AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

STUDENT REPORT

CIVIL-MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL IN FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

MAJOR IRVING W. IRONS, III #86-1225

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REPORT NUMBER #86-1225
TITLE CIVIL-MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL IN FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE
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The American experiences in Vietnam and Central America raise questions about the ability of the United States' civilian and military command and control structures to develop and implement programs which can help host regimes to effectively counter the seeds of revolution and insurgencies worldwide. This study concludes that while the structures in existence are adequate for the task, there are functional problems which degrade overall performance. Recommendations include Presidential strengthening of the State Department and establishment of a regional diplomatic agency colocated with the regional unified command.
PREFACE

This study provides an assessment of the effectiveness of the civil-military command structure to support foreign internal defense operations. Chapter One presents a general introduction to the research study. Chapter Two contains the key material gathered during a review of literature related to civilian and military strategies in foreign internal defense as well as the overall command and control structure. Key issues identified through the literature review are presented in Chapter Three. The final conclusions and recommendations made throughout the study are presented in Chapter Four.

The subject of the study is a portion of the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) research effort on low intensity conflict. The format used in this document is in accordance with the overall TRADOC research effort.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Part of our College mission is distribution of the students' problem solving products to DoD sponsors and other interested agencies to enhance insight into contemporary, defense related issues. While the College has accepted this product as meeting academic requirements for graduation, the views and opinions expressed or implied are solely those of the author and should not be construed as carrying official sanction.

REPORT NUMBER 86-1225
AUTHOR(S) MAJOR IRVING W. IRONS, III, USAF
TITLE CIVIL-MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL IN FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

I. Problem: Many political scientists and military leaders see insurgent operations as a portion of the growing threat to US national interests. However, the American experiences in Vietnam and Central America raise questions about what the US can and should do to combat the threat, and whether or not the civilian and military agencies' command and control infrastructures are adequate to accomplish the required actions.

II. Objective: The objective of this research was to evaluate the effectiveness of the command and control networks of US civilian and military agencies to assist a second nation in their efforts to protect their citizens and combat insurgents (foreign internal defense). The scope of the study was limited to the application of power short of direct introduction of US troops. Therefore, the sub-objectives were to determine: how to fight insurgencies, what can be accomplished short of direct US military involvement, and whether the current command and control structures are adequate to accomplish the required actions.

III. Method: A literature review of the causes of revolution and strategies to defeat insurgent movements was conducted. Then the civil-military command and control network was assessed to determine whether or not it was structurally and functionally able to support the foreign internal defense strategy.

IV. Results: Insurgencies arise in countries with long-term, deeply rooted internal economic, political, and social problems. The solutions required to
stabilize the government are reform measures within the government and throughout the economic and social environment of the nation. While reforms are the long-term solution, immediate action should be taken to isolate the insurgents from the populace using militia or national forces. These protectors can make significant contributions to the well-being of the country by dealing compassionately with the citizens while also providing development and humanitarian assistance. Although the bulk of the responsibility for turning the nation around lies within the country, the United States can assist through economic support, development and humanitarian assistance, and the infusion of democratic principles. The US military can provide training and hardware to the national forces. However, US military combat action should be used only as the last resort. Efforts by the US to assist a nation should be coordinated through the growing number of regional agencies. The command and control network required by the civilian and military agencies to execute an effective US foreign internal defense program is structurally in place.

V. Conclusions and Recommendations: While the US civil-military command and control hierarchy is present and contains the structural connections to perform foreign internal defense, there are problems due to the way the system actually functions. While the Secretary of State oversees the in-country embassies and has a large staff, foreign policy decisions reportedly are made between the President and his staff rather than with the Secretary of State. Further, some authors believe that US foreign policy is not coherent because of conflicting goals. The foreign policy is also degraded by conflict between staff members and bureaucratic rivalries. It is recommended that the President strengthen the State Department through his own leadership and that foreign policy decisions at the executive level be made through the Secretary of State. The military portion of civil-military command and control provides essential assistance in foreign internal defense. However, consideration should be given to identifying a contingency command structure and human intelligence network capable of supporting US military means. The author noted that there are no regional civilian equivalents to the unified command physically located in the global regions. While this is not a documented deficiency, it is recommended that a diplomatic counterpart be colocated with the unified command. The benefits may include coherent policy formulation and execution and the continued presence of a major US civilian representative to coordinate US strategy with non-US regional agencies.
Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

There is clearly a war going on... A highly politicized form of warfare, psychological, economic and it's military and frankly, we, the US, institutionally do not understand it and we are not organized very effectively to cope with it... I believe that low intensity conflict is the most important strategic issue facing the U.S. If we don't learn to deal with it, we risk being isolated in an increasingly competitive world. (16:24;24:1)

General Wallace H. Nutting
(USA, Retired)
CINCUSREDCOM, 1983-1985

The United States' national interests prior to World War II were primarily territorial integrity, political independence, and economic welfare. Emerging from that war, the US found itself inextricably the keeper of the torch of international order and international justice. Thus, these became our fourth and fifth national interests, even though they transcended our boundaries and did not directly threaten our domestic well-being. The forty years of peace celebrated recently is increasingly tempered by the realization, "that there is no such thing as peace between nations, only varying degrees of conflict." (25:2)

The US grand strategy to meet the challenges to national security interests included the drive toward military preeminence or, as a minimum, parity. Military strategies such as Eisenhower's massive retaliation, Kennedy's flexible response, Ford's detente, and Reagan's deterrence all served the national objective of keeping the Soviet Union and its client states from forthright conventional or nuclear war with the United States or its allies. However, terrorism, insurgency operations, and other forms of low intensity conflict are ongoing threats to US national security interests.

Some authors see the move toward low intensity conflict as an alternative approach by adversaries to prosecute their
national interests in light of US nuclear and conventional strength. Others see it as an inexpensive, effective form of warfare. Both views may be correct. While there is disagreement as to the causes, a shared assessment is that the United States’ greatest challenges for the rest of the century will come from the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Many military and political authors and speakers cite the US experience in Vietnam and state concern, as General Nutting did, that the US does not understand low intensity conflict and that we are not organized to effectively operate at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.

The US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is conducting an extensive analysis of low intensity conflict. As part of that effort, this study is designed to assess the nature of the threat and the effectiveness of the current US civil-military command and control structure in conducting foreign internal defense.

SCOPE OF STUDY

This study is concerned with the ability of the US to conduct foreign internal defense operations from policy development at the national level to policy implementation within the country drawing US support. The study focuses primarily on the causes of insurgencies and the civil-military command and control structures which must meet the insurgent threat. It is limited to diplomatic and other US efforts to combat insurgencies short of direct employment of US combat forces.

While the impetus for the TRADOC research is the current US Army involvement in Central America, this study is concerned with US foreign internal defense efforts worldwide.

PURPOSE OF STUDY

The purpose of this study is to assess the effectiveness of the current civil-military command and control network in conducting foreign internal defense operations, to identify shortfalls, and to propose recommendations to correct deficiencies.

METHODOLOGY

To address the problem, the study is divided into literature review and issues chapters. The literature review outlines written material on the causes of insurgencies and the depth of the problem. The literature review then continues with a presentation of the US civil and military command and control organizational structure, and concludes with material which
can serve as a model for foreign civil and military command and control efforts tasked with providing internal defense. The issues chapter begins with a statement of problem areas and continues with discussions and recommendations to correct deficiencies.
Chapter Two

CIVIL-MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL
IN FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE:
A LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

The various elements of the crisis—the economic, social, political, and security issues—form...a seamless web. They cannot be separated...peace cannot be achieved unless there is tangible hope for escape from misery and oppression. (1:195)

Henry Kissinger

This chapter summarizes issues culled from current literature which directly or tangentially impact civil-military command and control efforts in foreign internal defense. These issues are presented in three broad, and for the purposes of this paper, interrelated areas: the threat, US civil-military command and control, and host nation civil-military command and control.

THE THREAT

A valid assessment of the civil-military command and control structure cannot be realistically performed without understanding the threat. Correct analysis of the threat is also fundamental to the development of the national grand strategy, selection of one or more of the instruments of power (i.e., political, military, economic), and development of the strategies for applying these instruments in support of the grand strategy.

Foreign internal defense efforts are designed to counter the sources of military, political, and military instability (primarily insurgents) within the assisted country that threaten to overthrow the government. Foreign internal defense is accomplished through civilian and military agencies which seek to free and protect the society from the insurgents. (22:152, 187, 192, 353)

Basically, this is the threat the US faced in Vietnam. As
the abundance of literature on that war indicates, we lost. Did we understand the threat? Lewy believes we did not: "One of the tragedies of Vietnam is that the services refused to recognize the realities of the people's war and clung to the illusion that this was a war that troops could win." (17:5)

In his analysis of the Vietnam experience, Turok reiterates the need to understand the dynamics of "the people's war":

In my view an approach which seeks to find out "what went wrong" and "what could have been put right" [in Vietnam] cannot help us understand major events like the French, Russian or Chinese Revolutions. It is clear that in each of these cases the authorities were well enough aware of the "dysfunctions" but they were emeshed in a set of political, social and economic contradictions too vast and complex for easy adjustment. The essence of the pre-revolutionary situation is that reforms must therefore be sought in terms of the social system as a whole and the system's overall tendencies, rather than those individual adjustments which might have prevented revolution. (6:4)

What are these internal factors, referred to by Turok, which caused the major revolutions? Krejci wrote a comparative assessment of the great revolutions and summarizes that,

A great vertical revolution is likely to break out when there is a substantial multiple dysfunction encompassing the following disproportions and contradictions: (a) people of more than one social group (class) represent a disproportion between certain key elements of their social position or status (wealth, power, education, prestige), or a failure of maintenance values; (b) their hopes of abolishing or at least diminishing these disproportions or this failure have been foiled by the adverse development of the economic conditions or a political countermove; (c) these resentments find justification in a new interpretation of what may be called either social justice or legitimacy; and (d) the regime in power is blamed for all the deficiencies. (e) Within the society thus affected there are institutions with a certain breadth of societal power which make the spread of the new ideas and the defence of their promoters possible. (f) If there are no institutions they are created from scratch, provided the existing regime has been sufficiently weakened by foreign war and/or defections from the ranks of the elite. (g) The extent and intensity of the resentment, its ideological justification and institutional support permit the activation of an extraordinarily large number of people, people who usually prefer to maintain a passive attitude.
towards politics. (h) The actual outbreak of revolution requires over and above these general conditions (which in their turn can be classified as either preconditions or accelerators) some triggering event such as the martyrdom of a revolutionary leader, the dismissal of a popular minister, the refusal by the government to fulfill its promises of reform, or attempts to suppress, or at least limit, the activity of the reformists. (2:212-213)

There is a stated concern among many authors that the causes of revolution upon which insurgents feed are present throughout the Third World. As Armitage states,

Many of the more crucial challenges which face us are those generated by the interplay of North-South and East-West developments. The North-South issues alone present policy questions which will task our ingenuity and our credibility. We face formidable tasks in the efforts we have joined to adapt international economic and political institutions in ways that contribute to the continued development of the nations of the Southern Hemisphere and to their smooth integration into the international system. Unfortunately, for many of those nations the development process itself remains anything but smooth. It generates dislocations within societies and pressures on political systems which too often produce instability and violence, both domestically and internationally...We realize that instability is symptomatic of more fundamental problems [and that] those who respond with repression rather than with reform are probably doomed to failure and overthrow. (8:3-7)

Many other authors agree with Armitage that Third World countries are unstable because of many factors including economic maldistribution. LeoGrande cites the Kissinger Report on Central America and states that the "report details how economic growth after World War II produced modernization without redistribution, raising popular expectations of better living conditions without fulfilling them and stimulating demands for political change". (15:255) Jackson also cites the economic factor as a key element behind the fermenting political upheaval in Africa. (13:1081)

While Central America and Africa face problems today, the Middle East may provide insights for overcoming these problems. Katz believes that the Soviets planned to make inroads into the Persian Gulf and finally take over by exploiting economic maldistribution. With the increased revenues from oil into the monarchies in the last decade, the Soviets expected unrest and political upheaval in the "feudal" monarchies. However, the oil rich monarchies undertook programs to redistribute the wealth, "eliminating poverty as a reason for revolution." (14:25-28)
Ultimately, the office of the President of the United States is the point at which the civil and military command and control networks converge. The President derives the authority constitutionally as the Head of State/Head of Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. However, supporting him on foreign policy matters are the Secretary of State and the State Department. Military expertise and advice is provided to the President by the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the services.

As discussed above, foreign internal defense efforts are conducted through the civilian and military agencies which are the executors of the grand strategy formulated to support the national objective. The following presentation of material gleaned from the literature review will focus primarily on the civil and military command and control structures and relate insights into operations within those structures from the national level to the in country team.

The civilian command and control network extends from the Secretary of State and the State Department at the national level, through the regional offices situated in Washington, D.C., to the embassies in each country. In outlining the functions and structure of the embassies, Rubin writes,

As representatives, they maintain American presence in each country, facilitate communication between the two governments, explain Washington's policies, protect US interests, and seek local support for American initiatives and goals; as negotiators, they carry out bilateral agreements; as reporters, they observe and analyze events and viewpoints within the host country, sending home information and advice...The embassy staff is divided into four parts. The political section deals with the local foreign ministry and studies the country's government, parties and policies. The economic section monitors domestic and bilateral business, trade, and financial matters. Counsuls protect US citizens abroad and issue visas to foreigners. Administrators keep the embassy running, ministering to the needs of all agencies represented, obtaining required supplies, managing personnel, and hiring local employees...[The embassy also houses] the large non-State contingent in overseas embassies: employees from the US Information Agency (USIA) and the Agency for International Development (AID) as well as military attache and advisory groups, CIA officials, and representatives of many other agencies. (5:128, 131)
The military chain of command extends from the Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs at the national level, through the unified commands down to the military personnel within each embassy. These military personnel perform functions in support of Security Assistance, Attache, and Military Assistance Group (if present) responsibilities.

Each of these functional offices manage different components of the US foreign internal defense efforts. As outlined in the United States Army Field Manual 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict, these efforts are divided into three major categories: Development Assistance, Humanitarian Assistance, and Security Assistance.

Development Assistance is designed to support economic and social progress, to increase agricultural and industrial production, to educate and train people, to help prevent population growth from outrunning economic growth, to build lasting institutions, to reduce economic disparities, and promote wider distribution of the benefits of economic progress. The programs are operated through the International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA) and its component, the Agency for International Development (AID).

Humanitarian Assistance...basically consists of welfare and emergency relief...administered by AID and the IDCA...

Security Assistance includes those programs used to assist friendly foreign countries to establish and maintain adequate defense postures to provide internal security and resist external aggression...[The four programs include:] the Military Assistance Program (MAP)...[which] provides for transfers of defense articles and services...as grant aid; International Military Education and Training (IMET)...[which] provides instruction and training [on a grant basis]...to use their own resources and to operate and maintain equipment acquired from the United States; Economic Support Fund (ESF)...[which] enable[s] a recipient to devote more of its own resources to security purposes than otherwise possible without serious political or economic consequences...[The funds are provided on a loan or grant basis with the overall program administered by AID]; and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) [may be made on grant, outright sales, or credit basis to countries to enable them to]...purchase defense articles, services, and training...[from the US Department of Defense].

(23:101-107)
According to Rubin, this US foreign policy structure was developed by experimentation between 1945 and 1969. At the end of that period, the Department of State had evolved to its present structure. However, since 1969, the Presidents' primary sources of policy information have been the National Security Council (NSC) and White House staffs. (5:123) The observations of Rubin are shared by Gelb, who specifically ties foreign policy development to the NSC advisor "for reasons of propinquity and politics." (10:295)

Both authors believe that two of the major problems affecting the US foreign policy apparatus are personality conflicts and bureaucratic rivalries. While neither author can assess quantitatively or qualitatively how the conflicts impact foreign policy, Rubin asserts,

When process makes bureaucratic and personality considerations dominant, this may produce the populist nightmare vision of icy, isolated men flinging around continents or playing global chess...The strain between political appointees and career staff is ultimately unresolvable and even partly useful by providing a variety of perspectives. Foreign policy is rarely subject to neat organization. Its complexity and rapidly changing profile make it inherently disorderly. While outwardly the system demands conformity and consensus, it is always driven by individual will-powers and objectives...[The dangers of the White House ignoring the State Department] can be high-risk activism and unilateralism...[The Secretary of State] must negotiate not only with foreign countries, but also with other sectors of his own government. In Kissinger's words, "The nightmare of the modern state is the hugeness of the bureaucracy, and the problem is how to get cohesion and decision in it." (5:126,249,263)

The impact of these problems is specifically brought home by Gutman in his article on US involvement in Lebanon. Gutman writes that, "Haig, smarting over attempts by White House aids to make policy without him, this time [in Lebanon made] policy without them, [and this action] typified many of the decisions that were to follow". (11:21)

Van Creveld's assessment of the US military in Vietnam underscores the fact that the military instrument of power, like its civilian counterpart, also experiences command and control problems:

Not only was top-level organization diffuse and chaotic to the point that nobody and everybody was in charge, but
an entire regular command structure designed for conventional warfare was transplanted into a guerrilla environment for which it was not suitable. (7:258)

With the breakdown of the civilian and military command and control structures listed above, are there any problems noted in the military or combined civil-military conduct of operations? Maechling states that generally, in countering insurgency movements, the State Department automatically views friendly governments as a national interest regardless of its policies and State solicits military and economic support to stabilize the government; CIA views internal dissent as reflective of external influence; and, the military advocates military (security assistance, modernization) solutions. Maechling’s recommendation is that the US should develop and employ "an effective counterinsurgency strategy [as part of] a foreign policy that is detached and flexible toward revolutionary change", avoiding imposition of a government contrary to the local populace interests, while protecting the revolutionary process. If intervention is necessary, it should be through regional agencies or the UN. (18:32-41)

The thrust of LeoGrande’s article and a second by Haag is that the US must clearly define its national interests and understand the causes of unrest, whether domestic or extra-national. (12:119-129;15:251-284)

HOST NATION CIVIL-MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL

The complement to US foreign internal defense efforts is the internal defense program conducted by the country facing the insurgency. Providing his thoughts on the best way to perform counterinsurgency operations, Dubik writes,

The counterinsurgency force can do the unexpected: First, it can tenderly and compassionately control those members of the local population and supplies may be of use to the guerrilla force. By controlling the useful population and useful supplies, the counterinsurgency force will begin to isolate the guerrilla from the local population physically. However, tender and compassionate control is most important. Otherwise, the actions of the counterinsurgent force will only reinforce guerrilla antigovernment propaganda and strengthen the local population’s support for the insurgent movement.

Tender and compassionate control will begin the process of isolating the guerrilla from the population psychologically. Simultaneously, the counterinsurgency force can also sever the flow of insurgent supplies from external sources. Controlling the population, the local
sources of supply will physically isolate the guerrilla and begin the process of psychologically isolating him.

Second, the counterinsurgency force can defend the villages or towns and their outlying farms from the guerrilla. This defense will deny the guerrilla access to villages and towns, thus cutting off the guerrilla from his source of recruits and supplies and forcing the guerrilla to attack. To attack, the guerrillas must not only abandon their tactical strengths—raids, ambushes and minuets—but also must mass and commit themselves...[They are then subject to attack by the military and trained local population volunteers]...Third, the counterinsurgency forces can conduct internal development and civil action operations which, if conducted properly, will take away the guerrilla's raison d'être [by tying together the government, the counterinsurgency forces and the local population]. (9:46-47)

A Massachusetts Institute of Technology Study Group viewed the military as important to the local citizens because the armed forces members posses technical training and competence which could help in modernizing the populace while stabilizing it. (20:37-40)

Taken together, the thoughts of Dubik are very similar to Ramsey’s model outlined in his article on the Republic of Colombia’s success against insurgent movement in the 1950’s. He writes,

After General Pinilla took over the government [he used] its officer corps as peace negotiator and arranger of amnesties with insurgent groups...[providing] personal safety in exchange for turning in one’s weapons and going home...They introduced into the Constitutional system some structural changes which facilitated democratic governance in a climate less charged with political excesses...[The armed forces provided] a trained, functional leadership institution to organize economic takeoff in the underdeveloped rural zones, while allowing democratic institutions to develop. Armed forces leaders set about to convert this theory into a workable plan. The commitment included bridge and road building, well drilling, health care, literacy instruction, and limited public housing construction, all guided by a civilian National Civic Action Council and subject to Congressional appropriations and audit...Lightly equipped, self-sufficient infantry units were stationed in turbulent rural zones: experimental organizations were tested which could protect the peasants against bandit gangs while simultaneously rendering public services. Colombian military journals became a fountainhead of
articles on innovative, low-violence methods for internal peacekeeping...Military strategy to the Colombian officer had three dimensions: social structure, firepower and maneuver...Isolation of criminals and foreign-sponsored revolutionary organizers was the first order of business; excellent tactics were the means for eliminating diehard criminals and armed insurgents, not for fighting the populace in an indiscriminate manner...[They joined] in regional and international peacekeeping systems. (21:354-364)

SUMMARY

The author specifically avoided making assumptions in the preparation of this research project in order to remain objective. Although material reviewed in support of the study came from authors with diverse backgrounds (political, academic, military) discussing different geographic areas, the data is consistent with the findings in The Report of the President's National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. The summary of this chapter therefore contains references to the applicable portions of that report.

1. Many of the Third World countries have internal problems and are experiencing insurgencies or contain the seeds of revolution right for insurgencies. (4:100-103)

2. Insurgent movements occur in those countries with poverty, economic maldistribution, and closed political systems which are not responsive to the needs of the people. The objective of the insurgents is the overthrow of the government by developing indigenous popular support, and "economic and military attrition." (4:33)

3. The solutions to the insurgent problem are social and economic reform, better distribution of wealth, and progress towards democracy with a political system responsive to the populace. The military troops needed to isolate the insurgents from the population should come from the host country. Militia and national forces should assist the local population and win their support. (4:60-62)

4. The US strategy for foreign internal defense should consist of political, economic, humanitarian and development assistance. Military support should be limited to hardware and training; direct involvement by US troops should be used only as the last resort. The use of diplomatic, economic, and military instruments of power should be in coordination with other countries in the region through the regional agency. (4:55-62, 114,141-142)
5. The US should encourage reform within those countries not yet facing insurgencies. If reform efforts are not conducted and the citizens threaten to overthrow the government, the US should allow the revolutionary movement to continue while protecting it from outside influence. (4:5)
Chapter Three

CIVIL-MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE: A DISCUSSION OF CRITICAL ISSUES

INTRODUCTION

In light of the literature review outlined and discussed in the previous chapter, several key areas appear worthy of further development. They are: command and control of US foreign policy; command and control of the US military in foreign internal defense; linkages between US and host nation agencies; and the regional perspective as an alternative to a country-by-country approach for foreign internal defense. Each of these areas will be presented with a general discussion followed by recommendations.

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF US FOREIGN POLICY

Discussion

If there are clear, consistent messages vis-a-vis the US foreign policy mechanism, they are that the apparatus is well organized. Nonetheless, it suffers from conflicting policy approaches, ill-defined national interests, and personality conflicts and excesses. (11:21:4:126) The result is there are no cohesive policy approaches, fundamental foreign internal problems are misdiagnosed, and forthcoming policy actions are often inappropriate. (18:32-41;5:249)

During personal interviews with a former US ambassador, two security assistance personnel, two defense attaches, two foreign service officers, and a member of AID, there was a consensus that the current Department of State command and control network was effectively organized. However, their observations and experiences revealed that the system suffered from personality clashes and arbitrary or parochial approaches to foreign policy issues and implementation. Those interviewed also cited conflicts between the ambassador and his staff, civilians and military personnel, and between defense attaches and security assistance personnel. Combined, these issues were seen by those interviewed as threatening the ability of the US to prosecute its
foreign policy through the lowest levels of US civil-military command and control.

Several authors (11:21;5:126,249,263;7:258) indicate that there are problems at the highest echelons of command and control as well. They underscore Maechling's assessment that there are "conflicting voices...inside government and out over the causes of the third world turmoil and the proper response: local factors versus external subversion, economic aid versus overt and covert military intervention." (12:32)

As presented in the literature review, insurgents target countries already weakened by economic, political, and social problems. Whatever US grand strategy is adopted, it must take into account the internal causes and provide for internal reform and development to quell the ills separating the people from the government. Ultimately, the strategy would not only solve the immediate insurgent problem but also provide a solid basis for nation building.

Recommendations

1. "The President must actively use his prestige and power to end disputes and mobilize the slow-moving bureaucracy; in many cases nothing else will do." (5:262)

2. "There must be a leading figure below the President who has large measure of operational authority over policy." (5:262) Specifically, the President should consider the State Department his primary if not sole source for foreign policy development. This is in contrast to heavy reliance upon his immediate staff. (5:123)

3. Long-range, clearly defined national objectives must be developed and used as a consistent guide in grand strategy formulation, particularly in foreign internal development efforts.

4. Foreign policy should focus on relieving the causes of insurgencies by promoting internal development in countries considered vital to the US national interest.

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

Discussion

As discussed in the literature review, embassies contain military personnel who serve as attaches, security assistance, and (in some countries) military assistance workers. The military, like their civilian counterparts, fall under the
administrative control of the ambassador. As noted above, personality conflicts and interagency rivalries are not confined to civilian relationships.

United States military personnel assigned to the embassy serve many vital roles in providing counterinsurgency support to national forces through training in tactics and advanced technology weapons and weapons systems. They can further assist the host nation and provide a vital mission in preparing for possible US direct military support by training indigenous forces to establish, expand, and maintain a human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and reporting network. The Long Commission Report cited the lack of a developed HUMINT infrastructure as a crucial shortfall which contributed to the Beirut massacre. Cooperative efforts with host nation military and the amount of support the local population provides to the HUMINT effort could provide valuable insights into the degree of disaffection with the current government.

While the effective use of the US military assigned to embassies is important, it is perhaps more important that the command and control structure for contingent US military action be developed as soon as possible. As the Vietnam experience indicates, the problems associated with establishing a command and control structure, not only for application of firepower but also for interfacing with echelons above the area of conflict, are large. The issue of de facto versus de jure control, especially with the gradual introduction of extra-regional forces into conflict, should be resolved quickly and early. (3:337;7:232-260)

Recommendations

1. US military personnel assigned to the embassies can provide valuable assistance to host nation forces. Attention should be focused on development of an extensive, effective HUMINT network in support of counterinsurgency operations.

2. A contingency US military command and control network should be conceived and approved very early in any country facing insurgencies to provide for direct American military support.

Linkages Between the US and Host Nation Agencies

Discussion

The host nation can provide the primary actions necessary to counter the basis for insurgent support by "winning the hearts and minds of the people". While indigenous military operations are primarily counterinsurgent, the military can also serve as a vital resource for nation-building. (9116-47;21:554-564)
Diplomatically, the embassy is paramount and can serve as the most effective advocate for political reform. However, personnel assigned to the Agency for International Development mission play the most visible role in communicating US support to the population. This role can be further enhanced by using non-embassy military personnel to conduct humanitarian and civic operations in support of foreign internal defense. The amount of military support is limited by Title 10, US Code, Section 8103 (Stevens Amendment) to small dollar values and only as an adjunct to military exercise activities.

Recommendation

The Stevens Amendment should be considered for repeal or expansion to allow for direct support by non-embassy US armed forces personnel conducting counterinsurgency training in support of nation building efforts to stabilize and resolve the conflict.

THE REGIONAL APPROACH AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY APPROACH

Discussion

Dr. Hans Mark asserts that the global community is evolving toward 8-10 regional blocs. (19:16) If correct, this trend may pose greater challenges to foreign policy architects. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), NATO, the European Economic Community, ASEAN, and the Contadora Group are regional actors which have evolved since World War II toward meeting the needs and fostering the interests of the countries within their regions. A guest speaker at Air Command and Staff College in the fall of 1985 recommended that the GCC be encouraged to evolve into a greater, more decisive and powerful Mideast regional actor. Maechling further recommends that intervention should be orchestrated through the regional agencies or the UN. (18:41) The recommendation to foster the development of the regional agencies and coordinate US efforts with the agency is also supported by the Bipartisan Commission. (4:142) In contrast to this, the country-by-country perspective is inherently narrow and disregards the growing regional, multinational organizations whose interests are more directly involved that those of the US.

In studying the US civil-military command and control structure down to the host country, it is clear that there is no diplomatic/political counterpart to the military unified command at the regional level. The regional bureaus of the Department of State are located in Washington, D.C.

The crucial questions are:
1. Is the lack of a US diplomatic organization colocated with the unified command at the regional level a significant shortfall?

2. What role would the US diplomatic organization have?

3. What should the relationship be between the unified command and the regional diplomatic organization?

First, as developed in the literature review, there are strong arguments that the grand strategy for foreign internal defense employ all the instruments of power. Further, insurgents usually originate from countries within the same geographic bloc as the country threatened.

The presence of a regional diplomatic US mission with the unified command could provide an organization for the development of fused, cohesive policy recommendations to the national level. Whichever policy option is finally selected at the national level, the combined diplomatic/military regional organization could function as an intermediate-level overseer for policy execution. Additionally, this integrated US regional center could serve as the focal point for interaction with established regional-level non-US actors as well as consolidate US power in the region.

Second, while the US Department of State maintains its regional bureaus in Washington, D.C., there is no compelling evidence to suggest that this geographic separation from the country missions adversely impacts foreign policy design and employment. However, relocating much of the regional bureau into its area of responsibility may enhance their assessments of reports originating from the countries within their region.

General Momyer firmly believes that the command structure (at least for the military) should be located no more than 500 miles from the source of conflict. Geographic proximity, he maintains, heightens sensitivity by the commanders to the real problems of the war and also lessens the chance for micromanagement from Washington, D.C. (3:337)

The net effect could be the early diagnosis and prognosis of countries susceptible to insurgencies, precluding late involvement by the US when the fiscal and manpower requirements needed to combat the threat are higher (i.e., internal development versus foreign internal defense).

Finally, the author believes that the relationship between the regional diplomatic center and the unified command should be formal and dynamic. The diplomatic center should include members of the IDCA and AID as well as the Department of State.
Colocating the diplomatic center with each unified command may provide a vital bridge between cohesive strategy development and employment.

**Recommendations**

1. That the United States acknowledge, support, and promote the regional agencies, providing direction and leadership in the development of these actors. As with the GCC, regional agencies may evolve toward establishing and maintaining their own regional military umbrella thereby relying less on the United States when addressing regional hotspots.

2. Establish a US diplomatic regional center colocated with the unified command.
Chapter Four

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter contains the conclusions derived from the literature review and the recommendations based on these conclusions.

CONCLUSIONS

The movement of insurgent forces into a country appears tied to the susceptibility of the invaded country to revolution. Among the factors feeding the fires of revolution are economic maldistribution, an entrenched and unresponsive political mechanism, and raised expectations with no improvements forthcoming.

Many of the Third World countries have major elements of instability already in place and therefore will remain major challenges to US policymakers in the future. One crucial decision the US will have to make is how vital the Third World countries are to the US national interest. If any country is vital to the US, many programs can be implemented to stabilize and develop the nation but the programs cannot sustain governments unwilling to institute basic reforms to alleviate indigenous turmoil.

The US civil-military command and control structure is adequate to perform actions necessary to assist in foreign internal defense. While commitment of US forces to directly fight the insurgents should be accomplished only as a last resort, the military does provide other valuable contributions to defense programs within the threatened country. These contributions include foreign military sales, strategy and tactics development, and training. Civilian agency contributions are the most vital in addressing the economic and political sources of instability. Humanitarian and development assistance programs are performed through the International Development Cooperation Agency and the Agency for International Development. On the other hand, internal political reform relies on the Ambassador and his political section working diligently with the host nation. While the US civil-military command and control network appears quite capable of supporting foreign internal
defense, some internal problems may degrade the overall effectiveness of the network in mission execution.

Among the problems identified in the command and control day-to-day operations are the lack of a cohesive foreign policy, internal personal and bureaucratic conflicts, and the trend of US Presidents to rely less on the Secretary of State than on his own staff when formulating foreign policy. While it is impossible to quantify the impact of each of these problem areas on foreign policy, several articles and interviews provided the focus on these problems.

The indigenous strategy should include military and psychological isolation of the insurgent forces from the population and political, economic, and social reform to stabilize their country. The national forces and militia should avoid actual and apparent corruption while compassionately dealing with the local citizens to isolate the insurgents. Internal development and nation building programs can be accelerated by using the standing forces to provide medical, instructional, and development assistance.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

The President should strengthen the foreign policy mechanism of the executive branch by providing strong leadership and clearly defined national objectives, and he should rely on the Secretary of State and the State Department as the key sources of information in policy formulation. As part of this process, the President should make assessments on which countries are vital to the US national interests and pursue development or foreign internal defense programs to ensure the stability of these countries.

The US military should establish an effective HUMINT network and command and control structure capable of supporting direct US military presence in countries where foreign internal defense operations are conducted. In addition, the Stevens Amendment should be repealed or modified to allow US military assistance in development programs whenever feasible.

The final recommendation is that a regional diplomatic mission should be colocated with the unified command to enhance policy formulation and execution, while serving as the US regional representative and coordinator with non-US regional agencies.
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Articles and Periodicals


Official Documents

CONTINUED


Unpublished Material


B. RELATED SOURCES

Books


The following definitions are extracted from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms:

INSURGENCY - An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.

INTERNAL DEFENSE - The full range of measures taken by a government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT - Actions taken by a nation to promote its growth by building viable institutions (political, military, economic, and social) that respond to the needs of the society.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE - Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

SUBVERSION - Action designed to weaken the military, economic or political strength of a nation by undermining the morale, loyalty or reliability of its citizens.
END 12

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