Auftragstaktik: How Low Can You Go?

by

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By MAJ David N. Cowan, USA

Chaos is acknowledged as an integral part of battle, and future battles will be no different. At a time when the United States Army is feverishly striving to master its ability to synchronize the effects of modern weaponry on the battlefield, the potential for friction and electronic warfare to disrupt that process is at its highest. Key to fighting successfully on the AirLand battlefield is a command and control system which minimizes those effects of friction and confusion. Auftragstaktik is an approach to such a command and control system, and the U.S. Army has embraced it as the technique which best supports its new doctrine. Several questions remain as we endeavor to implement such a leadership style, most conspicuous of which is whether such a technique is universally applicable within the Army.

To implement Auftragstaktik a number of characteristics must be present and certain prerequisites met. This paper identifies some of those characteristics and prerequisites and attempts to determine their presence or absence at the lower tactical levels of command.
analyzing those factors which influence soldier development of the requisite characteristics of the Auftragstaktik leadership style, some insight is provided as to the likelihood of whether we can reasonably expect success with implementation of the technique at the lower levels.

While historical precedents exist within the American military tradition, evidence as to the lower level where it regularly applies is inconclusive. Analysis of the societal influences reveals that although a "common cultural bias" (which favors Auftragstaktik) exists, it may be as much a liability as an asset. The impact which the Army has on its soldiers does not fully promote such a leadership style, as the personnel turbulence and a perceived negative "command climate" do not foster the cohesion, trust and confidence necessary for implementation of Auftragstaktik, particularly at the lower levels. Finally, examination of the TRADOC training focus indicates that it is not until after a soldier serves at company level that he begins to receive adequate training in the skills necessary to implement Auftragstaktik. The paper concludes that battalion is the lowest level of command where we might currently expect Auftragstaktik to be employed with any degree of success.
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ABSTRACT

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Chaos is acknowledged as an integral part of battle, and future battles will be no different. At a time when the United States Army is feverishly striving to master its ability to synchronize the effects of modern weaponry on the battlefield, the potential for friction and electronic warfare to disrupt that process is at its highest. How to fight successfully on the AirLand battlefield is a command and control system which minimizes those effects of friction and confusion. 'Auftragstaktik' is an approach to such a command and control system, and the U.S. Army has embraced it as the technique which best supports its new doctrine.

Several questions remain as we endeavor to implement such a leadership style, most conspicuous of which is whether such a technique is universally applicable within the Army.

To implement Auftragstaktik, a number of characteristics must be present and certain prerequisites met. This paper identifies some of those characteristics and prerequisites and attempts to determine their presence or absence at the lower tactical levels of command. By analyzing those factors which influence soldier development of the requisite characteristics of the Auftragstaktik leadership style, some insight is provided as to the likelihood of whether we can reasonably expect success with implementation of the technique at the lower levels.

While historical prececdents exist within the American military tradition, evidence as to the lower level where it regularly applies is inconclusive. Analysis of the societal influences reveals that although a 'common cultural bias' (which favors Auftragstaktik) exists, it may be as much a liability as an asset. The impact which the Army has on its soldiers does not fully promote such a leadership style, as the personnel turbulence and a perceived negative 'command climate' do not foster the cohesion, trust and confidence necessary for implementation of Auftragstaktik, particularly at the lower levels. Finally, examination of the TRADOC training focus indicates that it is not until after a soldier serves at company level that he begins to receive adequate training in the skills necessary to implement Auftragstaktik. The paper concludes that battalion is the lowest level of command where we might currently expect Auftragstaktik to be employed with any degree of regular success.
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INTRODUCTION

There is a historical argument that those armies which have been most successful were those which did not attempt to control everything from the highest levels of command. Rather, they delegated authority and hence flexibility to subordinate commanders to exercise initiative and follow their own best judgment in the course of accomplishing the mission. This decentralized method of command is most commonly known as Auftragstaktik. Although visible in modified forms as far back as Napoleon’s Grand Armee, historians generally credit the Germans for institutionalizing the technique in the early 20th century. In their Field Regulations of 1906 the Germans acknowledged that “...combat demands thinking, independent leaders and troops, capable of independent action.” Few disagree that independent thought and actions within the chain of command are essential to success under the chaotic conditions of modern battle. Some debate exists, however, on what levels within the chain of command require and are capable of incorporating such a decentralized style of leadership. This paper will examine that issue and attempt to determine the lowest level at which the American Army might be capable of instituting such a technique.

Within the American Army Auftragstaktik has become synonymous with the term "mission orders". and high on the list of prerequisites for the technique are resourceful leaders with initiative. Auftragstaktik is much more.
however, than mission orders or a thinking leader with a flair for initiative and independent action. The Auftragstaktik order must be clear about what the commander wants to accomplish. The Auftragstaktik leader must be capable not only of independent action, but actions which support his immediate commander's intent and are in concert with the next higher commander's objectives. The leader must also be skilled in analyzing situations and have at his disposal a repertoire of options derived from his mastery of the techniques and tactics of war fighting. His judgment must be sound, and he must be capable of decision and exercising options when confronted with conflicting situations. Equally important is a mutual trust and confidence between subordinates and commanders. All of these elements are vital to the Auftragstaktik leadership technique, and throughout this paper wherever the term Auftragstaktik appears it will imply incorporation of all of the above attributes. For purposes of a general definition, Auftragstaktik will mean a decentralized method of command and control which fosters independent thought and actions within the framework of the commander's overall intent. Critical to this definition is the crucial linkage between the mission, commander's intent, and subordinate's actions.

Auftragstaktik evolved in the late 19th Century primarily as a result of the German assessment that confusion was the normal state of the battlefield and existing command techniques within their organizations were inadequate. To
remedy this situation, they decentralized command and lowered
decision-making thresholds. They found that when subordi-
nates thoroughly understood the concept and intent of an
operation, delegation of authority allowed the often required
independent actions of subordinates to be more in harmony
with the overall mission.

Under similar circumstances nearly 100 years later, the
U.S. Army found itself in the throes of a discussion on the
command and control problems of future battlefields as its
new "AirLand Battle" doctrine evolved. The concept of
Auftragstaktik had already drawn the interest of planners at
the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Headquarters and
the Combined Arms Center, but it was the Forces Command
(FORSCOM) commander, General Robert M. Shoemaker, who
precipitated action on it. Shoemaker saw the need for a
concept of command and control under adverse conditions. The
chaos of the next battlefield, he believed, would make
centralized control of subordinates always difficult and too
often impossible. In an effort to create the resourceful
leaders who would be so crucial on future battlefields, a
move toward a more decentralized method of command and
control was incorporated in the new doctrine. Although not
identified as Auftragstaktik, the essence of such a technique
is clearly visible in the May 1986 edition of FM 100-5: "The
command and control system which supports the execution of
AirLand Battle doctrine must facilitate freedom to operate,
delegation of authority, and leadership from any critical
point on the battlefield."

The visions of the high- and mid-intensity battlefields where AirLand Battle doctrine will be employed indeed reflect a need for independent action within the framework of a common intent and purpose. As pointed out in FM 100-5 the battlefield will be characterized by fluid and nonlinear operations punctuated with chaos. The pace of operations coupled with the lethality of weapons and proliferation of electronic warfare systems will make command and control extremely difficult. In the absence of communications with their commander, the ability of subordinate leaders to take charge and adapt to rapidly changing situations will pay big dividends on future battlefields.

Acknowledging the need for such a system and integrating it into an existing command structure, however, are two very different things. Even the Germans, who had announced the requirement for such a command and control system in 1916, found it necessary in 1915 to re-train units to obtain the initiative-oriented leaders necessary to achieve the spectacular success of their March 1918 offensive. Morel, directing that a procedure be instituted does not necessarily produce results. There are obviously prerequisites for integration of such a leadership style within an army.

First on the list of Auftragstaktik essentials is a commonality of understanding. Sometimes referred to as a "common cultural bias," it refers to a common undercurrent of anything from language to techniques, tactics, and
doctrine. Second, the freedom and willingness of leaders to act independently without the benefit of specific guidance from superiors needs to stem from the command climate within the organization. Third, information in the form of a concept of the operation and commander's intent must be widely disseminated to keep the subordinate's actions within the parameters of mission accomplishment. Fourth, experienced judgment within the ranks is needed to facilitate selection of the best course of action when confronted with options. And finally, the leaders must have confidence in themselves and trust not only in those for whom they work but also in those who work for them.¹

Any change worth making will naturally entail risks. It is conceivable that an over-zealous dose of initiative permeating the ranks runs the risk of failure because of independent actions conducted without sound judgment or a thorough appreciation of the mission and intent. One need only recall J.E.B Stuart's liberal interpretation of his orders from Lee and his conspicuous absence from the battlefield at Gettysburg to realize that failure of such a command technique can occur even among the best of leaders.¹ The risks of failure from actions such as Stuart's, however, are far less than the risks of an army becoming paralyzed as the result of a lack of guidance from the top.

Where then within our army might we expect Auftragstaktik to be employed? Is there a level where the risks of not tightly controlling an operation outweigh the advantages
of decentralized control? To what level will we be able to produce leaders with the skills necessary to implement Auftragstaktik within the ranks of our army? In an effort to answer these questions, two areas critical to attempts to instill Auftragstaktik within our army will be analyzed. After discussing historical precedents the environment in which our army operates will be examined to evaluate what factors might promote and what factors might inhibit the development of leader characteristics essential to a decentralized method of command and control. The current training efforts within our army will then be explored to assess how those efforts might foster or impede development of the skills necessary for Auftragstaktik. Through careful analysis of both, some insight may be provided as to the lowest level at which we might reasonably expect success in our efforts to adopt Auftragstaktik.
PAST AMERICAN EXPERIENCES

One indicator of an ability to adopt such a leadership style would be the presence (or lack) of a historical precedent for Auftragstaktik within our Army. The term "Yankee ingenuity" has for ages symbolized the American independent spirit, initiative, and drive to find a way to get the job done. All of these characteristics fit nicely into our definition of Auftragstaktik, but the question remains whether that mentality has been effectively tied into military methods of command and control.

Evidence of Auftragstaktik can be found very early in American history. Although the Germans are credited with institutionalizing the technique in the early 19th century, the idea was actually brought to Germany by the Hessian soldiers returning home from the American Revolutionary War. Lack of the resources to defeat the British outright, a myriad of different American forces and leaders attempted to compensate for the absence of an experienced "American Way of War" by adopting what was, at the time, a somewhat radical approach to warfare. It was hoped that a protracted war of raids and avoidance of decisive engagements would eventually tire the British causing them to withdraw, resulting in American independence. To wage such a war required a significant amount of initiative and aggressiveness on the part of the commanders within the loosely organized Continental Army. Separated as the operations were in most cases by both space and time, they were, nonetheless, conducted within the
confines of the fledgling democracy's stated strategic intent and focused on the common desired end. The decentralized command which facilitated execution of independent operations carried out for a common cause are what caught the eye of the Hessian observers who carried the concept back to Germany.

This somewhat unique form of command and control did not end with the revolution, and subsequent armed conflicts in America continued to exhibit some form of Auftragstaktik. Two classic illustrations are found during the American Civil War. In July of 1862 unsuccessful attempts to take the Confederate capital of Richmond resulted in a decision to mass available Federal forces for a major offensive in northern Virginia. Lieutenant General (LTG) George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac was directed to join Major General (MG) John Pope's recently organized Army of Virginia for the campaign.

Robert E. Lee's Confederate Army of Northern Virginia had been divided while defending Richmond and the critical rail network just to the north at Gordonsville. Recognizing the Union intentions, Lee rapidly began consolidating his forces to counter the threat. His intent was to defeat the Union Armies individually before they could unite. His plan was to move LTG Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson with half of the Army of Northern Virginia astride Pope's supply line while Lee created a diversion with the rest of his army. Lee hoped that as Pope maneuvered to eject Jackson from his supply routes, he (Lee) could join Jackson and defeat Pope as
he moved. As Pope maneuvered his forces, Jackson observed his general eastward movement, and became fearful that Pope would move east across the Bull Run and join McClellan before Lee could arrive. Knowing that the intent was to defeat Pope before the two Union armies could unite, Jackson decided to attack, hoping to draw Pope's army upon himself. This action fixed Pope's force, and set the stage for the final victory as the rest of Lee's army arrived. Jackson's actions provide a clear example of initiative and action within the framework of his commander's intent.

Another good example of Auftragstaktik is found a year later at the Battle of Gettysburg in July, 1863. As MG George G. Meade deployed the Army of the Potomac to face the pending attack from the west by Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, a serious flaw developed. Meade's intent was to anchor his Union defense along the Cemetery Ridge and connecting high ground just south of Gettysburg. Prior to the battle however, MG Sickles who commanded Meade's III Corps had (without Meade's permission) moved his corps forward to what he felt was a better position. This action could be interpreted as an example of Auftragstaktik failure, as Sickle's Corps was now not astride the intended Cemetery Ridge high ground. Sickle's Corps was rapidly pushed off this new terrain, and as they fell back to Cemetery Ridge, they failed to occupy a small but dominant hill known as Little Round Top. In the midst of this action, Brigadier General (BG) Gouverneur K. Warren, chief engr...
of the Potomac, happened to visit Little Round Top and
recognized that the hill was critical to the flank of the
entire Union force. On his own responsibility, he ordered a
V Corps brigade and a battery of artillery onto its summit."
These units got there a few yards ahead of the rebel attack
and drove them off in furious hand-to-hand fighting. Here
again was a subordinate who knew his commander's intent, and
took action to shape the battlefield according to that intent.

Gettysburg has an even richer example of Auftragstaktik
at a lower level. One of the units ordered by Warren to
defend Little Round Top was the 20th Maine Volunteer Regi-
ment, commanded by Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain. Chamberlain
understood his mission as received from Warren, and was
acutely aware of the importance of his regiment holding the
southern flank. Time and again on the afternoon of 2 July
the Rebels stormed Little Round Top in an effort to root out
the determined troopers of the 20th Maine. With casualties
mounting, Chamberlain had run out of ammunition but not
ideas, and ordered his soldiers to fix bayonets. He was
confident that the success or failure of the entire Union
defense rested on his ability to hold the southern flank and
was determined to be successful. As the rebel soldiers
approached his positions in their final attempt to take the
hill, Chamberlain ordered a bayonet charge and the Union
soldiers stormed out of their positions. The move so shocked
and surprised the Rebel attackers that they turned and ran
down the hill. Some not stopping until they had reached the far side of the valley. Here is clearly an example of a subordinate using initiative and all means at his disposal to accomplish the mission in line with his commander's intent.

In more modern times, additional evidence of American experiences with Auftragstaktik can be found in World War II. In support of the Normandy invasion on D-Day Eisenhower planned to employ two airborne divisions to ensure a rapid expansion of the UTAH beachhead. One of these divisions, the 82nd, had the mission of capturing the key communications center at Ste. Mere Eglise and protecting the right flank of the beachhead from attacks by German forces coming out of Cherbourg. Thanks to German antiaircraft fire during the operation, the airborne drops went awry resulting in significant dispersal and a loss of control of some forces.

Lieutenant Turner B. Turnbull, platoon leader of D Company, Second Battalion, 505th Paratroop Infantry Regiment, was the ranking officer of one of the widely dispersed drops and found himself and his men astride one of the north-south arteries out of Cherbourg. Knowing that the mission was to prevent forces attacking from the north, he set out to do with his platoon of 42 men a task that had been intended for a battalion. Supported by mortars and a self-propelled gun, he engaged a counterattacking enemy battalion at the village of Neuville-au-Plain. The platoon held its ground throughout the day and gained critically needed time for American forces in the beachhead to consolidate. There is no question that
this action was in line with his commander's intent.

Still more evidence of Auftragstaktik experiences can be found later that same year. As the Allied Forces dashed across Europe in the late fall of 1944, Hitler launched a daring counteroffensive designed to split the Allies and Force Great Britain out of the war. During battles against this effort in the Ardennes in December, the 7th Armored Division (AD) played a key role in the action in and around the village of St. Vith, a key transportation hub in the bulge.

Upon his arrival in the area of St. Vith, BG Robert W. Hasbrouck, commander of the 7th AD, observed the confusion and fluidity of the battlefield and determined that digging in and holding a specific line was not feasible. His intent then turned to denying German use of the valuable transportation network of St. Vith.

Early in the action the Germans had been successful in penetrating selected points along the American lines, and some Nazi units were attempting to exploit this success. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Robert O. Stone, commander of the 440th Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA) Battalion, was moving west along the division's southern boundary into the town of Stouvy when three German tanks came through the town firing and generally wreaking havoc. The service troops who occupied the town were understandably in an uproar, but Stone, aided by Captain (CPT) Walter J. Hughes, got everyone under control and successfully organized the defense of the town. Thus
A faltering flank to the south of St. Vith had been saved.

Actions of American leaders during battle have not always exhibited the positive spirit of Auftragstaktik, however. There are examples of opportunities to exercise initiative in line with the commander's intent being missed as well, a classic occurring in June of 1864.

Upon assuming command as general in chief of all the Union armies in March, Ulysses S. Grant formulated his plan for bringing the Civil War to a close. He felt that if he could destroy the two largest remaining Confederate Armies -- Lee's in Virginia and Johnston's in Georgia -- the South would surrender in defeat. After two months of relentless pressure on Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, Grant was very near accomplishing one half of his objective. Lee's army had withdrawn to positions around Richmond and Petersburg, and MG W.F. Smith's XVIII Corps was spearheading an assault on the vital supply depot at Petersburg. At 7:00 P.M. on 15 June, Smith's Federal forces attacked and opened up a mile wide gap in the Confederate fortifications. The door was now open for destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia's major supply depot. Taking counsel of his fears, Smith elected to await reinforcements before exploiting the situation. The Rebels reorganized their positions, and the Union missed a chance to deal what could have been a decisive blow to the Confederacy.

From the examples just cited, it is apparent that a precedent for Auftragstaktik does exist in the American military experience. The frequency and effectiveness of such
a leadership style at various levels of command, however, remains in question. It is clear that the American soldier has never wanted for bravery or a talent for taking charge of situations, but once in charge, the soldier's actions must be directed and in consonance with the overall plan. Evidence of actions influenced by a commander's intent is not conclusive as to which level of command was most successful in employing such a leadership style.
THE ENVIRONMENT

Leaders of the past who employed Auftragstaktik were able to do so because of characteristics they had developed from experiences in their environment. It is a commonly held belief that, with the exception of a few, good leaders are made not born. The readiness of individuals to display the characteristics which have been identified as important to implementation of Auftragstaktik is shaped by the conditions of their development prior to and after entry in the army. In exploring the potential impact of the environment on development of soldiers' skills, attitudes, and opinions, both societal and military influences will be studied. The focus of the examination will be on the previously identified leader characteristics necessary for the Auftragstaktik leader: common cultural bias, ability to communicate, freedom to command, judgment, and mutual trust and confidence.

Societal influences on communicative skills and commonality of understanding form the foundation of a soldiers' ability to function effectively within an organization. A cursory look at the American society might indicate that the potential for a "common cultural bias" is lacking within America because of the wide variety of backgrounds and heritages represented. As analyzed in Wm. Darryl Henderson's *Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat* however, the potential is, in fact, quite strong. Henderson identifies a number of factors which influence the soldier's attitudes, skills, and opinions, and most contribute favorably to a cohesive
A Common and unique history: This is a strong source of common values, and the strong socialization process experienced by most Americans at school, at home, and with associates fosters consensus about unique American values.

A Common and Unique Culture: Although American culture is pluralistic, most citizens feel and support values that can be described as uniquely American.

A Common and Unique Language: Because English is so widely spoken and understood throughout the United States, ease of communication is facilitated among American soldiers.

A common and Unique Religion: The broad umbrella of Christianity that covers most religions in the United States offers some basis for common religious values.

Thus, it appears that there is a commonality within our society that must be counted as a positive contributing factor in the development of leaders with the requisite leader traits for Auftragstaktik. From such tangible basics as a common language to the less tangible benefits derived from a common history and shared beliefs, all are a part of the common cultural bias necessary for effective cooperation.

This first impression of our "common cultural bias" warrants further investigation, however. It is recognized that American standards of education have fallen significant-
ly in the past decade. In verbal communications skills, the average score on Scholastic Aptitude Tests (SAT) between 1972-82 fell by over 4%. Although there are some encouraging signs of a recent upswing in this trend, the Army has felt the impact. Turning again to Henderson’s cohesion, two illustrations demonstrate the effect: “First, the Army has been forced to rewrite many manuals as a result of significantly lower reading and comprehension skills. Second, some minority soldiers are prevented from becoming fully integrated into primary groups because they do not possess sufficient English skills.” American colleges, the major source of officers through the Reserve Officers Training Program (ROTC), also exhibit signs of a decline in standards. An editorial in the Washington Post in 1983 described an alarming lack of appreciation for American military history or political science within the collegiate community.

Our society’s “common cultural bias” may not, therefore, be the significant positive influence one initially presumes. The ability to communicate an effective concept of the operation or intent is questionable when common language skills are lacking. An American heritage cannot be perceived when American history is not known. Cohesion and a commonality of understanding under such circumstances is difficult to achieve. Some of the problems may be overcome through training of the soldiers after their entry into the military, but there is potential that initial entry officers and enlisted men and women may not possess the desired communica-
tions skills or commonality in all areas necessary adequately to support Auftragstaktik. These problems would be most acute at the lower levels of command where the initial entry soldiers serve.

Thus far the discussion has centered around the societal impacts on the shaping of a soldier's skills and attitudes, but what about the Army itself and the influence it exerts on our soldiers? There are three impacts which the Army might have on developing soldiers. One impact is the training effort discussed later in this paper, the second is stability within the army, and the third is the command climate in which our training and operations are carried out. The Auftragstaktik attributes most influenced by stability and command climate are: mutual trust and confidence, freedom to command, sound judgment, and capability for independent action. The aspect of stability in our army and how it affects the environment which shapes our soldiers' attitudes is examined first.

A gradual move toward an All Volunteer Force culminated with the end of the draft in 1973. Concurrent with this was the reduction in force after Vietnam and the widespread disdain of the military on the part of the public after a long and unpopular war. Faced with the challenge of recruiting and maintaining a 'professional force' and under rising criticism from a watchful Congress, the Army made some fundamental changes in its methods of operation.

In an effort to meet the recruiting demands of the AVF,
many policy decisions were designed to appeal to the personal self interest of the soldier. Efforts were made to bring military pay scales more in line with the civilian community and adequately compensate through assignments or salaries for special training or skills of the soldiers. The result, according to Charles Moskos, was a shift in the Army toward an "occupational model" and away from a professional army. The suggestion is that the soldier has perhaps become more motivated by financial incentives, an "economic man" so to speak, making decisions primarily for tangible gain. Indeed, there is evidence that such a mentality exists. Even within the NCO corps, "tangible incentives are now necessary to entice NCOs into combat-arms jobs". Soldiers now have a greater ability to influence their career patterns, and with avoidance of the "hard jobs" and personal considerations driving assignments choices, turbulence in the combat arms leader positions will continue. The result will be an inability to develop the mutual trust, confidence, and commonality within units essential to Auftragstaktik implementation, with the greatest impact at the lower levels.

A second factor contributing to instability within our Army is personnel turbulence created by our own assignment system. Demands for filling the ever critical overseas assignments constantly tax the Army's personnel system and force a frequent rotation of soldiers. At brigade and battalion levels there is some evidence of stability thanks to the current emphasis on extended command tours. At platoon
and squad level, however, the personnel situation remains highly turbulent. Going even deeper to the fire-team or crew level, there is extreme fluidity. A recent assessment revealed a 16-percent turnover every three months in most battalions, with a complete turnover within a battalion every one and a half years, and this does not even consider reassignments within the battalion. The roots of this dilemma can be found once again in efforts to support the AVF. The driving force of many personnel assignments is consideration for the soldier, and shortened tours overseas and in so-called hardship assignments forces an almost constant shuffling of personnel.

In short, stability as a factor for development of a common cultural bias within our army does not appear favorable. Turning once again to Henderson's Cohesion, "The maintenance of high frequency of association and structured relationships...is very weak within the U.S. Army." There is a positive side to this issue in the form of Army initiatives designed to address the problem by bringing some stability into the ranks through regimental affiliations and unit rotation efforts. These programs are not yet fully implemented, however, and their fate is questionable. Should these programs survive, their effect at the squad and platoon level is debatable as there are additional factors which affect stability of the lower ranking soldiers.

The characteristics of freedom and willingness to act independently, sound judgment, and ability to make decisions
are all products of the command climate within an army. The command climate of our army is always a controversial subject with perhaps as many definitions as there are units in the army. There is little doubt however that it influences heavily our ability to produce resourceful leaders with the initiative, judgment, and decisiveness so essential to an Auftragstaktik leader.

One of the most recent sources on command climate within units is a War College Study Project conducted by four ex-battalion commanders during the '85-’86 course. The paper stemmed from a similar study conducted in 1984 by three Army officers at the Naval Post-Graduate School. Both papers focused on excellent battalions and brigades within the Army in an effort to find the key elements of success within these organizations.

Turning first to the War College study, the officers found that "to a man the battalion commanders in these excellent brigades felt that they had 'freedom to command' and this enabled them to employ the same techniques with their subordinates." During visits and interviews with four CONUS brigades, they found an overwhelmingly positive command climate where leaders were free to exercise their initiative and act independently. "Missions given and standards expected are clearly articulated, however methods to achieve the desired results are empowered to the leader who is directly responsible to accomplish the mission." Surveys conducted in conjunction with the study verify these
ports. Of the soldiers surveyed, a full 91.4% felt that the
brigade commander allowed his subordinates to command. When
asked if the battalion commanders were in competition with
each other, 48% felt that they were, while 37% felt that they
were not. While these figures reflect the continued presence
of the often considered negative influence of competition,
they indicate that at least some of the walls preventing
cohesion and common understanding have been broken down.

The "Excellence in the Combat Arms" study conducted by
students at the Naval Post Graduate School had similar
findings. In the course of their research they found a
healthy command climate which fostered independent actions
and encouraged initiative prevalent in most of the battalions
studied. In the population surveyed they found leaders who
proudly claimed that they were "risk takers", and that "the
old 'Cya' attitude just doesn't cut it anymore". Mutual
trust and confidence ran both ways in the chain of command.
The study verified that "excellent units allow mistakes", and
leaders were concerned with developing experienced judgment
and decisiveness within their units.

Contrary to the two rather optimistic viewpoints just
presented, however, the comments and opinions of officers
attending the battalion/brigade Pre-Command Course at Fort
Leavenworth indicate that there is still room for improvement
in the command climate. In surveys conducted during the
course of instruction during FY '86, a number of opinions
surfaced which conflict with the findings of the above
studies. Composite lists were formed reflecting the opinions of a majority of the officers on three questions concerning our efforts to implement the AirLand Battle doctrine. The first question asked what were the key leadership imperatives for subordinate leaders in ALB doctrine? Their responses tended to agree with the assumptions of this paper and included, among other things, technical and tactical competence, initiative, cohesion, risk taking, decisiveness, trust, and ability to communicate. When asked what they felt senior leaders must do to develop subordinate leaders with these characteristics, among the most prevalent responses were: clearly state intent, require initiative, demonstrate trust, "power down", resist tendency to centralize, and accept personal risk. The officers' responses to the third question -- are there pressures, policies, or practices that preclude your accomplishing these tasks -- are key to an assessment of the current command climate of the Army. The list of responses had "Boss" in the number one slot. Personnel turbulence as well as Bureaucratic "BS", reports, inefficiency, and the requirement for RBIs (Responses By Indorsement) on every mistake distracted them from accomplishing their tasks. Statistics and a "Zero Defects" mentality as well as weak or timid commanders and leadership by threat and fear also contributed to preventing them from doing their jobs. Empirical data on these assertions is not available and it is not possible to determine their frequency of occurrence. There is apparently, however, some concern about
these distractors which might prevent establishing an environment conducive to development of Auftragstaktik leader skills.

In an effort to temper these two apparently conflicting viewpoints an informal survey of a number of officers at Fort Leavenworth was conducted in support of this paper. By means of interviews it was hoped that some inferences might be drawn to help illuminate not only the current command climate of our army, but also the receptiveness we might expect in our efforts to incorporate Auftragstaktik.

Focusing on those segments of the survey which reflect the command climate, an extremely positive attitude on the subject of freedom to command among Lieutenant Colonels existed. Most felt that they had the trust and confidence of their brigade commander, and only two brigade commanders were identified as having centralized tendencies. As for the degree of freedom and independence they allowed their subordinates, most felt that their subordinates were quite competent and delegated authority accordingly.

Of the eight Majors interviewed, opinions varied as to the amount of freedom they had been granted in positions they had held. Half felt they were granted total freedom, while the others felt they were somewhat or severely restricted in performing their duties. When queried as to how they viewed themselves, all but one felt he was a decentralized operator, tolerated mistakes, and granted his subordinates extreme latitude in the performance of their duties. Three of the
Majors mentioned having some degree of a fear of failure, with a comment made about how "statistics (at brigade level) determine success".

Interviews conducted with seven Captains attending the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS) produced similar results; however in cases where the interviewee had worked for a centralized leader, comments as to the adverse effects of such a leadership style were pronounced. There was a refreshing awareness of the necessity for decentralized operations and that allowing subordinates to try and accepting their mistakes was one of the sure ways to develop sound judgment and initiative.

Although this informal survey provides no conclusive data, it does reveal that the command climate in some units does not foster the development of initiative and judgment critical to implementation of Auftragstaktik style of leadership. The problem appears to increase in magnitude at the lower levels of command. In the more definitive Professional Development of Officer's Study (PDIS) conducted in 1984, it is also suggested that development of a command climate supportive of leader creativity and initiative is a major challenge still facing the Army.

As yet unexamined is the receptivity to an Auftragstaktik style of leadership which we might expect to find in the ranks of the army today. Communication of orders, confidence in leaders and subordinates, and command climate were the thrust of a survey conducted as research for this paper.
At the Sergeant Major Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas.

Well over half of those surveyed indicated that while serving as a squad leader or platoon sergeant they normally received orders and intentions sufficiently clear to allow them to operate independent of their higher headquarters should the situation arise. Opinions were mixed on the command climate of units in which they had served. However, a clear majority were of the opinion that authority should be delegated and some mistakes tolerated to foster subordinate development. Uncertainty was again apparent regarding confidence in leaders' selection of the best course of action and subordinates' ability to act independently. When asked directly, what is the lowest level at which we might expect success in our efforts to instill Auftragstaktik, a narrow majority felt that the platoon level was best suited for such a leadership style, with the remaining divided between squad and lower or company and higher levels.

The inferences which can be drawn from this study of societal and military influences on the soldiers' environment indicate the existence of some trends in the development of characteristics conducive to Auftragstaktik. Soldiers currently entering the army may be somewhat lacking in an appreciation of American heritage, shared values, and ability to communicate. Some effort will be required to standardize the "common cultural bias". In the area which most heavily influences development of mutual trust and confidence -- stability -- it appears that our Army does well with tours of
duty at battalion or above, but is still struggling with efforts to stabilize assignments at the lower levels. Small unit cohesion suffers as a result. Although reviews on the command climate issue are somewhat mixed, a general assessment is that below battalion level the command climate may not be conducive to development of the initiative. Judgment, and decisiveness required of Auftragsstatik leaders. Indicators of the overall receptiveness of soldiers to such a leadership style are generally good; however, confidence in the soldiers ability to implement Auftragsstatik does not appear to be universal.
TRAINING FOCUS

Efforts to incorporate Auftragstaktik within our army will entail significant training in a number of areas. Although it appears that some leader traits are products purely of one's environment, in reality virtually all of the requisite characteristics and skills of Auftragstaktik leaders can be developed through training. By exploring in turn each of the Army's major service schools' Program of Instruction (POI) to determine its focus on selected skills, it is hoped that further indications may appear as to the level at which we might reasonably expect success in our efforts to incorporate Auftragstaktik. In examining the POIs, the focus will be on training which is aimed at developing the skills of analyzing situations, developing a repertoire of options (from a mastery of techniques and tactics), decision making, preparing operations orders (concept and intent), and, to a lesser degree, developing judgment and confidence.

The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC hereafter CGSC) is a 40 week course conducted annually at Fort Leavenworth Kansas. Although the course covers a myriad of subjects, by far the greatest amount of allocated studies is devoted to training in operations. It is assumed that the officer has previously mastered the techniques and tactics of warfighting, and the focus of CGSC level training is on the planning and execution of operations at division and corps levels. During an intense six weeks the officer is instruc-
ted on fundamental staff techniques, the estimate process, decision making, and planning. Numerous practical exercises are employed to enhance and refine the officer's skills in these areas. Complementing this training is an additional two weeks devoted to staff battle exercises requiring the officer to apply his skills in analyzing situations, formulating courses of actions, decision making, and developing concepts of operations. At intervals throughout the year instruction on both oral and written communications skills is provided to enhance the officer's ability to communicate his concept and intent to subordinates.

The CGSC curriculum supports training efforts required to produce an Auftragstaktik leader by establishing a common foundation of principles for the decision making process and fundamentals of tactical operations. When an officer graduates from the course, he is intimately familiar with AirLand Battle Doctrine and has been exposed to training in many of the skills required to implement Auftragstaktik.

The Army's Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS) is also conducted at Fort Leavenworth and is a two part course aimed at Captains in their sixth through ninth year of service. Part one of the course is non-resident and requires the officer to complete a number of correspondence courses, 40% of which relate to the fundamentals of military decision making, the communicative art, and combined arms operations. Part two of the course is eight weeks of resident instruction, during which the officer spends nearly
six weeks refining and applying his skills in staff techniques, decision making, planning and communications.

As at CGSC, the instruction provided at CAS makes significant strides toward developing the skills essential to leaders expected to employ an Auftragstaktik style of leadership. The officer graduating from CAS is well versed in the decision making process and planning, and has developed additional confidence in himself and his judgment.

The Officer Advanced Course (OAC) is established for officers in their fourth through sixth year of service and designed to prepare officers for duty as company level commanders and staff officers at battalion and brigade levels. Although a common core curriculum is established by TRADOC, emphasis on selected subjects varies from school to school. It is at these schools that officers develop their repertoire of techniques and tactics which will give them the options needed to fight and win on the battlefield. It is at these schools also that the officers are exposed to perhaps the broadest spectrum of subjects in the Army school system. The OAC curriculum does not appear to place the emphasis that CAS and CGSC do on the leadership skills in question. For example, there are as many hours devoted to NBC training as to decision making and order preparation.

The OAC schools exhibit the first signs of a breakdown in the continuity of training emphasis on Auftragstaktik leader skills. The officer graduating from OAC has been exposed to all the requisite skills for employing Auftrags-
However the degree of development of these skills is questionable.

The Officer Basic Course (OBC) is similar to OAC in that it too is conducted by the various branch schools. Designed for Lieutenants in their first year of service, the course is 16 weeks long and aimed at preparing officers for their first duty assignment. There is a common core curriculum established by TRADOC, but many of the subjects taught are by necessity branch peculiar. As in the OAC, the schedule is intense with a broad variety of subjects taught, but far fewer than at OACs. The focus in much of the training is on development of the officer's confidence by educating him on many basic subjects from the role of the different arms to capabilities and limitations of various weapon systems. A significant amount of time is spent on tactical training and the officer is exposed to many of the fundamental techniques of warfighting. Encouraging is the provision for 84 hours of remedial training for those officers who do not meet college freshman level English and reading standards.

The OBC provides a start point for the development of the *Auftragstaktik* leader requisite skills. It is the exceptional officer, however, who graduates with a solid foundation in these skills. It can be assumed that an OBC graduate is aware of many of the traits and skills required to employ *Auftragstaktik*, but a significant amount of mentoring will be required to develop his proficiency in the tasks.
There is an apparent lack of emphasis on training in the Auftragstaktik requisite skills at OGCs and OGCs, and Leadership Lessons Learned at the National Training Center (NTC) tend to verify such a problem. Observer Controllers (OCs) are assigned to each company level unit within the battalions training at the NTC, and they are in an excellent position to assess and evaluate trends of performance during the exercises. The OCs comment that there are critical problems with leaders' planning, communication of intent, delegation, and initiative at the company level. A second problem area lies in the area of leader development during time in garrison (before they arrive at the NTC). If leaders do not develop subordinate leaders during garrison training, they lack trust in these subordinates and are reluctant to delegate tasks and authority on the NTC battlefield. This problem was seen as particularly acute at the company level. "The lack of adequate guidance in planning, poor communication of the commander's intent, and a lack of self-confidence contribute to a serious lack of initiative by leaders at the company level and below (at the NTC)."

The U.S. Army training system is perhaps the finest in the world. The broad range of subjects covered in the course of an officer's progress through the various schools make him one of the most intellectual warriors in history. But to adopt such a leadership technique as Auftragstaktik requires a training effort focused on specific leadership traits and skills. The Germans attribute their success in employment of
Auftragstaktik during World War II in part to "...a century-long tradition" and "...peacetime training." We do not have a century to develop a tradition, and although our training efforts are headed in the right direction, we still have significant room for improvement, especially at the lower levels.
CONCLUSION

General Herman Balck, famous commander of the German 11th Panzer Division on the Eastern Front during World War II is quoted as saying "Auftragstaktik is not limited to any levels; it applies to the division commander and his Chief of Staff just as much as the tank commander and his gunner." Few people would disagree with that statement, and indeed, of the officers and NCOs interviewed in conjunction with this paper, an overwhelming majority felt that there should be no lower limit to our efforts to incorporate Auftragstaktik.

The question of this monograph, however, is not how should we go, but how low can we go with Auftragstaktik?

The conclusion is that successful incorporation of Auftragstaktik below battalion level is not currently feasible. There will be, of course, those leaders capable of receiving a "mission order" and through initiative and talent achieving success with minimal guidance. That is the exception, however, and it should not be expected that Auftragstaktik as a leadership style will be the rule below battalion level.

This conclusion is based on three assessments.

In evaluation of the environment which shapes soldiers' traits and skills, it is probable that the drop in reading and comprehension skills within our society in general may have an effect on initial entry officers and enlisted personnel. If the Army education system is unable to rectify this apparent disparity, our ability to communicate and develop a common understanding and cooperation within units...
will be adversely affected. It has also been pointed out that stability and command climate are most favorable at battalion and higher levels. The stability problem at the lower levels of command precludes development of the cohesion within units which is so critical to mutual trust and confidence both up and down the chain of command. The perceived negative command climate at some of the lower levels of command in our Army has an unfavorable effect on the development of a number of the skills identified as essential to implementing Auftragstaktik. Not allowing subordinates to make mistakes deprives them of valuable learning experiences which would otherwise contribute to development of their judgement. Leaders unwilling to take risks and delegate deny subordinates the chances to employ their own talents, thereby hindering development of not only the subordinates' confidence, but the leaders' confidence in his subordinate as well. Finally, subordinates who are victims of over-bearing leaders demanding "zero defects" will not be inclined to make decisions, take the initiative, or act independently. In summary, both societal and military influences hinder development of the requisite Auftragstaktik skills in soldiers at the lower levels.

Examination of the training focus within our Army indicated that training at CAS¹ and CGSC appears to be on track with what is necessary to produce leaders capable of employing Auftragstaktik. These officers have already served at the company level, however, and any impact they might have
will be seen at battalion and higher levels. There is an apparent emphasis on the training of techniques and tactical skills of battle present in OAC and OBC, but it is somewhat obscured by the myriad of other subjects our junior officers are expected to learn. Without a solid foundation in the basic techniques and tactics of warfighting, options to the leader are limited and a "common cultural bias" of battle drill will be not be present. The comments by JCs from the NTC support the assessment that there are problems in operations at the lower tactical levels, and emphasize that a problem exists in developing de-centralized leaders who can clearly articulate a concept of the operation and intent.

Final support of the conclusion is drawn from the attitudes and opinions of soldiers expected to implement such a leadership style. Among the Majors and Captains interviewed for this monograph, most felt that there was a significant lack of decisiveness on the part of subordinates with whom they had worked in previous assignments. Many felt that roughly only half of their subordinates would venture to make a decision, and of those decisions, little over half would be supportive of the commander's intent. Another recurring theme in the survey was the transmission (or lack thereof) of an understandable intent. Whether that was because of the way it was communicated or the way it was comprehended, the intent was often unclear and did not provide the crucial link between the subordinate's actions and mission accomplishment. These opinions were reinforced
by the responses of the NCOs participating in the survey. Transmission of a clear intent was perceived as sometimes a problem, as was the ability of subordinates to act independently.

This conclusion does not necessarily mean that incorporation of Auftragstaktik below battalion level is not an attainable goal. Indeed, as pointed out earlier a clear majority of leaders surveyed felt that such a leadership style could be successfully employed at platoon level, with a substantial number feeling that it could be applicable at squad/crew or even individual levels. There will always be those select individuals who will rise to the occasion and through initiative and personal perseverance salvage a desperate situation. The challenge is to expand that base of select individuals to a solid foundation of the resourceful leaders needed for the AirLand battlefield. With continued emphasis on development of subordinates through a command climate which fosters initiative and independent thought, and a training focus which highlights the requisite skills of an Auftragstaktik leader, that challenge can be met at all levels within our Army.
Appendix 1 (Summary of questions used to guide discussions during interviews of officers at Fort Leavenworth in October 1986.)

* How often during operations was an intent disseminated to you?

* When you received an intent, was it an understandable, workable intent?

* How would you assess the "Command Climate" as it relates to your superiors?

* What kind of command climate did you try to foster?

* Was there a "fear of failure" within your last unit? At what level? Why?

* Was your boss a centralized or decentralized leader?

* What kind of leader do you consider yourself?

* How far down the chain of command were you confident that your instructions and orders were disseminated?

* How much trust do you feel your boss had in you?

* How much trust did you have in your subordinates?

* How much confidence did you have in your subordinates' judgement? Decisiveness?

* Do you feel there should be a lower limit to our efforts to instill Auftragstaktik?

* Do you feel there is a lower limit to our ability to instill Auftragstaktik?

* Do you have any general comments on the subject?
1. I would classify the operations orders I have received from my leaders as:
   a. Very Detailed (24%)
   b. Detailed (42%)
   c. No opinion (3%)
   d. General (27%)
   e. Very General (4%)

2. As a squad leader/vehicle commander, I received a complete order - i.e., the full concept and my platoon's piece of the action:
   a. Almost always (27%)
   b. Often (33%)
   c. About half the time (22%)
   d. Seldom (14%)
   e. Almost never (4%)

3. As a squad leader/vehicle commander, I knew what the mission of the company was:
   a. Almost always (46%)
   b. Often (24%)
   c. About half the time (16%)
   d. Seldom (5%)
   e. Almost never (9%)

4. As a platoon sergeant, I received a complete order - i.e., the full concept and my company's piece of the action:
   a. Almost always (46%)
   b. Often (42%)
   c. About half the time (11%)
   d. Seldom (0%)
   e. Almost never (1%)

5. As a platoon sergeant, I knew what the mission of the battalion was:
   a. Almost always (41%)
   b. Often (25%)
   c. About half the time (27%)
   d. Seldom (3%)
   e. Almost never (4%)
Appendix 2 (Questions and responses of NCO Survey, Fort Bliss, Texas, Oct 1986)

6. As a squad leader/vehicle commander, I disseminated the full concept of the operation to all of my subordinates:
   
   a. Almost always (40%)
   b. Often (31%)
   c. About half the time (17%)
   d. Seldom (9%)
   e. Almost never (3%)

7. When I was a squad leader/vehicle commander, my subordinates knew what the mission of the platoon was:
   
   a. Almost always (58%)
   b. Often (30%)
   c. About half the time (6%)
   d. Seldom (5%)
   e. Almost never (1%)

8. While serving as a platoon sergeant I felt all members of my platoon understood the full concept of the operation:
   
   a. Almost always (37%)
   b. Often (34%)
   c. About half the time (22%)
   d. Seldom (5%)
   e. Almost never (1%)

9. When I was a platoon sergeant, the members of my platoon knew what the company mission was:
   
   a. Almost always (50%)
   b. Often (27%)
   c. About half the time (18%)
   d. Seldom (1%)
   e. Almost never (4%)

The next section asks for your opinion on the command climate in units in which you have served. Consider all of your assignments to include both troop and staff duty.
Appendix 2 (Questions and responses of NCO Survey. Fort Bliss, Texas, Oct 1986)

10. When executing orders issued by my leaders, I understood that I could deviate from the plan if necessary.
   a. Strongly agree (14%)
   b. Agree (50%)
   c. No opinion (5%)
   d. Disagree (26%)
   e. Strongly Disagree (5%)

11. When issuing orders/instructions, I expect my subordinates to:
   a. follow the orders explicitly (16%)
   b. modify the instructions if the need arises (61%)
   c. come see you if there is a discrepancy (21%)
   d. other (please specify) (12%)

12. Consider this situation: Your unit’s mission is to defend a riverline and be prepared to counterattack if the occasion arises. You have told a subordinate of yours to move out with his element and defend a bridge from the near side of the river. Upon arrival at the site the subordinate discovers that he would have significantly better fields of fire on the far side of the river. Unfortunately the subordinate has lost radio contact with you. Would you expect him to:
   (8%) a. Establish his position per your instructions.
   (62%) b. Occupy the far side of the river and send a runner to advise you of the modification.
   (14%) c. Send a runner to you to request permission to modify the plan.
   (12%) d. Act in accordance with his own best judgment
   (0%) e. Other (Please Specify)

13. During your most recent troop assignment, what percentage of your subordinates could effectively receive, understand, and comply with the concept of operations and tactical situation?
   a. less than 25% (4%)
   b. 26-50% (15%)
   c. 51-75% (51%)
   d. more than 75% (30%)
Appendix I. (Questions and responses of NCO Survey, Fort Bliss, Texas, Oct 1986)

14. Based on your experience, what percentage of your subordinates (regardless of length of acquaintance) did you allow to modify your instructions if the situation warranted it?

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<th>Option</th>
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<tr>
<td>a. less than 25%</td>
<td>34%</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. 26-50%</td>
<td>23%</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. 51-75%</td>
<td>28%</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. more than 75%</td>
<td>15%</td>
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15. How many of the leaders you have worked for have had your full confidence?

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<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. less than 25%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. 26-50%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 51-75%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. more than 75%</td>
<td>44%</td>
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16. Again regarding leaders/commanders you have worked for, how often have you been satisfied that the orders they issued to you reflected the best course of action?

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<th>Option</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Almost always</td>
<td>14%</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Often</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. About half the time</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Seldom</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Almost never</td>
<td>1%</td>
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17. In the past, when I or one of my peers made a mistake, the leaders were:

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<tr>
<td>a. Tolerant</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Somewhat tolerant</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. No opinion</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Not very tolerant</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Not tolerant</td>
<td>4%</td>
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18. In units to which I have been assigned, leaders and commanders:

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<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Almost always delegated</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Sometimes delegated</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. No opinion</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Seldom delegated</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Almost never delegated</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The next three questions center around your opinion of what the climate in an organization should be. Answer the questions reflecting how you would like to see the Army operate.
19. I feel leaders should:
   a. Tolerate mistakes (15%)
   b. Tolerate some mistakes (79%)
   c. No opinion (1%)
   d. Tolerate very few mistakes (4%)
   e. Not tolerate mistakes (0%)

20. I believe that authority to interpret and modify orders should (when the situation warrants it) be:
   a. Almost always delegated (28%)
   b. Sometimes delegated (64%)
   c. No opinion (3%)
   d. Seldom delegated (5%)
   e. Almost never delegated (0%)

21. The Airland Battlefield will demand highly resourceful leaders capable of independent thought and actions at all levels. What level of command do you feel is the lowest which we can reasonably expect orders to be interpreted and modified if required, and still be assured of mission accomplishment?
   a. Brigade or higher (1%)
   b. Battalion (8%)
   c. Company (12%)
   d. Platoon (46%)
   e. Squad or lower (33%)

22. I feel that the Army has provided me with effective training in the art of decision making and independent thought/actions.
   a. Strongly agree (48%)
   b. Agree (41%)
   c. No opinion (4%)
   d. Disagree (6%)
   e. Strongly disagree (1%)
ENDNOTES


5. Ibid.


15. Ibid, page 392.


22. Ibid, page 95.


30. MAJ Jerry A. Simonsen, CPT Herbert L. Frandsen, CPT David A. Hoopengardner, "Excellence in the Combat Arms." (Study Project, Department of Administrative Sciences, U.S. Naval Post Graduate School, December 1984).


33. Seventeen officers were interviewed in October 1986 to get an impression of the command climate and general attitudes toward Auftragstaktik. Three Lieutenant Colonels, eight Majors, and seven Captains were interviewed. All had served in command or staff positions with troops within the past 6 months. A list of topics discussed during the interviews is at Appendix 1.

35. Eighty Non-Commissioned Officers attending the First Sergeants Course and Sergeant Majors Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas, were surveyed in October 1986. Survey questions and responses are at Appendix 2.

36. The USACGSC is a forty week course conducted annually at Fort Leavenworth Kansas. The target population for the course is promotable Captains through Lieutenant Colonels, and approximately half of all serving officers have the opportunity to attend the course. For officers unable to attend resident CGSC, a non-resident course is available. The purpose of the course is to prepare officers for duty as commanders and staff officers at division and higher levels. Source of the information cited is the CGSC '86-'87 school year Program of Instruction (POI).

37. The U.S. Army CAS is a two part course also conducted at Fort Leavenworth. The course is aimed at Captains in their sixth through ninth year of service, many of which have completed tours of command at the company level. The purpose of the course is to develop officers to function as staff officers in battalion, brigade, and division assignments. Source of the information cited is the CAS '86 POI.

38. The Officer Advanced Course is established for officers in their fourth through sixth year of service and is designed to prepare officers for duty as company level commanders and staff officers at battalion and brigade levels. The courses are 16 weeks in length and conducted by the various branch schools. Source of the information cited is the Armor Officer Advanced Course FY '87 POI (DRAFT), Fort Knox, KY.

39. The Officer Basic Course is designed for officers in their first year of active duty. The course is sixteen weeks in length and aimed at preparing officers for their first duty assignment. Source of the information cited is Armor Officer Basic Course FY '87 POI (DRAFT), Fort Knox, KY.

40. MAJ Samuel C. Endicott, Center for Army Leadership, and Earl C. Pence, PhD, Army Research Institute, "NTL Leadership Lessons Learned," (Combined Arms Training Activity, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 Sep 1986) page 8.


42. Ibid, page 22.
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Program of Instruction (POI) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Ks. 1986-87.

POI, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Ks, 1986.


Auftragstaktik: How Low Can you Go

by

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1 December 1986

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