MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND

Remarks by
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at
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Proposed Remarks for General Duane H. Cassidy at Winter Defense Symposium 27 Feb 86

(Acknowledgments)

As I thought about how I could meet this symposium's dual objectives of:

- explaining the military airlift command's missions and functions in peace and war,
- and summarizing our major wartime needs now and in the future

- I considered presenting wiring diagrams, flow charts, and a full debrief of the 23 active warplanes MAC supports

- but I think it's better if we examine some fundamental issues that describe the limits of our capability to carry out the military airlift command's part of the defense of this nation

- as we try to picture how MAC will support the conflict in the future, it helps to look at the past

- although, in the past, conditions were much different than they are today, there are many things that remain the same... that may never change

- there are recurring themes that happen over and over again
A RECURRING QUESTION THAT MUST ALWAYS BE ANSWERED IS: 
"HOW MUCH AND WHAT KIND OF AIRLIFT WILL BE NEEDED TO SUPPORT TOMORROW'S UNIFIED, SPECIFIED AND FIELD COMMANDERS?"

- WE'VE STRUGGLED WITH THAT QUESTION FOR A LONG TIME

- THAT THEME, THAT QUESTION IS NOT UNIQUE TO AIRLIFT, BUT OUR ABILITY TO ACCURATELY ANSWER THAT QUESTION, MAY BE UNIQUE

- THE POINT IS THAT WE HAVE NEVER ACCURATELY DETERMINED HOW MUCH AIRLIFT IS ENOUGH.

- WE HAVE TRIED, EVEN IN OUR EARLIEST DAYS

-- LOOK FOR A MOMENT AT THOSE WHO MADE THE FIRST BEST GUESS OF HOW MUCH AIRLIFT WE WOULD NEED TO WIN A WAR.

ON THE 3RD OF AUG 1941, A SUNDAY MORNING, GENERAL HAP ARNOLD PACKED HIS BAGS AND WENT WITH PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO NEWFOUNDLAND.

- THE PURPOSE OF HIS TRIP -- ALTHOUGH HE DIDN'T KNOW IT AT THE TIME -- WAS TO CONFER WITH WINSTON CHURCHILL ABOUT HOW TO STRENGTHEN GREAT BRITAIN WITHOUT SENDING AMERICANS INTO COMBAT

- BEFORE HE LEFT THAT SUNDAY MORNING, HAP ARNOLD LEFT WORD FOR HIS WAR PLANS DIVISION TO PLAN FOR THE ALL-OUT INVOLVEMENT OF AMERICA IN THE WAR.

-- GEN ARNOLD WANTED THE PLAN COMPLETED BY HIS RETURN, 9 DAYS LATER.
- THAT SUNDAY MORNING, HIS WAR PLANS DIVISION WAS LESS THAN 4 MONTHS OLD

-- THE DIVISION CHIEF WAS LT COL HAL GEORGE, AND HIS COLLEAGUERS INCLUDED 3 MEN THAT HE KNEW FROM HIS DAYS AT THE AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL AT MAXWELL FIELD, ALABAMA

--- THEY WERE LT COL KEN WALKER, MAJ POSSUM HANSELL, AND MAJ LARRY KUTER

- THEY CONCLUDED A MONUMENTAL TASK IN THOSE 9 DAYS AND THE DOCUMENT THEY PRODUCED WAS CALLED AWPD-1

+ THE SURPRISING THING WAS HOW CLOSE THESE PLANNERS CAME IN PREDICTING WHAT WE NEEDED TO WIN THE WAR

- THEIR CALCULATIONS SHOWED THAT AMERICA’S INDUSTRY WOULD HAVE TO EXPAND ENOUGH TO PRODUCE A FORCE OF 7,097 HEAVY BOMBERS

-- AND IN MARCH, 1945 -- 4 YEARS LATER -- 7,177 AMERICAN BOMBERS WERE FLYING COMBAT MISSIONS IN EUROPE

--- A DIFFERENCE OF LESS THAN 2% FROM WHAT THEY PREDICTED

+ BUT EVEN THOUGH HAL GEORGE LATER TOOK OVER COMMAND OF THE AIR CORPS TRANSPORT COMMAND, AND LARRY KUTER LATER BECAME THE FIRST COMMANDER OF THE MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE, THEY WERE UNABLE TO FORESEE HOW MANY TRANSPORT AIRPLANES WOULD BE NEEDED.
THERIR ESTIMATE OF AIRLIFT NEEDS WERE NOT EVEN CLOSE.

THAT'S VERY SURPRISING IN A PLAN IN WHICH THE BROAD CONCEPTS AND MINUTE DETAILS WERE REMARKABLY ACCURATE

-- BUT THESE AIR FORCE PLANNERS -- AND AIR FORCE PEOPLE IN GENERAL -- LACKED VISION OF AIR TRANSPORT AND HOW TO EXPLOIT IT

FOR THE WAR EFFORT, HAL GEORGE AND HIS GROUP ESTIMATED THAT THE AIR FORCE WOULD NEED TO GROW TO:

- A TOTAL OF 32 TROOP CARRIER AND TRANSPORT GROUPS AND 2500 PLANES

- THEY UNDERESTIMATED BY A FACTOR OF FOUR.

-- AT ITS MAXIMUM STRENGTH IN FEB 1945, THE ARMY AIR FORCES POSSESSED 32 TROOP CARRIER GROUPS

--- AND 9 AIR TRANSPORT DIVISIONS (NOT GROUPS AS THEY PLANNED!) WITH A TOTAL OF 10,138 PLANES

-- AND THIS WAS PLANNING FOR A WAR IN PROGRESS, NOT PLANNING FOR A WAR AS WE DO NOW...LOOKING TO THE FUTURE THROUGH A GLASS, DARKLY

IN THE YEARS SINCE AWPD-1, WE HAVEN'T BEEN MUCH MORE ACCURATE IN DETERMINING HOW MUCH AIRLIFT IS ENOUGH

THE QUESTION WASN'T RESOLVED IN THE 1950'S WHEN BRIG GEN JOHN DUNNING, IN TESTIFYING BEFORE CONGRESS IN 1959, SAID
SUPPORTING TACTICAL AIRLIFT OVER GENERAL WAR FORCES WAS LIKE "AN INVESTMENT COUNSELOR ADVISING THE HEAD OF A FAMILY TO BUY AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE BEFORE LIFE INSURANCE BECAUSE HE IS MORE LIKELY TO DENT HIS FENDERS THAN HE IS TO DIE."

--- HE MISSED THE FACT THAT SOME ACCIDENTS ARE SO BAD, THE CAR IS TOTALLED OUT

- THE QUESTION WASN'T RESOLVED IN THE 1960S WHEN ROBERT MACNAMARA SAID THAT HE HAD FOUND "NO SIMPLE BLACK AND WHITE SOLUTION" FOR CALCULATING MILITARY AIRLIFT.

+ THIS INABILITY TO QUANTIFY AIRLIFT'S NEEDS HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED TODAY.

- OUR LATEST WORD ON THE SIZE OF AIRLIFT COMES FROM CMMS (WHICH SETS THE GOAL OF 66 MTM/D FOR INTERTHEATER AIRLIFT)

-- THIS ONLY ESTABLISHES FISCALLY CONSTRAINED, REASONABLY ATTAINABLE GOALS, NOT "HOW MUCH DO YOU REALLY NEED TO DO THE JOB?"

- AND WE HAVE THE SAME PROBLEM TRYING TO DETERMINE HOW MUCH INTRATHEATER AIRLIFT IS ENOUGH.

-- THE JCS AND OSD WORLDWIDE INTRATHEATER MOBILITY STUDY IS TAKING MUCH LONGER TO PUT TOGETHER THAN ANYONE EXPECTED...

--- BECAUSE THERE ARE JUST TOO MANY VARIABLES IN TRYING TO DETERMINE WHAT YOUR NEEDS WILL BE. OUR CRYSTAL BALLS Aren'T GOOD ENOUGH
+ IT'S NOT ONLY A QUANTITATIVE PROBLEM...IT'S ALSO QUALITATIVE
- IT'S NOT ONLY A QUESTION OF "HOW MUCH AIRLIFT IS ENOUGH."
- THE QUESTION -- AT THE SAME TIME -- IS "WHAT KIND OF AIRLIFT DO WE NEED?"

+ AND IF YOU WERE TO DRAW SOME LESSONS LEARNED FROM HISTORY IN ORDER TO ANSWER THIS DOUBLE-EDGED QUESTION, THE LESSONS WOULD INCLUDE THESE:

- 1) SINCE THE BEGINNING OF WORLD WAR II, AIRLIFT HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY CRITICAL TO BATTLEFIELD SUCCESS IN EVERY MAJOR CONFLICT.
- 2) THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AIRLIFT HAVE ALMOST ALWAYS BEEN GREATER THAN WAS EXPECTED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT, AND THE VARIETY OF MISSIONS PERFORMED BY AIRLIFT INCREASED MEASURABLY AS THE CONFLICT DEVELOPED.
- 3) AIRLIFT WAS CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING LARGE FORCES, SOMETIMES FOR CONSIDERABLE PERIODS OF TIME.
  -- EVEN WITH THE SMALL AIRPLANES OF WORLD WAR II, SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES OF POL AND OTHER SUPPLIES WERE MOVED BY AIRLIFT.
- 4) AIRLIFT WAS THE ONLY MEANS OF SUSTAINMENT FOR GROUND UNITS Whose LINES OF COMMUNICATION WERE TEMPORARILY CUT.
- 5) WE'RE MOST LIKELY GOING TO FIGHT WHERE WE LEAST LIKELY EXPECT TO FIGHT -- FALKLANDS, GRENADA
- 6) THE FINAL LESSON IS THAT WHEN THE TIME COMES TO FIGHT, THERE WILL LOTS OF CUSTOMERS FOR AIRLIFT,

-- AND THERE MUST BE A SPECIFIED COMMAND THAT CAN ALLOCATE AIRLIFT -- NOT JUST AIRLIFT AIRPLANES -- TO THE CINCs

--- OTHERWISE AIRLIFT LOSES ITS INTRINSIC CAPABILITIES OF FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS

+ WE'VE COME A LONG WAY FROM THOSE TIMES WHEN GEN CLAIRE CHENNAULT COULD CLING TO HIS IDLE CARGO PLANES IN CHINA, WHILE GEN BILL TUNNER WAS FLYING HIS PLANES TO THE BREAKING POINT OVER THE HUMP

- NOW WHEN THE CINCS REQUIRE IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO AIRLIFT, WE CAN SWING OUR AIRLIFT SYSTEM IN MANY DIRECTIONS -- SIMULTANEOUSLY -- TO PUT IT WHERE ITS NEEDED

-- AT THE SAME TIME THAT WE WERE FLYING OVER 1000 MISSIONS TO SUPPORT CINCLANT IN GRENADA...

--- WE SUPPORTED CINCEUR BY REINFORCING, RESUPPLYING, AND MEDICALLY EVACUATING THE MARINES IN BEIRUT, FOLLOWING THE TERRORIST BOMBING THERE,

--- WE CONTINUED TO SUPPORT CINCPAC AND THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION DEEP FREEZE,

--- WE FLEW AN ADDITIONAL 125 MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE JOINT CHIEFS IN THE BOLD EAGLE, AUTUMN FORGE, AND AHUAS TARA EXERCISES,

--- WE FLEW 13 MISSIONS TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO EARTHQUAKE VICTIMS TO TURKEY.
AND AT THE SAME TIME WE RAN OUR ROUTINE CHANNEL MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF CINCs, WORLDWIDE

- MAC'S SUPPORT OF ALL THESE EVENTS AT THE SAME TIME JUST POINTS OUT THE UNQUANTIFIABLE INGREDIENTS OF THE WORLD OF THE HERE AND NOW

-- WE NEVER WILL KNOW WHERE THE NEXT SERIES OF CHALLENGES WILL COME FROM

-- BUT WE DO KNOW WE'LL NEED CENTRAL DIRECTION TO PROVIDE THE CINCs THE FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS TO MEET THE CHALLENGES

--- AND THAT'S WHAT YOU BUY WITH MAC'S AIRLIFT... FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS

+ IN THE PAST, AS WE DISCUSSED HOW MUCH AND WHAT KIND OF AIRLIFT IS ENOUGH, IT WAS VERY EASY TO LIMIT YOUR THINKING ABOUT WHAT AIRLIFT REALLY IS... AND THE FLEXIBILITY IT REALLY HAS.

- THAT'S BECAUSE WHEN PEOPLE THINK OF AIRLIFT, THEY TEND TO PACKAGE IT INTO SIMPLE CATEGORIES:

-- WHEN MANY PEOPLE THINK ABOUT STRATEGIC AIRLIFT, THEY THINK ABOUT C-141s AND C-5s...AND NOTHING MORE

-- WHEN MANY PEOPLE TALK ABOUT TACTICAL AIRLIFT, THEY THINK ABOUT C-130s...AND NOTHING MORE

-- SIMILARLY, AS WE TALK ABOUT SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, IT'S CUSTOMARY TO THINK ONLY ABOUT MC-130 COMBAT TALONS, AND AC-130 GUNSHIPS, AND HH-53 PAVE LOW HELICOPTERS
CERTAINLY THAT IS LOGICAL. IT'S ALSO MYOPIC.

AND IT'S ALSO THE THINKING OF THE PAST – THAT IS GOOD PLANNING FOR THE WAR WE JUST FOUGHT BUT IGNORES THE PRESENT AND THE CHARACTER OF THE FUTURE

THE FACT IS, WHEN YOU THINK ABOUT AIRLIFT, YOU MUST THINK ABOUT WHAT RESOURCES CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM AT HAND.

WHEN CINCEUR ASKED US TO SHUTTLE THE 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION'S MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE BETWEEN CAIRO AND RAS NASRANI, EGYPT, WE CALLED ON 4 EUCOM C-130'S TO DO THE JOB

TO SUPPORT CINCPAC'S RESUPPLY OF CARRIER TASK GROUP 70.0 IN THE GULF OF OMAN, WE ROUTINELY CALL UPON C-141S.

TO SUPPORT CINCEUR’S DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING IIs AND GLCMs TO EUROPE, WE USE C-141S AND C-5S

BUT TO SUPPORT CINCEUR’S UNCONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS EXERCISE FLINTLOCK, WE NOT ONLY USE MC-130S SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED FOR SPECIALOPS, WE ALSO USE C-141 AND C-130 SPECIAL OPERATIONS LOW LEVEL (SOLL II) AIRPLANES, AS WELL AS OUR RESCUE HH-53s AND HC-130s.

AND WHEN WE'RE ASKED BY THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF TO EVACUATE DEPOSED PRESIDENTS FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES, WE CALLED ON A VARIETY OF AIRCRAFT

-- PRESIDENT DUVALIER WAS EVACUATED OUT OF HAITI ON BOARD A SOLL II C-141
-- PRESIDENT MARCOS FLEW FROM HIS PALACE TO CLARK AB IN ONE OF OUR RESCUE H-3S AND FLEW FROM CLARK TO GUAM IN ONE OF OUR C-9 MEDIVAC AIRPLANES

+ THE POINT IS, WHEN YOU THINK OF AIRLIFT SUPPORTING A CINC, YOU MUST NOT THINK OF AIRLIFT AS AN AIRPLANE; YOU MUST THINK OF IT AS A SYSTEM THAT INCLUDES SEVERAL AIRPLANES ... ALL AT THE BECK AND CALL OF THE CINC

- AND SUDDENLY THE CLASSIC DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS BECOME BLURRED.

- IT'S NOT A MATTER OF A FEW AIRPLANES, OR A TYPE OF AIRPLANE FOR A GIVEN MISSION,

-- IT INDEED IS A SYSTEM OF AIRPLANES THAT CAN BE USED ACROSS THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT.

- THIS AIRLIFT SYSTEM GIVES MAC THE ABILITY TO TAILOR A FORCE TO A CINC.


+ WE OFTEN USE THE TERM "WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY" TO DESCRIBE THE TIMEFRAME IN WHICH THE COMBAT COMMANDER CAN ACT WITH A STRONG FORCE TO PREVENT OR DEFEAT A POTENTIAL THREAT

- THAT "WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY" IS THE TIME WE WILL HAVE TO LIMIT THE INTENSITY OF A WAR
-- THE TIME WE WILL HAVE TO END HOSTILITIES BY EMPLOYING THE RIGHT MIX OF FORCES THAT WON'T CREATE OR RISK ESCALATION

- IT'S IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT THE LENGTH OF THIS "WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY," BUT ONE THING FOR SURE -- THE COMMANDER MUST HAVE THE RIGHT FORCES AT THE RIGHT PLACE AND AT THE RIGHT TIME.

-- BECAUSE OF ITS SPEED, RANGE, FLEXIBILITY, AND RESPONSIVENESS, THE AIRLIFT SYSTEM IS THE ONLY MOBILITY SYSTEM WITH THAT CAPABILITY

+ NOW AS YOU CONSIDER THIS "AIRLIFT SYSTEM," THE BEST WAY TO DETERMINE HOW MUCH AND WHAT KIND OF AIRLIFT WILL BE NEEDED, YOU HAVE TO BREAK THE SYSTEM DOWN INTO ITS THREE KEY ELEMENTS:

- FIRST OF ALL, THE AIRCREWS

- SECOND, THE AIRPLANES AND THE EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO SUPPORT THOSE AIRPLANES

- AND THIRD, BUT NOT THIRD TO ANY OF THESE, THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF BOTH, INDIVIDUALLY AND TOGETHER

+ AS WE SIZE THE AIRCREWS FOR OUR FUTURE AIRLIFT, WE HAVE TO BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT OUR CREW RATIOS ... THAT WE DON'T GET THEM TOO LOW AND THAT THE MIX BETWEEN ACTIVE AND RESERVE IS CORRECT. THERE ARE RECURRING PRESSURES TO ALTER BOTH
- BUT BOTH OUR ACTIVE AND RESERVE AIRCREWS ARE OF THE HIGHEST QUALITY WE'VE EVER HAD...MEN AND WOMEN WHO PROVIDE US A QUALITATIVE EDGE OVER OUR POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES

-- THE SOVIETS HAVE PROVEN THEY ARE FULLY CAPABLE OF REVERSE-ENGINEERING EVEN THE MOST TECHNICAL AND ADVANCED OF OUR WEAPON SYSTEMS AND HARDWARE

--- BUT THE ONE THING THEY CAN'T REVERSE ENGINEER IS THE COMMITMENT, DEDICATION, SPIRIT, AND PROFESSIONALISM OF OUR PEOPLE

- OUR FLEXIBILITY RESIDES IN THE INHERENT CAPABILITY OF OUR AIRCREWS

-- IF WE ALWAYS DID EVERYTHING AS WE PLANNED TO DO -- IF OUR PLANS WERE ALWAYS PERFECT -- THEN OUR PEOPLE COULD FOLLOW THOSE PLANS BY THE NUMBERS, AND WE'D NEVER FAIL

--- BUT THAT NEVER HAPPENS, AND I'M HERE TO TELL YOU AS A MILITARY MAN THAT IS NEVER GOING TO HAPPEN

--- IN FACT, OUR AIRCREWS HAVE TO FOLLOW THE SECOND, THIRD, OR FOURTH BEST DECISION

-- THEY ARE THE ONES THAT GIVE MUCH OF THE FLEXIBILITY TO THE AIRLIFT SYSTEM

--- AND WE MUST NEVER LOSE SIGHT OF THIS

+ TO MAXIMIZE THIS KEY ELEMENT -- OUR AIRCREWS -- YOU NEED

- THE RIGHT AIRPLANES, THAT WORK,

- AND A COMMAND AND CONTROL CAPABILITY THAT IS FLAWLESS
+ COMMAND AND CONTROL OF MAC'S AIRLIFT AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN THE FUTURE WILL BE A TOUGH REQUIREMENT BECAUSE WE FACE TWO CONFLICTING DEMANDS

- ON ONE HAND WE FACE AND WILL FACE CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS ON A TRULY GLOBAL SCALE

-- AND CONTROLLING THESE OPERATIONS WILL BE MORE COMPLEX AS WE EMPHASIZE OUR ABILITY TO OPERATE IN A TACTICAL AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT AND FOR THE MOST PART UNDER PEACETIME RULES.

- ON THE OTHER HAND, WE'VE TAKEN A LOT OF HITS FROM OUR CREWS --AND OTHERS -- ABOUT "MOTHER MAC" DIRECTING EVERYTHING -- FROM THE TOP

-- NOTHING COULD BE FARTHER FROM THE TRUTH

- TO RECONCILE THESE TWO CONFLICTING DEMANDS OF IMPROVED C² AND IMPROVED LOCAL FLEXIBILITY...

-- WE'RE GOING TO HAVE-TO KNOW JUST ABOUT EVERYTHING THAT'S GOING ON IF WE'RE TO MANAGE AND NOT WASTE AIRLIFT

-- BUT AT THE SAME TIME, WE'VE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED WHAT INFORMATION NEEDS TO BE AT WHICH ECHELON.

- WE MUST PROVIDE A SYSTEM THAT MAKES SURE INFORMATION FLOWS BOTH WAYS, AND IN A REDUNDANT FASHION

-- THAT SYSTEM DOES NOT EXIST TODAY

--- AND YOU CAN THEREFORE ASSUME THAT WE WASTE AIRLIFT
WE'RE TAKING SEVERAL STEPS TO AMEND THAT. SOME OF THE MAJOR ONES INCLUDE:

- THE GLOBAL DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM, A JCS-SPONSORED PROJECT THAT WILL SERVE AS THE PROTOTYPE FOR THE DOD’S COMMAND CENTER

  -- THE ADVANTAGE OF THIS IS THAT IT WILL INTERACT WITH THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS OF THE OTHER CINCs WE SUPPORT AND TAKE THE BURDEN OFF OF THEM AND THEIR COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

BUT HAVING A STATE-OF-THE-ART COMMAND CENTER WON’T DO ANY GOOD UNLESS WE CAN COMMUNICATE WITH THE PEOPLE OUT IN THE FIELD

TO CONTROL MAC’S TOTAL SYSTEM, WE HAVE INITIATED A HIGH-PRIORITY PROGRAM

- THAT SPANS THE GAMUT FROM MERGING COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, TO ESTABLISHING LOCAL NETWORKS AT THE WINGS, TO PUTTING DEPLOYABLE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS IN THE FIELD.

- WE’RE ADDING SECURE VOICE, ANTI-JAMMING AND EMP PROTECTION TO UPGRADE COMMUNICATIONS WITH OUR PEOPLE IN THE FIELD AND WITH THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

WE HAVE A WIDE NUMBER OF C2 PROJECTS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE MAC’S AIRLIFT AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES.
- AND ALTHOUGH COMMAND AND CONTROL WILL PLAY A VITAL ROLE IN BRINGING MAC TO THE RIGHT PLACE AT THE RIGHT TIME

-- WE ALSO HAVE TO HAVE THE EQUIPMENT TO DO THAT JOB.

+ AS WE EXAMINE HOW MUCH AND WHAT KIND OF ARLIFT WE WILL NEED IN THE FUTURE, WE FACE MANY HARD QUESTIONS ABOUT THE KIND OF EQUIPMENT WE NEED.

- WE HAVE TWO AREAS OF GREAT CONCERN ABOUT THE EQUIPMENT WE WILL BE USING IN THE FUTURE

- FIRST OF ALL IS SPECIAL OPERATIONS

-- WE HAVE 88 PROGRAMS FUNDED AND UNDERWAY NOW TO IMPROVE SPECIAL OPERATIONS

--- INCLUDING THE COMBAT TALON II, THE ENHANCED HH-53S AND NEW GUNSHIPS

--- AND ALL THESE 88 PROGRAMS WILL GIVE US THE FLEXIBILITY TO SHORTEN THE PLANNING CYCLE AND MEET THAT IMPORTANT WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY.

---- AND WITH THIS, A STRUCTURAL CHANGE TO ACCEPT AND GUARANTEE THE SUCCESS OF THIS GROWTH

--- WE HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO

+ HOWEVER, IT'S A GREAT CONCERN TO ME HOW WELL OUR ARLIFT FORCES WILL BE ABLE TO MEET THOSE WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY IN THE FUTURE.
- I have read articles written by those who bill themselves, in various forums, as experts in airlift,

  -- People who would have us buy additional C-5Bs and wish the problem away.

- Our country cannot afford that...the military airlift command does not believe in that solution

  -- In meeting our 66 MTM/D goal, operating a fleet of C-17s will take $5,000 people less than trying to meet that goal with a fleet of C-5s

  -- And calculating life cycle costs, the C-17 option costs $16 billion less than a comparable C-5 option

- This command and the Air Force have stated the need; the separate services have unanimously supported that statement of need

  -- The process has been deliberate and painstaking

- We have designed an airplane for the need, and that's the C-17

  -- Now we need to quit debating that, and delaying that, and start building it

- Had the decision been made correctly, we would have been flying the C-17 this year

  -- And ask any one of the combat cincs what this would do for them

  -- As the commander in chief of MAC, it would not only give me added capability, it would be the most responsible way to do business.
--- FROM LIFE CYCLE COSTS

--- TO PEOPLE COSTS

--- TO COMBAT CAPABILITY

+ THE C-17 MUST BECOME A REALITY; IT HAS THE TECHNOLOGY THAT'S ALREADY PROVEN...IT IS NOT JUST A PAPER AIRPLANE AND ITS USES -- ONCE IN PRODUCTION -- ARE CONSTRAINED ONLY BY IMAGINATION

- ITS ENGINES ARE FLYING TODAY ON THE BOEING 757

-- AND FROM OCTOBER 1984 UNTIL THE C-17'S IOC IN EARLY 1992, THIS ENGINE WILL ACCUMULATE ABOUT 6 MILLION HOURS


-- WHICH GIVES US THE ABILITY TO REDUCE THE CREW SIZE TO THREE PEOPLE -- THAT'S 1/2 THE PRESENT SIZE

+ IT WILL GIVE THE AIRLIFT SYSTEM NEW SPEED, RANGE, FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS,

- AND WILL ALLOW US TO MEET THE UNEXPECTED CHALLENGES WE WILL FACE AS WE APPROACH THE 21ST CENTURY.
Yet, you can safely predict that there will be greater demands for airlift in the future than planners will be willing to fund prior to a conflict.

-- This has been the pattern in the past, and it may be the pattern in the future

-- But the time to think of the 21st century is now...as we are doing at this symposium

How much airlift we will need in the future depends on what your vision of the future is.

- Much of our defense planning is driven by the need to deter high intensity wars -- such as between NATO and the Warsaw Pact

-- And there is no reason for complacency in planning for this type of conflict

--- Because how well we keep the Soviets from seeking direct military confrontation will depend on the quality of Western forces and on Soviet perceptions of Western unity and resolve

But when you think about how much and what kind of airlift is enough, it is just as important to examine our ability to deal with lower levels of conflict as well.

- Michael Howard, the noted British military historian, suggests that in the future, land warfare between the nuclear powers may become more a matter of posturing and maneuvering than of actual fighting.
HE STATES THAT LAND WARFARE MAY BECOME SOMETHING LIKE WARFARE IN THE DAYS BEFORE NAPOLEON, IN WHICH

"MEN WHO HAD MUCH TO LOSE AND LITTLE TO GAIN FROM WAR...FEARFULLY COMMITTED THEIR FORCES TO BATTLE AND MANEUVERED THEM CAUTIOUSLY."

- IN THIS TYPE OF WORLD THEN, WHERE MANEUVERING BECOMES A SUBSTITUTE FOR FIGHTING, THE MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND MAY WELL BECOME THE STABILITY FORCE OF THE AIR FORCE

-- MAC PROVIDES OUR COUNTRY THE ABILITY TO REACT VERY QUICKLY AND STABILIZE SOME VERY UNSTABLE PLACES.

+ IN THAT TYPE OF WORLD -- WITH THREATS ON A TRULY GLOBAL SCALE -- IT WILL BE VERY HARD TO TELL THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL USE OF AIRLIFT

- IN THAT TYPE OF WORLD, THE C-17 -- A STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL AIRPLANE -- WILL GIVE OUR LEADERS THE ABILITY TO USE TROOPS STATIONED AT FT BRAGG AS A STABILIZING INFLUENCE OVER THE TURMOIL IN THE MIDDLE EAST

- THE C-17 WILL GIVE US THE CAPABILITY TO USE A LINE OF TANKS IN A DEPOT AT ANNISTON, ALABAMA TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF A BATTLE IN EUROPE

+ THIS KIND OF WARFARE, IN A WORLD OF MANEUVERING AND POSTURING IS TAILOR MADE FOR MAC’S STABILITY FORCE.

+ AS THE CINCs STRUGGLE IN POSTURING AND MANEUVERING THEIR FORCES TO MEET THAT "WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY" --

-- SO THAT THEY MAY PREVENT BATTLE OR THAT THEY MAY SURELY WIN BATTLE --
-- THEY MUST HAVE UNRESTRAINED MOBILITY AND FLEXIBILITY

-- THEY WON'T CARE IF IT'S CALLED TACTICAL OR STRATEGIC AILIFT OR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AILIFT; THEY ONLY CARE THAT IT WILL DO WHAT THEY WANT IT TO DO.

- I'VE HEARD IT SAID THAT DEFINITIONS ARE THE PLAYPENS OF SMALL MINDS

-- IT'S NOT MY INTENT -- AS THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF MAC -- TO DEFINE THE ARENA

--- IT'S MY INTENT TO TAILOR THE FORCE FOR THE CINCS SO THEY CAN USE IT, NOT BE BURDENED BY IT

+ IT'S NOT GOING TO BE EASY

- IT'S DIFFICULT TO DEFINE, MORE SO TO DEFEND

- BUT I AM REALLY UPBEAT ABOUT THE TASK AT HAND -- I AM OPTIMISTIC

- WE'LL HAVE TO COMPETE FOR RESOURCES

-- BUT WE ENTER THE COMPETITION WITH THE BELIEF THAT WE ARE FULL PARTNERS IN THE COMBAT ARENA

+ I GUARANTEE YOU WE ARE PREPARED TO ENTER THE FIELD OF INNOVATION FOR THE FUTURE

+ I LOOK FORWARD TO ANSWERING YOUR QUESTIONS DURING THE DISCUSSION PERIOD
END
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