The Right Place at the Right Time -
A Dilemma for the Tactical Commander

by

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The Right Place At The Right Time - A Dilemma For The Tactical Commander

MAJ Charles E. Burgdorf, USA

This monograph discusses considerations that a tactical commander should make in determining his position during an engagement, and from these considerations suggests criteria that should guide his decision. The tactical commander is a significant combat multiplier by virtue of his rank and experience and his placement on the battlefield deserves the same care that is given to the overall task organization. The commander's position is a significant element in the command and control scheme. It affects his ability to know what is going on and to influence the combat action in accordance with his will.

The monograph first examines a series of historical examples from World Wars I and II, in which the tactical commander's position figured prominently in the outcome of the battle. From these examples a number of considerations for selection of the tactical commander's position are derived. Then it examines the principal differences between historical and contemporary combat environments and what these differences suggest for...
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the contemporary tactical commander in choosing his position on the battlefield. Next it examines a series of contemporary combat and training examples, to refine or confirm previously determined considerations. As part of the conclusion, the paper offers a synthesis between criteria suggested by both historical and contemporary examples.

Given a consistent set of considerations for the tactical commander's position selection, the paper examines implications that the conclusions have for current doctrine, equipment design, and training. With a "go to war with what we've got" view, the paper suggests several areas of training in which a greater awareness of the importance of position selection might readily be implemented.
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ABSTRACT

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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

The positioning of the tactical commander on the battlefield can be a significant combat multiplier or it can deprive the unit of the person who best understands the intent at a critical time. History is replete with examples of the tactical commander's position having both positive and negative results by virtue of its contribution to the commander's ability to influence the battle. But the "best" position is not intuitively obvious to most, especially in an Officer Corps that is not intuitively obvious to most, especially in an Officer Corps that is not experienced in recent combat.

"It is quite normal for the commander who is experiencing battle for the first time, no matter what his rank or length of training, to devote most of his time to worrying about the welfare and conduct of his men instead of continuing to ply himself with the questions: 'Am I at my right place? Am I doing the right thing?' This is a perfectly human trait. Indeed it would be commendable if it were not excessively costly." 1

Recent lessons both in combat and in training, indicate the issue has not been subjected to that analysis which would provide the inexperienced commander with a practical starting point. 2 There needs to be a better understanding of the process by which a commander chooses his position on the battlefield during the engagement; it is to that end that this paper is written.

It should be obvious from the start that different combat conditions will require different considerations of the commander as he chooses his position. Therefore, certain parameters are necessary to focus research and help impose consistency in viewing results. To define these parameters the time period for research will be from World War II to the present, with excerpts from Erwin Rommel's World
War I experience, because this period provides the most readily available sources for the study. The level of conflict will be mid-to high intensity because this level seems to offer the greatest variety of position selection challenges. And the level of command will be tactical, i.e., task force, brigade/regiment, and division, narrowing to the task force level in contemporary examples. The actions of division and regimental commanders from the WW II era readily illustrate the dilemmas which face the task force commander in today’s potential mid-to high intensity conflict. Why focus on the task force level?

"The battalion commander is the first officer in the hierarchy of command in which military experience and direct personal guidance routinely influence unit personnel and operations...The critical crossroad or key linkpin of interface between battle preparation and battle execution is the battalion commander."

The study will address both historical and contemporary examples in which the position of the commander appeared to have either a positive or negative bearing on the outcome of the engagement. The study will not include other examples in which the effect of the commander’s position was either not evident or insufficiently described to permit analysis. In each example, a certain orientation will guide the analytical effort. First will be the attempt to identify both the main effort and the decisive point in an engagement. Next will be an examination of the commander’s position in relation to these locations and how that position may have contributed to the engagement’s result. From the evidence available, an attempt will be made to reconstruct the criteria that influenced the commander in his position selection. Finally, there will be a
discussion of the apparent validity of these criteria based on results of the engagement. And where appropriate will be the interposition of comments and opinions of others who appear to have thought carefully about the issue. It is important to note that the purpose is not to pass judgment on the relative skills of various commanders, but rather to draw out those criteria which appear to be important in determining where a tactical commander should position himself during the engagement.

By its conclusion, the paper will have suggested a list of discrete criteria that the commander might use to determine his most effective position on the battlefield. In addition the conclusion will discuss implications that these criteria have for current doctrine, equipment design, and training.

Before embarking on the research, it is necessary to review the broadly accepted demands on the tactical commander during an engagement; such a foundation provides a ready standard against which one might judge the effect of his position during that engagement.

Essentially, the commander must control the battle. Key elements in that control process are the commander's acquisition of information, his use of that information, after analysis, to maintain or change the direction of maneuver, and his coordination of combat support to facilitate the maneuver. How the commander does these things, to include the staff's participation, is a broad area under the umbrella topic of Command, Control, and Communications. Within that broad area, the commander's personal role can be more narrowly described as one of overall motivation, of using his experience and judgment to keep the momentum going and on track, and of directing
subordinates in the best execution of their roles in the plan. To do these things, he first needs to find out what is going on.

"The commander is important for he establishes the guidance, issues the orders, and is the most knowledgeable of the overall operational environment. He must see the battle and converse with his staff and liaison personnel to determine the most decisive course of action. He must be free to employ all assets at his disposal and guide his units to their required positions through electronic communications, personal contact, messengers, and guides." 4

Having reviewed what is expected of the commander during an engagement, it is possible to determine how he uses his position to enhance the possibility of a successful outcome; and from this determination, it is further possible to evaluate and identify the criteria by which the commander selects his position on the battlefield. It is useful here simply to assert that position is one of the key elements affecting the commander's ability to exercise his personal role in the command and control process. The function of position is to enable the commander to employ various methods of information acquisition and control of the battle. To elaborate on the quotation above, this includes various communication methods such as radio or personal contact, observation methods such as reports of others or personal observation, and methods of causing direction, either through available communications or by personal involvement.

As the indispensable element in the command and control process the commander must use his position as well as all other elements in the process to maximize his capacity and thereby that of his command.
Chapter One described a research methodology of looking at actual examples of combat and training that illustrate the effect of the tactical commander's position on the result of the engagement, and from this deriving the criteria by which the commander might have selected his position. This chapter will examine instances from the German and American experiences in World Wars I and II.

Of those tactical commanders from the period whose modus operandi significantly involved position during the engagement, Erwin Rommel is among the most noteworthy. Apart from his own works, scarcely a source is examined that does not emphasize the daring exploits of this leader who habitually placed himself at the forefront of his lines. To remain within the scope of this paper, it is more valuable to examine his methods during World War I, when he served as a detachment commander in the Wurttemberg Mountain Infantry Battalion. Assigned anywhere from two to five companies in this role, he fought in combat conditions that were not far removed from much of the World War II action.

The first example is an action in the southeast Carpathians against Rumanian forces of the Russo-Rumanian Army near the Hungarian-Rumanian border in August 1917. The Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion, attached to the 18th Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment, had achieved a position near the summit of Ungureana Mountain, and was to continue attacking to the east along a ridge road that connected several subsequent peaks. Rommel was assigned two companies and directed to proceed down the southeast slope of the ridge toward a narrow valley below it. He would then drive back up the ridge toward the northeast.
with the aim of penetrating less well defended positions along the slope, below the battalion objective. His route of advance would be through steep, wooded terrain requiring a fairly narrow formation; the enemy along this route was thought to be light, but its actual strength was unknown.

The detachment contacted a platoon sized enemy force as soon as it began the northeast climb. Rommel immediately decided to fix the enemy with one company and conduct a flank attack to the right with the other. He accompanied the flanking company and directed its progression based on his understanding of the terrain and his knowledge of what the other company was doing. Threatened by this flanking force, the enemy steadily withdrew up the slope under continued pressure from the fixing company. Each time the enemy halted to return fire against the fixing company, Rommel advanced the flanking company to press that threat and keep the enemy in a dilemma. But he was careful to avoid a pursuit that moved the flanking company into the fixing company's field of fire, or which broke precipitately out into the open where it would be vulnerable to enemy field guns. In this manner, Rommel directed his detachment in a wedge across the ridge road that he was to have penetrated and occupied a small saddle just west of the Rumanian position on the crest of the ridge. He was forced to communicate this success to his battalion commander with pyrotechnics as the telephone wire was cut. Rommel was about eleven hundred yards behind the hostile front, without heavy weapons, and almost surrounded, but he had accomplished his mission. "To avoid being cut off, the Rumanian (during the night) had
evacuated his positions between Ungureana and the ridge road bend...and had retired in a northeasterly direction..." ¹

Though this first example is a simple one, it illustrates some important considerations in determination of the commander's position. The main effort can first be identified as the forward elements of the detachment in column during the approach to the enemy positions; once contact had been made, main effort shifted to the flanking force. Rommel changed his position to accompany the main effort as it changed throughout the engagement. The difficult terrain and largely shouted communications required a well-forward position to gain immediate knowledge of any change in the tactical situation. Upon contact, Rommel estimated the size of the enemy and judged that it could be flanked from the right. The decisive action that would resolve this engagement rested with the flanking company, and Rommel moved with that force. His presence there enabled him to control the tempo of the advance, alternately charging and holding to coordinate with the steady pressure exerted by the fixing company and keep the enemy continually off balance. Had he remained with the fixing company it would have been difficult to control the whole detachment as effectively. In that case, while the fixing company was restrained by the enemy to its front, the flanking unit commander, less restrained, might have advanced too quickly, disrupting the coordinated effort. Rommel, the more experienced leader with the flanking force, was free to visualize the whole scene, giving instructions to a single subordinate commander rather than to each subordinate platoon in that force. The result was a well coordinated attack that preserved Rommel's detachment and
significantly facilitated the regiment's success. Location of the main effort and the decisive action within that effort would seem to be an obvious consideration in determination of the commander's position.

The next example is a continuation of the tactical scenario described above, and is described in Rommel's ATTACKS as the defense of Mount Cosna. The Rommel detachment consisted at this time of seven company size units, and was to defend a section of an extensive ridge system on which Mount Cosna was the key terrain. The enemy was in sufficient strength on the east side of this north-south ridge system to preclude continued offensive action by the Germans. Rommel arrayed his forces with one company partially outposted near the ridgeline just south of Mount Cosna, one company extended north of Mount Cosna along the main ridgeline, and a third company extended northwest from Mount Cosna along a secondary section of the main ridgeline. The machinegun company was interspersed among these dispositions. Immediately to the west of the peak was an elevated piece of ground known as Headquarters Knoll which commanded a view of all the Rommel detachment positions. To the rear of this knoll and echeloned further west Rommel placed his remaining units, holding them in reserve against the attack that was forming. He placed his command post initially at the forward edge of the knoll and established wire communications with each of his forward units and with the battalion headquarters. He was in direct contact with the reserve units. The main effort was the defense of Headquarters Knoll, as this terrain dominated the rest of the detachment sector.

When the enemy attacked from the east, it drove back the combat
outpost line from the ridge south of Mount Cosna along with the
initial elements sent to reinforce it. Two of the reserve companies
occupied positions along the southwest of Headquarters Knoll and the
remaining units bolstered the forward edge of the knoll in the
direction of Mount Cosna. One additional company was sent from
battalion, and Rommel positioned that, as his sole reserve, on a
slope three hundred yards to the west of the knoll. He positioned
himself there as well, where he retained an excellent view of the
whole battleground, and had immediate control of the reserve unit.
Rommel focused his efforts on resupply, maintenance of
communications with the forward units, and coordination of the
artillery battle. He used the reserve company to expedite the
resupply effort, which he regarded as critical to success of the
defense.

This engagement raged for most of an entire day. Rommel sent
platoons of his reserve company to the most threatened areas and
coordinated devastating artillery concentrations with local
counterattacks to hold the enemy at bay. Battalion provided another
reserve company, which Rommel immediately put to use digging a
communications trench from Headquarters Knoll to the detachment
command post. Although the enemy continued its attacks into the
night, it failed to hold any penetration. The day’s action stopped
the enemy initiative in the vicinity of Mount Cosna and permitted the
Germans to resume the offensive.²

Throughout the battle, Rommel remained in the vicinity of his
command post. He could see and communicate with his positions to the
front, although he devoted no little effort to maintaining those
communications. While the main effort was forward on Headquarters Knoll, the forces there were holding and defeating the small penetrations that occurred. The detachment was being hard pressed against all its positions, and Rommel's attention was needed across the whole front. This situation suggests that there can be a different decisive point from that of the main tactical effort which the commander must also consider in his selection of a battlefield location. In this case, the decisive point was the command post, where Rommel coordinated the combat and combat service support that kept his detachment in action throughout the long day. Had a major penetration occurred, he was in position to commit the reserve immediately and accompany it if he felt necessary. If he had located himself, for example, forward on Headquarters Knoll, he would have lost that flexibility; moreover, he would have sacrificed the overview and the communications that permitted successful coordination of all available resources.

To the considerations of main effort, communications and mobility, this example adds the issue of a decisive point from which the success of the battle is determined. While that point may coincide with the main effort, it may for a time be separate. The commander should ask, then, at what location will the action occur that most critically affects the shape of his battle.

Another German commander, General Von Senger und Etterlin, speaks to the commander's position in the offense during mobile, armored combat. His 17th Panzer Division on the eastern front was continually so understrength that it consisted of little more than a modern day brigade. It had anywhere from thirty to sixty tanks.
During the period 15-25 December 1942, the division advanced to within 40 kilometers of Stalingrad but could not maintain its momentum. During that period General Von Senger und Etterlin often positioned himself behind the armored regiment making progress against the enemy. But he was careful to avoid the close in fight.

"In order to be able to control the armored battle, the divisional commander usually moved about close behind the second wave of tanks during the decisive attack, where he would not become directly involved in the action. The forward tanks must fight a rapid duel at short range with a limited range of vision, and this is no place from which to supervise the whole battlefield. By keeping a few hundred meters behind the line of engaged tanks, however, it is possible to do so. Here the commander is exposed, it is true, to the enemy artillery fire, but he is not within the field of fire of the opposing tanks, where he would be exposed to the total force of the attack."

In addition to location of the main effort, General Von Senger und Etterlin's comment demonstrates an awareness of the lethality of armored combat as a consideration in his position selection. This consideration combined with the necessity not to get too caught up in the action, so that he remained free to shift the infantry-armor focus; it dictated a position near but not at the forward edge of the advance. Von Senger und Etterlin adds, then, the issues of survivability and sufficient separation from the point of contact to maintain an overview of the tactical action. These concerns apply whether the combat is mechanized or dismounted, as will be demonstrated in a subsequent example.

An example from the 82nd Airborne Division, however, first illustrates that the personal leadership of the commander at the point of crisis, regardless of the danger, may be necessary to
maintain momentum or insure a tactical success. The division had jumped into the Cotentin Peninsula on June 6, 1944, with the mission of securing crossings over the Merderet and Douve Rivers. German reactions had the effect of squeezing it into an airhead roughly the shape of an equilateral triangle, about two miles to a side. The points of the triangle were Ste. Mere-Eglise, a bridge at La Fiere, and Chef-du-Pont. Matthew Ridgway, the division commander, determined that a crossing would have to be forced at the westernmost point of the triangle, the La Fiere causeway, in order to facilitate the advance of the oncoming 90th Division. The crossing would be a difficult frontal attack against prepared enemy positions, and would be led by the assistant division commander, James Gavin. This causeway was clearly the division’s main effort and decisive point, and Ridgway concentrated every bit of available combat support into the effort. But when the artillery preparation lifted, the battalion designated to conduct the assault failed to move in any concerted effort. Gavin relieved the battalion commander, but his replacement was unable to motivate more than a few men at a time, who were gunned down as they charged.

"In the midst of this slaughter, Matt Ridgway appeared on the causeway, carrying his .30.06 rifle. He and Gavin and Lewis (regimental commander) and Maloney (another regimental commander) ‘personally by word of mouth, by gesture and by actually taking hold of individuals’ (as Ridgway later put it) reversed the backward flow of men and sent them running after Rae (a company commander). Ridgway then turned his personal attention to the wreckage (blocking the bridge). It was obvious that for the charge to fully succeed, the junk had to be cleared away...Amid falling German mortar and artillery shells, Ridgway began rigging the towing cable on the partially disabled American tank."

12
The 345th Field Artillery Battalion Commander, Frank W. Norris, who was directing his howitzers from Gavin's foxhole, was awed by this first closeup of combat and the leadership he witnessed.

"The most memorable sight that day was Ridgway, Gavin, and Maloney standing right there where it was the hottest. The point is that every soldier who hit that causeway saw every general officer and the regimental and battalion commanders right there. It was a truly inspirational effort."

Ridgway describes his own actions matter of factly, and renders the opinion that had he and Gavin not been there physically to push the soldiers into the attack, it would not have succeeded. He saw success of this attack as critical to VII Corps' capture of Cherbourg and therefore to the entire Allied invasion effort. Given this emphasis, he judged the consideration of survivability as distinctly subordinate to the issue of motivation by personal example, another important criterion the commander must evaluate in his position selection.

Another American leader in World War II, Aubrey S. Newman, made a personal leadership plan prior to entering combat with his 34th Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, during the Pacific war in 1944. Part of the plan included a resolution to be seen by his men at the forefront of battle; he felt that this would earn him the right, in the minds of his men, to issue those orders that carried them all into deadly combat. This earning of the men's confidence coincided with another of his principal considerations, that of seeking the "hot spot," or again, the decisive point:

"I also think that the commander, no matter what his rank, should go to the 'hot spot,' to the place where judgment counts, where a true feel of the actual situation can be gained that just simply is not transmitted by telephone or radio -
in fact is transmitted in no other way than through the six senses of the man who is there. How far forward this is will depend on his rank and upon the situation at the time. There is no set rule, unless that rule is that when in doubt err toward the front and not toward the rear."

MG (Ret) Newman suggests here that critical, timely combat information is to be gained close to or at the front. Notice that he qualifies this general counsel with a consideration of the "situation at the time." He relates the example of a trip to the front, where he felt that the lead battalion was making insufficient progress. Walking to the very front, he ignored the urgent request of the lead platoon leader to take cover and continued to advance, hoping to inspire others to follow.

"Yes, just like in a story book - the regimental commander fell at the head of his regiment...My Planned Leadership was suddenly lost to my regiment - because I lay helpless on the ground. No longer was I a leader, but a burden to be taken care of...I had made a great mistake, because I had become a casualty needlessly."

MG Newman (Ret) in this example suggests that to go forward, to share the danger with his men, is not always to lead the attack or expose himself pointlessly to hostile fire. Further, he suggests that the value of the leader is such that his survival is worth more to the unit than the alternate value in motivation that might be gained from careless exposure. S.L.A. Marshall puts into perspective this necessary balance between the considerations of personal leadership at the front and survivability:

"A battalion advancing boldly may be brought in check because its commander did it the disservice of going too far forward and getting himself killed within sight of the ranks...The small unit commander who practices self exposure in the hope
of having a good moral effect on men, instead, frays the nerves of troops and most frequently succeeds in getting himself killed under conditions which do no earthly good to the army... In extreme emergencies, when the stakes are high and the failure of others to act has made the need imperative, such acts are warranted. But their value lies largely in their novelty. A commander cannot rally his men by a spectacular intervention in the hour when they have lost their grip if they have grown accustomed to seeing him run unnecessary risks in the average circumstances of battle."10

General Newman suggests, then, that in determining his position the commander should consider the necessity to prove himself in the eyes of his men. He should balance any such course against the detriment that would ensue from the loss of the commander. And he should consider the quality of combat information to be gained by his presence at the "hot spot," different from that which he receives through the reports of others.

The Battle of Schmidt and the Kall Gorge clearly illustrates the importance of this last consideration. By October 1944, First United States Army was preparing to cross the Roer River in its advance to the Rhine; but first, V (US) Corps was to conduct a limited flank operation to facilitate the 1st Army advance. 28th Infantry Division, commanded by the experienced MG Norman D. Cota, was to make the V (US) Corps attack in that operation.

The 112th Infantry Regiment, commanded by LTC Carl L. Peterson, would conduct the division's main effort toward the east to seize Vossenack and southeast across a steep gorge to seize Kommerscheidt and Schmidt. It was accordingly reinforced with significant combat support, including tanks and tank destroyers. By this time in the war, the criticality of the tank - infantry combination was well
recognized, and tactical plans were designed to exploit this complementary arrangement.

The regimental plan called for a two battalion attack. The 2nd Battalion would seize Vossenack and occupy the nose of the east-west ridge on which it sat. The 1st Battalion would attack to the southeast, crossing the steep Kall River Gorge, and capture Kommerscheidt, which lay across the gorge southeast of Vossenack. The 3rd Battalion would follow the 1st and continue through Kommerscheidt to capture Schmidt which lay further to the southeast.

The attack began on 2 November. 2nd Battalion seized Vossenack, but the 3rd Battalion was stymied. It was redirected the next day through Vossenack and then southeast down a very narrow trail across the Kall gorge and into Kommerscheidt. Against minimal resistance, the battalion continued on to Schmidt and captured that town as well. The 1st Battalion followed and occupied Kommerscheidt.11

The regiment had accomplished its mission and had now but to support its success. The key to that support was the trail across the Kall Gorge, which became the main supply and reinforcement route to the lead battalions. In particular, it was important to get the tanks across so that they could defend against the counterattack that was sure to come.12 With the 1st and 3rd Battalions in possession of Kommerscheidt and Schmidt, the Kall Trail became the regiment’s decisive point.

The 20th Engineer Battalion was charged with developing and maintaining the trail, but to a company of tanks it remained impassable on 3 November. The engineer effort to upgrade the trail was ineffective; the group and battalion commanders did not
appreciate the improvement required for tanks to cross, and as a result accomplished little during the night. Neither the engineer nor tank battalion commanders were present. The regimental commander had seen neither the trail nor the forward positions southeast of the Kall River, which were poorly prepared for counterattack.  

Early the next day, 4 November, 3rd Battalion was struck with a sufficient enemy counterattack to knock it out of Schmidt and cause it to fall back on Kommerscheidt in disarray. "Despite radio communication with Kommerscheidt, the Schmidt action was a confused blur at regimental headquarters..." Attacked by enemy tanks, the 1st Battalion in Kommerscheidt had only three tanks with which to respond, as the Kall trail was still blocked. It was only with the arrival of air support and continued hammering by artillery, mortars, small arms, and the heroic efforts of the three tank crews that the German assault was stopped about 1600. "Just how big a role a small number of tanks might have played had they been available for the earlier defense of Schmidt was clearly illustrated by the temporary success at Kommerscheidt." Sometime during the afternoon both the regimental and assistant division commanders arrived and spent the night. The division commander ordered the senior engineer to get the Kall Trail fixed; that person in turn ordered the engineer battalion commander to take charge. 

On 5 November the forces at Kommerscheidt took a terrific pounding, but the arrival of five additional tanks and nine tank destroyers allowed them to hold. The regimental commander was again present and evaluated the condition of his units as disorganized. Despite repeated urging by the division commander to counterattack,
he was unable to do so. During the night, the Germans gained control of the Kall Trail, effectively cutting off the units in Kommerscheidt. The division commander ordered a relief force to counterattack Schmidt, but it was insufficiently organized for the mission.

On 6 and 7 November, the combined 1st-3rd Battalion held at Kommerscheidt, but with a strength of barely two rifle companies and almost no armor it was long past being an effective force. The regimental commander was wounded trying to respond to a summons from the division commander and was replaced. The new regimental commander's job was to organize the unit's evacuation back across the Kall Gorge, which he accomplished on 8 November. The 112th Regiment and the 28th Infantry Division had failed.

To review the battle of Schmidt in isolation from other activities in the 28th Division sector and without full description of the enemy situation would be misleading. It is arguable whether the division could have accomplished all the missions assigned it in any case, but the points to be taken about the commander's position remain valid. The division main effort was the 112th Infantry Regiment, and the regimental main effort was Schmidt. The decisive point, that place which could decide the success or failure of the regiment during the night of 3 November, was the Kall Trail. It was not until the situation had become desperate on 4 November that the regimental and assistant division commanders appeared at the main effort. Their earlier arrival and experienced evaluation might have caused 3rd Battalion to prepare better for counterattack, and might have focused the necessary command pressure to open the Kall Trail.
And the regiment's failure over the next three days to conduct its own counterattack would seem to have suggested a visit by the division commander. His earlier and accurate appreciation of conditions at the front might have saved the force, if not the mission.

The final example for historical analysis most clearly illustrates the issue of decisive point vs location of main effort, and the importance of that point to the commander's position. On 17 December 1944, BG Bruce C. Clarke, Commander, CCB, 7th Armored Division, was charged with the defense of St. Vith. The situation was most precarious, as only a small force of engineers stood between St. Vith and the 18th Volksgrenadier Division about one mile to the east. Clarke's CCB, the lead regiment of 7th Armored Division, had not yet arrived from the north as planned, so he had no force with which to influence the situation.

The most critical factor influencing the mission was the snarled traffic on roads to the west, preventing CCB and others from reaching ST. Vith. The disorganized retreat in the face of this last German offensive had produced an "every dog for himself" attitude. Clarke had dispatched his operations officer to the small crossroads at Rodt, just west of St. Vith, but that officer was outranked there and unable to clear a way for CCB. Upon notification, Clarke himself immediately went to that spot and disposed of the offending units.

Shortly thereafter, elements of 7th Armored Division began to arrive at the crossroads. Pressured by desperate reports from the engineers in front of St. Vith, Clarke stayed at the crossroads and fed units into the defense piecemeal as soon as they arrived.
was no time for fancy plans or careful deliberation to pick the best defensive positions. "West of town, Clarke was still on traffic duty, positioning his troops as they dribbled in... 'Take the Schonberg road!' Clarke called out to the tank commander. 'Go east until you contact the engineers'... Slowly, improvising as he went along, Clarke set up a thin, mobile arc of defense between Manteuffel and St. Vith. 18

Although the main tactical effort was east of St. Vith on the Prumberg Heights and those positions were underdefended and under attack, Clarke identified a more critical decisive point in this situation. First, he had to insure that traffic on the narrow crossroads did not impede his force. Next, he had to hasten his units through and into the defense as rapidly as possible. There had been no time to formulate a careful plan, and the 7th Armored Division's road march from the north had been such that he couldn't be sure which units would arrive in what order. It took a tactical commander, making up a plan based on units that appeared at the decisive point of arrival, to bring initial success to this operation.

To conclude this chapter, a brief review of important considerations for the tactical commander's selection of battlefield position is in order.

The tactical commander is a combat multiplier in that he best knows the plan and can bring his command weight to bear on the coordination of assets to influence that plan. It is appropriate then to consider the location of the main effort in positioning that combat multiplier.
In addition to a main effort, the commander might look for another location at which some action must occur that will ultimately decide the success or failure of his mission. That location might be with the reserves, at a critical supply node, or at an RP where his unit is to arrive after a long road march. He must consider whether a key subordinate can control that point or whether it requires his command influence.

The consideration of available subordinate leadership is important because it may determine the flexibility with which a commander can consider his own position. A James Gavin as your subordinate regimental (or company) commander may suggest different priorities than would a Carl Peterson.

The effect of a commander's personal leadership in the face of hostile fire must be considered. Whether to motivate by example, force a rally by virtue of rank, or simply gain the confidence of subordinates, the commander's presence in danger can be a powerful force multiplier. But as a valuable asset to the command, the commander must also consider his own protection and survival as he evaluates the best place for him to go on the battlefield.

Finally, and often the most important, the commander must have access to combat information and to the means of bringing combat power to bear on the critical tactical point. The best place to get the most accurate information might be at the point of contact with the enemy or it might be from a vantage point that covers more of the force. Effective communications might be at a control center or it might be face to face with a subordinate commander.
It is clear that these considerations may conflict in the positions they suggest to the commander. Another skill, then, that the commander must develop is the ability to discern which consideration dominates the others in a given situation and how that priority may change as an engagement develops. It is a skill that, like any other, begins with recognition of and facility with the issue's basic elements.
In beginning a consideration of contemporary examples, it is important to understand the differences in combat environment likely to be faced by contemporary commanders. It is expected that the primary difference will be in the shorter duration and increased intensity of the modern battlefield. What took months to accomplish in World War II may only take days in a future conflict, and that translates to an extremely rapid tempo. The lethality of firepower has so increased the intensity of combat that analysts expect battle stress casualties to be at least a quarter of the total losses in the first few days.

Contemporary organizations and weapons systems require the commander to address larger zones and sectors than he did in World War II. Today's battalion or task force commander might be responsible for as much ground or enemy force as previously were regimental commanders. A significant impact of the broader ranges has been an increased reliance on not only the radio, but other electronic communications as well.

This increased intensity, tempo, range, and electronic environment means a corresponding increase in confusion and uncertainty. The enemy will add to this uncertainty with a concerted effort to degrade communications.

Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, in an article on the challenges facing future field grade battle leaders, summarized the problem: "What all of this implies is that commanders and staff officers at all levels must know more and must discharge their combat functions
much more rapidly over wider areas with greater consequences of failure by several orders of magnitude than their World War II counterparts.

Insofar as position relates to the discharge of a commander's combat functions, this statement suggests that the commander must be ever more careful in determining where to go on the battlefield. It suggests that mobility and communications will receive greater priority in the commander's consideration. And the issue of lethality suggests that the commander must consider his own survival more carefully if he is to discharge his functions at all.

The extensive Israeli experience in modern, high intensity combat provides an appropriate laboratory for examining these implications, and for checking the validity of other considerations discussed in Chapter Two. But an understanding of the unique Israeli situation must preface their example.

Israel's size, enemy, and traditions dictate certain imperatives during modern combat. It must conquer any threat rapidly, before strategic consumption or superpower imposed peace cause it to lose territory. To do so entails a stridently offensive spirit and a high tolerance for risk, in which commanders are expected to be successful whatever the cost to themselves. Their priorities, then, are the benefits that accrue to personal example and leadership from the front. But while these priorities dominate the Israeli commander's deliberations in position selection, they by no means negate other considerations.

Three examples from the same battalion on the 1967 Sinai front illustrate a number of important issues. Major Ehud Elad's Patton
tank battalion, "S/14," was part of Colonel Shmuel Gonen's 7th Armored Brigade, which in turn was part of General Israel Tal's northern armored task force, or *ugda*, a division sized combat arms force. The brigade mission was to advance through Gaza, break through Egyptian lines to the north of Rafah, and then swerve through that town towards El Arish. Defenders made the first miles difficult by linking anti-tank ditches, obstacles, and ambushes to the several small villages along the route. These impediments so slowed the advance that Major Elad elected to bypass a bottleneck at Beni Souhila to reach a high speed route beyond. Under radio silence, he struck out in the lead, depending on the others to see him and follow. Only a disjointed mix of companies were able to follow his route, but the rest had been well briefed and rejoined him at the first objective. Enroute to that objective, under fire, the battalion commander in the lead had a positive effect on momentum:

"The speeding tanks of the battalion command group and the well-known and confident figure of the battalion commander riding at the head of the column infused his men with new courage and as though awg-struck they braced themselves and leapt forward."

S14 arrived at the initial objective and sped on. Momentum was the priority and the decisive point was at the front of the column. Elad gained the information he needed there to change course rapidly and keep the momentum going. Further, his example in taking the lead had the utilitarian effect of urging the rest of the battalion to recover and keep up, which in itself was an effective means of communication. In this case, "pull" rather than "push" was the most effective course. Elad knew that each tank crew in the battalion had been well briefed on both intent and specific objectives and he
trusted those who were left behind to find their way rapidly.6

At Rafa Junction, the S14 Patton battalion encountered dug in, camouflaged, integrated tank/anti-tank defenses, later ascertained to be the Egyptians' strongest in the Sinai. The impromptu battalion plan called for a bold frontal attack directly into these defenses to draw attention from a decisive flanking movement by the bulk of the battalion tanks. In briefings before the war, Colonel Shmuel had forbidden battalion commanders to advance ahead of the lead company - the issue was survivability. In this case, Elad determined to lead the frontal attack and received that permission from Colonel Shmuel. After a false start caused by too hasty a communication of the plan, the battalion thoroughly defeated its assigned northern sector of the junction's defense zone.7

By weight of force, the battalion's main effort was the flank attack. But the terrain was sufficiently open for the enemy to observe this movement and counteract it had they not been fully occupied to their front. The terrain also permitted, though, the destruction of the enemy in one attack if it were rapidly and violently conducted. These factors led Elad to identify the frontal attack as the decisive point. And there was the division commander's directive - "...to carry out the first day's movements aggressively and at all cost, because this first day would decide the outcome of the war."8 Elad chose to lead the frontal attack because it was decisive, it met the commander's intent, and by example and tradition it would inspire others to participate violently and make the plan work. These considerations superseded the issue of survivability.
But the initial faulty communication almost stopped the plan. Elad's group did not hear his command and did not at first charge with him. Elad reversed his charge, narrowly escaping death, and more carefully repeated the instructions. It would appear from this example that in the confusion of combat, when plans are being made on the fly, the issue of effective communications cannot be superseded.

Neither can the issue of survivability be too long disregarded without cost. Continuing the attack, S14 arrived at Jiradi, a narrow pass between sandhills which are not readily negotiable by vehicles. The Egyptians had set up powerful fortifications in several places among the sandy dunes. Beyond the Jiradi lay El Arish, the division's initial objective. Colonel Shmuel sent S14 in a flanking maneuver through the sand. Elad led again.

"Now Elad's Patton was in the lead again...as Ehud [Elad] thrust forward into the raging fire of the Egyptian dense zone, there was again a holdup...In the pause, Ehud straightened up in his cupola, the binoculars to his eyes searching for the locations of the enemy's guns and looking for a possible way through for his battalion. All around him the ground was exploding violently, and the flashes of fire were blinding, but the vital thing was to keep the assault on the move, not to let it break, not to falter for a moment. 'Driver, faster!' Ehud called through the intercom...They were the last words he spoke. Amiram heard a thump, and Ehud's body tumbled into the compartment, headless."

This passage indicates that the demand for momentum drove the demand for immediate information, and that in Elad's mind the issue of his survival was again a lesser priority. He was not the only leader killed. By that time, three company commanders and the operations officer were out of action. But Colonel Shmuel redirected the brigade effort, raced through the Jiradi defenses, and occupied
El Arish by the end of the day. "At all cost" is clearly a prioritizing but costly criterion in determination of the commander's position.

Having looked at examples of contemporary combat, it is appropriate now to consider those training situations in which U.S. commanders will most likely find themselves - the National Training Center and the 7th Army Training Center at Hohenfels, FRG.

The experience of the 2-34 Infantry (Mech), in October 1982, is typical of most units at the NTC. It had some successes and some failures. The following "defend in sector" mission demonstrates the importance of mobility to the commander's position.

The scenario was to defend against a motorized rifle regiment attacking from the northwest. Team A and the antitank platoon were on a hill to the left, to provide flanking fires. Team B was guarding a dangerous flank approach on the right. And a depleted Team Tank was in the center, in compartmentalized terrain. The main attack was expected in this sector, and Team A was to defeat it with flanking fires as Team Tank slowly moved back. The battalion commander was on the left, on the hill with Team A.

The enemy ran a platoon in front of Team A, destroyed most of Team Tank at long range, and conducted its main attack against the dangerous flank approach on the right, out of TOW range from Team A. Although the main attack was repelled, Team B was fixed. The enemy entered the far right area of compartmentalized terrain and bypassed Team A TOW fires. The battalion commander was unable to reorient his forces on the radio, and by the time he got down off the hill the enemy had penetrated well to his rear.
Even if everything had gone as planned, the battalion commander would have contributed little from his position on the left. He identified it as the main effort, since that is where the main, enemy-defeating fire was to come from. But that main effort depended on Team Tank's resistance in the middle, which did not happen. And when it became necessary to reorient, the battalion commander could not traverse the sector quickly enough to get to the critical point.

The After Action Report cited the commander for failure to locate himself on the most dangerous avenue of approach. This wording suggests that the most dangerous avenue, as distinct from the location of the main effort, be considered in determination of the commander's position in the defense. But perhaps just as important is the suggestion that the commander remain sufficiently mobile to react to a threat in any sector. Given the increased range and tempo of modern combat, a flank position unless supported by other considerations would not seem to offer sufficient mobility.

Another example from the NTC, during 2-41 Infantry's rotation during the spring of 1985, illustrates that control is not automatic from either the most dangerous avenue or from the best vantage point. In his deliberate defense, the commander had achieved both of these. Two widely separated avenues entered his sector, and he had arrayed forces to cover both, with a strong reserve to defeat any penetration. He located himself on the left avenue, judged to be the most dangerous, but in a position having vantage over the right avenue. The reserve was located to react either way.

It was difficult to differentiate between the main and supporting attacks, and by the time he identified the main attack in the
secondary avenue, the enemy was into the defenses. Radio communications failed and the sky was so full of pyrotechnics that this secondary means was not feasible. The commander had to go halfway to the reserve’s location before he could contact it, and by then it could only chase the enemy into the battalion’s rear. 13

On a modern battlefield, there is every reason to believe that even cross-battalion radio communications will be difficult. If timely commitment of the reserves is crucial to success of the plan, and electronic means are unreliable, that suggests another consideration for the commander in position selection - one that better facilitates communication, perhaps direct communication, with his decisive maneuver force. In fairness, the ranges involved may well have precluded a position which offered contact with the reserves, location on the most dangerous avenue, and vantage over both approaches. But effective communication with the decisive force remains a consideration in the commander’s position selection.

The final two examples are from task force training and evaluation exercises at the 7th Army Training Center’s training area in Hohenfels, Germany. They illustrate again the criticality of control over the decisive force and the decisive location.

Infantry Task Force 1-54, in the fall of 1983, conducted a deliberate night attack from east to west against a tank heavy task force’s deliberate defense. The basic plan was to conduct a fairly heavy supporting attack in the north at H-hour and draw the enemy reserves in that direction. Weaker attacks in the center, at H + 2, would depict a reverse deception, in which the initial attack would appear to be the main attack. The real main attack, where the
battalion commander located himself, was down a narrow, difficult route on the southern flank.

It worked for two reasons. First, the battalion commander located himself with the critical force. Once it was committed, he directed the advance into the enemy rear and onto the battalion objective. Second, and actually preparatory to the first, communications worked. Recognizing that his move was predicated on forward conditions, he placed the S3 up front with a powerful radio to report progress. Pyrotechnics and a careful radio relay were backups, and the combat information required was within the S3’s capability to evaluate. Had the commander not accompanied the main attack, it would not have had his personal direction at a critical time. The speed and timing of the attack, termed a "thunder run" by evaluators, required experienced judgment and control.14

The same battalion, a year later, conducted another deliberate night attack, this time over a simulated canal. Weather conditions were inclement and visibility was extremely poor. The plan called for a main effort in the south over armored vehicle-launched bridges (AVLB), with a supporting attack in the north through a fordable crossing site. Under these conditions the crucial factor was not a particular force, but rather a specific location. If the main effort did not cross in the south, the attack would likely fail. The battalion commander located himself well up front at the southern crossing site.

As crossing occurred severe traffic congestion resulted at the crossing site with both friendly and enemy vehicles passing each other under the inclement weather conditions. The commander stayed
at the crossing site to insure that task force elements were properly oriented into the pitch darkness beyond. In addition there were safety considerations that might not have been so dominant in wartime. Both the S3 and the XO were occupied on other missions. Had the commander not assumed close control of the crossing site, the task force would likely have become distended, misoriented, and ineffective.

To conclude this analysis of contemporary examples, it is appropriate to review the criteria that have been suggested for determination of the commander's position, with respect to the conditions expected on the modern battlefield.

A position which facilitates maintenance of the momentum in the offense seems important. Immediate access to information - to what is going on at the point of the advance - and the capability to affect rapid changes in direction at that point are corollary to the first consideration. While this partly relies on a certain level of training, it also suggests a position near the front of the advance.

In the Israeli examples, motivation by personal example was clearly important. In the confused, stressful environment of a modern battlefield, it is not unreasonable for U.S. commanders to consider that issue.

The location of a main effort, a distinct decisive point or force, and a most dangerous avenue of approach all compete for the commander's attention.

A position which facilitates the commander's ability to move from one location to another must also be considered. Modern battlefield tempo places the commander who isolates himself in a single location
at a distinct disadvantage.

Survivability is a consideration that demands attention. To ignore it is to acknowledge and accept the ultimate tradeoff. And communications are always important. The greater range and coverage required on the modern battlefield makes it impossible for the commander to be at or get to every "hot spot." Effective communications can help fill the gaps that a void in personal presence creates.
In Chapter Two, analysis of historical examples suggested certain considerations or criteria by which the commander should evaluate the best place for him to go on the battlefield. In Chapter Three, analysis of contemporary examples did the same, but did so with respect to the faster, more lethal environment of the modern battlefield. A synthesis between sets of considerations suggested in the two periods will indicate criteria that have both historical and contemporary validity.

First, the location of main effort in the unit's mission remains a consistent consideration. It is at this location that the unit has invested the majority of its combat power and where it expects to affect a tactical success. The commander wants immediate information about progress at this location, and he wants the capability to influence the action, either to spur it on or change its direction.

After the main effort, the commander must recognize and consider the location of any distinct, decisive force or point on which depends the success of his mission. BG Clarke's presence at the reporting point for his combat command, Major Elad's position with the supporting attack at Rafah Junction, and the TF 1-54 Commander's presence at the canal crossing site all readily illustrate the importance of this consideration.

Next, a location that facilitates communication is critical. For the commander to exert his will during the engagement, i.e., make use of his potential as a combat multiplier, he must be able to transmit effectively the force of his authority and personality to
those elements which are to kill the enemy. Lieutenant Rommel at Mt. Cosna and the TF 2-34 and TF 2-41 Commanders at the NTC illustrate this point.

Survivability of the commander was a criterion apparent in both historical and contemporary examples. As the focal point of will in a unit, his loss at a critical time may so deflate the unit’s drive that it adversely affects the mission. The commander’s loss highlights to the unit its vulnerability, and necessitates the awkward adjustment to a new commander. From both a morale and organizational standpoint, the commander’s survival is important.

These first four criteria are consistent through time, but the modern combat environment may increase the need to strike a balance among them; or, if one is weighted more heavily than others, the commander must acknowledge and accept a greater tradeoff. The intense tempo of modern combat, for example, makes it less likely that a commander can cover more than one “hot spot” in an engagement. A position at the decisive point may offer the best direct control there, but it may sacrifice communications with a critical supporting effort and may place the commander in unacceptable danger. The intense lethality means that any undue exposure is more likely to result in the commander’s injury. A centrally oriented position might afford better vantage over the whole battle, better overall communications, and better survivability. It is for each commander to evaluate this balance based on his own circumstances, but the balance of these first four criteria would seem to be a greater imperative in modern combat than was evident in the historical examples.
The motivation provided by personal example at the front was consistent insofar as the Israeli experience was concerned, but seems less an issue in other modern examples than the control and availability of information that a forward position brings. But when the directive "at all costs" is invoked, the consideration of personal example may become a much higher priority.

And perhaps the key to achieving the balance mentioned above is the availability of capable subordinates to plug the gaps where the commander cannot be. In the first Hohenfels example, the S3 was able to judge, or at least pass the commander sufficient information for him to judge, when to launch the main attack. And the leader charged with conducting the convincing secondary attack? It was the experienced HHC Commander, in this case.

Finally, the need for mobility is consistent with modern tempo. Mobility can be degraded by getting too close to the enemy contact, or by a position in which terrain blocks the commander's efforts to see or get to another sector. Good mobility may offer additional flexibility in achieving balance among the first four criteria, but does not supersede their consideration.

Having determined a set of working criteria for the tactical commander's position selection on the battlefield, it remains to examine the implications that these criteria pose for current doctrine, equipment design, and training.

Current doctrine addresses the tactical commander's position in generic terms that match up well with the criteria suggested by a fast moving, violent combat environment. FM 71-2J (Coordinating
Draft), The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, states:

"To control the battle the TF commander must "see the battlefield" or know where the enemy and his own units are, what their status is, and what they are doing... The commander must be well forward to observe. At the same time, obvious terrain which would be easily targeted, or being too far forward where he would become unnecessarily exposed to direct fires, or involved in active fighting must be avoided."

FC 71-6, Battalion and Brigade Command and Control, shows hardened vehicles for the mechanized and armored command groups, indicating the intention for protection in forward positions. The light infantry force commander must rely on the same, constructed overhead cover that his predecessors did in the historical examples. That document also provides a doctrinally consistent example of the command group's position in its command and control scenario.

But neither doctrinal manual thoroughly examines the process by which the commander determines his position. That a more thorough examination is necessary is evidenced by the frequency with which observer controllers at the NTC cite task force commanders for being out of position. As a minimum, the criteria suggested in this paper might be included in FC 71-6 as a checklist for use by commanders, in its otherwise comprehensive appendix for precombat inspections. While the commander must strike the balance that best suits his situation, each criterion deserves consideration. And although such a checklist may not be infallible, it might at least help to order the thinking process under highly stressful conditions.

The implications for equipment design center on improved communications and information processing capability. An excellent
study by the Armor Center, COMMAND and CONTROL of the MANEUVER HEAVY
FORCE in the AIRLAND BATTLE, captures these implications:

"The imperative of a new command and control philosophy and its associated hardware is the ability to quickly issue mission-type orders and have them understood by all...the system must be capable of working in a degraded mode...(and) the last imperative is to determine what information must be acted upon, what information must be passed on, and...what information must be discarded."

An improved tactical radio and an integrated vehicle information system are two initiatives in the study that pertain to a commander's position. One gives him better communications and the other provides him immediate feedback on the condition of his unit.

The most important implications of this discussion are perhaps in the area of training. For however doctrinal descriptions are improved in the future, and whatever equipment is developed to ease the commander's burden in the future, the commander must train himself and his unit to go to war now.

To begin with, TRADOC schools might discuss the issue of command position more analytically than doctrinal manuals currently suggest. Basic and advanced courses could introduce the concept of criteria by which a commander chooses his position and include the topic as a special interest item in review of historical literature. The Command and General Staff Course could readily take up and enhance the topic with almost no additional preparation to its command and control curriculum. Each wargame, for example, could include an analysis of the commander's selected position. By the time a command selectee arrives at the precommand course, an analytical approach to his position on the battlefield would be familiar. The best
enhancement to the concept at that level might be a critical review of lessons learned from the NTC as well as compared notes from experiences within the class.

The precommand sessions at both Fort Knox and Fort Benning do include discussions of the task force commander's position on the battlefield, including historical and contemporary lessons learned. These discussions begin with a review of the generic doctrinal formula, but progress to more concrete descriptions of where a commander should go on the battlefield. At Fort Benning, in particular, the Director of the Department of Tactics relates and analyzes examples from the NTC with respect to the commander's position. The level of discussion sometimes generated in these sessions suggests that the prospective task force commanders seek more "how to" detail than the manuals provide.

Beyond the TRADOC schools, training in units can provide hands on experience which would enhance the commander's ability to discern the dominant considerations in his position selection. Field training and command post exercises, terrain walks, and even wargames all provide the opportunity for commanders to critically examine their battle positions. In Europe, division commanders might make a point of quizzing the task force commanders on how they selected their planned wartime locations.

In professional development classes, brigade and task force commanders could use historical and recent examples to highlight the effect of a commander's position, with a view toward critical analysis. Such a course would reinforce the importance of the issue.
to junior officers, who might remember its introduction in basic and advanced courses.

The point of these training implications is that interest in the subject exists, and the framework for developing a better awareness of the process, the "how to," also exists.

Position, like every other aspect of command and control, should maximize the commander's capability to exert his will on the battle. The process by which the commander determines his best position in each situation should be as careful a part of the planning sequence as the rest of the task organization. It represents the allocation of a significant combat multiplier.
CHAPTER ONE


2. During research, NTC After Action Reports for 23 task force rotations at the NTC were examined. For engagements in which position of the commander/command group were cited, approximately 50% were identified as being out of position to "see" the battle, with the specific result that control of the battle was sacrificed. To "see" the battle was defined from FM 71-2J as "...more than positioning the command group in a location to observe decision points and critical actions. It also implies that the command group is in a position to receive reports on those key indicators that he has discussed with his subordinates and, upon receipt of these reports he is in a position to order decisive action." (FM 71-2J, p.2-36, para. 2-17c.)


CHAPTER TWO


2. Ibid., pp. 1


5. Ibid., p. 323, 324

6. Ibid., p. 323

7. Ibid., p. 323


9. Ibid., p. 262

10. Marshall, Men Against Fire, p. 179, 186

12. Ibid., 9. 294
13. Ibid., p. 291
14. Ibid., p. 307
15. Ibid., p. 309
17. Ibid., p. 328

CHAPTER THREE

5. Teveth, *Tanks of Tammuz*, p. 140
6. Ibid., p. 139
7. Ibid., 154 - 157
8. Ibid., 154
9. Ibid., p. 193
10. NTC After Reaction Report for Rotation 1-83 (Mech) (2-34 Inf) discussed the commander/command group's position in three engagements. In two of those, the commander was cited for not being in position to "see" the battlefield and control his forces. In one engagement, he was credited with selecting a good position. In a fourth engagement, the commander was credited with being well forward to "see" the battlefield, but was "killed" during the engagement.
11. CPT Daniel P. Bolger, *Dragons At War, 2-34 Infantry in the Mojave*, (Novato, CA, 1986), 133 - 143

12. Take Home Package for NTC Rotation 1-83 (Mech), P. IV-C-2

13. Interview with the Battalion Commander, 2-41 Infantry (during this NTC Rotation), LTC James R. McDonough, 7 Nov 1984

14. During this task force ARTEP, the author was S3 of 1-54 Infantry, and conducted a detailed review of the commander's position selection process during the mission planning phase.

15. During this task force ARTEP, the author was XO of 1-54 Infantry, and conducted a detailed review of the commander’s position selection process after the ARTEP.

CHAPTER FOUR


2. U.S. Army Field Circular 71-6, Battalion and Brigade Command and Control, (FT Benning, 1985), p. 4-1


4. In review of NTC Take Home Packages for 23 task force rotations, the commander/command group’s position was discussed in 46 engagements. In 22 of these engagements, the commander/command group was cited for being out of position to “see” the battlefield.

5. USA Armor Center Study, *Command and Control (C²) of the Maneuver Heavy Force in the AIRLAND BATTLE*, (FT Knox, 5 Feb 86), p. 3

6. Telephone conversations on 7 Nov 86 with CPT Patrick Vaughan, Officer Course Management Branch, Course Development Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Fort Knox, Kentucky; and with CPT Henry Banker, Officer Training Branch, Course Development Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Fort Benning, Georgia

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**Articles**


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**Studies**

USA Armor Center, *Command and Control (C²) of the Maneuver Heavy Force in the AirLand Battle*, Fort Knox, KY, 5 Feb 1986

**Other Documents**

NTC Take Home Packages for the following rotations, available from the Center for Lessons Learned - NTC, FT Leavenworth KS:

1-83 (M)  4-85 (M)  10-85 (T)  14-85 (M)
1-85 (M)  4-85 (T)  11-85 (M)  14-85 (T)
1-85 (T)  6-85 (M)  12-85 (M)  3-86 (M)
2-85 (T)  8-85 (M)  12-85 (T)  7-86 (C² focused rotation)
3-85 (M)  9-85 (M)  13-85 (M)
3-85 (T)  10-85 (M)  13-85 (T)

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