces (NAF) had promoted the war for justice and peace that Thai people supported. So, the strategic victory was on the side of the Royal Thai Government and the NAF. The Communists and the CPT had promoted the war in order to kill the Thai people for the foreign benefits, but the Royal Thai Government and the NAF wanted to end the war as fast as they could in order to protect the Thai lives and the national benefits.

This was the meaning of the "Peace Line Struggle." It was the strategic objective in the small circle and in the deep side. The "Peace Line Struggle" is the only one measurement to force the communists to return to fighting in the way of peace and let them change the condition to be the "Left wing Democracy" in the final. Even though we had sufferance or trouble we shall create this strategy to defeat the Communists and the CPT until we shall bring the peace and happiness to our country.
In the present, the main problem is the problem of the defectors or the Compatriots.

When we assigned correctly about the strategic objective, our next mission was to destroy the Communist forces in the pattern of the revolutionary war.

The principle of the population war of MAO, LENIN or HOCHIMINH were as the same rules, that was the victory depending on the people, from the people to the people and by the people. So our creation was to stand firm on this point and in order to destroy the enemy effectively is to "destroy the will to fight of the enemy."

In the National Strategy Offensive of the Order Number 66/23 (66/80), item 3 would be made completely by:-

To give up the Communists Activity Protection Law (Counter-Communists Law) and to issue the National Security Law in replacement.

To give up, to add up, and to correct the laws of the political party and the election for agreeing with the democratic doctrine.

To correct and adjust the Constitution Law about the political party and the others.

The creation in each step or each phase is very difficult, because it has a lot of barriers and obstacles, as to:-

The lacking of the understanding to solve the Communists problem of all strategic levels.

The lacking of the authority to operate.

The Director of the Internal Security Department (ISD: or the General Communists Activity Protection Director) has to do with the first priority of the development and adjustment of the ISD. It means that from the central part to the regions and provinces. All officials of the ISD have too study
and make sure that they clearly understand the Order Number 66/23 (66/80). The missions must be expanded more than the former time though the organization was reduced and is smaller than the old one. These missions have to cover the Communists' fighting, the politics, the economics and the national socials.

The ISD was founded for a long time in order to suppress the Communists, so it had the confusion and the complication of too many subjects. When the CPT and the Communists changed the way of the armed struggle to the peace-line struggle, the ISD had to change the policy in order to relate with the new-line of the CPT. That is a very important condition with making the CPT freed from the International Communists. These tactics should let the CPT and the Communists move under the rule and system of the democracy in the future.

The new missions and policies of the ISD are:

To fully support the democratic movements, (Political party, Group, Party or Personal), because all of these are the main basis of the armed forces in order to fight with the "dictatorship system" and the Communists.

To expand the development in the countries and suburbs, and to collect and combine the repeated offices or units coming back under control of the ISD for being the center in order to fight with the CPT and the Communists.

The development as mentioned, were the political offensive strategy in the next step (phase). This political step means to the politics, the economics, and the socials altogether. It is not the same meaning as in the former period before Order Number 66/23 (66/80) was issued.

The basic concepts for solving the problems which vis-a-vis the CPT, that is to destroy the conviction of the "Leading Bureaucrats," as follows:

The problems of the mankind (people) classes struggle:
o To reduce the intellect of the mankind (people) classes struggle.

o To eliminate the armed struggle and the population war.

o To correct the critical economics by development in the step by step.

o To develop the structure of the politics.

The problems of the national struggle:

o To accelerate the development of the national industries.

o To support the national investments.

o To free from under control of the power countries in order to promote the war in the Indo-China.

o To accelerate the development to the small part nations and the hill tribes.

o To solve the Southern Muslim problem by the peace-line method (means).

The problems of the destroying, the eliminating, and the level keeping of our side with the Order Number 66/23 (66/80) to the CPT.

o To solve the problems from the easy to the difficult.

o To solve the present problem to the basic problem.

o To solve the specific problem to the general problem.

o To solve the tactical problem to the strategic problem.

Our policy and concept are still to operate along with the Order Number 66/23 (66/80) as follows:-

To create the political measurement in order to bring the Communists and the fronts out from the jungles for the peaceful survival and coordination for the national development.
To create the military measurement in order to destroy the guerrilla base camps and the CPT fortifications and pressing them to give up the armed struggle.

To pilfer the opportunity in the period that the International Communist countries, CPC, CPV (Lao Dong), and thee CPT had a lot of conflicts to expand the effective operations both the political and the military measurements. At the same time if the communists become the defectors and deliver their weapons to the government, if we don’t have the officials to control and supervise the "THEORY PROBLEM AND THE STRATEGY, the operations may be stopped at this point. And the CPT can deploy the expansive rule of the mankind or the population classes struggle in order to reorganize the mass and the infrastructure fronts one more time.

Now, the guerrilla base camps and the CPT fortifications were almost destroyed in all areas. The armed struggle was ended by the basic condition, the Communist forces were spread and scattered down to the plains and cities in the form of the small arms units or teams. These forces had to face with security and economical problems. So, we have to expand the effective operation through all means and areas and straight on to the strategic level, because these defectors may persuade the mass and the fronts to return to the CPT one more time if the opportunity and the social conditions are support them.

In brief, even though we won at the basic level, we have to maintain the military mission for the last decisive victory, and the political mission for the fronts and the CPT.

To destroy the old bureaucrats of the CPT is the main mission to destroy the party.
To avoid vis-a-vis the fronts and the mass, the fronts destruction must be created by limiting capability and step by step, and good planning.

The SANTI-NIMITR PROJECT or the LOW-LAND OPERATION PROJECT is the project for this mission.

THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OF THE NATIONAL POLITICS

Even though it was a small part of the successful victory to the CPT in 1982, but it was very important and the great victory, because if we didn't have this victory (The Great Offensive in 1982), we didn't have an opportunity to win in the future at all.

We have to clearly consider the causes of the victory in order to bring them for planning and a guide line in the future...

Firstly, the omnisciences, the intelligences, and the experiences of the leader and government, who knew all about the communists problem, made the suitable and the right policy.

Secondly, the relation between the government and the Armed Forces. The government selected to deploy the Armed Forces in order to defeat the CPT, because in the war situation was the main mission of the military. The Armed Forces have a lot of the power, the organization, the tactics, the strategy and the control, and the Armed Forces are the arms-holding that operate the main political mission for the success of the governmental policy.

Thirdly, the CPT and the Communists did not really know the theory and repeated the wrong creations, because of the dictatorship leading and the wrong THAI-CULTURE analysis. These causes were the very important base of the operational concept. The document of the THAI-CULTURE analysis in the FOURTH ASSEMBLY MEETING of the CPT had confirmed that THAILAND was still the "SEMI-COLONIAL and SEMI-LANDLORD COUNTRY." In fact, the CPT and the Communists did not really know the "MARX-LENIN THEORY," particularly in the subjects of the
"ECONOMICAL BASIS" and "SUPERSTRUCTURE" (Politics and Cultures). So, they analyzed and were confused about the "SEMI-COLONIAL COUNTRY" and the "ECONOMICAL BASIS."

The Semi-Colonial country is the political problem. It is not the economical problem, and the SUPERSTRUCTURE is not also the economical problem or Economical Basis. But they analyzed these theories from the problem of the Economical Basis.

If we consider the analysis of the CPT, for example, the super countries depend on the underdeveloped countries, such as the economics of Japan depends on the oil of Arabian countries, so Japan must depend on Arabian Countries (it's wrong). Or in the TSAR'S reign, though the economics was in the capitalism system but the great part of economics were in the foreigner hands or in the economical control of the Western countries. So, some revolutionists thought that RUSSIA was the superpower and the imperialism country, which displaying that RUSSIA was an independent country.

LENIN could solve this problem by picking up the "MARX THEORY" to explain that the Superstructure was not the Economical Basis, so the word "INDEPENDENCE" means that the "POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE." If any country has the political independence though she depends on the economics of the others, that country is still independent.

In the reign of the KING RAMA V of THAILAND, the imperialism countries could build up the condition of the "Extra-territory" or Extra-territoriality in Thailand, which was similar as the Semi-Colonial country. But the Economical Basis was still with the Royal Thai Government and THAILAND, and in the contrary of the present which THAILAND is the independent country but the Economic Basis depends on the foreign countries.
For the Semi-Landlord country problem is the problem of the Economical Basis, but the CT and the Communists did not really know which one of the "COMMODITY PRODUCTION" (Capitalism System) and the "SELF-SUFFICIENT PRODUCTION" (Semi or Landlord System). They could not segregate these problems, so they had failed and could not correct them until right now.

There are a lot of people interested in the Fourth Assembly Meeting of the CPT, in spite of the nonsensical subject and the way it was destroying itself. It may be mentioned briefly as follows:-

There were some communists who said that the Fourth Assembly Meeting was similar to the conference of the "CHUN-EE-BASE" of the CPC, which was the conference of the expansion of the political committee between the "LONG MARCH." This conference was the correction of the military and the political concepts in the situation of the "TOTAL RETREAT." (The Revolutionary War of the CPC.) But the Fourth Assembly Meeting of the CPT was the conference of the "BASIC DEFEAT" of the CPT.

The Retreat Situation is not severe condition (CPC) as the Defeat Situation (CPT). So, the correction is the difference in the concepts.

The CPT and the Communists intended to open the Fourth Assembly Meeting for several years, but they did not have a chance to do it, because of the insane bureaucrats who wanted to follow the track of the "CHUN-EE-CONFERENCE." In spite of the different situation, they had failed already.

If the CPT and the Communists want to counteroffense by the political offensive, they cannot use the party for this mission, because the party had lost a lot of power. Now they only have the fronts that they have to push or support these fronts for creating the new mission, which is to destroy and obstruct the Order Number 66/23 (66/80) in every way.
If the NAF were defeated by the CPT and the Communists, it could mention that the Fourth Assembly Meeting was successfully completed. But they could not...!

The important considerations in the document of this conference had confirmed about the armed struggle, the urbans and the countries were the bases, and pointed to the incorrections and the failures in the past 20 years.

This displayed that the old leading bureaucrats did not want to change their concepts. They were fallen into the hopelessness and termination.

If they really knew about the "CHUN-EE-CONFERENCE," they would find that the conference was the correction of the "MILITARY CONCEPT," however the CPC had changed the "LI-LI-CHAN" leading bureaucrats came to be the "MAO-TSE-TUNG" staffs. But the CPT did not change both the concepts and the leading bureaucrats. They tried to change and raise comrade PRACHA THANYPIBOON up to be the CPT secretary, but PRACHA was the representative of the old one.

Fourthly, the sacrificing, the endurance and the "Will to Fight" for all of us.

The Will to Fight of the commander is the great consideration in the warfighting. The commander has to make the "Will Offensive" all time though how the situation is! For the commander motto:

"MONEY LOST NOTHING LOST; HONOUR LOST, MUCH LOST; COURAGE LOST, ALL LOST."

The last one, in order to win the war you have to finish the strategic offensive, you can not do it in the half way or only some parts otherwise you will lose as HITLER lost in the WWII.

The strategic offensive mission in the Order Number 66/23 (66/80), item 3--"... in order to defeat ... became the struggle of the Peace-Line means." This is the mission of the strategic offensive to the CPT and the
Communists until it is successfully completed. Since 23 April 1980 (23 April 2523) the NAF had to continue the strategic offensive both the military and the political offensive until the mission was successfully completed.

If the CPT and the Communists will turn the situation to win in the revolutionary war, they have to fight with the weapons. But before they will deploy the weapons they have to offense in the political strategy that they have to take some conditions from the government. The only one basic condition is the uncomplete democracy system in the country. So, our main political offensive are the "DEMONCRATIC MEASUREMENT."

The Democratic Measurement is the population sovereignty and the human right.

The political offensive to the CPT is to expand the human right and to expand the sovereignty of the population.

In order to change the armed struggle of the CPT and the Communists come to be the Peace-Line Means, that was the way closing to win of them because the MARX-LENIN'S facts had mentioned that--If THEY DID NOT HAVE TO DEPLOY THE ARMED STRUGGLE FOR THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR, THEY WOULD NOT HAVE THE WAY TO WIN.

The CPT and the Communists will deploy the armed struggle when they are the underground party, but the government forced them to stay on the ground and let them fight with the Peace-Line Means.

There are a lot of barriers and obstacles which obstruct our mission. We do not look over the long historical struggle of the CPT and Communists (The past 40 years with bloody fighting, under arresting, torturing and inflicting of great pain in the first period). These are the reasons that they had to search and engage about the theory of the "SEVERE REVOLUTION" of MAO-TSE-TUNG, or their slogan had mentioned that "The State-Power is Barrel" or "The Gun is the Power." If the communist members or comrades stay away from these
concepts, they will have blamed that they are the reversible activists. Even though in the present the CPT and the Communists would have scattered and stay in on the other side, but they still maintain to fight in the jungles, mountains and urbans. But their long strategy does not change, they wait for the time and condition in the future.

"WE DO NOT FORGET THE BASIC CONCEPT OF MAO."

The democracy is the democratic tangibles, no matter what politics have the highest tangibleness as equal to the political democracy. The democratic concepts are an endurance to the opposite side, to discipline, to accept the major votes; to stand firm in the right principle; to surrender to the right reason; to respect to the rules; to sacrifice for the people and the country, and have to virtue.

The last problem that we have to mention for the correctional understanding, because this problem is concerning with this struggle period. This problem is to organize the new party of the SOVIET LINE. In the former time the whole world Communist Parties had unified under the MARX-LENIN THEORY, and depended on the THIRD INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISTS (OR THE THIRD COMINTERN) by the leading of the COMMUNISTS PARTY OF SOVIET UNION (CPSU). But in 1943 the COMINTERN was given up and each party freed from organization except the theory and the politics were still the leading of the CPSU.

After WWII the Communists Party of Yugoslavia had freed accurately from the CPSU.

STALIN died in 1953 and after the TWENTIETH ASSEMBLY CONFERENCE, the CPC had conflicted with the CPSU by the theory. The expansive conflict made them an enemy of each other in the final. So the small communist countries were divided in two sides. These communist countries did not need to bring the
theory of the superpower communist countries in order to create communism in their countries.

So, in the communist party problem it is not important that they are in the lines of CPSU or the CPC, but it is important that they have the capabilities in the communism theory or not!

The communist parties in Southeast Asia such as the CPT, the KHMÉR ROUGE, the VN-HENGSAMRIN; the CPB; the CPM; the CPI; and the CPP don't have the capabilities of the theory. For example, the Communists Party of Malaya (Malaysia: CPM) had struggled with the Malaysian Government since the WWII until right now. The CPT in THAILAND had proved that they were defeated in the jungles and on the mountains, and came out to move in the cities and towns which have not the accurate objectives.

Particularly in Southeast Asia, if governments can create the correctional strategy, they will easily defeat the communists, such as the CPT and the Communists who were defeated by the right strategy of the Order Number 66/23 (66/80).

Suppose that in the future if we have to confront with the communists arty of the Soviet-Line that they have a lot of capabilities, . . . What can we do?

The answer, we will defeat them by the Order Number 66/23 (66/80) as the same that we won the CPT of the CHINA-LINE.

THE ROLE OF MILITARY (ROYAL THAI ARMY: RTA) FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY

The role of military and the military status (RTA) is the status of our nation that we have to protect and maintain the national liberty (freedom), religious, and the KING in the regime of democracy that there is the KING being Leader. The role of RTA has the main mission for the liberty (freedom) keeping and national security, and the sub-mission for the country development
which the policies are assigned to support the military security. The main components which to deploy the troops for the national defense are concised as to:-

SECURITY POLICY:

- The national policies are assigned within the Constitution of the Royal Thai Kingdom, 1978, section 56 named that:
  - The state had to provide military forces for maintain the Liberty (freedom), state security and national interests.
  - The military forces should to deploy for combat and/or war in order to protect the KING status, for suppression to the rebelling and riot uprising, the state security and national development.
- National Level: The policies of the National Security Council (NSC) for the National Defense, the military policy that government described to the Senate and the policy of the struggle to defeat CPT belonged to the Order Number 66/2523 (66/1980) of the Prime Minister Office, dated 23 April 1980.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

NSC had recommended for the military objective or national defense:-
- To develop the national defense forces by the basis support of ourself.
- To buildup the national defense forces stronger step by step until enable to confront with the invading or threatening, must be agreed with the national economy by cooperating (sealing) the both military forces, paramilitia troops, voluntary population forces and every unit in order to prevent the danger (vulnerable situation) both internal and external country or the most of all, and aiming to the important of the city insurgency movements or all of entire terrorist patterns.
The Military Policy of the present Government: On 20 May 1983, General PREM TINASULANONDA, the Prime Minister, had described to the Senate about the National Defense Policies altogether 11 categories:

Should be prepared and reinforced the forces (Power/Strength potential) for national defense and "Stand to" (Troops Readiness) in conditions of the Royal Thai Kingdom defensive.

Should be expanded the national defense forces along with the planning and developing until the sufficient quantities and in the combat readiness condition in order to protect the sovereignty and national security.

Should be cooperated all of the national defense forces both the military, para-militia troops and the voluntary population forces, and to support the coordinating between the military defense forces officials and population in order to prevent the danger (vulnerable situation) from outside and inside country.

Should be accelerated about training, both adjusting and developing the doctrines and tactics in order to add up (increase) the efficiency of the national defense forces for confrontation with the danger (vulnerable situation) both inside and outside country.

Should be supported and produced both of equipments and weapons within the country, and to develop about technical and the weapons standard by the basis support of ourself.

Should be prepared the resources by agree with the national economy in order support the whole national strength (forces) to defense the country.

Should be taken soldiers participating in the development and decreasing the national disaster, both all of civic actions and civil affairs.
Should be taken soldiers participating with the other official services to train for the population in cooperating of the national security.

Should be trained and developed the soldiers to know about the occupations for their earnings when they would have retired from the units.

Should be raised up the ethics and morales of soldiers by the welfare-developing in the suitable and good conditions.

Should be insured and helped the veterans and their families in suitable survival earning for the disabled veterans and their families of the soldiers who were killed in actions that should be helped in the extraordinary cases in order that they would have suitable survival for the great sacrificing to their homeland.

The Policy of the Struggle to defeat the Communists: Essence of the Office of the Prime Minister's Order Number 66/2523 (66/1980), dated 23 April 1980, concerning the policy of the struggle to defeat the communists (CPT):

Objective.

To end the communists (CPT) revolutionary war situation quickly.

Policy.

To defeat the Communists (CPT) quickly by launching continuous political offensive.

To eliminate and destroy the united front movements and armed insurgent forces in order to end the Communists revolutionary situation.

To carry out neutral policy in order to stop activities that create national war situation.

To transform an armed struggle into a peaceful time.
Implementation of Policy (Creation).

Accomplish the mission quickly by becoming aggressive politically to make the people realize that this land is theirs—they are to govern and benefit (interest) from it. Political actions are the governing factor, and the military operations must be continued essentially to support and promote the political goal.

Eliminate injustice within the society from the local to the national levels.

Formulate actions to compromise and sacrifice class interests in order to attain the interests of the majority.

Let the people of all classes and occupations getting of the opportunity to govern themselves and to take part in politics. The people's needs must be responded.

Support the establishment of all democratic movements but the attention should be paid to the communist movements in disguise.

Conduct military operations and political actions concurrently against the communists (CPT).

Treated the captured or the defeated communist insurgents as compatriots.

Pay utmost attention to the urban struggle to eliminate the establishment and expansion of the communist united fronts in the cities and to deny the creation of the revolutionary and national war situations.

Conduct intelligence, psychological and public relation actions aggressively in all operational phases.

As the mentions above all, the Policy of the Struggle to defeat the Communists (CPT) along with the Order Number 66/23 (66/80) should be composed of the four main categories:
Democratic Policy
Democratic Developing Policy
War Policy
Neutral Policy

o The Ministry of Defense Level: The Ministry of Defense Policies are assigned for the military objectives as to:

  oo To fight and prevent the threat from the outside of the country.
  oo To protect and suppress the insurgency inside the country.
  oo To cooperate with the allies along with the governmental policy in peacekeeping and security of Southeast Asia.
  oo To protect and take the national interests.
  oo To develop and help the population in building up the national security.

The Armed Forces have two main missions:

  oo Military Mobilization. (To assemble and prepare for war.)
  oo Royal Kingdom Defensive.

In the Royal Kingdom Defensive means that preventing the danger (vulnerable situation) from both outside and inside of the country, meaning of the overt invading from outside, and counterinsurgency, struggle to defeat the communists (CPT), psychological operation and civic action, the KING Status protection, cooperating for the national development and all creations along with agreement (compromising) inside the country.
ENDNOTES

1. Essence of the Office of the Prime Minister's Order Number 66/23 (66/80); 5/24 (5/81); 65/25 (65/82) AND 47/29 (47/86); General Prem Tinasulanonda, Prime Minister and the former Minister of Defense.

2. The effective briefings and speeches of General Chavalit Yong-Chai Yudh, Commanding General of the Royal Thai Army and the former C-of-GS, RTA.

3. The effective briefings and descriptions about the role of military and national security, Colonel Charn Boon Prasert (C-in-C Staff Officer), the office of the Commanding General, RTA.

4. The researches and the experiences of the author.
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