AN INTERIM STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE ARMS NEGOTIATION STRATEGY

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AIR War college research report abstract

Title: An interim strategic defense initiative arms negotiation strategy

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Comments on some of the pros and cons of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Key issues discussed relate to the projected cost of SDI and the potential violation of the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty. Proposes a solution that has the potential to significantly reduce the total cost, circumvents the treaty resulting in the deployment of a more effective ballistic missile defense system.
BIograPHICAL SKETCH

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

"Where no counsel is, the people fall: but in the multitude of counsellors there is safety." (KJV, Pr. 11:14)

I shall endeavor to proffer military counsel on the subject of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The purpose of this counsel is to offer yet another option that may help as an interim SDI ARMS Negotiation strategy that if adopted should prove to be more effective, cost efficient and politically more acceptable. I will provide the reader with a short introduction followed by chapters on cost, the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the proposal, and conclusion. Now how did this all come about?

Robert McFarlane [who was to become the President's National Security Adviser] was worried that U.S. strategic-military policy was breaking down. The nuclear freeze movement was gaining ground in Congress. Negotiations in Geneva were going nowhere. McFarlane could foresee a time when the Soviets might spurt far ahead in the missile race.

Seeking a way to rattle the chessboard, McFarlane reasoned that a defensive research program would attract bipartisan support at home and might someday be useful in Geneva. He mentioned these possibilities to Reagan, knowing he would be receptive....Late in 1982 McFarlane and Watkins [Admiral James Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations] consulted informally. The product of these
talks was a document, known to insiders as the "freedom from fear" briefing paper, conveying McFarlane's views over Watkin's name.

Next Watkins got his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to approve a briefing for the President. On Feb. 11, 1983, they sat down with Reagan .... Then he made his pitch: the advances in defensive technology were so promising that the President should throw his weight behind a major research effort. McFarlane interjected: Are you saying that over time this could lead to deployable systems? Exactly, Watkins replied. McFarlane then polled the other four military leaders around the table. None dissented. (1:16)

McFarlane's strategy was successful for " on 23 March 1983 President Reagan made his now famous speech on SDI. (2:8) Soon thereafter the President ordered an assessment of technologies and systems that might provide a defense against ballistic missiles, together with a study of the policy implications of ballistic missile defenses for the United States and its allies. The Defensive Technologies Team and the Future Security Team's efforts were submitted to Congress around March 1984. (3:1,3)

This study addressed only defense against ballistic missiles. Key to the proposed strategy was an analysis of the characteristics of a ballistic missile through all four phases of a typical trajectory. The basic finding of this study was that a multi-layered defense which would attack a ballistic missile throughout its entire trajectory held the best chance for success. Thus a four-layered defense system has become the core strategy of this basic research effort. A by-product of this type of defense is that the cost of
achieving the same effectiveness should be far less than an equivalent single-layer defense. (3:15)

If each defense layer could be designed to allow only ten percent leakage, the overall system's effectiveness would be 99.9%. In other words, if the Soviet Union launched all 10,000 of their warheads at the United States at one time only 10 would get thru.

Obviously each phase of this layered defensive system will present unique technical problems to be solved. These technical problems may not be insurmountable, but in the words of Richard D. DeLauer, former undersecretary of defense, success depends on breakthroughs in eight technologies, each "equivalent to or greater than the Manhattan [A-bomb] project." (4:1) The cost of this basic research effort for the fiscal years 85-89 is estimated to be about $25 billion. "This represents two percent of the Department of Defense budget and 15 percent of the defense R&D budget during that period." (5:47) Now that we know a little more about how this all came about, let's return to the President's speech.

On March 23, 1983, President Reagan described his vision that one day nuclear weapons might be made "impotent and obsolete." The president asked: 'what if free people could live in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack: that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our soil or that of our allies" (2:8)
This excerpt comes from one of the most hotly debated speeches of any president during this century. The media immediately dubbed our President's vision "star wars." Here like in so many other cases the media goes for a catchier way of describing the concept rather than the factual—but that sells news coverage. Being a bit more fair, the media also does perform a very valuable function in our open society;—it starts and assists in public debate. In our society the expenditure of public funds, not to mention the adoption of a bold new defensive strategy which the Administration wants and needs the American public to support, must be thoroughly debated and discussed. One thing about the debate that has ensued since the President's 1983 speech has been its bipolar character—one is either vehemently for or against SDI. We need to understand some of the major arguments put forth by both sides. Assessment of these arguments/facts will be used as a basis of my proposed strategy. First let's address the major reason for the President's decision.

For the past twenty years the only option open to any president for the deterrence of nuclear war has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. This is basically the strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction. There was no alternative. In the opinion of President Reagan and those in favor of this basic research effort there is now hope for a second option. An option that is defensive rather than offensive in nature and offers the world hope rather than the
continued threat of annihilation. This, in my opinion, is a very good reason to pursue SDI. But what has been the opinion of our chief enemy -- the Soviet Union? (6:5,6)

The following quote, I believe, adequately describes the Soviet's opinion: "Despite U.S. assurances, the Soviets perceive Star Wars as part of a U.S. first strike, allowing us to launch a preemptive attack and then to destroy the remnant of any surviving Soviet retaliatory forces." (7:5537) Such a perception should leave little doubt in the minds of any American of the real intentions of the Soviets. Their intention is to deny the United States the very system they themselves are developing (2:17). If they are successful, won't they be in exactly the same position? Would they hesitate to strike first in that situation?

The change in the industrial situation, i.e., the recent scientific research breakthroughs, has been the impetuous behind SDI from the very beginning. Those in favor of SDI have analyzed recent technological trends and feel confident that within the next two decades the president and Congress will be in a position to make an informed deployment decision.
CHAPTER II
WHAT WILL IT COST?

Senator Proxmire, like those that so adamantly oppose star wars, oppose it because of its projected cost. Like Mr. Proxmire, former Secretaries of Defense Harold Brown and James Schlesinger, and a senior spokesman of the Reagan Administration, have all estimated the full star wars cost as hundreds of billions to one trillion dollars. (1:55327) Schlesinger added that star wars' development would absorb funds drastically needed by conventional programs. (2:573)

With the exception of accepting the fact that conventional programs might have to compete with star wars for funds, I could not find any basis for such an estimate. This is not to say that their estimates were not supported, only that none were offered in the books and the numerous articles that I read. Without this basic information one can only conjecture as to the accuracy of their estimates. If there estimates were based upon an extrapolation of the Union of Concerned Scientists' (USC) estimate of the number of laser satellites that would be needed to protect the United States in a worst case scenario (as originally proposed), their estimate would have been based upon a requirement of 2,400 satellites. (7:21) In this case, if one assumed that each satellite would cost about $100 million each their
estimate would have been in excess of $2 trillion. It should be noted that a careful analysis of the USC estimate reveals that less than "100" satellites would be required. (3:21) Obviously the estimated cost would have to be re-evaluated. Now if their estimate was based upon an extrapolation of star wars' R&D budget, perhaps a more reasonable estimate could be supported. None-the-less, this type of information was not provided either. Because there is no support for this estimate and the fact that it is so grossly overstated, one must only assume that the accuracy of their estimate is not as important as their desire to stress that the total cost may, in their opinion, be exceedingly great. If they are close by even one order of magnitude, with the Gramm-Rudman amendment in force the United States may find it extremely difficult to fund SDI all by itself. (4:24) But what about the cost to the Russians?

Senator Proxmire's position is that the cost margins will always favor the offensive. (1:552-56-SS37) A reading of Clausewitz on the other hand, would lead one to the opposite conclusion. For he states, "that the defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offensive." (5:358) Little Brown supports Clausewitz when he cited studies that were done at Lawrence Livermore that showed that a single laser or particle-beam satellite (estimated cost: $1 billion) could destroy 23 Soviet SS-18 missiles (cost: $2.5 billion). Thus, in an offense-defense race involving these
weapons, it would cost the Soviet Union twice as much as it would cost us. (6:38) Dr. Robert Jastrow, one of the nation's leading physicists, also supported Clausewitz when he informed the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that the U.S. could build a two-layered smart-bullet ballistic missile defense system for about $60 billion that would require the Soviets to spend up to $2 trillion to overwhelm. (7:112) Who is correct: the Proxmires or Clausewitzians? I don't know, but the Administration's position supports the Clausewitzian position.

Paul Nitze, the President's senior arms control adviser, stated that before the Administration will proceed with the SDI development and test program they will have to have the answer to two key questions: "Will the projected defense be invulnerable to attack? And if the offense improves or increases its forces, will the defense be able to resist the challenge for less than what it costs the offense to mount it?" (6:40) Then and only then would continuance of SDI be justified in his opinion. This appears to be a very reasonable position, but how will one really know the answer to these two questions? Will the Soviets provide us their half of the information? If not, won't the answers be as speculative as Proxmire's? If cost is to be the primary criteria perhaps parallel cost should be used not simple system by system analysis.

By parallel cost I mean the combined Gross National
Product (GNP) of the free world versus the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. By free world I would include all of NATO, Japan, Israel, Australia, and South Korea. In this case, the GNP would favor the free world by a factor of three to one. In other words, the free world could corporately spend three times as much on a ballistic missile defense system and still be relatively cost effective. (6:40; 8:472-475) I believe this would be the wisest course of action because we not only gain financially we might also have access to the technical communities of all these countries. It should be noted that some would argue that this is at best optimistic because Western societies have historically found it difficult to spend as large a percentage of their gross national product on defense as the Soviet Union. Perhaps they are right, but with the stakes so high this could change. Although cost is important, saving our societies has a value that should be included in this decision also. In closing this section let me leave the reader with the following consideration.

Experts have concluded that since the ABM Treaty of 1972, The Soviet Union has spent about as much on strategic defenses as on their enormous buildup in offensive strategic nuclear missiles...The Soviets have invested very heavily for more than two decades in other forms of antiballistic missile defense, including precisely those technologies encompassed by our own research program. Given these facts, does it not seem hypocritical that the Soviets would excoriate the U.S. SDI program in tones of outrage and moral indignation? Is it not hypocritical that they are now constructing a radar in central Siberia which blatantly violates the very ABM Treaty they claim to want stringently enforced? (9:2)
CHAPTER III
1972 ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

The continued viability of the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty has and continues to be a central issue in the debate of SDI. But before we get into a discussion of how the ABM Treaty should be handled, its purpose needs to be understood.

Under Secretary of Defense Fred C. Ikle had this to say about the this subject:

...it is time for the United States to recognize "that our arms control theories of 15 years ago were mistaken."

"We did not slow down the build-up in offensive nuclear arms by curbing strategic defenses. The ABM Treaty failed in bringing stability."

In the 15 years since the negotiation of that treaty, he noted, the Soviets have added 'some 7,900 medium and long-range nuclear missile warheads to their arsenal, an increase of 515 percent. Since the treaty was signed in 1972, some 3,850 Soviet missile warheads were added, a growth of almost 65 percent.

"Clearly the Soviet Union did not agree with us on our philosophy for the ABM Treaty," he said. moreover, the Soviet Union "not only violated the spirit of that treaty, but its formal provisions," e.g., by construction of the huge phased array radar at Krasnoyarsk." (1:114)

Although I'm sure that Mr. Ikle is absolutely right in stating the general purpose of the ABM Treaty and where we find ourselves today, those who oppose SDI, the
Administration, and the JCS clearly see value in continued compliance. Those who oppose star wars appear to reason as Carl Sagan does that enlightened policies, not star wars, will save us; hence, even though these treaties have not been as successful as we'd hoped, they have done some good and they serve as a reminder that we can do better. (2:66,69) Based upon the Soviet Union's continued violations of such treaties coupled with our apparent inability to attain our stated objectives, it is amazing that this hope of yet a more enlightened treaty has such persuasive force. Although Senator Proxmire's main argument against star wars is clearly a sincere worry about the eventual cost of an anti-ballistic missile defense system, he too uses the American hope in enlightened policies--verifiable treaties. He stated his case as follows:

"... 'star wars' would jeopardize arms control in the following ways: First, it advances and extends the arms race. Second, if deployed, it obviously violates the Anti-Ballistic Missile Arms Control Treaty according to testimony by the Defense Department's own leading advocate of "star wars."

Third, it would end any chance of a treaty limiting Soviet offensive missiles because the Soviets would certainly not agree to an arms control treaty that nullified their ability to retaliate effectively to a nuclear attack. The easy response by the Soviets to 'star wars' is to build more offensive missiles. If we go ahead with 'star wars,' they will do just this and they will certainly refuse to agree to any treaty that would prevent them from doing so.

Fourth, 'star wars' would seriously jeopardize the superpower satellites which constitute the very heart of arms control verification. Fifth, "star wars" would seriously diminish the credibility of arms control
agreements because it would make verification of a much more complex and far-flung offensive missile system much less reliable.

And sixth, any offensive missiles the antimissile system could intercept and stop could be, and would be, replaced by new offensive missiles the Soviets would build in anticipation of precisely this kind of problem. (3:59445)

Senator Proxmire’s position is typical of those that oppose star wars. These reasons need to be discussed.

The fact that SDI may or may not extend the arms race first is not supported by anything other than Mr. Proxmire’s statement. However, other opponents have voiced the same argument and cite that a modest increase in the offense using penetration aids and the like could easily foil star wars. As pointed out earlier this may not be true. Remember Little Brown and Dr. Robert Jastrow share the opposite opinion. (4:38:1:112) In any case, the race might just center around the defense rather than the defense/ offence. If the former were the case, then our President’s objective would be achieved. Then perhaps the United States and the Soviet Union could negotiate a real and lasting reduction in nuclear ballistic missiles. This is in fact the very hope of the Administration. (5:9) Of course there is a third alternative—an increase in both defense and offense. I believe that as long as we are enemies the later will be the course followed. Only time will tell. Let us skip the second reason and come back to it later.
Mr. Frostmire's third factor may in fact be true, but on
the-other-hand it may not be. Frostmire's reasoning is based
upon his and like opponent's opinion that the Soviet's
easiest and surest answer to star wars is to increase their
offensive missiles or the number of warheads. The obvious
corollary of this reasoning is that a ballistic missile
system would work much better if the opponent's arsenal was
dramatically reduced. As pointed out earlier, the Soviets
have invested as much on defense as on offense. Was it not
Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party, that
made the offer to reduce the nuclear arsenal by 50 percent
(this is of course tied to no U.S. SDI)?
Wouldn't it be
difficult to prove that the Soviets had disbanded the ICBMs
that they had in silos if we agreed to such a reduction? If
I remember correctly, many of their silo based ICBMs are cold
launched and hence they may already have spares. To be sure
that this capability was in fact dismantled we'd need to
verify that the silos were destroyed also. Compliance by the
Soviets would still leave them their mobile ICBMs which
significantly complicates the verification task. The flip
side of the coin would leave the U.S. with a serious ocd.
Could we afford the risk associated with Gorbachev's offer at
this time? With his cold launch and mobile ICBMs isn't
Gorbachev in a much better position than us? Perhaps it
would be wise for the U.S. to stall the negotiations until we
have our own mobile ICBMs and additional time to do the basic
research for SDI. I for one believe this suggestion to be
expedient, because we'd be in an equivalent negotiating position and have perhaps far greater SDI basic research information with which to make an intelligent go-no go deployment decision.

Mr. Proxmire would have you believe that stopping star wars at this stage would be not only expedient, but absolutely necessary if we are to save the satellites which constitute the very heart of an arms control verification capability. He reasons that any nation that could find and knock out and incoming ballistic missile could perfect an antisatellite variation of the same weapon. This is hard to dispute, since it represents nothing but conjecture. But if it's true, and if Paul Nitze's public statement has the backing of the President, then perhaps SDI will have to be scrubbed. We won't know, however until we prove it to ourselves. Surely we shouldn't base the defense of our nation on mere conjecture?

Again it seems that Mr. Proxmire's fifth and sixth position are based more on conjecture than hard facts. Star wars or no, the Soviets appear to be continuing their strategic missile modernization and build-up program. According to Under Secretary of Defense Ikle 15 years haven't achieved the desired results. What makes us so sure now that another arms control agreement will achieve any better results? Speaking of results let us now return to Proxmire's second position--deployment of star wars would violate the
1972 ABM Treaty.

Mr. Froxmire and like opponents of star wars are basically right when they say that the deployment of star wars would violate the 1972 ABM Treaty. Stressing the potential violation, they fail to point out that the treaty is a living document and meant to be so. There are provisions incorporated in it that allow for its modification. "Article XIV gives each party the right to propose amendments to the treaty." (6:2) Articles XIV and XIII are provisions that give the responsibility to the Standing consultative Commission to negotiate amendments to the treaty that either side proposes. According to Paul Nitze, it is the intent of the United States to fully comply with this agreement. (6:3) If this is the case, and I have no reason to doubt it, then what's the problem? The problem will come when the United States reaches the deployment phase and the Soviet Union refuses to negotiate. What will be the United States' alternative then?

The only reasonable overt course of action would be for the U.S. to revert to international law. International law provides that a material breach by one party entitles the other to withhold compliance with an equivalent provision. The United States has reverted to this stipulation in the past, and thus should have no compulsion in exercising it again (7:707). There are several Soviet violations of the
arms treaties.

In his January 1984 report to the Congress, the President concluded that the Soviet Union has violated or probably violated several of its major arms control obligations and political commitments...They have violated the Helsinki Final Act requirement of advanced notification of certain major military exercises, and the SALT II limits on encryption of missile test telemetry. A new large phased-array radar that they are now building in the central USSR is almost certainly in violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. The SS-25 missile is probably a second new ICBM type, prohibited by the SALT II agreement; if it is not, it violates the SALT II provisions regarding the permitted ratio between the weight of an ICBM reentry vehicle and the missile's total throw weight....And they probably have deployed the SS-18 missiles in violation of SALT II.(8:62-63)

Obviously, the United States has ample ammunition to pursue the provisions of international law. The major problem here, in my opinion, would be the potential loss for meaningful treaties in the future. All-in-all, this may turn out to be a political stumbling block that can't be hurdled. If so, is there another alternative?
CHAPTER IV
THE PROPOSAL

My proposal is a covert idea. First it recognizes that McFarlane's idea appears to lack a strategic strategy and proposes one: second, it proposes a way to handle the potentially prohibitive cost of SDI; and third it addresses the problem of testing.

My counsel is that the United States deploy and test its ballistic missile defense system covertly. Covert deployment and testing may prove to be extremely difficult but surely not more difficult than the SDI venture itself. Although Mr. McFarlane's idea has given our open society the privilege of public debate, in my opinion, it lacks a strategic strategy that has the potential to be cost effective. The deployment of an unknown ballistic missile system has a far greater chance of being successful than a known system. A boxer that thinks that his opponent lacks a defense on his left side because he can't see an arm is more likely to be surprised and his blow countered than would otherwise be the case. This would be the same case if the Soviets were unaware of our deployed ballistic missile defense and they decided to exercise their first strike option assuming that their own defense could handle the residual threat. The reader should note that this appears to be a basic change in our overall
military strategy to avoid nuclear war. This is not the case
at all, but a basic assumption of this proposal is that the
united States would have a far greater chance of survival
should our basic strategy fail if we had a ballistic missile
defense system that was unknown to the Soviets versus no
defense at all. In my opinion, one must always have a viable
alternative if one's basic strategy fails. Hence the
question that we need to address is "just what should we do
to give us an even greater chance of survival?"

The ARMs control negotiations should be prolonged to
give us time to deploy more Peace Keeper (MX) missiles so as
to have an equivalent cold launch system and to deploy, the
small midgetman (SM) missile to have a survivable/mobile ICBM
like the Soviet's SS-25 and time to reach the deployment
point of SDI. Of course, our Congress must be aware of our
reasons for delaying the ARMs negotiations and be willing to
fund continued deployment of the MX and SM systems, otherwise
we could be defeated before we really get started. Given we
get the Congress' support and are successful in correctly
posturing ourselves, hard-ball negotiations should be
concluded.

The Soviets appreciate power and should be approached
accordingly. (1:326-361) The U.S. should demand that the
Soviets dismantle all ballistic missiles that in "our
opinion" violate any previously negotiated ARMs agreements
(SS-15 and SS-25 for example) and demand the dismantling of
the phased-array radar at Krasnovarsk. This should be our
going in position. Then offer to give up SDI deployment and
testing for a verifiable reduction of 60 percent of all ICBMs
on both sides. Given the Soviets agree and we verify the
sealing of the silos and the destruction of the missiles and
the phased-arrived radar, we will have significantly reduced
the threat and the Soviet Union's own ballistic missile
defense capability. Of course we will not give up SDI on...
those parts that we've already determine as unworkable and
rename SDI something else and press on with a covert
deployment. It's a gamble and a lie, but it just might work.
(Obviously, this runs counter to our nation's values and
purpose, but one must at times weigh these with perhaps more
important issues -- such as national survival in the event of
a nuclear war.) Remember in the long run we are talking
about the fruits of negotiation and they will probably differ
from our initial goals, but the real objective is to
significantly reduce the threat and at the same time simplify
our defense.

By simplifying our defense requirements we will have
reduced the cost accordingly. Our allies have just as
much, if not more, to be gained by this overall venture and,
in my opinion, they should shoulder their fair share of the
financial burden and the problem solving task. Parallel cost
would be the cheapest way to go, but including allies in this
venture presents us with as many problems as we might be able
to solve. First and foremost is the problem of secrecy and then there is the problem of coordination and the agreement of the fair share of the cost.

As far as what represents a fair share of the cost that our allies should be asked to bear I’ll leave that up to our politicians, but I do have a suggestion as to how we might get our allies to finance their share. With the problem of our huge national debt and the continued trend of ever increasing trade deficits and the unknown effect of the Gramm-Rudman amendment, I believe even a partial solution to this problem would be politically welcomed. I suggest that our allies be asked to finance specific SDI ventures via 10-20 percent of their trade surplus with the United States. Our Congress should in turn promise not to pursue protectionist legislation. Our allies should be allowed to invest this money in their own economy and thus, reap a positive return and we will in effect reap a significant cost reduction for the overall SDI venture.

The issue of secrecy might be achieved by blinding the Soviet’s satellites and other collecting devices through the use of SDI products and by launching the SDI systems into space over a prolonged period. This prolonged launch period should be so constructed as to appear as our normal launch activity.

Given that our allies’ fair share of the cost and the
secrecy of the SDI deployment could be favorably resolved, we will have significantly reduced the overall cost of SDI, developed much closer allies, and have a ballistic missile defense in place that protects us all far more than an overt system could. This leaves only one question to be addressed— the confidence factor.

Operational testing is required to demonstrate a satisfactory level of confidence. What I propose is that the multi-layered defense system use SM, MX, and sea launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), launched out of Vandenberg and Patrick AFB as its targets. These targets should be launched with scrambled telemetry data and during times when Soviet surveillance is most difficult. Destroying targets over the Eastern and Western missile Test Ranges is ideal for this purpose, because the right targets are available, the total missile trajectory is available so that all four phases of the layered-defense could be tested, and the test/target missiles are all constructed in such a manner as to allow safety to destroy them; thus, a kill could be publicly explained as a detonation by the range for safety reasons. Obviously, there is a limit to the amount of testing that could be done, but these ranges afford us the best covert test range available. Demonstrated confidence is necessary; complete confidence cannot be demonstrated in either an overt or covert system unless the Soviets start World War III.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The opponents of the President's Strategic Defense initiative base their case on the technical aspects, the cost, and the potential violation of the 1972 Anti-ballistic missile Treaty. Since SDI is a basic research effort and I am not qualified to discuss the technical issues, this part should be left to the expert. With respect to cost, I've shown that at the very minimum their cost projections are at least questionable. However, anything near the amount they are projecting when coupled with the Gramm-Rudman amendment should give one strong cause to seek reliable allies that are willing to share the cost. In addition to cost, the potential violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty has been stressed. The only overt ways to insure that the treaty is not violated seems to be either a resort to the provision of international law or the negotiation of a modification to the existing treaty. Neither way may be politically acceptable or possible. Besides, the Soviet's track record of violating treaties is clear. It is doubtful that we can trust them, so why put the fate of our society in another treaty?

If another treaty is not the way to go, a covert deployment of a ballistic missile defense makes sense. However, it makes sense only if the United States has
sufficient Peace keeper and Small Midgetman missiles. SDI basic research is near deployment, trusted allies are willing to share the cost, and we are successful in negotiating a significant reduction in the offensive strategic nuclear threat. Since neither an overt nor a covert ballistic missile defense system can be fully tested, a defense system that the Soviets are unaware of should have a much better chance of being effective. Assuming that the number one political responsibility of our government is national survival this proposal might be politically more acceptable because it should have a far greater chance of success than an overt ballistic missile defense system. Counseling from a military standpoint I for one would recommend this course of action from a military point of view. However, from a moral point of view which I for one believe is the best approach, I would recommend that this great Nation with all of its allies proceed with an overt SDI venture. Being united in an overt SDI venture, I believe, would send the Soviets one powerful and succinct message -- the free world is united and will defeat you should you choose war!
NOTES
CHAPTER I (1-5)


CHAPTER II (6-9)


CHAPTER III (10-16)


7. John F. Reichart and Steven F. Sturm (eds.),


CHAPTER IV

BIBLIOGRAPHY


