TAKING THE ULTIMATE RISK: COMMANDING AND CONTROLLING MANEUVER FORCES IN TACTICAL DEEP OPERATIONS

by

Major Robert W. Mixon, Jr.
Armor

School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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This monograph examines the problems of commanding and controlling maneuver forces conducting tactical deep operations, specifically at the corps and division levels. Inasmuch as airland doctrine calls for corps and divisions to fight deep with maneuver elements to influence the course of future engagements, this paper seeks answers to the question of how to command and control them effectively.

The monograph first discusses the probable nature of the future battlefield, where multiple engagements will be fought in depth—a depth of time, space, and resources. The lack of U.S. Army doctrine for command and control of deep battle is addressed, along with the increasing emphasis our potential enemies are placing on disrupting our C2 technology. (continued on other side of form)
Next, the monograph examines six historical examples of tactical deep operations. The command and control processes that were successful, as well as those which were unsuccessful, are discussed in order to ascertain if lessons for future battle are evident.

Finally, this monograph addresses the doctrinal implications that the findings suggest for command and control of tactical deep operations. The paper concludes that an institutional system of command and control should be implemented in the United States Army, in order to be able to fight in depth and win.
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Approved by:

Larry Lizzo
Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence L. Izzo, M.S.

Colonel Richard Hart Sinnreich, M.A.

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Monograph Director
Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Director, Graduate Degree Programs

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ABSTRACT

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PREFACE

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the command and control of maneuver forces conducting deep operations at the tactical level. Within this context, it is necessary to define the parameters of discussion.

"Maneuver forces" are those elements which move to position themselves so that they can defeat the enemy, usually with direct fire. The body of the paper will define how maneuver forces conduct deep operations, in general, as opposed to other types of operations. "The tactical level" indicates that the focus of discussion throughout this paper is on the series of engagements that make up a modern battle. The operational level of war (a series of battles), then, is not the subject of analysis here regarding the command and control of maneuver forces conducting deep operations.

Command and control are defined differently among U.S. Army doctrinal publications. In fact, most publications combine the two words and treat them as one. However, within the scope of the definition in JCS Publication 1: (C^2 is "the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of his mission."). command and control are distinguishable. As in FM100-5, Operations, I will use the following definitions throughout this monograph:

*Command*—the process of evaluating and choosing a course of action and motivating subordinates to follow that course of action.

*Control*—the process of planning, directing, and regulating the subordinates' performance of that course of action.
In order to adopt the AirLand Battle doctrine, the leaders of the Army had to accept the notion that the battlefield was no longer linear. This acceptance meant the Army's leadership had concluded that future battles and engagements would be fought in depth—a depth of time, space, and resources. FM 100-5, *Operations* thereby separated the battlefield into three fights: rear, close, and deep, all of which would have to be fought simultaneously—and won—in order for victory to be ours.

FM 100-5 went on to define the parameters of each of these fights. While the definitions of the rear and close fights are not germane to the subject of this paper, the definition of deep operations is. Deep operations were described as “activities directed against enemy forces not in contact designed to influence the conditions in which future close operations will be conducted.” At the tactical level, where a series of engagements occur to decide the outcome of a battle, deep operations would be fought “to shape the battlefield to assure advantage in subsequent engagements.”

Initially, it seemed that tactical deep operations would only be fought by fires and electronic warfare; however, the 1986 version of *Operations* went beyond those means to state that divisions and above would use *maneuver* forces to fight deep. Now instead of using only indirect fires

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2 Although FM 100-5 *Operations*(1982) mentions the use of maneuver forces in “Deep Battle”, they are mentioned only in passing—reflecting a lack of emphasis on their use:

   Our primary strike assets for deep attack are air and artillery interdiction. Conventional and unconventional forces can also interdict enemy movement in depth....(p. 7-13).
or electronic assets against uncommitted forces to delay their arrival, tactical commanders could strike deep for a number of other missions, such as deception, surveillance, interdiction, and destruction of those forces. Maneuver elements could also be used to seize terrain that the enemy could not afford to lose possession of. Thus, the role of maneuver forces in tactical deep operations had greatly expanded.

Curiously enough, however, the command and control of these tactical deep operations was ignored. Although our doctrine had become much more complex, the command and control system required to execute it had not kept pace. As one writer described the problem, our command and control system had not progressed along with our doctrine:

The notion of command and control presented most often in US Army doctrinal publications will not support winning future battles and campaigns. In fact, the command and control processes described in those publications will preclude success against an operationally effective, numerically superior enemy.

A paradox exists, then, because our new doctrine is based on a command and control system that has yet to be developed. We are planning to fight a number of engagements, perhaps simultaneously, in depth, without a highly developed means of planning and directing the battle! The Army's doctrine states that we may fight tactical deep operations with maneuver forces; however, it does not say how those operations will be accomplished.

This paper seeks to determine the answer to the question: "How does the tactical commander successfully command and control the maneuver

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3 For a detailed discussion of deep operations missions, see FM 100-5 (1986), p. 20.
forces he sends deep?” In order to answer it, a series of analyses must be conducted. First, we will examine the likely command and control environment of the future battlefield. Next, we will look at several historical examples of tactical deep operations, to see what command and control measures have proven to be reliable (or unreliable) in modern combat. Finally, we will consider the doctrinal implications that these findings suggest. Through this process, some solutions may emerge to help the tactical commander send maneuver forces deep with effective command and control.
CHAPTER II: C² OF MANEUVER FORCES ON THE FUTURE BATTLEFIELD

FM 100-5 states that division is usually the lowest tactical level where maneuver forces will be sent deep; therefore, lower commanders will still have to rely on fires and electronic warfare to destroy or delay enemy forces not yet committed to the close fight. Division and corps, then, will be the focus of discussion in this paper, inasmuch as they will fight deep with maneuver forces to influence the course of future engagements.

The size and composition of the forces that the tactical commander sends deep are not specified by doctrine. Much depends on the nature of the battlefield and the capabilities of the enemy. Most likely, though, there will be some combination of air and ground forces in the deep unit task organization. The deep force has to be large enough to defeat heretofore uncommitted enemy forces, or seize and hold a vital piece of terrain so that the close battlefield will be isolated. These requirements place a premium on the overall commanders' sense of balance because he must judge how much risk he can assume in his combat strength and still win the present engagement. Finally, the tactical commander must carefully consider the time required for the deep force to strike and return, or link up with the main body. If he misjudges time, the deep force could succeed but the battle could be lost. Equally disastrous is the situation wherein the superior commander leaves the deep force out too long for the main body to be annihilated, leaving the main body in grave danger of defeat.

Complicating the division and corps commanders' problem of sending maneuver forces to fight deep are the increasing threats and

5 FM 100-5, Operations (1986) states that "Divisional brigades and below tactical do not normally conduct separate deep operations."
dispersal of the battlefield. Chaos can be expected to dominate future battles, as commanders above platoon level will be unable to see their troops or do much to reorient forces once the fight begins. The ever-present element of friction will rise to new heights of importance in this environment, as more things will be more liable to go wrong than ever before.\footnote{I make this assessment based on my historical research as well as the responses of my professional contemporaries when asked about the nature of the future battlefield. It is logical to expect that greater dispersion of soldiers will provide individuals with less supervision and role models as they fight. This fact will enhance the feeling of isolation that has been a dominant part of combat. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Richard Holmes, \textit{Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in Battle}, (New York: The Free Press 1985), pp 204-270.}

The enemies we will face are similarly aware of the probable nature of the future battlefield. They are also aware of our new AirLand Battle doctrine, which exacerbates the problems of chaos and dispersal by requiring that U.S. Army units fight in depths of time, space, and resources.

It seems that the best chance an enemy has to defeat us is to attack and destroy the primary mechanism we have to orchestrate the complex future battle—our command and control system. Indeed, the Soviets have dedicated much of their technological efforts in recent years to the interdiction of our command and control systems. The Soviets realize that to defeat the AirLand Battle operational concept they must attack our command and control systems to prevent our ability to focus combat power on the battlefield. Accordingly, they have moved ahead rapidly in the electronic warfare arena, aggressively using the emerging technology to develop a wide variety of means to attack our command.
and control efforts. 7

Although they tend to lag behind the United States in technology overall, they are concentrating their research and fielding efforts in certain areas, one of which is command and control systems. This emphasis bodes ill for the assured success of our technological means, at least in the foreseeable future.

Our command and control means, for the present and near term, are based primarily on technological assets. These systems are:

1.) FM Radio
2.) Microwave
3.) Radioteletype
4.) HF Radio
5.) Satellite

Ideally, these systems provide the tactical commander with the ability to command and control all of his forces all of the time—thus enabling him to synchronize the rear, close, and deep fights. Realistically, however, they will at best provide the commander with periodic command and control on the future battlefield. Increasing enemy interdiction capabilities and the friction inherent in a larger battlefield will serve to limit technology’s reliability.

Facing intermittent command and control disruption, division and corps commanders will have great difficulty orchestrating several fights. To a degree, the Army realizes this potential problem, having recently

7 MAJ James H. Willbanks, ’AirLand Battle Command and Control Reducing the Need to Communicate Electronically in the Command and Control of Combat Operations at the Tactical Level,’ MMAS Thesis, (Fort Leavenworth U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1984), p 4
adopted a command philosophy emphasizing the need for greater mutual
trust among commanders and more effective communication of the higher
commander's intent in all orders. Commanders are being encouraged to
accept wide latitude in subordinates' execution of orders. Terms like
"mission-type orders" and "Auftragstaktik" have appeared in numerous
publications. New problems, though, have accompanied this new concept.
The leaders of the Army must grapple with the inherent conflict that a
command and control philosophy encouraging wide latitude in execution
conveys versus the need to orchestrate the complex battle carefully.\(^3\)

The solution to this problem of devising an effective command and
control system for the AirLand battlefield has not yet appeared. As Major
Stephen Runals wrote in December of 1985, "Currently there appears to be
no single doctrine for U.S. Army tactical command and control. More
importantly, there appears (to be) no common agreement on what such a
document, if published, should entail."\(^9\)

The implications of this lack of doctrine for the command and control
of deep operations are significant. Clearly, since deep operations will be
the riskiest fights that the division and corps commanders have to conduct,
they cannot afford to have to fight deep without a doctrine for commanding
and controlling the forces out there. Technology, often touted as the

\(^3\) Even the newest edition of FM 100-5 does not specify what our command
and control doctrine should be; however, there are strong indications that
some form of intent oriented system should be effected. See "Tactical
Implications of the Adoption of Auftragstaktik for the Command and Control
of the AirLand Battlefield.\(^5\) by Major John Vermillion, SAMS Monograph, 2
December 1985, pp. 8-9 for further discussion of Auftragstaktik.

\(^9\) Major Stephen E. Runals, "Command and Control: Does Current U.S. Army
Tactical Command and Control Doctrine Meet the Requirement for Today's
High Intensity Battlefield?" SAMS Monograph. Ft. Leavenworth: U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College, 2 December 1985.
answer, promises much more than it can reasonably deliver on a chaotic battlefield where a determined enemy lurks. A vague system of trusting subordinates to do what is best when all else fails is inadequate to the needs of modern combat, and promises disaster for the commander who sends his deep force out under such circumstances.

There are only two answers to this challenging dilemma. One is to discard the doctrine which calls for fighting deep with maneuver forces, going back to linear warfare because it is easier to command and control.\textsuperscript{10} The other is to dig deeper and try to find an effective command and control doctrine for maneuver forces conducting tactical deep operations. The first answer is unacceptable because we cannot afford to fight a numerically superior enemy on his terms -- in a battle of attrition. The second, then, must be pursued.

For solutions, we must look to those who have fought before us. Research indicates that there are several examples of tactical deep operations which have been conducted with varying degrees of success. By examining the command and control measures that existed in those examples, we may find some answers in solving our present problem.

\textsuperscript{10} The term "linear warfare" is used here to describe conditions of battle wherein almost all combat occurs between forces directly facing one another. Thus, there is little or no direct fire engagements occurring in the rear of or beyond the direct fire range of the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT). A major assumption of the AirLand Battle is that such conditions will not be the norm in future combat.
CHAPTER 3: PAST EXAMPLES OF C² IN TACTICAL DEEP OPERATIONS

Modern examples of tactical deep operations provide us with a mixture of lessons on command and control. First, we will examine three successful tactical deep operations for evidence of effective command and control measures. Next, we will examine three unsuccessful operations, looking for the same evidence. In both cases, we will also look for command and control measures that were inappropriate to the conditions of battle, because they are equally valuable in our effort to find ways that may work in the future.

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel gained one of his most spectacular triumphs at the battle of Bir Hacheim - Gazala, fought from 26 May to 13 June 1942. Outnumbered and outgunned, he planned and executed a brilliant scheme of maneuver which was heavily dependent on an effective command and control system for success. Rommel's system relied on the preparation that was done long before the battle, particularly that preparation which made his subordinate commanders virtual shadows of the Field Marshal in their doctrinal thinking. The best description of this remarkable command and control system is intent-command, which I will shorten to INTCOM.

Rommel planned to circumvent the formidable defenses which the British had erected across the North African desert and strike the rear of General Neil M. Ritchie's Eighth Army, particularly the armor reserves. While his supporting attack fixed the main defenses in their prepared positions, he decided to lead the deep force himself, setting out on the night of 26 May with over 10,000 vehicles, travelling in communications silence. Having skirted the British flank by dawn, he attacked the enemy rear and a fierce
battle began. For the better part of two weeks, German and British air, infantry, armor, and artillery conducted a series of engagements that can best be described as chaotic. Often airplanes attacked their own troops, artillery fired on friendly positions, and entire units attacked or withdrew without orders. In this highly disorganized battle, it was the German ability to bring their combat power to bear more effectively than the British could that led to victory.\(^\text{11}\)

Why were the Germans successful? Primarily, the answer lies in the fact that Rommel understood and accepted the fact that desert warfare would be fought in depth, amidst confusion and chaos. He trained his subordinate commanders to succeed in this environment by establishing a superb level of understanding among them as to how he planned to win. Personal example was expected to be the preferred method of leadership, despite the risks that method entailed. Those subordinates who showed the least hesitation to move to the scene of greatest danger and assume control of the fight were immediately relieved. Furthermore, Rommel did most of his commanding face to face, where feedback could and did occur. Most importantly, Rommel displayed an extremely high level of trust in his subordinates, for he knew they shared with him a common view of how battles are won. LTC John Mountcastle, in his article, "On the Move: Command and Control of Armor Units in Combat," described Rommel's system as follows:

\(^{11}\) There are a number of excellent accounts of the Bir Hacheim-Gazala battle, which describe the fierce fighting and confusion that took place. I recommend Major General F.W. Von Mellenthin's Panzer Battles (New York: Ballantine Books, 1956), pp. 120-134; Ronald Lewin's The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps (New Quadrangle Books, 1977), pp. 144-164; and David Irving's The Trail of the Fox (New York: Avon Books, 1977), pp 194-215
The concept (which the author called Auftragstaktik) demanded that subordinate leaders possess an understanding of their leader’s mission, his basic plan for mission accomplishment and the tactics necessary to succeed. In the absence of specific instructions, the well trained unit leader was expected to make on-the-spot assessments and carry out his assigned tasks with energy and imagination. In the Gazala battle, most of the bad things that can happen to a unit befell the Germans. Rommel lost communications with his command post on several occasions; one of his division commanders (General Cruwell) was captured; and Lieutenant Colonel Westphal (the Operations Officer) committed a major part of the reserve without orders. The German commander’s unswerving dedication to the fight, however, demonstrated by his presence at the front, enabled him to turn many of these “disasters” to his advantage. “What earned him the respect, devotion, and loyalty of his troops,” Westphal later wrote, “was his personal courage and his absolute reliability in the conduct of operations.”

In stark contrast to his opponent, Rommel worked to train and develop a staff and subordinate commanders who trusted each other and, more importantly, trusted their leader. As they wargamed future battles while training, these men exchanged ideas. They came to know how each other thought, and Rommel made sure that they knew much of how he thought. After the Bir Hacheim-Gazala battle, Rommel explained his philosophy of command and how it differed significantly from that of the British:

Prejudice against innovation is a typical characteristic of an officer corps which has grown up in a well-tried system. The only military thinking (in the British officer circles) which was acceptable was that which followed their standardised rules. Everything outside the rules was regarded as a gamble; if it succeeded then it was the result of luck and accident. This attitude of mind creates preconceived ideas, the consequences of which are incalculable.

Thus the modern army commander must free himself from routine methods... for he must be in a position continually to adapt his ideas of warfare to the facts and possibilities of the moment. If the circumstances require it, he must be able to turn the whole structure of his thinking inside out.

I think that my adversary, General Ritchie, like so many generals of the old school, had not entirely grasped the consequences which followed from the fully motorised conduct of operations and the open nature of the modern battlefield. In spite of the good detailed preparation of his plans, they were bound to go wrong, for they were, in essence, a compromise.\footnote{Captain B. H. Liddell-Hart,(ed.), The Rommel Papers, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1953), p. 204.}

Rommel's command and control system, then, was based on INTCOM - a common understanding of the commander's intent, mutual trust, and a sincere appreciation for the value of leadership by personal example as the surest way to restore some order to a chaotic battlefield. Rommel's command and control system in Panzerarmee Afrika gave him the capability to fight a tactical deep operation successfully, especially since he attacked an enemy whose ability to react was inferior.

A second tactical deep operation which proved to be successful in World War II was conducted by Combat Command A of the U.S. Army's 4th
Armored Division at the Nancy Bridgehead, 12-18 September 1944. As was the case in Panzerarmee Afrika two years earlier, a superb command and control relationship existed in the force striking deep -- an INTCOM that insured common understanding, mutual trust, and personal leadership.

On 12 September 1944, the 4th Armored Division stood poised on the west bank of the Moselle River in southeastern France, ready to launch the final phase of its exploitation which would complete the destruction of Hitler's Germany. The XII Corps, parent unit of the 4th Armored, had set the attack for the morning of 13 September, not expecting much of a fight. The twelve days they had spent waiting for their logistics to catch up with them, however, had given the Germans time to prepare defenses which would spoil American hopes for an easy victory.

The division's mission was to cross the Moselle on two axes north and south of the city of Nancy to block the German exits east from the city, and be prepared to continue the advance across the Saar River on order. Combat Command A was tasked with conducting the northern penetration. Its attack, if successful, would take the high ground in the vicinity of Arracourt, thus controlling the roads leading east from Nancy.

Receiving the order late on the afternoon of 12 September, the soldiers of CCA had to move quickly in order to meet the requirements of the mission. They had to abandon crossing plans that they were making for another site on the Moselle and make new plans quickly. They would now have to pass through the 80th Infantry Division (which was to attack ahead of CCA and secure a bridgehead), and strike some 40 miles deep to get to Arracourt.

MAP 3

Route of the 4th Armored Division, 13-14 September 1944
Attacking through a fragile bridgehead at 0800 on 13 September, CCA literally drove through the German defenses on the strength of Lieutenant Colonel Creighton Abrams' charging 37th Tank Battalion. Within twenty-four hours, the command had penetrated over 20 miles into the German defenses. By 1900 on 14 September, CCA was at Arracourt, preparing to defend its objective while waiting for link up with CCB, which was coming toward them from the south. Additionally, the forces of CCA began to destroy German forces from the rear on the morning of 15 September, thus completing the destruction of the main enemy forces along the Moselle. By violent action along a narrow front, CCA had struck deep to completely unhinge the German defenses. In the words of one historian, "The machine guns on CCA's rampaging tanks did as much to pry the Germans out of Nancy as did a frontal attack mounted by an entire infantry division and supported by corps artillery."\(^1\)

CCA, as part of the 4th Armored Division, represented a fighting force of unique agility and power -- in no small part due to the command structure that existed. Major General John S. Wood, the division commander, was an aggressive, dynamic leader who sought people like him to be his subordinate commanders. Colonel Bruce C. Clarke, the CCA commander, was just such a man. And, so was the command's premier battalion commander, LTC Abrams. These men had leadership styles like that attributed to Wood by Dr. Christopher Gabel:

Like the legendary German field marshal (Rommel),
Wood's superiors had to restrain him rather than

\(^{15}\) Christopher R. Gabel, The 4th Armored Division in the Encirclement of Nancy, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, April 1986), p.23.
prod him into action.... Wood habitually commanded from the front, as did Rommel, utilizing a light liaison aircraft to personally channel mission-type orders from corps headquarters to his far-flung, fast-moving columns. Wood justified his frequent and prolonged absences from division headquarters by saying, "If you can't see it happen, it's too late to hear about it back in a rear area and meet it with proper force." 16

Although Clarke and Wood could and frequently did communicate by radio to make plans or alter existing ones during this battle, such contacts were minimal. Like his boss, Clarke directed Abrams' battalion and the rest of CCA from a light aircraft as they headed toward Arracourt, scattering enemy armor columns and destroying supplies. The success of operations on 14 September indicates the ease with which CCA struck deep: 400 prisoners taken, 26 armored vehicles, 10 88-mm guns, and 136 other vehicles destroyed at a loss of 33 casualties and two medium tanks. 17

The tremendous flexibility of CCA in this operation was a product of several assets that the unit had, not the least of which was a command and control system which emphasized the judgment of men who understood each other and the nature of the mission at hand. Thus, they could transfer the commander's intent into results on the battlefield, quickly and effectively:

 It had been found early in the campaign that, due to the swift movement of events, it was necessary to establish a division of responsibility and permit a latitude of decision to staff officers and subordinate commanders which at first glance appeared radical. On closer examination, however, the advantages of this system became apparent. It permitted the officer on the spot and with full knowledge of

16 Ibid., p.5.
17 Ibid., p.16.
the situation to make a decision quickly and take action when it was most important and when it would do the most good. This was the teamwork that resulted from training closely together and becoming fully acquainted with each other.  

The presence of INTCOM in CCA was not the only reason that the Arracourt operation succeeded, but it certainly made success more attainable. Colonel Bruce C. Clarke had developed his command and control system for the battle long before CCA ever arrived on the banks of the Moselle River in September of 1944.

Some twenty-three years later, a third successful tactical deep operation took place in the Sinai desert, wherein a command and control system was in place that was much like the ones that Rommel and Clarke had developed. Like Bir Hacheim and Arracourt, victory at Abu Aquilla was not solely the result of the command and control system, however, it was a major factor in the success of the deep operation.

The IDF attacked Egypt on the morning of 5 June 1967 in a preemptive strike designed to cripple Nasser's forces in the Sinai before he could mass them against Israel. In conjunction with a massive air operation against the Egyptian air force, ground forces of the IDF advanced into the Sinai to destroy the Egyptian forces there before the United States and the USSR intervened to stop the fighting.

18 Author Unknown, The Nancy Bridgehead (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 5. Apparently, this document was printed to express the operation for the benefit of those who participated in it. The inside cover that it was prepared "for use in the instruction of training forces," so it may have been printed for training as well. These and the documents like this one on a number of World War II operations are valuable sources.
was all-important to the IDF, as they had to win quickly in order to have any chance of winning at all.

One of the only two major avenues of approach into the Egyptian-held Sinai led to a crossroads called Abu-Agheila, and there the Egyptians had constructed a formidable series of defenses that no frontal assault would be able to penetrate. The scene of bitter fighting in 1956, Abu Agheila was one of those pieces of terrain that could not be ignored by either an attacking or a defending force. Thus, both sides knew that it would once again be the scene of fierce combat in 1967.

Fortunately for the Israelis, the commander of the attacking force was ideally suited to such a challenge—Brigadier General Ariel Sharon. He had been an instructor in the Israeli officer education system between the wars, and he had studied and wargamed attacking the Abu Agheila stronghold at length. From his analysis of the 1956 assault, he had learned that the Israelis had won only because of the combination of a fortuitous advance of an armored column and the Egyptian decision to withdraw rather than lose their defenders. Sharon decided to try a different approach, using a deep operation followed by a combined arms night attack to take the stronghold. Many of the officers who would execute the plan wargamed it with Sharon as students before June of 1967. Additionally, they practiced it using sand tables in the days immediately preceding the operation. Through this mental exercise and dialogue, a common understanding of Sharon's intent grew in his subordinates. INTCOM developed

Commanding a division-sized force of armor, infantry, paratroopers, artillery, and engineers, Sharon developed a complicated plan which depended on an advance by his armor and mechanized infantry, to take
blocking positions beyond the fortress, denying the Egyptians reinforcements or escape. Then, he would launch a coordinated night attack to take the trench lines guarding the crossroads. Finally, an assault on the stronghold from all sides would destroy the enemy tank reserve. The initial deep operation, then, was the key to the outcome of the battle.

Beginning on 5 June and continuing through the night into the next day, Sharon’s plan worked almost to perfection. The armor force in the north, travelling along a trail among the sand dunes (which the Egyptians considered impassable), seized the key reinforcement routes from north and west, while the mechanized infantry blocked the southern route. That night, the Israeli armor crashed into the rear of the Egyptian defenses, while heliborne paratroopers landed amongst the startled defenders. The Egyptians thus faced Israelis in both their front and rear and the outcome was decided. Few if any Egyptians of the 2nd Infantry Division escaped as the IDF scored one of the most decisive tactical victories in its brief history.¹⁹

There are many indications that Sharon’s command and control system was quite mature prior to the battle. As mentioned earlier, he had wargamed the battle with his battalion commanders on numerous occasions, both in the classroom and on sand tables. Second, Sharon was one of several prominent IDF commanders who had served in the 1956 campaign.¹⁹

¹⁹ There are several fairly accurate accounts of this battle. The information provided herein comes from my personal knowledge and research as well as a case study book edited by Dr. L.C. Sims, Combined Arms Actions Since 1939 (Fort Leavenworth, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1975), pp 26-1 to 26-3. I also consulted Shlaim Hermon, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), pp 158-159.
I. I. Sims, (ed.) *Combined Arms Actions Since 1945*.

[Map illustration showing military operations in Israel and Egypt, with labels indicating positions and movements.]
and many of his subordinate commanders had similar experience working together. Although Sharon was notorious for fighting independent of his fellow unit commanders at times, he maintained strict unity of command and effort within his own unit. He believed in leading from the front, and his personal courage was widely known throughout the IDF. Representing a small and culturally close-knit society, there was a bond among soldiers that can only be described as remarkable.

Furthermore, the IDF had a history of improvisation and Sharon's division was no exception. It had to fight with whatever was available; thus, technological assets for command and control (specifically radios and other communication equipment) were antiquated and varied -- if they existed at all. Although the various elements of "TF Sharon" could communicate via radio when the battle began, the commander strictly forbade it, instead using visual signals and time scheduling to coordinate the many facets of the attack. The Egyptians were quite capable of intercepting radio signals, and Sharon realized that their doing so would have compromised the mission.

Sharon thus relied on his version of INTCOM to send his armor and mechanized forces deep, secure in the knowledge that the commanders of those forces knew what he wanted them to do and that they would find a way to get it done. They had worked together for many years, sharing a common view of warfare that was part of their common view of life -- for they knew that failure in any battle could mean the destruction of Israel. Sharon had good reasons for believing he could trust them to succeed or die trying. His extensive preparation insured that everyone shared the same view of how to win the battle. Mutual trust, personal leadership, and
common doctrinal views created the command and control conditions for success at Abu Aghela.

In addition to the deep operations that did work, there are, of course, those that did not. The command and control measures that were utilized in these operations are instructive, though, for obvious reasons. Most important among these reasons is the fact that, in cases where command and control failures were part of the overall reason for defeat, there are lessons on what measures may not work in future battles. Similarly, there may be good examples of command and control that we can learn from, despite the overall outcome.

The defeat of the 6615th Ranger Force (Provisional) at Cisterna, Italy on 30 January 1944 was a tragic example of a tactical deep operation that quickly got out of command or control, both for the Ranger commander (Colonel William O. Darby), as well as the commander of the close fight (Major General L. K. Truscott, commander of the 3rd Infantry Division). Since no one knew what was to be done if things did not go as planned, disaster was the inevitable result.

On 22 January 1944, the 6615th Ranger Force landed at Anzio, becoming attached to the 3rd Infantry Division soon thereafter. As part of the division, the Rangers fought to expand the VI Corps beachhead, which had grown to be seven miles deep and sixteen miles wide by the 24th. German resistance began to stiffen on the 25th, however, and the advance slowed to a crawl. Unless a breakthrough could be made to focus German attention away from their Winter Line, the Anzio landing would not be considered successful. Therefore VI Corps was ordered to conduct a major attack to break through the German defenses surrounding the Anzio beachhead.
3rd Infantry Division was to be the spearhead of the secondary attack, with the mission of seizing the town of Cisterna.

Major General Truscott issued his order on 28 January. The Ranger Force received the mission of moving ahead of the rest of the division to seize the town of Cisterna and hold it until a link up was made. Colonel Darby felt his three battalions could accomplish the mission, and he developed a simple plan for his operation. The 1st, 3rd, and 4th battalions would attack in column in order to seize the town quickly and effect link up with units which would be arriving on the left and right (the 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments). If the 1st Battalion got into trouble leading the advance, the 3rd would move up to assist it. The 4th Battalion would be a ready reserve, to be used if needed. Attacking at night, Darby felt that this plan had a good chance of success. He was to be proven wrong.

From the outset, command and control problems plagued the Rangers. Several radio operators got lost, key commanders were killed, and units became separated in the darkness and confusion. Reaching the outskirts of Cisterna, 1st and 3rd Battalions were quickly surrounded by elements of the Hermann Goering Armored Division and the 2 Parachute Lehr Battalion. Unknown to the G2 of the 3rd Infantry Division, the Germans were assembling a counterattack force in Cisterna when the division launched its attack. The 4th Ranger Battalion was unable to breach the enemy defenses and assist their beleaguered comrades, and the 1st and 3rd Battalions were
annihilated. Of the 767 men who made it to the objective, only six returned. It was the worst defeat in the history of the Rangers.  

Darby, located with the 4th Battalion, could only sit helplessly as the main part of his force was destroyed. The infantry regiments which were designated to link up with the Rangers failed to make any progress, leaving the embattled Ranger battalions isolated. Darby's headquarters and the 4th Battalion were surrounded during the battle as well, finally being rescued by an attacking regimental combat team on 31 January. Although later reports would place the blame for the defeat on poor intelligence, General William H. Baumer, who interviewed Darby in 1945, wrote that "Darby blamed himself for the disaster at Cisterna, believing that the outcome of the operation would have been different had he been with the forward battalions."  

Attrition had hurt the fighting capability of the Rangers, too.

20 For an excellent summary of the Cisterna operation, see Dr. Michael J. King's Leavenworth Paper, Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War II, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, June 1985), pp 29-41. It is also referred to briefly in Martin Blumenson's Salerno to Cassino (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1969), pp 388-392.

21 In his book, Command Missions: A Personal Story, (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1954), Truscott describes how Darby was able to monitor the progress of the two Ranger Battalions:

Colonel Darby was in radio communication with the sergeant major of the 1st Ranger Battalion -- he had been sergeant major when we had organized the Rangers back in Northern Ireland -- and through him was directing artillery fire to support the beleaguered battalions. (page 314)

Truscott implies, then, that Darby could have given orders to the battalions in trouble--perhaps in time to save them. Neither he nor Darby, however, state that any orders were given.

22 General William H. Baumer and Brigadier General William O. Darby, Darby's Rangers: We Led the Way, (San Francisco: Presidio Press, 1980), p 172. Darby was killed two days before the end of the war, inspecting troop positions in Italy.
as they had lost valuable men in the battles prior to Cisterna. The loss of several key leaders in these battles was particularly damaging. The command and control difficulties that the Rangers experienced were not the sole cause of the defeat at Cisterna, but they certainly contributed to it.23

General Truscott, in his memoirs, accepted full responsibility for the disaster, saying that he and Darby had agreed on the employment of the Rangers to lead the attack. Darby's failure to command from the front, however, obviously hurt the Rangers' ability to deal with a deteriorating situation. The misuse of the Rangers in conventional operations at Anzio reflected a lack of understanding among all of the senior commanders involved as to the capabilities of the unit. Thus, while mutual trust may have been present, common understanding and personal leadership at all levels were not. Thus, the conditions for INTCOM were not met.

In early 1945, another unsuccessful tactical deep operation occurred in the unit that had been brilliantly successful earlier, the 4th Armored Division. This time, however, the deep force was defeated because, in part, INTCOM was ignored. In the Hammelburg Raid, Lieutenant General George S. Patton, the Third Army commander, ordered a deep operation without

23 For a discussion of the training weaknesses and replacement problems that the 6615th had, see King, pp. 30-32. King states that the Rangers were continually used for conventional operations -- which they were not trained or equipped for -- and this problem aggravated their losses. Certainly, it hindered their ability to work with conventional forces as they were trained to do.
knowing the condition of the unit he was sending forward. He ignored the objections of the intermediate commanders, and thus sacrificed the lives of many good men needlessly. His reason for ordering the raid was to rescue his son-in-law, who was being held as a prisoner of war near the town of Hammelburg, Germany.

Having crossed the Main River on 25 March 1945, Patton knew he was within eighty miles of Oflag XIIIIB where Lieutenant Colonel John Waters, his daughter’s husband, had been held since early 1943. Although his troops were exhausted from hard fighting, he decided that the time was right to rescue his son-in-law, perhaps before the Germans began executing prisoners. He felt that his best qualified unit for this operation was the 4th Armored Division; and, in particular, that the best Combat Command in the division was the one commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Creighton Abrams. Despite Abram’s objections, however, Patton refused to allow Abrams to take Combat Command B out on the mission. He wanted a small unit, one

24 Although it may be debatable whether or not the Hammelburg Raid fulfilled all of the modern requirements for a deep operation, Patton later justified the mission by saying that it was intended to confuse the Germans as to the 3rd Army’s next attack. In that context, Hammelburg was a tactical deep operation. See GEN George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), p. 275.

25 The book written by Abe Baum and two others, Raid! The Untold Story of Patton’s Secret Mission (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1981) states that Patton ordered that the size of the force would be 300 men (page 20). This statement directly contradicts that made by General Patton in his book War As I Knew It, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), page 275:

I intended to send one combat command command of the 4th Armored (on the Hammelburg mission), but, unfortunately, was talked out of it by Eddy and Hoge, commanding the 4th Armored Division, so I compromised by sending one armored company and one company of armored infantry
which could strike deep and return with the prisoners from Oflag XIIIB before the Germans could react effectively. Restricting the size of the force to 300 men, Patton finally accepted Abram’s recommendation to allow Captain Abe Baum to command the task force.

Composed of tanks, personnel carriers, artillery, and a reconnaissance platoon, Baum’s force was given the mission of going over sixty miles behind German lines to rescue the prisoners at Hammelburg. Baum was told that he could expect little, if any, help. In a daring advance that began on 26 March, Baum and most of his task force reached the POW camp, liberating many of the 300 officers inside (including Waters). The Germans reacted in force, however, destroying the task force before it could return to friendly lines. By the 12th of April, the 4th Armored Division listed all 53 vehicles and 293 out of 294 men in TF Baum as missing in action. The vehicles were indeed destroyed or captured; however, all but twenty-five men survived, either in POW camps or by hiding out in the countryside. Sadly, a significant number of prisoners at Oflag XIIIB perished as well. Colonel Waters survived, and he was later awarded the Silver Star from General Patton while recovering in an American field hospital.²⁶

Very little control was practiced by the 4th Armored Division or Combat Command B over Task Force Baum during the Hammelburg operation. There was little command, either. Patton sent his aide, Major Alexander

²⁶ This summary of events comes from the only major source available on the Hammelburg Raid, written by Richard Baron, Major Abe Baum, and Richard Goldhurst, *Raid! The Untold Story of Patton’s Secret Mission*, (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1981). A brief overview is provided on pp 270-271 of the results of the operation, but the entire book is filled with first person accounts that are remarkable, (if regrettable, in that the task force was destroyed).
The Route to Hammelburg
Stiller, along on the operation, but he did not command any part of the force. He reported on the outcome to General Patton after he escaped capture, and Patton wrote later that Stiller tried to prevent the task force from taking a particular route back and stopping to refuel (when they were overrun and captured). Without a concise plan, common understanding of the mission did not exist throughout the chain of command. Unsure of how Patton wanted him to accomplish his mission, Baum did the best he could. Since the intermediate commanders had tried to convince Patton that this mission was inappropriate for the time and the size force being sent, there was obviously no shared understanding of how the battle could be won. The potential for another success like Arracourt certainly existed in the command and control system of the 4th Armored Division. The 3rd Army commander, however, chose to ignore it.

A very different system of command and control existed in Merrill’s Marauders in Burma, but the deep operation at Myitkyina in May of 1944 failed nonetheless. Colonel Charles N. Hunter, acting commander of the Marauders (known officially as the 5307th Composite Unit), did not know his commander’s intent. If he had, he probably would not have accepted the mission. No spirit of INTCOM ever existed in General Joseph Stilwell’s Burma command.

The 5307th Composite Unit was a unit of American infantry specially trained for jungle warfare. Originally part of British General Orde Wingate’s famous Chindits, the unit was transferred to Stilwell’s Burma command in early 1944. Largely through Colonel Hunter’s untiring efforts, the 5307th had been trained into a crack outfit; however, their survival in the arduous

27 Patton, p. 281
jungle and mountain terrain of northern Burma was limited. Wingate had promised the unit no more than 90 days of combat at any one stretch before pulling them out to be reconstituted. Stilwell failed to keep that agreement. To make matters worse, General Stilwell appointed Brigadier General Frank Merrill commander of the 5307th, or Galahad Force (which was their code name) -- a move which was highly unpopular with the men. Merrill's "contribution" to the demise of Galahad was that he readily accepted the series of deep operations that would culminate with Myitkyina. Suffering two heart attacks in the spring of 1944, Merrill would not be with his unit during most of their operations, therefore he would be unaware of their steady decline in fighting ability. The burden of leadership then rested squarely on the shoulders of the second-in-command, Colonel Charles Hunter. He proved to be an able commander -- not a miracle worker. Unfortunately, the 5307th would need the latter in order to succeed at Myitkyina.26

As part of the major Allied drive to retake Burma from the Japanese in 1944, the 5307th had struck deep successfully twice by the first week seizing Walawbum and Shaduzup in succession. The first operation was a brilliant maneuver, wherein the three battalions moved around the enemy positions and captured the town before the enemy realized that they were off. Thus forced to fight in two directions, the Japanese 15th Infantry Division was badly mauled. Shaduzup had also been a brilliant maneuver, but cost had been extremely high. Galahad had endured a

26 An excellent overview of the poor command relationships within the Burma forces under Stilwell's command is Major Scott M. Pipkin's article, "Common Man, Uncommon Leadership: Colonel Charles Merrill and Galahad in Burma," in Parameters (Volume XVI No. 2 Spring 1986) pp. 55-57.
Nhump Ga awaiting link up with the main body of Stilwell's forces, and they had taken high casualties. As disease compounded the weakening condition of the 5307th, Hunter pleaded for time to reconstitute his weary battalions, having been in combat for almost three months. Stilwell ignored the request and instead proposed an even deeper operation for Galahad to begin on 1 May, to seize the important airfield at Myitkyina and destroy the Japanese garrison there. From his hospital bed, Merrill readily agreed.

For seventeen days, Galahad struggled over 6000 foot mountain peaks in some of the world's thickest jungle to reach their objective. Hunter later described the ordeal:

the hike over the Kumon Range was slow, tedious, and brutal in its demands on men and animals alike. Leeches, muddy trails, wet clothing, continuously going up and up with no place to rest even at the ten minute breaks—all this was endured because it was the beginning of the end. With this mission under our belts even Stilwell would be incapable or dreaming up more misery with which to try our weary bodies and bear our already scarred souls. 29

To compensate for the terrific casualties that Galahad had suffered at Nhump Ga, Stilwell attached several hundred Chinese troops to the 5707th (most of whom did not speak English and had never worked with American troops before). To Stilwell, numbers of men seemed to be the only indicator of combat readiness. What he either neglected or ignored were the leadership and fitness deficiencies in Galahad that existed after two deep operations in horrible conditions. 2nd Battalion of the 5307th Composite had gone from over 450 men to killed, wounded, and sick. Even the U.S...
Army's official account of the campaign states that, "After Nhpum Ga, the troops (of the 5307th) were physically worn out...nearly all the men had suffered to some extent from dysentery and fevers."³⁰

Galahad somehow reached the objective on 17 May 1944. Desperately weak, they managed to take the airfield, but they soon came under attack from the Japanese, who rapidly recovered from their initial surprise. Hunter begged for reinforcements, but all he got were antiaircraft units and airfield construction troops. Facing a strong Japanese garrison in the town astride the airfield, Hunter was forced to fight for every foot of ground. The 5307th literally fought itself to death, ceasing to exist as a unit by August. By failing to link up in strength, Stilwell had to fight for three months to secure the Myitkyina objective, and he destroyed Galahad.³¹

Apparently, Stilwell considered surprising the Japanese and perhaps seizing the only all-weather airfield in western Burma worth the destruction of his deep force. He failed to tell either Merrill or Hunter this fact, and he certainly failed to reinforce the Galahad force when they could have taken the objective quickly -- even when the British offered him troops to do it with!³² The General himself was unsure of what he was doing, it seems, from his diary entry of May 1, 1944:

Rain. (Depression days, commander’s worries: I start them off for Myitkyina, it rains. The resistance grows here. Why didn’t I use them on our front? Is the gap too big? Will they meet a reinforced garrison? Does it mean we’ll fail on

³⁰ United States War Department, Merrill’s Marauders (February - May 1944), (Washington: Military Intelligence Division: 1945), p.94
³¹ McMichael, p. 53. By the end of May 1944, the 2nd Battalion -- already depleted badly before the operation-- had only 12 men left.
³² Ibid.
both sides, instead of only one? Can I get them out?

...The die is cast, and it's sink or swim. But the nervous wear and tear is terrible. Pity the poor commanding officer). 33

Perhaps some indication as to why Stilwell was willing to sacrifice the only American maneuver unit he had in Burma can be found in a comment made by the editor of The Stilwell Papers, Theodore H. White, when he explained the need for taking Myitkyina, "But the capture of Myitkyina would seal his (Stilwell's) winter long campaign with a victory that would not be belittled anywhere in the world...." 34

Thus, the command and control in Stilwell's command at Myitkyina in May of 1944 was the antithesis of INTCOM. No mutual trust existed, except within the 5307th -- which accomplished extraordinary feats under the most trying circumstances. Merrill was an ineffective commander who did little good for his unit because he could not be with it, yet he refused to use common sense and give up the command to Hunter. Hunter was an exceptional leader, but his sense of duty prevented him from pushing Stilwell or Merrill very hard to change the mission. Most importantly, Stilwell sent Galahad on a mission that could only succeed with massive support, and he failed to tell Hunter that the necessary support would never come. Thus, Stilwell had a different understanding of success than Hunter did, because he was willing to destroy Galahad in order to take the objective and hold it. Merrill also failed to establish any mutual trust between himself and Hunter, avoiding the latter's questions about the link up...the

34 Ibid., p 287
airfield. As Hunter wrote, Merrill "did not want to 'level' with me."35

In these historical examples of tactical deep operations, INTCOM has certainly been present in the ones which succeeded. Similarly, it has been lacking in those which failed -- at least to the extent that it did not extend throughout the chain of command from the main force commander down to the key leaders in the deep force. Furthermore, control of the deep forces was difficult at best, either because the enemy could intercept or interdict communications or because the close fight commander was unable to direct or regulate the deep operation once underway. In the successful cases, a close relationship existed among the commanders, and everyone seemed to know his particular role in the overall battle plan. Trust and confidence were shared throughout the chain of command. Personal leadership and example were the norm, rather than the exception. Unlike the operations which failed, the plan was carefully thought out and shared among the successful commanders. This is not to say that the unsuccessful operations failed because INTCOM was missing, rather, it suggests that the command and control systems in these operations were flawed.

What do these historical examples suggest for the command and control of future tactical deep operations? Along with the probable nature of the future battlefield that was presented in Chapter One, we will use this historical evidence to consider the doctrinal implications for command and control of tactical deep operations in the next chapter.

35 Hunter, p. 105
CHAPTER 4 A MISSION TOO DIFFICULT TO COMMAND AND CONTROL?

The realm of tactics -- that is, the realm of engagements -- has steadily grown larger. It is perhaps no more than a natural evolution of combat that battles are no longer fought wherein the two (or more) antagonists simply square off on opposite sides of a battlefield and come crashing together. Our AirLand Battle doctrine, then, is no more than a tacit acceptance of that fact. Further, though, than the mere acceptance of reality is the notion that AirLand Battle puts the initiative on our side. However, the enemy is not going to give it to us freely, and there will most likely be a lot more of “them” than there will be of “us” on the next battlefield.

Our doctrine is that we must fight several engagements in depth if we are to seize the initiative and defeat a larger foe. Three fights -- close, rear, and deep -- will have to be won. All three promise to be difficult to command and control, for one reason because the battlefield has become far bigger than it was in the past. There are others: increasing lethality of weapons, greater mobility, more complex political considerations (particularly in Europe where we have a strange military mission to “Restore the IGB”), and the ever-present spectre of nuclear war which would devastate a concentrated force.

All of these stark realities are magnified within the realm of tactical deep operations. As we have seen, prior efforts to fight deep have been risky at best. Even the most meticulously planned battles, such as Sharon’s fight at Abu Aghila, were fraught with danger of failure. Those which were planned haphazardly, such as the Hammelburg Raid, ended in disaster.
of the major reasons that examples of tactical deep operations are not easy to find is because most commanders have deliberately avoided such bold exploits, fearing the worst.

The luxury of choice, though, is no longer with us. And, in order to command and control the forces we send deep, the U.S. Army is going to have to make some difficult decisions. The most important among these decisions will be the one to institutionalize INTCOM. Although the effort has already begun, it must be greatly accelerated and intensified.

Clearly, successful command and control systems for sending maneuver forces deep will have to be based on a complete understanding of the commander's intent throughout the chain of command. The successful examples we have seen had this characteristic. Colonel James H. Leach, who was a company commander in LTC Abrams' famous 37th Tank Battalion (and later Combat Command B), stated that the chain of command was "an extremely courageous command from top to bottom." Similarly, Colonel Abrams told his commander, Colonel Bruce C. Clarke, "The only way home is east," when Clarke asked him what he thought about forcing his way through the German defenses along the Moselle River north of Nancy. The leaders of the 4th Armored Division, from top to bottom, understood how their commander viewed battle.

Conversely, Stilwell's Burma command was torn by dissension and mistrust -- destroying the conditions whereby INTCOM could have taken root and grown. Stilwell was suspicious of both his superiors and subordinates, and he was willing to send Galahad deep to Myitkyina only.

 Colonel Leach made this statement during an interview he granted to an officer at Fort Sill, Oklahoma in August, 1976.

Ibid.
because he felt it was expendable; or, at least worth losing in order to gain a victory that people in Washington would notice.38

Martin Van Creveld, in his penetrating analysis of our command and control system, Command, concludes that we must learn to accept more uncertainty, and therefore trust our subordinates more to fight successfully without strict control. Nowhere is this need greater than in deep operations, because the overall commander will only rarely have the opportunity to be a Rommel and lead the deep force himself. As one officer recently wrote, "It is this inability to accept and deal with uncertainty that prohibits the U.S. Army from truly adopting mission-oriented command and control."39

Our technological efforts, however, continue to orient on finding a way to achieve certainty, enabling the commander to control all aspects of battle. Despite all of the technological wizardry we have promised ourselves for the future battle, none is foolproof or invulnerable. We can ill-afford to place our doctrine for command and control of tactical deep operations in the lap of MCS (the Maneuver Control System), AFATDS (the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System), or any other technological asset. One analyst wrote in August of 1985 that the Soviets have made a major effort to explore ways of defeating our command and control.

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38 Throughout The Stilwell Papers, the author makes derogatory remarks about Lord Mountbatten, the theater commander. Theodore White noted that Myitkyina offered Stilwell a victory "no one would belittle." Apparently then, Stilwell wanted recognition in Washington. He finally succeeded, but it only resulted in his being relieved of command in late 1944.

39 Willbanks, p 129
technology for deep operations, saying that it is considered to be "one of the most urgent tasks facing the Soviet Union" by Marshal N.V. Ogarkov.40

Much more command than control will dictate the course of future tactical deep operations. The only way to solve the doctrinal dilemma of sending a force deep without being able to control it is to ensure that the deep commander has a rock-solid understanding of the battle commander's intent, and that this understanding will not die if one of the commanders does. The INTCOM method of command and control, where leaders are taught by their commander how to think, rather than what to think, offers a solution. Mutual trust, built on working together and shielding subordinates from paying for every mistake, is very much a part of this concept. Personal leadership at the decisive point is the third cornerstone. INTCOM is established long before the fighting starts.

Thus, the implications of commanding and controlling maneuver forces in tactical deep operations extend far beyond this particular doctrinal issue. This study suggests that we must redefine our notion of risk if we are going to fight engagements against uncommitted enemy forces in order to isolate the battlefield and influence the course of future engagements. That does not mean that there does not still exist a realm of danger known as the gamble; rather, it means that we must expand our concept of risk to go farther than it ever has before. Accepting uncertainty in the command and control of deep operations is a major step toward expanding our concept of risk.

Building the camaraderie that will make INTCOM a reality in the Army will not be easy. The trust extended by commanders to subordinates will take time; thus, commanders will have to stay in command longer than one year or eighteen months. Doctrinal instruction will have to become part of daily life for officers, which will mean that Non-Commissioned Officers will have to do more of what they are supposed to do than ever before—train soldiers. Less control and more command must be practiced; therefore it must become a part of the way we do business.

The application of this way of thinking will carry major responsibilities with it: inefficiency will have to be ruthlessly weeded out, especially among senior officers who must be more role models than ever before; training will have to take on a sense of urgency and importance that has only begun to surface at places such as the National Training Center; officers will have to perform less routine supervision of daily soldier life so that they can spend time learning how to fight as one mind. These reforms are not costly in terms of funds; rather, they are costly in terms of traditions. Old ways die hard, and the traditions of officers practicing over-control of the battlefield and ignoring their doctrinal growth will not end without a struggle.

Despite the obstacles, INTCOM is attainable. Future requirements for careful orchestration of the battle and historical examples of what works, (and what does not), demand that a directed effort be made from the top down to go beyond cursory treatment of vague terms like "Auftragstaktik" and "mission-oriented command and control." The evidence suggests that the United States Army needs an institutionalized system of command and control that teaches leaders to seek common understanding.
demand mutual trust, and lead by personal example. INTCOM assumes that future battles can be successfully commanded -- it does not assume that they can always be controlled.

Since war usually comes before an army is ready for it (especially ours), we should begin our reforms immediately. Deep operations are the ultimate risk in future battle-- but all of the other forms of battle will be difficult at best, even if we achieve the common understanding we need. Developing an effective command and control system is but one part of a series of difficult missions that must be accomplished before we enter tomorrow's battlefield.
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