U. S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE
FOR THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

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U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE
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by

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: Security Assistance for the Yemen Arab Republic

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Lieutenant Colonel Frederick C. Stutsman (B.S., Manhattan College, M.B.A., University of Utah) has been interested in the Arabian Peninsula and the Yemen Arab Republic since he began preparing for an assignment in the Y. A. R. by attending the U.S. State Department Foreign Service Institute in 1983. He has traveled throughout the Y. A. R. and in Saudi Arabia. In the Y. A. R., he served as Deputy Chief and Air Force Operations/Logistics Officer in the U. S. Office of Military Cooperation (USOMC). He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College and the National Security Management Course of the National Defense University. Lieutenant Colonel Stutsman is a graduate of the Air War College, Class of 1986.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The Yemen Arab Republic (Y.A.R.), or North Yemen, as it is commonly called, is unfamiliar to most Americans. It is a small, poor country, about the size of South Dakota, with a population of around 6,500,000. Relatively few Americans have been there and most would probably have difficulty locating it on a map or globe. Events which occur in the Y.A.R. would seem to have little bearing on our everyday lives, or upon the interests of the United States.

In many ways however, North Yemen is a microcosm which contains typical elements of North-South and especially East-West issues affecting the third world. Although it is a neutral country, it is courted by both the Eastern and Western blocs. A surprising number of disparate nations are participating in its development, The North Koreans recently completed a football stadium in the capital, Sanaa, while the South Koreans are installing the sewage system. Taiwanese maintain some Y.A.R. Air Force (YARAF) aircraft, while mainland Chinese are repairing many streets and roads. Saudi Arabia, in efforts to provide a moderate, conservative influence, provides large amounts of aid. In addition, the Saudis have funded acquisition and support
for western origin military equipment which is found in the Y.A.R. armed forces. Despite this funding however, the overwhelming majority of military equipment in North Yemen is from the Eastern Bloc. The Y.A.R. is in fact unique, in that both the USSR and the U.S. have active security assistance programs there. Both the U.S. and the USSR are interested in increasing their influence in the Y.A.R. Their interests are based on several factors. First, the country occupies a strategic location at the southern end of the Red Sea. Second, it is a neighbor of Saudi Arabia, with which the U.S. has a special relationship. Finally, recent oil discoveries show promise of commercial exploitability.

The purpose of this paper is to offer some thoughts and conclusions pertaining to present and future U.S. interests and courses of action in the Y.A.R., especially regarding security assistance. These conclusions have been drawn from the perspective of a recent tour of duty in the Y.A.R., but also in light of the history, geography and economy of the Y.A.R. While detailed discussions of these areas are outside the scope of this paper, I have included brief outlines since they are crucial to an understanding of the situation in the Y.A.R. today.
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Many western observers of the Yemeni scene have remarked that, until the 1960s, Yemen was a country living in the Middle Ages. Even today, many refer to it as being in transition from antiquity to the late 20th century. Indeed, it is only a short drive from the office of the Wang computer representative in Sanaa to the countryside and a world of oxen-drawn single-bladed wooden plows of a type dating back to earliest biblical times. The anomalies associated with a country which has a long, rich history and which is now leapfrogging several centuries make a knowledge of historical factors crucial to any understanding of current events and personalities in the Y.A.R. The following brief sketch will provide only a basis for further discussion of events.

Man inhabited the southwest corner of the Arabian Peninsula from his earliest beginnings. Archaeologists have discovered flints used 15,000 years ago and evidence of hunting activities dating back 75,000 years. Early biblical (and Quranic) stories are mixed in with local folklore. A tomb purported to be Job's is located on a peak just outside Sanaa and makes an interesting day trip from.
that city. The people of Southern Arabia, the Qahtanis, trace their ancestry to Qahtan, or Joktan, who is named in the book of Genesis as a great-great-great grandson of Noah.

Actual written records of civilizations and culture in the area date to about 1200 B.C. The Mineans and Sabeans flourished and engaged in widespread trade. Artifacts of the Sabeans are plentiful near their capital, the present city of Marib, in the Eastern Y.A.R., about a three hour drive from Sanaa. The famous queen of Saba (Sheba), in visiting Solomon, followed a common trade route of her people. Caravans, traveling north from southwestern Arabia, brought incense, myrrh, silk and spices which eventually found their way to Rome. The name Arabia Felix (happy) was given to the area because the Romans believed that goods carried by the caravans originated in Arabia and that the area must be very prosperous. A famous dam, one of the great structures of antiquity, was built near Marib about 500 B.C. and lasted until 570 A.D. The locks are still standing and are impressive structures. Around 100 B.C., the Himijarite dynasty came to rule all of the Yemens and in 24 B.C. it defeated a Roman attempt at invasion. Judaism and Christianity both made inroads into the Yemens and Abyssinians and Persians each conquered and ruled for about 50 years in the years preceding the birth of the prophet Mohammed in 570 A.D.
The birth of Mohammed and the establishment of Islam are central events for the Yemens. The people were converted to Islam within the lifetime of the prophet. Subsequently, the area was part of the great Islamic Ummayid and Abbasid dynasties. As in other parts of the Islamic world, a split developed in the mid-seventh century between Sunni and Shiite branches. In Yemen, this split resulted in establishment of the Zaydi (Shia) sect in the Northeast and the Shafi (Sunni) sect in the southwest. This split has since had a divisive effect on the Yemens, although the degree of divisiveness is considerably less today than in the past.

In the late 9th Century Zaydi civil-religious leaders, called the Imams, began asserting control over various portions of the Yemens. From that time until 1962, Zaydi Imams controlled parts or virtually all of the Yemens at various times. However, there were a number of competitors and foreign invaders during the nearly eleven centuries of Imamic rule.

The first Europeans to exert their influence were the Portuguese, who attempted unsuccessfully to conquer Aden, in southern Yemen, four times between 1513 and 1530. In 1517,
the Egyptian Mamlukes, who were under Ottoman Control, began a twenty year campaign to conquer the Yemens. Eventually, these Ottoman surrogates controlled many of the towns, but not the countryside. Also in the mid-sixteenth century, the British and Dutch began trading with Yemen. Early in the seventeenth century, the Zaydi Imam regained control over virtually the entire country and for the next one hundred years, there was little contact between Yemen and the outside world.

Although contact was re-established and trade with the west began again in the eighteenth century, the Imams retained control of the country until the early 1800s. In 1837, the British purchased Aden, in southern Yemen, from a local sultan for use as a coal bunkering station. In 1849, the Ottomans entered Yemen for the second time and took control of coastal areas in northern Yemen. The Ottomans were to remain in northern Yemen for about seventy years until the end of World War I, and although they never again controlled the entire countryside, they did control cities and coastal areas for most of that time.

In southern Yemen, the British retained control of Aden and built it into a prosperous trading and shipping center. Although they claimed territory to the border of what is now the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (P.D.R.Y.), they never fully controlled the tribes in the interior. In the
late nineteenth century, there were frequent clashes between
the British and the Turks over the location of the border
between their colonies. In 1904, the British and the Turks
reached an agreement which delineated what is essentially
the present-day border between the Y.A.R. and the P.D.R.Y.
It is important to note that before the colonial era, all
Yemen was one and this British-Ottoman agreement led to
quite different subsequent paths of development for North
and South.

Following World War I, the Ottomans were obliged to
leave North Yemen. The Zaydi Imam, who had revolted against
the Turks before their withdrawal, declared North Yemen to
be an independent country and, over time, extended his
control over much, but not all, of the country. The Imam
viewed foreign influence as not in the best interests of the
country and decided to shut out foreigners to the maximum
possible extent. He also viewed South Yemen as part of his
country and clashed several times with the British in
attempts to extend his influence in the border areas.
However, he also was faced with border disputes with the
Saudia and in 1934, the Imam signed a treaty with the
British which dealt with the border question. Unfortunately,
the language in this treaty was vague and there were
disparities between the English and Arabic texts. These disparities in turn led to further border disputes.

In South Yemen, the British colony of Aden grew in size and importance during the first half of the twentieth century. After the 1956 Suez Crisis, the British increased the number of troops they had stationed in Aden, making it a key point in a forward deployment strategy. Serious opposition developed among the local populace, however, to British rule. This opposition led to increasingly violent resistance and in 1969 the British were forced to leave Aden. South Yemen became the People’s Republic of South Yemen (P.R.S.Y.) and, later, the P.D.R.Y. The P.D.R.Y. is pro-Soviet and is the only Marxist state in the Arab World.

During the twentieth century in North Yemen, in spite of the Imam’s attempts to isolate the country, modernity crept in. New ideas of government and its responsibility were fostered by a wave of Arab nationalism led by Nasser of Egypt. These ideas led to dissatisfaction with Islamic rule and coup attempts in 1948, 1955 and 1962. The 1962 coup was followed by a seven year civil war and resulted in establishment of a republic, the Y.A.R. The government of the Y.A.R. has been quite unstable however. Since 1969, there have been five presidents, two of whom were assassinated and two deposed by coups. The present president, Ali Abdullah Salih, has remained in power since
1978, contrary to all predictions, and has provided a degree of stability. During the existence of the republic the various regimes have striven to attain legitimacy, extend their sway over the country, modernize institutions and build infrastructure.

The above history, while sketchy, will serve as a framework for further discussion. For those assigned to the Y.A.R., or dealing with issues concerning the country, there are some "standard" works which detail the history of Yemen and are well worth reading. They include:

Modern Yemen: 1918-1966 by Manfred Wenner

Yemen: The politics of the Yemen Arab Republic by Robert W. Stookey

Yemen: The search for a Modern State by J. E. Peterson
CHAPTER III

GENERAL BACKGROUND

1. Borders. The Y.A.R. is bordered on the west by the Red Sea, on the north by Saudi Arabia, on the east by a vast desert known as the empty quarter, and on the south by the P.D.R.Y. It is important to note that, with the exception of the Red Sea, all these borders have been, or are in dispute. The border with Saudi Arabia was the subject of a war in 1934 which was won by Saudi Arabia. Many Yemenis do not accept the officially demarcated border today. The eastern border, which is shared with the P.D.R.Y. and Saudi Arabia, has never been defined. Until recently, none of the concerned countries was sufficiently interested in the desert area involved to raise the issue. The southern border, as previously noted, was artificially demarcated by two colonial powers and has been a subject of contention since that demarcation.

2. Geography. For a small country, the Y.A.R. has a surprising variety of topography. There are three principal regions. The Tihama is a flat coastal plane which runs the length of the Red Sea and is about 20 to 30 miles wide. The Tihama is dry desert, very hot and humid, almost unbearable
in the summer. Extremely rugged mountains rise abruptly from the Tihama and reach elevations ranging from 7,000 to 10,000 feet. The highest peak, near Sanaa, is over 12,000 feet high. Yemen has been called the “Switzerland” of Arabia and these rugged mountains make overland transportation exceedingly difficult. Climate in the mountains, due to the elevation, is moderate. The third type of terrain is classic Arabian desert, to the east of the mountains, just inside the eastern border of the country. This desert is part of the “Empty Quarter” which occupies a good part of the southern Arabian Peninsula.

3. Infrastructure. Very limited. Hard surface roads connect the three main cities; Sanaa, Taizz and Hodeida. These roads are two-lane and are in deteriorating condition, especially between Taizz-Hodeida and Hodeida-Sanaa. There is also a hard surface, new, two-lane road linking Sanaa-Marib and a similar road linking Taizz-Mocha. In the three principle cities, main streets are paved but residential streets are not. There is one main port, Hodeida, which handles the bulk of seaborne imports to the Y.A.R. A second port at Mocha is small, but provides some service to Taizz. There are three
airports with good hard surface runways, one at each of the three main cities. These airports also serve as airbases for the YARAF.

4. Population. Because of migration, lack of accuracy in government census and falsification, population figures on the Arabian Peninsula are tenuous at best.\(^1\) The official U.N. estimate for 1983 for the Y.A.R. is 6,230,000.\(^2\) Approximately one million Yemenis are estimated to be working outside the country. Life expectancy is 40.4 years for males and 42.2 years for females.\(^3\)

5. Economy. Estimated per capita income for 1984 was $614.\(^4\) The Y.A.R. has almost no exports ($10 million in 1983), but imports almost all manufactured goods and sizeable amounts of food (total 1983 imports were $1,776 million).\(^5\) There is an unusually large informal economy and as much as a billion dollars worth of imports may be smuggled into the country yearly. The import-export balance is redressed by foreign aid and remittances from Yemeni workers abroad. In 1984, those workers are estimated to have sent home $1.2 billion.\(^6\) Even with this input, imports exceeded exports by a wide margin and foreign currency reserves dropped by one billion dollars from 1980-1983.\(^7\) As a result, the official currency, the Yemen Riyal decreased in value by 30% in 1984, a trend which continued in 1985.\(^8\)
CHAPTER IV
THE SOVIETS IN YEMEN

Soviet involvement in the Yemen dates back to 1923, when the Russian consul-general based at Jidda, Saudi Arabia established contact with the Zaydi Imam. This contact led to Russian recognition of the Imamate in 1928 and a ten year treaty of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. There is speculation that the Imam sought ties with the Soviets to demonstrate to the British that their reluctance to see his side of the Aden border dispute would lead to North Yemeni ties with British opponents. A permanent Soviet representative was stationed in Sanaa and substantial trade took place between the two countries. During World War II however, the Soviet mission was closed.

The Soviets did not re-establish relations with North Yemen until 1955. In fact, prior to 1955, the Soviet Union supported and assisted the Free Yemen Party which was based in Aden and opposed the Imam in North Yemen. During the 1950's, however, the Imam was involved in conflict with the British, including armed border skirmishes. He also permitted dissidents from Aden to continue their
anti-British activities from North Yemen. Based on a desire to reduce British influence in the Middle East, the Soviet Union concluded a treaty of friendship with the Imam in 1955. ¹

During the next two years, the Imam received eight ship-load of arms from the Soviets, including small arms and tanks. ² Subsequent Soviet aid included economic and technical assistance and modernization of the port of Hodeida. On the 19th of September, 1962, the Imam died and Kruschev and Brezhnev sent a message of condolence to the new Imam as well as a message congratulating him on his ascendancy to the Imamate. ³ However, within one week of the death of the old Imam, a coup took place which led to the establishment of the Y.A.R.

The Soviet response to the coup demonstrated the flexibility of Soviet foreign policy. On the first of October the Soviets were one of the first non-Arab nations to recognize the newly proclaimed republic. ⁴ Almost immediately, Eastern Bloc military aid was increased and by June 1963 there were approximately 1000 Soviet technicians in the country. ⁵ Subsequently, the Soviets provided increasing military materiel, both through the large Egyptian involvement (up to 60,000 troops in 1964) and directly. In fact, as Royalist opposition intensified,
Soviet pilots are reported to have flown combat missions in the civil war.  

Following the Republican victory in 1969, the Saudis, who had supported the losing Royalist cause, began providing extensive aid to the Y.A.R. Government. This aid was provided to offset Soviet advances and encourage a moderate Y.A.R. government. At the same time, the Y.A.R. perceived that the Soviets were supporting South Yemen in Y.A.R.-P.D.R.Y. border clashes. Additionally, the U.S.-Y.A.R. diplomatic relationship, which was broken during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war was re-established in 1972. Finally, the Y.A.R. was influenced by Egyptian President Sadat's expulsion of Soviet military advisors. All of these influences signalled a shift in Y.A.R. policies towards the West. The number of Soviet military advisors was reduced from one hundred to about a dozen and no Soviet military aid was received between 1970-1972.

Immediately following 1972, the Soviets concentrated their activity in the Yemens on the P.D.R.Y. However, in light of 1975 unification discussions between the Y.A.R. and the P.D.R.Y, they began assistance to the Y.A.R. again in 1975. From mid-1975 until 1978, the Y.A.R. received, among other items, 200 tanks and 280 armored fighting vehicles.
The years 1975-1978 were a period of turbulence for the Y.A.R. Two presidents were assassinated and the relationship between the Y.A.R. and P.D.R.Y. varied from unification talks to outright hostility. The Y.A.R. blamed the P.D.R.Y., and by association, the Soviet Union for the June, 1978 assassination of the Y.A.R. chief of state, President Gashimi. During 1978-1980, three unsuccessful coup attempts occurred in the Y.A.R. and the leaders of all three coups escaped to the P.D.R.Y.

The tension between the Y.A.R. and the P.D.R.Y. erupted in open hostilities from February to March, 1979. The U.S., with Saudi funding provided substantial military assistance to the Y.A.R. and the Y.A.R. condemned the Soviets for supporting the P.D.R.Y. However, U.S. aid was controlled by Saudi Arabia and the refusal of the U.S. to provide additional aid, except through Saudi Arabia, led Y.A.R. President Salih to again turn to the Soviet Union for assistance in September, 1979. In addition to obtaining additional arms, President Salih's aim seems to have been to strike a balance between U.S./Saudi and Soviet influence. During 1979-1980, the Y.A.R. received Soviet military aid valued at between $500 million-$1,000 million. This aid included 350 tanks, 150 armored personnel carriers, 40 tactical fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles and artillery. The number of Soviet advisors has now increased.
to between 500-1,000 and the Y.A.R. reportedly owes the Soviet Union about one billion dollars for various arms purchases. Large numbers of Yemeni military personnel study in the Soviet Union. The Y.A.R. Army and The Air Force are predominately supplied with Eastern Bloc equipment. President Salih visited the Soviet Union in 1981 and again in 1984. In his 1984 visit, he concluded a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. In fact, during the 1980's, it would appear that the Y.A.R. has moved steadily closer to the Soviet Union, at least in the area of military cooperation.
CHAPTER V
THE U.S. IN YEMEN

The first recorded American contact with Yemen was made by an American merchant ship which called there in 1798. Subsequently, American traders began substantial trafficking in Yemeni coffee. Relations remained purely commercial for almost 150 years. Despite requests from the Imam in 1927, the U.S. declined to establish diplomatic relations, possibly out of deference to the British, who were at odds with the Imam in Aden. Finally, in 1944, in response to another request from the Imam, and after consulting with the British, the U.S. established formal diplomatic relations. Again at the Imam's request, the U.S. sponsored North Yemen for United Nations membership in 1946. The U.S. did however reject a request from the Imam for $2,000,000 line of credit with which to purchase modern arms. U.S. reluctance to provide military aid and a tendency to coordinate with the U.K. prior to reaching any decisions regarding North Yemen led to cool relations during the remainder of the Imamate.

The 1962 coup which toppled the Imam occurred at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, the U.S. State Department, at the request of the Kennedy Administration,
had already been conducting a review of U.S. Mid-East policy. The U.S. was concerned about its identification with conservative regimes in countries such as Libya, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Because of this concern and in light of early recognition of the republic by other Arab States and the Communist Bloc, the U.S. also decided on early recognition, which it accorded on December 18, 1962. This recognition was opposed by the Saudis, Jordanians and British. President Kennedy also made several proposals to end outside support of opposing forces. The U.S. provided aid including road-building assistance and 20,000 tons of wheat in 1962 and 1963.

Unfortunately, the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 terminated U.S. efforts to offset Soviet influence in the Y.A.R. as the Y.A.R. broke diplomatic relations in protest against U.S. support for Israel. Normal relations were resumed in 1972 when Secretary of State Rogers visited the Y.A.R. Within months, the U.S. provided development aid including grants for irrigation, mineral exploration and drinking water projects.

The first provision of U.S. military equipment was Saudi-financed and consisted of Vulcan 20mm guns, artillery and vehicles in 1976. After the 1979 border clash between the Y.A.R. and P.D.R.Y., President Carter invoked a first
time ever emergency presidential waiver of Congressional arms transfer. This waiver was used to transfer a Saudi-financed arms package valued at about $300 million which included 12 F-5Es, 64 M-60 A1 tanks and 50 M-113 armored personnel carriers. Subsequent congressional hearings produced some criticisms of the use of presidential waiver authority and of the appropriateness and timeliness of the weapons involved. There was, however, also praise for the resolve which this quick action was meant to demonstrate.

In addition to Saudi-funded military assistance, the U.S. independently funds modest Military Education and Training (IMET) and Military Assistance Programs (MAP). These programs, designed to supplement Saudi-funded aid are administered by the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation (USOMC) in Sanaa. For FY 86, the administration requested six million dollars (MAP) and about one and half million dollars (IMET) for North Yemen. Additional U.S. non-military economic aid to the Y.A.R. for FY 86 totals $34.96 million.
CHAPTER VI
PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS AND EXPERIENCE

When the first time visitor to Yemen travels from Frankfurt, West Germany to Sanaa, he experiences an interesting transition. On the Ground in Frankfurt and enroute to the intermediate stop in Cairo, western music is played, western food is served and the passengers are a mix of Arabs, many in western dress, and westerners. At the refueling stop in Cairo, food, music and passengers all shift markedly towards middle-eastern, but there is still an element of modernity and western influence. Finally, on arrival in Sanaa, the traveler is not only in another place; he is in another age, almost on another planet. The feeling of change is overwhelming.

The feeling of change is appropriate, because many things are different in Yemen compared to the United States. People do not react the way we would expect, things are not what they seem to be. There is no "little America" to retreat to as there is in many overseas military assignments. This section sets forth some hard-earned "lessons learned" and personal observations from a tour of duty in Yemen.

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1. Factionalism is widespread. This is true both in the civilian and military sectors. There is little coordination between branches of the military. As an example, no Y.A.R. Air Force personnel are stationed at military headquarters. Thus, coordination of a comprehensive assistance package for all services is extremely difficult and must often be accomplished by a representative of the providing country. Within the Air Force, there are officers who are pro-Soviet or pro-Western and these factions will attack each other without regard for the good of the service or the country. There are selfless officers in the military, but many others are interested in promoting their faction or themselves ahead of all else.

2. Personality Cults. Since factionalism is widespread and the legitimacy of formal structure is questionable, power is a function of the personality, not the office. In many cases, the de facto head of an organisation is not the titular head. A prime example is the YARAF, where the nominal commander appears to be a figurehead and the deputy commander (the president's half-brother) appears to be in charge. Additionally, military rank has less meaning than appearances suggest. For example, the F-5 squadron commander is a captain, but the maintenance officer is a major (as is the deputy commander).
3. Centralized Authority. Perhaps because of considerations listed above, seemingly trivial matters must be handled at very high levels. The president is involved in picking candidates for some military training courses. On a lower level, when squadron vehicles need new tires, the squadron commander must personally obtain them. Only the base commander (wing commander equivalent) can issue base passes.

4. Military influence. The military, especially the army, wields great power in internal affairs. The last three presidents have come from the military. Also, the military is probably the only organization with enough power and cohesiveness to maintain order and control. In fact, the army performs many internal police functions, such as guarding key road checkpoints, government buildings, foreign embassies and maintaining internal order. Thus, security assistance offers access to some of the most powerful people in the country, while military training, especially in the U.S., offers a chance to influence future leaders of the country as well as the military.

5. Suspicion of Foreign Military Personnel. Iraqi advisors brought to Yemen in the 1930s were key to
development of the Free Yemen Party. Egyptian advisors in the 1950s encouraged formation of the Free Officers' Association. Both of these organizations contributed to the downfall of the Imamate. Yemeni military personnel who were educated in Egypt, Iraq and Syria also played a part in the revolution. Y.A.R. officialdom wants technological development, but is suspicious of outsiders, especially outsiders associated with (countries viewed as) manipulative superpowers. Best results are obtained by being somewhat apolitical while contributing as much as possible technically.

6. Cultural Acclimatization. It should go without saying that one should not show disdain or contempt for the people and culture of the host country. Unfortunately, this is not obvious to all. As an example, an American Air Force Officer stationed in Sanaa during my tour showed open disdain for Yemenis, cursing them and making obscene gestures in public while frequently denigrating the people and country in conversation. This officer did untold harm to U.S. interests before he was sent home. Security assistance personnel should be hand-picked for sensitivity and empathy and thoroughly trained in the local language, history and
culture. The U.S. military and especially the USAF does not adequately select and train personnel for sensitive security assistance posts in third world countries. Probably the best advice can be found in T. E. Lawrence's accounts of his experiences. As Lawrence says, one must adopt Arab "kit" to have the most impact. While times have changed since Lawrence's advice was given, a sincere interest and respect for local people, culture, religion, food, etc. will greatly increase effectiveness of the individual in this part of the world where so much depends upon personal relationships.

7. The Y. A.R. is an Islamic Country. Islamic values, morals and mores differ from Judeo-Christian. Although in some respects the Yemenis pay lip service to Islamic tenets, Islam still pervades the environment. Prayers are said at appointed times, women are veiled, alcohol is (officially) proscribed. There is a substantial conservative movement (Muslim Brotherhood). The foreigner should take time to learn Islamic practices and show respect for them. For example, public displays of alcohol are inappropriate, as are public violations of the Ramadan fast.

8. Yemenis Like Americans. In extensive travel and contact with the civilian populace of the Y. A.R., my experience was overwhelmingly positive. This was true in cities and especially in small villages. People show genuine
warmth and interest in Americans. In the countryside, casual conversation would often lead to an invitation to dinner and to meet the Yemeni family. As a point of interest however, on two occasions, in different cities, I was mistaken for a Russian. In both instances, I was treated rudely and brusquely. On one occasion, in a store, prices were raised substantially, then lowered when the storekeeper found that I was not Russian, but American. In short, there is a large reservoir of goodwill toward Americans and, in fact, a surprising number of Yemenis have visited, worked or have relatives, in the United States.
CHAPTER VII

U.S. INTERESTS IN THE Y.A.R.

U.S. Interests in the Y.A.R. are largely determined by the country's strategic location. Along with the P.D.R.Y., Ethiopia and Djibouti, the Y.A.R. overlooks the Bab al Mandab Strait which control the southern entrance to the Red Sea (and the Suez Canal). In addition, the country serves as a buffer between the radical, Marxist P.D.R.Y. and Saudi Arabia. Additionally, a moderate, independent Y.A.R., with its free market economy is in the interest of the U.S. As officially stated:

"U.S. strategic objectives in the Yemen Arab Republic (Y.A.R.) derive from that country's location adjacent to the Bab al Mandab Straits and between a Soviet supported South Yemen and Saudi Arabia, a country of key importance to U.S. interests in the region. More populous, but considerably poorer than its northern neighbor, the Y.A.R. is vulnerable to both external threats and internal subversion. Internal U.A.R. developments have a potential impact throughout the oil producing region through approximately one million expatriate Yemenis working in the oil states. U.S. security assistance serves in particular to strengthen the Yemeni Armed Forces as a deterrent to renewed insurgency sponsored by South Yemen.

U.S. security assistance programs also contribute to countering Soviet influence in the Y.A.R. The Soviet Union has already obtained a firm foothold there, based on a heavy Yemeni dependence on Soviet Military equipment and training supplied on liberal credit terms. The debt resulting from this credit gives Moscow considerable political leverage. While the comparatively modest U.S. security assistance programs are unlikely to reverse Soviet gains, they do reinforce elements within the Yemeni government and military that seek alternatives to reliance on the Soviet Union. Although Soviet military aid to Yemen is many times greater than that of the U.S., specific U.S. programs have been designed to highlight the qualitative superiority of our assistance. U.S. aid is also important in complementing
existing and future cooperative assistance programs with Saudi Arabia.

Economically, the Y.A.R. is one of the poorest and least developed countries in the Middle East. Although oil has recently been discovered in the Y.A.R., it will be several years before substantial income is realized from this source. It is important that the U.S. continue to support the Y.A.R.'s independence and western orientation through grant assistance in the interim years. 1

Several areas in this statement of objectives and interests deserve further discussion:

1. Trilateral Relationship. U.S. policy, and especially security assistance policy, has been greatly influenced by the Y.A.R.'s proximity to, and relations with, Saudi Arabia, especially over the past decade. The relationship among the U.S., Y.A.R. and Saudi Arabia is sometimes called the trilateral relationship.

In the 20th century, Saudi-Yemeni relationships have varied between wary friendship and outright hostility. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Zaydi Imam and the Saudi King disputed ownership of the Asir and Najran, two areas which lie just north of the present day Y.A.R.-Saudi border. These disputes led to a war in 1934 in which the Saudis decisively defeated the Yemenis, and in a subsequent treaty, the Yemenis ceded the Asir and Najran to the Saudis. The disputed area has continued to be a sore point between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, however. In 1973, Y.A.R. Prime Minister Haith acknowledged Saudi control over the Asir and Najran as.
a condition for receiving aid from the Saudis.\textsuperscript{2} During the 1962-69 Civil War, the Saudis supported the royalist (Imamic) cause against the republicans. After the republican victory, Saudi strategy changed to one of rapprochment with the new regime. In an effort to moderate Y.A.R. policies, the Saudis provided large amounts of aid to the government.\textsuperscript{3} On the other hand, the Saudis, through their own channels, have also provided aid to tribes within the Y.A.R., in areas which are not fully under government control.\textsuperscript{4} Saudi strategy appears to be one of keeping the central government strong enough to serve as a buffer against the P.D.R.Y., but not strong enough to threaten Saudi Arabia itself.\textsuperscript{5} As John Peterson stated in \textit{Yemen: The Search For a Modern State}: "Riyadh would like to see a Sanaa government strong enough to serve as a buffer between itself and the P.D.R.Y. radicals. But at the same time, it attempts to minimise the potential threat of the Peninsula's most populous state and one culturally if not politically tied to South Yemen by keeping the Y.A.R. weak and subservient. The Saudis employ a number of strategies in this regard, such as budgetary payments to Sanaa, which gives them a voice in Y.A.R. policies, under-the-table payments to Shaykhs, officers and other politicians to achieve the same goal, and implied threats via restrictions on the entry and/or remittances of the half-million Yemeni
workers in Saudi Arabia.

In addition to attempting to fine tune the strength and stability of the Y.A.R., Saudi Arabia appears to be strongly opposed to a union of the two Yemens. As Tripp states in Regional Security in the Middle East:

"Foreign Minister Prince Saud told the Lebanese Prime Minister "Just as you are burdened with your problems in the south we also have a southern problem at the Saudi-Yemeni border." The great, unspoken fear is that the two Yemens might merge, and with a population of nine million present a formidable challenge to Saudi Arabia." 7

Tripp (and other authors) discuss Saudi meddling in Y.A.R. internal affairs to prevent such a union. In fact, as Tripp states, there are suspicions that the Saudis were involved in the assassination of Y.A.R. President Hamdi in 1975, the day before he was to begin unity talks with South Yemen. 8

An important tool of Saudi strategy is aid provided to the armed forces of the Y.A.R. Much of this aid is in the form of American military equipment, paid for by the Saudis or transferred from Saudi stocks. In addition, many of the spare parts which are essential to keep the American-origin equipment operating are routed through Saudi Arabia. 5
While these arrangements may serve U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia, it is the author's experience that such arrangements are counter-productive to U.S. interests in Yemen. The U.S. effort is seen by the Yemenis as a tool of Saudi policy and the U.S. shares in resentment by the Yemenis of Saudi attempts to manipulate their country and its armed forces. The relationship described above creates numerous difficulties for American security assistance personnel in the Y.A.R., especially since Saudi personnel in the Y.A.R. will not coordinate programs simultaneously with the Y.A.R. and the USOMC.

2. Strategic Location. In addition to serving as a buffer between Saudi Arabia and the P.D.R.Y., the Y.A.R. is one of four countries overlooking the Bab al Mandab, a rather narrow strait at the southern end of the Red Sea. This strait commands not only Red Sea shipping lanes, but also, effectively, much of the shipping through the Suez Canal. Two of the other three countries bordering the Bab al Mandab are Marxist countries who provide military facilities to the Soviets. The third, Djibouti, is a small country with close ties to France.

Soviet interest in this strategic area is strong and clear, but Soviet objectives are not so clear. Some would
claim that Soviet policies in the area are driven by expansionist aims. Others might say that Soviet objectives are defensive in nature, meant to secure access. Whichever the case, an unstable situation in the area would appear to provide opportunities for loss (or gain) by both superpowers.

3. Threat from the P.D.R.Y. Both the Y.A.R. and P.D.R.Y. claim to be the legitimate Yemeni state. They have, however, little in common otherwise. The Y.A.R. is a conservative, relatively weak government, while the P.D.R.Y. is an avowedly Marxist, party-ruled state. Relations have varied between war and unification talks since the two countries origins in 1969. Each supports dissident movements against the other. Neither the Soviet Union nor the U.S. would want to see a united Yemen which was oriented towards the other superpower.

4. Countering Soviet influence in the Y.A.R. Soviet military assistance to the Y.A.R. provides considerable access to Yemeni military personnel and considerable Soviet leverage on the military and government of the Y.A.R. In 1981 about 1500 Yemenis were enrolled in military training programs in the U.S.S.R. By contrast, in 1984 only 49 Yemenis were enrolled in similar programs in the United States. U.S. strategy in countering the Soviets has been to
emphasize the qualitative edge of U.S. equipment and training. There are, in fact, some U.S. qualitative advantages. For example, the quality of instruction given to YARAF pilots by U.S. F-5 instructors appears to be better than that given Yemeni MIG and SUKHOI pilots by Soviet instructors. Since 1979, only one F-5 has been lost, and the pilot was a Saudi instructor practicing for an airshow. On the other hand, during 1984-1985, when the author was in Yemen, at least three MIG-21s and one SUKHOI-22 were lost, reportedly with their Yemeni pilots. The F-5, however is generally considered an inferior aircraft to the MIG-21 and SUKHOI. The author has also personally inspected some stocks of munitions for the F-5 squadron. AIM-9 air-to-air missiles are overdue inspections and time change items, and practice munitions are in extremely short supply. The maintenance of F-5 aircraft, which is done by Saudi-funded Taiwanese is good, but parts are in very short supply. One of the chief objectives of the program, self-sufficiency, is not being met. In the author's opinion, this is at least partly due to an inability (due to lack of English language capability) and reluctance of Taiwanese to perform their training mission. The status of U.S. origin army equipment is similar. In short, any qualitative edge which was present in the U.S. program is eroding rapidly.

5. Oil in the Y.A.R. In July, 1984, oil was discovered in the Y.A.R. in commercially exploitabled
quantities. While exact potential of the discovery is not known, it appears that the Y.A.R. could become a producer with output on the order of Oman. Any revenues are several years away, and the uncertain price of oil makes any forecast of the economic benefits to the Y.A.R. tenuous at best. However, if one assumes revenues on the order of those accruing to Oman, the discovery could drastically alter the face of the country. The discovery is not an unmixed blessing, however, as at least part of the oilfield may be within areas which do not have a clearly marked border, in the eastern Y.A.R., raising the possibility of disputes with both Saudi Arabia and the P.D.R.Y.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS

I believe that the U.S. security assistance program has helped advance American interests in the Y.A.R. and has, at least partially, met the objectives stated in the previous chapter. Some of the positive effects of the program include:

1. Strengthened the Yemen Armed Forces. U.S. equipped air and ground force units have contributed to Y.A.R. combat capability. These units performed credibly in combat during the 1982 defeat of the National Democratic Front (NDF) insurgency. The Y.A.R. F-5 squadron is arguably the most combat capable tactical unit in the YARAF. Ground forces weapons including M-60 A1 tanks, M-113 APCs and Vulcan guns have proven useful in the Y.A.R. and equal or exceed the capability of eastern bloc equipment provided by the Soviets.

2. Counter to Soviet Influence. Almost 200 Y.A.R. military personnel have received training in the U.S. American mobile training teams, technical representatives and technical assistance field teams (TAFT) have provided training in the Y.A.R. The YARAF F-5 squadron is the most
prestigious fighter squadron in the Air Force and is
routinely sent out to escort and welcome visiting heads of
state. The security assistance program has been a vehicle
for providing regular access to some of the most powerful
officials in the Y.A.R., as well as many junior officers who
will hopefully be in more responsible positions in the
future. In some areas, such as training and ground forces
equipment, U.S. assistance is qualitatively superior to
that given by the Soviets.

On the other hand, there are some negative aspects to
the program. The first of these is the extremely close
tie-in of U.S. assistance to Saudi Arabia. It can be argued
that, without Saudi funding, there would be no U.S. program.
However, we must realize that Y.A.R. frustration with Saudi
control of the program has in some ways turned the Y.A.R. to
Soviet sources, particularly in 1979. Yemeni officials have
repeatedly requested independent U.S. assistance for the
armed forces. Tight Saudi control of parts and training
programs insures that U.S. origin weapons will not be turned
on the Saudis, but it also builds resentment and frustration
with the U.S. as well as Saudi Arabia.

The second negative aspect of the program is the
declining combat capability of U.S. origin equipment. This
is due to several factors. First, the equipment is aging and
requires more parts and maintenance. Second, initial
supplies of spares are now used up and much support
equipment is aging. Training and war reserve munitions have
been used and no provisions made for replenishing stocks.

A final negative aspect of the program is the slow
progress made towards self-sufficiency in maintaining
equipment. Much of this is due to mismanagement by the
Y.A.R. Armed Forces. There is, however, a perception on the
part of the Y.A.R., which this author believes to be
correct, that the Saudis (and by association, the Americans)
do not wish to see significant steps towards self-
sufficiency.

In assessing the future of the security assistance
program, it is important to look at the future environment
in the Y.A.R. While the only element which can be predicted
with confidence in the Middle East is unpredictability, some
events and trends seem likely to affect the future of the
Y.A.R. Among these are:

1. Economic Change. The discovery and development of
oil resources seems likely to change the Y.A.R. from a poor,
dependent country to a moderately well off, independent one.
Defense responsibilities, as well as resources available for
defense are likely to increase.
2. Conflicts with neighboring countries. Recent events in the P.D.R.Y indicate that it may become increasingly radical in the future. As the Y.A.R. becomes financially independent, the leverage which the Saudis obtain by providing aid is likely to decrease and friction between Saudi Arabia and the Y.A.R. is at least possible.

In light of these possibilities, I believe that the U.S. should attempt to improve its security assistance program in the Y.A.R. These improvements, which would not be expensive, would demonstrate that the U.S. is committed to supporting the Y.A.R. armed forces and would improve the U.S. position if and when the Y.A.R. becomes financially independent and seeks to upgrade its military capabilities. In my opinion, there is a possibility that a financially independent Y.A.R. will choose exclusively western sources for military equipment and training and choose to decrease Soviet involvement in the Y.A.R. military. Recommended steps are:

1. Improve training and qualifications of personnel assigned to USOMC Sanaa. During my tour, none of the OMC
personnel were trained to be conversationally proficient (three level on a scale of five) in Arabic. Fluency in Arabic, and training in area and country studies is essential for this isolated country. Additionally, personnel who serve in the OMC should be hand-picked and be required to serve a minimum two year tour. 4

2. Assess needs to keep present U.S. equipment operational for next the five years. Parts, training and wartime munitions needs which are not met by present Saudi funding could be met with only a modest increase in U.S. MAP allocations.

3. Reach high level agreement with the Saudis on future support to Y.A.R. military. Two program management reviews have been held in the United States during the past five years. These were attended by working level Saudi and U.S. representatives. A higher level policy conference between U.S. and Saudi representatives is necessary to determine Saudi intentions with regard to funding support for U.S. origin equipment in the Y.A.R. Absent such an agreement, U.S. security assistance planners are literally working in the dark in trying to program requirements for
4. Improve quality of training for Y.A.R. military personnel. Increase mobile training teams and TAFTS to provide follow-on training and guidance to Yemenis trained in the U.S. Additionally, the amount of training bang the U.S. is getting for the IMET buck should be improved. In FY 84, for example, the U.S. allocated slightly over one million dollars IMET funds to the Y.A.R. Only 31 students were trained in the U.S. While the low student/dollar ratio reflects the need for extensive English language training prior to technical training, many other undeveloped countries have similar problems. The ratio of students to dollars for the Y.A.R. is the lowest for any country in the world. Perhaps a review and revamping of the Y.A.R. IMET program would provide a greater return to the U.S. and the Y.A.R.

In summary, I believe that the U.S. must realize that the Y.A.R. is maturing politically and economically and that U.S. security assistance policies, which have been stagnant since 1979, must also mature for the U.S. to maintain its position in the country.
NOTES

CHAPTER I (pages 1-2)


CHAPTER II (pages 3-9)

1. The Yemenis include roughly the area now comprising present day North and South Yemen.

2. As an example, 36% of Y.A.R. cabinet members between 1968-1980 were Shafi and 56% were Zaydi. J. E. Petersen. Yemen: The Search for a Modern State. Baltimore, Md. Johns Hopkins University Press. 1982. Pg. 127.

3. The 1970 Constitution changed the name of the country from the People's Republic of South Yemen (PRSY) to the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).

CHAPTER III (pages 10-12)

1. As an example, the U.S. Department of Commerce in Foreign Economic Trends and their Implications for the United States estimated 1984 Y.A.R. population at 8,500,000. Their 1977 Area Handbook for the Yemenis estimates Y.A.R. population at (in 1977) 6,500,000. While the U.N. (see below) estimates 1983 population of 6,230,000.


3. Ibid.


5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid. Pg. 4.
9. Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States (FET 84-113). Pg. 3.
10. Frederick. Pg. 15.

CHAPTER IV (pages 13-17)

2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
7. Reported in, among others; On the Shores of Bab Al Mandab. pg. 5, and The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula. pg. 4.
8. The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula, pg. 5
11. Ibid. Ppg 139-140.
12. Exact amount of debt unknown. One billion dollars was the generally accepted figure at American Embassy, Sanaa.

14. Virtually all small arms are of Eastern Bloc origin as are 90% of tanks and 85% of tactical aircraft. For an accurate tabulation, see Air Force Magazine, February, 1986, pg. 123.


CHAPTER V (pages 19-20)

1. The Two Yemens. Pg. 23.

2. Ibid. Pg. 114.


4. This road building assistance included building the Sanaa-Taiz-Mocha road, one of three key roads in the Y.A.R. The Taiz-Hodeida road was built by the Soviets and the Hodeida-Sanaa road by the People's Republic of China.

5. The highest ranking American official to ever visit the Y.A.R..


7. Ibid.


9. Ibid.

CHAPTER VI (pages 21-26)

1. For example, none of the six U.S. military personnel assigned to USOMC Sanaa were trained to a three (conversationally proficient) level (out of a Five scale) in Arabic. The U.S. Ambassador frequently mentioned the need for such training to U.S. military agencies such as
USCENTCOM and the Military Departments.

2. Ramadan is a period of fasting, approximately one month long, which occurs once each Islamic year. During daylight hours of Ramadan, no eating, drinking or smoking is permitted.

CHAPTER VII (pages 27-34)

1. Foreign Military Aid of U.S. etc. Pg. 178.

2. The Two Yemens. Pg. 285.


5. This opinion is not only that of the author, but is expressed in many works on the area. For example; Regional Stability in the Middle East, pg. 34; Yemen. The Search for a Modern State, pg. 176; and Yemen. Traditionalism vs. Modernity, pg. 76.

6. Peterson. OP. cit. Pg. 89

7. Regional Stability in the Middle east. Pg. 34.

8. Ibid.

9. The author during his tour in the Y.A.R. was extensively involved with the Cooperative Logistics Supply/Support Arrangement (CLSSA) which supported the YARAF. All parts, equipment and technical manuals were shipped from the U.S. to Saudi Arabia and then, by the Saudis, to the Y.A.R. This gave the Saudis direct and almost immediate control over readiness rates of the YARAF F-5s, since there was no bench stock in the Y.A.R. and almost no warehouse storage.


11. Ethiopia provides landing rights for Soviet military aircraft as does the P.D.R.Y. In addition, r

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Soviet Navy uses ports in both countries to support its Indian Ocean operations.


13. The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula. Pg. 140.


15. Personal opinion of the author. Dissatisfaction was repeatedly expressed on this score by the Commander and deputy Commander of the YARAF. Taiwanese maintenance technicians contract reportedly specifies English language capability and training mission. Most Taiwanese did not speak English and they neglected their training mission. On two occasions, the Author witnessed Taiwanese who brusquely shoved aside Yemeni trainees trying to do their job and then did the task themselves.

16. There are several reports of estimated yields per day. In "The Yemen Arab Republic and the Ali Abdullah Salih Regime" (pg. 313), Burrowes provides an estimate of 300,000 BBLs/day.

CHAPTER VIII (pages 35-40)

1. Based on pilot proficiency and accident rate. As an example, in a May 85 firepower demonstration, a SUKHOI-22 pilot flew too close to to his bomb drop and lost his aircraft due to fragmentation from the blast. F-5 pilots have consistently avoided these types of problems. Also, in 1982 counter-insurgency actions, Soviet-equipped squadrons reportedly suffered at least three downed aircraft, while the F-5 squadron, which saw an equal amount of action, lost none.

2. Interestingly, several Vulcans were mounted on Soviet-supplied BTR-152s, with good results.

3. As an example, YARAF stocks of BDU-33 practice bombs were only 50-100 when the author left the Y.A.R. in April, 1985. A good training program would use 50-100 such bombs per pilot per year.

4. US Army personnel generally serve a two year tour, USAF personnel one year. Recommendation does not apply to Technical Assistance Field Team personnel.
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