DESTINY IN THE PACIFIC: IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY OF RISING JAPANESE NATIONALISM AND ECONOMIC POWER (U)
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DESTINY IN THE PACIFIC:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY OF RISING
JAPANESE NATIONALISM AND ECONOMIC POWER

by

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June 1986

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**Abstract**

This thesis examines the implications for U.S. policy of rising Japanese nationalism, focusing on the role of economic power in reinforcing Japanese nationalism. The thesis argues that Japan's growing economic power has been enhanced over the last decade by a traditional sense of nationalism and pride in Japan. This sentiment has its roots in the same components that led to the growth of militarism in the 1930s. This paper discusses the growth of modern nationalism in Japan through this century, emphasizing the components of the culture and the environment that are common to pre- and post-World War II Japan.

The clear theme gleaned from Japanese actions in this century is Japan's faith in her own destiny as an international leader. Current U.S. policy with regard to trade and defense toward Japan is too heavy-handed, too likely to produce a backlash of sentiment in Japan in the coming years. The U.S. needs a policy which recognizes the Japanese view of their role in the world but at the same time draws them into a position supportive of U.S.
interests in the Pacific and the world. This paper concludes by proposing a new policy for the U.S. which accords best with the cultural, economic, and political developments of modern Japan.
Destiny in the Pacific: Implications for U.S. Policy of Rising Japanese Nationalism and Economic Power

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ABSTRACT

The thesis of this paper is that rising Japanese economic power has been reinforced over the last decade by a traditional sense of nationalism and pride in Japan. This swell of sentiment has at its roots the same components which led to the growth of militarism in the 1930's. This paper examines the growth of modern nationalism in Japan through this century, stressing those components of the culture and the environment which are common to both pre- and post-World War II Japan.

The clear theme gleaned from Japanese actions in this century is her faith in her own destiny as an international leader. Current U.S. policy with regard to trade and defense toward Japan is too heavy-handed, too likely to produce a backlash of sentiment in Japan in the coming years. The U.S. needs a policy which recognizes the Japanese view of their role in the world but at the same time draws them into a position supportive of U.S. interests in the Pacific and the world. This paper concludes by proposing a new policy for the U.S. which accords best with the cultural, economic, and political developments of modern Japan.
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As is often the case with academic works, this paper is a product of many ideas and much assistance from a variety of sources. I owe a debt to those who have contributed thusly. The final arrangement of these ideas and facts into a coherent document and thesis is mine alone, however, for good or bad.
HANA WA SAKURA, HITO WA BUSHI

("As is the cherry blossom among flowers, so stands the warrior among men.")

-Old Japanese saying.

"Our purpose shall be not solely to gain wealth nor to display industrial strength, but to contribute to the progress and welfare of the community and the nation."

-From the Matsushita Electric daily employee recitation

"Those who ignore history tend to become its victims."

-Carlos P. Romulo
Former Foreign Minister
Republic of the Philippines
I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE AND THESIS STATEMENT

The purpose of this paper is to propose a policy for the United States to improve relations with Japan. To achieve this goal, I have researched their fundamental beliefs including legends and myths as well as Japanese history for clues to their methods of thinking as revealed in their actions and reactions to world events. I have found significant similarities and parallels between Japanese ultranationalism of the early twentieth century and Japanese economic expansion of the 1970's and 80's. Later chapter will examine the 1920's and 1930's in greater detail to bring out these parallels. On the surface the two may appear unrelated, however, in terms of an expression of Japanese nationalism, there are some common threads. It is this potent force of nationalism which will be the common theme throughout this paper.

In 1983 Prime Minister Nakasone referred to relations between Japan and the United States as similar to those before the Second World War\(^1\) and in early 1985, Matsunaga

Nobuo, then ambassador-designee to the United States said that "sentiment in the United States is like that before the outbreak of a war." Such ominous comments support very directly the thesis of this paper which is that rising Japanese economic power over the decade of 1975-1985 has reinforced, and has been reinforced, by a growing sense of nationalism and pride in Japan—a swell of sentiment which has at its roots the similar components as those that led to the growth of militarism in the 1930's.

The United States in the mid-1980's is at a critical juncture in its policymaking. Poor decisions could lead the U.S. away from what should be our goal of closer bilateral ties and produce a nationalistic backlash which does little to improve our ties with Japan and resolve our differences. This growing, powerful nationalistic sentiment is malleable now and must not be hammered with an iron-fisted policy but skillfully cast into the links which will bind our nations together.

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2Japanese names will be printed with the family names first, as is the Japanese tradition.

3"U.S.-Japan Relations 'Critical',' Monterey Peninsula Herald, 14 March 1985, p. 34.
B. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

It has been the nature of Japan since the Meiji Restoration to be very concerned with her status or mission in the world. Japan's promulgation of the Charter Oath in 1868 specifically included a provision for seeking knowledge to enhance the imperial rule and was initially exercised in the form of accepting all things Western as good. There was, in short, a pronounced reaction to be like the West. Emerging from a period of extended isolation to confront a world of white imperialism, the Japanese, unlike the Chinese, quickly recognized the danger posed to their sovereignty by the Western powers of the day, and so were careful to avoid falling under their domination. Steps were taken to insure that Japan rapidly progressed to a point of equivalency with the Western world. These steps included

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5References to "white" as they apply to the period of approximately 1850-1940 refer to the racist differentiations made at that time between the White European nations and the Yellow Asian nations.

becoming "like the West" as this was seen as necessary in order to compete.

Half a century after Perry's arrival, this once feudal, 
backward nation had defeated the Russians and was rapidly 
becoming a nation of international prominence. Almost 
effectively forty years after the Russo-Japanese War of June 
1904-January 1905, the Japanese were in ruin following a 
disastrous war of imperialism. What happened to allow the 
militaristic forces of Japan to acquire and then abuse power 
form the root causes of the Pacific War and must be 
examined. Additionally, the social forces within 20th 
century Japan will be surveyed for their importance in 
Japanese relations with the rest of the world.

Forty years have passed since V-J Day and Japan has 
emerged as one of the foremost economic powers of the world. 
In the one hundred-plus years since Perry's arrival, the 
Japanese were able to enter the world of the white 
imperialists and better them at their own game twice. First, 
they avoided the slicing up that China suffered and second, 
they successfully became an imperialistic power themselves.

of "snapshot" articles and extracts for the period providing 
more details on specific periods and incidents.

'Often debated; in this paper, the word feudal is used 
in its most liberal sense. Japanese feudalism had its own 
distinct characteristics and thus references to a feudal 
culture in pre-World War II Japan are liberal in the sense 
that they do not follow the European feudal model.
The West is now "losing" to the Japanese in an economic world. Will we change the rules again now that the Japanese have figured them out and are once again beating us at our own game? Will we be forced to follow a path that may eventually lead us to war again to prevent Japanese domination of what has been traditionally Western "turf"?

Having posed this question at an early juncture I confess that I do not have certain answers. This thesis is intended to raise an eyebrow--provoke a second glance--at an issue which may be extremely important in the coming years. It is not a cry of "wolf" (or "keizai dobutsu", as the case may be), merely a note that history has recorded lessons for us, and it never hurts to review them periodically. U.S.-Japanese relations in the 1980's are strong, but nothing is forever. On the contrary, these frictions may never be an issue in the context of war, but lead us to some point short of warfare.

Even so, it is my intent to show the Japanese potential to be, at worst, a belligerent military power. In this context, a recurring theme is the similarity between the nationalistic roots of 1930's militarism and contemporary nationalism present in the 1980's. One might consider these roots in a contemporary analogy: if nationalism is "the

*Translated as "economic animal"; the term is sometimes applied to Japan in a pseudo-humorous fashion.
Force" of Star Wars\(^9\) fame, then it has a dark side as well as a good side. My purpose here is to propose policy which encourages Japan to move away from the "dark side" of their nationalism and toward those aspects which make nationalism a good and progressive force.

C. A LESSON FROM HISTORY

One key lesson from history, predominant in Japanese thought, is that the Japanese see themselves—as they have since Meiji—as the leader in the Pacific. This thought is evident in items as diverse as the Japanese legends of creation to the actions of Prime Minister Nakasone in shaping a greater role for Japan in the international community.\(^1\) This is embodied, from a racial standpoint, in their legends and it is clearly seen in their pan-Asianist

\[^9\text{Star Wars} \text{ was a major motion picture released in 1977 dealing with a theme of good versus evil in a futuristic extraterrestrial location. "The Force" is the essence of life force in the universe whose power is available to those who can understand it. Those with evil intent were said to be availing themselves of the "dark side" of the force.}\]

\[^1\text{See, for instance, Robert K. Hall, ed. Kokutai No Hongi, Translated by John O. Gauntlett. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949 (cited hereafter as Hall, Kokutai). Note that Emperor Hirohito never acknowledged defeat—his message to Japan was that he was "stopping the war", clearly different from admitting that the nation was defeated. For more recent indications, see articles such as "Japanese Prime Minister to Urge Allies to Line Up Behind Reagan", Christian Science Monitor, 23 Oct 1985; "Nakasone Seeks an International Japan, Chief Executive 28 (Summer 84): 10-12.; Otsuki Shinji, "Nakasone's New Asian Diplomacy," Japan Quarterly 31 (July-September 1984): 259-261.}\]
policy prior to their defeat in World War II. The Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere\textsuperscript{11} had at its roots Japanese leadership in the Asia/Pacific area. The methods the Japanese used in implementing this policy of militarism were a function of the political leanings of the elites at that time. These elites were brought into power by a combination of internal and external factors. These factors are introduced at the beginning of the third chapter.

Of the internal factors, nationalism, as an emotional conduit, is the factor which concerns this paper. This is not to say that the issues leading to World War II did not have economic roots—they most certainly did, especially for the Japanese. The economic roots of the conflict stemming from Japan's desire for access to resources are well documented in history books. The issues in the mid-1980's seem even more obviously economic, however. Rather than a tide of Japanese soldiers overrunning Asia, Americans, as well as other Asians, see a tide of Japanese exports invading what were formerly considered by Americans to be American markets. Indeed, today we find our own domestic markets are the target of Japanese products. The hue and cry by the U.S. Congress during the spring of 1985 for an opening of Japanese markets is testimony to the concern that is felt throughout the United States. While many Japanese

\textsuperscript{11}Referred to hereafter as GEACOPS.
may have passed this off as the annual spring trade concessions ritual,\(^2\) Prime Minister Nakasone noted that: "It is the first time for the U.S. Senate to adopt a unanimous resolution asking for [Japanese] restraint."\(^3\)

Fifty years ago, the United States wanted Japan to curtail her colonial policies and the military machine running rampant throughout Asia. Ironically, Japanese economic interests remain essentially the same in the 80's requiring access to raw materials and markets for Japanese products. The United States is urging Japan to take up arms hoping, I believe, that the shifting of resources within the Japanese economy will be more to the U.S. benefit, slowing Japanese economic growth and perhaps easing the U.S.-Japan trade imbalance. Naturally, the very real benefits of an armed and friendly Japan are supportive of U.S. goals worldwide—or are they?

There may be very real dangers associated with the rearming of a nation whose cultural values incorporate racial superiority and whose economic prowess is expanding exponentially. The danger is pronounced if the main reason Japan rearsms is U.S. pressure and not consensus both within Japan and between our two countries. Even a cursory review

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of the history of the 1920s and 1930s shows that the Japanese nation may have been our ally in World War I, but in the course of only twenty years became our enemy. The reasons were no more complex than a failure on the part of the West to recognize Japan as an equal--this despite Japan's demonstration of her ability to hold her own with the major powers, i.e. military defeat of a Western power (Russia in 1905) and possession of the third largest navy in the world. Despite these clear demonstrations of national power by the Japanese, the United States preferred to think in terms of the impending "yellow peril" and considered the Japanese to be worthy of only the short end of the 5-5-3 naval ratio set at the Washington Conference in 1921.

D. THE IMPERATIVE OF APPLYING THE LESSON

One cannot live in the past, however. Mistakes are only valuable if they are applied as lessons. The United States made the mistake (along with Japan--I don't claim the U.S. is solely or even mostly responsible for the Pacific War) of not heeding pre-WWII warning signs and so ended up involved in a costly war in the Pacific. The lesson to be learned is clearly that the national interests of other nations cannot be treated cavalierly in the formulation of one's own policy. We cannot formulate policy assuming that our interests are more important to us than Japan's, or any nation's, interests are to that nation. In our case, we
failed to account for the needs of the Japanese in terms of recognizing them as a major power for the first half of the 20th century. The United States appears not to have learned the danger pointed out in this lesson. Japan cannot be treated as a second class citizen. Some might argue that current U.S. policy reflects a fair and equitable policy for Japan—that U.S. urging of Japan to rearm is a reflection of American faith in Japan as an ally. This sounds good but is not the whole truth. The U.S. appears to be asking Japan for a more equitable partnership and shared responsibilities, but I believe the U.S. really wants another "unequal treaty" or at least an unequal partnership. The irony is that we want it to be "unequal" in our favor this time. If Japan goes beyond the bounds which the U.S. sees as healthy or necessary, there will be a chorus of restraining voices from both the U.S. and a number


15Olsen, "Power Sharing." Olsen acknowledges the lack of Japanese influence in the use of her "ally's" nuclear weapons, and believes this inequality establishes a conventional limitation on any U.S.-Japan treaty. My argument is that the U.S. is fully cognizant of Japanese feelings on nuclear weapons and really has no desire to share control of these weapons. Thus, any policy which increases Japanese expenses on conventional weapons and keeps from them the nuclear trigger is an "unequal treaty" in our favor.
of concerned and frightened Pacific nations who have already experienced what a strong Japan can do.

Without even considering the possible political implications of a rearmed Japan, the impact of Japanese intrusion into the arms export business could pose immediate economic problems. If Japan should decide to arm at levels in the 3-6% of GNP range, the Japanese may logically seek to provide their own arms. Large scale production is economically more efficient and beneficial than purchase. Their entry into this arena will probably lead to exporting of arms, a necessary task for the industry to be efficient.

The topic of arms exports will be discussed in greater detail in a later chapter. The argument presented there is significant in terms of weighing the benefits versus the costs of Japanese economic restructuring caused by U.S. pressure on Japan to take that course of action. While the benefits may be valuable in the short term, ultimately they may prove to be an even greater headache later.

Finally, the United States, faced with global problems, must plan carefully to assure the best use of Japanese support in the coming years and prevent unnecessary and trivial problems from becoming overwhelming issues separating the two countries. The U.S. must recognize the growing spirit of nationalism in Japan as a healthy trend and make it work for us rather than against us.
It is in this spirit that I will propose a policy which accounts for U.S. needs and U.S. goals as well as Japanese needs and goals. The United States must look down the road and see the point where our two nations will meet. We need to anticipate Japanese needs (just as they must anticipate ours), whether economic or cultural, and plan accordingly. We cannot afford to turn a blind eye to the forces which are growing in Japan anymore than we can to the growing threat in the region and the world.

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16It is entirely possible to interpret PM Nakasone's actions in the latter part of 1985 and early 1986 as economic (but not necessarily pecuniary) compensation for the U.S. defense umbrella.
II. THE GROWTH OF NATIONALISM AND ULTRANATIONALISM

In a period of between seventy and ninety years, depending on how one measures, the Japanese nation evolved from a comparatively backward, feudal, and isolated society to the militant, belligerent nation which conquered territory spanning nearly one quarter of the circumference of the globe from Burma to the Aleutian Islands. A number of elements were required to accomplish this--some were permanent aspects of the culture; some were generated artificially by the circumstances of the day. The permanent cultural elements are the key ones.

These key elements--the core cultural elements--do not change, or they change so slowly as to be undetectable except when viewed over a millennium. These elements are functions of the fundamental beliefs of the people themselves, and reflect the very essence of the nation, its raison d'être. In Japan this concept takes on a very special meaning; the word is kokutai, usually translated as "the national polity".17

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Kokutai is the soul of Japanese society— in it is to be found the origins of militarism. "National polity", an English language term, does not begin to fully embrace the intricacies of religion, loyalty, and duty—among other abstractions, which bind the Japanese together and explain why they act the way they do.

This chapter will tie these intricacies together, alongside the events of history, and thus explain how Japanese nationalism led to militarism. Kokutai and the relevant events of the period from the Meiji Restoration through 1937 will be surveyed as well as the political climate and the final accession to power of the right-wing nationalists. I will show that the kokutai and the growth of Japanese nationalism only provided a base upon which militarism subsequently developed for other reasons.

Three concepts under scrutiny must be defined—nationalism, ultranationalism, and militarism. This is not an easy task. Since their definition is not intended as the focus of this paper, simple, explicit definitions are the most expedient and useful. Accordingly, nationalism,¹⁸

¹⁸For two excellent discussions of nationalism, see Delmer M. Brown, Nationalism in Japan, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1955), pp. 1-9. and Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 135-156. See also Morris, Nationalism, pp. vii-x, and selected readings throughout this work for a more focused look at nationalism as a force in transition during the post war period.
in general, is defined as the intangible sense of group loyalty to the ethnic, cultural or geographical group to which one feels that they belong. Ultranationalism, in a Japanese context, is the fanatical sense of nationalism which purports national superiority over all other nationalities. Militarism is the politically active dimension of ultranationalism; it is the intangible belief made manifest through belligerency, political control of the government by the military, and force of arms—the manifestation which ultimately led Japan into war.

A. THE NATIONAL POLIT Y

Japanese nationalism, by the preceding definition, did not exist prior to 1868. Prior to the Meiji Restoration, most of the Japanese peasantry were unaware of the existence of the mikado\(^1\) or, in many cases, the Shogun who ruled in his name.\(^2\) The feeling of "Japaneseness" simply did not exist because the common people were not knowledgeable of their land as constituting a state. If there was any feeling of "we-they" at all, it was due to local or regional loyalty to the village samurai or daimyo.

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\(^1\) A more archaic term for the Emperor, suitable for the time frame discussed here.

\(^2\) Storry, p. 1.
This figured prominently in the Meiji Restoration as loyalties were not automatically cast with the young Emperor; ties to the land and the family which ruled that land had been ingrained over hundreds of years. The success of the Emperor was ultimately the result of the successes in battle of those families which supported him. It is here that the real beginnings of nationalism are seen.

The twin battle cries for Imperial supporters were "Honor the Emperor!" and "Expel the barbarian!" (sonno joi) The men promoting this were not the peasants; rather they were samurai who were discontented with the progress and inroads made by the West into Japan. These men were seeking a return to the traditions of the past. Not coincidentally, they were also men of the same clans whose loyalties to the Shogunate were "earned" in their defeat at the hands of Tokugawa Ieyasu in the early years of the 17th century. Earned in the ironic sense that there was no choice for these clans. They either declared loyalty to the Shogun or suffered his wrath.

The men who shaped the history of the nation from the early part of this millennium were the elite. They were, for the most part, the only ones who, through their governance, knew of the existence of the "nation". The common man owed his existence to his immediate lord and not until after the

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21 Fairbank, *East Asia*, p. 494.
Meiji Emperor was well entrenched in power was this changed.\textsuperscript{22}

This change came most dramatically in the form of the Imperial Rescript on Education issued in 1890. This important document tied together the Confucian ethic and the Shinto legends of the origin of Japan\textsuperscript{23} as well as providing a basis for loyalty beyond the local lord.\textsuperscript{24} This document changed the face of Japanese society significantly because it centralized the object of the people's political and religious loyalty into a single entity, the Emperor. It established the Emperor as the state itself and in so doing created a base for building nationalism--loyalty to the state. Equally important to this development was the incorporation of the religious aspects of the culture, notably Shinto, into the politics of the state.

\textsuperscript{22}The Imperial decrees abolishing samurai privileges are well documented. The fact that the Meiji Emperor survived the backlash from these decrees is offered here as de facto "proof" of the Emperor's entrenchment. Additionally, it should be noted that direct action to remove the Emperor and replace him with a more politically agreeable one was not unknown. During the decline of the Fujiwara regents, numerous descendants of the Imperial line in competing court families led to considerable intrigue and efforts by one family to install their "true" heir to the throne. Most notable of these is the Gempei War (ca. 1180-1185). See George B. Sansom, \textit{A History of Japan to 1334}, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 289-305.

\textsuperscript{23}Hall, \textit{Kokutai}, pp. 28, 34.

\textsuperscript{24}This conclusion is based on Sansom's statements, p. 363.
The Shinto beliefs of the people extend back before recorded history. Shinto is the ancient and indigenous religion of Japan. Originally an animistic religion, it provides the legends of the origins of the Imperial line. Shinto's evolution began prior to recorded Japanese history in a synthesis with Confucianism. Sometime during the Nara period (8th century), there occurred another synthesis, this time with Buddhism. This merging was significant for the acceptance "... of the gods of one religion in the pantheon of the other." This merger was so complete that the identity of each was virtually lost until the rise of the Meiji Emperor.

One of the first acts of the Meiji Emperor was to disestablish the two religions from each other and make Shinto the State religion. As a reaction to Tokugawa requirements that Japanese register for census purposes as Buddhists, Buddhism was particularly hard hit. This included the elimination of all Buddhist elements and priests from Shinto shrines. In so doing, the formal promulgation of the Emperor as the basis for the state was established. Confucianism provided the basis for loyalty and piety. The Meiji Emperor, in his rescript, drew upon all

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these and provided the Japanese with the direction they needed and at the same time established loyalty to the Imperial throne not just as a filial duty, but as the very purpose of life itself. As large a step as this may seem, the Japanese were already well used to giving their loyalty to members of a higher class; the religious basis offered by the Emperor actually may have provided a measure of legitimacy to the Emperor. This shift of loyalty to the Emperor for quasi-religious and political reasons formed the basis of what was to become known as "State Shinto" and a key element of the kokutai.

State Shinto was more than the legislative adaptation of a particular religion to the State. Its philosophy was drawn heavily from "... the writings of the opponents of Ryobu Shinto ... [a sect which believed in] an absolute Buddha and under this a multitude of manifest Buddhas who appeared from time to time in the form of various gods and goddesses of other religions." This opposing view to the idea that "kami" of Shinto belief were merely a subset of the larger Buddhist pantheon was necessary to establish the supremacy

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27Hall, Kokutai, p. 9.

28The term "legitimacy" is not used in any works covering this period. It is a Western term, unsuited for use in Japanese, yet totally appropriate for explanation to the Westerner.

29Hall, Kokutai, pp. 28-29.
of the Imperial line rather than allow it to be a lesser to the "supreme Buddha". This move would clearly disestablish the Imperial line from Buddhism and preclude conflict with Japanese legends. In this way, opposition to the adaptation of State Shinto as the religion of the nation eventually led, by 1877, to a separation of State Shinto from religion and its installation as a cult. This separation of State Shinto from ordinary Shinto focused the adoration of the elites on to the Emperor and as such became a defacto "cult". The Meiji government further clarified and confirmed this in 1882 with the statement "... that Shinto was not a religion, properly speaking, but a formulation of national ethics and a cult of loyalty to national institutions."31

The result was a nation emerging into the 20th century with the politically inspired belief in the absolute divinity of their Emperor, their national soil, and the

31 Shinto did not focus on one single "kami" but had (and has) a huge pantheon of gods found throughout nature. State Shinto did not replace Shinto, it was a facet of the times, a fad followed by those who felt the rising nationalistic spirit and who looked to the Emperor as the focal point of that energy. Those who fear a return to militarism often cite the official visits to the Yasakuni shrine by dietmembers as evidence of a State sponsored Shinto.

31 Noss, p. 314.

32 Divinity must be clarified at this point. To the Japanese, their emperor is the symbol of all that is Japanese. Since all Japanese are descended from the gods, the emperor could be said to have more of the "stuff" that
Japanese people--a nation stepping from feudalism to nationalism within a generation of men. More than just men, they were men bred in the ethical code of the warrior, bushido, owing absolute allegiance to their Emperor. They were men emerging to find that imperialism was the international societal norm.

The stage was now set for the rise of the ultranationalists and the success of the militarists.

B. THE POLITICAL CLIMATE

The international political climate in Asia was imperialistic. The European nations of the day were scrambling for colonial holdings in Asia and the grand prize was China. Japan wasted no time in joining the nations of the West. Less than twenty-five years after Commodore Perry's arrival, Japan had opened Korea for trade where the major Western powers had failed. But had Japan "joined" the major powers of the world? In terms of recognition as equals, the answer is an unequivocal "no". Despite Japan's best efforts, the Western powers regarded Japan as an

makes a Japanese "Japanese." Divinity in the Christian sense that the Emperor is "God" is incorrect. A closer analogy might be that he is the Pope, the most "holy", although even this entails other connotations which are not applicable. Thus, the nation entering the 20th century believed that they were the fruit of their own legends and myths, not that their emperor was the "God" of all the world.

Japan's rise to power was an impressive one. From the
"Asian" power, and thus second rate. This stigma remained with Japan until well into World War II and played a major role in the development of Japanese militarism from the very beginning. Surprisingly, it was domestic political turmoil that gave life to the first militant, nationalist organization.

The Genyosha was the first of many extreme right-wing organizations to form in Japan. Founded on the island of Kyushu in 1881, the organization took root in the traditional area of unrest. Its name, meaning "Dark Ocean Society" or "Black Sea Straits" made direct reference to the straits between Kyushu and Korea. The organization was an amalgamation of existing patriotic associations from the region but, more importantly, was the legacy of Saigo Takamori's dream of invading Korea.\(^3\)

\(^3\)Storry, pp. 9-10. Saigo was certainly not the first either. Hideyoshi attempted conquest of Korea in the last few years of the 16th century. His death brought the invasion to a halt as Japan fell into political turmoil.
During the early years after the Restoration, rapid societal changes which impacted heavily upon the Samurai led to widespread discontent among this class. Isolated plots against the government were easily subdued until the decision in 1873 not to invade Korea. There had been a major faction in favor of war, including Saigo and his clan, and the political defeat of this prowar faction (among other reasons) finally led to a series of uprisings including the Satsuma revolt of 1877.\(^{35}\) Saigo had spearheaded this revolt in an effort to rescue the Emperor from the bad advice of "unfaithful ministers".\(^{36}\) The Genyosha thus provided a refuge, of sorts, for the pools of discontented ex-samurai. The society had three stated goals: "to revere the imperial family", "to respect and honor the fatherland", and "to guard strictly the rights of the people."\(^{37}\) These goals correspond very closely to those battle cries of the Restoration and it is little wonder that membership drew heavily from the patriotic organizations of the region. Compulsory education, heavily laced with "patriotic ethics"

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\(^{36}\) Storry, p. 10.

\(^{37}\) Storry, p. 10.
was increasing the national consciousness and overseas expansion was a popular idea, not only within the Genyosha, but among the rising class of educated and the Army.

The Genyosha developed as an organization for terrorists and intelligence collection outside of Japan. It is an important organization because of its ties to the military and its reflection of the national mood. By 1890, owing to parallel interests, the Genyosha began to receive covert funding from the Ministry of War. By the early 1890's, Japan felt strong enough to challenge China over what amounted to the suzerainty of Korea. The close ties between the Genyosha and the Japanese Army were demonstrated by the latter providing funding to the Genyosha for intelligence in the form of translators, maps, guides and Tonghak contacts. It also provided funds through the


39 I refer here to the bomb attack on Foreign Minister Okuma in late 1889. This was in reaction to press reports of further treaty concessions about to be made by him. The diplomatic channels appear to have been too slow for the impatient military who correctly sensed the public mood. See Storry, pp. 10-12.

40 Storry, p. 12.

41 The Tonghaks were a religious group in Korea whose extreme xenophobia led to rebellion in 1894 against the Korean monarchy and precipitated the Sino-Japanese War. See Woo-keun Han, The History of Korea (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1974), pp. 403-415 for details of the Tonghaks. See also John W. Sabey, "The Gen'yosha, the Kokuryukai, and Japanese Expansionism." (Ph.D
Genyosha to the Tonghaks to insure their continued agitation of the situation. When revolt broke out in 1894, the Japanese used the Tonghak action as an excuse to intervene and, once in Korea, forced the events which led to the Sino-Japanese War.42 The mood in Japan was right for their development and the men who wielded power were the same ones who belonged to these organizations.43 The popular support demonstrated for these organizations is clear evidence of swelling nationalism; and from the men who joined, ultranationalism. The key elements in Japan's development towards militarism, however, were the contributions of Okawa Shumei and Kita Ikki, the latter sometimes referred to as "the founder of Japanese fascism".44


42Storry, p. 12. Also see Fairbank, East Asia, pp. 553-554 for the details of the revolt.

43One notable exception is the Sakurakai. This particular society was open only to military officers in the rank of LTC or below. It was an important society in the 1930's because it was instrumental in linking the Army to right-wing politics. The aims of the society were to force the declaration of martial law. Also note, despite its junior membership, it was sponsored by MG Tatekawa who was in charge of the Second Division of the General Staff HQ. This was "... possibly the most important single organ of the Japanese Army; for its function was the planning of military operations." Storry, pp. 55-56.

44Storry, p. 37.
Kita Ikki's rise to prominence began in the period just after World War I. His writings were arguments which justified the taking of territories necessary for Japanese livelihood and advocated a vigorous military buildup to support a "bellicose foreign policy".\textsuperscript{45} He returned to Japan from serving as an intelligence officer in China after World War I under the auspices of another key ultranationalist figure, Okawa Shumei. They were closely associated with numerous nationalist societies until 1923 when a quarrel between them led to Okawa's resignation from the society in which they were both members.

Two years later Okawa founded the Gyochisa (Action) society which Kita also joined. The Gyochisa is important because it was "... the first society to establish a working relationship with the younger officers of the army".\textsuperscript{46 [sic]} Other societies had been on terms with the military as promoters of nationalist ethics but the Gyochisa was the first to be heavily involved in politics.\textsuperscript{47} A split in 1927 between Kita and Okawa signaled a similar polarity in the Army. Kita maintained the following of the most

\textsuperscript{45}Storry, pp. 37-38.
\textsuperscript{46}Storry, pp. 37-42.
\textsuperscript{47}Storry, p. 42.
junior officers48 while Okawa's associations became much closer with the more senior officers after his split with Kita. It was this combination of elements, the Army, ultranationalist societies and politics which, by 1933, placed Kita and Okawa into the leadership of opposing, and powerful, political factions. These two factions were known, respectively, as the Kodo-ha (also known as the Kōgun-ha or Imperial Forces Faction) and Tosei-ha (Control Faction).49

The years between 1932 and 1936 were years of political intrigue as the two factions wrestled politically for control of the government. The differences between the factions have often been categorized as extremist versus moderate but the truth is more complex. The Kodo-ha viewed communism as the greatest threat to Japan. It was more fanatical than the Tosei-ha but not necessarily more

48 After 1922, the number of junior officers who were the sons of commoners rose sharply. The Choshu Clan had dominated the ranks of the officer corps until World War I. Storry, pp. 42-43.

49 The former, led by Kita, was much more idealistic. It should be understood that these men were politicians but their power came from the support each drew from their factions of the Army. Note also that the Kōgun-ha was a subset of the Kodo-ha, consisting primarily of the lesser educated members.
extreme; both organizations were known to resort to murder and terrorism.\textsuperscript{50} The \textit{Tosei-ha} was, however, more conservative, if not cautious; if murder was determined to be the more politically expedient, the impact would have been well thought-out before the action was taken. The \textit{Kodo-ha} was more likely to act in a spasmodic fashion.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{50}Storry speculates as to whether Okawa was involved with the 1928 assassination of Marshal Chang Tso-lin. At the time, Okawa was regularly in Manchuria for periods up to six months a year working for the South Manchuria Railway Company. He also lectured on occasion at General Staff HQ and was close to COL Kawamoto, the man who planned the assassination. See pages 43-44.

\textsuperscript{51}Storry, p. 138. The contrast between the two factions is best seen in this citation quoted by Storry from \textit{Japan's Military Masters} by Hollis Lory, (London, 1947) pp. 178-179:

The \textit{Kodo-ha} was "100\% soldier. Hard-boiled sort yet warm-hearted. Ready to sacrifice rules for personal sympathy. Cause of Emperor higher than law of the land. Must make extreme sacrifices to-day to achieve 'direct rule of the Emperor'. Very strongly believes in divine origin Imperial House and 'manifest destiny'. Bitter foe of communism. In private association hail-fellow-well-met; general associating with private. Battlefield commanders; no peacetime men. Death in battle highest honour that can befall a Japanese. Consider politicians no better than so many 'frogs in a well'. Believes argument useless. 'I will knock you down' type. No compromise. White or black; no grey. In organization like steam-roller. Very restless. Unhappy in sustained peace. National socialist in their thinking but confused. Not logical. Two and two do not make four."

The \textit{Tosei-ha}, however, were "Law abiding. Not so 'pious'. Outward observance of national policy, but not fanatical. War minister type rather than battlefield commanders. Capable administrators, diplomats, suave in manner. Businesslike, possessing relatively clear ideas
Describing the events of 1936-37, Reischauer writes:

Young army officers almost brought off a coup d'état on February 26, 1936, when they killed a number of government leaders and seized part of downtown Tokyo, but, after some indecision, the army and navy commands suppressed the movement and executed its leaders. The more moderate element in the army then reimposed sterner control over its officers and put an end to the factionalization between the higher officers, which had become severe in recent years. At the same time, the 1936 incident resulted in another decline in the powers of the Diet, and in 1937 all party participation in the cabinet was eliminated under a prime minister who was an army general.5

Ultimately, the Tosei-ha emerged as the winner but it was a victory for naught as the general, Abe Nobuyuki, was aligned to neither faction. He was, however, the Army's man—and that meant war was inevitable. Control of the government now rested in the hands of the militarists.

What circumstances led to this evolution in nationalism? Examination of the period reveals five key elements of Japanese culture which consistently stand out. These

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elements are the roots of militarism and Japanese behavior during the period and are the subject to which we now turn.
III. THE ORIGINS OF MILITARISM IN CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT

There is a direct and significant relationship between one's perceptions of the surroundings and the cultural environment where one's values and morals are formed and reinforced. Post-Meiji Restoration Japan emerged into a world of imperialism; it was the norm for the international society in Asia. The Japanese concept of the nature of the international society was formed by observations made upon entry into that society and based on the cultural imprint of 2000 years. Japan's confucian outlook on the world presumed that "seniority" would dictate the pecking order for nations. It was only natural that Japan desired to participate as a senior colonial power. Was not Japan the divine land of the gods?

Emerging from isolation with this newly discovered nationalistic fervor, Japan was immediately shocked to find that she could not "play ball". Japan was an "Asian" nation, a "yellow" nation, and in the eyes of the West, an inferior nation. It was in the face of these insults that the patriots of Japan rose to the occasion and ultranationalism became the salve to put on the wound.

The growth of nationalism itself was a normal and healthy development. The rejection by the West was reflected
in Japan by an intensified feeling of "we-they". This, equally normal, reaction was further intensified by the sincerest belief in the kokutai and all the tenants of racial and cultural preeminence therein. The logical enhancement of Japanese nationalism was the phenomenon of ultranationalism. Ultranationalism might have died out on its own if it had not been supported by the West in the form of unequal treaties and racial policies. The West fueled the fire. Given the circumstances of the day--a world war, imperialism the norm and colonial holdings a measure of national stature--it was probably inevitable that Japan would move toward militarism. Given the circumstances, it is remarkable that the militarists did not come to power earlier than they did.

This chapter will examine the origins of Japanese militarism to provide a feel for the potential dynamism of Japanese nationalism. These elements are assumed to be the fundamental elements which brought about the rise of the militarists. These will be compared and contrasted with the 1960's-80's and conclusions will be drawn about the possible future behavior of the Japanese given the current U.S. policy direction. Each of the origins of militarism cited will be viewed in a contemporary context. In so doing, the importance of Japanese nationalism as a potential source of internal national strength will emerge.
There appear to be five elements gleaned from the last chapter which comprised the origins of militarism in prewar Japan. These elements are the Emperor System, kokutai, or belief in cultural superiority, the presence of a large and powerful military, the "rules" of behavior for nations, and a series of actions by Western powers which were perceived in Japan as racial slurs and insults to the Japanese people and their emperor. In this section each of these elements will be discussed in historical and current context. Parallels past and present will be highlighted to justify conclusions concerning the potential for damage to U.S.-Japanese relations.

A. THE INSTITUTION OF THE EMPEROR

Prior to the Japanese defeat in World War II the Emperor served a very different function than he presently serves. For over twenty-five centuries the unbroken imperial line served almost exclusively as the titular head of Japan while true power rested with either a military commander, a regent, or a group of advisors to the Emperor. The Meiji

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53 The prewar Emperor System ended with the Imperial Rescript of 1 January 1946. The postwar "Emperor System" is one of a constitutional monarch behind whom the nation remains loyal.

54 Beginning with Jimmu, supposedly the first mortal emperor, in 660 BC. In theory, the unbroken line goes back considerably further when deities are included. I decline to argue the "titular" aspects of gods, however. See Chikafusa Kitabatake, A Chronicle of Gods and Sovereigns, trans. by
Restoration placed Mutsuhito into the relatively strongest position of any emperor in modern Japan and revealed the existence of the Emperor to the greater part of Japan. Thus, the societal proclivity of loyalty toward an immediate superior was superceded by the duty now borne toward the Emperor. The establishment of State Shinto and the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 institutionalized this relationship between the Japanese and their Emperor.55

The cultural aspects of this relationship remain intact into the 1980's despite the defeat of the Japanese nation. The primary reason for this appears to be the natural integration of the concept of the kokutai as espoused by State Shinto and Japanese nationalism. The change in the Emperor's status has had little impact on the cultural relationship between the Emperor and his people.56

H. Paul Varley. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 84-88. Despite occurrences of multiple claimants to the throne, today's emperor has essentially the same blood flowing in his veins as his predecessor 2,000 years ago (albeit somewhat enriched by intermarriage with the daughters of regents and advisors.)

55Storry, p. 1.

56Several sources discuss this in roundabout terms. Storry states, in his discussion of Japanese nationalism, that the national character is composed of "... three elements--loyalty to the Throne [sic], sense of mission, and belief in the possession of superlative inborn qualities...", p. 5. Although dated (1957) the context of Storry's statement indicates an "absolute" feeling of the people for their Emperor--something that cannot be changed by mere decree. Their own history has shown them the susceptibility of the Emperor to bad advice. Morris
The Emperor as an entity and as a concept is the single most important aspect of the Japanese raison d'être. Should national honor (as well as personal honor) be found to be the wellspring from which a Japanese consensus on security issues will flow, it may well be the restoration of the Emperor as a divine entity that will provide the catalyst for their Emperor in less explicit terms: "... the outstanding popularity in recent years of... [visiting shrines associated with nationalistic feelings] cannot simply be dismissed as a result of improved economic conditions; it is undoubtedly to some extent an expression of a renascent 'home consumption' nationalism and of [the] growing mood of vague nostalgia for prewar patterns. Devotion to the Emperor symbol is a similar indication of 'home consumption' nationalism... [and] a steady rise in enthusiasm, though very different, be it added, from the awestruck attitude of prewar days [has occurred in the postwar period].", pp. 134-135. Finally Halliday and McCormack, in discussing education, refer to revisions of textbooks citing one trend (among many) which is (and are) indicative of official thinking in the late 60's: "Avoid any mention of the Emperor's declaration that he is a mere human (and not divine)." Jon Halliday and Gavan McCormack, *Japanese Imperialism Today*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), pp. 187-188.

Kataoka appears to be saying this when he discussses nationalism and refers to the feeling of Japanese for their Emperor in less explicit terms: "... the outstanding popularity in recent years of... [visiting shrines associated with nationalistic feelings] cannot simply be dismissed as a result of improved economic conditions; it is undoubtedly to some extent an expression of a renascent 'home consumption' nationalism and of [the] growing mood of vague nostalgia for prewar patterns. Devotion to the Emperor symbol is a similar indication of 'home consumption' nationalism... [and] a steady rise in enthusiasm, though very different, be it added, from the awestruck attitude of prewar days [has occurred in the postwar period].", pp. 134-135. Finally Halliday and McCormack, in discussing education, refer to revisions of textbooks citing one trend (among many) which is (and are) indicative of official thinking in the late 60's: "Avoid any mention of the Emperor's declaration that he is a mere human (and not divine)." Jon Halliday and Gavan McCormack, *Japanese Imperialism Today*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), pp. 187-188.


Divine in terms of being the ultimate Japanese "kami". His present status as a mere human denigrates not only the institution of the emperor but the entire nation as well since the emperor remains the spiritual head of the nation.
for this consensus to occur. The Japanese have a state and a nation as defined in contemporary Western terms, but in Japanese minds it is a hollow entity because the true Japanese nation is psychologically divine. The Emperor is the focus of loyalty and honor in Japanese hearts.

There seems to be a tacit understanding of this among elites in Japan. In the decades since the war there have been intermittent references to resurging Japanese ultranationalism but they have been isolated and largely considered anachronistic. Despite this, the "demand that the 'symbolic emperor' be restored to his former status as

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59 Examples include Mishima's celebrated writings, his cult of followers (the Shield Society) as well as his take over of SDF headquarters to call for a return to militarism and his subsequent ritual suicide. Additionally, the textbook controversy of the early 1980's sparked considerable controversy among Asian neighbors that Japan was making a move to cover up past indiscretions and move toward the prewar spirit. The 'Kimigayo' incident of the early 1980's in Fukuoka prefecture demonstrated the rising patriotic feeling and its impact on the educational system. See Edwin P. Hoyt, The Militarists (New York: Donald I. Fine, 1985), pp 131-135. for a description of the event. Proposals within the Ministry of Education that schools provide instruction in patriotic ideals has been proposed on several occasions (see Soviet Threat Forces Pacifist Japan to Debate the Meaning of Patriotism," Christian Science Monitor, 4 September 1980, p. 6.) Other examples include the writings of Shimizu Ikutaro, Hori Yukio, and Nakagawa Yasuhiro, the latter considered to be a good example of young right wing opinion by Dr. Kenneth B. Pyle, a noted professor of Japanese nationalism. In a conversation with Dr. Pyle in early May 1986, he noted a trend in right wing tactics toward building grassroots support for their ideas. He cited attempts to place the issue of using the Japanese calendar rather than the western calendar on local prefectural agendas as an example of such political activity.
sovereign monarch has some powerful supporters among the LDP, who have long wanted to remove or revise these parts of the Constitution.\textsuperscript{68} With the growing emphasis by the United States for Japanese participation in an American security program, these ideas may be taking root—why fight if there is nothing to fight for? The embodiment of the nation remains the Emperor, but in a "purgatorial" suspension. Patriotism cannot flourish without the object d'etat. Without patriotism the Japanese as a nation will not condone a military buildup to the point of being an offensive capable power.\textsuperscript{61} Should the Emperor be restored to his former status, perhaps expenditures on military and defense related items will increase also. Regardless, the U.S. does not need to rush Japanese defense expenditures; the Japanese will eventually rearm to a point of significant military capability. If it is done for reasons which are mutually agreeable, their military power will serve to strengthen the alliance.

B. NATIONAL SUPERIORITY

As Storry pointed out in his elements of national character,\textsuperscript{62} the Japanese belief of their "possession of

\textsuperscript{68}\textsuperscript{Kudo Yoroshi, "Showa Perspectives," Japan Quarterly 32 (January-March 1985): 39.}

\textsuperscript{61}\textsuperscript{Emphasis on "capable". Japan's present goal is, of course, defense of Japan.}
"superlative inborn qualities" is a fundamental part of the kokutai. The 1946 government claim that the kokutai has not changed despite the wartime defeat may be difficult to accept forty years later, but there are enough contemporary sources which indicate this to be the case. Whether or not one believes that the Japanese subscribe to the kokutai is an enormously important issue. The policy implications for the United States in nurturing a nation of racists has not

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62 Storry, p. 5.


64 See Hall, Kokutai. p. 198. In a furnished passage from "Exposition on the New Constitution" published by the Japanese Imperial Cabinet, November 1946, is stated: "The term 'national entity' can mean many things, but it is appropriate to interpret its correct meaning as 'basic characteristics of the nation'. So interpreted, national entity forms the foundation of the nation's existence, and its destiny is common with that of the State; so that if this national entity were to suffer change or loss, the State would at once lose its existence. . . . When we look upon national entity in this way and in its relation to our country, we can say that in a word it means the immutable and solemn fact that the Japanese people look up to their Emperor as if he were the center of their adoration, on the basis of the link that deep down in their hearts binds them to him, that the entire nation is united thereby, and that this forms the basis of Japan's existence."
only moral overtones, but far more importantly, carries an intrinsic danger which must be prepared for well in advance.

The U.S. must recognize the potential of the Japanese to find justification for the return of neo-ultranationalists who could lead Japan away from ties with the U.S. and even, however unlikely, toward a new era of militarism. However unlikely a return to militarism may seem in the mid 1980's, Japan has become a superpower in its own right. Other alternatives notwithstanding, Japanese leadership may eventually realize that ultimately only military force can resolve unrelenting conflicts between the national interests of two nations. If so, Japan will most likely see that it is in her interests to rearm for her own good and not just for the good of the United States. If at this point the U.S. has maintained a relationship with Japan which demonstrated a respect for Japanese interests, the subsequent remilitarization of Japan will be to our mutual benefit and not present the potential ramifications of

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*I am not arguing that the Japanese are, in the 1980's, the kind of rabid, racist individuals which terrorized minorities in the U.S. over the past century. I am pointing out a fact (that racism is inherent in the Japanese Confucian outlook and legends) and bringing light on this fact insofar as I mention that such an interpretation (as the latter one) was accurate during the 1930's. It could be a factor in current or future Japanese thinking, even if deeply buried.*
damaged U.S.-Japanese relations. The U.S. can benefit from Japan re-learning the necessity of arms on her own; we risk jeopardizing our relationship by being too heavy-handed.

C. MILITARY POWER

There are many differences in the military of Japan in 1940 and the 1980's. Political intrigue, strength, motivation, prestige--these come to mind immediately. Of all the differences, the biggest difference which currently exists between the prewar and postwar militaries is the degree of political power and sway held. The current Japanese military is divorced from the political sphere. Given that civilian control of the government as established by the Japanese constitution remains firm, the danger of resurgent Japanese military power is not so much what the military might do on its own but the fact that the military power exists and is at the disposal of the Japanese political hierarchy.

Given a situation of increased political disillusionment over U.S. policies, a contemporary Mori Kaku seems quite feasible. As a civilian politician, he did not want to see

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66 Of the numerous key actors in the prewar period, Mori Kaku is one of the more significant, yet least known, actors--probably because of his relatively early death in 1932. It was he who led the arguments for right wing political control of the government of Japan. Mori Kaku figures prominently in the activities of the Kwantung Army and his ideas paved the way for the later formal policy engendered by the GEACOPS. See Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign
the government controlled by the military as it ultimately was, but rather wanted a strong government to use the military to promote a policy of continental advance. A man of similar leanings could prove to be quite palatable to a Japan weary of domineering rhetoric and insensitive, unceasing demands from a nation (the United States) which it has eclipsed economically and militarily. Nakasone Yasuhiro might fit this mold but his political problems indicate that he is on the scene too early. As his faction expands in the latter half of the 1980's and into the 1990's (a very likely course of action if Takeshita Noboru and Nikaido Susumu split the Tanaka faction with in-fighting) Nakasone's behind the scenes influence will likely increase.

As Japanese nationalism grows stronger and the recurring question of constitutional revision (not only to redress the status of the emperor, but also the provisions of Article

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67 In terms of advocating a strong military under civilian control—not necessarily continental advance policies.

68 A hypothetical future for the military—perhaps not so hypothetical, nor futuristic, in economic terms. The thrust of this point is to note that Japanese military power could be increased for reasons not wholly in the interests of the United States. A rising nationalistic trend and anti-U.S. fervor would closely parallel prewar conditions.
IX) becomes more frequent, Japan may find fewer reasons why she should remain a nation disenfranchised from all the sovereign rights of other nations. It is not necessary that they be provoked into full-scale rearmament--only that they question why they cannot rearm. Combined with other events, this may provide the incentive for constitutional revision. Again, the revision to allow a warmaking capability is not an inherently bad thing and should not be viewed as such. The reason that Japan feels the need to attain this posture is the crux of this thesis.

D. THE INTERNATIONAL 'NORM'

As the Japanese emerged from isolation in the second half of the nineteenth century, they realized the importance of the West to their own growth and survival. Japan recognized her vulnerability resulting from a lack of modern knowledge. The Japanese sent multiple missions abroad to study the West and bring back the knowledge and technology necessary to bring Japan on par with the greater nations of the day.

Quickly apparent was the imperialistic behavior of the West. Although immediate Japanese goals were to prevent falling prey to the Western nations as China had, it was not long before Japan secured her position and became interested in participating in the colonial competition of the West. Colonial holdings provided markets and resources for the
nations who possessed the capability to produce finished goods. The British provided a perfect example of an island nation, short of natural resources, yet powerful in the world. Asia was being invaded by colonial powers and Japan saw no reason why she should not participate as well. In rapid succession Japan opened Korea for trade, defeated the Chinese over de facto suzerainty of Korea, and established an alliance with Britain, the premier sea power.

The pattern in the postwar period has been factually different yet thematically the same. Rather than emerging from a self-imposed isolation Japan has emerged from postwar devastation and rapidly emulated the behavior of her postwar mentor, the United States. Economic power and domination of world trade patterns by the United States has been observed and adopted just as Western colonial behavior was in the Meiji period.

The result of this is seen today, in the mid-80's in the growing trade surplus which Japan has with the rest of the world and, quite possibly, as a "... critical turning point when Japan surpasses the United States as the dominant economic power in the world."\(^6^9\) In the postwar era Japan has

\(^6^9\)Ezra Vogel as quoted in "Japan May Pass U.S. This Year, Expert Says," Monterey Peninsula Herald, 28 May 1985, p. 11. Although quoted out of context, Vogel's point is valid here. The point of his statement in the article concerned American complacency as the primary reason for the decline of American economic power in relation to Japan. Regardless of the reason for the relative decline, my point
challenged the West in an economic war and at the moment seems to be winning. The world of imperialism and colonial holdings at the beginning of this century has evolved into a world where interdependence, rather than deterrence alone, maintains order—at least as the Japanese see it.

Certainly deterrence has added to the stability of the international system; mutual annihilation benefits no one. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to speculate on where strategies of deterrence are leading, it is to the point to speculate on one possible impact of the U.S. pressures on Japan to take a greater role in the "Western" defense. The Japanese view of this pressure could easily become one of resentment given other conditions. The U.S. propensity to assume our allies will subordinate their own national interests and goals to ours wreaks of "little brown brotherism". Since the Japanese see their policy of peace to be not only national but global in terms of saving the world to a better way, to them the U.S. assumes too much. For the U.S. to make this assumption is another straw on the proverbial camel's back which will make it that much harder for the Japanese to continue on their idealistic track and that much easier for Japan to find fault with the U.S. that is concerned with it only as a potential fact; Vogel has eloquently said it for me.

Referring again to the GEACOPS (of the past), the Global 'New Deal' and the concept of Comprehensive Security.
could lead to a rift in relations. The Japanese look to peace now, but they may eventually discover a need to have a warmaking capability. Our relationship with Japan must not be the reason, in any negative sense, that Japan feels the need to rearm.

E. "SLAPS IN THE FACE"

The final element comprising the origins of militarism concerns the failure of the West and the U.S. to recognize Japan as a nation deserving of equal international stature. Early Japanese successes in establishing Japan as a world power were met with little fanfare in the West. The defeat of the Russians in 1905 proved to be significant in two respects. First, it was the first defeat of a major Western, white, nation by an Asian, yellow, nation. The Japanese knew it; the Western powers knew it. But the Japanese did not receive the recognition they felt was due them--this combined with other events led to the second and most significant result of Western failure to see Japan as an equal.

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71 Such as the triple intervention (1895), the Gentleman's Agreement of voluntary emigration limits on Japanese going to the U.S. and Hawaii (1908), Secretary Bryan's note of non-recognition of the Twenty-one Demands (1915), the failure of the West to include statements of racial equality in the Versailles Treaty as requested by Japan (1919), the unequal 5-5-3 Naval agreement (1922), the exclusion of Japanese immigrants (1924); the list is virtually endless.
The Japanese view of their role in Asia began to assume a different hue after the Washington Conference of 1921-22. The Taisho period produced an internal political climate conducive to the growth of untranationalist thought and ultranationalist political activity.\(^7^{2}\) As the succession of slaps at the Japanese continued and the ultranationalists became more outspoken, the concept of Japan's "divine" role in Asia began to evolve from one of participation with the West in slicing up Asia to one of leading Asians in the fight of "Asia for the Asians".

Is the West and/or America still slapping Japan in the face? Effrontery to pride is a matter of perception. Pride cannot be wounded, as Kataoka suggests,\(^7^{3}\) if there is no pride to wound. In the past few years there have been no

\(^{72}\) Perhaps arguable. My position is that the Taisho period was one of a weak and sick emperor who took little interest (indeed, was largely unable to take interest) in the State and thus left his advisors to manage. Granted that the historical role of the emperor has not been political, this was a significantly different state of affairs from the stronger Meiji emperor who preceded and was a significant political actor. With a virtual power vacuum, the growth and policies of the Japanese government became an incestuous affair. The young Hirohito was not prepared to deal with this upon his ascension to the throne. See Leonard Mosley, *Hirohito: Emperor of Japan*, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1966 for an excellent description of imperial interaction with the government during these years.

\(^{73}\) I am drawing a conclusion based on his theme in *Waiting*. During a conversation with Professor Kataoka in May 1986, I understood him to confirm this through remarks about the status of the Emperor, defense of Japan, and other topics.
insults to Japan as the U.S. has perceived—certainly nothing on the scale of the prewar insults that in hindsight seem so obvious and foolish. Although these perceptions of mutual goodwill would seem to be borne out by public opinion polls, mood swings on a national scale can occur virtually overnight if the situation dictates. Despite our current good relationship, there are enough skeletons in the closet to sully our relationship if the Japanese found it politically expedient to do so.

74 "In a December 1983 poll, the U.S. ranked first among fifteen countries as the best liked, the most trustworthy, and the most important nation to Japan." United States Information Agency, Office of Research, Japanese Public's Attitudes on Security Issues: 1984 Update, by James S. Marshall, Research Report R-13-84, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1984), p. 2. (This report is one of a series of reports by USIA. They will be cited hereafter as, for example, USIA, R-13-84 or USIA, 1984 Update.)

75 Fads are well documented in Japan as they are in most cultures. Some fads are political, for instance the mood swing in Japan toward the Soviets after the KAL 007 shootdown. Some are social, like the Pink Ladies. Still others are cultural, like the post-Meiji "pro-western" fads. Any number of popular magazines, or TV shows such as "This Week in Japan" reflect and report the current vogue in music, dress, and style. USIA documents trends in opinion through their polling and compilations of Japanese polls.

76 For instance, the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan on U.S. vessels stationed there; the pressure by the U.S. on Japan to have Japan commit military forces outside of Japan despite Japan's avowed determination to keep such forces on Japanese soil; U.S. accusations of a Japanese "free ride" on defense despite the fact that the U.S. established the conditions for such a situation to exist; U.S. protectionist measures against Japanese products; U.S. attempts to damage the fragile Japanese domestic citrus and beef industries by political arm-twisting; again, the list...
F. THE COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY GAMBIT

In the end it appears that the U.S. is poking at what might be a hornet's nest. Our policy in the mid-80's of pressuring Japan for greater defense spending presents too many opportunities for a deterioration of future Japanese-U.S. relations. For the time being, however, the Japanese have given us an alternative policy proposal in Comprehensive Security. It does little to truly offset the increasing Soviet threat but it has provided both sides with something concrete to work on in terms of a defined formal policy; for the Japanese it is an opening position. For the U.S. it is a sign of a weakness in the Japanese armor of vulnerability. If the Japanese are concerned enough with the Soviet Union to recognize them as a threat then we

of "alleged" U.S. "offenses" against Japan could go all the way back to the "forcing" on the Japanese of a U.S. designed constitution contrived to strip them of their sovereign right to arms. Consider also these public opinion survey results: in a country that perceives trade to be absolutely essential to its survival, only 10% of respondents in a 1983 survey stated that U.S. economic policies and actions were helpful to Japan while 33% believed them to be harmful. In a 1982 survey, the results were similar--20% believing them to be helpful and 40% believing them harmful. In both surveys, there was a significant "I don't know" contingent. USIA, R-19-83, p. X-1.

"Their "armor of vulnerability" is the argument that by being a threat to no one, no will threaten them. Thus, they need no defense--in effect, "the best defense is no offense".
have taken a step toward each other in security policy. The real gain, though, will be in the fact that the step will have been made by mutual concurrence--Japan feeling as though she has made the decision in her own interests and not as part of a trade-off requiring subordination of her goals to preserve U.S.-Japanese ties.

These were the reasons the militarists found the support to come to power and these were the origins of Japanese militarism in the 1920's. These elements form the basis for the theme which is the key to this entire analysis. They formed the roots of Japanese ultranationalism in the 1930's and, for the most part, form the basis of modern Japanese nationalism although not all the elements are present in the 1980's in the same form.

Is there application today? Of the elements listed above, the two most important remain in existence--the Emperor and the *kokutai*. 7 These form the core for the

7"The Soviet Union has been building its military strength consistently, and . . . a latent threat against Japan has increased due to the remarkable buildup of Soviet forces in the Far East and the intensification of related activities." Defense of Japan, 1984, (Tokyo: 1983), p. 3.

7A 1946 publication by the Japanese Cabinet stated that the *kokutai* had not undergone any change despite the defeat of Japan in World War II. Hall, Kokutai, p. 47. The contemporary aspects of *kokutai* are today debated under the name *nihonjinron* or "discourse on the Japanese man." The translation, "the question of Japanese identity" is perhaps looser, but more descriptive. *Nihonjinron* is significant in that through it's mere existence as an ongoing debate by Japanese about who and what they are, it points out that
country; the others are transient and changeable month by month. If there is a reason to be fearful of Japanese nationalism becoming a hostile factor in U.S.-Japanese relations, it is to be found in contemporary occurrences of the transient elements. The prognosis must be based on the international society of today, not yesterday. Those who fear a rearmed Japan are short-sighted; the arms are not the problem, the reason that nation feels the need to arm may be.

U.S. policy must not push the Japanese to the point of becoming a military power if they are not ready. This only serves to exacerbate already strained relations. The U.S. must adopt a policy which "leads" the Japanese (in a

they acknowledge, at least subconsciously, that there is a difference between themselves and other races and nationalities. Japanese, as well as western, authors continually note the unique aspects of Japanese culture in their writings on this topic. This proclivity to return to the uniqueness of the Japanese confirms the existence of the kokutai. Long time nihonjinron specialist, Watanabe Shoichi, writes: "At a subconscious level, we [the Japanese] know that our cultural roots are deep and our national identity is secure." Watanabe Shoichi, "Hirohito's Long Reign Underpins Japan's Prosperity," Asian Wall Street Journal, 6 May 1985, p. 15. For additional comments on this topic, see the book reviews in Far Eastern Economic Review: Ian Buruma's "The War on Modernity", 6 February 1986, pp. 46-48 and William Wetherall's "Talking to Crickets", 1 May 1986, pp. 43-44. Wetherall's review of Tsunoda Tadanobu's book The Japanese Brain points out the immense popularity of Tsunoda's work in Japan. Tsunoda's theories would seem to support the existence of the strong prejudices congruent with the kokutai in its original form. Further, the popularity of his books indicates an interest in his theories if not agreement.
convergent sense, not a leadership sense) so that our policy accommodates both countries' future needs—not just U.S. short-term goals. Such a convergent policy must be far-sighted enough to allow U.S. goals to be supported by the Japanese as they become stronger. It cannot be a continuous series of short-sighted steps that will only lead to increased frustration and friction between Japan and the United States. Policy options will be discussed further in later chapters. It is to nationalism and modern Japanese thinking that we now turn our attention.
IV. 1980'S NATIONALISM AND COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY

Following defeat in the Pacific War Japan entered into a period of intense soul-searching and postwar rebuilding. This chapter will examine the implications for U.S. policymakers, in light of a growing Japanese nationalistic sentiment, of Japanese thinking on national security in the 1980's. As the global environment has changed so, too, has Japan's perception of her role in the world. The fundamental belief in national destiny has not disappeared, however, only lain dormant for several decades while Japan rebuilt her economic infrastructure.

This fundamental belief is not necessarily one of "racist" superiority, although the legends most certainly indicate this. It is not an ingrained aggressiveness aimed at world conquest. It is however, a belief in a manifest destiny, much the same as our own 19th century doctrine. Japanese manifestations of this sense of national destiny resulted in aggression during the early part of the 20th century and led to a reevaluation of the fluid environment of the late 20th century.

"The American Heritage Dictionary defines a racist as one who harbors notions that "one's own ethnic stock is superior". Since Japanese legends maintain the divinity of the Japanese people and islands, as opposed to rest of the world, they are racist.
This reevaluation has led to a conceptual change in the focus of Japanese security. The concept of security via military power has evolved into one of security via global economic interdependence. The embodiment of this focus is the policy of Comprehensive Security\(^1\) which Japan proposed formally in 1980. Comprehensive Security is an important statement by the Japanese concerning their role in the world but its importance is best seen as a reaction to the Japanese perception of the global environment. This perception is largely the product of the Japanese cultural experience and security experience of the half-century prior to World War II, especially the prewar years of 1920-1940 discussed in the last chapter.

The significance of Comprehensive Security in relation to U.S. interests in the Pacific and the world is the focus in this section. A clear theme which will emerge is that the Japanese find in their culture the elements of a socially and culturally superior race which has the duty and the right (as they see it) to help their global neighbors. This was the underlying premise of the "GEACOPS"; it is the underlying theme of the "Global 'New Deal'",\(^2\) and

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\(^1\) See Robert W. Barnett, Beyond War: Japan's Concept of Comprehensive National Security, Washington, D.C: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984. A detailed analysis of the policy may be gleaned by the reader from the numerous opinions he has provided from a large number of key Japanese and American policymakers.
Comprehensive Security as a symbolic statement clearly reflects a growing Japanese nationalism and leadership role in global affairs.

This theme of social, cultural and racial superiority is so closely related to nationalism as to be indistinguishable from it. It is for this reason that pressure should not be brought upon Japan to subordinate their stated goals to those of the United States. We should instead recognize the potential strength of Japanese nationalism and consider Comprehensive Security at face value as an acceptable policy for the time being. This demonstration of respect can only be a step toward strengthening the ties that bind us and away from antagonizing the Japanese psyche.

A. COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY

The Japanese see themselves as a large population living on a small group of islands devoid of natural resources. They must, therefore, work very hard to insure that the nation can trade in the international system. Comprehensive Security is the vehicle by which Japan has determined it can mollify its domestic political constraints against militarism, satisfy domestic cultural egoism as to Japanese duty, satisfy international concerns about a revival of

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"For an explanation of this, see Barnett, pp. 139-142. See also his source, Asiaweek, "A Global 'New Deal'," 10 June 1983, pp. 28-29."
Japanese militarism, and accomplish its economic goals simultaneously. It "is a Japanese term intended to describe how Japan should help to forestall, to prevent, or to limit war." Simultaneously, it is condemned both in the U.S. and Japan as a smokescreen behind which the Japanese avoid committing themselves to defense expenditures commensurate with U.S. desires, and avoid antagonizing their Asian neighbors while improving their economy.

The true purpose behind Comprehensive Security will not be debated here as the true purpose, whatever it may be, is not germane to the point. Specifically, it matters not what the Japanese really intend by Comprehensive Security, only that we base our action on what they say is the purpose of Comprehensive Security. To do otherwise invites recriminations from the Japanese that we are attempting to impose our will on Japan. Rather, Comprehensive Security will be examined here partially as a pawn, not so important on its own merit, which it has, but as a line which Japan has drawn in the dirt and which we must not step over. This doesn't mean we must naively take everything at face value. Far from it, we must base our policy and action realistically but give as much support as possible in the public eyes, working behind the scenes if necessary to reach consensus with Japanese leaders.

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3Barnett, p. xiii.
Although formal study was begun in 1979 by Prime Minister Ohira, the concept of a security policy couched in non-military terms--indeed, in almost purely economic terms, has been the thrust of Japanese foreign policy since the end of the war. The Japanese have determined that security means "protecting the people's life from various forms of threat." and they have structured their foreign policy to achieve this national goal by working at three levels. These three levels of effort are "to turn the overall international environment into a favorable one", "self-reliant efforts to cope with threats", and "to create a favorable international environment within a limited scope while protecting security in solidarity with countries sharing the same ideals and interests." Two aspects of this policy pose potential challenges to the United States, one directly and the other in a passive manner.

"Donald Hellmann says "Japan's approach to the issue of security has been that of an expanding international trade company, not that of a nation-state." He then adds "In this . . . vision of global affairs, economics and politics are seen as separable, and armament and power are rejected as critical ingredients for a successful foreign policy." and "The assumptions on which this dimension of Japanese foreign policy rest are . . . perpetuated by the singularly salutary international economic relations that prevailed [in the postwar period]." Donald C. Hellmann, "Japanese Security and Postwar Japanese Policy," in The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan, ed. Robert A. Scalapino (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 325-326.


The direct challenge is actually the lesser threat. It concerns the second level of effort, "self-reliant efforts to cope with threats." Given Japan's extraordinary potential for manufacture of arms, it may be assumed that Japan will produce the weapons she needs for herself rather than purchase them.57 A Japanese arms buildup might resolve short-term U.S.-Japanese trade imbalances but in the long run could cause even greater economic imbalance between us. A Japanese arms buildup may alter the regional balance of power and economically change the face of the U.S.'s and the world's arms industries.

The "passive" challenge results from the primary Japanese effort, "to turn the overall international environment into a favorable one." How could this represent a threat to the United States? To the Japanese this means establishing economic interdependence on a global scale to reduce the feasibility of war. To the United States it means that Japan will continue to resist U.S. efforts to influence Japanese thinking on defense issues. The passive or backlash effect is that the United States, in its present policy direction, will continue to push Japan toward a goal that the U.S. sees to be in both our interests but which Japan sees to be counter to its interests. Thus, the U.S.

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57This potential will be the subject of a hypothesis in the next chapter.
leaves itself open to charges of dominating and browbeating Japan--perfect ammunition for a rising nationalistic or ultranationalistic movement to use against the United States.

This is not to say or even imply that such a sentiment would lead to a return of militarism. This is a different age and militarism in its 1930's form is highly unlikely. Nationalistic feelings can manifest themselves in many ways, militarism being only one. Even so, in terms of a potential threat to U.S. security posed by this policy of Comprehensive Security, the rousing of Japanese nationalism against the United States (caused by the U.S. stepping over that "line" that Comprehensive Security represents) is a far greater danger than the possible economic repercussions, bad though they may be, of a viable and competitive Japanese arms industry, a topic to be explored at length in the next chapter.

B. NATIONALISM AND COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY

As Japan recognizes her growing status as an economic superpower, she becomes more proud and more willing to do more in the world. Japan sees for herself a comparable manifest destiny in the world just as the United States saw for itself in the Pacific in the latter part of the 19th century. Comprehensive Security is only a stepping stone--an intermediate step toward a more clearly delineated policy of Japanese leadership in global affairs.
As Japanese pride increases so will her sense of nationalism. In the interim Japanese nationalism grows slowly while the domestic agenda is clouded by factional politics and international issues which impact on the Japanese only slightly. There is little else happening which threatens to subvert the natural maturation of Japanese nationalism in its current direction except U.S. pressures on Japan to rearm and take a greater role in regional security. This pressure could conceivably alienate the Japanese in terms of being an insult to what the Japanese may feel is a level of respect due to them because of their relative importance in the world but which they do not feel they are getting from the United States. At the same time it provides a reason to rearm which is far from U.S. interests.

The U.S. is thus presented with a dilemma. The environment presents growing nationalism and economic power in Japan as well as a growing threat in the region. On one hand, we see the growing power of the Soviet Union and increasing number of "holes in the dyke" which require armed "fingers" to plug. Japan is seemingly enjoying a "free ride" on defense while U.S. resources continue to be stretched thinner and thinner. On the other hand, Japan has proposed a policy which provides for little acceptance of military responsibility but which is in concert with the ideals of U.S. interests.
If the U.S. presses Japan to take a greater role in her own defense, we ask her to subordinate her stated goals and security ideals to our conception of the threat. We are, in effect, stating that we either have no faith in Japanese methods or we are too chauvinistic to allow any other ally to chart the course to achieve our mutual goals. Conversely, if we accept the Japanese policy position that Comprehensive Security is a starting point, we show the Japanese--with the world watching--that the U.S. has enough confidence in our allies to give them an equal stake in policy planning. This does little to offset the growing defense shortfall but the potential benefits in producing a much stronger alliance far outweigh the drawbacks.

As Japanese nationalism and pride increases, we will have strengthened our bond with Japan and not given them a reason to find fault with our relationship. Comprehensive Security should be viewed in positive terms as a step in the right direction and not as an obstacle to be overcome in achieving U.S. goals. It is an excellent opportunity for the U.S. to tell the Japanese what they "need" to hear and demonstrate that the U.S. is big enough to let all our friends have a stake in the decisionmaking process of peace and not just in the consequences of a unilateral U.S. decision. Where the Japanese are concerned, this show of good faith is especially important.
Now let us examine the possible economic consequences of a competing Japanese arms industry, one which would have a major impact on the world's economic status quo.
V. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF COMPETITIVE JAPANESE DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

Since the end of the second World War, Japan has enjoyed phenomenal economic growth under the protection of the United States. The policy of the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), which evolved quickly from a desire for retribution, was to get Japan back on her economic feet and return the country to the international community as a functioning and productive member. Article IX of the 1947 MacArthur Constitution forbade the Japanese from rebuilding their armed forces. Japan was left free of the responsibility for her own defense--indeed, was stripped of the authority to exercise military force--and tasked only with her national recovery. Thus did Japan rise from a nation decimated by a costly war to become third in the world in economic power less than twenty years later.

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"General MacArthur's title during the occupation.


This amazing economic comeback has sparked a feeling in
the United States that Japan has enjoyed a "free ride" for
too long. These people feel the time has come for Japan to
contribute more to her own defense. This has been
exacerbated by U.S. industry lobbying for import
restrictions and tariffs on Japanese goods which compete in
the United States against domestic production and by
Congress, seeking to alleviate a growing trade deficit with
Japan. But what if Japan decided to increase her defense
spending?"9

In theory, if the Japanese were to shoulder a greater
share of the defense burden for itself and/or the region,
this would cause a restructuring of the system for
allocating resources among her industries. By committing
more resources to defense industries, those industries which
compete with U.S. domestic industry would receive less,
produce less, and be less of a threat to U.S. domestic
industry. Other areas of the economy, such as the balance of
payments and currency exchange rates, might be affected as
well. In this chapter the prospect of significant Japanese

91See, for example, Takubo Tadae, "Perception Gap
Between Tokyo and Washington," Asia Pacific Community
(Summer 1982) 14-15.

92The first assumption here is actually that "increased
defense spending" and "military power" are synonymous. For
a nation as efficient as Japan, a true decision to buildup
would validate this assumption.
rearmament will be analyzed for its potential impact on the economies of both the United States and Japan. This exercise is done only to dramatize a potential and not to indicate Japanese leanings toward a decision in either direction. This is a glimpse of another reason as to why we should not rush the Japanese into an arms buildup. In this hypothetical situation, many political realities will be ignored to focus on the economic potential of Japan to produce arms.

To do this requires that numerous assumptions be made; for simplicity, however, only the most relevant are mentioned. The first is that Japan has made the political decision, for whatever reason, to increase defense spending to a level commensurate with other major powers in the West.9 This is not an unconscionable assumption. U.S. pressures on Japan for increased defense spending have increased noticeably since the mid 1970's. In 1983 Prime Minister Nakasone confirmed that Japan will perform patrolling and security of the sea lanes 1000 miles from

9U.S. pressures on Japan to rearm appear to be the most likely reason but this should not be limit of possible reasons. Rising nationalism may lead the Japanese to such a course on their own accord.

Japanese coasts.\footnote{Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko actually agreed to this in 1981 but quibbling on his part, resulting from pressure in Japan, cast a shadow on his pledge. See Edward A. Olsen, \textit{U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity.} (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1985.), p. 96. (Cited hereafter as Olsen, \textit{Reciprocity.})} This in itself will require increased spending on the Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF) and the Air SDF (ASDF) for equipment, training, and logistical support.

A second assumption is that Japan has opted to produce her own arms rather than purchase them from an outside source. This is a fairly safe assumption\footnote{Although there are other ways of expending this money, such as foreign military aid and grants, the focus in this chapter is on the production aspects of military weapons. The assumption is meant to specifically exclude the option of purchasing arms from third party nations.} since the physical apparatus is already in place as well as the decision being an economically sound one. As an industrialized nation, it will require little effort to convert certain industries to defense; Mitsubishi, as an example, already produces limited arms. An increase in plant production and expansion would be relatively easy.\footnote{"Rearming Japan," \textit{Business Week}, 14 March 1983, p. 107.}

Finally, because the point of this chapter is to emphasize the economic possibilities and not to debate political considerations (which are numerous and significant,
in their own right), no other political problems\footnote{Including domestic Japanese distaste for such action, the uneasiness of Pacific Asian nations at such a move (witness the textbook controversy of the early 1980's) and possible Soviet pressures on Japan to prevent such an action. There are numerous facets to this topic and this list is far from complete.} will be considered. This has an impact in two spheres, foreign and domestic politics. Domestically, the key issue is the sincerity of the Japanese to remain an unarmed, unaggressive, and militarily introverted nation. This may or may not prove true in circumstances where Japan finds it desirable to change this policy. Olsen has indicated that Japan could be moved from this position toward a "more responsible position" fairly easily if the United States would "twist a few arms". He has caveated this, however, by emphasizing the point that Japan tends to offer arms for twisting when political expediency dictates. Despite this, he does feel that their nuclear allergy is sincere\footnote{From private conversations with Dr. Olsen on 7 December 1984. Concerning the nuclear allergy, I received a significantly different view during a private conversation on 11 April 1985 from Dr. Ronald A. Morse of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Dr. Morse indicated that he would not be surprised if the Japanese were armed with nuclear weapons within the decade.} and is not proposing a policy of Japan bashing".

The political impact of this decision on the other regional nations will be intentionally overlooked in favor of emphasizing the economic potential of a new Japan with a
new world role. All trade relations will be assumed to remain intact. Again, this would seem a reasonable assumption; statements made by Suharto, Marcos (before his exile), and other regional leaders concerning Japanese sea lane patrols indicate that no political or economic sanctions will be imposed upon Japan for this as long as Japan operates under the watchful eye of the United States. Then, too, as time continues to pass and heal wounds, this becomes more realistic.

A. A COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN DEFENSE?

With an additional US $21-$55 billion dollars to spend on defense, Japan now has decisions to make concerning how it will be spent. Although there are several areas which could be looked at—manpower acquisitions, training, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) purchases, etc.—of immediate interest, from a comparative advantage point of view, is arms production versus arms purchases. This scenario assumed the Japanese would produce their own arms. Is this in the

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U.S. interest? Several factors go into answering this question, but comparative advantage will be the basis for analysis here.

Japanese heavy industry is fully capable of producing arms and has been doing so since 1953 when Japanese industry began to produce and maintain equipment for U.S. forces in Asia. The Japanese now produce their own tanks, destroyers, helicopters, and transport planes.\textsuperscript{1,2} The raw materials necessary for such production already flow into Japan and for Japan to divert larger quantities from one area to defense would make little difference to the exporting nation from whom Japan buys them. The difference is in the distribution of the finished product and the revenues generated.

As a given, Japan must create a surplus and export it to survive.\textsuperscript{1,3} Because the arms in this scenario are now consumed by the Japanese, the revenues for having converted raw materials into manufactures cease to flow into Japan. With these decreased revenues, Japan will have less money to

\textsuperscript{1,2}Bunge, p. 370.

\textsuperscript{1,3}Some say import to survive--the point is that Japan must generate revenues by turning raw materials into manufactures and selling them. It's a chicken-or-the-egg proposition.
purchase the raw materials to create the arms and the circle becomes ever tighter until the entire Japanese economy is choked.

The solution is that Japan must export a portion of these weapons to keep revenues up. This is quite feasible if Japan enjoys a comparative advantage in arms production. It is not so lucrative if they do not. Fortunately for Japan, they have an edge.

Japan is a world leader in high technology products, particularly electronics. Such capability could lead Japan to become a strong exporter of electronic weapons. The market for high technology arms from the United States alone totaled over two billion dollars worldwide in 1983. Japan, with their high technology arms, could very easily become an exporter of arms in competition with the United States. This would be in character with previous behavior as an economic competitor, although out of character as a postwar political move. Again, for the sake of emphasis, I reiterate that political considerations are not the focus here and thus will not be dealt with.


145Comptroller, DSAA, "Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1983", (Washington, D.C.: Gov't Printing Office, 1983) p. 37. This was only the licensed commercial exports from the United States; total FMS was nearly $11 billion. Subsequent references will be cited as 'FMS book.'
Linder's\textsuperscript{16} theory—that a nation imports items, then begins domestic production, finally becoming a net exporter—has a nearly textbook example in the Japanese model with textiles and aluminum.\textsuperscript{17} Although Linder was speaking of luxury items, the principle still holds for this application. This has some relevance here as Japan could easily follow the same pattern in the arms market. One difference might be in the early importation of arms, but Japan buys arms now from the United States and this serves to fit the theory.

Whether Japan would eventually compete in this market with the United States is a political issue; whether they possess the economic capacity to do so, and in the process alter the political situation, is obviously a reality. Japan has the capability to provide a product which satisfies a great demand and has few competitors. There may or may not be a comparative advantage in arms production over the United States, but there would certainly be one over a large portion of the third world, from whom Japan buys her raw materials.

\textsuperscript{16}Staffan Burenstam Linder, a Swedish economist and politician.

\textsuperscript{17}Bunge, p. 201.
B. IMPACT ON THE JAPANESE ECONOMY

The raw resources needed by Japan come from a variety of nations. Japan's greatest need is oil to supply the energy required for manufacturing output.\textsuperscript{188} Japan's primary source of oil is the OPEC; oil also accounts for the largest of the Japanese trade deficits totalling nearly $31 billion in 1981.\textsuperscript{189} By trading weapons with the OPEC countries, Japan could make significant strides toward reducing this trade deficit. Although U.S. commercial arms exports to the Middle East totaled only $315 million in 1983, total FMS sales to the region were over $6.1 billion.\textsuperscript{110}

This is significant because it is a reasonable assumption that Japan would follow a defense buildup and arms exportation program with a similar program having all the aspects of the U.S. Foreign Military Sales programs.

\textsuperscript{188}Oil will be used as a sample commodity because it's important and because I want to avoid needless repetition of all the imports of Japan. The major import groups are food (about 30% of total intake; 50% of caloric intake is imported) and raw materials (nearly all). Bunge, p. 199.


\textsuperscript{110}FMS book, pp. 11, 37. N.B. These are approximations; the source combines the Near East and South Asia while I refer to OPEC. The non-Middle East nations which are not included are thus made up for by non-OPEC nations of South Asia and the Middle East.
The addition of yet another aspect, Foreign Military Construction Sales could whittle away even more of the trade deficit with OPEC countries.

In consonance with the theory stated in the introduction, this new emphasis on arms exports will have forced a reallocation of the resources being imported. Many of the resources used in arms are used in non-military hardware such as cars. A reduction in the sales revenues from cars in foreign markets will have to be compensated for in arms sales to the point where it is not only more profitable to sell arms than to sell cars, but the profit is large enough to justify restructuring a portion of the industrial base to an arms industry.

As the new industry causes an increase in Japanese demand for resources critical to arms production, the price for these resources will be driven up on the world market. Simultaneously, the demand for yen should increase to pay for these arms. In the long run, the net result for the Japanese will most likely be a zero change in real purchasing power since they will be buying more expensive resources but with a better exchange rate for their yen.

Mentioned earlier were the notions of increased manpower acquisitions, training, and patrolling exercises as possible sources of expenditures. These items would certainly have a more far-reaching impact on the Japanese economy. Anyone who
has ever lived in the vicinity of a U.S. military base will immediately grasp the implications for the economy of areas where these bases are either built or enlarged.

There will be a shift in the job market as civilian employees are required in large numbers to support bases. The addition of large numbers of military personnel to an area increases the flow of money in the local area. Base construction will increase demand for building materials and civilians to perform the labor. Training land requirements could radically change the nature of agricultural and dairy industry, although this is unlikely due to realistic domestic political considerations. Finally, increased military activity such as sea lane patrols or troop deployments will boost fuel oil consumption and force allocation strategy changes to insure adequate reserves remain available for military use. These are only a few of the most obvious impacts of increased military spending on local areas.

C. IMPACT ON UNITED STATES

For the United States this is a case for the proverbial "good news and bad news". The good news is that U.S. military forces, already spread thin around the world, would then have a reduced burden in the Pacific. This would free U.S. forces for assignment in other, more critical, areas of the world. Having had to reallocate some resources into the
defense sector, Japanese industries would then be producing fewer cars and exports United States would decrease allowing U.S. car manufacturers to produce with less competition. This means a decrease in trade deficit with Japan. The sales of some of our weapons technology, previously unusable to the Japanese, might even give us a trade surplus.

Another aspect that is a plus for the Japanese may also be a plus for the United States. This is the stronger yen. With a stronger yen, the United States may find a softening of the Japanese market as U.S. products become more within the means of the Japanese.\textsuperscript{111} However, this can be both a curse and a boon--a stronger yen will necessarily mean a weaker dollar in comparison. The really bad news, however, is that the United States will have a new trade competitor in a whole new ballgame--arms sales.

U.S. arms are highly valued around the world for their quality and state of the art technology. Generally, the arms business has only a few real competitors on the technological level with the United States as we do not sell our latest technology. The entry into the field by the Japanese could change the profile of high technology arms

\textsuperscript{111}The events of early 1986 have shown this to be true. The drop in the Yen from about Y250 = $1 to Y165 = $1 during early 1986 has made US products more available to the Japanese although the reverse has hurt their economy, pricing many of their products too high in foreign markets to be competitive.
and make exported versions of U.S. equipment substandard on the world market. This would reduce our arms sales and possibly cause critical defense industries to close down or cut back production, cooling our defense base. A "warm" defense base is desirable so that defense production can be resumed quickly and efficiently, should the need arise. This is not the only fear shared by American businessmen.

Equally as disconcerting as arms competition is the fear that U.S. defense technology may find its way back to the United States in the form of non-military applications.\textsuperscript{112} U.S. businessmen fear that U.S. military technology, sent to Japan for defense application, will be converted into other commercial applications, such as satellites and commercial aircraft. These items might then be sold in the United States in direct competition with U.S. goods. Still other problems may include pressure from EEC nations, Great Britain and France in particular, who are major arms exporters and who will also feel the pinch of Japanese competition. These pressures could introduce new trade problems in the Atlantic trade, possibly even totally offsetting the gains made from the Japanese.

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D. THE RIGHT DECISION?

United States policymakers have, for the last several years, been pressing the Japanese for increased defense spending. Japan has come into its own economically and it is only right that having "taken" for so many years and reaped the considerable benefits, Japan should start "giving" a little. This chapter began with the assumption that Japan has, indeed, begun to "give" a little. Now the question is whether U.S. policymakers made the right decision in pressing Japan for this change. There are both pluses and minuses to be considered here.

Since, in this hypothetical, the political decision has been made to produce arms in quantity, it is highly likely that Japan would enter the into the arms export business if more self-reliance in this field were to be decided upon. It is equally likely that Japan would quickly gain a comparative advantage in the arms industry. High technology and efficient manufacturing would make Japan a formidable competitor. While Japan's shift in resources to arms industries may relieve import competition in the U.S. domestic automobile and steel industries, we risk challenging our arms industry. Eventual compromise of high technology may even occur if the Japanese sell high technology arms to nations which, under U.S. regulations, were not previously allowed to have them.
Further, dual-use technology research and development efforts in Japan, available to us since only 1983, may dry up as this technology is recognized by the Japanese as a highly marketable commodity. The United States is still the leader in military applications of high technology, but the Japanese are not far behind. If we lose a source of high technology as valuable as this one, the United States may suffer—if not in any tangible way, then by the need to reallocate some of our own defense resources into research and development to make up for that which we previously obtained from Japan.

The ire of EEC nations, notably France and the United Kingdom, who depend on their arms exports as a substantive portion of their economies, may be vented on us in the form of detrimental trade policies. While this is beyond the scope of this paper, the impact on all aspects of the world economy are relevant and would have to be considered by a U.S. policymaker. It is in this light that the impact of a strengthening yen must be considered. The impact of a stronger yen will not be felt only by the United States; all the world’s currencies will be affected.114

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113 As an example, our stealth technology is based in part on Japanese high technology sales to us. See Jon Woronoff, "Measuring Japanese Military Threat," The Oriental Economist, February 1984, p. 23.

114 Again, this is readily visible in mid-1986.
On the positive side, our trade deficit with Japan will, in all likelihood, decrease rapidly as fewer imports enter the country. This shrinking foreign supply will further reduce the imbalance and return a competitive edge to U.S. firms. As Japan purchases arms initially to make up for immediate shortfalls, our arms industries will profit and it is even conceivable that a short term trade surplus would be run during the period that their industries gear up into full production.

The final positive element is that U.S. military presence in the region may be decreased to permit increased force levels in more troubled regions of the world without the added expense of training and equipping more soldiers. Our defense expenditures will not have to be increased to meet the increased threat globally. We need only "redistribute" our military resources. From a purely economic standpoint, it appears that the Japanese would benefit greatly from a decision to increase defense spending to comparable NATO levels. The short term costs will quickly be made up for by long term gains in an industry which has few competitors on par with Japan.

Having initially ignored political issues in order to "cry wolf" with this argument, it is only fair in conclusion to caveat the argument again by reiterating my purpose--this hypothesis was presented for evaluation to point out a
potential which Japan has and which will change slowly even as political variables change quickly in comparison.

U.S. policymakers must weigh a number of elements as they decide on how much to pressure the Japanese into increasing their defense spending. A significant element is the long term effects of a Japanese arms competitor versus the possibly transient benefits of reduced U.S. strength requirements, and their associated costs, in the Pacific Basin.

It is not so clear whether the U.S. would gain from such a Japanese move. While U.S. defense requirements lessen initially to our benefit, we may damage U.S.-Japanese ties by forcing a move which has not been wholly supported by the Japanese. Further, this argument focused intentionally on the economic aspects of a competing arms industry and not on manpower. If the nation's policy were to change course, nine trillion yen\textsuperscript{1} will buy a lot more than arms. It buys prestige and prestige attracts men. Suddenly, a proud Japanese army, full of samurai spirit, is present in Japan. Will that Japan be our friend and ally or an angry nation too long bullied by the U.S? At some future point when Japan decides to become a military power, the U.S. must be able to look forward to enjoying these benefits secure in

\textsuperscript{1}Based on \$1 = ¥170; \$55 billion dollars (6\% GNP, see footnote 101) = ¥9.3 trillion yen.
the knowledge that Japan is rearming in accordance with a decision arrived at by a process of mutual consent and desire. At this point, the U.S. will have achieved the strategic integration required and have retained the respect of an ally who feels they have an equal say in our mutual destiny as well as an equal stake.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP

As the two superpowers compete for power around the world, the relative strength of each at any given spot rises and falls. The danger of war is increased as the superpowers attempt to compensate for a perceived drop in power. Attempts, particularly by the Soviet Union, to alter the balance of power in the region increase tensions in the region, magnify the sensitivity of the precarious balance and promote instability. In the early 1980's the Soviet Union greatly increased its presence in the Pacific region. Combined with a diminishing U.S. presence during the 1970's and the abandonment of Vietnam, U.S. credibility has wavered in the eyes of our regional allies and other nations. This has added to uncertainty of U.S. ties and allowed the Soviets to step up their program of revolution, promote instability, and dramatically increase their regional stature—the best example being Vietnam.

The United States cannot risk continued setbacks in the credibility of our defense effort in Asia or elsewhere. The evolving economic structure of the world and the increasing interdependence of all nations make the threat to any nation a threat to all; if any nation's economy is disrupted, the potential repercussions throughout the world are magnified.
as the disrupted trade of that one nation disrupts the exports of three other nations. In effect, a snowball can result. Because of the serious consequences of economic disruption, we must be even more careful in our handling of perceived threats to the region. As mentioned, Japanese defense policy is one area where strengthening in opposition to our common threat has not been commensurate with U.S. hopes. It is to this we now turn.

A. JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY AND THE UNITED STATES

Japanese defense policy has its roots deeply entrenched in the feelings which ensued after the loss of the Pacific War. The Japanese people felt betrayed by the militarists who had led them to such utter defeat. Article IX of the constitution was a reaction against Japanese militarism and was the beginning of a long period of pacifism and anti-military sentiment within the general public. While these sentiments have lasted into the 1980's, the actual policy was short-lived.

With the outbreak of the Korean War, U.S. use of bases in Japan to stage from and run the logistical operations essential to the war effort drastically modified the immediate post-war policy. U.S. forces were aided by former members of the Imperial Navy in conducting mine clearing
operations in the waters surrounding Korea. With the formation of the National Safety Agency in the early 1950's and its subsequent renaming of the 100,000 man force as the Japan Defense Agency in 1954, the ice was broken as far as maintaining a military force.

Since then, Japanese defense efforts have increased despite public sentiment and constitutional prohibition. Interpretations of the constitution have provided the leeway for Japanese officials to increase the defense budget to its current level of nearly US $11 billion, ranking seventh in the world. The significant role of public opinion in Japan is not unnoticed, however. In the last decade the notion of a 1% cap on defense spending has been widely supported by the general public and has served to keep Japanese expenditures in defense below the level which the

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118USIA Report R-13-84, p. 7 indicated a mixed view on exceeding the 1% level. USIA statistics, however, show a wide majority (greater than 45% in most cases) of the opinion that the 1% ceiling should be held or reduced. See p. 32.
U.S. feels is adequate to defend Japan and contribute to the regional defense.

There are two major problems with the current Japanese policy. First, Japan has determined that a mobilization base must be maintained. Given the high cost associated with a low output, the defense industry operates with a built-in disadvantage. If Japan were to increase spending on equipment, the increased quantity would not only bolster Japanese equipment levels, but reduce the per-item costs of this military hardware. This impacts primarily on the Japanese.

The second problem is that the Japanese have assumed a best case scenario for their defense planning. This policy has had as its basis the assumptions that the U.S. military commitment to the region and to Japan was total and that the peace of the region would continue. The relative calm of Northeast Asia has been shaken by several events, however. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Soviet force buildup in the "Northern Territories", the deployment of both SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers to within striking range of Japan, and the almost daily overflights by Soviet reconnaissance planes have all served to wear thin the Japanese security blanket and counter the

\[^{119}\text{Sneider, p. 75.}\]
\[^{120}\text{Sneider, p. 100.}\]
cycle of public opinion that has, for so long, been the excuse and reason used by the Japanese government to stall U.S. efforts to have Japan increase her defense expenditures.

Japanese leaders are now realizing, along with the general public, that U.S. resources are not infinite; Soviet expansion in all areas of the world is forcing the United States to react over the span of the entire globe and that Japan, important as it is, still is only one area of many. This realization is being made manifest in a number of ways but especially noteworthy is the election—and reelection—of Prime Minister Nakasone. Granted that he has not made the sweeping changes to the Japanese defense budget that were expected in 1983, he has, nevertheless, been the instigator of many other nuances and subtle changes.\footnote{I refer to his visits to the Yasukuni shrine as Prime Minister, his alleged association with Mishima, his right-of-center stance, and other "statements". See, among other sources, New York Times, "August in Tokyo Evokes Echoes of Militarist Past," 16 August 1984, p. A. 2, Henry Stokes Scott, "Mishima, a Movie and Nakasone," Japan Quarterly 31 (Jan-Mar 1984): 49. Further, while he has been unable to cause sweeping reforms in Japanese defense policies, his ideas and attitudes have impacted on Japanese thought accelerating this type of thinking. Olsen suggests that this may be his greatest contribution in his discussion of Nakasone's impact on Japanese thought in Reciprocity. See pp. 36, 49-51, and 80-81.} It is with Nakasone that the present U.S. administration has based its hopes of reshaping Japanese defense policy.
The highly publicized "Ron-Yasu" relationship, which seemed so promising at the outset of the Nakasone premiership, has yet to produce the results so ardently desired by the United States government. Admittedly, economic concessions have been made--voluntary quotas on cars, increases in citrus imports--these are steps in the right direction, but tiny steps. The tougher rhetoric on trade present in the U.S. press during the early part of 1985, may have helped produce the more fruitful results in the yen-dollar ratio seen in late '85 and early 1986.

The Japanese are fully cognizant of the economic implications for both countries. While they may generally recognize "what's good for the U.S. is good for Japan", they also know that "what's bad for Japan ain't necessarily bad for the U.S." It is this latter contention which is causing the hesitancy; slowing down the Japanese economy, as a shift to defense production is bound to do in the short run, will hurt Japan while it helps the United States. Additionally, Japan's policy of Comprehensive Security reflects a national mood as well as a national goal. Shifting to defense production would be inconsistent with this policy and I am not saying that such a change is imminent. The potential to do so, however, makes it all the more important that the U.S. nurture Japanese friendship and thus insure any future nationalistic movements do not find a scapegoat in the United States.
B. THE CONTINUING DILEMMA

Soviet power in the Pacific Ocean is increasing while their concurrently increasing actions throughout the world are steadily diluting U.S. force levels as we attempt to respond. Despite this obvious challenge, the Japanese, a major supporter of U.S. principles if not an outright ally, continue to cling to their own interpretations of the Soviet threat.

The Japanese are not unaware of this threat; indeed, specific actions perpetrated against the Japanese have increased their awareness of the danger of Soviet power. Despite this, the Japanese remain hesitant to increase their own military power for self-defense. The sentiment in Japan remains strongly anti-military as a result of the loss of World War II under the militarists, but more so, because of the economics of the current situation.

Japan, having developed into one of the economic superpowers of the world, recognizes the importance of her economy to an interdependent world. Conservative LDP members appear to be counting on, among other reasons, the world in general and the Soviets in particular to recognize the importance of Japan's economy to the well-being of the world and the potential damage to the economies of all nations if Japan were attacked. It is from this position that many Japanese espouse neutrality and tend to insist on their own
DESTINY IN THE PACIFIC: IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY OF RISING JAPANESE NATIONALISM AND ECONOMIC POWER

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independence vis-a-vis the U.S., particularly when we refer to Japan as an ally or when we discuss increased defense spending for our mutual protection.

Japan is also hesitant to shift into arms production for fear of the stigma which would certainly attach itself to all her exports. The potential damage to her economy which might be caused if she were once again viewed as a "merchant of death" greatly sensitizes the Japanese leadership to this issue. Japan has worked very hard since World War II to paint herself in a new light and does not want to jeopardize her economic well-being by having to deal with her neighbors and more distant trading partners in any form associated with her militarist past. Hence, strident U.S. pressure for an increased security posture is snubbed in Japan and feared in other Pacific Basin nations as a revival of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere; Japan fears the militaristic overtones and the reaction of this by other nations with whom she must do business to survive. The other nations fear that a strong Japan, whose military and defense expenditures already far exceed their own, might once again lead to a Japanese dominated region.

Prime Minister Nakasone's position throughout his political career has been hawkish and his selection by the conservative LDP as party president and thus Prime Minister was seen by the U.S. as an indicator of changing Japanese
attitudes. His comments that Japan would become an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" against the Soviet threat were not well received in Japan, however, and despite U.S. hopes that he would change the direction of Japan's defense strategy, these hopes have not, thus far, been borne out. His rhetoric has been toned down in this regard adding credence to the argument that he is succumbing to political pressure from fellow party members.

Japan has taken steps to accommodate U.S. goals concerning defense. Loose interpretations of the constitution have allowed a defense buildup, since the end of World War II, to rank seventh or eighth in the world (depending upon the source). While the non-nuclear principles may be sincerely imbedded, the fact that Japan maintains a mobilization base, small that it may be, indicates they are keeping their options open. This very willingness to maintain open options, as well as a quarter of a million men under arms, is encouraging to proponents of any policy which seeks greater such measures.

Such is the stage upon which the United States must formulate a policy to strengthen both our position in the region vis-a-vis Japan and our position globally in the wake of an increasing Soviet threat. Burden sharing has not been

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accepted by the Japanese elites because the Comprehensive Security policy of Japan is viewed by them as the equal of most NATO contributions.\textsuperscript{123}

C. A NEW POLICY PROPOSAL

U.S. interests are both global and regional. Any attempt to propose U.S. policy toward Japan must first determine what U.S. interests are vis-a-vis Japan. These interests, both long and short term, will provide the goals for which actions structured through policy are intended to attain. Because our interests are not all of equal importance, the policy must be defined in such a way as to provide some prioritization of U.S. interests.

The primary interest of the United States is the security of the nation. Security insures the survival of the nation and thus allows for other, lesser, interests. The cornerstone of all U.S. policy must be the preservation of the nation. In this respect, trade of resources necessary for the nation to defend itself falls into the range of the nation's primary interest. Maintenance of global U.S. influence insures U.S. ability to have a

\textsuperscript{123}This is, of course, almost an apples and oranges comparison since NATO contributions are purely military while Comprehensive Security encompasses other aspects.
powerful voice in the affairs of the world. Finally, efforts to maintain and improve the peace by reducing or negating the threat increases the security of all nations.

Secondary interests include maintenance of free trade and access to markets worldwide to insure access to products and resources which improve American standards of living and quality of life. To maintain this quality of life, it is in our interest to share the cost of defense among those nations who share the benefits of a strong and stable American presence.

I have identified growing Japanese nationalism as a potential threat as well as boon to U.S. security and influence in the Pacific. Additionally, Japan's industrial potential to produce arms could reduce or eliminate U.S. access to Japanese research and development efforts and dual-use technology--both are considered national security assets--if Japan became an arms producer in her own right. U.S. policy toward Japan must reflect both the long and short term goals of the United States with respect to Japan. The analysis of this paper suggests at least two long term goals and one short term goal which current U.S. policy addresses unsatisfactorily and possibly dangerously.

One long term goal should be to insure that the Japanese, in becoming a military power, do so within the auspices of a mutually (and eventually even multilaterally)
agreed upon necessity. By alleviating Japanese feelings that they are being treated as second class citizens, we reduce the potential adverse effects of rising nationalism combined with military capability and sense of destiny. By adopting a policy of conciliation with regard to Japanese views of their own destiny, the U.S. can support Japanese efforts in providing an economically interdependent world without providing cause for uneven military buildup.

This will not forestall the growth of nationalism, however, not that any policy could or would want to. As Japan achieves greater success in her global endeavors it is inevitable that her pride will increase also; this is already happening. This U.S. goal of tempering a Japanese military buildup succeeds by refocusing the growth of nationalism on the positive aspects of successful Japanese policy rather than on the constraints and negative aspects of a U.S. policy. Such a U.S. policy is designed to badger the Japanese into actions inconsistent with their stated national policy, peace through interdependence.

Achievement of the second long term goal would flow from a U.S. policy which cautions against undue growth of a powerful Japanese military and counters the potential economic problems associated with an indigenous Japanese arms industry. Forestalling this industry serves the dual role of providing, in effect, only one customer for Japanese
dual-use technology and military related research and development.

Steps to secure our short term goals must be consistent with those of our long term goals. The U.S. is deeply concerned about a growing trade imbalance and "burden sharing" in all its various forms has been suggested by some as one solution. This runs counter to our long term goals, however. A conciliatory policy recognizing Japanese efforts in areas besides the growth of their military serves to strengthen a U.S. position calling for alternative methods of sharing the costs associated with defense.

One solution may be to accept Comprehensive Security at face value.\textsuperscript{124} This does little to redistribute the burden of defense but is a gesture of respect toward Japan. In time we may use the concept of Comprehensive Security to have Japan purchase our surplus farm products for subsequent aid distributions. This could be considered the Japanese contribution as a major power to defense. Although it sounds almost mercenary, this is not the same as simply having Japan pay us for the defense provided to them. It diminishes our aid program somewhat but accomplishes several things: it eases the trade deficit, it reflects a U.S. willingness to honor Japanese ideals as laid down in the

\textsuperscript{124}See Barnett, Beyond War, chapter 1 for the official summary of Comprehensive Security.
policy of Comprehensive Security, it becomes a matter of record that Japan has increased her defense spending—even if for farm products, it prevents the buildup of the Japanese military, and subsequently reduces the likelihood that a Japanese arms industry will emerge.

Instituting such a policy would involve several steps. The United States must begin by not playing up the immediate Soviet military threat to Japan. The importance of ties between the U.S. and Japan should be emphasized as well as the benefits of Western prosperity to Japan. Finally, the United States should seek to enhance our relationship by giving a little—let the Japanese have Comprehensive Security and let us see if our own policies can be structured to accommodate this.

Japan's destiny in the Pacific and the world is deeply embedded in the national myths and concept of identity which the Japanese have of themselves. As Japan again plays its role as a major power, it is imperative that the United States recognize the destiny which Japan sees for itself and adopt a foreign policy which leads Japan away from the path of military force to achieve her goals. We are at the critical period now. Our present policy is pushing Japan in the wrong direction; we do not want a rearmed Japan at the cost of the national goodwill which has evolved over the last forty years.
Any U.S. policy must allow Japan's great economic power to be channeled to augment the power of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japan has given the U.S. a policy alternative to military power in Comprehensive Security. This policy may do little to directly offset the growing cost to the United States of defending the free world, but U.S. power is better enhanced by the strength of Japan and our other allies who enjoy the potential that Japan does. In the interim, our policy in the Pacific may have to be one of status-quo ante to counter the growing Soviet presence. Our policy toward Japan should be one of respect for the differences between us. We must not allow the insignificant frictions of trade imbalance cloud the true issue of defending our mutual interests against our mutual enemies.
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