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MILITARY FORCES AND INTELLIGENCE IN THE DRUG WAR

BY

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In August 1986 the President of the United States declared a war on drugs. During the ensuing months Congress passed a comprehensive anti-drug bill and considerable discussion occurred among the senior leadership of the US government concerning what the level and extent of involvement by the US Armed Forces should be. The Army is already involved in the Drug War via Operations HAWKEYE and GROUNDHOG, as well as the recently concluded operation BLAST FURNACE in Bolivia. The other services are also conducting on-going operations, flying reconnaissance missions, lending equipment to drug enforcement agencies and...
Supporting the US Coast Guard in its drug interdiction mission. DOD directives and Army regulations limit the amount and type of support which can be provided as does the Posse Comitatus Act; but they do not preclude selective involvement. The military services have the capability to provide additional support while neither sustaining a degradation of readiness nor requiring the military to become law enforcers in violation of the long-standing Posse Comitatus Act. Intelligence and aviation assets can make a significant contribution to reduce or eliminate the flow of illegal drugs into the US. After all, the role of the military is to deter war; that failing, to fight and win the war. A war has been declared by the Commander in Chief, and the military has the resources and expertise to help this nation win the war.
MILITARY FORCES AND INTELLIGENCE IN THE DRUG WAR

An Individual Essay

by

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23 March 1987
In August 1986 the President of the United States declared a war on drugs. During the ensuing months Congress passed a comprehensive anti-drug bill and considerable discussion occurred among the senior leadership of the US government concerning what the level and extent of involvement by the US Armed Forces should be. The Army is already involved in the Drug War via Operations HAWKEYE and GROUNDHOG, as well as the recently concluded operation BLAST FURNACE in Bolivia. The other services are also conducting on-going operations, flying reconnaissance missions, lending equipment to drug enforcement agencies and supporting the US Coast Guard in its drug interdiction mission. DoD Directives and Army Regulations limit the amount and type of support which can be provided as does the Posse Comitatus Act; but they do not preclude selective involvement. The military services have the capability to provide additional support while neither sustaining a degradation of readiness nor requiring the military to become law enforcers in violation of the long-standing Posse Comitatus Act. Intelligence and aviation assets can make a significant contribution to reduce or eliminate the flow of illegal drugs into the US. After all, the role of the military is to deter war; that failing, to fight and win the war. A war has been declared by the Commander in Chief, and the military has the resources and expertise to help this nation win the war.
Military Forces and Intelligence in the Drug War

The President of the United States recently declared a war on drugs stating on 4 August 1986 that his wife's "crusade to deprive the drug peddlers and suppliers of their customers becomes America's crusade."¹ This war was actually initiated approximately four months earlier when President Reagan signed a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) on Narcotics and National Security. This top secret document assessed the threat resulting from the illegal international narcotics trade and directed specific actions to increase the efforts of the United States to counter the threat posed by illicit narcotics. A major provision of this NSDD was a statement of policy that the United States, in consonance with other interested nations, would attempt to stem the production and movement of illegal drugs, reduce the capability of insurgent and terrorist groups to use drug trafficking to support their activities, and improve the capabilities of individual governments to meet and defeat the threat posed to them by illegal drug operators.² It is significant to note that this
directive recognizes the apparent linkage that exists between some terrorist groups who cooperate closely with drug traffickers and use the income derived from illegal drug activities as a source of funds for their terrorist activities. The National Security Decision Directive also directed an expanded role for US military forces to support the counter-narcotics effort, greater participation by the US intelligence community to support efforts to counter drug trafficking, and an emphasis on the subject of drugs when discussing national security issues with other nations.3

As a result of the promulgation of this directive, military involvement in the drug war is expected to increase, especially in the areas of military surveillance and the use of US intelligence capabilities and assets.4 However, as of this time the extent of military involvement is still uncertain as the Pentagon has yet to make public its plans for military participation, and resources for military involvement have not yet been provided.

The military services have already been involved in countering the posited threat presented by the influx of illegal drugs into the United States, but with illegal drugs being designated as a threat to US national
security interests a legal basis now exists to provide even greater support than in the past. Vice President Bush’s press secretary when commenting on the publication of the NSDD, stated: “in one sense, it makes it a part of their (military’s) mission and officially authorizes some of the work that has been going on in the past, but it should also expand their support for the drug interdiction activities.”

On 11 September 1986 the US House of Representatives, by an overwhelming margin of 392-16, approved a sweeping legislative package concerning the problem of illegal drugs. The measure approved by the House provides funds for local and federal enforcement of existing drug laws, stiffens penalties for drug trafficking, and provides for economic sanctions against drug exporting nations that make no effort to eliminate their drug crops, the prime source of illegal drugs after processing. Numerous amendments were attached to the House bill, but there was one amendment in particular that raised considerable concern, especially to civil libertarians. That amendment, “to halt the unlawful penetration of US borders by aircraft and vessels carrying narcotics,” was one that required the Department of Defense to use necessary military forces that would enable this provision to be accomplished. In their eyes they believe
this amendment would violate the military's traditional role vis-a-vis law enforcement because of prohibitions of the Posse Comitatus Act.6

In a 14 September 1986 television and radio broadcast the President and his wife appealed for a "national crusade against drug abuse." During this nationwide address the President reiterated his intention for the US government to "continue to act aggressively against the narcotics problem."7 The next day he unveiled a package of proposed legislation designed to thwart the serious narcotics problem that exists within the United States. His package, less extensive than that passed by the House of Representatives four days earlier, called for tougher drug penalties and an increase in funds for law enforcement agencies to enable them to better prosecute the war. The President's proposal differed significantly from that passed by the House in that it did not include a call for the use of military forces against drug smugglers. Attorney General Meese's statement that "the notion of the military taking part in law enforcement was totally foreign to the histories and tradition of our country"8 probably reflected the legal concerns of the President.

On 17 October 1986 the US Congress passed an anti-drug bill after eliminating two controversial provisions which had been considered for
inclusion. One of the provisions would have given police powers to the military; and the other was a directive to the Department of Defense requiring it to use US military forces to seal the border to drug smugglers within 45 days of the bill's passage. Secretary of Defense Weinberger characterized this latter provision as being "pretty absurd."9

According to a 15 November 1986 article which appeared in the Army Times, it is highly probable that Congress will initiate legislation during the current session aimed at combating drug smuggling with a renewed push to increase military involvement. Senator Paula Hawkins, (R-Fla), one of the chief authors of the anti-drug bill, stated: "We need to get the military involved in the war on drugs in a big way, and this bill falls short of that goal."10 Generally speaking it appears that the Pentagon is opposed to any significant military involvement in anti-drug smuggling operations claiming that morale and readiness will be adversely affected if service members are required to conduct drug-fighting missions for which they are not trained. The question really is: Will readiness be adversely affected?

This final legislation that passed the House of Representatives on 17 October 1986 precluded military forces from interdicting or intercepting
vessels or aircraft suspected of carrying illegal drugs; however, it did authorize the military to "intercept aircraft and vessels for the purpose of directing them to a landing field or port" as well as authorizing the military to track aircraft in situations involving "hot pursuit" that might continue into the jurisdiction of a US civilian law enforcement agency. The legislation also directed the Pentagon to compile, within 90 days, a comprehensive list of the type of assistance which the military could render to law enforcement agencies to include loans of surveillance and communication equipment, intelligence support, and the utilization of aircraft and naval vessels. Another provision of the Congressional Drug Bill authorized funds both to improve capabilities of drug enforcement activities and to reimburse the Department of Defense for the material it provided to the various drug enforcement agencies. Included in this amount were funds for the Navy to purchase replacement aircraft for the four existing E-2C Hawkeye surveillance planes which were required to be turned over to the US Customs Service and Coast Guard; the acquisition of eight tethered radar-equipped balloons; the purchase of eight Black Hawk helicopters for drug enforcement agencies; an increase in Coast Guard strength by 500 personnel; the improvement of radar equipment and
systems on existing Coast Guard aircraft; and funds for the Civil Air
Patrol to enable them to purchase equipment for drug interdiction
missions.\textsuperscript{12}

Based on the above it seems readily apparent that if the US Congress
has its way the future portends a greater role for the US Armed Forces to
play in the presidentially declared war on drugs. A cursory review of
current Department of Defense Directives and Department of the Army
Regulations indicates some degree of specificity as to the type of support
which US military forces may render to civilian law enforcement agencies
who are the elements charged by law to enforce the laws of the land.

The stated policy of the Department of Defense as outlined in DoD
Directive 5525.5 is "to cooperate with civilian law enforcement officials
to the extent practical... consistent with the needs of national security
and military preparedness, (and) the historic tradition of limiting direct
military involvement in civilian law enforcement activities." \textsuperscript{13} An
example of the type of cooperation which can be rendered to law
enforcement activities includes allowing them to accompany routinely
scheduled training flights as observers for the purpose of collecting law
enforcement information. Another means of cooperation is the authority
for the Armed Forces to provide any information pertaining to illegal drug activities, which is provided to civilian law enforcement officials, to also be provided to the El Paso Intelligence Center.\textsuperscript{14}

The Drug Enforcement Administration, or DEA, operates the El Paso Intelligence Center, or EPIC, and is the agency which spearheads the fight against illegal drug operations. It has an extensive intelligence mission which incorporates the traditional intelligence functions of establishing collection requirements, collecting information, and collating, evaluating and reporting the intelligence. DEA's intelligence program has been quite successful in terms of identifying and structuring major criminal drug trafficking organizations and pulling together the strategic picture for planners and policy makers. However, DEA lacks the extensive resources it needs to help the nation win this war against drugs.

The EPIC is a unique, cooperative effort established to collect, process and disseminate information concerning illicit drug trafficking. It is staffed by personnel from the following supporting agencies: Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS); US Customs Service; US Coast Guard; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); US Marshalls Service; FBI; and the Internal Revenue

8
Service (IRS). As can be noted from the composition of the EPIC there is currently no representation from the uniformed services assisting in this aspect of the Drug War. The two primary functions of the EPIC are to disrupt the flow of illegal drugs at the highest trafficking level through the exchange of time-sensitive information dealing principally with the movement of drugs, and to support, through the intelligence process, other programs of interest to EPIC's participating agencies, such as the illegal entry of aliens and trafficking in weapons. The analysis section of the EPIC consists of air, maritime and general intelligence units. In addition to routine analysis and data base expansion, analysis personnel are available for the planning, support and evaluation of special drug interdiction missions.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel is specifically charged with the responsibilities to coordinate with civilian law enforcement agencies in an effort to determine how the Defense Department can best cooperate; to furnish information to the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System so they can have access to Defense Department resources; and to coordinate with other governmental departments concerning matters involving the interdiction of illegal drugs.
into the United States.\textsuperscript{17}

AR 500-51 encourages elements of the Army to provide any information obtained through the course of normal training and operations to civilian law enforcement agencies especially if the information obtained appears to be in violation of any state or federal law. However, this same regulation specifically precludes the Army from getting involved in any activity which may result in the interdiction of a vessel or aircraft, as well as any activity which may involve a search, seizure or arrest. It is within the parameters of Army guidance for military organizations "to consider the needs of civilian law enforcement officials for information, when the collection of information is an incidental aspect ... performed for a military purpose"\textsuperscript{18} when they plan and conduct their training and operations. But again there are restrictions: operations cannot be planned solely to assist law enforcement agencies; nor may operations be conducted to acquire information on United States' citizens, except for information which may be collected on any United States person who is reasonably believed to be engaged in international narcotics activities.\textsuperscript{19} Regulations also authorize the military to loan equipment and make facilities available to civilian law enforcement personnel for
law enforcement purposes as long as the readiness of the military organization is not adversely affected. Military personnel are further permitted to train law enforcement personnel to whom equipment is loaned on its proper maintenance and operation.

The primary legal restriction which precludes military involvement in civilian law enforcement activities is section 1385, title 18 of the United States Code. The provision, popularly known as the Posse Comitatus Act, states: "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined... or imprisoned... or both." Military personnel are precluded from conducting those activities which are fundamentally under the purview of civilian law enforcement agencies such as: the interdiction of vehicles, vessels or aircraft; search, seizure, arrest, stopping or frisking actions; conducting surveillances; pursuing individuals; or acting as informants, undercover agents, interrogators or investigators.

From this brief review of DoD Directives and Army Regulations it is obvious that, if committed in force, the US Armed Forces do not have carte
blanche to take whatever actions they may believe are necessary to fight the drug war. There are limitations and legal restrictions which the DoD must consider and review before committing any US military forces into the battle.

But even with the restrictions the Department of Defense over the past few years has been providing a significant level of assistance to drug enforcement agencies. One statistic which represents this support is that DoD aircraft flew more than 3000 sorties in support of the drug war during FY 1985 with more than 10,000 flying hours in the air, and this at a time when there was minimal pressure from the Congress and the Administration to involve the US military in the drug war to any significant extent.

The support which DoD provides had its genesis in 1981 when President Reagan signed PL 97-86 which clarified the role of the Defense Department's involvement in the battle against the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. This law added a new chapter to Title 10 of the US Code and includes four sections, 371, 372, 374 and 375, which are of particular importance to the military. These sections authorize the sharing of information collected during routine military operations with
authorize the Secretary of Defense to make facilities and equipment available to law enforcement agencies in addition to personal assistance under certain circumstances; and preclude military personnel from participating directly in drug enforcement arrest and seizure activities.23

The four armed services, along with the Coast Guard and the National Guard, are already providing a significant amount of support to the drug war. Aerial surveillance for the Customs Service is provided by Navy E-2 Hawkeye aircraft in the area of the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, along the Mexican border, and in the contiguous waters off California and Florida. OV-10s from the US Marine Corps are frequently collocated with the Navy aircraft to perform supporting missions.24 Following is a typical scenario using these assets: when the Hawkeye aircraft gains radar contact with a suspected aircraft, i.e., one which might be smuggling illegal drugs into the United States as indicated by its non-conformity to the usual airways or because of its erratic movement, the E-2 will request the launch of an OV-10 to tail the suspected aircraft. The OV-10 interceptor will visually identify, evaluate, and track the suspect by day and will use its forward looking infrared detection system by night. In
coordination with the E-2, the pilot of the OV-10 will contact the US Customs Service and either a fixed-wing interceptor or a UH-60 Blackhawk on loan from the Army will be launched to investigate further or make the arrest when the suspected aircraft lands.25

The Navy also uses its P-3 Orion aircraft to fly long-range surface surveillance tracks throughout the Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean, and coastal Atlantic and Pacific Ocean areas. S-3 Viking anti-submarine aircraft also fly surveillance tracks off California and Mexico as well as the Mexican border adjacent to California, New Mexico and Arizona. Contacts which appear to be of interest are passed to US Coast Guard cutters that are tactically positioned along various regional checkpoints. Coast Guard cutters coordinate with and receive authorization from the Department of State to conduct a search and seizure of any suspected vessels.26

The Navy also assists by complying with the provisions of an agreement with the Coast Guard to tow into port any drug vessels which the Coast Guard seizes. This allows the Coast Guard ships to remain on station longer and continue to be a viable threat to interdict vessels carrying illegal drugs along the major drug traffic water routes.

The Air Force is also heavily involved in DoD's effort against drugs
using their U-2, AWACS, B-52, C-130, and RF-4 aircraft as well as helicopters. Since the fall of 1984 Air Force U-2 planes have conducted high altitude flights over Central America. One of the sensors on board is used to look for airstrips and clearings in the sparsely inhabited jungles of South and Central America; and the other, an infrared sensor, is used to detect heat sources such as the high intensity lights which are used by drug processing labs to dry cocaine paste.\(^{27}\) AWACS aircraft fly aerial surveillance missions similar to the Navy's E-2 aircraft and frequently have Customs Service personnel who man one of the available consoles on board the aircraft functioning as radar operators or air intercept controllers. When an aircraft suspected of carrying drugs is detected, Customs Service interceptor aircraft are launched in an attempt to identify the suspect. Turnover of suspected aircraft can also be made to UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters manned by civilian law enforcement personnel. When the suspected aircraft lands, it is searched, seized and apprehended as appropriate by Customs' agents.\(^{28}\)

The Air Force uses its strategic B-52 bombers while conducting joint training with the Navy in offensive anti-surface warfare operations. This training, flown under the program known as “Busy Observer,” provides
excellent anti-drug surface surveillance as an adjunct to normal military training or operations. B-52 sorties search areas for drug ships which later can be intercepted and seized by Coast Guard cutters.29

C-130 aircraft, flown both by active and reserve Air Force pilots, conduct maritime surveillance. Some missions are targeted against known drug ships. C-130’s will track such ships until they are intercepted by US Coast Guard vessels. Another mission for C-130 aircraft is surface surveillance of known high-density drug-trafficking sealanes. If any suspicious vessels are detected they are reported to the Coast Guard for appropriate detention, search and seizure as warranted.30

Finally, RF-4 Phantom aircraft have flown photomissions at the request of DEA to look for airstrips suspected of being used by drug traffickers.31

The Air Force has also provided on loan to drug enforcement agencies, a variety of equipment, the most important of which have been communication encryption devices loaned to the Customs Service and the Drug Enforcement Administration. By having the requisite ability to encrypt their communications, sophisticated drug smugglers will not be able to learn about the plans, operations, or locations of the enforcement
agencies.

The US Army is currently involved in two training exercises involving students at the US Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and is also a major lender of equipment to federal civilian drug enforcement agencies. Aircraft which the Army has loaned include: eight Blackhawk helicopters, two OV-1D Mohawks equipped with Forward Looking Infrared Radar, four Cobra helicopters, 16 OH-6's, and six C-12's. Both the Active Army and the Army National Guard provide a variety of other support to drug enforcement agencies, including specialized training, loan of night vision devices, and the use of ranges.32

Operation HAWKEYE is a program developed by the Intelligence School, and is designed to present real-world situations to students in a training environment. Students, training as right-seaters in the OV-1D Mohawk observation aircraft, provide collected data to the Border Patrol and Customs Service. Students fly in their aircraft along the Mexican border between Douglas and Nogales using flight tracks which have been slightly modified to have this capability. During these flights target areas along the border are imaged with the camera systems aboard the aircraft. Information is read out, collated by an analysis of the imagery, and
provided to the Customs Service for inclusion in their intelligence database. In FY 1985, 72 HAWKEYE missions were flown, and as of 11 July 1986, 69 HAWKEYE missions had been flown during FY 86. These missions concentrate on those areas of interest as received from the US Border Patrol. Although a training exercise, Operation HAWKEYE offers ancillary benefits to the government's drug interdiction efforts.33

Operation GROUNDHOG was also developed by the Army Intelligence School. It is an End-of-Course-Comprehensive Test designed for students completing the Ground Surveillance Radar Operator's and Ground Sensor Operator's courses to provide them with a real-world, high-stress, training environment. Radar operators use the AN/PPS-5 Ground Surveillance Radar to detect targets crossing the US border from Mexico. Ground Sensor operators deploy and monitor ground sensor devices capable of detecting the movement of personnel, vehicles, and aircraft. As targets are detected, information is passed to the US Border Patrol for their action. In FY 1985, this exercise was conducted 20 times, with 518 targets detected, resulting in 176 apprehensions; in FY 1986 (as of 11 July 86), Operation GROUNDHOG was conducted nine times, with 317 targets detected, resulting in 147 apprehensions.34
These two programs have received an enthusiastic response from the Border Patrol, and field commanders have indicated that the quality of trained soldier has improved significantly as a result of the students' participation in these two programs. In a sense then, involvement of students in these two training programs has contributed to readiness by making them more professional in a real-world training situation.

In addition to the support being rendered by the Armed Forces, several operations have been, or are being conducted, which support the President's effort to control drugs. Probably the one which has received the most publicity has been Operation BLAST FURNACE which began in July 1986. A little background might ably show just how the United States military became involved in this operation. The US had pressured Bolivia for many years to reduce its coca crop, with little or no success. At a meeting of the International Drug Enforcement Conference in April 1986, Bolivia requested DEA support to assist them in reaching isolated areas where drugs were being processed. Under the top secret NSDD mentioned earlier that indicated the illegal international drug trade was a threat to US national security, US military personnel could aid American agencies and foreign governments in planning raids on narcotics traffickers, and
equipping police forces and transporting them to the sites of the raids.

The operation in Bolivia consisted of six Blackhawk helicopters equipped with M-60 machineguns, along with 160 pilots and support personnel, to assist the Bolivian military in conducting raids in north central Bolivia where a large part of the world's cocaine is produced. The helicopters were to be used to transport Bolivian troops to known or suspected drug installations for the purpose of destroying the cocaine-producing plants and burning the coca fields. Officers of the US Drug Enforcement Administration were on board each helicopter. Army personnel were not involved directly in the raids, but were permitted to return fire if shot at. The operation was initially scheduled to last approximately 60 days; however, the operation did not terminate until 15 November 1986 and received mixed reviews for what it actually was able to accomplish. What is significant is that this operation was the first in which US soldiers had assisted a foreign government in its efforts against drug smugglers, and the first time that US troops were involved in an anti-narcotics operation in which gunfire was possible and in which they were given authorization to use their weapons if necessary.

HAT TRICK I and II were operations involving sea and air support to
interagency drug interdiction efforts conducted during each of the past two years along sealanes in the Caribbean. HAT TRICK II, conducted from 1 November 1985 to 28 February 1986, was a major joint national drug interdiction operation intended to attack and disrupt the flow of illegal narcotics from source countries by denying drug smugglers the use of their traditional and alternate sea, land and air routes. The operation involved the nations of Colombia, The Bahamas, Jamaica, Belize and Mexico, all four services of the Department of Defense, law enforcement agencies including the Customs Service, Coast Guard, DEA, FBI and Border Patrol, and state law enforcement agencies along the southern states bordering Mexico. Army involvement consisted of providing personnel as radar and SATCOM operators and two Blackhawk helicopters with crew members and maintenance personnel. The success of this operation can be highlighted by the following statistics: within the first 17 days the operation resulted in the seizure of seven vessels, five aircraft, and 39 land vehicles, 59 individuals arrested; and more than 133 tons of marijuana seized along with in excess of 2 and 1/2 tons of cocaine and hashish. During the entire operation over 400 tons of illegal drugs valued at $27 billion were confiscated and law enforcement officials made over 1300
arrests.\textsuperscript{39}

Operation BAT (for Bahamas and Turks) is a small Air Force operation involving two special operations helicopters flown by US Air Force crews stationed in the Bahamas which is active today. These helicopters are used to rapidly deploy Bahamian drug enforcement teams to interdict drug shipments on any of the islands in the region as the need dictates.

One final measure of support consists of the uniformed services personnel who provide assistance to the six National Narcotics Border Interdiction System regional centers as well as to the NNBIS headquarters in Washington, D.C. NNBIS is responsible for coordinating the activities of federal agencies which have the responsibility for interdiction of sea, air and cross-border drug traffickers. They also monitor suspected smuggling activities originating outside the national borders of the United States but destined for the US, and coordinate the seizure of contraband and arrests of persons involved in illegal drug activities.\textsuperscript{40}

Although somewhat restrictive in nature, neither current Department of Defense Directives nor Army Regulations preclude the use of military forces in the prosecution of the Drug War; nor is the Posse Comitatus Act, since it was revised in 1981, any longer the strict impediment to military
involvement in this war. Until the revision of that Act, assistance by US military forces was essentially limited to training and loaning equipment because military leaders were concerned that Armed Forces personnel would become involved in law enforcement activities, an idea which Caspar Weinberger called "very dangerous and undesirable." 41 Today the services are authorized to disseminate any information obtained during routine operations such as passing on "the path of a 'low, slow plane in an area known for drug traffic." 42

In a very thought-provoking article which appeared in the January 1987 edition of the Armed Forces Journal International, Herb Segal stated: "... expanded military action in the war on drugs could be not only a reaffirmation of our commitment to serve the people, but also a vehicle for the development of mutually supportive political alliances between traditional adversaries in the resource allocation process." 43 He continues with the admonition that the war on drugs demands the efforts of the Army even though it is certainly not "winnable" in the short term. However, the Army should not preclude an increased level of involvement without first thoroughly considering and thinking through the support it could provide. Any involvement, however, would have to be meticulously
planned in consonance with the resources made available, readiness posture of our military forces, and the impact such involvement might have on national security.44

For the US Armed Forces to provide extensive support to a successful prosecution of the drug war requires a commitment to the idea that the nation is at war and the government should marshall whatever forces it requires to win that war in consonance with its overall national security objectives. The military forces of the United States possess capabilities and have resources that can assist the nation in winning this war. And in my opinion, it can be accomplished without significantly degrading readiness. In fact, military involvement might actually contribute to readiness by having selected assets perform real-world missions, the same type of missions they would perform in a low insurgency type of warfare.

I am not advocating that the government use five combat divisions along our southern border with Mexico with soldiers in foxholes facing south, the amount of force structure required to seal the border according to some estimates. I am advocating an increased use of intelligence units and personnel, as well as aviation assets, to augment the civilian law
enforcement agencies who are aggressively prosecuting this war but have neither the resources nor the manpower of the US military due to competing budgetary factors.

High on the list of increased support is to enhance the capabilities of the police, military, and intelligence elements in those countries which are the source of the illegal drugs which flow into the US and erode the entire fabric of our society. Intelligence analysts and counterintelligence experts could function as training teams to the national police and intelligence elements of South and Central American countries to develop their organizational infrastructure and expertise. These assets could assist those countries in developing order of battle type files, identifying individuals involved in the processing of drugs for shipment throughout the world, and analyzing and collating data received from sources throughout the region. Similar analysts, from Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence Units stationed throughout CONUS, could augment intelligence fusion centers such as the El Paso Intelligence Center. This support would add to the available manpower of the DEA and enable them to provide more in-depth and comprehensive coverage of the illegal drug network.

The US military could also conduct more operations involving aviation
assets such as Operation BLAST FURNACE conducted in Bolivia. Recognizing that political ramifications are involved in such operations, the US Department of State could use political pressure to encourage the governments of selected South and Central American countries to request such support. The parameters of these type missions should not be any different than they were in BLAST FURNACE, i.e., US pilots piloting the aircraft, the nation's police or military forces aboard along with a DEA official, and no involvement by the US pilot in an actual law enforcement role. The short term objective should be to destroy illegal drug processing plants, with the long term objective to train the country's law enforcement agencies in the use of the aircraft. Eventually such aircraft could be turned over or sold to the country to enable them to continue these type of operations on their own initiative, possibly supported only by US military personnel who would assist them in maintaining the aircraft.

Military assets could be used to establish an integrated network along the southern border of the US that could pass on sightings of suspected drug aircraft entering US airspace. An effective network of tracking suspected aircraft would enable law enforcement agencies to track
aircraft from the time they enter US airspace until they reach their destination within the US. Aircraft, manned by DEA or Customs personnel, but operated by US military pilots, could be available on call throughout the tracking process to intercept these aircraft when they eventually land to conduct the required law enforcement actions.

Carrying this a step further, upon entering US airspace the suspected aircraft could be pursued continuously by US military aircraft. When one aircraft is close to exhausting its fuel supplies, another could take over the pursuit. This could be done until the plane lands at which time DEA or Customs officials would execute their law enforcement functions. At no time would the pursuing aircraft attempt to "force" the suspected aircraft to land to preclude unnecessary casualties which may result because of such actions.

With the increasing capabilities possessed by our sophisticated surveillance and reconnaissance satellites, the US military should use them more extensively to identify drug processing centers and pinpoint remote airfields that are being used for drug drops. This data could be provided to intelligence integration centers and used to mount "drug-busting" operations within the US or in countries which have a
dedicated interest in eliminating their drug problems.

AWACS aircraft based in Oklahoma are already used in the Gulf of Mexico to identify suspected drug smuggling aircraft. According to information presented to Congressional leaders in a hearing on *The Role of the U.S. Military in Narcotics Control Overseas*, AWACS aircraft are only flown on six occasions per month in areas of interest to the US Customs Service at their request. On an additional 30 occasions each month, when an AWACS plane is flying along the border from Florida to California, one console is used to search for the type of targets which would be of interest to Customs. I personally think this is insufficient coverage if we are serious about waging a war against illegal drugs especially when considering the overwhelming numbers of aircraft which enter US airspace each day. It is currently estimated that approximately 76,000 aircraft cross the southern borders of the United States each day. The first step would be to identify them which continuous coverage by AWACS might enable us to do. It is my serious and strong contention that it is a war we are engaged in and that is potentially the way we would employ our AWACS in wartime. How to accomplish the next step of determining which aircraft should be detained, and how they should be detained, is a subject
for another paper. But if the AWACS aircraft can identify them, then computers in the intelligence integration centers focusing on the drug problem, should be able to determine if they are legitimate flights or potential drug-smuggling aircraft. This latter could be determined by their air speed, extremely low altitude, or erratic flight pattern. When an unidentified aircraft meets one or more of these criteria, the information could be relayed to the Customs Service and this agency could then decide how to react to this “threat.” At a cost of approximately $7,000 per hour to operate one AWACS aircraft, funding has to be a consideration; but I submit that since the nation is at war, it should use whatever assets that are available in its arsenal to turn the tide of battle in our favor.

Over the past few years the amount of operational support and resources provided by the Department of Defense to the illegal drug interdiction effort has increased from approximately $5 million in 1982 to $40 million in FY 86. If you consider the value of materiel that has been loaned to drug enforcement agencies, which includes intelligence and communications equipment and operational and tactical equipment such as aircraft and helicopters, another $100 million worth of support would have to be added. If this materiel is needed in the event of a military
mobilization, and is not readily available, then the readiness of our armed forces might be affected adversely. However, it seems to me that provisions could be agreed upon that any materiel which is loaned could be returned in accordance with contingency plans, alert measures, or previously written agreements. This should only be a stop-gap measure, however, until such time that the equipment could be procured and given to drug enforcement agencies to provide them with their own organic drug-enforcement capabilities.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, Chapman Cox, stated in September 1986 that the DoD will probably increase its level of support to law enforcement agencies in the area of drug enforcement. He cautioned, however, that the level of support will be increased only to the extent that it is requested. "We do not," he said, "expect to be the ones responsible for developing the concept of operations and for pursuing the civilian law enforcement. It will be requested by the other agencies and directed by the president who is our commander in chief. It will also be increased only to the extent that it does not impair our readiness to perform our primary mission, which is defend the U.S. against foreign military forces." 49
There is little doubt that the Department of Defense has been increasing its support to drug enforcement activities, even though it has been reluctant to announce its strategy for continued support. More can, and should, be done, however. It essentially boils down to a realization that a war has been declared, a war thus exists, and to a greater or lesser degree a war is being waged. I believe that whatever funds, equipment, personnel, procedures, and laws needed to fight this war should be made available by the Congress and the Department of Defense. In some respects the drug war is a problem which is crying out vociferously for a solution. It is a war that must be won or there won't be any need to construct a global national defense policy because the internal decay of the US will soon result in its following in the footsteps of other great civilizations of the past, e.g., Greece, Rome, Persia, etc. I recall a former college professor telling my History of World Civilization class 26 years ago that "all power is relative," meaning that all the great nations of the past have ceased to exist after reigning supreme in the world for a period of time. It is my firm belief that if the US fails to marshal its resources and national will to eradicate the cancer caused by the influx of illegal drugs within the United States, then the 200 year history of the United
States will be on its way to becoming a footnote in the history books for future generations, and join those other world powers of the past whose civilization has decayed from within.

END NOTES


3. Ibid.


5. Ibid.


8. Ibid.


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

14. Ibid.


18. Department of the Army, *AR 500-51*, p. 2-1e.


20. *AR 500-51*, p. 3-3.

21. Ibid, p. 3-5.


24. Ibid.


26. Ibid.


29. Tice, p. 15.

30. Smith, p. 2.

32. Smith, p. 3.

33. Tice, p. 15.

34. Ibid.

35. Smith, p. 3.


37. Juan J. Walte, “US Troops Leaving Bolivia,” USA Today, p. 4A.


40. Smith, p. 5.


42. Ibid.


44. Ibid.


47. US Congress, p. 34.


49. Ibid.
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