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TURKEY: DEFENDER OF NATO'S SOUTHEASTERN FLANK

BY

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Turkey: Defender of NATO's Southeastern Flank

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The basic question is the viability of Turkey's ability to fulfill its role in the defense of the southeastern flank of NATO. In the 1970's, Turkey faced numerous political and economic problems, exacerbated by the U.S. arms embargo, which cast serious doubts on that ability. Research shows that in the 1980's, Turkey has made dramatic improvements in all areas through aggressive internal reforms and increased external support. Those initiatives have resulted in a stable political situation, a fast growing economy with enhanced

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AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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Turkey: Defender of NATO's Southeastern Flank

I. Introduction. Turkey's army stands in direct descent from the Ottoman Army, and has been molded and matured by five centuries as the army of a great power. However, in recent history, Turkey's viability as the defender of NATO's southeastern flank has been questioned, because of its persistent political, economic, and military problems. This study addresses those issues and concludes that Turkey, through its positive internal initiatives, reinforced by external support, has dramatically improved its political, economic and military position and is capable of performing its vital NATO role.

II. Background/History. In 1826, one of the great Turkish reformers, Sultan Mahmud II, formed an army modeled after Western armies. Within a year Mahmud's army had annihilated the regular army (Janissary corps) and assumed control of the government. The regular army that then emerged is the lineal ancestor of the Turkish army of today. Those events also marked the beginning of the leading role that army officers would take as reformers and Westernizers, a role which has strongly influenced Turkish history down to the present. It was those officers, more than any other Ottoman Turks, who were taught European languages and given Western education in the military schools that were founded to train the
officer corps of the regular army. They were in the best position to see the dangerous gulf between the decaying traditional institutions of the empire and the new forms of organization which led to European successes. They became reformers first, then revolutionaries.  

In 1908, it was army officers who carried out the Young Turk Revolution that began the last desperate race to rescue the empire by turning it into a European-style state. They attempted to transform the empire into a constitutional democracy with an elective parliament, remodelled practically every institution in sight along Western lines, and extended the right (and duty) of military service to the non-Turkish and non-Muslim populations of the empire. In reality, they turned the state into a military dictatorship, run by an oligarchy of young Turkish nationalist officers. Their efforts failed and within six years they had plunged the empire into its last disastrous war. By 1918, with both the government and the military in shambles, they were awaiting partitioning by the victorious Entente Powers.  

A second group of "Young Turk officers" emerged who had been excluded from the ruling group early on because they favored a "Turkish" solution rather than an "Ottoman" solution. They had argued that it was too late to save the dying multi-national empire, and that all of their efforts should be devoted towards salvaging a Turkish national state from the inevitable disaster. Mustafa Kemal was the most prominent of these nationalist officers. He had served
loyally in military commands throughout World War I and had risen to the rank of general and pasha. When the military catastrophe finally discredited the ruling group, Kemal, or Atatürk as he was later called, and his group were prepared to step in and provide alternative leadership.  

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his companions created a military resistance movement in central Anatolia, and fought off the French, Italian, Greek and British forces. They won the part guerrilla, part conventional war while receiving little or no outside assistance. The Turkish Republic was created in 1923. The Turks described the war as "the war of the reserve officers." It was the army that rescued a Turkish national state from the ruins of the empire, just as an earlier Turkish army had founded it.  

During the next fifteen years, until his death in 1938, Atatürk, with the army's backing, rammed through radical reforms in an attempt to turn Turkey into a mirror image of a European secular state. He did Turkey an equally great service by firmly insisting on the total separation of military and civil functions. Atatürk set the example by resigning his military rank upon becoming president of the republic. It was the army's role, clearly stated in the constitution, to safeguard Atatürk's reforms and prevent backsliding, but not to rule itself.  

Atatürk's definition of the army's role within the state prevails even today. A multi-party democracy was introduced in Turkey in 1950, and despite several
interruptions has been the predominant pattern ever since.

In 1960 the army intervened against the government of the
day, claiming it was corrupt, supporting traditionalist and
anti-"Ataturkish" factions, and that it was planning to rig
the upcoming elections. The intervention had the support of
the intellectuals, including the students, and the
government was returned to civilian control after only one
year. The military government also gave the Second Turkish
Republic a considerably more democratic constitution than
its predecessor had had.\(^7\)

In 1971, many of the top military officers staged a
"mini-coup", and without actually trying to overthrow the
constitution, demanded and got the resignation of the prime
minister. They had grown more and more impatient with the
government's policy of inactivity in the face of the
terrorist campaign then troubling Turkish cities by the
Turkish People's Liberation Army. The Army allowed the
elections of 1973 to be held and turned over control to the
civilian government in October of that year.\(^8\)

In the late 1970's everything started to go wrong for
Turkey. The effects of rising oil prices and the general
world recession on the Turkish economy were further
exacerbated by domestic problems. A primary contributor to
the domestic problems were a series of governments that were
ineffective and almost totally paralyzed by disagreements
among the coalition parties. The level of corruption and
favoritism in all state-run organizations rose to a new
high, and popular respect and support for them, and their political parties, dropped dramatically. At the same time, terrorism by right- and left-wing extremist groups returned, with far greater ferocity than at the beginning of the 1970's.\(^9\)

The sources of the crisis were not totally financial and administrative. The transformation of Turkey from a static peasant society based on Islamic values into a secular, semi-industrialized state whose official values were democratic and "European", also contributed to the crisis. By the end of the 1970's, almost half of Turkey's 49 million people were urbanized and living in a Western-style physical and economic environment. Most were first generation immigrants from the countryside and not very successful in dealing with the new environment and culture. The resulting identity crisis, combined with the economic and political difficulties, came close to causing the collapse of the entire Atatürk system.\(^10\)

A similar situation occurred in Iran, where the social transformation had been more abrupt. The lack of a strong democratic tradition or an army with an ideology independent of the autocratic rulers led to a fundamentalist Islamic revival and the rejection of all Western values in 1979.\(^11\) Turkey was spared that fate but, by 1979, was effectively bankrupt. The government was unable to import even the basic necessities of life, electricity was cut for up to six hours a day, and there was insufficient fuel to heat homes
through the harsh winter. A state of undeclared civil war also existed between the right-wing terrorists (receiving support from two of the smaller parties in the governing coalition) and left-wing terrorists (including many from the Kurdish minority in the southeast). The two groups were waging a war of assassination against each other and the general public that was killing an average of 30 people a day, despite the fact that 20 of the 67 provinces were under martial law.12

Much to the relief of almost everybody, the armed forces, under the command of General Kenan Evren, intervened on 12 September 1980. All political parties and institutions were suspended, and the army proceeded to suppress the terrorism. Over the next two years, thousands of people were detained for suspected terrorist activities, and by the end of 1982, over 8,000 had received prison sentences and another 18,000 were in detention awaiting trial. The army also seized huge quantities of illegally held arms, including 40,000 rifles and half a million hand guns. By 1982 deaths from terrorism had been reduced to an average of three per week.13

The regime of austerity imposed by the armed forces led to rapid economic recovery. By the end of 1982 exports had doubled, inflation was more than halved, shortages of imported products had ended, and the GNP was growing at 4 percent after two years of stagnation. Given these results and the return of civil peace, a new, less-liberal,
constitution was submitted for popular approval in November 1982 and received a 91 percent "yes" vote. Under the same referendum, General Evren was elected president for a seven-year term, with wide-ranging constitutional powers.14

III. Current Status.

A. Economic/Political. In January 1981, a stabilization program was approved by the military-controlled government and reaffirmed by the appointment of Turgut Ozal as deputy prime minister in charge of the economy. The program combined stabilization measures aimed at lowering inflation and improving the balance of payments. It included measures such as currency devaluation designed to improve export sales and the role of market forces. Price controls were lifted on many items, including agricultural products, to suppress demand, and interest rates were freed in July 1981 to encourage savings. Apart from meeting the immediate emergency, the long-range economic goals entailed an ambitious restructuring of the economic system similar to the constitutional restructuring of the political system.15

Military and technocratic reformers, unhindered by party and union politics, changed the import substitution subsidy system to an export promotion system. This allowed state and private enterprises too weak to adjust under the new system to die. The bureaucracy encouraged market expansion at the expense of the state sector, so that Turkey
could pay for imports and loans. The economic and political viability of Turkey depended on that expansion.

Initially, the "economic miracle" seemed as stunning as the "law and order miracle." By 1981, the 100-130 percent inflation rate was reduced to 25 percent, and the negative growth rate reversed so that the GNP expanded at 4.5 percent. With reduced domestic demand, a competitive exchange rate, and export incentives, overseas sales and credits climbed rapidly. The dollar value of Turkish merchandise exports almost doubled between 1979 and 1981. The increase was even larger in industrial exports. Exports to the Middle East soared as Turkey took advantage of trade openings deriving from the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, its comparative advantage in location, and good will based on its Islamic identity. Turkey has been able to accomplish much of this because of its traditional policy of neutrality toward the conflicts of its neighbors. Iran and Iraq may be at war, but Turkey conducts business with both. In fact, they are Turkey's two largest trading partners. Trade with Iran in the past year alone totaled nearly $1.5 billion. Iraq has one oil pipeline running through "neutral" Turkey now, with a second slated for 1987. Iran also has expressed interest in a similar pipeline arrangement. However, Kurdish unrest, backed in part by the Khomeini regime, has caused increasing tension between Iran and Turkey.  

Turkish construction activity in the Middle East
boomed, going from $4 billion in 1979 to $12 billion in 1981, and rising to $14 billion in 1983. European trade remained dominant, despite a trend of declining imports from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. In 1983, trade to the Middle East accounted for about 40 percent of Turkey's exports and Western markets for about 50 percent. According to the newsletter *Mideast Markets*, Turkish exports to the Islamic world stood at 49 percent in 1983, the most recent year for such figures. Despite the growth of Turkish imports, which ended the dramatic pre-1980 shortages, the current account deficit declined from $3.2 billion in 1980 to $1 billion in 1982. Turkey had regained its credit-worthiness in private capital markets. 17

Beginning in mid-1982 and lasting through 1983, the Turkish economy took another down swing. The GNP continued to grow at a rate above 3 percent, but inflation climbed toward 40 percent and unemployment again reached 25 percent. A rash of bankruptcies occurred during that period. The state's failure to meet revenue, budget, and foreign trade targets caused a reversion to deficit financing. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilization agreements had to be renegotiated, first in mid-1983 and again in the spring of 1984. The Turkish government began to tighten fiscal policy, freeze social spending and new state investments, and take urgent measures to increase exports. 18

Ozal made a dramatic attempt to improve the economy by
deregulating interest rates. He hoped to draw funds out of gold, real estate speculation, and untraceable "black money" into taxable savings and investments. However, this experiment in deregulation ended in a banking crisis that led to his forced resignation as deputy prime minister in July 1982.19

In contrast to the financial failure, increased export sales has been a major and sustained achievement of the Evren regime. Turkey reestablished its international credit and significantly raised its import capacity. With regular payments of about $2 billion a year on its $20 billion debt, Turkey has become the world's most improving debtor.20

Turgut Ozal's victory as prime minister in the 1984 parliamentary elections surprised many observers because he was not the favorite choice of General Evren's military government. Ozal's Motherland Party also won a majority of seats in parliament. He is the first Turkish prime minister to come from the Anatolian Plain and not the Western-oriented coastal or European regions. He is a practicing Moslem who has repeatedly spoken of the common Turkish ties to the Islamic world while professing support for Turkey's secular traditions. Despite any differences they may have had, Evren and Ozal have formed a close-working team dedicated to restore strength and democracy to the country.21

B. Turkey's Relations With Its Neighbors. Since the days of Kemal Ataturk, Turkey has considered itself a Western country. A member of NATO since 1952, it anchors
the southern region along with Greece and Italy. Turkey occupies some of the world's most strategic real estate, including a common border with the Soviet Union, a Black Sea coastline near which Soviet military and merchant vessels traverse daily, and the Bosporous and Dardanelles, the straits through which those ships make their way from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.²²

For several centuries, Turkey's main military preoccupation has been Russia, against which it fought (as the Ottoman Empire) about a dozen wars. Hostility and fear towards Moscow are deeply ingrained in the Turkish national consciousness and a substantial minority of the Turkish population are descendents from refugees from the territories lost to Russian armies over the generations.²³

Turkish-Soviet relations improved during the period 1923-41, as a result of the aid provided by Russia in the Turkish War of Independence. Turkey was able to adopt a neutral foreign policy for the first time in its history and succeeded in staying out of World War II. However, the old anxieties were instantly reawakened by the Russian arrival in the Balkans in 1945 and Stalin's demands for territorial concessions from Turkey. Ankara immediately switched its alliance to the United States when the Truman Doctrine was promulgated in 1947.²⁴

Following the lead of many of its Western allies, Turkey has attempted to achieve a measure of detente with the Soviet Union. Despite the Soviet government's
repudiation of Stalin's claim to Turkish territory, Turkey still sees the Soviet Union as the primary threat to its country. 25

As discussed earlier, as Turkey's economic crisis worsened, it began to look to the East to help solve its financial problems. It has managed to walk a thin line and stay neutral in the Middle East conflicts. Although relations are somewhat strained with Iran over the Kurdish issue, Turkey has been able to take advantage of the Iran-Iraq conflict and draw economic strength from both countries without becoming directly involved in the conflict. Turkey has also acquired trade and construction contracts with other Middle Eastern countries, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Libya. 26

Turkey and Egypt are the only two Islamic countries in the Middle East which have diplomatic relations with Israel. It has received increasing pressure from the Islamic nations in the region to break those ties, and as a concession to the Arabs, Turkey cut its representation back to the second secretary level in protest over the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. However, so far Turkey has resisted all other pressures to close its doors in Tel Aviv. 27

Ankara has publicly supported the PLO and has become increasingly more involved in the Conference of Islamic Nations. Turkey is wary of Syria and its ties to the Soviet Union. As with other European and Middle Eastern countries it is fearful of international terrorist activities and is
willing to make public or private concessions in an attempt to keep it out of the country.²⁸

Turkey’s relations with Greece are an entirely different issue. There has been a running feud between the two countries since the days of the Ottoman Empire. Greece was enticed into World War I on the side of the Entente Powers with the promise that it would share in the division of Turkey. Had it not been for the successes of Kemal Ataturk, Greece would claim much of what is now western Turkey.²⁹

In more recent times, Cyprus has become the focal point for the dispute between the two NATO allies. With the friction on the Cyprus issue beginning back in the 1950's, it finally reached a crisis in July 1974. At that point, the Turkish armed forces were fully prepared and equipped to carry out a swift sea and airborne invasion.³⁰

The 1974 crisis was caused by the ill-advised action of the Athens government in sponsoring a coup against Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus. It used the 12,000 man Greek-Cypriot National Guard, a semi-regular force which was commanded by Greek army officers. Makarios escaped with his life, but the coup leader, Nikos Sampson, a former terrorist notorious for his anti-Turkish attitudes, was established as President within 24 hours of the attack on the Presidential Palace in Nicosia on July 15th. Cyprus was proclaimed a "Hellenic Republic", and the military junta in Athens evidently believed that the path had been cleared
for "enosis" (union of Cyprus with Greece) within a year. Surprisingly, despite clear prior warning from Ankara, the Greek government was under the opinion that Turkey would not react vigorously. 31

The Turkish government, fearing for the Turkish-Cypriot minority and determined not to allow "enosis" (which would create a Greek military stronghold flanking its southern coast), first sought British co-operation in a joint intervention into Cyprus. Both countries, as co-guarantors (Greece was also a guarantor) of the 1960 treaty establishing Cypriot independence, had the right to intervene in defense of the constitution. However, Britain refused to exercise its right, or to allow Turkey to land forces through the British sovereign base areas on the southern coast. There were also reports that Washington was considering the recognition of the Sampson regime. The Turkish government therefore decided to ignore British and American pressure for a non-military solution to the crisis, which it feared would consolidate the new situation, and chose to exercise its right of unilateral intervention by invading Cyprus. 32

The Turkish armed forces, despite initial difficulties, were successful, in their occupation of the northern portion of Cyprus. During the ensuing cease-fire, the majority of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots were relocated to the northern and southern portions of the island respectively. Since August 1974 the Turkish government has insisted on a
bizonal, not merely a cantonal federal government for Cyprus, with the Turkish-Cypriot community remaining concentrated in a single contiguous area in the north.\footnote{33}

The UN Secretary General has a mandate from the Security Council to use his "good offices" to bring the two communities on Cyprus together. In late 1984, Secretary General Perez de Cuellar sponsored a series of proximity talks with leaders of the two Cypriot sides culminating in a January 1985 summit meeting between President Kyprianou and Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash. At that meeting the Turkish Cypriot leader agreed to the Secretary General's draft document formulated in the proximity talks. The Greek Cypriots, however, did not accept it. Although unable to achieve an agreement, the Secretary General stated that the gap between the two sides had been narrowed.\footnote{34} Turkey has continued to withdraw its forces from Cyprus. Its remaining forces include two reduced-strength divisions.\footnote{35}

The election of Prime Minister Papandreou in Athens has led to a significant worsening in Greek-Turkish relations, since he has avoided all direct negotiations with Ankara on the disputes between them. He has indulged in much sabre-rattling over alleged Turkish infringements of Greek territorial waters and airspace in the Aegean. These occur almost constantly, since Greece claims a ten-mile aerial zone and a twelve-mile territorial zone around all of its Aegean islands, while Turkey only recognizes six miles. This is the primary development which could involve the two
neighbors in open hostilities. If unchallenged, it would effectively foreclose the Turkish claim to an equitable sharing of rights of the Aegean seabed outside territorial waters. Only 45,000 square kilometers of the total 160,000 square kilometers would remain outside undisputed Greek territorial waters. It would also render access to much of Turkey's Aegean coast impossible without passing through Greek waters or airspace. Ankara has indicated that there would be a military response to any Greek attempt to impose an expanded territorial limit of this sort. However, Turkey has made no attempt to reposition major combat units into the area or along the Greek/Turkish border.

C. Armed Forces. The Turkish army is organized for national defense, and except in time of martial law has no authority to perform internal security functions. However, the gendarmerie, which is responsible for those functions, is commanded by army officers and co-operates closely with local army units. In times of peace, the gendarmerie is under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. In time of war, and during periods when martial law is in effect, it comes under the direct control of the military.

In its initial enthusiasm for the Western alliance, Turkey sent a brigade to join the United Nations forces fighting in Korea in October, 1950. In all, some 20,000 Turkish soldiers fought in Korea, and 717 died there. It was the first time the Turkish army had fought since 1922, and it showed that the Turkish military reputation for
ferocious bravery and unyielding resistance was still as well merited as it had always been. 

In 1952 Turkey was admitted to full membership of NATO, and in 1955 it joined the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO), headquartered in Ankara. Its main assigned role in both alliances was simply to defend its own strategically vital territory, and above all the Bosporus and Dardenelles Straits which provide access from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. This corresponded entirely to Turkey's own security priorities. Turkey withdrew from CENTO in 1980, following the Iranian revolution.

During the period 1947-73, military assistance to Turkey from the United States totalled almost $6 billion. Turkish-NATO relations began to cool somewhat after the Cyprus problem began to surface, since it raised the possibility of conflict with Greece, its nearest NATO ally. The situation was further exacerbated by American attempts to steer a middle course between contending Greek and Turkish claims. After the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the United States imposed an arms embargo in an ill-advised attempt to force Turkey to seek a non-military solution to the conflict. The embargo proved to be most damaging to the Turkish armed forces. Turkish military equipment, already in desperate need of modernization, suffered even more as the flow of new equipment and repair parts were cut off by the U.S. Congress. The embargo was not supported by either President Ford or Carter, but it
took until late 1978 before Carter could convince Congress to fully remove all restrictions.\textsuperscript{41}

Once the obstacle of the embargo was removed, a new Defense Cooperative Agreement, regulating the status of U.S. bases, was negotiated fairly rapidly. In response to the arms embargo, Turkey had required all non-NATO operations in the country to be suspended. That had a major impact on U.S. electronic information gathering in the southern part of the Soviet Union and the Middle East. The new agreement, signed in March 1980, permitted those non-NATO U.S. bases to operate under nominal Turkish command. It also included additional American military and economic aid and investment in Turkey's arms industry which averaged over $450 million in the subsequent five years.\textsuperscript{42}

Like many other countries with large standing armies, Turkey has attempted to reduce its dependence on external arms suppliers. It has begun limited production of a variety of small weapons systems and repair parts, many for export to Middle Eastern countries and NATO allies. In exchange for economic assistance and oil, Turkey has embarked on a major training program with a number of units in the Saudi Arabian armed forces. Both countries use primarily U.S.-built weapons, and the Saudis have expressed a willingness to underwrite weapons production in Turkey. Published reports indicate that Turkey provided combat aircraft and pilots to the Saudis to protect their southern flank, while the bulk of the Saudi air force is tied down in
Turkey is updating its weapons. It is acquiring 35 F-4E Phantom fighter-bombers from Egypt and has on order 160 General Dynamics F-16's under a co-production arrangement with the Turkish National Aviation Corporation. Also on order are Super Sidewinder and Sparrow air-to-air missiles.

Turkey's armor and artillery arsenal is mostly Korean War vintage, including M-47 and M-48 tanks and M-114 towed howitzers. Its anti-tank capability is not at a level considered adequate for a country that faces 4,000 modern Soviet tanks on the Soviet side of its border and 3,500 more Soviet-made tanks across another border in Syria. Delivery of improved TOW, TOW-2, attack helicopters, and other munitions will be a major step toward rectifying that problem. Ankara continues to upgrade its tanks and artillery. It has been buying West German Leopard I and M-48A5 tanks, the British Rapier air defense system, advanced U.S. rocket launchers, in addition to locally built and West German-built frigates and submarines. All of this modernization is part of a multi-billion dollar acquisition program that will take place over the next 10 years.

While the improvement in Turkey's defense capability is welcome news to NATO military planners, it is also an important development for Ankara's growing list of friends in the Middle East. Turkey's 600,000-man armed forces may be short on sophisticated weapons, but its fighting ability is widely acknowledged. Already called into action to
monitor the Iraqi-Turkish oil pipeline and to flush out Kurdish insurgents on their common border, the Turkish forces may be in for further cooperative field ventures with Arab armies.46

There has been speculation about a Turkish rapid deployment force that could be dispatched to Gulf trouble spots, particularly in the Gulf Cooperative Council countries, which have only a limited military capability. However, any suggested activities of this kind, including the use of Turkish bases by U.S. RDF, would compromise Ankara's much prized neutrality.47

III. Outlook For The Future. Turkey continues to make great strides towards improving its world situation. The Evren regime has provided the country much needed leadership and stability. Internal strife, primarily terrorist activities, has been reduced dramatically through aggressive and firm policies by the military controlled government. The general population has displayed support for those efforts and the sense of well-being they have produced.

Turkey's overall economic condition is also showing strong improvements. Under the direction of Prime Minister Ozal, Turkey has looked both to the East and West for economic solutions. Its position of neutrality has enabled Turkey to expand its international trade without becoming involved in Middle East conflicts. Although it still has far to go before becoming fully economically sound, Turkey
has managed to pay respectable amounts on its international debt the last two years. A multitude of problems have prevented the same degree of success in its domestic financial situation, however, the trend has stabilized as the Turkish government attempts to strike a delicate balance on the issues.

Turkey has made dramatic improvements in its relations with other countries around the world over the last five years, especially in the Middle East. Although Greece presents the greatest possibility of armed conflict, Turkey is apparently not overly concerned since it has made no attempt to reposition forces along the Greek border. Turkey is also continuing to reduce its military forces on Cyprus.

Turkey's armed forces are also showing strong improvements due to the extensive modernization effort now underway. Increased arms production and trade, and continued military aid and assistance from the United States and other countries have been the foundation for those efforts. In 1986, Washington will provide more than $700 million in military grants and credits to Turkey. West Germany, Turkey's primary trading partner in Europe, provided more than $800 million under arms transfer agreements in 1985 alone.

Turkey's role in NATO remains vital. As the major protector of the alliance's southern flank, its partners recognize that Turkey might be called upon to blunt a Soviet move south or west, on land or sea, until help arrives. The
Turkish soldier's reputation as a fighting man ranks among the top four or five in the world. Given intelligent leadership and adequate support, he is superb. National support is there, in the sense that the extraordinarily powerful Turkish reflex of national unity in times of crisis is as strong as ever, and national pride in the army and in Turkish military prowess is still immense. The leadership is also more than adequate. The Turkish regular officer corps has high professional competence and a justified reputation for intelligence.

Turkey is capable of performing its NATO role. Its armed forces are the largest and strongest in the area, however, military strength alone does not ensure viability. The combination of its military capabilities, political and economic condition, national will, and international relationships give Turkey its true strength, credibility, and viability in the world environment.
ENDNOTES


6. Ibid.


8. Ibid.


15. Dyer, op. cit.


17. Ibid.


19. Ibid.


22. Ibid.


24. Ibid.

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26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., p. 29.


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32. Ibid.

33. Ibid, p. 597.


35. Statement by COL Riza Kucukoglu, Turkish student, USAWC, personal interview, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, April 22, 1986.


37. Kucukoglu, op. cit.

38. Dyer, op. cit.


42. Ibid.

44. Mariaschin, op. cit., p. 18.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
49. U.S. ACDA, op. cit.
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