The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

THE MILITARY, THE MEDIA, AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHILIP W. LEON, MI

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

7 APRIL 1986

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013
After a brief respite in 1983 and 1984—with the notable exception of the bombing of the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut in October 1983—United States military facilities overseas have once again become prime targets for terrorists. Terrorist groups such as the Red Army Faction in West Germany, the Red Brigade in Italy and various Muslim groups in the Mediterranean and Middle East regions, have vented their anger and dissatisfaction on American soldiers, sailors, and airmen who are often stationed in isolated duty posts worldwide.
Whether it is "ban-the-bomb" leftists in England, independence advocates in Puerto Rico, or Communists in the Philippines, international terrorism puts American servicemen and their commanders before the camera's eye and subject to the scrutiny of an increasingly aggressive news media. Terrorist acts make good news. This study seeks to advise public affairs officers and commanders of some of the assets available to them when a terrorist incident involving the American military occurs. To gather my data, I travelled to the most active terrorist spot today, West Germany, and talked with PAOs at European Command, US Army Europe, and US Air Forces in Europe. There I shared information obtained at the various headquarters and interviewed personnel experienced in dealing with the media during a terrorist situation and, in one case, with personnel who had actually been endangered by a terrorist act. American military commanders need not be victimized by the news media if they rely upon their public affairs professional to control volatile situations.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

THE MILITARY, THE MEDIA, AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Philip W. Leon, MI
Lieutenant Colonel James N. Hawthorne, Jr., AGC
Project Adviser

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
7 April 1986

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Philip W. Leon, LTC, MI

TITLE: The Military, the Media, and International Terrorism

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 7 April 1986 PAGES: 63 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

After a brief respite in 1983 and 1984—with the notable exception of the bombing of the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut in October 1983—United States military facilities overseas have once again become prime targets for terrorists. Terrorist groups such as the Red Army Faction in West Germany, the Red Brigade in Italy, and various Muslim groups in the Mediterranean and Middle East regions, have vented their anger and dissatisfaction on American soldiers, sailors, and airmen who are often stationed in isolated duty posts worldwide. Whether it is "ban-the-bomb" leftists in England, independence advocates in Puerto Rico, or Communists in the Philippines, international terrorism puts American servicemen and their commanders before the camera’s eye and subject to the scrutiny of an increasingly aggressive news media. Terrorist acts make good news. This study seeks to advise public affairs officers and commanders of some of the assets available to them when a terrorist incident involving the American military occurs. To gather my data, I travelled to the most active terrorist spot today, West Germany, and talked with PAOs at European Command, US Army Europe, and US Air Forces in Europe. There I shared information obtained at the various headquarters and interviewed personnel experienced in dealing with the media during a terrorist situation and, in one case, with personnel who had actually been endangered by a terrorist act. American military commanders need not be victimized by the news media if they rely upon their public affairs professional to control volatile situations.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## ABSTRACT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

| Background. | 1 |
| Scope of the Problem. | 3 |
| Purpose of the Study. | 5 |

## II. THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER

| Department of Defense Guidance. | 8 |
| State Department Guidance. | 10 |

## III. EUROPEAN COMMAND (EUCOM)

| The Achille Lauro Hijacking and EUCOM | 14 |
| Staff Guidance. | 16 |
| Command Presence. | 18 |

## IV. US ARMY EUROPE (USAREUR)

| The "Watchful Eye" Campaign | 21 |
| The Dangers of Press Exclusion. | 23 |
| Civilians Become New Targets. | 26 |

## V. US AIR FORCES IN EUROPE (USAFE)

| Large and Small Media Organizations | 29 |
| State Department Takes Precedence | 30 |
| Military Lines of Authority | 33 |
| The TWA Situation at Home | 34 |

## VI. CONCLUSION

| 37 |

## SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

| 40 |

## APPENDIX 1. STARS & STRIPES "Watchful Eye" advertisement

| 60 |
| 4. List of Persons Interviewed. | 63 |
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Air Force Master Sergeant Dave McMahon was one of the first to arrive at the Public Affairs office on August 8, 1985, at Rhein-Main Air Base in Frankfurt, West Germany. Captain Lorrie J. Bourland, USAF, chief of the public affairs division at Rhein-Main, was delayed in traffic but would arrive just minutes later. At 0715 Sergeant McMahon stepped out the door and down the hall for a cup of coffee. At that instant a bomb blast ripped through his office, shattering windows, hurling shards of glass through the air.

A few moments later, when the initial shock was over—with more confusion and tragedy to follow—Sergeant McMahon surveyed the disarray from the terrorist incident which had nearly cost him his life. The bombing that destroyed Captain Bourland's and Sergeant McMahon's offices was the first battle of their day; later there would be skirmishes with another powerful challenger: the news media.

Georgie Anne Geyer, syndicated foreign correspondent, is an able journalist, one of the sort Sergeant McMahon might encounter as he deals with the media after a terrorist attack. Geyer's autobiography, *Buying the Night Flight*, has a chapter entitled "Entering the World of International Terrorism" in which she discusses the power of the media
in the early 1980s: "During these years the correspondent's role was changing. Diplomats could not get to these revolutionaries, for the revolutionaries blamed them for their problems. We had become the new diplomats—the new intermediaries in the world—the surrogates for nations." Perhaps Geyer inflates the role she and her colleagues play, but her thoughts indicate that she feels that her writings should not simply be confined to reporting the facts.

She continues: "Interestingly enough, I have found that guerrillas...terrorists...freedom fighters...whatever you choose to call them, understood us and our role perfectly—in many ways they understood it better than many Americans (Delacorte, 1983, p. 195). Geyer knows that terrorist incidents have no impact without media coverage.

The military professional is used to playing his cards close to his vest. He knows that "loose lips sink ships," and he knows the value of surprise and secrecy in military operations. In short, it is axiomatic that the military professional perceives his role as tightening the lid down on information, particularly when damage reports, casualties, or other facts may reveal a vulnerability.

Thus, the military—with its responsibility to suppress information—and the media—with its responsibility to report the news in a free press—are inextricably bound in antagonism.
SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

How significant is the problem of terrorism directed against the military forces of the United States? What geographical scope are we dealing with? What and who are the targets of terrorism?

The incident that almost killed Sergeant McMahon, a car bomb exploding just feet away from the headquarters of the 435th Tactical Airlift Wing (MAC), killed two people and injured about twenty. The attack, presumably by the Red Army Faction, the successor to the infamous Baader-Meinhof Gang, was one in a series of terrorist acts against the United States military throughout the world. There have been other incidents, some directly involving United States military personnel, others indirectly. Here are just a few recent examples:

- On 18 August 1981, two coordinated bomb attacks took place at American and British Army installations in West Berlin. Andrews Barracks, a U. S. Army troop installation was not damaged by the incendiary device.

- In Puerto Rico, the Macheteros (machete wielders) blew up nine aircraft in 1981, and authorities say they staged a 1979 attack on a U. S. Navy bus that killed two sailors.

- On 31 August 1981, a car bomb exploded in the parking lot of the Headquarters, U. S. Forces in Europe, at Ramstein Air Base, West Germany. Fifteen Americans were injured and there was extensive damage.
The Baader-Meinhof Gang attempted to assassinate former Commander, U. S. Army, Europe, Frederick J. Kroesen by firing a Soviet-style anti-tank grenade at his sedan, 15 September 1981.

Major General James L. Dozier was rescued by special Italian police on 28 January 1982, after Dozier had been held captive by terrorists for forty-two days. The "Red Brigade" was responsible for the kidnapping.

On 23 October 1983, massive vehicle bombs destroyed the headquarters of the U. S. Marine contingent and damaged a French military post in Beirut, killing 296 U. S. Marines and French soldiers and wounding another 84.

On 4 December 1983, four individuals broke into a U. S. Army camp near Mutlangen, Germany and used sledgehammers to damage a Pershing II transporter.

On 12 August 1985, an incendiary device was discovered on a U. S. military train used to transport troops and supplies to West Berlin.

On 15 August 1985, in Moenchengladbach, about fifty miles northwest of Bonn, an explosion at a U. S. Army equipment storage site damaged an unmanned transmitter tower of the Armed Forces Network Europe.

On 6 September 1985, three bombs exploded at a United States air defense base in West Germany, destroying three radar units. This act was believed to be the work of the Red Army Faction.
In Frankfurt, West Germany, on 24 November 1985, thirty-four people were wounded when a bomb detonated just outside a crowded American military shopping complex. West German police searched for an Arab whose Moroccan passport bore the name "Mohsein Aziz."

On 6 December 1985, terrorists bombed NATO fuel network facilities in Belgium and France. Letters signed by the Fighting Communist Cells and the "International Communist Group in France" claimed credit for the bombings.

On 5 April 1986, a bomb exploded in a West Berlin nightclub killing a U.S. Army sergeant and a Turkish woman. Two hundred others were injured. President Reagan claims Libyan ties; incident prompts USAF/USN raid on Tripoli, 15 April (0200 Europe time), 14 April (1900 Eastern time).

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

This current form of warfare occupies a position on the low end of the conflict spectrum that escalates toward total nuclear war, but it commands high attention on the front pages of the world's newspapers and presents graphic drama on the network television news reports.

"Terrorism" is one of those contemporary terms that seizes the public's imagination, much as do the terms "black holes in space," "AIDS," and "capital punishment." These are the exotic attention-
getters that are at the same time fascinating and horrible, seductive in their ability to remove us from the ordinary into the extraordinary. As correspondent Geyer indicates, the newsworthiness of terrorism has not been lost on the terrorists. In 1972 the Olympic Games in Munich ceased to be an athletic event when terrorists killed Israeli athletes and held captive the world's attention. It is commonplace to suggest that the media actually encourage terrorist acts by giving detailed coverage whenever such actions occur.

Add to the allure of terrorism the fact that America's military forces are exposed geographically and one begins to see that this form of violence indeed assumes the proportion of a sort of global warfare. American forces occupy land in Western Europe, the Pacific, on the border of North and South Korea; there are peace-keeping forces in the Sinai Desert; military attachés are on duty around the world; soldiers, sailors, and airmen serve in remote posts, often co-located near forces that oppose America's goals and purposes. And because they are so exposed and such visible representatives of the United States, military servicemen have become relatively easy targets for terrorists.

This study will bring together some fundamental observations about terrorism, the media, and the military in order to provide commanders with guidance that informs them about the role of the public affairs professional on their personal staffs who can help them deal with terrorism. Among these observations are these assumptions:
1) that American forces will continue to be targets of international terrorism, 2) that an increasingly aggressive news media will apply undiminished pressure on military commanders in their search for copy and air time stories, and 3) that the actions and utterances of military commanders in their response to terrorist acts will have a direct impact on the success or failure of the terrorists and on the public's perception of the terrorist's goals and purposes.
CHAPTER II

THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER

In order to obtain current information and to interview public affairs officers who have had actual experience in dealing with the media following terrorist attacks on American military forces, I went on a fact-finding trip to West Germany where most of these activities have occurred. My trip included visits to European Command (EUCOM) at Patch Barracks in Stuttgart and two of its component commands, U. S. Army Europe (USAREUR) at Campbell Barracks in Heidelberg and U. S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) at Ramstein Air Base near Kaiserslautern. I also visited Rhein-Main Air Base near Frankfurt where Captain Bourland and Sergeant McMahon discussed their dealings with terrorism.

There is theater-wide agreement that the public affairs officer’s role is expanding in new directions because of the increased terrorist activity directed against U. S. military installations. There is also general agreement that the PAOs are prepared to assist and advise the commander when such incidents occur.

The public affairs officer has several professional tools at his disposal to satisfy the needs of the media to provide information to the American public while safeguarding sensitive information which might impact on military operations. Among those tools are the PAO’s functional organization, his staff relationship with intelligence and
security officers, and his rapidly growing base of experience in these matters. An express goal of this study is to acquaint commanders with internal and external workings of the PAO staffs at various command levels by explaining—with a minimum of technical jargon—how this staff officer can operate effectively to the benefit of the command during a terrorist crisis.

Until quite recently, there has been little guidance available to either the commander or the PAO in how to deal with terrorism. Specifically, there has been no guidance with how to control the national and international news media. Some material was generated within the separate commands, and this is still being done.

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE**

A brief survey of some of the available material shows that scant attention has been paid to the importance of controlling the media in these situations. For instance, as recently as April 1983, when the Department of Defense published DoD 2000.12-H, "Protection of DoD Personnel Against Terrorist Acts," the discussion given to public affairs was negligible. The handbook, which itself is eighty-four pages in length, devotes one paragraph, quoted below in its entirety to public affairs:

> Public affairs officers (PAOs) can make an important contribution in the overall effort to protect DoD personnel against terrorist acts and shall be included in local protection planning and measures. The public affairs and information program can be used to assist in informing DoD personnel and their dependents of the
terrorist threat and their role in the effort to protect themselves against it. PAOs shall stay current on the subject of terrorism to enhance their effectiveness in dealing with the problem. (p. 3-3)

Clearly, this single paragraph offers little of substance for the PAO who finds himself assigned to a high threat military post. But within recent months there has been increased interest in the role of the PAO during a terrorist incident. A brief review of just a few documents indicates that new guidance and doctrine are being developed.

On 7 January 1985, Colonel John E. Taylor, Chief of the Policy & Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, in the Office of the Secretary of the Army, sent a memorandum to the Chief of the Proponency Task Force addressing the issue of a new Field Manual (FM) which was being developed at Ft. Leavenworth out of the Terrorism Counteraction Office. The public affairs section at Department of the Army is assisting. This memorandum, "Terrorism Public Affairs Doctrine," represents a major step toward advancing specific guidance to PAOs and their commanders.

Lt. Col. Bob Flocke, with public affairs at Department of the Army, provided me with a draft of Annex E of FM 46-1, the proposed field manual on terrorism. This draft incorporates much of the information contained in Colonel Taylor's memorandum of January 1985. However, until FM 46-1 is available, interim measures are being taken, including messages sent to units from the highest levels. For example, in July 1985, an unclassified message, "Political Terrorism:
Guidance for Public Appearances and Responses to Media Queries," went out from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to commanders-in-chief (CINCs) worldwide. Sample responses to questions that senior commanders might expect to get from the media are provided along with some statistics about the growing terrorist threat. Such messages are important because they can be timely, address specific issues (such as the Trans World Airlines hostage situation in Lebanon) and re-emphasize the significance of the role of the public affairs officer.

Specific examples of local PA guidance will be discussed in subsequent chapters dealing with major commands in Europe.

**STATE DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE**

One of the first things a commander in a vulnerable overseas assignment must realize is that the State Department has overall authority when a terrorist incident occurs. (The Federal Bureau of Investigation has this overall responsibility at a stateside post.) Now, this realization does not absolve the on-the-ground commander from dealing with the situation forthrightly and decisively, but it is essential to know that the guidance for PAOs overseas begins at the State Department.

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley is Director, Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning at the State Department. I visited his office on 18 September 1985 and obtained several publications that
indicate increased awareness at the State Department that the military occupies a special place in the world of terrorism.

The State Department has responsibility for all Americans abroad, including the military. Oakley's office publishes an annual pamphlet, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, which assesses the worldwide picture. In September 1984, the 1983 edition was published, and it appraises the situation in West Germany:

In West Germany, terrorist activity—including attacks against US military personnel and facilities—declined in 1983. INF deployment took place as scheduled and, despite some predictions of a "hot autumn," there was little violence and no apparent terrorist involvement in the anti-INF campaign. We noted a new emphasis on targeting German armaments industries and computer firms, and less emphasis on US military installations than in recent years. The Revolutionary Cells committed most of the terrorist attacks, but they were less active than in previous years. The Red Army Faction (RAF), crippled by German counterterrorist operations in late 1982, gave no evidence of resurgence in 1983, and the RAF supporters were less active than in previous years. (pp. 13-14)

Oakley's 1984 report was soon out of date concerning American military personnel and equipment, particularly in West Germany. Apparently the respite of 1983-84 was a time of recruiting for the Red Army Faction as the events of 1985 cited above would seem to indicate.

While Americans abroad may be targets in general, as in the December 1985 Rome and Vienna airport bombings which were indiscriminate killings of persons near the El Al counters, American military personnel may be specific targets. When a terrorist can launch a successful attack against an armed force, his own strength
appears confirmed. Thus, while it is reassuring that increased emphasis on terrorism originates at the State Department, it remains for the Department of Defense to formulate its own special guidance for dealing with these situations. In subsequent chapters we shall see how various major commands construct their public affairs guidance.
CHAPTER III
EUROPEAN COMMAND (EUCOM)

We have looked briefly at the global problem of terrorism and some of the guidance available at the highest levels. But it is in this and subsequent chapters that I will address the specific measures currently being taken by major military commands, and it is to those American military units in the high threat area of West Germany that we now turn.

I observed an example of the proper utilization of the public affairs staff elements at EUCOM. The PAO contributes a lengthy portion of the SECRET contingency plan (EUCOM Directive 25-1, dated 6 May 1985) dealing with terrorism. Master Sergeant Ralph Monson, assisting Lt. Col. Robert Brus, USAF, in the media relations division, arranged for me to see the PAO portion of the plan. This section is not an annex but an integral part of the basic document.

The PAO portion of the plan is a verbatim transcript of a State Department message sent out to commanders-in-chief (CINCs) worldwide. Lt. Cdr. El Ahlwardt, USN, Chief of the Plans and Policies Division of EUCOM PAO, had primary staff responsibility for incorporating PAO guidance into the plan.

Commander Ahlwardt said the directive drafters in the security section of EUCOM made some slight editorial changes to the information supplied by PAO. Ahlwardt emphasized to the drafters that the PAO
portion must go into the directive unaltered because of the keen interest in terrorism by the State Department. Ahlwardt's calm insistence won out, and the office of the Special Assistant for Security Affairs, having overall responsibility with the EUCOM J-2 for ED 25-1, relented and allowed the PAO guidance to remain unchanged.

**THE ACHILLE LAURO HIJACKING AND EUCOM**

There have been other occasions when the PAO has contributed staff guidance, sometimes in unexpected ways, given the primary role of public affairs to "spread the word" rather than to conceal it. One such case involved the celebrated hijacking aboard the cruise ship *Achille Lauro* in the Mediterranean Sea (which is part of EUCOM's area of responsibility). In 1974 Egyptian actor Omar Sharif and Englishman Richard Harris starred in the movie "Juggernaut" in which criminals threaten to bomb a cruise ship unless $10.5 million in ransom is paid. Life imitated art on October 7, 1985, when Palestinian commandos hijacked the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* in Egyptian waters and demanded the release of fifty prisoners being held in Israel. The hijackers said they would blow up the ship if their demands were not met or if a rescue were attempted.

This terrorist situation was fraught with the same implications as so many in the recent past—the hand-wringing by American officials, the frustration at being unable to comprehend, much less deal with the terrorists, the seeming inability to do little more than
voice protests in the court of world public opinion. When the terrorists murdered American citizen Leon Klinghoffer, an invalid Jew confined to a wheelchair, the outrage and indignation in the United States were palpable.

American military forces entered the drama when four Navy jets forced a landing in Italy of the Boeing 737 carrying the four Palestinian hijackers to what they thought was a triumphant conclusion to the incident. The euphoria in America at this small victory over terrorism bolstered hopes that indeed something might be done, after all, to deter these violent acts.

Colonel Dennis Mehigan, deputy director of public affairs at EUCOM, relates a brief episode that illustrates the value of consulting with the public affairs officer.

It seems that a movement started among the ranking staff officers at EUCOM (which commands NAVEUR, hence a relationship to the Navy fighters involved with the hijackers) to capitalize on the positive press coverage resulting from the capture of the terrorists. There was talk of issuing photographs of the four pilots, of magazine and newspaper articles on their backgrounds and training. All of this coverage would be carefully couched in terms of patriotism, of our inevitable domination over upstart fanatics who challenge us.
Colonel Mehigan's public affairs staff was asked to spearhead this campaign. But the PAO section saw clearly with the professional's understanding of the power of the media, that there were inherent dangers in such a plan.

"In a terrorist situation of this sort, we are dealing with zealots who thrive and prosper in a world of revenge, retaliation, and martyrdom," says Colonel Mehigan. "It's a complex world. By lionizing our four pilots and by publicizing them, we would have been painting large targets on them and on their families. There is no question that we would be marking them for some nasty vengeance in the future."

And if these four particular pilots could not be reached for retaliation, any other pilots randomly selected as targets for violence would serve equally well for the terrorists to proclaim their reaction to the American intervention. So, ironically, the PAO, whose job it is to tell the story, advised the commander to suppress the publicity campaign. The temporary gratification of identifying heroes to a country starved for them would be obliterated by the potentially dangerous repercussions.

**STAFF GUIDANCE**

Master Sergeant Ralph Monson, USAF, at EUCOM has prepared a set of questions that newsmen would likely pose to a commander when terrorist incidents occur. He has addressed such issues as the
killing of Army SP4 Edward Pimental to obtain his military identification card allowing access to military facilities; the car bombing at Rhein-Main Air Base; the killing of Navy enlisted man Robert Stethem on board the hijacked TWA flight 847. He provides sample answers, not a prepared, unwavering script, but merely suggestions for accurate answers. Here is an example from Sergeant Monson’s briefing sheet:

QUESTION: The Navy man who was killed during the TWA hijacking was apparently singled out because he was carrying only a U. S. military identification card. Have there been any steps taken to prevent this from reoccurring?

ANSWER: Travel procedures have been modified for certain “high risk” regions. Some of the U. S. military services have instituted restrictions in these areas which include policies affecting the use of military identification cards and official passports.

This is one of thirteen such questions and answers. The answer is not evasive, stays within factual policy guidelines, and is positive and forwardlooking in tone. Sergeant Monson has developed a valuable instrument for assisting commanders in “how to think” about responding to newsmen’s questions.

Sergeant Monson at EUCOM and other public affairs officers throughout EUCOM became actively involved with the TWA hostage release when the former hostages arrived at Rhein-Main Air Base near Frankfurt on 1 July 1985. Not only were the hostages taken to American military facilities for medical checkups, but a Military Airlift Command C-141
brought them to Rhein-Main from Damascus. The hostages were transported to medical facilities at Wiesbaden on military buses. And throughout that portion of the TWA hijacking drama, the public affairs officers at EUCOM, working with USAFE and USAEUR PAOs, largely orchestrated the press coverage. Occasionally the State Department made overriding decisions, but, for the most part, the military was in charge.

Two facts clearly emerge from the TWA experience. First, the military PAOs performed superbly under intense pressure from politicians as well as the media. Second, when the military becomes actively involved in what begins as a "civilian" terrorist incident--an Achille Lauro affair or a TWA hijacking--then the military becomes identified as a spoiler in the eyes of terrorists. The military must rightfully assume its place in protecting American interests as the needs arise. But commanders must also understand that the involvement of the military opens up new opportunities for terrorists to engage in retribution and revenge.

COMMAND PRESENCE

Too often commanders are defensive when the media ask penetrating questions, particularly when a tragedy has already occurred. They regard every question as a personal attack upon their leadership in the command. Such an attitude toward the press is not new. In his bestseller *Son of the Morning Star* (1984), Evan S. Connell reproduces
a message from President Grant to General Custer before the Battle of Little Bighorn advising Custer "to be prudent not to take along any newspaper men who always work mischief" (p. 106).
CHAPTER IV

U. S. ARMY EUROPE (USAREUR)

Commanders of installations should know that their public affairs officer can materially assist in antiterrorist activities. Antiterrorism is defined by Training Circular 19-16 (April 1983) as measures designed to "decrease the probability of a terrorist act occurring. These measures include basic crime prevention techniques designed to harden the target and procedures implemented to detect a planned action before it takes place. Planning and training are important components of this program. Antiterrorism is the proactive, preventative stage of countering terrorism."

At USAREUR headquarters in Heidelberg, Colonel Richard Hahn, Chief of Public Affairs, and his staff have initiated some effective antiterrorist devices. Lt. Col Robert McDowell, deputy PAO, says their PA shop has three major divisions: public relations (dealing with the media); command information (internal); and community relations (external). Colonel McDowell insists that a "siege mentality" in Europe would be devastating. "Families would return home leaving the soldiers here. That would result in deterioration of morale and job effectiveness." To avoid the siege mentality, the public affairs section at USAREUR has subtly enlisted the participation of the entire military community as well as the German nationals who work on the various Army bases.
THE "WATCHFUL EYE" CAMPAIGN

Major Conrad H. Busch, chief of command information, was project officer for the "Watchful Eye" campaign, a security awareness program similar to many "Neighborhood Watch" programs in the United States. The purpose of the campaign was not crime reduction—although that is a pleasant by-product—but antiterrorism. Busch says the program is a "low-key, face-to-face and multi-media campaign to raise the level of alertness for terrorism and other criminal acts." Busch says all U. S. personnel should "be alert, observe, report and work as a team to thwart and disrupt terrorism and other criminal activities through surveillance and planning."

The USAREUR PAO increases awareness by getting the community to notice things out of place—cars parked where they should not be, suspicious activity, strangers who do not belong there (as in schoolyards and in the family quarters areas)—and to practice normal security consciousness such as locking homes and cars. Presented in the form of a community security campaign, "Watchful Eye" clearly contributes to the antiterrorist awareness and assists security forces by actively involving as many people as possible. Colonel Hahn's team works together to produce items for the post newspapers, American Forces Network radio and television spot announcements, fact sheets, articles for magazines circulated throughout Europe to U. S. forces, and other outlets for command information.
If an actual terrorist act, such as the bombing of the American post exchange in Frankfurt on November 24, 1985, does occur then the PA section continues "Watchful Eye" with a positive media thrust. In the case of the Frankfurt bombing, thirty-four people were injured; all were Americans except for one Filipino and one West German. A BMW car with West German license plates entered the unguarded American complex and exploded near a crowded laundromat. Forty-two cars were damaged, windows were blown out, and an office was demolished. Altogether an estimated $775,000 in damages occurred. This serious incident, similar to the bombing at Rhein-Main Air Base in August 1985, represented an escalation of the threat against dependents as well as U. S. servicemen.

The USAREUR PA section realizes that when such attacks occur, the response from dependents will be to stay home, thereby achieving the terrorists' goal of disrupting normal operations and instilling fear. "Watchful Eye" goes into action with announcements emphasizing the good relations between the U. S. and West Germany. Local officials are interviewed (the local German authorities have responsibility for security around all U. S. installations) for reassuring comments. For instance, following the Frankfurt bombing the New York Times reported that "Mayor Walter Wallman of Frankfurt visited the site of the blast and expressed his condolences for the victims. The Frankfurt area has one of the densest concentrations of American military personnel in West Germany" (November 25, 1985,
p. A3). The PA section makes sure that information of that sort gets to the media representatives who cover these incidents. The fact that high-ranking German officials are on the scene and realize the impact of the incident presents a stabilizing view, even though the act has already occurred. Such statements also help form local German public opinion in support of the U.S. military.

THE PRESS CANNOT BE EXCLUDED

Lt. Col. Robert McDowell, Deputy USAREUR PAO, feels that public affairs has still not won acceptance at the highest levels of command. Perhaps this is the residual effect of the Vietnam experience (where there was no press censorship) or perhaps this mistrust is simply a reflection of the public perception of the aggressive media.

However, Colonel McDowell believes that the initial reactions of some commanders to exclude the press totally whenever a terrorist act occurs is ill-advised. The attitude of some commanders seems to be that what the press cannot see it cannot report. McDowell thinks this stance simply invites reporters to approach soldiers off the base, away from the control of the PAO. An examination of how EUCOM managed the news in a single incident is revealing.

Hawk Missile Incident

William Drozdiak of the Washington Post Foreign Service, wrote the article covering a bombing at the Hawk site: "Radar Units Bombed At U.S. Base in Germany" (7 September 1985, p. A-12). Notice that the
headline cites "radar units" but makes no mention of Hawk missiles. The radar units, of course, assist in the targeting, but the muscle of the Hawks is the raison d'être of the military facility. The Post article mentions that the bomb blasts "occurred shortly after 6 a.m. (midnight EDT) when few soldiers were on duty, inflicted no injuries but probably more than $1 million in damage, according to a spokesman at U.S. Army headquarters in Heidelberg." This spokesman, from Colonel McDowell's office, provided facts and figures, the food upon which newsmen subsist, but said little that would reveal the level of security of the base. It could be argued that a terrorist could use the information that few soldiers are on duty at that early morning hour, but it is likely that such information was already known. The fact that the damage was to equipment, not people, underscores this. If the terrorists had wanted to hurt or kill soldiers, they could probably have done so.

Buried in the sixth paragraph is the fact that the base, "near Nohfelden in the state of Saarland, is manned by about 100 American military personnel of the 32nd Army Air Defense Command. The soldiers are responsible for operating Hawk nonnuclear ground-to-air antiaircraft missiles." This succinct paragraph gives the manning of the base and provides the only mention of Hawk missiles in the article of sixteen paragraphs. The next paragraph quotes Sgt. Bob Lentner, "a spokesman for the U.S. Army in Heidelberg (who) said of today's attack, "There were three blasts that destroyed three mobile radar
sets mounted on trailers." This is the only direct quotation in the entire article, and it says little of any tactical value. It does not say how many radar sets were undamaged, thereby indicating American antiaircraft capability. The remaining nine paragraphs of the article make no further reference to this specific event but supply information gleaned from the files about past terrorist incidents and the reactivation of the relatively dormant Red Army Faction.

In short, the EUCOM PA shop in Heidelberg was able to contain this story—while still providing factual data—to keep it from becoming sensational in the extreme. Suppose the article had emphasized the "missile" aspect rather than the "radar" aspect. Suppose the reporter had interviewed soldiers off the base who described their fears, the noise of the explosions, the inevitable confusion resulting from such an incident. The article has none of that tone. Says McDowell, "A journalist has the right to talk to anyone he can buttonhole for a comment. Soldiers need to know that the public affairs office is the authorized spokesman. By opening up the channels and providing sufficient information, we can satisfy the media and our command. To deny this access and try to pretend that the incident did not happen, when it obviously did, sets up an adversarial relationship between the media and the military which is unnecessary and unwise."
CIVILIANS ARE THE NEW TARGETS

Major Robert E. Dittmer is the Chief of the News Branch at USAREUR in the Public Affairs office. He, along with Mr. Rex L. Gribble, Chief of Public Information, deal most directly with the major news outlets and with the local German press. Major Dittmer predicts that we will see more terrorist activities involving the U.S. military and cites the Post Exchange bombing in Frankfurt as a case in point. He says, "This was the first bombing that was in a completely civilian area. There was no military hardware involved." Dittmer draws a contrast between the Hawk missile site bombing—which his office covered—and the PX bombing in Frankfurt. He believes we may be seeing a new wave of terrorism.

Mr. Gribble keeps in touch with the community public affairs officers stationed at the small U.S. installations scattered throughout West Germany, often in isolated communities where the relationships between military bases and local communities is close. Says Gribble, "These community PAOs are often German nationals and are not trained to handle the media, particularly the American media who may arrive on the scene. For many years their role was basically that of translator of public relations material. They were not effectively used by local commanders. Now, more than ever," says Gribble, "commanders must let the PAO handle the situation when a terrorist incident occurs. If the local PAO cannot protect our interests sufficiently, we are ready at USAREUR to back them up."
It appears that the role of the community PAO will likely transform from its current "boosterism" to spokesman for the commander with the increasing possibility for terrorist acts.

The USAREUR PAO has transcended the reactive stage and progressed to the active stage of combatting terrorism. Not content to wait for a terrorist incident to occur and then have to account themselves and the command to the media, EUSARER conducts active campaigns to inhibit the possibility of a terrorist act. The command emphasis on prevention, highlighted by a continued relationship with the media, appears to be a suitable model for commanders in high threat areas.
CHAPTER V

UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

(USAFE)

At Headquarters, United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), Colonel Tom LaPolt is Director of Public Affairs. He has two key assistants who are experienced in dealing with terrorism and its aftermath. Lieutenant Colonel Bill Johnson, Chief of Media Relations, was in charge of the joint public affairs bureau coordinating three major medical facilities that treated the wounded following the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983. He also was the primary media spokesman for USAFE when the Reverend Jesse Jackson brought Lieutenant Robert Goodman, USN, back from Syria after his jet fighter was shot down.

In addition to Lt. Col. Johnson, the public affairs office at USAFE has Major Johnny Whitaker, Deputy Chief in the media relations division. Both Johnson and Whitaker have a wealth of experiences involving the military—either directly or indirectly—and terrorism.

Lt. Col. Johnson says each case is different and there are no prescriptions for commanders. "The commander must lean on his PAO, and as we gain more experience in this area, we feel that we can be increasingly dependable. The Marine bombing in Beirut, for instance, was a purely military situation. It wasn't like the TWA hostage
crisis involving civilians. Our biggest problem was trying to accommodate the electronic media because everyone wanted a line feed, not just the large national and international media, but even the local, hometown media representatives. And, even though we wanted to cooperate as much as possible, there are times when we just don't have the resources to fill everyone's needs."

**LARGE AND SMALL MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS**

Lt. Col. Johnson introduces to this study a new dimension: the differences between working with the large media organizations and the small, local media. He says, "We have built some strong personal and professional relationships in the European and Middle East regions. For instance, when the Reverend Benjamin Weir was released from his captivity in Beirut, the Associated Press called us here at USAFE to inform us. And this was done without any sort of trading of favors or storing up markers for future situations. It's just the sort of working atmosphere we have here, and it's important."

On the other hand, both Lt. Col. Johnson and Major Whitaker have had bad experiences with the media in the aftermath of terrorist activity. Lt. Col. Johnson tells of the television reporter who had travelled to Germany specifically to interview and film a hometown Marine who was injured in the Beirut barracks bombing: "The young soldier was badly burned and couldn't talk because of a tracheotomy that was performed to save his life. His doctors at the hospital at
Landstuhl didn't want him to talk, but somehow the television reporter got through to him on the telephone." Johnson says he had to deal with that one reporter over and over, telling him "no" again and again. "He was really obnoxious. Not only was he disruptive to my section, but to the hospital and the other reporters as well."

Major Whitaker agrees that the local media are often more aggressive than the international representatives. "They send reporters over here seeking out specific individuals from the hometown viewing or reading area. If a television station can put the local boy on the air, that boosts ratings. Sure the station is performing a service by showing the soldier or airman who has survived, and that's reassuring to the folks back home, but their primary motivation is just to get the story. The Department of State or the Department of Defense will have already informed the immediate family, and those are the ones who count, not a viewing audience that helps buy a sponsor's products."

STATE DEPARTMENT TAKES PRECEDENCE

Major Whitaker tells of a Boston television reporter who wanted to film Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) who had travelled to Frankfurt to welcome the TWA hostages back from captivity in Beirut. Earlier in this study we learned that the hostages had been taken to Wiesbaden for medical checkups before being united with families.
"The Boston reporter wanted to set his cameras and other equipment up in a particular spot to have a vantage point showing Senator Kennedy, the hospital, and the hostages. Normally, such a request would not be too difficult to handle, but we had already specified the areas in which reporters must remain, where cameras could be installed, when press conferences would be scheduled, and so forth. Now, this one station wanted to countermand all of that planning, preparation, security, privacy— you name it—just to get its own exclusive. Imagine the chaos if every local station back home were to make demands of that sort."

In fact, says Whitaker, "We had some testy comments following the Beirut bombing to the effect that EUCOM was unable to handle patients. This simply is not true, but the confusion caused by an unruly media could give the impression that no one is in charge, either medically or in terms of public relations, or just the command in general. By the way, in the case of the Boston station, we were overruled by the State Department representative on the scene, and the station got its interview with Senator Kennedy at the camera angle it wanted."

I found another source which confirms Major Whitaker's version of the incident with the Boston television station. EUCOM headquarters, USAFE's superior command, sent an after-action report, "Public Affairs Aspects of the Return of the TWA Hostages" to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), on 19 August 1985. Significantly, though, the after-action report provides only a crisp,
inoffensive account of the incident: "Senator Kennedy arrived for private meetings with former hostages. A media session with the senator was arranged at his request later on the hospital grounds."

Those two succinct sentences do not convey the problems generated by one senator and one local television station. Apparently Senator Kennedy's stature was such that the State Department felt justified in overturning the established press policies that were disseminated by a hardworking USAFE team. Captain Jay Coupe, Jr., USN, who was director of public affairs for EUCOM at the time, says, "Had it been a completely military operation, it would have gone even smoother. The reality, however, is that we will have future such joint State-Defense operations, and we must be prepared to work within that sometimes confusing framework."

MILITARY LINES OF AUTHORITY

Both Colonel Johnson and Major Whitaker recall with groans the unexpected role of mediator that was thrust upon them at the time of the return of the TWA hostages. They found themselves actually representing the interests of the media (which, of course, a PAO understands are ultimately the interests of the command) against the will of a military commander. Major Whitaker explains this ironic situation: "The hospital commander here in Germany really clamped down on interviews with any of the patients inside the hospital building or surrounding compound. This happened because of a stampede
by the print media when they discovered that some of the broadcast media had privately contracted for interviews (so-called "checkbook journalism") with patients and their families. In a sense the broadcast journalists broke our stated policy of when and where press conferences and interviews would be held.

"This officer's responsibility as a doctor and as hospital commander was to his patients, but he went overboard and issued orders summarily prohibiting interviews. Meanwhile my people and I are out there with a hungry, snarling bunch of media types demanding to get some interviews with anybody--patients, military commanders, State Department--you name it."

Major Whitaker adds, "We found ourselves bargaining for time and exposure. We had to explain to the hospital commander that he could conduct his medical operations without interference if he would just work with us. We could schedule interviews with patients whose conditions were non-life threatening. Many of them were ambulatory and willing to talk. Don't forget that we represent the commander, and the image that appears on screen or in print is the image that the public will have of this command."

I found Colonel Johnson's and Major Whitaker's remarks to be congruent with Colonel McDowell's of USAREUR when he discussed the need to keep a controlled flow of information. The hospital commander, who understood his medical responsibility to his patients, did not always understand or appreciate the importance of keeping the
media informed. It is not necessary to have roving bands of reporters stalking the wards of hospitals to get the story out. In fact, as my interviewees have demonstrated, it is far more damaging to a command, in the long run, to shut the press out unilaterally. The secret to success is to let the PAO control the news.

It is equally important to note that even when a non-military event, such as the TWA hostage release, takes place on a military base, as with the USAFE hospital, the military public affairs officer is subject to extreme pressure from the media, particularly if the media feels it is being denied access. Often the media see the PAO and his staff as obstacles, disregarding the fact that the State Department, not the Department of Defense, has overall authority.

THE TWA SITUATION BACK HOME

An interesting footnote to the problems that the on-the-spot PAOs were having with aggressive reporters in Germany during the TWA hostage situation is the way the media behaved back in the United States where even less was known of the health and safety of the hostages. I met Mr. David Venz, Director of Public Communications for TWA, at a conference sponsored by Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies on 9 October 1985.

Mr. Venz said that he was besieged by requests for interviews by news people so desperate for any tidbit that at times he was threatened. One reporter chased him down the streets of New York City
demanding that Venz and the recently released flight attendants accompany her immediately to her network studio for an interview. When that failed she pleaded that she would lose her job unless he accompanied her. When that failed, she said her network boss would call his boss and he would lose his job.

Venz also reiterated that two American servicemen were singled out and beaten during the first hours of the takeover. (Recently commands have published numerous guidelines advising servicemen on what to do if they are singled out in this way.)

The lesson from this footnote is that reporters, particularly broadcast news reporters, can be imaginatively obnoxious in their quest for any quotation, any camera shot, any scrap of information that they can "scoop" the other networks with on the evening news.

Fred Barnes, senior political editor of The New Republic, joined Venz in commenting on media coverage of the TWA hijacking. Barnes feels that we need to deny coverage to any terrorist-produced events. He recalled news conferences that were staged by the terrorists that were later embarrassing to the hostages and their families, and damaging to our national prestige. If coverage must take place because it is genuine news, the coverage must be reasonable. Barnes cites the time CBS news broke into regular programming to report that the TWA co-pilot had been bitten by a spider; this episode later amounted to nothing. Further, Barnes recommends that newsmen should never become negotiators, as when Ted Koppel on ABC's "Nightline"
asked Muslim leader Berri if he would like to send any message to
President Reagan. Barnes feels that normal diplomatic channels are
more proper than unedited airings of demands by terrorist spokesmen in
resolving problems such as this.

Interestingly, our discussion takes us back to the comment at the
beginning of this study by columnist Georgie Anne Geyer that newsmen
are the new diplomats. Perhaps because Geyer's columns are
"commentary" in nature rather than straight news reporting, they have
more in common with the "entertainment" aspect of broadcast journalism
than with other print reporting. Regardless, her comments stand in
opposition to the views of Fred Barnes and other professionals who
want to report the news rather than make the news.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In a real sense the PAO is a crisis manager. He earns his pay best when under pressure because tragedy and crisis are newsworthy. While the PAO might be trying to carry out his duty in a workmanlike fashion, the reporter who can get the big story might boost his career dramatically. Commanders must allow their PAO to take the heat—as Mr. Venz did representing TWA in New York City—when reporters become aggressive. While the TWA hostage release was not a military operation, it appears that PAOs at EUCOM, USAREUR, and USAFE profitted from an intense situation that resulted in many lessons learned.

I talked with Lt. Col. Thomas J. McHugh of special planning in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) in October 1985. He had just that month compiled and distributed the latest statistics on terrorist incidents, subdivided by many categories. In the first six months of 1985 there were nineteen international terrorist incidents directed against the United States military. In Western Europe there were fourteen incidents; in Latin America three; and in the Asia/Pacific area, two. Clearly the PAOs I talked with in Germany occupy important staff assignments and are in positions where their actions can have long-ranging repercussions.
Colonel McHugh's grim statistics continue as to type of incident against the U. S. military in the first six months of 1985:

Bombing - 8
Arson - 5
Other - 3
Armed attack - 2
Hijacking - 1

Of the fourteen U. S. fatalities due to international terrorism in the first six months of 1985, five were U. S. military personnel. While the number of casualties is relatively low in terms of the total number of men and women in uniform, it is the impact of those few deaths that we should address. I return to one of my original premises, that violent acts against U. S. military personnel will continue because terrorists have learned the value of free publicity supplied by the American press.

Nowhere in this paper have I mentioned the word "censorship," and I do not introduce that topic for consideration here. News management is not censorship. Public Affairs Officers can manage--in the sense of reasonable restraint--the news only if they manage the newsmen. Free-wheeling competition for column inches and broadcast minutes sacrifices truth for sensationalism. The more sensational the coverage of a violent act, the more violent the next act is likely to be.
As commanders take anti-terrorist actions to preclude attacks, and when they take counter-terrorist actions when such attacks do occur, they should remember that the public affairs officer can be as powerful in his sphere as the security police, the rifle marksman, the bomb disposal team, the intelligence and security forces. In terms of the long-range perception of the military by the public, the PAO's role probably eclipses all the others.
A SELECTED ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Within the last year, beginning in the summer of 1985, the United States found itself the focus of global terrorism. TWA Flight 847 was hijacked and an American killed; the cruise ship Achille Lauro was hijacked and, again, an American killed; there were bombings at the Frankfurt, Germany, Army post exchange and at Rhein-Main Air Base. In addition there were simultaneous bombings at the airports in Rome and Vienna and Americans were killed. In each case the media coverage was extensive. The following items were selected for this bibliography because, in the case of the books, they were used directly in the study, or because the items deal with the relations between the military and the media, or because they center on the use of American military force to oppose terrorist acts, or because they concern actual terrorist incidents on military bases around the world.

I. BOOKS


The quotation on page 19 of this study appears on page 106 of Connell's book. Custer had "newspaper men" with him often on his expeditions, chiefly because he liked publicity. Custer himself had published several articles about military life in the West.


The quotations on page 2 of this study appear on page 195 of Geyer's book. Geyer has specialized in covering the Middle East and has known and interviewed many leaders in those nations. Her highly readable book demonstrates the difficulties in obtaining accurate news stories in that turbulent part of the world.
II. ARTICLES IN MAGAZINES AND NEWSPAPERS


Mohammed Abbas, the alleged mastermind of the \textit{Achille Lauro} hijacking said in an interview that "revolutionary forces" will meet in secret soon to map a "war" strategy against the United States.


"U.S. officials would like to set up a forward base for Delta or other special units in Western Europe close to the Mediterranean and the Middle East, probably at Italy's Sigonella NATO base" to combat terrorism. Reports the Army and Air Force plan to spend $3 billion on aircraft and other equipment for special operations.


"Iran is training terrorists to hijack airliners and kidnap hostages, with special vengeance toward Americans. This underground warfare, directed by the Iranian foreign ministry, has accounted for the deaths of at least 262 Americans since 1983."


Noel Koch, deputy assistant defense secretary, successfully carried a dismantled Glock 17 plastic pistol, now being manufactured in Austria, through detectors at Washington's National Airport. Reportedly, Libyan dictator Moammar Khadafy is trying to buy 100 to 300 of these handguns favored by international terrorists.


"Americans and U.S. installations in Western Europe, particularly West Germany, are once again the target of terrorist attacks. . . . Terrorists also struck U.S. targets in Belgium and Portugal, which had gone 11 years without such attacks. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research warns that western Europe can expect more terrorist incidents."

"Since 1975, the Bekaa Valley has been the headquarters and nerve center for the greatest concentration of terrorists in the world today. . . . It was from the Hosseinieh headquarters that terrorists planned the devastating bombings of the U. S. Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, as well as airplane hijackings, murders and kidnappings of Americans."


Article blames Iran for masterminding the hijacking of Kuwait Air Lines Flight 221 on 4 December 1984 in which two Americans died. Anderson says Iran ended the terrorist act when it discovered that anti-terrorist Delta Force from Ft. Bragg might intervene with force.


"Intelligence reports reaching Washington repeatedly warn that the Islamic Jihad is still determined to strike at American targets. Their resolve has been buttressed by a growing confidence that they have nothing to fear in the way of retaliation by the United States."


U.S. extradition laws make it difficult to extradite terrorists who seek "political" refuge. Arnold cites recent attacks on U.S. military facilities by the Red Army Faction and the murder of a U.S. serviceman to obtain his identification card. Under current laws, those attacks could be legitimate political expressions, not punishable by extradition. Calls for treaty reform.


News item describes how twelve members of the Washington news media were flown in secrecy to witness a mock invasion of a nation where Americans had been taken hostage. This was a test of whether the Pentagon and the press can cooperate in coverage of U.S. military actions. A similar test in mid-April 1985
went awry when word of the pool leaked out before its members departed for Honduras to watch U.S. troops on maneuvers.

"Blast in Belgium kills 1 as NATO units also hit." The Patriot (Harrisburg, PA), 7 December 1985, p. A7.

Describes a bomb explosion at a Belgian court which killed one and injured two; also describes bombings at NATO fuel network facilities in Belgium and France.


Says the Red Army Faction claims responsibility for the Frankfurt shopping center bombing. The Red Army Faction has attacked West German, U.S. and NATO institutions for 15 years.


A brief item describing two simultaneous bombings at Andrews Barracks, a U.S. Army troop installation and at Churchill House, a British hotel for transients. There were no casualties. While this incident took place before the period covered in this study, the news account shows the ability of terrorists to penetrate NATO bases and to conduct simultaneous events.


"Gradually, the people of the United States are coming to understand that terrorism is the characteristic form of warfare of this age, and that the choice of strategies to counter it is not different from what it was when Hitler was the threat: alliance or appeasement."


Lists some precautions that military members should take to be less conspicuous while traveling overseas in light of recent attacks such as the Vienna and Rome airport attacks and the Rhein-Main Air Base bombing.

Admiral James L. Holloway III, a former chief of Naval Operations and executive director of the President's task force on terrorism (Vice President Bush is chairman), urged the setting up of a National Security Council staff position to coordinate a program against terrorism.


Discussing President Reagan's inability to deal in a heavy-handed way with terrorists, Cannon says, "the public acting out of U.S. frustrations with Libya could increase the pressure for military action and may even turn out to be good politics for the president."


The writer argues in favor of using military retaliation--as well as nonmilitary actions--in response to terrorist acts. See Viorst, below, for counterpoint article.


Cohen deplores President Reagan's use of Hollywood lines and other chest-thumping rhetoric as a counteraction to Qaddafi's terrorist acts. He urges quiet action that will not glamorize the Libyan leader.


Major General Curry was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. "The press must be allowed to be free and we have to accept the fact that some of the fallout from that freedom will be messy and hard to deal with. But that's one of the things we get paid for. As commanders, as public affairs people, as military people, we're supposed to be able to handle messy situations."

Major General Curry wrote this article while serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. He defends the free press as vital to our nation and offers advice on how to deal with media pressure.


People in France, Britain and West Germany say they believe American military action against international terrorism would only make the problem worse.


"Three bombs exploded today at a U.S. air defense base in southern West Germany, destroying three radar units in the latest in a wave of terrorist attacks on American military installations."


Lt. Col. Eberhard maintains that the press will win in an adversarial relationship with the military. The press has an electronic superiority and the ability to snoop out the facts when a cover-up is attempted.


This bulletin is published by the Institute for the Study of Conflict Limited in London. "Blanket censorship and control of the media, such as is practised in the Soviet Union is, of course, unacceptable in a democracy. In any case, without accurate and credible reporting the public will lose confidence in both the press and the government."


The writer is director of the Center for Policy Research at The George Washington University. He writes that when two leading American reporters were asked if they would publish classified documents if they were leaked to them, "both reporters
were sure they would on the grounds that maintaining security was the government's job; theirs was to inform the public."

Francis, Samuel T. "Restraint won't work; overthrow Khadafy." USA Today, 8 January 1986, p. 8A.

"There is only one way to deal with Khadafy, and everybody knows what it is. He and his government should be overthrown, and the USA, through covert funding, training, and support for the Libyan dissidents that Khadafy has not already murdered, should initiate the coup. See "Reagan was wise," below, for counterpoint.

Gemma, Peter B., Jr. "Enemies of the USA manipulate the media." USA Today, 23 September 1985, p. 10A.

"The kooks and criminals in the Mideast play the media-manipulation game well . . . . The USA is under attack by a worldwide terrorist conspiracy. It's about time the media faced that fact and shouldered their part of the responsibility to fight back."


Urges negotiation rather than military response to terrorism. "When every terrorist act is answered by an Israeli attack on PLO installations, so-called moderate Arabs lose whatever moderating influence they have. Israel is thus spared the stresses of entering into the unknown of a 'peace process' whose outcome it can't be sure of."


Lt. Gen. Robert L. Wetzel says he is a target for terrorists. "They have my picture. They know the exact way to get into my office. We found documents when we captured some of them."


An excellent overview of military units being trained to combat terrorism and the controversy surrounding an effort to create a single counter-terrorism unit.
Students armed with gasoline bombs took over the office of the director of the United States Cultural Center in Kwangju and held it for nine hours. The students protested the government of President Chun Doo Hwa.

During the hostage crisis of TWA Flight 847, television journalists got carried away with the excitement of the story and suspended their normal news judgment in pursuit of interviews.

A lengthy article that discusses security measures recently undertaken at such bases as the Marine Air Station at Cherry Point, NC; Fort Dix, NJ; and the Norfolk Naval Base.

A lengthy article reporting the results of a special commission of military officers and former journalists. One participant, Robert B. Sims, a retired naval officer who is the Pentagon's chief spokesman, is critical of "younger reporters with no military experience, saying many do not understand how the military works."

Hart calls for military responses to terrorist acts. "In order to end these outrages, the president is going to have to make up his mind to hold the Shiite population itself hostage to our bombers, and, if necessary, kill a great many Shiites."

Editors of Sea Power interview Maj. Gen Winant Sidle, USA (ret.), chairman of the "Military and Media" Commission following the Grenada invasion. Sidle believes the Grenada experience will ultimately benefit both the military and the media as their working relationship grows.

Provides the views of Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Alexander Haig, Dean Rusk, Hodding Carter III, and Jody Powell on the effects of the presence of television during the hostage crisis of TWA Flight 847.


This is an interesting article showing how the Soviets handle the media when terrorism touches them, as it seldom does: "An official at the Beirut office of Tass, the official Soviet press agency, also confirmed the kidnappings, but could not provide any details. Telephone calls by reporters to both the embassy and the Soviet Cultural Center here went unanswered."


Discusses the exclusion of the press from Grenada and deplores the cult of personality, particularly with regard to broadcast journalism, that displaces objective reporting on the military.


President Reagan says he takes seriously the threats issued by Col. Moammar Khadafy to "hit American bases in Europe and the people around them."


"Will the U.S. employ force to preempt or retaliate for terrorist attacks? It has declared that it will, but political, operational, and institutional constraints limit her force options. That poses a dilemma: State-sponsored terrorist attacks are likely to continue; lack of action to back up U.S. words will increase perceptions of U.S. impotence."


"The Reagan Administration's five-year effort to build up special commando units for unconventional warfare and counter-
terrorist operations has been hampered by the indifference and sometimes active opposition of regular Army and Air Force officers, according to a senior Pentagon official and members of Congress.


A lengthy article that recalls many recent terrorist attacks and considers possible solutions to the problem. Includes a debate over the use of American military forces in resolving crises when they occur.


Discusses the ineffectiveness of a policy which relies on the use of the military. "More than 300 Americans have been killed by terrorists in the 1980s. In no case has the U.S. been able to use the elite troops of Delta Force, the secret unit trained to deal with terrorism."


Columnist Kirkpatrick discusses the reluctance of our allies to join in economic sanctions against Libya following the terrorist attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985. "Most of our allies see their alliance with us as strictly limited to mutual defense against military attack, where we Americans see it as providing for mutual defense against all manner of ills."


"We cannot simply declare war on terrorists because often we do not know who they are or where they are, and when we find them, they have hidden out among civilians. We cannot treat terrorists as they treat us, because we care more than they about human life and law."


The writer is a Pulitzer-Prize-winning reporter. "We have far too much official secrecy in this country and, as a practical matter, it does not serve our military well."

The writer is senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University: "Terrorism is theater. At times, we will need successful counterterrorism theater, if only for cathartic reasons. But we ought to recognize that we may not always pull off a military solution and that there is little evidence that success deters future attacks."

Leahy, Patrick J. "Good Rule: Talk softly and carry a big stick." USA Today, 8 January 1986, p. 8A.

Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-VT) is vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. He recommends a strong counterterrorism program grounded in good intelligence, carefully constructed military options, a clear strategy for combating terrorists, and an end to partisan divisions.


Graphics and chart from the Chicago Tribune point out where and when the major terrorist attacks of 1985 occurred.


Describes the damage and injuries at the Frankfurt post exchange when a car bomb exploded. Quotes hospital personnel who discuss injuries.


"We are condemned to being involved in the Middle East. So are all the peoples who live there, and to 'wipe them out' is as impracticable as it is unthinkable. That being so, we had best leave the Middle East to experts, not to our emotions of the moment." See Phillips, below, for opposing view.


A British reporter worries that concerns over security during military operations might be excessive and approaching censorship.

"Intelligence analysts in this country and in NATO Europe believe the West can expect a steady escalation of terrorism. Although they believe American garrisons and airfields abroad will continue to be the prime targets, many expect at least one terrorist operation in the United States."


A lengthy article about life in the foreign service under the threat of terrorism. "Before the mid-1960s, according to the State Department, not a single American diplomat was murdered abroad for political reasons. Since then more than 70, including six ambassadors, have been killed and many others wounded. American citizens and property have become targets of nearly one-third of all international terrorist incidents."

Neuman, Johanna. "Terror panel stresses spies, intelligence." USA Today, 6 March 1986, p. 4A.

Gives highlights of the 36-page report presented at the White House by Vice President George Bush, chairman of the president's anti-terrorism commission. Shows pie-chart of where 812 international terrorist acts occurred.


Rand Corporation analyst Brian M. Jenkins says the trend toward state sponsored terrorism will continue and could lead to a new kind of "global guerilla warfare." With regard to the value of media coverage, he says, "Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead."


Lengthy article detailing the composition of the interagency task force set up in July 1985 to develop a strategy for dealing with terrorism. Vice President Bush "is scheduled to meet with 11 representatives of the news media" to get the media's view on how the government handles terrorism.

In response to questions about Israel's 1 October 1985 raid on Tunisian headquarters of Yasser Arafat, President Reagan, "in one of his strongest endorsements of the use of military force against terrorism, said yesterday that Israel and other nations had the right to strike back 'if they can pick out the people responsible.'"


Ottoway writes that American officials view terrorism as an "apolitical" phenomenon that must be confronted in legal or military terms. Europeans, however, view terrorism as political, to be coped with in political terms. Ironically, Ottoway points out, the French took military action against Shiite headquarters in eastern Lebanon when the French and U.S. military barracks in Beirut were bombed in October 1983.

Phillips, James A. "Don't talk to thugs; it rewards terrorism." *USA Today*, 23 September 1985, p. 10A.

"If we should pressure Kuwait to release its prisoners, we would be setting a dangerous precedent. . . . U.S. citizens traveling abroad would become potential political targets, the preferred hostages for countless violent causes."

"Reagan was wise to counsel restraint." *USA Today*, 8 January 1986, p. 8A.

Unsigned editorial thinks strong economic sanctions against Libya are better than any overt, military response. See Francis, above, for counterpoint.


News media coverage of the military is often bad, not because of a liberal bias, as conservatives often claim, but because "reporters on average are phenomenally ignorant of the military. To begin with, few have served, and as the draft recedes the number falls. Further, the military is a formidable field of study, and few reporters, to put it charitably, are intellectuals."

The casualties at the Frankfurt PX bombing of 24 November 1985 "illustrate the problems in dealing with terrorists. . . . They can attack anything, anywhere, anytime and you can't protect everything, everywhere, all the time."


Russell cites the various special anti-terrorist units of the United States and other countries, such as West Germany's G.S.G. 9 unit, and says "the rescue of hostages is the most likely to lead to loss of life."


Says "1985 was the terrorist's bumper year. In West Germany, bombs that exploded in and around U.S. military installations killed three and injured 50." Also discusses the use of U.S. military action when four U.S. Navy F-14 Tomcat fighters intercepted the Achille Lauro hijackers.


Article cites a dozen cases in which military commando units have combatted terrorism, including: the aborted Iranian hostage rescue by Delta Force and the successful rescue of Brig. Gen. James L. Dozier who was kidnapped by Red Brigades in December 1981.


"Israel is in a technical state of war with most of its Arab neighbors, and its smallness and sense of vulnerability work against the moral and political restraints on military action. The United States, however, has yet to find a consensus—even within the Reagan Administration—on how to respond to terrorism, vacillating from the use of extensive force against the Druse in Lebanon to an explicit ban on the assassination of terrorist leaders."
Shipler, David K. "U. S. tightens terrorism security but remains vulnerable." The News and Observer (Raleigh, NC), 28 November 1985, p. 33A.

First of two parts by the New York Times news service. A lengthy article which discusses America's ineffective dealings with terrorists. "Slowly, almost ponderously, the policy-makers, intelligence agencies and security systems of the United States have begun to adjust to terrorism as an expanding method of warfare."

Shipler, David K. "U. S. putting more money, effort into fighting global terrorism." The News and Observer (Raleigh, NC), 29 November 1985, p. 5B.

The second of two lengthy articles from the New York Times news service dealing with international terrorism. This article describes the Army's Delta Force, Navy's Seal Team Six, and the Air Force's Special Operations Wing--all military counter-terror units.


Citing the murder of SP4 Edward F. Pimenthal whose identification car played a part in the successful car bomb attack at Rhein-Main, Shoemaker predicts that "terrorist attacks on American forces in Europe may be entering a more violent phase."


Calls for a single military-civilian counter-terror unit, not an assemblage of multi-service individuals hastily put together. Recommends its own logistics system, training plans, and a degree of autonomy heretofore unseen in the military.


The hijacking of TWA Flight 847 ranks as the number one national or international news story of 1985. American military medical facilities in West Germany treated the hostages upon their release.

Describes the 8 August bombing of Rhein-Main Air Base as "the worst attack on an American installation in West Germany since the bombing of Ramstein Air Base in 1981."


A UPI article states that "the prospect of being suddenly and anonymously blown to bits by terrorists is robbing thousands of servicemen of the thrill of traveling overseas."


This unsigned editorial discusses the media during a terrorist incident: "When incidents arise, media, government, victims, and their relatives become unwitting participants in the drama, as terrorism expert Robert Kupperman notes. Restraint is required of all parties. Terrorists seek to increase their importance to pressure governments to meet their demands. The media should cover news developments, but without the excesses that marked reportage on the TWA hostage-taking. For terrorists, media exposure constitutes leverage."


A report of a conference at which a distinguished panel of scholars and reporters discuss the role of the media during a terrorist situation. "Terrorism becomes the entertainment lure through which to gain access to the world audience. And to reach the world, the mass media are indispensable. . . . Without the presence of the media, the acts would be meaningless; they would not even take place."

"Terrorist targets, GIs told to hide military status abroad." The Evening News (Harrisburg, PA), 17 October 1985, p. A11.

Cites actions being taken at various bases and posts throughout the world to inform service members of the dangers of appearing "too American" as they travel abroad. Quotes spokesmen from all the services.

Describes the 24 November 1985 bombing at the U.S. Army post exchange in Frankfurt which injured 36 people and caused extensive damage. The article quotes authorities who credit the Red Army Faction for the attack.


An "inside" look at how the major television networks covered the hostage crisis of the hijacking of TWA Flight 847. Gives anecdotes of how reporters used contacts to obtain interviews with hostages in Beirut.


Reports that credit for the Rhein-Main Air Base bombing on 8 August 1985 was the work of the Red Army Faction and a lesser-known French group called Direct Action. A letter to West German newspapers from the groups said Rhein-Main "is a nest of spies. It will be used as the entry gate to Europe in a war against the socialist states in the East."


"Authorities barricaded approaches to the U.S. Embassy and sent more police to patrol near other possible American targets of Palestinian terrorists thought to be preparing a strike against Americans, Israelis, and Jews."


Ambassador Robert Oakley testifies before the House Judiciary subcommittee that the FBI, the State Department and other federal agencies helped foil more than 120 planned terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens here and abroad. Oakley says international terrorism is likely to worsen.

Small news item states that more than 100,000 left-wing demonstrators marched to the U.S. Embassy, calling for Greece to oust American military bases and leave NATO. Some demonstrators tossed Molotov cocktails at private businesses along the way. The marchers, mostly socialist and communist youths, shouted "Americans--murderers of the people," and "capitalism means unemployment, inflation and austerity."


The writer argues against military reprisals for terrorism. "Retaliation has killed far more innocents than terrorists have." See Chafets, above, for counterpoint article.

Volk, Joe. "Overreaction just helps terrorists." USA Today, 8 January 1986, p. 8A.

The writer, of the American Friends Service Committee, says, "Seeking revenge for vicious terrorist actions by launching a military strike against Libya may ventilate U.S. frustrations, but it will also make the Middle East crisis far worse than it already is."


"Unless a link is incontestably uncovered... reprisals against a state for a terrorist even could serve to escalate a relatively minor act into a far more serious confrontation. Escalation of such an event to state conflict, ironically, serves the purposes of most terrorists exceedingly well."


The Chief of Naval Operations discusses the "just war" theory and its applications to responding to terrorism.


"The U.S. military needs the media to tell its story. Without the media, there will be no public support. Furthermore, there is..."
courage in reporting improper policy or conduct, and this kind of reporting sometimes protects the well-being of the individual fighting man."


"The nature of the relationship between a free press and government in our society is constant competition, an additional check and balance within the democratic process. It is a healthy and historically sound situation."


Quotes Secretary of Defense Weinberger as saying a military response to terrorism must include taking into account the international implications of such action. Weinberger indicates that only a specific strike against a specific target would be acceptable.


"Many military officers and enlisted men are uncomfortable in media encounters. They may be cool in combat but self-conscious in front of a microphone. The morale of men and the efficiency of battlefield operations is, in the views of many combat-tested veterans, impeded by the intrusion of reporters seeking interviews and broadcast worthy footage."


Reports that West German police had started a nationwide search for two men who purchased the silver BMW that exploded at the Frankfurt PX. One man showed what appeared to be a Moroccan passport.


"The December 27 (1985) raids that killed 19 persons, including five Americans, and wounded more than 110 underscored a pair of hard, unchanging facts about the Mideast. One is the ease with which terrorists and their sponsors can disrupt a quest for peace. The other is the difficulty of tailoring a response to terrorism in a way that serves as an efficient deterrent."

Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger rejects a congressional proposal to put antiterrorist units, including the Army's Delta Force and Navy's Seals and other "special forces," under a single Pentagon command.


A behind-the-scenes look at planning for military retaliation against Libya as the result of the Rome and Vienna airport bombings. Discusses the problems and risks involved and the difficulties of planning such an operation.


Reports on efforts of a House subcommittee to unify Army Green Berets, Delta Force, Navy Seals and other special forces under a single civilian command.


Discusses plans to pre-position elements of Delta Force closer to the Middle East than its present Ft. Bragg, NC, home base. The Delta Force has been called out several times but has never seen action in an ongoing terrorist incident.
PROTECT YOURSELF AGAINST CRIME & TERRORISM

U.S. European Command officials recommend the following security precautions:

- Be alert to "unusual" people and vehicles and report those that seem suspicious.
- Don't carry a large amount of cash or keep it at home.
- Lock vehicles when leaving them unattended.
- If parking in commercial facility, leave only ignition key with attendant.
- Whenever possible, travel in civilian clothing to avoid advertising being member of U.S. military.
- Never pick up hitchhikers.
- Avoid revealing travel and vacation plans in public.
- Have neighbors watch house when away.
- Join or form a neighborhood watch program.
- Make sure household doors and windows are secure and check locks periodically.
- Keep a low profile in public.
- Avoid getting involved in civil disturbances.
- Don't go out alone.
- Whenever possible, use elevators instead of stairwells.

- Post emergency numbers near telephones at home.
- Ensure family members know what to do in an emergency.
- Make sure children's play areas are supervised.
- Be wary of unattended packages around buildings or automobiles.
- Be cautious if mail packages have: an unusual odor, odd colored wrapping, unusual heaviness or lopsidedness, misspelled words on label, no return address or unknown place of origin.
- When staying at hotels, avoid ground-floor rooms.
- Stop routine household deliveries and mail when away for more than one or two days.
- Don't hide spare keys outside of house.
- Walk only on well-lighted sidewalks.
- Don't take shortcuts through alleys.
- Report people who seem "overly" curious about assignments, duties, installation entry procedures, etc.
## International Terrorist Incidents Against U.S. Military, 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Incident</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) 1 Oct 85
## INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS AGAINST U.S. MILITARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Western Europe</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
<th>Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOMBING</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMED ATTACK</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIJACKING</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARSON</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(International Security Affairs) 1 Oct 85
APPENDIX 4

LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED FOR THIS STUDY

EUCOM

COL Dennis Mehigan, USA, Deputy Director of Public Affairs
LCDR El Ahlwardt, USN, Chief, Plans and Policies Division, PAO
MSGT, Ralph Monson, USAF, Chief, NCO, Public Information Division

USAREUR

COL Richard O. Hahn, USA, Chief, Public Affairs
LTC Robert M. McDowell, USA, Deputy Chief, Public Affairs
Mr Rex L. Gribble, Chief, Public Information Division
MAJ Robert E. Dittmer, USA, Chief, News Branch
MAJ Conrad H. Busch, USA, Chief, Command Information Division

USAFE

LTC William H. Johnson, USAF, Chief, Media Relations Division
MAJ Johnny Whitaker, USAF, Ass't Chief, Media Relations Division

RHEIN-MAIN AIR BASE

CPT Lorrie J. Bourland, USAF, Chief, Public Affairs Division
MSGT Dave McMahon, USAF, Chief, NCO, Public Affairs Division

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

LTC Thomas J. McHugh, USA, Chief, Special Planning
END D.T.I. C

9-86