Asking Questions:
Will Army Tactical Interrogation Be Ready For War?

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1 December 1986

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**Asking Questions: Will Army Tactical Interrogation Be Ready For War?**

**MAJ Mark S. Partridge, USA**

**This monograph addresses a perceived imbalance in US Army tactical force structure between technical means of intelligence collection and non-technical means, specifically interrogators. It proposes to provide a judgement on whether or not, in light of historical experience, current tables of organization and equipment (T&Es) provide an adequate interrogation capability. The monograph first examines the historical importance of interrogator derived information (IDI) and concludes that it has historically been the most prolific source of intelligence at least through the Vietnam War. The monograph next discusses IDI's likely usefulness on battlefields of the near to mid term future (5 to 10 years). It concludes that IDI will in all probability be important on almost all foreseeable battlefields of the future and that its importance will vary indirectly with the intensity of conflict. Thirdly, the monograph compares and contrasts Twentieth Century US Army requirements and authorizations for interrogators with the Army of Excellence (AOE) tables currently being**

**20 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT**

- UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED
- SAME AS RPT
- DTC USERS

**21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION**

- UNCLASSIFIED

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introduced. AOE tables for division and below are found to meet likely minimum requirements, while authorizations above division level, especially outside Europe, are judged inadequate. Finally, the monograph concludes that while there are encouraging trends in resourcing, it is ultimately the careful and intelligent use of the assets by commanders and staffs which will determine whether or not Army interrogators are ready for war.
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Accepted This 20th day of December 1986.
ASKING QUESTIONS: WILL ARMY TACTICAL INTERROGATION BE READY FOR WAR? by Mark S. Partridge, USA, 54 pages.

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SECTION I Introduction

A relatively constant characteristic of major armies of the twentieth century has been the trend toward combined arms. There are numerous reasons for this, but probably the most important is that the effective combination of arms allows an army to take advantage of strengths while compensating for weaknesses of individual arms. While some military thinkers have hailed a new arm as having replaced an older one — as for example, JFC Fuller and the tank or Douhet and the airplane — events have shown that the various arms, new or modernized, are most effective when used together.

A parallel and similar "combined arms" trend is to be seen in Military Intelligence in the US Army. Instead of arms, there are the three intelligence disciplines of human intelligence (HUMINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT). The latter two are late Nineteenth and Twentieth Century phenomena, while HUMINT is as old as organized conflict. These disciplines have been either combined or used separately to varying degrees over the last eighty-six years, but the general tendency, especially since 1945, has been toward effective combination. Combination of the disciplines, as with the combat arms, allows the Army to take advantage of the strengths and protect against the weaknesses of each. IMINT, for example, is generally useless without clear line of sight; SIGINT is hampered or defeated by encryption; and both are susceptible to deception, but of different kinds. HUMINT, in this case interrogation, is also vulnerable. Stories may be "planted;" prisoners may provide
bogus information out of fear of abuse, out of ignorance, or from misinformation; or a prisoner of value may be able to hide that value for a considerable period of time. Document exploitation is similarly vulnerable to planted or outdated information. Today in the Army there is almost universal agreement on the desirability of combined or "all-source" intelligence. Debate continues only on how to do it to achieve the most effective combination of accuracy, timeliness, and security.

In spite of this agreement on the desirability of all-source intelligence, it seems that Army tactical intelligence is heavily weighted toward SIGINT. For example, in the Army of Excellence (AOE) table of organization and equipment (TO&E) for an MI battalion in support of a heavy division, of the approximately 218 personnel who have intelligence collection military occupation specialties (MOS's), only 17, just under 8%, hold HUMINT MOS's; while 162, or just over 74%, hold SIGINT MOS's. The objection could be made that these figures show only the dedicated Military Intelligence collectors in the division and do not reflect the fact that in reporting on enemy action, virtually anyone in the division may become a HUMINT collector, while the likelihood of non-MI personnel acting as SIGINT collectors is very low indeed. Like nearly all statistics, those arrived at by merely examining the inner structure of the AOE MI battalion may be manipulated and explained ad nauseum and still never answer the basic question: "Is there enough?" It is the interrogator portion of this question that this paper will address to provide a tentative answer for the near to midrange future.

Section II of this paper will examine the historical
importance of interrogator derived information (hereafter, IDI), concentrating generally but not exclusively on the twentieth century U.S. Army experience. Section III will conceptually examine future battlefields and project the likely import of IDI to the U.S. Army on each. Section IV will compare and contrast historical experience with projected force structure and the conceptual outlook from Section III. Finally, Section V will present conclusions derived from the previous sections on force structure, general language mix, and doctrinal employment of interrogators.

Before embarking on an examination of the importance of IDI in history, however, it would be well to define clearly the subject at hand. In the active Army today, Military Intelligence tactical HUMINT linguists come in only two basic varieties--interrogators and language qualified counterintelligence agents. While the latter are a valuable resource, it is with the former that this paper will concern itself. In addition to interrogators, there have historically existed, and there continue to exist today (almost exclusively in the Army National Guard), MI linguists in the categories of interpreter and translator. To differentiate: interrogators need the most extensive military education, must have a high degree of fluency; should be educated in the culture and history of the state or nation from which the prisoner or detainee comes, must be schooled in interrogation techniques, and must have a good knowledge of the current tactical situation and enemy order of battle and equipment. An interpreter needs basically the same training as as interrogator less the training in interrogation
techniques and psychology. His language and cultural training will often relate to friendly or neutral countries. In contrast, a translator must have only language proficiency sufficient to translate documents. The level of training indicates what is expected from each type of linguist. As the most trained in asking questions, the interrogator is the command's most valuable resource for eliciting useful information from individuals whether friendly or hostile. He potentially combines most effectively the knowledge of what is needed and how to get it. While the interrogator is expected to operate mainly in the language of the enemy, the interpreter is expected to mainly use allied, friendly, or neutral languages as he provides linguist skills to the commander who needs to deal with non-English speaking nationals. The interpreter can readily assist the interrogator if he has the requisite language. Interrogation using an interpreter is a viable and practical technique for U.S. Army interrogators. A fourth category of linguist, document exploiter, was created after World War II and designates a linguist with sufficient training not just to translate, but also to analyze a document for intelligence. Because the tactical commander today would have to rely principally upon his interrogators to do the work of all four types of linguists, for the purposes of this paper they will be included together as producers of IDI. IDI itself is whatever information of intelligence value these linguists may produce, to include information from interrogation of prisoners of war (PW), detainees, refugees, escapees, evaders, repatriates, and so on; from reports from local nations; and from foreign language
(especially captured) documents. With these definitions and distinctions in mind, we will now briefly examine the importance of IDI in history.
SECTION II THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

In May 1809, Napoleon’s army had fought and then lost contact with Austrian General Hiller’s three corps. Napoleon stopped at Molk (about 45 miles from Vienna) and personally planned and directed a "prisoner snatch" from the Austrian camp across the swollen Danube. The three prisoners obtained were interrogated by Napoleon the morning of their capture and revealed that not only Hiller’s corps but the entire Austrian army was on the far side of the Danube. Napoleon, thus finding the road to Vienna clear, rapidly moved Lannes’ corps directly to the city which it reached on 10 May, capturing the well stocked Vienna arsenal intact. On this and many other occasions, Napoleon demonstrated the importance he placed in obtaining information, especially from prisoners.

On "the other side of the hill," Lord Wellesley also recognized the value of IDI. As a result, a good many people in his Peninsular Army became quite adept at interrogation, following the example of their commander who spoke French, Spanish, and Portuguese and both interviewed and read extensively in each language. The American experience was no different. Washington, like Wellesley his own Chief of Intelligence, depended heavily on interrogation of prisoners (PW) and deserters for tactical information about the enemy. During the Civil War, Lee’s brilliant victory at the Second Battle of Manassas was based firmly on intelligence from prisoners and captured dispatches, and provides a good example of the continuing importance of IDI throughout that war.
In World War I, the criticality if IDI to combat operations was once again highlighted. The US War Department's *Intelligence Regulations 1920* states: "Experience has shown that the information derived from documents is second in value only to that secured by the actual examination of prisoners." In 1936, the former head of the American Expeditionary Force's Intelligence Service, Major General D. E. Nolan, in a lecture at the Army War College explained: "In all wars, the principal source of information has been enemy prisoners, so we made no new discovery in this respect in the World War. We simply rediscovered a fact that is lost sight of in long intervals of peace." It is worth noting that MG Nolan said this immediately after discussing at some length the great utility of SIGINT to both sides.

By World War II, both SIGINT and IMINT had improved immensely over the standards and capabilities of World War I. Nevertheless, in Europe at least, IDI remained the single most important source of intelligence for tactical—and for that matter, operational level—units. A study of intelligence operations in 12th US Army Group for the period 1 August 1944 to 9 May 1945 was prepared immediately after the end of the war in Europe with the object of providing lessons learned to the Army in the Pacific. Extensive interviews and surveys of army, corps and division G2's and their staffs indicated that over time, prisoner of war interrogation was the single most valuable source of information, comprising from 33% to 50% of information available at corps and, according to at least one division, up to 90% of the information received by the regiments and
battalions. While no percentage figure was provided by the armies, they agreed that information from PW's was "by far the most important single source of intelligence." Documents were also a valuable source of intelligence, but their potential was not fully exploited because not enough document translators were available to allow their posting below army level. Tactical air and photographic reconnaissance were second only to IDI at division and above and were especially valuable to armored divisions because they provided information on enemy rear areas. SIGINT, while "of material value...at times...provid(ing)...very vital information" to the armies, only rarely provided information of immediate tactical significance. The relatively recent revelations concerning ULTRA and its influence on the war in no way diminish the conclusions noted above for IDI. While ULTRA-derived intelligence was passed down as imagery or interrogation derived, nearly all IDI available to the tactical level units came from the tactical level, so there is little possibility such reports were actually disguised ULTRA, which was not normally introduced below army level. Therefore, while the relative importance of the various intelligence disciplines to the strategic and (perhaps) operational levels may require reevaluation, the judgment on their relative worth at the tactical level stands.

In the Pacific, there were fewer PW-- which is not to say there were none-- but other sources for IDI remained, including indigenous peoples, Korean laborers, and documents. According to the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) for the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), the vagaries of the Japanese
language produced an army with a near mania for writing things down. For example, in September 1944, ATIS had over 200,000 captured documents. Experience from 1942 to 1944 showed that of documents captured, 3 1/2% had "immediate operational value," 16 1/2% had "operational value," 40% had "general or technical intelligence," and 40% were of no apparent military value. Because the Japanese placed great reliance on the difficulty of their language, encoding of documents was unusual and therefore not a problem. Even with the scarcity of prisoners, occasional IDI successes occurred. One happened on 27 November 1944, when IDI revealed Japanese intentions to stage a coordinated ground and airborne attack on the airfields in the vicinity of Burauen in the Philippines. Appropriate precautions were taken and when the attack took place on 5 and 6 December, it was handily defeated. Because it was not expected that a Japanese soldier would be captured, he was not given any training on what to say and what not to say when that occurred. As a result, most of the prisoners that were captured, once induced to talk, would tell their captors literally anything they knew.

The US experience in Korea did nothing to change the lessons learned in World War II. Not only did it provide much valuable intelligence throughout the war, but it provided the United Nations forces clear warning of the impending massive intervention of Chinese Communist forces (CCF) in late 1950. For example, by 29 October 1950, some 16 Chinese prisoners had been taken from a variety of divisions and armies. The prisoners talked freely and indicated the presence of large, purely Chinese forces in the Eighth Army area of operations. On 1 November,
refugees reported to the XO of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, the presence of large numbers of Chinese troops behind them. Yet the 8th Cavalry Regiment was surprised and virtually destroyed over the course of the next 72 hours. In early October, an American officer escapee reported that three Soviets had interrogated him on 22 September and warned that the Chinese would intervene if US forces crossed the 38th parallel. By 23 November over 96 Chinese from seven different armies had been taken prisoner. Sadly, this information was ignored in light of Far Eastern Command’s pronouncement that CCF would not enter the war. In spite of prisoners, refugee reports, and so on, UN forces were surprised when 300,000 Chinese fell on them the night of 25 November 1950. It was an "intelligence failure" that need not have happened.

By the time the Army went to Vietnam, it had the lessons of the British in Malaysia to add to its own experience. The former indicated that IDI would be more important than ever in a counterinsurgency and indeed, the Army found this to be true. The history of intelligence operations for that conflict reports: "Among the best sources of combat intelligence are knowledgeable informants and captured documents. The drastic cutback in resources and training devoted to human intelligence since World War II has seriously reduced our capacity in this field."

The Army’s most recent combat action in Grenada confirmed the importance of IDI yet again. In an after-action report on Operation URGENT FURY, the US invasion of Grenada, the commander of the supporting military intelligence group stated: "HUMINT played a vital role as it would in any conflict, particularly at
the lower end of spectrum...Moreover, the importance of language capabilities was demonstrated in every intelligence area: interrogation, communications intelligence, and CI."

Before leaving the historical importance of IDI, it is both germane and instructive to note that IDI does not seem to have been very important to the Israelis in the 1956, 1967, and 1973, eruptions of the Arab-Israeli War. If this is true—and it may be that a relative dearth of reporting on Israeli collection and use of IDI is due to tight security—there are three possible reasons. First, the tempo of Israeli operations has always been so high and their forces so infantry poor that there was neither time nor were there troops available to secure and interrogate prisoners. One example of such a situation occurred early in 1967 when an Israeli unit captured a body of Egyptian troops in the Sinai, put them in a holding area, and then simply left them for some follow-on unit—and all the follow-on units also left them alone. Second, the Israelis fight the same enemies and have an excellent and very focused "peacetime" intelligence collection and analysis system. Therefore in war, especially in a short war in which few fundamental changes in an army occur, they have a much lower need for basic order of battle information than would the U.S. A last possible reason is that the Israelis have taken a calculated risk and decided to simply do without this form of intelligence. Of course, some combination of the three reasons may also be true.

Similarly, IDI seems to have had little importance for UK forces during the Falklands Islands War. In all the works consulted, the only references to PW are concerned with their
disarming, guarding, and repatriating (and the fact that the British liked their boots!). Interrogators are not mentioned at all. As with the Israelis, it is perfectly possible that interrogators were used, but that security considerations—in this case the Official Secrets Act—precludes open discussion of their activities. Assuming this is not the case, the apparent absence of IDI may possibly be explained by three factors. First, the land area of operations was extremely limited. This allowed the second factor, the excellent information gathering capabilities of the British Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) to be relatively pervasive. SAS and SBS operations, in conjunction with the third factor, were able to provide enough information so that interrogators seem not to have been needed. The third factor was the information provided by the local civilians. The British troops had the advantage in the Falklands of having not only a friendly populace but an English speaking one as well. Local inhabitants are a classic source of IDI, but the fact that they provided the information directly to the troops (often over the telephone from behind Argentine lines) and in English tends to obscure the concept of it being IDI. It is therefore fair to say that in spite of the absence of interrogators, IDI still had an important part to play in this conflict.

The evidence presented above, only a sampling of the total available, demonstrates that IDI has had great tactical importance in most modern conflicts. Certainly, this is true in all the conflicts in which the U.S. Army has been a participant in this century. Even the two possible exceptions--
Israeli conflicts and the Falklands Islands War of 1983— are likely either an aberration or more apparent than real. In light of U.S. Army experience, and in view of Israeli and British experience on a modern mid-intensity mobile battlefield, the question which now presents itself is: "how important will IDI be to the U.S. Army on the battlefield of the future?"
SECTION III  IDI AND TOMORROW'S BATTLEFIELD

This section will conceptually examine the probable usefulness of IDI on the near to midterm future (five to ten years) U.S. Army battlefield. Before undertaking that examination, a few general observations about IDI are in order.

Intelligence collection and analysis are fundamentally designed to fill gaps in the friendly force’s knowledge of the enemy. The kinds of information which may be used to fill those gaps are virtually endless and most lend themselves to more than one means of collection. Virtually any type of information may be supplied by IDI. At the tactical level, questions about who exactly your enemy is—i.e., order of battle—have historically been the primary type of IDI supplied, followed by the enemy’s strength, dispositions, state of morale, intentions, etc., as well as information concerning the geography and demography of the area of operations. Discovery of enemy intentions is an especially important capability of interrogators and is facilitated by the fact that it is the only type of tactical intelligence collection that allows one to interact with the enemy. At the operational and strategic levels, longer range intentions, trends in order of battle, technical intelligence and so on are expected from IDI; i.e., intelligence valuable over a longer period rather than of immediate value. While IDI related successes at these levels do not spring to the mind as SIGINT-based ones do (Tannenberg, Midway, the V-weapons), they nonetheless exist. For example, between 21 and 23 May 1945, some German PW’s collected near Munich for identification and
interrogation provided the U.S. 7 1/2 tons of equipment capable of reading encrypted Russian signals, thus delivering a capability, we did not previously enjoy. The more sophisticated an enemy or potential enemy, the more potentially important such technical aspects of IDI will be.

Conversely, the less sophisticated an enemy is, the more important tactical IDI tends to become in relation to the other intelligence disciplines. History has shown that SIGINT and IMINT have significant difficulties in providing information on an enemy who eschews the use of radio and who is relatively nonmechanized. Excellent examples of this are the Chinese intervention in Korea in late 1950 with over 300,000 men and their incursion into Vietnam with over 200,000 men in early 1979. In neither case was the movement of troops reported by IMINT or SIGINT prior to their introduction into combat. The relation of this observation with low intensity conflict is discussed below.

Another factor which will influence the need for IDI is, not surprisingly, the degree to which the enemy is already known. For example, as noted above, the general Israeli disregard for IDI appears to be mostly a function of the tempo of operations they maintained. But U.S. experience in France in World War II indicates that high tempo operations can also greatly benefit from IDI. A possible explanation lies in the amount of intelligence already available about the enemy. If your prewar intelligence collection is good and you have fought the same enemy over the same ground before, you many not perceive a great need to devote assets and time to IDI operations, especially in a
short war scenario. Another situation in which the relative importance of IDI would decline is one in which your superiority is so overwhelming as to make knowledge of the enemy almost superfluous—the Red Army invading Lithuania, for instance.

Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the United States Army will find itself in either situation on any foreseeable future battlefield. Given US worldwide commitments and interests and the concomitant plethora of potential enemies, plus the relatively limited intelligence resources devoted to producing contingency related tactical intelligence, it is nearly certain that on commitment U.S. forces will have serious gaps in intelligence about their enemy.

A final general observation: while IDI is always useful, it becomes very difficult to come by in static situations. Both World War I and World War II experience show that when static situations develop, prisoners become rare but vital nonetheless, so "prisoner snatches" are ordered. These can be both resource and time consuming as well as very difficult, but are staged anyway because of the great value of prisoners. For instance, one such operation executed by 2d Bn 317th Inf in 1944 during the Lorraine Campaign took ten men, 36 hours, and extensive coordination with artillery, engineers, S4, and S2 to produce one PW.

The above observations apply almost regardless of the type of battlefield on which the US Army finds itself. Other observations are more battlefield related, but what will that battlefield look like? The Army 21 study, produced jointly by TRADOC and AMC, is the source of the popular "sine wave"
depiction of types of conflicts relating probability and risk (figure 1). This model will be the basis for discussion, commencing at the right side and working left.

The least likely but most intense and risk filled form of conflict is total strategic nuclear war at the high end of the "high intensity" section of the conflict spectrum. In this environment, IDI will probably be largely, if not totally irrelevant because of the time it takes to derive IDI. Virtually all intelligence input will have to be made prior to the first exchanges in such a war, meaning that it will mainly have to occur in peacetime, when IDI is for obvious reasons less often produced. IDI should have relevance throughout the rest of the high intensity spectrum, however. IDI will be able to inform commanders on precisely who the enemy is, his state of morale and maintenance, his standard operating procedures and plans, and so on. Historical experience and logic show that in a highly fluid situation, PWs may almost always be expected as forces intermingle. And indeed, a nonlinear battlefield characterized by extensive intermingling of forces is exactly what FM 100-5 tells us to expect in mid and high intensity conflict. Additionally, IDI is an all weather, day/night, passive source of intelligence which can continue to work even after EMP from tactical or operational nuclear weapons has destroyed all the circuitry in a division or corps. Its great drawback will be the time it takes to derive IDI and pass it to a commander. In the high tempo continuous operations currently envisaged by the Soviets, even if successful they will surely lose men as prisoners. These will be from reconnaissance units operating boldly in advance of
FORCE EMPLOYMENT SPECTRUM

FIGURE 1

SOURCE: ARMY 21 Briefing; DJCO, USACGSC
the main bodies, exploitation subunits which become overextended, supporting attacks, and so on. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces, who will likely have less motivation for fighting NATO, may prove to be an even richer source of PW’s and line crossers. But while there will be prisoners, IDI’s lack of timeliness could easily result in providing the commander only history or information about which he can do nothing. The higher that commander is in the chain of command, the more likely it is that this will be the case. Therefore, IDI’s probable relevancy on this battlefield increases as one goes down the tactical chain largely because of the reduction in the time lag between time of capture and interrogation and the time at which the information is available to the commander. The only probable exception to this general rule would be a long war (i.e., a year or more) scenario. World War II demonstrates that in such a situation, accumulated information from prisoners of all ranks, refugees, defectors, and so on can begin to have an influence at the higher operational and strategic levels.

Time and the tempo of operations are also the key factors in the relevance of IDI to the mid-intensity battlefield. This is the section of the conflict spectrum least addressed by current Army thought. For the purposes of this paper, the mid-intensity battlefield will be defined as one having some combination of the following characteristics:

1) The use of brigade or larger sized ground forces as units by both sides;

2) Relatively limited political aims on the part of the combatants, especially in that the continued existence of the
belligerents is not at issue;

3) General limitation of the military aspects of the conflict to a specific geographic region or sub-region;

4) The existence of an unexercised option to expand the conflict spatially or in its ultimate objectives; and

5) The employment of a wide variety of modern armaments well beyond small arms but not including nuclear weapons or (usually) chemical weapons on a large scale.

By this definition, it is possible for a conflict to be mid-intensity for one belligerent and high intensity for another. An example would be the latter stages of the Vietnam Conflict prior to the U.S. withdrawal. For the U.S. vis-a-vis the North Vietnamese, it was a mid-intensity conflict. For the Republic of Vietnam, it was closer to high intensity. Other examples of mid-intensity conflict would be the Falklands Islands War between the UK and Argentina and the ongoing Iran-Iraq War. These wars may feature high tempo continuous operations, but usually are more episodic in nature, with lulls between major operations. In this environment, the relative importance of IDI rises compared to high intensity conflict. As mentioned above, the drawback to IDI is the time involved in developing a useful bit of intelligence. Even if a PW or detainee is totally cooperative-- and at the tactical level (i.e., generally within a few hours of capture) they are cooperative more than one might imagine because of the shock of capture and uncertainty about their future (figure 2)---one must still reckon with the time lags introduced between the point the PW learned the information and his time of capture, the time lag between capture and interrogation, and the time involved
Figure 2


Note: CED = Captured Enemy Documents
in the transmission of the information, its analysis, and the
decision and execution times involved to act on it. The time lag
between an individual learning information and being captured is
generally beyond our control, but obviously may contribute to a
lack of timeliness on the part of IDI (by contrast, SIGINT
holds the promise of allowing us to learn of enemy decisions as
he passes them to his subordinates). The U.S. Army has
historically attempted to reduce the time between capture and
interrogation by two methods—first, by providing linguists well
forward and second, by expediting evacuation of FW to the rear.
In mid-intensity conflicts, because there is generally more time
available to collect, analyze, and disseminate information, IDI
may more often be available in time to be of use.

The foregoing discussion indicates that IDI is probably most
important in low intensity conflict (LIC). The definition and
precise nature of LIC are today a matter of debate within both
the defense community and the Army. The following
characteristics of LIC which impact on the importance of IDI at
this level of conflict intensity represent this writer's
synthesis from a variety of sources. The first of these
characteristics is the lower tempo of operations experienced on
this largely non-mechanized battlefield. Even when such a
conflict is motorized— as for example, in the case of the
Polisario versus Morocco in the Western Sahara—such a conflict
is normally very episodic in nature with frequent and significant
lulls between engagements or series of engagements. These lulls
provide the time necessary to exploit captured enemy personnel
and documents to the advantage of the capturing force before
the next engagement with or operation against the enemy. LIC is also as a rule protracted over time and this protraction means that IDI will have the potential to increase significantly the total data base available on the enemy. This data base will include not only his order of battle and planned operations, but also individual operational idiosyncrasies, sources of supply and support, political aims, and so on. In short, there is probably no type of information on the enemy which, given the time available in this environment, IDI cannot usefully provide. IDI increases in significance more geometrically than arithmetically because while it can increase in usefulness as a collection discipline, IMINT and SIGINT will normally decrease in usefulness as one moves from mid to low intensity conflict. The decrease is mainly the result of a lowering in the sophistication of the enemy's equipment and size of his force. Low intensity conflict is usually infantry intensive, so there is little for cameras to image. It usually is conducted in very difficult terrain where line-of-sight problems are the rule. For these reasons the usefulness of imagery--both photo and radar--falls off dramatically. Operations are often platoon sized and smaller, so radios are less important. Enemy attacks are typically planned well in advance, often against fixed targets, again reducing the need for radio. Because such wars are infantry intensive, equipment must be man-packed, which means normally such radios as are used will be relatively low power and therefore short ranged. Finally, while an insurgent will nearly always attempt to establish a base camp, because he is inferior in strength, he will normally take strong precautions to insure his position is
not compromised, to include a stringent signals security program should he have radios available. This strong preoccupation with security, coupled with the need for mobility and low sophistication, means that radars—whether for surveillance, counterbattery, early warning, or fire control—will almost never be used. Therefore, the electronic intelligence (ELINT) component of SIGINT will normally be entirely absent from low intensity conflict. All of the above tend to reduce the utility of SIGINT to the superior force. SIGINT will likely be highly useful to the inferior force if the superior force is radio dependent—as it normally will be when conducting counterinsurgency operations. The superior force will be radio dependent because one of the few ways to counter the insurgent’s possession of the initiative is with the mobility and speed of action that the radio and helicopter make possible. It is, of course, better to seize the initiative from the insurgent rather than simply react, and IDI is also key to accomplishing this objective. Unlike high and mid intensity conflict, in low intensity conflict the captured enemy is regularly “turned” to become an asset. In counterinsurgency operations, turned PW’s can help destroy the insurgent infrastructure by identifying supporters in villages, drop boxes, caches, and so on. They can provide location and planning information which will allow constant pressure to be put on the insurgents. Finally, they can work on former colleagues through a variety of broadcast and printed media to lower their enthusiasm for continuing the fight and possibly even induce surrender.

From the above, a few conclusions may be drawn. First, IDI
is a potentially lucrative source of intelligence in all situations in which the U.S. Army may fight. Second, the potential criticality of IDI varies inversely with the intensity of the conflict. Third, as IDI has historically been, it will likely continue to be among the most valuable sources of intelligence for the tactical level.

The value of IDI is obviously only realized if it is exploited. The topic which we shall now consider is whether or not the U.S. Army is currently structured to exploit IDI’s potential.
SECTION IV  INTERROGATORS-- HOW MANY ARE ENOUGH?

The Army of the near to mid-term future will in all probability be some variant of the Army of Excellence (AOE) structure currently being developed and fielded. This may be asserted with some confidence simply because leaders at all levels, having experienced the turmoil of reconfiguring the Army from ROAD (Reorganization Of Army Divisions) to Army 86 to AOE, will now press very hard for a temporary end to major change so the Army can recover from and assimilate changes already made and train to a warfighting standard.

Under the current AOE concept, the heavy division will have 10 interrogators organized into two five man teams. These interrogators will operate at a divisional PW cage and can, on an exceptional basis, be allocated down to a brigade. Because a light division is considered more likely to be involved in a low intensity conflict situation, it has double the interrogation capability of the heavy division-- a 10 man PW cage operation section and two five man interrogation teams. The concept for employment is based on an assumed separated base camp situation in which two brigades would be at semi-autonomous base camps while the third would be co-located with division headquarters. The detached brigades would have their own interrogation teams while the co-located brigade would have direct access to information from the division's PW cage. Both divisions would ideally be augmented by interrogators from corps.

The AOE corps will have eight five man teams in the Military Intelligence (MI) brigade. An additional five interrogation
(IPW) teams will be provided by the reserve component tactical exploitation battalion which is to be provided to each corps— if those battalions are ever formed. The employment concept calls for corps to use four teams at a corps-level PW cage and attach the others to divisions, separate brigades, or the armored cavalry regiment (ACR). Certainly, the ACR will require augmentation as it is to be provided with only one five man interrogation team to operate a Regimental cage. When performing reconnaissance missions over a large area, the ACR should operate with interrogators at least down to squadron level.

The current word formula which applies to echelons above corps (EAC) is: "IEW units at EAC are tailored both regionally and functionally to support a command or otherwise accomplish a mission." Six EAC MI brigades will eventually be formed using this approach. The one for Europe will be the largest and most complete, while the others will be more or less variations on the theme. The European MI Bde will have an Interrogation and Exploitation (I&E) Battalion which will be comprised of a HHC, two MI Companies I&E (PW), a MI Company (TI), and a MI Company I&E (GS-EAC). The I&E (PW) companies will each have eight IPW teams whose business it will be to operate EAC level PW cages in support of EAC Army, joint, combined, and national requirements. The I&E Company (GS-EAC) has 12 IPW teams which will be available to augment corps, divisions, allied and joint interrogation centers, and temporary PW cages.

In addition to the interrogators, there are three document exploitation teams in the HHC of the I&E battalion of the MI
Brigade. Total interrogators available will be approximately one hundred sixty-six in thirty-one teams. In addition, three I&E COs (not further defined) are to be made available out of the reserve component. While these were not identified specifically, they will probably come from the 142nd MI Bn (Linguist) (UTARNG). As a practical matter, while this seems to be a significant augmentation (especially with the three reserve companies), when spread across the projected NATO area of operations, it is does not meet the stated need for Europe.

Regarding augmentation, while not stated in the FM, it is reasonable to presume that EAC level combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) organizations will also develop requirements for IPW augmentation. This would be particularly true in a non-NATO environment where a theater army area command (TAACOM) or transportation command (TRANSCOM) confronts rear area threats without the advantage of a well-developed host nation infrastructure. In any event, it has been customary for the US to use PW labor to offset manpower shortages during wartime. For example, the historian of the Quartermaster Corps wrote of the World War II European Theater of Operations: "Without the proper organization and training of prisoners of war, it would have been impossible for the Quartermaster Corps to carry out its mission." In CONUS, PWs did 90,629,233 man days of labor from early 1943 through 31 December 1945. Obviously, linguists would be required to facilitate control of such a labor force and some trained interrogators would be needed to help the administrators of such a system monitor the PW population and to help investigate acts of sabotage or criminal behavior. This normally unrecognized
requirement could severely limit the number of interrogators available from EAC to augment corps and below.

We must now turn to the question of the adequacy of the AOE structure to handle the missions which may be required of it. Again, we will use history—representing the only available empirical data on requirements—tempered by reflection which will try to divine what changes the future may bring.

In the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), many interrogators were officers, and most officers detailed to intelligence functions were expected to be able to interrogate. Basically, since interrogation was the most important source of intelligence, all intelligence personnel were to be able to do it. Because not all officers were linguists, interpreters were required to assist. As today, intelligence personnel were also expected to be able to glean information from captured maps and documents even in the absence of language capability. An AEF infantry regiment S2 (referred to as "R2") was a captain and was authorized one sergeant interpreter as part of his nineteen man section. Similarly, an infantry brigade S2 ("B2")—a captain or lieutenant—was to have a sergeant interpreter. At division, the G2—a major or lieutenant colonel—was authorized a language qualified lieutenant and two sergeant interpreters. None of these organizations was to operate a PW cage. According to Intelligence Regulations—1929: "The responsibility for examination of prisoners rests with the Intelligence Section of the General Staff." Regiment was to keep prisoners no longer than two hours. Division was also to pass PWs back promptly. Delay only lessened the worth of interrogation at echelons above
division. An army was supposed to have a captain, four lieutenants, and fourteen enlisted, all language qualified. A corps would presumably have been similar. Also, a corps headquarters was authorized six commissioned interpreters.

Between the wars little changed. A Col. Schwien in 1936 is still saying no organized interrogation is to be done below division. Interestingly, he says: "...it will be found necessary to create a special papers and documents examining service. The personnel to maintain this service must be specially detailed from the troops as there is no adequate provision made for this in our organization. Men so detailed should be able to read the enemy language. They should be specially trained..." Obviously, he did not feel the current TO&E’s were adequate.

By 1944, things had changed considerably from the World War I organizations. Interrogators (and other intelligence specialists) were assigned as teams to a Military Intelligence Service (MIS) organization at theater, then attached out as needed to field armies, corps, and divisions. An ideal "type" organization to support a division would include a detachment headquarters, four IPW teams (one officer and three enlisted each), an interpretation team (two officers and four enlisted), and a translator team (two officers and four enlisted); in all a captain, three lieutenants, and twenty-two enlisted. This would allow for a team per regiment plus one to work at the division PW cage. A corps would get a detachment with a headquarters, one IPW team, two interpretation teams, and two translator teams, while an army would get the same with one additional IPW team.
All of these personnel were language qualified. In practice, a division in Europe normally had two IPW teams, a corps three, and an army four. PW were interrogated at division then evacuated directly to army. Corps interrogated those PWs captured by corps troops and those wounded PW evacuated to hospitals. IPW teams were frequently shifted from one division or corps to another by MIS at theater in order to give appropriate support where they could best be utilized. In the Pacific by late 1944, a normal linguist augmentation for a division was two officers and ten enlisted. Both corps and army were to have an "advanced echelon" from ATIS consisting of two officers and thirteen enlisted (plus five non-linguists for administrative duties). Finally, GHQ, SWPA was to have 53 linguists supported by 71 non-linguists. All of this was based on an organization of 15 divisions, four corps, and two armies. Presumably, if more divisions were assigned, the same interrogator pool would be stretched a bit. Nevertheless, the "normal" linguist augmentation in the SWPA was remarkably similar to the normal augmentation provided in Europe. By late 1944 and 1945, the US Army had had sufficient time to select, train, and deploy linguists to augment those available at the beginning of the war. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that these norms represent as much a minimum requirement as the effect of constrained resource availability. Today's AOE corps is probably analogous to a World War II field army in size, complexity, and mission. While the need for interrogators at corps has not changed, an increase in numbers will probably be necessary. This will be because of the larger, "field army size" area of responsibility and greater number of units that the corps
of today controls. And unless helicopters are used to evacuate PW, the rate at which a PW is evacuated from the point of capture to the interrogation or collection point will be much the same as in World War II.

In 1948, on the basis of World War II experience, the practice of allocating intelligence specialists in teams from a central pool was modified. The G2 section TO&E was increased to include additional editorial, photo interpreter, and interrogation personnel. In making this change, it was argued that a unit would normally encounter only one enemy language on a given campaign, so there was no reason that interrogators should not be a relatively permanent part of the organization. Note that there is no question about whether or not interrogators will be needed— it is assumed they will be. It is only a question of the right language. After July 1948, for example, an infantry division had organic to the G2 section three officer and sixteen enlisted interrogators. Available at field army on the basis of about one per division were to be: interrogator teams, translator teams, interpreter teams, and document exploitation teams, each with one officer and two enlisted. It was felt that the interpreters should not be as fixed in the organization because of the four or more allied, friendly, or neutral languages it was expected a unit would encounter on a campaign. The translator and document exploitation teams' retention under central control probably reflects the World War II experience in Europe that with documents it was either feast or famine, therefore they should be available for concentration as required. Note that during this period, which lasted through
the Korean War, the Army provided all four of the basic linguist services. By the later Vietnam period, there had been a fundamental change.

When the Army transitioned to the PENTOMIC division and then to the ROAD configurations, it largely left behind General McNair’s concept of pooling scarce resources. Under this concept, the division was given as organic components only what it absolutely needed to fight in a fluid offensive situation with weak resistance. All other units were pooled under control of a higher headquarters and provided as "plugs" to the division on an "as needed" basis. The shift away from "pooling" also affected intelligence support. By the end of Vietnam, a division had an organic MI Company which was authorized an interrogation section with one interrogation support team to operate the division PW cage and three brigade interrogation teams (in 1973, six warrant officers and fifteen enlisted). A corps was to have an MI Company with a smaller interrogation section of three teams (in 1970, one captain, three warrants, and eleven enlisted). Corps was still not in the PW evacuation chain, per World War II practice. The concept for employment saw one PW team at the corps cage and two at divisional cages to represent corps interests. At field army level, there was to be an MI battalion with an MI Company (Interrogation) commanded by a lieutenant colonel and having approximately twenty officers and eighty-two enlisted. Finally, at theater army there was to be an MI Detachment (Interrogation) also commanded by a lieutenant colonel, with a total of twenty-four officers and thirty-two enlisted linguists. It was during the period 1968-1970 that
commissioned officers were largely replaced by warrant officers in interrogation and related jobs. This organization served well in Vietnam but was only part of a larger combined effort at the higher levels. Even the Combined Interrogation and Document Exploitation organization at MACV level was overwhelmed from time to time.

Finally, during Operation URGENT FURY, the 82nd Abn Div was supported by two warrant officers and fourteen enlisted from the interrogation company of the tactical exploitation battalion at corps. Within four days of their arrival, their numbers had grown to seventy-six, including personnel from the Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Army personnel from INSCOM and the US Army Intelligence Center and School augmenting personnel from XVIII Airborne Corps. This group completed 2,400 interrogations and exploited some five tons of documents. Because of the short distances involved, IPW teams were attached out to brigades only on an exceptional basis.

A brief comparison of the proposed AOE interrogator organization with historical examples yields the following observations: While no intelligence officer is likely to complain that he has too many assets, an AOE heavy division compares very favorably with a World War II/Korean division in assets available. For the gleaning of immediate, perishable combat information, its ten interrogators are probably adequate for World War II-paced combat. With augmentation from corps to provide IPW teams to each brigade, increases in space and tempo of combat on the mid to high intensity battlefield can probably be adequately handled.
The assessment made above also applies to the light division whose twenty-four interrogators should be adequate to screen PW and refugees in a low intensity combat situation. The 82d Abn's experience on URGENT FURY indicates significant augmentation would certainly be required for independent operations of almost any scale or duration. Corps is now firmly back in the PW chain for the first time since World War I. This is totally in keeping with the AirLand Battle focus on larger unit operations and the US Army recognition of the operational level of war. The historical examples indicate that the organization foreseen for corps should be equal to the task of providing for interrogation of PWs, screening of refugees, and augmentation of divisions—with four caveats. First, a really detailed and thorough interrogation of PWs (involving multiple sessions) will probably not normally be possible; second, this organization would likely not be able adequately to handle really large numbers of PWs or refugees such as occurred toward the end of World War II or even during Operation CEDAR FALLS in January 1967 in Vietnam; and third, the organization provides only for interrogation at PW cages as called for in the current interrogation field manuals. Immediate tactical interrogation of PWs captured by corps troops (for example, by MPs in rear area security or rear battle operations) and interrogation of wounded PWs in hospitals are not part of the scheme. Finally, anything more than a very modest document exploitation load could not be handled simultaneously with a "normal" PW load. These missions would tend to overload the system.

The AOE organization for EAC is more difficult to evaluate
both because of the dearth of historical information and because of the still evolving nature of AOE organizations at this level. At first glance, the projected European organization with two 80 man companies and one 120 man company seems more than adequate. When compared with the overall language requirements for the entire NATO area of operations, however, it is, as noted above, short of actual needs. Language services in the areas of interrogation, document exploitation (the three teams provided are totally inadequate), debriefing, refugee screening, intelligence liaison, general liaison, translation, and so on in upwards of seventeen or more languages will quickly deplete the projected capability and still leave a great deal to be covered. Requirements for linguistically trained personnel to help handle PW labor, MP PW control and criminal investigation do not appear to be provided for in current planning. As serious as this is, it is overshadowed by the fact that Europe will be the best supported theater by a considerable margin. The more likely needs of CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM will be considerably less well addressed and only somewhat offset (in SOUTHCOM) by the probability that more Spanish speakers will be available than for any other second language. This may constitute the most serious deficiency in the projected AOE organization, which overall, given resourcing restraints, is probably generally adequate to handle at least its projected tactical missions.

A word of caution about this projection of adequacy: when the Army went into Tunisia in 1942, it expected 12,000 to 14,000 PW. It got 275,000 and the system was overwhelmed. Similar underestimates were made for Sicily, Normandy, and later for
Inchon. Such consistent underestimates produce a system unprepared to cope with the problem. This situation applies not only to the intelligence aspects, but also to all the logistical considerations of handling and providing for large numbers of prisoners. Experiences during URGENT FURY showed that the Army has remained true to form in this regard. The estimates used by the Army today are based on World War II and Korean War experience and are found in EM 101-10-1: Staff Officers’ Field Manual: Organizational, Technical, and Logistic Data. It states (Table 5-5) that planners should expect the following numbers of PW per month in the defense: 230 per infantry division, 175 per mechanized infantry division, 117 per airborne division, and 155 per armored division. In the offense, these numbers shoot up (3500, 3550, 3600, and 2550 respectively). Based on Vietnam experience, Table 5-7 estimates an average of 423 PW per division per year, with higher numbers expected to accompany success (average for 1967 was 644 per division). Significantly, it warns to expect six detainees for each PW. Therefore, while the AOE structure would seem to be adequate on the basis of general historical experience, history also warns us to be prepared for situations to occur which overwhelm this organization. An appropriate approach to handling such a situation at the tactical level would be to include in the unit SOP provisions for expedited handling of large numbers of PW. Presumably the planners for Tunisia, Sicily, Normandy, and Inchon also had planning figures to start with, but the battlefield turned out differently than they expected. Numbers of PW will vary not only with the type of US unit and its operations, but also in
conjunction with the general political climate, the circumstances of battle, and most of all, with the enemy himself. For these reasons, the planning figures of FM 101-10-1 are useful for general planning but, as URGENT FURY showed, they must be revisited once a specific operational scenario is identified.

Three final general observations on structure: First, the rank structure of interrogators has declined slowly but steadily from World War I to the present. This may represent a decline in the importance attached to interrogation by the TO&E gurus or simply a realistic appraisal of resource availability. In any case, this will probably not be significant unless and until the US has occasion to face again an enemy as rank conscious as the Germans. Second, the functions of document exploitation and interpretation/translation have relatively recently been amalgamated into the general job of interrogation. This is a mistake. Only the most highly trained personnel will be good interrogators. A lesser degree of skill or training and in fact, a different psychological make up, are quite adequate to accomplish the other still vital missions. These differences should probably be recognized and allowed for in our doctrine and TO&E. Third, AOE seems to have taken a conceptual step backward to General McNair’s "pool at higher" concept. In this case, this is probably a good decision as it will allow scarce assets to be focused on critical areas by the higher tactical and operational level commanders.
SECTION V CONCLUSIONS

Through the course of the Twentieth Century, the attention given to providing U.S. Army forces with interrogators and linguists has waxed and waned. To its credit, the Army since the Korean War has not ignored the great potential worth of IDI during the "intervals of peace."

As demonstrated above, IDI will almost certainly have the potential to be a vital source of intelligence to the Army in future conflicts. This is true almost regardless of the battlefield on which the Army is employed, though it increases in probability as the conflict moves toward the lower end of the spectrum. The key question this monograph has addressed is: "Will the Army be prepared to exploit that potential?"

At the division and below, the answer to the foregoing question is: "yes, barely." More interrogators are, in fact, required, but if the AOE structure is resourced, the unit should normally be able to make do. Unit SOPs which provide for good, well understood IPW "triage" to identify quickly the most promising prisoners or documents for exploitation will help provide the margin of safety for the unit that the current force structure does not. The Army could help by taking a leaf from the AEF's book--each battalion and brigade S2 should possess rudimentary interrogation skills and, ideally, be language qualified. The former would require a significant increase in numbers of MI officers attending the Defense Language Institute, while the latter would require a relatively minor modification to the program of instruction for the basic and advanced courses.
It is arguable that basic interrogation and document exploitation skills are just as necessary for an MI officer to learn as tank gunnery (in terms of actual target engagement) is for an armor officer, if not more so. In the 12th Army Group in World War II, such linguistic ability was considered "exceedingly important" for an intelligence officer. Only combat experience was also mentioned as a specific desired acquired characteristic.

Obviously, even if every intelligence officer learns a foreign language, it will still be practically impossible in peacetime to insure that all of a unit's S2's speak the required language when it has to deploy to a given country for combat. Nevertheless, if every intelligence officer did speak a foreign language, the Army's total linguist inventory would be much improved.

While commanders at division and below probably have barely enough, commanders at corps and above probably do not and will find that interrogators-- like trucks and bulldozers-- will quickly rise from the mundane to the "intensively-manage-this-vital-asset" list. The most likely areas of conflict, CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM, will provide the greatest challenges and will certainly require augmentation from local nationals at all levels. Procedures for such augmentation need to be put in place as soon as possible. It must be stressed that IPW planning factors in unit war plans should be reevaluated as soon as a specific execution scenario is identified.

The brightest spots on the IDI horizon are the expansion of the 142d MI Bn to a brigade-sized organization, the recently approved bill from the Congress which will prevent state governors from interfering in the employment of these
linguists, and the recently approved bonuses for language qualification in specific MOSs. These bonuses do not go far enough, but rather should be used to encourage all Army personnel—particularly those in intelligence, psychological warfare, civil affairs, and public relations—to acquire and maintain a foreign language capability. It is in any case an encouraging start.

Issues this monograph has pointed to which could be fruitfully investigated include standard procedures for extracting information from very large groups of prisoners or documents and; perhaps most important, an examination of the AOE logistical and administrative structure for adequacy with regard to handling, caring for, transporting, and securing large numbers of prisoners.

The Army has doctrinally and organizationally provided for a minimum interrogation capability. It is now up to those who run the Army to be sensitive to it, nurture it, and when the time comes, intelligently and vigorously use it.
APPENDIX 1

FACT SHEET

HQs- 142d
LTC Johnson
17 July 86

SUBJECT: 142d Military Intelligence Battalion Briefing.

PURPOSE: Provide Overview of the 142d MI Ling Bn Capabilities.

FACTS:

1. The 142d MI Ling Bn was organized Feb 1960. Since that time
the unit has grown from 60 to the 600 now on hand. The 142d is
authorized 390 and has a current strength of 155% of authorized.

2. The 142d is currently organized with a battalion
headquarters at Camp W G Williams and line companies located in
Provo, Camp W G Williams and Ogden. Future plans call for
creation of a group/brigade size headquarters with two
battalions located in Salt Lake City and line companies in
Provo, Ogden, Salt Lake City and Logan. In FY 88 the first
company outside of Utah will be formed in Hawaii. Plans for
other battalions outside of Utah are being discussed by the
Department of Army.

3. Most of the linguist in the battalion have extensive
experience in country and bring with them not only excellent
language skills, but in-depth knowledge of customs and culture
of their area. The attached sheet shows the language skills of
the battalion. Level 0 being no language ability to level 5
being native ability.

4. The 142d conducts over 150 annual training missions each
year. The missions involve linguists at all level of the army
and over the entire world. Besides providing language support
for the various exercises, the 142d provides teams of linguists
to help train other interrogators both active and reserve. The
two week language training courses taught at Brigham Young
University trains around 250 soldiers each time. (See attached
sheets)

5. When the new state headquarters building is completed the
142d will have the capability to train linguist in the Signal
intelligence skills. This facility is scheduled to be
completed at the end of 1983, and will be one of the finest
language maintenance facilities.
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101 | 44 | 41 | 37: | 519
ENDNOTES

1 See TDA 34-285J500, MI Battalion (Hvy.), Hvy Div, AOE, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1986. HUMINT MOSs are 97 series (97B, 971, and 35E-- all counterintelligence, and 97E and 973-- interrogators). SIGINT include 05G, 98 series, and 35G. If one considers ground surveillance radar personnel as IMINT-- and this writer did for these purposes-- IMINT personnel number 39, or just under 18% of the intelligence collectors. Approximately 185 personnel in the battalion have command, logistic, communications, analyst, and administrative MOSs.


9 G2 Intelligence Branch, 12th Army Group, A Study Of Operations Of G2 (Intelligence Branch) In The 12th Army Group For The Period
From 1 August 1944 To 9 May 1945, HQ, 12th Army Group, 1945, p. 39.

10 ibid., pp. 18 and 36.


14 Roy E. Appleman, South To The Naktong, North To The Yalu (June-November 1950) of The U.S. Army In The Korean War, ed. by Statson Conn, Office of the Chief of Military History (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 751-767. Far Eastern Command’s estimate of the situation drove all others. It was a primary assumption of General MacArthur’s, and therefore of Far Eastern Command, that Chinese Communist forces would not intervene. Information was either made to suit the assumption or dismissed.


Thomas Parrish, The Ultra Americans: The U.S. Role In Breaking The Nazi Codes (New York: Stein & Day, 1986), pp. 282-284. See also L. St. Clare Grondona, "Sidelights On Wilton Park," Journal Of The Royal United Services Institution, CXV (December 1970), 36, where it states: "Had it not been for the information obtained at these centres, it would have been London and not Hiroshima which was devastated by the first atomic bomb."


It is, of course, theoretically possible to have a mid intensity conflict conducted solely by air or naval forces, but such conflicts produce few PW or documents and are not germane to a paper on Army IDI.


27

AOE information for corps and below was obtained via PHONCON with CPT Chamberlain of the US Army Intelligence Center and School’s Combat Developments Center on 9 May 1986.

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US, Department of the Army, EC 34-37, EAC Intelligence And Electronic Warfare Operations (U) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985). The six EAC MI "brigades" will be formed in support of USAREUR, CENTCOM, NE Asia, the Pacific (less Korea), CONUS, and SOUTHCOM.

30

The 142d is a unique organization in the U.S. Army force structure. It is the Army’s only large pool of linguists available to augment the active component capabilities. Incidentally, it is also one of the very few MI units in the Army National Guard. A fact sheet on the battalion is included as Appendix A. The information on the 142d was obtained via PHONCON and follow-up letter with 2LT Lawrence N. Sheriff, Training Officer, 142d MI Battalion (Linguist) (UTARNG), AVN 924-5207. Regarding adequacy of linguist augmentation for Europe, this writer, while acting as War Plans Officer in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence at HQ, USAREUR, developed and submitted in 1983 the consolidated USAREUR Statement of Requirements for Linguist Augmentation. While the total figure thus requested by USAREUR is classified, it is larger than the proposed augmentation under AOE by a considerable margin. The shortfall is a major reason for the projected expansion of the 142d MI Bn in January 1987.

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p. 31.

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37 Allied Translator and Interpreter Service, op. cit., p. 9.


43 McChristian, op. cit., p. 34.


45 GE, PL, CZ, RU, UK, HU, BU, SC, TU, NR, FR, FL, DU, DN, IT, SU, & GK.

46 The logistic considerations of handling PW became serious enough for 12th Army Group in World War II that toward the end of the Ardennes campaign, when a German corps commander offered to surrender his whole corps, General Bradley, prodded by his Chief


48 See fn. 31. The 142d MI Bn is current authorized 390 personnel and has 610 on hand. By January 1987, it will transition to a brigade-sized structure with two battalion headquarters in Salt Lake City, Utah and with line companies in Provo, Ogden, Salt Lake City, and Logan (each battalion will be organized with an HHC and three line companies). By 1989, it is scheduled to be authorized 768 personnel. See Appendix A.

49 This measure, passed as a part of the 1987 Military Appropriations Bill, is designed to "... block [the] power of governors to bar deployment of their Guard units for overseas training unless the units are needed at home for local emergencies." It was proposed and passed in reaction to twelve states' governors barring their Guard units from deploying for active duty training to Central America in 1986. See "Governors Lose Power To Stop National Guard Going Overseas," *Army Times*, October 20, 1986, p. 6.

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G2 Intelligence Branch, Headquarters, 12th Army Group. A Study Of Operations Of G2 (Intelligence Branch) In The 12th Army Group, The Period From 1 August 1944 To 9 May 1945. HQ, 12th Army Group, 1945.


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Information in a letter to the writer from 2LT Lawrence N. Sheriff, Training Officer, 142d MI Bn (Linguist) (UTARNG), 30 August 1986.

Information from a telephone conversation with CPT Chamberlain of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School's Combat Developments Center on May 9, 1986.


--- **Provisional Intelligence Manual.** Washington, D.C.: War Department, 1918.


