SHOULD THE US ARMY'S AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE BE ACCEPTABLE TO NATO? (U) NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI ADVANCED RESEARCH PROGRAM J A VAN ALSTYNE MAY 86
SHOULD THE U.S. ARMY'S AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE BE ACCEPTABLE TO NATO?

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AirLand Battle doctrine's acceptability in NATO is assessed in relation to three elements: NATO doctrine, other national doctrines and Allied Command Europe's Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA). Review of the Army's FM 100-5 and NATO's ATP 35(A) indicates consistency between AirLand Battle doctrine and NATO doctrine. A review of national doctrines indicates most recognize that successful defense requires some depth and emphasize an offensively-oriented reserve force. A review of both AirLand Battle doctrine's and FOFA's approach to airpower indicates competition for resources. This does not render the two approaches incompatible, however. It is concluded that AirLand Battle doctrine should be acceptable to NATO.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SHOULD THE U.S. ARMY'S AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE BE ACCEPTABLE TO NATO?

AirLand Battle doctrine's acceptability in NATO is assessed. In doing so, the doctrine is examined in regard to three elements: NATO doctrine, the Alliance's other national tactical doctrines and Allied Command Europe's Follow-On Forces Attack. AirLand Battle doctrine, as presented in the Army's FM 100-5, was compared with NATO doctrine, as presented in ATP 35(A). The comparison indicates general consistency between the doctrines. A review of the national tactical doctrines espoused within the Alliance indicates NATO permits significant variance. Further, most of these doctrines recognize that successful defense requires some depth and emphasize the importance of offensively-oriented reserve forces. These factors are two of the AirLand Battle doctrine's basic elements. Finally, a review of AirLand Battle doctrine's approach to the employment of air is compared with FOFA's approach. Clearly, the two approaches will compete for assets, but this does not render them incompatible. Rather, commanders employing AirLand Battle doctrine in NATO will have to direct available air sorties against the most significant targets in priority. It is concluded, then, that AirLand Battle doctrine should be acceptable to both NATO commanders and to our NATO allies.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II BACKGROUND</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Emergence of Interest in Deep Attack Concepts</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AirLand Battle Doctrine, 1982</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism of AirLand Battle Doctrine, 1982</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO's Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE IN NATO</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AirLand Battle Doctrine, 1986 and Allied Tactical Publication 35 (A)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Role of National Doctrines</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AirLand Battle Doctrine and Follow-On Forces Attack</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SHOULD THE U.S. ARMY'S AIRLAND BATTEL DOCTRINE BE ACCEPTABLE TO NATO?

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The 1982 edition of the Army's FM 100-5, Operations, introduced and described a new approach to fighting - the AirLand Battle doctrine. The new doctrine proved extremely controversial, especially in Europe.

The doctrine has been discussed, refined and repackaged over the past four years. A new edition of FM 100-5, Operations is scheduled for release this summer. The question now, from the Army's perspective, is as follows: Will the AirLand Battle doctrine be acceptable to the NATO leadership and to our NATO allies or will a new round of criticism ensue?

Chapter II provides the background for an appropriate consideration of this question. First, it describes the environment that led both the Army and Allied Command Europe (ACE) to begin developing deep attack concepts. The chapter next presents the basics of the AirLand Battle doctrine and the criticisms it invoked. The chapter concludes with a brief description of ACE's approach to deep attack - Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA).

Chapter III considers AirLand Battle doctrine's acceptability in relation to three elements:

- NATO doctrine
- Other national tactical doctrines
- Follow-On Forces Attack

Chapter IV summarizes conclusions regarding AirLand Battle doctrine's acceptability as a national tactical doctrine to be applied by U.S. Army forces operating in NATO.
CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

The Emergence of Interest in Deep Attack Concepts

Both Allied Command Europe (ACE) and the U.S. Army began to develop deep attack concepts in the early 1980s. Interest in deep attack resulted from several factors. First, the Warsaw Pact's conventional force buildup had been highly visible since the late 60s. Generally, both ACE and the Army visualized a Pact strategy that first sought a quick penetration of NATO's forward defenses. Then, a rapid advance into Alliance territory would disrupt European mobilization and U.S. reinforcement. To accomplish this, first echelon forces would fix NATO's forward elements. Subsequent echelons would complete their destruction and then penetrate into NATO's rear areas to achieve the intended disruption.

Further, both ACE and the Army generally believed that NATO's forward forces and the Pact's initial forces were relatively matched. NATO, then, could provide a credible forward defense if reinforcing echelons were precluded from the battle area until a time that was advantageous to NATO.

Secondly, both ACE and Army interest in deep attack was spurred on by technological advancements in sensors, terminal guidance systems and conventional munitions. Such advancements would facilitate effective acquisition and engagement of moving targets at great ranges.
Finally, the Army's interest in deep attack concepts was based on dissatisfaction with a defensive doctrine many regarded as excessively reactive to the initiative of Warsaw Pact forces. This doctrine, termed Active Defense, was promulgated in the 1976 edition of FM 100-5, Operations, the Army's key doctrinal manual. The doctrine called for the defender to defend well forward and quickly identify the attacker's main thrust. Then, firepower was to be concentrated to defeat each echelon before subsequent echelons closed in the main battle area.

Critics of the Active Defense within the Army made three major points. A general understanding of the criticism is key to understanding the AirLand Battle doctrine that emerged from it. First, the doctrine was criticized for ceding the initiative to the attacker by discouraging maneuver of forces against enemy vulnerabilities. Second, the doctrine was criticized for its dependence on the defender's ability to mass firepower at the point of the attacker's breakthrough. Such massing would require that the defender move laterally to a point where combat force ratios would clearly favor the attacker. Finally, the Active Defense was criticized for seemingly endorsing an attrition-oriented defense. Friendly forward forces would be exhausted as they faced both initial and reinforcing echelons. One author, in summarizing this criticism stated: "In short, Army commanders doubted the success of a doctrine which confronted wave after wave of echeloned Warsaw Pact forces with a linear position defense."
These three factors came together to set the stage for ACE and the Army to simultaneously, but independently, develop deep attack concepts.

AirLand Battle Doctrine, 1982

The Army's deep attack concept was presented as a key element of a significantly revised doctrine. The new approach, termed AirLand Battle doctrine to denote its three dimensional perspective, was promulgated in the 1982 edition of FM 100-5, Operations.

There have been many efforts to define, explain and describe AirLand Battle doctrine. For our present purpose, only a brief description of the doctrine's basic elements will be provided.

The 1982 manual emphasized that AirLand Battle doctrine was not national policy or strategy. Rather, the doctrine was intended to provide "... guidance for the operational and tactical employment of U.S. Army units worldwide." ²

The manual emphasized that "alliance and bilateral international agreements; U.S. joint military policies and doctrine; and specific theater military policies, strategies and doctrine provide the framework for application of AirLand Battle doctrine. . . ."³

After addressing the relationship of doctrine to national policy and strategy, the 1982 manual emphasized and described four key elements of the AirLand Battle doctrine:

- the role of initiative and offensive action.
- the role of deep battle.
the importance of maneuver.
the importance of nuclear weapons.

Again, for our present purpose, each will be discussed briefly.

Initiative was defined as "the ability to set the terms of battle by action" and described as "... the greatest advantage in war." Commanders, whether attacking or defending, were exhorted to "... secure the initiative as early as possible and exercise it aggressively." Further, commanders were to "... throw the enemy off balance with a powerful blow from an unexpected direction" and subsequently "... follow up quickly to prevent his [the enemy's] recovery."

The second key element of AirLand Battle doctrine to be discussed is deep battle. In defense, deep battle operations are designed to "... delay the arrival of follow-on forces or cause them to be committed where and when it is most advantageous to the defense." More specifically, the 1982 manual described two battles to be fought simultaneously and in close coordination. There is a forward battle against committed forces and a deep battle against uncommitted forces. The role of the deep battle is to delay and disrupt follow-on forces commitment to the forward battle. Further, deep battle is to "... create windows of opportunity for offensive actions that allow us to defeat him [the attacker] in detail." The manual emphasized that deep attacks on uncommitted forces have but one purpose: "... to support
the ground commander's overall scheme.*9 The manual further emphasized that to obtain an operational or tactical advantage, the deep attack effort had to be "... directed towards a specific goal."10

The AirLand Battle doctrine emphasizes maneuver as "... the dynamic element of combat."11 The objective of maneuver is described as "... focusing maximum strength against the enemy's weakest point so as to gain strategic advantage."12

The doctrine also proposes use of maneuver forces in deep attack. One of the doctrine's principal developers published an article on this subject shortly before the manual was published. The author stated that "... maneuver forces fighting in depth offer considerable advantages over deep attack by fire alone."13 He enumerated these advantages as follows:14

- the maneuver unit's direct fire weapons and the conventional, nuclear and chemical munitions it carried would create a stronger, wider and more lasting effect on the enemy than would long-range fire support systems.

- maneuver forces can adjust their actions and supporting fires based on the enemy's movements and countermeasures.

- a maneuver force's requirements for precision in timing and intelligence are less demanding since they are present in an area for an extended period and are capable of spotting and engaging targets simultaneously.

Finally, the doctrine addressed the role of nuclear weapons. Specifically, the manual stated that "on the modern
battlefield, nuclear fires may become the predominant expression of combat power. . . ."15 Nuclear weapons were described as being "particularly effective in engaging follow-on formations...because of their inherent power and because of reduced concerns about troop safety and collateral damage."16

Criticism of Air-Land Battle Doctrine, 1982

Although the 1982 edition of FM 100-5 stated that it was ". . . consistent with NATO doctrine and strategy . . ."17, its release heralded a wave of criticism. A general understanding of this criticism is key to understanding recent refinements in the doctrine.

One category of critics, primarily Europeans, viewed AirLand Battle doctrine and saw vast strategic implications. They "... added up such terms as 'decisive maneuver,' 'deep attack,' and 'strategic advantage' and concluded that AirLand Battle doctrine represented nothing less than an indirect assault on both NATO's deterrent strategy and its self-consciously limited war aims should deterrence fail."18 They further perceived that the doctrine advocated strategically offensive ground operations. They held that the inferred deep cross-border operations were a clear threat to NATO's image as a purely defensive alliance. Finally, this group was concerned about the Soviet view of a doctrine emphasizing deep attack and follow through. They concluded that the Soviets would see an offensive threat and that this would have an escalatory effect.
A second category of critics, both U.S. and European, saw the doctrine as a departure from NATO's forward defense strategy. They were particularly concerned with references to "non-linear" battles and perceived AirLand Battle doctrine as inferring a preference for more mobile operations. Such operations, they held, would expose German territory to Soviet penetrations.\textsuperscript{19}

A third category of critics, again primarily Europeans, were concerned with the manual's comments on the role of nuclear weapons. Colonel van der Vlis, a Dutch officer and an alumnus of the U.S. Army War College, expressed the concern of this category of critics clearly:

There is no clear distinction in the manual between a conventional battlefield where battle takes place under the threat of nuclear weapons and the nuclear battlefield. Instead, FM 100-5 emphasizes the integration of the employment of nuclear weapons with conventional and other means. . . . the manual looks at nuclear weapons, once released, as another form of firepower, emphasizing the tactical use of nuclear weapons aimed at destruction of the enemy forces.\textsuperscript{20}

All of the above points of criticism contributed to General Rogers' view of the doctrine. In October 1983, he stated publicly that AirLand Battle doctrine was not the concept that would be used if conflict broke out in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{21}

**Follow-On Forces Attack**

As the U.S. Army was developing AirLand Battle doctrine, Allied Command Europe (ACE), under General Rogers'
leadership, was simultaneously, but independently, developing its approach to deep attack. The ACE approach was based on several key premises. First, was an assessment that NATO's forward forces can be expected to defend successfully against the Pact's leading formations. This assessment further holds, however, that the forward forces' defensive capability will diminish if the Pact succeeds in sustaining the attack by bringing successive echelons forward and thus changing the force ratio to NATO's disadvantage.22

Second, the ACE approach to developing a deep approach concept stemmed from a commitment to NATO's forward defense strategy. "The soil of our NATO nations," wrote General Rogers, "is neither expendable nor negotiable."23 The depth required for a successful defense would be achieved, rather, "... by extending conventional fires well beyond the forward edge of the battle area [and thus] interdicting enemy follow-on forces throughout the enemy's rear to prevent them from reaching and reinforcing the forward battlefield."24 "At a minimum," General Rogers pointed out, "our fires must delay those forces and disrupt their combat potential while we are successfully holding the lead Pact divisions."25 By destroying or disrupting the follow-on forces, force ratios in the main battle area would permit a cohesive defense. (The term "follow-on forces" refers to the Pact's subsequent echelons and operational maneuver groups that are not committed to the initial attack.)
The operational sub-concept that emerged from this approach was termed Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) and was adopted by the NATO Defense Planning Committee on 9 November 1984 as a long term policy guideline.\textsuperscript{26} (This does not commit member nations to the FOFA concept, but rather provides a guideline for research, development and force planning.)

The sub-concept includes three basic elements. First, modern sensors are to identify the flow of Pact reinforcements. Second, information is received, integrated, electronically evaluated and disseminated as intelligence to commanders to facilitate timely decisions. Third, long range aircraft and missiles attack designated targets in the enemy's rear.\textsuperscript{27} (General Rogers points out that interdiction of the enemy's rear area with long range weapons (manned aircraft) has always been a part of NATO's General Defense Plan and doctrine. FOFA, from his perspective, merely seeks ways and means to do it better with other systems as well as aircraft.)\textsuperscript{28}

The ACE sub-concept includes a definitive approach to targeting. First, the lines of communication between home garrisons and the main battle area are considered to be limited in capacity. Accordingly, "... attacks against critical LOCs at appropriate times would cause major disruption of deployment plans."\textsuperscript{29} The targeting approach further maintains that most follow-on forces will depend on the East German railway system. This favors attacks on
"... electrical power supplies, central command and control facilities, communications systems, computer stations, on-and off-loading sites, railway beds and river crossing sites." Finally, movement by road is considered equally vulnerable to disruption through attacks on known checkpoints.

General Rogers, in discussing the sub-concept, emphasizes that ground attacks across the border are not permitted under NATO policy. "FOFA," he reminds, "relies on attack in an enemy's rear area with conventional weapons systems only."

Finally, it is important to note that General Rogers views the defense at the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and the follow-on forces attack as "... complementary and mutually supporting aspects of the ACE concept of operations." Specifically he states that:

Defense at the FEBA protects our means to conduct attack of the follow-on forces, and striking deep will keep the force ratios at the FEBA manageable.
CHAPTER III

AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE IN NATO

Introduction

This chapter examines AirLand Battle doctrine's acceptability in relation to three elements:

- NATO doctrine as expressed in Allied Tactical Publication 35(A), Land Force Tactical Doctrine.
- Other national doctrines espoused by Alliance members.
- ACE's major operational sub-concept--Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA).

AirLand Battle Doctrine in 1986 And Allied Tactical Publication 35(A)

A new edition of FM 100-5, Operations is scheduled for publication in early summer, 1986. A review of the pre-publication edition clearly indicates that the doctrine writers have considered and addressed NATO's concerns regarding AirLand Battle doctrine. In an introductory article, General Richardson, the TRADOC commander, emphasized that the 1986 edition of 100-5 "is compatible with ATP 35(A) and other NATO publications but, by necessity, is more theoretical to satisfy U.S. needs in other theaters."1

The manual follows this lead by emphasizing that the doctrine presented ". . . applies to Army forces worldwide, but must be adapted to the specific strategic and operational requirements of each theater."2

The doctrine's applicability to NATO is addressed more definitively. First, the doctrine is said to be
"... compatible with ... NATO land force tactical doctrine." Second, the manual states that "U.S. troops operating in the framework of FM 100-5 will execute NATO's forward defense plans in compliance with Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) 35(A)." (ATP 35(A) is NATO's key doctrinal manual for tactical ground operations. Its stated purpose is to provide "... a common doctrine and vocabulary for land operations ..." and to "... outline the doctrine for combined arms operations at brigade level and above. ...".)

Both the new FM 100-5 and associated articles by its principal authors seem intent on offsetting the criticism directed at the 1982 edition of the manual (Chapter II). "The text," writes Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, a principal author, "makes clear the notion that policy and higher strategy provide the context for the application of AirLand Battle." The manual echoes his point:

Strategic guidance will constrain operation methods by ruling out some otherwise attractive alternatives. Withholding of nuclear weapons, prohibiting the unopposed surrender of territory or cities, exempting the territory of certain nations from operations and limiting the use of aerial bombing are examples of the curbs that strategy may impose on operations.

General Richardson highlights the point once again in his introductory article. He points out that the new manual "... discusses the prohibition of crossing international borders as a major consideration in planning operations and
makes clear the primacy of policy and strategy over operations and tactics in all cases."

The new manual also acknowledges the supremacy of the NATO strategy of forward defense. Colonel Wass de Czege writes: "AirLand Battle doctrine can be applied at the tactical level of corps, division, and below to comply with forward defense oriented war plans." The manual picks up on this theme:

... when strategic direction requires the retention of territory near a political border ... the campaign may have to be fought well forward in the theater.

The key elements of AirLand Battle doctrine introduced in 1982 (and briefly described in Chapter II) remain basically unchanged in the new manual. Both initiative and offensive action continue to be emphasized:

The object of all operations is to impose our will upon the enemy—to achieve our purposes. To do this we must throw the enemy off balance with a powerful blow from an unexpected direction, followed up rapidly to prevent his recovery and continue operations aggressively to achieve the higher commander's goals.

These words differ little from those on maneuver and offensive action in the 1982 edition. The emphasis now seems more palatable than it did in 1982 because the new edition of ATP 35(A) (March 1984) also emphasizes initiative:

In all combat operations, even those in which initially the enemy has freedom of action, commanders at all levels must seek every opportunity to retain or seize the initiative and strike the enemy.
The new manual also continues to emphasize maneuver as the dynamic element of combat. Again, the revised ATP 35(A) supports such emphasis:

*Maneuver is the decisive element at all levels in the defense.*

The 1986 edition of FM 100-5 includes an expanded discussion of deep operations. The key points included in the 1982 edition are re-emphasized and expanded upon:

- Deep operations are to be used "... to create windows of opportunity for decisive action against leading enemy echelons."[15]

- "Because of the relative scarcity of resources... deep operations must be focused against those enemy capabilities which most directly threaten the success of projected friendly operations."[16]

- "To obtain the desired tactical results, these efforts [deep operations] must be synchronized with the overall operation."[17]

- "... the primary strike assets for deep attack are aerial, artillery and missile weapons."[18]

(Correspondingly, ATP 35(A) states that "the most efficient use of TACAIR is against enemy formations prior to their deployment in the battle area."

- "... conventional and unconventional ground and air maneuver units can also interdict enemy movement and neutralize key facilities in depth."[20] (Colonel Wass de Czege points out that "... over enthusiastic, high
risk deep maneuvers are not encouraged if the payoff
does not produce results which fit the higher
commander's concept. . .")\textsuperscript{21}

As noted previously (Chapter II), the 1982 edition of
FM 100-5 was criticized for its comments on the role of
nuclear weapons. Colonel Wass de Czege emphasizes that the
1986 edition "... attempts to make clear the strategic
implications of the use of such weapons and points out that
the release of both nuclear and chemical weapons is made at
policy and strategic levels."\textsuperscript{22}

Several points in conclusion:
- the 1986 edition of FM 100-5 is definitely attuned to
  NATO's understandable sensitivities.
- the supremacy of policy over operational considerations
  is emphasized strongly.
- the manual's emphasis on initiative, the importance of
  offensive action and the role of maneuver are made more
  acceptable by a corresponding emphasis on these ele-
  ments in ATP 35(A).

The Role Of National Doctrines

ATP 35(A) sets the parameters for variations in national
doctrines:

It is understood and accepted that the
land force doctrine of any nation may go
beyond and expand on ATP 35(A). However,
this must not lead to a decrease in the
ability of their land forces to work
effectively together.\textsuperscript{23}
There are, in fact, differences in the tactical doctrines national forces intend to employ in support of NATO's strategy of Forward Defense. A brief description of each nation's basic doctrine will serve to illustrate the point.

The Netherlands Corps plans to fight an area defense based on strong defensive positions backed up by heavy concentrations of prearranged indirect fires and a reserve of mechanized and armored forces. The Dutch Chief of Staff describes area defense as "... begin[ning] at the forward edge of the sector and then continuing into its depth as the situation requires." Reserves, he writes "... are initially employed for offensive actions such as surprise fire, counterthrusts and counterattack." In conclusion, he describes the Dutch defense as "... a mobile, offensive-minded form of defense." British doctrine calls for a modified area defense:

Strong forward defensive positions will be backed up by smaller scattered multiple antitank fighting positions of about squad or platoon size. The antiarmor elements will allow enemy armor to pass and then engage them from the flanks and rear. At a decisive moment, a counterattack will repel the enemy from the British sector.

The Belgian Corps plans to conduct "a somewhat fluid variation of the classical area defense in depth" based on overlapping and mutually supporting platoon and company-sized fighting positions.
The West Germans plan to fight "... a classical armor-heavy mobile defense." Under this concept, "... forward units fight to channelize attacking formations and, at a strategically decisive place and time, the commander launches an armored counterattack to stop and repulse invading forces." The German Ministry of Defense's 1983 White Paper emphasizes that "... the principle of Forward Defense does not constitute an obstacle to the necessity of mobile defense." General von Sandrart, the current Chief of Staff, sees Forward Defense as "... an operational umbrella concept of the Alliance, but not a tactical doctrine of how to fight the battle at division or brigade level." "Defensive operations," he continues, "require depth in order to achieve freedom of action, to gain time for reaction, and to absorb or break the enemy's momentum." Nevertheless, he sees the decisive battles being fought "... as close to the Eastern borders as possible and mainly within the divisional sectors." 

NATO doctrine, in theory and in practice, permits significant variance in the general form of the national doctrines to be employed in support of the Forward Defense strategy. It is not inappropriate, then, for the U.S. Army to have a national tactical doctrine to be employed within the context of Forward Defense. Further, all national tactical doctrines within the Alliance recognize that some depth is required for successful defense and emphasize the importance of an offensively-oriented reserve force. These,
of course, are two of the most important elements of the AirLand Battle doctrine.

AirLand Battle Doctrine And The Follow-On Forces Attack

Operational Sub-Concept

The differences between AirLand Battle doctrine and Follow-On Forces attack have been discussed extensively over the past several years. Much of the discussion has focused on their differing approaches to the employment of airpower.

As noted previously, FOFA focuses on maintaining manageable force ratios in the main battle area by destroying or disrupting subsequent echelon forces. Such focus favors a traditional use of airpower through centralized air allocation and application theater wide.

AirLand Battle doctrine emphasizes maneuver-oriented defensive operations and the synchronization of deep operations with the commander's overall plan. This approach favors early sortie allocation to enable airpower to be integrated into this plan. Specifically, the commander must be assured that sufficient air will be allocated to preclude the second echelon from interfering with his maneuver against first echelon forces.

Requirements for battlefield air interdiction (BAI) sorties to support maneuver-oriented defensive operations will compete with FOFA's requirements for deep interdiction sorties. The fact that there will be competition for air assets does not mean that U.S. units cannot employ AirLand
Battle as a national tactical doctrine. Rather, it means commanders operating under the doctrine will have to consider the number of BAI sorties available as they determine the nature of their operations in the main battle area. Further, they will have to ensure that their limited battlefield air interdiction assets are directed against those targets that could most readily affect their operations against first echelon forces.37
CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

AirLand Battle doctrine should be acceptable to the NATO leadership and to our NATO allies. This conclusion is based on the following factors:

- AirLand Battle doctrine as outlined in the forthcoming edition of FM 100-5, *Operations*, is consistent with NATO doctrine as expressed in ATP-35(A).

- NATO doctrine, in theory and in practice, permits significant variance in the general form of national doctrines. It is not inappropriate, then, for the U.S. Army to espouse a national tactical doctrine for employment within the context of Forward Defense.

- The national doctrines espoused by Alliance members recognize that some depth is required for successful defense and emphasize the importance of an offensively-oriented reserve force. These factors are, of course, also principal elements of AirLand Battle doctrine.

- AirLand Battle doctrine and the Follow-On Forces Attack sub-concept differ in their approaches to the use of airpower. The requirements for battlefield air interdiction sorties to support maneuver-oriented defensive operations may compete with FOFA's requirements for deep interdiction sorties. This possibility of competition does not render the doctrine and the operational sub-concept incompatible.
- Competition does mean that the availability of BAI sorties will be a major factor in determining the nature of operations in the main battle area. Further, commanders executing AirLand Battle doctrine will have to carefully prioritize targets which are most critical to the enemy's operations and would most readily affect operations against his first echelon forces.
ENDNOTES

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