GUY V. HENRY: A STUDY IN MILITARY LEADERSHIP

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART and LEADERSHIP by MARCUS R. ERLANDSON, MAJ, USA B.S., United States Military Academy, 1971 M.A., University of Wisconsin, 1980

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1985

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This study is a biography of Brigadier General Guy V. Henry, Sr. General Henry was a model soldier who served as a commissioned officer from 1861 through 1899. He commanded a Union brigade in the Civil War, actively participated in several of the most significant campaigns of the Indian Wars, commanded a division in the Spanish-American War of 1898, and served as the Military Governor of Puerto Rico. He earned a deserved reputation as a leader and received six brevet promotions and the Congressional Medal of Honor for...
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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B.S., United States Military Academy, 1971
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1985

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

GUY V. HENRY: A STUDY IN MILITARY LEADERSHIP,
By Major Marcus R. Erlandson, USA, 191 pages.

This study is a biography of Brigadier General Guy V. Henry, Sr. General Henry was a model soldier who served as a commissioned officer from 1861 through 1899. He commanded a Union brigade in the Civil War, actively participated in several of the most significant campaigns of the Indian Wars, commanded a division in the Spanish-American War of 1893, and served as the Military Governor of Puerto Rico. He earned a deserved reputation as a leader and received six brevet promotions and the Congressional Medal of Honor for gallantry in battle.

Based upon an analysis of Army leadership development requirements and a thorough examination of General Henry's career, this study concludes that he is a superb role model for current and future Army leaders. His performance profile and personality traits closely match the Army's ideal characteristics for military leaders. This study further concludes that, although most historians have overlooked Henry, he made a significant contribution to American military history. An examination of his career reveals a great deal about the development of Army professionalism during the post Civil War era.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Guy Vernon Henry, Sr., is not a well-known historical figure. In most of the standard historical accounts of the United States Army of the later half of the nineteenth century, his name is only casually mentioned, if at all. This is unfortunate because he was a model Army officer who played a significant role in American military history. This study will examine Henry's life and hopefully show that he is an individual whom posterity should remember and Army officers should endeavor to emulate.

In a career spanning the years from 1861 through 1899, Guy Henry commanded a Union Brigade in the Civil War, actively participated in several of the most significant campaigns of the Indian Wars, commanded a division in the Spanish-American War of 1898, and served as the Military Governor of Puerto Rico. Although this list of accomplishments is impressive, more noteworthy is the outstanding manner in which Henry performed his duties. He received six brevet promotions for gallantry in the Civil War and the Indian Wars, and he earned the Congressional Medal of Honor at the Battle of Cold Harbor. He made a profound impression on many of his superiors. After observing Henry's duty performance for nearly thirty years, General Wesley Merritt wrote:

The only difficulty I find writing a letter setting forth your character as a soldier is describing adequately your brilliant record in the service without running the risk of being accused of flattery. Your leading qualities: as a
soldier are devotion to duty, courage in its execution, whether on the field of battle, on the march, or in garrison, and a rectitude of purpose in all the concerns of life. The events which illustrate these characteristics on your part are familiar matters of history and I need not recount them. In short I know of no officer in the service who in point of energy, ability and honesty of purpose, is more highly regarded by the service than yourself."

Another of his superiors, General Oliver O. Howard, wrote: "Probably there is no officer of the Army more indefatigable in the performance of duty than Major and Brevet Colonel Guy V. Henry." The historian Cyrus Townsend Brady was more poetic when he described his friend Henry in his book *Indian Fights and Fighters*: "He was the knightliest soldier I ever met, and I have met many. He was one of the humblest Christians I ever knew, and I have known not a few."

While widely admired by his contemporaries, Henry has been almost totally forgotten by posterity. Despite his remarkable record virtually nothing has been written about him in the past eighty years. His most extensive biography to date is a mere chapter in Cyrus Brady's book first published in 1904. One objective of this thesis is to secure Henry's rightful place in history. This would be reason enough to write his story, but it is hoped that this study may accomplish one additional objective - establish Henry as a character model for current and future Army leaders. This thesis is a biography of Guy Henry, and, more specifically, it is a study in leadership.

A revival of interest in developing leadership is currently underway within the United States Army. Secretary of the Army, John O. Marsh, Jr., and Army Chief of Staff, General John A. Wickham, Jr., have declared 1985 as the year of Army leadership. In an open letter to the Army, dated December 1, 1984, General Wickham wrote: "Our mutual task
is to assure that Today's Proud and Ready Army continues to improve. The resources are there: the quality of leadership will make the difference.* Furthermore, General Wickham stated that he believed: "Leaders are made, not born." The Army is intent on developing leaders, and one of the most effective methods it has found is to direct its people to study history; particularly the history of exemplary soldiers who exhibited the traits that the Army wishes to see reflected in the present generation of leaders. 6

The authors of the current edition of the Army's Field Manual 22-100, Military Leadership, were fully aware of the usefulness of historical role models in developing leaders. 7 They selected two outstanding leaders, Colonel Joshua Chamberlain and Sergeant Alvin York, and used them extensively throughout the manual to illustrate desirable leadership qualities. Certainly these soldiers were outstanding leaders and are worthy of emulation. They both lack one characteristic, however, which makes them less than ideal role models for the regular Army. Unlike Guy Henry, neither Chamberlain nor York were career soldiers. They are superb examples of the American citizen soldier, the patriot who steps forth in times of national emergency to take up arms in defense of his country and his beliefs.

All soldiers can learn a great deal about leadership by studying the records of Chamberlain and York, but full-time professional soldiers also need examples of fellow regulars with whom they can identify. Regular Army leaders need role models who made a career of serving their country in the Army during both peace and war, thereby subjecting themselves to the special challenges that confront
professional soldiers. The American regular has not enjoyed the romantic image and popularity among his countrymen that is the heritage of his citizen soldier counterpart. Perhaps no single figure in American cultural history has as diverse an image as the professional military leader. Throughout its history, America has had a contradictory and unstable view of military leaders. At any point in the nation's past there have been factions who viewed all professional soldiers as corrupt, incompetent, or excessively bellicose, while other elements of society admired their heroism, fidelity, and efficiency. If the Army wants its own soldiers, not to mention the rest of society, to have a favorable view of professional Army leaders, it needs to identify exemplary regulars and present them as role models in its leadership development program.

The first step that the Army must take in identifying exemplary regular Army leaders is determining the essential qualities of its ideal role model. Unfortunately, America's pluralistic society has failed to provide the Army with consistent guidance. Through its government, the American public has for two centuries told its soldiers what it wants them to do, but it has seldom, if ever, told them what it wants them to be.

Recognizing the need to codify its fundamental ideals of leadership, the Army has published what it calls the "Army ethic" in its primary field manual, FM 100-1. Adhering closely to what it views as the traditions of democratic society and the American Constitutional heritage, the Army has identified four fundamental and enduring values for military service: loyalty to the institution, loyalty to the unit,
personal responsibility, and selfless service. In addition the Army has identified four professional soldierly qualities which it considers essential to success on the battlefield: commitment to some purpose larger than oneself, competence, candor, and courage. A key characteristic of the Army's soldierly qualities and the Army ethic is the inherent recognition that, despite the ambivalence of the American public, soldiers and their leaders must carry out their duties in a manner approved by society. Americans want their Army to win all its battles but will not tolerate any serious violation of the society's fundamental norms. In the Army, as in every profession, the standards are set by the members, but, in the case of Army professionals, their standards for ethics and character must be even higher than those of the society which they serve.

General Wickham, in his December 1, 1984 letter, attempted to clarify further the ethical foundations of Army leadership. While reinforcing the philosophy promulgated by FM 100-1, he identified character as the prime element of leadership. He quoted George Washington, who said: "War must be carried on systematically, and to do it you must have men of character activated by principles of honor." According to Wickham, the primary focus in Army leadership training will be character development.

From this brief review of current Army leadership doctrine, we may conclude that the ideal model of any Army leader would be a career regular with impeccable character who adhered to the Army ethic and possessed all of the essential soldierly qualities. Additionally, it would be preferable if the role model had served primarily in lower
level leadership positions with which the typical developing leader can empathize.

As one might imagine, it is a difficult proposition to find a single individual who embodied all of the desirable qualities of the Army leader role model. Although the American Army has a wealth of former career soldiers who are widely admired, many of them possessed character traits that one would not want future leaders to emulate, or, in other cases, gained their reputations while serving at the highest command levels. Guy Henry, however, is one soldier who closely approached the ideal. Overall, his character was outstanding. He adhered to the Army ethic and possessed an abundant quantity of each of the essential soldierly qualities. For thirty years he commanded units of battalion size or smaller and served in staff positions at a comparable level of responsibility.

What follows is a brief biography of Guy Henry that focuses on his attributes as a military leader. During his military career Henry had fifty-five duty assignments, served in twenty campaigns and expeditions, and fought in more than twenty battles and engagements. Because he led such a full life, it is impossible to write his definitive biography within the confines of this study. Therefore, this work is a biographical survey which concentrates on the most significant episodes of Henry's life, particularly those which illustrate his character. Many of the minor details of his life, while no doubt of interest, are omitted.

This study endeavors to evaluate Guy Henry's qualification as a leadership role model by analyzing his values, behavior, and most
importantly, character. Despite his relative obscurity, the primary sources of information on Henry are extensive. Although there are no Guy Henry memoirs or extensive diaries extant, he left several letters and published many articles and books. The examination of these sources provides considerable insight into his leadership qualities. Since Henry was a man of action more than words, it is important to analyze his contemporaries' descriptions and evaluations of his performance. Fortunately, these sources are also abundant, enabling this study to make them the prime focus of analysis.

There is a tendency among biographers to be overly sympathetic toward their subjects, particularly when one of the author's objectives is to present the subject as a role model for others to emulate. This author is fully aware of this pitfall, but hopefully achieves objectivity in this study by reporting and analyzing Henry's failures and flaws as well as his accomplishments. Of course, there are lessons to be learned about leadership by studying any leader's shortcomings. One must not conclude, however, that any leader can serve as a satisfactory role model. Army role models must approach the ideal standards. The ultimate test of whether Guy Henry is worthy of emulation is whether his overall performance was exceptional.
ENDNOTES


Major General Guy V. Henry, Jr. is probably more widely remembered than his father, although he also deserves greater recognition. The younger Henry was the captain of America's gold medal equistrian team in the 1912 Olympics, a division commander during World War I, Commandant of the United States Military Academy, Chief of Cavalry, and the United States representative on the Canadian-American Board during World War II. See "A Brief Life of Guy V. Henry, Jr.," Guy V. Henry, Jr. Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; and "Guy V. Henry, Jr.," The National Cyclopedia of American Biography, 1973, LIV, 217-218.

2 Merritt to Henry, April 3, 1890, AGO Commission Branch file (M1118-C3-1864) National Archives, roll 98, microfilm publication M1064; hereafter cited as Henry-AGO file.

3 Howard to Henry, April 2, 1890, Henry-AGO file. This letter and the Merritt letter are but two examples of the numerous letters of commendation in Henry's official personnel file.


13Wickham is not the first Chief of Staff to declare that character is the prime element of leadership. See for example Matthew B. Ridgway, "Leadership", *Military Review*, 56 (October 1966), 40-49.

14According to an article ("Pay Homage to Gen. Henry", *New York Times*, October 30, 1899, p.10), Henry was writing his memoirs with the assistance of Henry Harrison Lewis at the time of his death. His wife asked Mr. Lewis to finish the memoirs and publish them. The National Union Catalog lists no such book nor are there any unpublished manuscripts in any of the collections of Henry's papers that the author has been able to locate.

Henry did keep a journal for a few weeks in October 1874. This document is in the possession of Henry's granddaughter, Mrs. Patricia Williams.
CHAPTER 2

THE MAKING OF A LEADER

Guy V. Henry was born March 9, 1839 at Fort Smith in Indian Territory. He was destined to spend most of his life as he came into it, in the Army and on the frontier. His father, Brevet Major William Seton Henry, was a West Point graduate of the class of 1835 and at the time a lieutenant in the 3rd Infantry. Guy had a number of distinguished ancestors. His father was the nephew of Mother Elizabeth Seton: America’s first canonized saint, and the half-brother of Admiral Charles Wilkes, the discoverer of the Anartic Continent and captain of the Federal vessel that instigated the Trent Affair during the Civil War. Guy’s mother, the former Arietta Livingston Thompson, was the granddaughter of Smith Thompson, a former Secretary of the Navy and United States Supreme Court Justice, and Daniel Tompkins, a Governor of New York and later the Vice-President of the United States under Monroe.

From birth until his father’s death in 1851, Guy and his mother followed his father on duty assignments to Florida, Louisiana, Kansas, Texas, and New York City. Even during the early stages of the Mexican War, families lived with the troops. It is not surprising that as far back as he could remember, Guy Henry thought of himself as a soldier. He was only seven years old when he witnessed his first two battles at Rassaca-del-la Palma and Palo Alto. During one of these battles he entered his mother’s tent and found her crying because of friends lost in the battle. "Using soldier language the young man asked what the hell
she was crying for. She forgot her grief and with vigor carried out the thinking of that day "spare the rod and spoil the child."  

As a youngster "Little Guy," as his friends called him, was short and slight, yet, in the words of a boyhood acquaintance, Mandeville Mower, "at this early age Guy Henry gave ample promise of these qualities which made him distinguished in after life, being then noted for his manliness and brightness."  

Gu a Henry's uncle, Smith Thompson, Jr., also recalled him fondly, noting that he was a "very bright boy" but also "very mischievous" and on at least one occasion, stubborn. His father's untimely death curtailed Guy's adolescence by forcing considerable responsibility onto him. At the age of twelve he became the man of the house for his mother and two sisters.

Arietta Henry was exceedingly particular and methodical about raising her children, and she was especially interested in her son's future. Her prime ambition was for Guy to attend West Point. She moved her family to a little place called "Cozy Nook" on the hills behind West Point and entered her son in a Military School in Milford, Connecticut run by a Mr. Everest. Obtaining Guy's appointment to West Point was a bit of a problem. Mrs. Henry might have had considerable political influence had not her grandfathers both died before Guy was old enough to seek an appointment. As it was she knew no one in Congress and therefore elected to take the most direct approach by personally requesting an at large appointment from President Franklin Pierce. In a bitter snow storm she drove to the White House in a sleigh. After considerable consultation, President Pierce promised her the appointment. Her brother, Smith Thompson, Jr., recalled that "as we were leaving the room Mrs.
Henry with tears in her eyes, said, 'Mr. President, don't forget your promise.' In reply the President said to her, 'Madam, if I forget it Mrs. Pierce will be sure to remind me. She is very much interested in your son.'

Throughout Guy's West Point cadetship his mother lived at or near the Academy and remained there until her death in 1886. She never lost her keen interest in her son's career. On at least one occasion during the Civil War she wrote a letter directly to Ulysees S. Grant, Commanding General of the Army, requesting a Brigadier Generalship for her son. No doubt the abiding love for military life and the persistent nature that Guy displayed throughout his life can be traced directly to the influence of his mother.

Guy had to work hard to overcome his indifferent early education and thereby prepare himself for West Point's tough academic regime. He taught school in order to perfect his own academic skills while simultaneously working as a messenger and mail carrier in order to help support himself. His record as a West Point cadet was mediocre. He stood at the middle of his class in virtually every subject, excelling only in English and Spanish, and finishing second from the bottom in drawing and in Dennis Hart Mahan's famous military engineering course for seniors. Guy held no rank higher than cadet private, but was never a serious discipline problem. His final overall class standing was twenty-seventh out of a class of forty-five enabling him to obtain a commission as a second lieutenant in the 1st Artillery.

The West Point class of 1861 was the last class with a five year curriculum. The Academy graduated the class a month early on May 6 due
to the pressing need for trained officers to wage the Civil War. One month later the Academy graduated a second class of 1861 by releasing the junior class a year early. The first class of 1861 was one of the most distinguished in Academy history. More than a quarter of the class attained the rank of general and five earned the Congressional Medal of Honor. Henry DuPont, Adelbert Ames, Emory Upton, and Judson Kilpatrick were some of the noteworthy graduates of the May class of 1861 but an even more famous soldier graduated last in the June class of 1861, George Armstrong Custer. From the beginning the careers of Guy Henry and George Custer displayed many parallels. Their early career accomplishments were similar but their character and personality were always quite different.

Lieutenant Henry's first assignment was drilling volunteers in Washington, D.C. This rather mundane duty had one interesting interlude in July 1861 when Guy served as an aide-de-camp to General Irvin McDowell during the First Battle of Bull Run. In December 1861 he transferred to the Department of the South which turned out to be a somewhat unfortunate turn. While it did give him an opportunity to participate in some action, he ended up spending the bulk of the war in a far less active theater of operations than many of his contemporaries such as Upton and Custer. Henry commanded a company at Key West, Florida for the next six months but saw no combat action. His first experience as a combat leader came on October 22, 1862 when he commanded a section of the 1st United States Artillery in a bombardment near Pocotaligo River, South Carolina for which he won the commendation of Brigadier General John M. Brannan and a brevet for "gallant and
distinguished conduct. Throughout the next twelve months Henry commanded Battery B, 1st United States Artillery, in several engagements, including the bombardment of Ft. Sumter in August and the siege of Ft. Wagner from July through September 1863.

On November 9, 1863, Guy Henry’s career received a dramatic boost when he accepted the appointment as Colonel of the 40th Massachusetts Regiment of Volunteers. At the age of twenty-four, with only two years of commissioned service, Henry became the commander of a regiment of veterans. Due to the acute shortage of trained officers it was not uncommon for very junior regular Army officers to assume volunteer commands several levels above their regular rank. At the time Henry assumed command of a regiment, Adelbert Ames and Emory Upton were already brigade commanders. Judson Kilpatrick commanded a cavalry division, with Custer as one of his brigade commanders. All of these officers had performed brilliantly during the early stages of the war but owed their positions as much to political savvy and powerful friends as they did to battlefield acumen. Most of Henry’s contemporaries, and many officers senior to him, advanced little beyond their regular commission ranks despite comparable demonstrations of heroism and competence. During 1862 both Ames and Upton used political connections to obtain command of volunteer regiments from their home states. Kilpatrick, the most politically astute of the lot, realized early that the shortest path to promotion lay in the volunteer service. He obtained his first volunteer commission on May 9, 1861, only three days after his graduation. Custer used all of the political pull he could muster to obtain command of the 7th Michigan Cavalry. He failed in this effort but
nonetheless vaulted ahead of his peers by cultivating the favor of powerful patrons. He was in turn the favored aide of General-in-Chief George McClellan, and Generals Alfred Pleasonton and Philip Sheridan commanders of the Union Cavalry Corps. Custer went directly from being a junior aide-de-camp to the command of a cavalry brigade. Guy Henry lacked the taste for politics and at the time had no powerful patrons.\(^{17}\) His ascent to regimental command was mostly a case of being in the right place at the right time. Since joining the Department of the South, Henry had performed all of his duties in an outstanding manner. Although he had spent the majority of this tour in command of Battery B, 1st United States Artillery, he briefly commanded a battalion during General David Hunter's advance on Charleston in April 1863, and in June 1863 he served as acting Chief of Artillery for the Department. The event that provided Henry's opportunity for advancement was the sudden, unexpected resignation of Colonel Burr Porter, who elected to return to the regular service. The 40th Massachusetts had first begun mustering in August 1862. Thus far in the war it had seen little action and all of its officers except Colonel Porter were inexperienced volunteers.\(^{18}\) The Regiment's division commander, Brigadier General George Gordon, and its brigade commander, Brigadier General Adelbert Ames, recommended Henry for the command to Governor John Andrew, and their recommendations were favorably endorsed by Major General Quincy Gillmore, the Department Commander.\(^{19}\) Henry's superiors were motivated by their perceived need for a regular Army officer, who was at least well-versed in drill and regulations, to command the regiment. Although Ames was Henry's classmate,
friendship did not influence him because he personally did not like Henry.20

Henry assumed command of the 40th Massachusetts on November 11, 1863, and initially was not well-received by the men. According to Charles Currier, one of the junior officers of the Regiment: "With the advent of Col. Henry, there was for a time, a friction which seemingly boded no good to the regiment, for while it had previously been looked upon as a model of good discipline, it was, in the estimation of our new commander, far beneath its proper standard."21 Frank T. Howe, another veteran recalled Henry's introduction to the regiment. "I remember the first day that he took command of the regiment and appeared at dress parade. He was a slim, sharp-featured man, with a keen eye, and every movement betokened the thoroughly drilled soldier. His voice had a keen, quick ring and every command meant business."22

The new Colonel lost no time in establishing his own high standards for the regiment. Henry was particularly concerned with the health of his men. He realized that disease and lesser forms of illness were a far greater cause of casualties during the Civil War than bullets and artillery rounds, and that a genuine concern for the welfare of his men was a necessary precondition for his commanding their respect and obedience. Charles Currier recalled that:

There was in connection with the most trivial of our duties, a system which all soon came to admire, in as much as it involved a personal responsibility which required the superior to jealously guard and look closely after the rights of the inferior. If tainted meat or mouldy bread was received, it was at once returned, and food of good quality substituted. Likewise with clothing, and stores of all kinds, and woe to the officer who failed of his duty toward the men of his command. That the men might as far as possible be protected from the nightly miasmatic exhalations..."
from the soil, all tents were by order stockaded and bunks supplied; water for drinking or for use in the cook-house was first boiled; all frying pans in the regiment were collected and destroyed, and no fried food of any kind was permitted to be served. Lime juice and curried cabbage were also occasionally added to our rations, with a view to counteracting and preventing scorbutic diseases.23

Henry's actions quickly produced the desired effects. He kept his men off the sick rolls, and he simultaneously earned their respect. By devoting the same attention to detail to tactical field training, Henry significantly improved the efficiency of the regiment. His men were delighted to discover that systematic training actually lightened their duties.

Colonel Henry had more difficulty overcoming the resistance of the volunteers to his standards of discipline. Even by regular Army standards, Henry was a strict disciplinarian. Although never unjust, at first his punishments were both frequent and severe. But "as time wore on, and the regiment became more accustomed to regular army methods, criticism and punishments became less frequent, and better feeling prevailed." Once he had gained the respect and unquestioned obedience of his men, it was not long before he earned their admiration. For as Charles Currier fondly recollected, "the Fortieth .... soon attained, under its new commander, a reputation which made it famous throughout the department, particularly among regular officers, who often came to witness the drills and parades of 'Guy Henry's regiment,' as they termed it."24

The fact that Henry so quickly assumed total control of a regiment was a remarkable accomplishment for such a young officer. He obviously possessed extraordinary potential as a leader, but he still had a great
deal to learn. Henry had developed one questionable habit. He occasion-
ally reprimanded his officers in the presence of their men. In the
future this practice would cost him dearly on at least one occasion.25

The first two months of Colonel Henry’s command were relatively
peaceful. Except for participation in a short, fruitless raid to Kiawah
and John’s Islands two days after Henry assumed command, the regiment
spent all of its time in garrison duties and training on Folly Island
off the coast of South Carolina. In the middle of January, General
Gillmore issued orders for a competition to be held among all of the
department’s infantry regiments. Gillmore was preparing for an expedi-
tion to Florida and needed additional cavalry. He decided that the regi-
ment that graded the highest in inspection would be mounted and detailed
to go on the expedition. This was a prize worth fighting for. "Just
think of it boys," one of Henry’s soldiers exclaimed, "every man on
horseback! No salt pork then but chicken three times a day,...26 Every
man in the regiment, taking advantage of his new found pride and
efficiency, put his full effort into winning the competition. The
inspecting officer was a regular Army major who had recently joined
General Gillmore’s staff. After thoroughly inspecting the entire regi-
ment, he turned to Captain Edward Giddings (in temporary command) and
said, "give my compliments to Col. Henry and say to him that his regi-
ment is the finest I’ve seen since I left Washington." The 40th
Massachusetts "won the spurs" and immediately departed for mounted
training at Hilton Head.27

Training his soldiers for mounted operations proved to be a
serious challenge for Henry. Many of his men had never ridden and the
horses were of poor quality. Nevertheless, Henry, with characteristic
determination, plunged into the task and within less than two weeks had
the regiment mounted, equipped, and trained in the rudiments of
horsemanship. Prior to its departure for Florida on February 4th, the
regiment staged an impressive mounted review for General Gillmore. The
General complimented the men on their amazing accomplishment, but as
Henry recalled with some chagrin, Gillmore was unaware that many of the
men were secured to the saddles with gunslings.28

There were a multitude of reasons for launching an expedition to
Florida. The Department of the South was growing restive with the lack
of activity. The six month siege of Charleston had settled into a stale-
mate. Florida seemed to offer General Gillmore an opportunity to produce
some worthwhile accomplishments within his geographical area of respon-
sibility. His plan was to land a division sized force near Jacksonville,
secure the west bank of the St. Johns River and then penetrate a hundred
miles inland to the Suwannee River. He speculated that such an action
would procure an outlet for cotton, timber, turpentine, and other
products; eliminate one of the rebels' vital sources of food supplies;
and obtain recruits for his black regiments. In approving Gillmore's
plan, President Lincoln hoped to accomplish an even more ambitious
objective - the restoration of Florida to the Union. Gillmore antici-
pated little difficulty in accomplishing his objectives since the
Confederacy had no regular troops assigned to the state's defense.29

Gillmore personally commanded the expedition with Brigadier
General Truman Seymour designated as principal invasion force commander.
Seymour's provisional division numbered about 8,000 and consisted of
three brigades of infantry and one mounted brigade. Gillmore appointed Colonel Henry as commander of the mounted brigade. It consisted of the Independent Battalion Massachusetts Cavalry, his own 40th Massachusetts mounted infantry regiment, and Horse Battery B, 1st United State Artillery, his original command. The mounted brigade was referred to as the Light Brigade or Henry's Brigade. Upon arrival in Florida the 40th Massachusetts became further prepared for service by exchanging its muzzle loading rifles for the Spencer repeating carbines of the 7th New Hampshire Infantry.

General Seymour lost little time in attempting to accomplish his mission. The Light Brigade disembarked at Jacksonville on February 7th against slight resistance, and set off toward Baldwin the following day. Henry's mission was to lead the advance. At about 11 o'clock in the evening he encountered enemy infantry forming a line of battle at Camp Finegan, seven miles from Jackson. His prime objective was to capture an enemy artillery park three miles further west. Not wishing to alert his prey, Henry left a large portion of his force to watch the rebel infantry and quietly crept by with the remainder of his command. Shortly after midnight he reached the artillery park. After a brief reconnaissance, he positioned his force for an attack. Henry ordered his bugler to sound the charge twice and shouted to his men: "If ever you yell in your lives, boys, yell now!" According to the official report, "They charged with a yell that still lingers in the ears of those who heard it." The forward detachment captured six guns completely intact, a large number of prisoners, and a substantial amount of supplies.

Meanwhile
the main body of Henry's force rode down the enemy line at Camp Finegan, capturing additional artillery and supplies.\(^{33}\)

After a brief rest, Colonel Henry pushed the Light Brigade on to Baldwin. They reached the town just at daybreak and immediately charged through it, once again catching the sentinels off-guard. Here they captured another artillery piece, several railroad cars, and supplies valued at over $500,000. Baldwin itself was quite a prize since it was a vital railroad junction. By holding Baldwin, Seymour could cut off all rebel supplies coming from southern and eastern Florida. Realizing he needed to consolidate his gains, Seymour pushed his infantry forward, but ordered Henry to continue to probe further west.\(^{34}\)

The enemy was now fully alerted. On the morning of the 10th, Henry's brigade encountered stiff resistance from a rebel cavalry force dug in along the St. Mary's River at Barber's Ford. The Light Brigade took some casualties but, by flanking the rebels, inflicted greater losses on the enemy.\(^{35}\) When Henry arrived at Sanderson, 10 miles west of Barber's, he discovered that the rebels had set fire to the railroad depot, destroying large quantities of corn, cotton, and resin in order to prevent their capture. After again pausing for only a few hours rest, Henry drove the Light Brigade on until they reached the outskirts of Lake City at about sundown on February 11. Once again they ran into an entrenched rebel force, this time reinforced with artillery and infantry. Henry decided that they had pushed their luck far enough. After having raided nearly sixty miles into rebel territory in little more than three days his men and horses were tired and nearly out of supplies. With minimal losses, the Light Brigade broke contact and
slowly withdrew to the east, arriving at Sanderson and rejoining the infantry on February 12.36

Henry's conduct throughout the operation clearly demonstrated that he was a superb young leader and military tactician. He had extracted the maximum effort from his men without abusing them, and he had exhibited the courage, initiative, and skill that are the hallmarks of successful commanders. It was indeed fortunate that Henry had decided to curtail his raid, for Brigadier General Joseph Finegan, the Confederate commander of the District of East Florida, had decided he would give no further ground. Finegan had concentrated all the forces he could muster, and General G.T. Beauregard, his department commander, had notified him that more troops were on the way. By February 13th, Finegan had a force of about 2,000 entrenched at Olustee, thirteen miles east of Lake City.37 Guy Henry had driven up to, but had not crossed, the fine line that separates boldness from rashness.

Due to an acute shortage of supplies and transportation, Seymour did not feel he could sustain his force at Sanderson. Therefore, he withdrew to Barber's Ford and encamped his entire force.38 To this point the invasion had been a rousing success. Although the Floridians were not yet ready to desert the rebel cause, the Confederacy had been dealt a serious blow. While sustaining only a handful of casualties, the Union forces had severed important lines of communication, destroyed and captured millions of dollars worth of supplies, and taken several pieces of artillery and numerous prisoners. The Light Brigade alone captured three flags, eight artillery pieces, three hundred prisoners, and destroyed or captured rebel property valued at over three million

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dollars. In his official report to the Department Commander, Seymour wrote, "I cannot commend too highly the brilliant success of this advance, for which great credit is due to Colonel Henry and his command, and I earnestly recommend him to your attention as a most deserving and energetic officer." There was no question in General Seymour's mind who was principally responsible for the success of his command.

For the next week Seymour maintained his position at Barber's Ford, and kept Henry's command active conducting patrols and raids. At least for the moment Seymour was convinced that nothing further could be gained by venturing deeper into Florida's interior. General Gillmore agreed. When Gillmore met with Seymour on February 14, they discussed the defenses of Jacksonville, Baldwin, and the South Fork of the St. Mary's (Barber's Ford). Gillmore considered it well understood that there would be no advance without further instructions from him. On February 15, Gillmore traveled to Hilton Head in order to rectify problems in his logistical support system, which seemed to be the principal impediment to continuing the Florida operations.

Gillmore's departure left Seymour in nominal command of the expedition. The combination of boredom and the opportunity for further glory was apparently too much for Seymour to endure. Entirely on his own volition Seymour decided to resume the offensive, against the advice of Colonel Henry and several of his other subordinate commanders. Ostensibly Seymour's reason was that he wished to prevent the rebels from removing the track from the railroad near the Suwannee River west of Lake City, an objective which he himself had previously disavowed as unwise.
On the morning of February 20, Seymour ordered his division to advance on Lake City. He realized that he opposed a force approximately the size of his own, but he believed he could accomplish his objective by seizing the initiative and taking advantage of his superior firepower. In order to move as quickly as possible he marched his three brigades of infantry in column, close behind Henry's mounted brigade. The total force was about 5,500 men, with sixteen field pieces. General Finegan, informed of Seymour's movement by spies, strengthened his position at Olustee. His command numbered about 5,400 men, including about 4,600 infantry, 600 cavalry, and three field batteries (12 guns). Finegan chose his position well. He deployed his force in a line perpendicular to the obvious enemy avenue of approach, along the road and parallel rail line that connected Jacksonville and Lake City. The left of his line was secured by Ocean Pond, a large lake, and his right was anchored by a large cypress swamp.

The Battle of Olustee began shortly after noon on February 20. Henry's mounted brigade made contact with the cavalry screening the Confederate position about four miles east of Olustee. When Finegan discovered that Henry was moving forward cautiously, he feared that the Union forces would not frontally assault his works. He therefore ordered one of his two infantry brigades to deploy forward with his cavalry. The Light Brigade, reinforced by the 7th Connecticut Infantry, became fully engaged with the enemy. Finegan quickly reinforced his forward line with the remainder of his force. When Seymour arrived he concentrated his artillery in the center. He deployed the 7th New Hampshire to the right and the 8th United States Colored Troops to the left of the batteries,
and ordered their advance. The two regiments attacked to within 200 yards of the enemy but were greatly overmatched. After sustaining significant casualties from the galling fire of the rebels, both regiments broke and fled to the rear, leaving the artillery unsupported. Each of the Union batteries lost pieces, except Elder’s Battery of Henry’s command. At this point Seymour was already beaten. He committed his remaining two infantry brigades in turn as they arrived, allowing Finegan to defeat him in detail. As described by one of Henry’s men: “The regiments came up singly, went in cheering, and stayed to be almost annihilated.”

The Light Brigade remained active throughout the battle repulsing counterattacks and protecting the Union flanks. Private Sewall P. Ridly of the Independent Cavalry Battalion recalled that “had it not been for Colonel Henry’s consummate skill in handling the cavalry they would have completely enveloped us.” Henry had three horses shot from under him, one killed by a solid round of artillery. Although his men had previously fought in several engagements, they had never experienced such an intense battle. One of the men of the 40th Massachusetts remembered that after receiving one particularly withering barrage, “Col. Henry came down the line and said, ‘Boys, you did splendidly! I’m proud of you.’ and we were ready to go anywhere with him then. It only showed the interest he felt in us, and we were proud to feel that we were under his command.”

The battle lasted until after dark. At about 7 o’clock Seymour ordered his command to begin to withdraw east, toward Barber’s Ford. He directed the Light Brigade, again reinforced by the 7th Connecticut, to
cover the withdrawal. The Battle of Olustee was a decisive victory for the Confederates. They sustained 946 casualties compared to 1,861 for the Union, but more importantly Seymour felt compelled to withdraw all the way to Jacksonville, thus abandoning the key railroad junction at Baldwin. The Union was able to retain Jacksonville for the remainder of the war but never again ventured into the Florida interior. The Confederate pursuit failed to exploit fully their victory. Although Seymour's command was severely beaten at Olustee it managed to escape destruction. There remains a question of whether this was primarily due to Henry's able rearguard action or a lack of aggression on the part of the Confederate cavalry commander.50

Henry received his second brevet for "Gallant and Meritorious Services" for his behavior at Olustee. Gillmore relieved General Seymour, but not before the latter noted Henry's performance. 'Colonel Henry kept his cavalry in constant activity, watching and neutralizing that of the enemy, and by important and gallant services before and after, as well as during the battle, was eminently useful.'51

Before its departure the Light Brigade fought two additional engagements in Florida. Both occurred during reconnaissance missions to Cedar Creek. In each instance, the enemy force Henry encountered outnumbered his own, yet his brigade inflicted serious damage on the enemy while sustaining only light casualties itself.52

On April 8, 1864, General Gillmore began to redeploy the bulk of his forces to Virginia to support General Ulysses S. Grant's planned offensive against Richmond. Gillmore broke up the Light Brigade and ordered the men to turn in the horses. Colonel Henry departed Florida on
April 22 with the 40th Massachusetts. On April 28th they landed at Gloucester Point, Virginia and reported to General Benjamin Butler, who was then organizing the Army of the James. Butler assigned the 40th Massachusetts to the 1st Brigade, 2d Division, 10th Corps, and appointed Henry the brigade commander.53

While Henry was sailing to Virginia a situation developed which suddenly threatened to terminate his promising career. Brigadier General George H. Gordon, Henry's former division commander, wrote a letter to Massachusetts Governor John Andrew withdrawing his recommendation of Henry for regimental command. Gordon cited no specific reasons other than "the general dissatisfaction of the officers of the 40th Regiment Massachusetts Infantry with Col. Guy V. Henry." He added that he had "been totally deceived in the character of this officer."54 Brigadier General Adelbert Ames, Henry's classmate, endorsed Gordon's letter by likewise withdrawing his recommendation. He was even more vague in explaining his motive. "I still think of him [Henry] a good soldier - but am convinced in my own mind that he is destitute of certain qualities that are absolutely necessary to a person in his or any other responsible position."55

Governor Andrew forwarded the recommendations to the Secretary of War, along with a request that he be allowed to replace Henry as regimental commander with another Colonel of Volunteers. His stated reason was a bit more specific. "He is a young man, and the inexperience incidental to his age, combined with a certain want of tact and want of knowledge of character and human nature renders him an unsuccessful governor of a regiment, certainly as compared with the Colonels for the
most part commissioned for Massachusetts. Stanton replied that he "might revoke the order to leave of absence given Col. Henry to command the regiment, but the established regulations of the Department will not permit the vacancy to be filled if the regiment is below the minimum strength." Since the regiment was indeed below strength, Andrew apparently reconsidered his request. Henry remained the Colonel of the 40th Massachusetts until the end of the War.

The motives for Andrew's, Gordon's, and Ames' change of heart are questionable, particularly after Henry's brilliant performance during the Florida campaign. It is important to note that Gillmore, who was well aware of Henry's accomplishments in Florida, did not withdraw his recommendation and that Gordon and Ames were not at the time in Henry's chain of command. Gordon's charge that Henry's officers were dissatisfied with his performance was groundless. Gordon had no contact with the regiment after its reassignment from his command on January 16, 1864. There is no record that any of Henry's officers or men had a poor opinion of him. On the contrary, according to one former member of the 40th Massachusetts: "Every officer and man in the regiment swore by their colonel, and the name of Guy V. Henry is enshrined in the heart of every veteran of the Fortieth Massachusetts." Governor Andrew was correct in asserting that Henry was young, but after three years of active wartime service he was hardly inexperienced. The Governor probably came closer to the mark when he criticized Henry for a lack of tact. If Henry had a character flaw, it was a penchant for making comments that were better left unsaid. It is likely that a thoughtless comment was the source of this unpleasant affair.

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As Henry trained his infantry regiment for mounted service he was no doubt frustrated by the fact that he was short-handed. He allegedly complained that some of his troops on detached duty had not been allowed to accompany the regiment when it left Gordon's division. This word got back to General Gillmore and infuriated him. He sent a letter to General Gordon stating that he had violated a department order and demanding an explanation. When Gordon returned the letter with an endorsement stating that he had been unjustly and improperly accused, Gillmore ordered his arrest. Gillmore and Gordon had been feuding for some time over Gordon's alleged insubordination. Gordon had made no effort to disguise the fact that he believed Gillmore was an ineffective commander. Gillmore considered this incident the last straw and preferred charges against Gordon. Before he departed for Florida, Henry testified at the court-martial that he had not asked General Gordon to allow him to take the detached soldiers with him. According to Captain John C. Gray, one of Gordon's staff officers, Gordon believed that Henry had instigated the dispute by allowing Gillmore to believe that he had applied for some of his men, and Gordon had refused. There is no evidence that Henry deliberately created such a false impression. He had no motive for damaging the reputation of the man who was partially responsible for his appointment to regimented command. Moreover, whether Henry had asked Gordon for the troops or not was irrelevant, since Gordon was charged with violating a department standing order. Regardless of the facts it appeared as though Henry had crossed General Gordon, and thereby incurred his intense disfavor. If Henry had any complaints he should have made them directly to his former division commander.
The courtmartial dragged on for several months, much to the discomfort of General Gordon. He apparently continued to nurse a grudge against Henry but felt it would be unwise to act until his verdict was decided. Gordon's letter to Governor Andrew corresponds closely to the end of this trial. It is more difficult to explain the motives of Andrew and Ames. Gordon had political ties with Andrew. He was a native of Massachusetts and one of the first officers to be nominated for a volunteer commission by the Governor. Volunteer commissions were a form of patronage, and Andrew incurred no political advantage from having Henry command one of his state's regiments. Ames was Gordon's protege and no doubt wished to continue in his good graces.

One other incident that may have affected Andrew and Ames was the fact that Brigadier General John P. Hatch, Seymour's replacement, had recommended courtmartial charges against Henry for an incident that occurred in Florida. For a short time a Maine regiment was part of Henry's brigade. One night his pickets caught several of the men from that regiment trying to desert. Henry convened a "drum-head courtmartial" and ordered three or more of the men, against whom the evidence was conclusive, shot. General Gillmore did not approve Hatch's recommendation, but word may have gotten back to Governor Andrew. Certainly Ames, a native of Maine and Henry's division commander in Florida after February 25, 1864, was aware of the incident.

Aside from Ames, those for whom Henry worked retained a favorable view of his ability to command. Despite the deserter incident, General Hatch was impressed with Henry's capability for independent command. Hatch ordered Henry to establish and command a new sub-district at St.
These orders were countermanded by orders from General Gillmore transferring Henry and the 40th Massachusetts to the Army of the James. Henry soon found himself in command of a much larger brigade with Gillmore as his corps commander. Those in Henry's chain of command who had the opportunity to observe Henry most closely not only believed he could command a regiment, they were confident in his ability to assume even greater responsibilities.

There is no doubt that Henry was a tough disciplinarian, but he always treated his men fairly and provided for their welfare. Captain Charles Currier, one of Henry's Company Commanders, described his discipline as "sharp, but wholesome." He further stated: "I should not call Gen Henry a martinet, because he always endeavored to do what was right if he was found to be in the wrong, but he would have discipline, and he would have strict obedience to orders." Currier cited an example of an incident where Henry discovered one of his officers asleep at his post. Upon learning the man had been performing double duty, Henry promptly discharged him from arrest. Henry's decision to execute deserters may appear severe, but one must realize that desertion was rampant among some regiments and that execution was a common and often effective method of solving the problem during the Civil War. In recalling the incident, Henry stated that many "bounty jumpers" had escaped from the Maira regiment prior to its joining his command, but that after the executions they had no more bounty jumpers. The 40th Massachusetts had but 13 desertions during the entire war, and not a single soldier ever deserted to the enemy.
The fact that Henry's superiors highly regarded his capability for independent command, was further demonstrated two days after his arrival in Virginia. Major General William F. "Baldy" Smith ordered Henry to take his brigade up the York River and occupy some old fortification at West Point, Virginia, deep in rebel territory. The movement was a diversion that General Butler hoped would allow him to conceal the movement of his army to Bermuda Hundred, a broad peninsula formed by the Appomattox and James Rivers, midway between Richmond and Petersburg. Henry's brigade landed at West Point on May 1 and spent five days conducting patrols and improving the position as a ruse to impress the enemy that they were the advanced guard for a full invasion.71

When Henry's brigade rejoined the Army at Bermuda Hundred, he relinquished his command and resumed his position as Colonel of the 40th Massachusetts. The accession of more senior officers to the Army of the James temporarily forced Henry out of brigade command. Colonel Samuel Alford, formerly the Second Division commander, took over Henry's brigade when Brigadier General John W. Turner assumed command of the division.72 From this point until the end of the war, Henry did not have another opportunity for an independent field command. He would command a brigade again but always as part of a larger operation, which limited his opportunity to display his tactical skill and leadership.

For the remainder of the month of May 1864, Henry and the 40th Massachusetts took part in what became known as the Bermuda Hundred Campaign.73 Butler's Army of the James conducted the campaign as part of Grant's spring offensive in Virginia. Butler's objectives were to sever Confederate supply lines south of Richmond, divert rebel units that
might otherwise join General Robert E. Lee's army opposing Grant, and, if possible, seize Richmond. Henry's regiment spent much of its time entrenched at Bermuda Hundred. They participated in a raid on the Confederate railroad near Chester Station on May 9, and in the major movement toward Richmond which culminated in the Battle of Drewry's Bluff on May 16.

The Confederates had constructed a series of trench lines and fortifications at Drewry's Bluff in order to guard the southern approach to Richmond, west of the James River. Under the false impression that Grant's army was nearing Richmond, on May 12 Butler began an advance from the south toward Drewry's Bluff. He hoped that this massive demonstration would prevent General G.T. Beauregard from reinforcing Lee. Butler's army took some of the rebel outer entrenchments, but by May 16, Beauregard had concentrated a substantial force and promptly launched a counter-attack.

The 40th Massachusetts was deployed near the center of the Union line. The rebels advanced early in the morning under the cover of dense fog, which concealed them until they were within 75 yards of the Federals. Desperate fighting ensued all along the front. Almost immediately the 6th Connecticut, on Henry's right, broke and fled. Henry used the 40th Massachusetts to block the penetration and personally took charge of the 6th Connecticut. With the aid of infilading fire from the 47th New York, the two regiments restored the original line. Meanwhile Colonel Joseph Hawley's brigade, on Henry's left and positioned somewhat in advance of his line, began receiving effective fire on the right from an enemy rifle-pit. According to Hawley's official report: "I opened
communication with Colonel Henry, Fortieth Massachusetts, next on my right, armed with Spencer carbines, and he advanced a portion of his command most handsomely, driving the enemy back (though at the cost of some men), and removing the danger, for which we gratefully thank him. Later in the morning, Henry was forced to withdraw the 40th Massachusetts in order to prevent his left flank from being turned. He reformed his command 100 yards from his original line and charged on enemy formation to his front causing it to break and run. Elsewhere the situation was more critical. General Smith's corps which comprised the Union right had fallen back under severe Confederate pressure. After making an abortive attempt to counterattack with General Gillmore's corps, Butler realized his army was defeated and ordered a withdrawal to Bermuda Hundred. At about 10 AM, Henry received orders to break contact with enemy and withdrew along with the rest of his division.

The overall success of Butler's campaign is debatable. From the point of view of the 43rd Massachusetts, the Bermuda Hundred Campaign was its most costly operation to date. Between May 5 and May 31, the regiment lost 13 killed, 62 wounded, and 22 captured or missing, more casualties than it had suffered from all previous engagements. The fighting was so desperate at times that the men resorted to using their carbines as bludgens.

Throughout the Battle of Drewry's Bluff, Henry exhibited extraordinary leadership. He deserves much credit for the fact that his regiment never broke and for helping to save other units. Once again he had demonstrated outstanding courage and tenacity. Henry continually inspired his men and maintained control under intensive fire and rapidly...
changing conditions. All this he accomplished without guidance from his immediate supervisor. In fact Henry essentially assumed command of most of his brigade when he discovered that his brigade commander was not present. Throughout the battle, Colonel Alford was in the rear suffering from what one soldier termed a "severe attack of discretion."79

Henry was so dissatisfied with the performance of his immediate commanders that he wrote a letter to General Smith requesting reassignment of himself and the 40th Massachusetts to the 18th Corps. Referring to the decision that resulted in Alford displacing him as brigade commander, he wrote, "I was very willing to abide by any decision till I found myself placed under incompetent persons, and then my duty to myself and my regiment demanded that I should, if possible, get it changed."80

Upon their return to Bermuda Hundred, Henry and the 40th Massachusetts transferred to 18th Corps, and Henry assumed command of 3rd Brigade, 1st Division. The next day General Grant transferred 18th Corps to the Army of the Potomac.31

Grant was preparing for what he hoped would be his final confrontation with Lee. They had fought two bloody but indecisive battles at The Wilderness and Spotsylvania earlier in May. Believing the fight had gone out of Lee's army and that one climatic battle of annihilation might end the war, Grant now directed the Army of the Potomac to attack Richmond. The transfer of the 18th Corps reinforced Grant's effort and gave him decided numerical superiority. Lee, however, having the advantage of interior lines, moved his army into a blocking position about ten miles northeast of the Confederate capital. On May 31, the two great
armies began to converge at a key road junction known as Cold Harbor. Grant decided to attack Lee on June 1, before either of their armies were concentrated, in the hope of breaking Lee's line or at least gaining an advantageous position that would facilitate his main attack planned for the following day.\textsuperscript{82}

The 18th Corps arrived just in time to participate in the preliminary attack. It had marched all day in oppressive heat and dust, yet it promptly deployed upon arrival at the battlefield at about 4:30 in the afternoon. During the Corps' attack, which dented the Confederate line and captured 250 prisoners, Henry's brigade achieved the greatest success. General Smith, the Corps Commander, described the action:

The brigade on the extreme right of the assaulting line, under the young and gallant Colonel Guy V. Henry, carried the rifle-pits in the front, but found the position commanded by an earth-work on the right flank against which no fire could be brought to bear, and the brigade fell back into the edge of the clearing.\textsuperscript{83}

The first day of the Battle of Cold Harbor marked the first time that Henry had led an all-out attack. His troops had won a number of skirmishes, but he had been on the defensive in previous major battles. He was determined that the attack would be successful. One of Henry's officers, Captain W. S. Hubbell, described his behavior:

Colonel Guy V. Henry, an intrepid young West Pointer of magnetic presence and merciless discipline, reckless of himself, rode back and forth crowding on his men, and at last with a smile of cool defiance, leaped his horse over the enemy's works, and as the dying steed lay struggling on the parapet, its rider coolly standing in his stirrups emptied his revolver in the very faces of the awestruck foe.\textsuperscript{84}

Had Henry's brigade penetrated the mainline of Lee's entrenchments it would have made the entire Confederate position untenable and may have
led to a decisive defeat of Lee's army. Henry was understandably frustrated. In the midst of the action he sternly and publicly rebuked Lieutenant Colonel George E. Marshall, commanding the 40th Massachusetts in his absence, for mishandling his troops. The criticism may have been justified; nevertheless it is questionable whether Henry should have censured the officer in front of his men. Marshall became enraged, seized the regimental colors, and strode to the front of his lines, thereby exposing himself to enemy fire. A Confederate sharpshooter killed him instantly. Perhaps Henry learned a lesson from this tragic event. There is no record of him ever again criticizing an officer in front of his men. 85

Undaunted by the tenacity displayed by Lee's forces on June 1, Grant was determined to press the attack. He was less than 10 miles from Richmond and Lee had the Chickahominy River at his back. Even a shallow penetration might produce a decisive victory. Grant spent all day June 2 preparing for the attack, which of course allowed Lee to substantially improve his fortified positions. The massive attack on June 3 was one of the bloodiest single engagements of the entire war. Henry's brigade was the second in line in a massive division column attack. It was his mission to continue the assault when the brigade in front of him was no longer able to stand the murderous enemy fire. His brigade held firm when the lead brigade fled back through his formation. They had succeeded in capturing the Confederate outer positions when Grant finally realized the battle was lost and called off the attack. Lee's army had firmly held its positions while literally slaughtering the Union attackers. Even the stolid Grant was touched with remorse. In his
memoirs he wrote, "I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made." Both armies remained entrenched until June 12, when the Army of the Potomac quietly slipped away and embarked on a new campaign against Petersburg, which guarded all but one of the remaining supply lines to Richmond.

The Petersburg campaign began with Grant’s skillful redirection of his forces from Cold Harbor, but rapidly bogged down into trench warfare. General Baldy Smith led the initial assault on June 15. The assault was quite successful, and the Union forces which included Henry’s brigade sustained only light casualties. Smith nevertheless decided it would be unwise to continue the attack until reinforcements arrived. Unfortunately Lee’s reinforcements arrived more rapidly and thus the opportunity for a quick victory was lost.

During the first few days of the campaign, and before both armies became firmly entrenched, Henry’s brigade participated in several sharp engagements. The most notable of them occurred on June 24, 1864, when Brigadier General Johnson Hagood’s Confederate brigade attacked Henry’s position. Henry had anticipated the attack and had laid a trap. As Hagood’s men advanced, Henry withdrew his pickets, thus decoying the enemy into the pits in front of his main positions. Once the Confederates entered the pits, Henry’s brigade laid down such a heavy fusillade of fire that the rebels could neither advance nor withdraw. The engagement resulted in the virtual annihilation of Hagood’s brigade. Sixty survivors including a captain surrendered to Henry, while his brigade suffered only eleven casualties. 
Henry's outstanding performance as a brigade commander had not gone unnoticed. General William T. H. Brooks, his division commander at Cold Harbor, commended him in his report, and Henry received another brevet promotion for gallant and meritorious services during the Petersburg campaign. General John H. Martindale, Henry's new division commander, demonstrated his admiration by recommending that Henry be promoted to Brigadier General of Volunteers. Martindale noted that, "From every report, from every source I have heard the highest encomiums upon Colonel Henry." Generals Smith and Butler strongly endorsed Martindale's recommendation, with Smith adding that "promotion is asked for him as much for the interest of the service as to recom pense him for meritorious acts." 90

Henry realized that promotion to the rank of general was seldom based exclusively on outstanding battlefield performance. Unfortunately, he had few powerful friends and no political influence. Even Smith and Butler were somewhat discredited because of their alleged poor performances in the recent campaigns. Henry's one attempt to influence the political process was to write to Montgomery Blair, the Postmaster General. Blair had been a classmate of Henry's father at West Point. The only other letter of recommendation that reached Henry's official personnel file was from the civilian guide who had aided him during the Florida campaign.91 Henry's mother tried to help by writing directly to General Grant. This no doubt embarrassed her son, but she did get an encouraging response. Grant noted that Colonel Henry had "the reputation of being one of the most gallant and best Brigade Commanders in the Army where he has been serving." And he added that, although he could not
promise that her son would be promoted, he thought that he might well expect it.92

Grant’s optimism did not prove to be warranted. Henry did not receive a promotion to Brigadier General, but he did receive an appointment as Brevet Brigadier General of Volunteers for gallant and meritorious services at the attack of Fort Harrison. Ironically this was one battle that Henry had missed. He was on sick leave at the time, suffering from an acute case of dysentery that he had contracted while serving for two months in the Petersburg trenches. Henry could have accepted the honor quietly and no one would have been the wiser, but his high sense of integrity would not permit that. He therefore graciously declined the honor. Fortunately, his division commander learned of the error and asked that Henry be awarded the brevet for the proper action. The War Department agreed and Henry received his brevet with an effective date of October 28, 1864.93

Ordinarily a brevet was merely a honorary promotion that granted no additional authority to its holder. The War Department decided to make an exception in Henry’s case. Upon the recommendation of General Butler, the President assigned Henry to duty according to his brevet rank of Brigadier General with an effective date of December 27, 1864.94 Henry served in the capacity of a general officer until August 1865.

Henry’s brigade remained relatively inactive during the fall of 1864 and the early winter of 1865. On January 29, 1865 he began a two month leave of absence. He took this occasion to recuperate from the strain of more than two years of continuous combat duty and to marry Frances Wharton of Philadelphia.95

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On March 23, 1865, the War Department issued orders assigning him for duty with the Department of Missouri. As the War began to wind down, the federal government started to pay closer attention to the lawlessness and Indian uprising that had flared up in the West as a result of the absence of regular Army troops who were in the East fighting the war. The War Department sent several officers and men to the West in early 1865. In April Henry assumed command of the South Sub-District of the Plains, an area that included essentially all of Colorado territory with headquarters in Denver.

Henry performed his duties well as both a civil administrator and commander of the troops that were widely scattered throughout his district. The most disagreeable aspect of his assignment was the high cost of living in Denver. On June 16, 1865 the 40th Massachusetts mustered out of active service, and Henry found his pay reduced to that of a first lieutenant, his grade in the regular Army. When Henry requested a transfer, the citizens of Colorado petitioned President Andrew Johnson and General Grant to promote him and increase his pay so that he could remain at his post. The petition was signed by Governor John Evans and many of Colorado’s most prominent citizens. They stated that they were making their request “because of the strict discipline and order <Henry> has established among the troops under his command and because of the superior ability he has manifested in controlling the affairs of this District.” In the cover letter to the copy of the petition sent to President Johnson, they added, “We have never had so orderly a community as we now have.” The Army solved the problem in its typical parsimonious fashion by assigning Henry to command the North
In October 1865 Henry returned to duty with his regular Army regiment, the 1st Artillery. For the next five years he commanded an artillery battery at various forts along the northern Atlantic coast. In recognition of his "Gallant and Meritorious Services During the Rebellion" he received the brevet rank of colonel in the United States Army and on December 1, 1865 a permanent promotion to captain in the 1st Artillery. Post-war reorganization of the Army did nothing to improve his status. A Congressional act in 1866 doubled the number of regiments in the Army, and necessitated a large number of promotions. Henry and his contemporaries were naturally eager to obtain one of the new field grade commissions. The appointing board was to make its selection based solely upon merit and qualification, but in practice political influence and powerful friends carried much weight with the board. Henry’s classmates, Upton and Ames, gained lieutenant colonelcies. Boh had political connections but were deserving officers whose Civil War records were even more distinguished than Henry’s. George Custer also became a lieutenant colonel. Although he had an outstanding war record, what weighed most heavily in his favor was the fact that he was Philip Sheridan’s favorite protege. Sheridan also managed to procure a lieutenant colonelcy for Ranald MacKenzie who graduated from West Point two classes behind Henry. It is hard to understand why Henry did not receive at least a promotion to major. After 1866 there were few officers serving in the Army in a grade lower than major who had demonstrated outstanding performance in
positions of responsibility as great as those held by Guy Henry or who had earned five brevets for gallant and meritorious services. Henry was undaunted by his lack of recognition. Unlike Adelbert Ames, who wrote to his mother that he would probably resign if he did not receive at least a lieutenant colonelcy, Henry had no intention of leaving the service. While most of his contemporaries resigned when they realized that they had an unpromising future in the military, Henry remained determined to be a successful career Army officer. He was proud of the fact that the military was the only life he had ever known and that as an Army officer he could perform a valuable service to his country. In the five years following the war he performed the routine duties of a battery commander while perfecting his technical skills. Before he was thirty years old he had already become an experienced veteran who knew more about leading men in combat than most officers learn in a lifetime. Even his free time was devoted to military matters. He single handedly undertook the monumental task of recording and publishing the military records of all the officers with civilian appointments who had served the Union in the Civil War. In the introduction to the massive two volume work, Henry stated that the reason he had undertaken the project was because, as a West Pointer, he felt "the injustice of having the services of graduates, alone, made a matter of history while ignoring the deeds of those who, equally with themselves, fought to sustain the Government in its hour of trial."

While Henry was slowly gathering moss at some damp coastal artillery fort, Custer, with his ubiquitous flare for the flamboyant, was pursuing hostile Indians across the western prairies. Custer too was a
bit of a military historian, only he confined himself to publicizing his own already overblown military exploits. His popular book, *My Life on the Plains*, contained a biased account of his role in the Battle of the Washita, a poorly planned and executed attack on a Cheyenne village on November 27, 1868. He totally neglected to mention, however, his court-martial conviction in October 1867 for unauthorized absence from his post and several counts of dereliction of duty, or his adulterous affair with a captive Indian maiden. All of this further clouded Custer's reputation in Army circles, but only added color to his romantic public image. Despite the similarity in their backgrounds, Henry and Custer were obviously two entirely different men.102

In 1870 Henry decided he had had enough of the artillery and requested an assignment with a cavalry regiment in the West. Henry was not interested in Custer-style glory. He was simply tired of the mundane routine of a coastal artillery fort, and he had found that the damp, cold climate of the northern Atlantic coast was damaging his health. At the time opportunities for reassignment were more plentiful than usual. Retirements and the so-called 'Benzine Boards' had eliminated nearly 900 officers that had become excess as a result of the 1869 Army appropriation act. The War Department granted Henry his wish by transferring him to the 3rd Cavalry Regiment effective December 15, 1870. After more than nine years of commissioned service, Henry knew his job well. It is doubtful, however, that he anticipated the tremendous character and leadership challenges he would face while fighting in the Indian Wars of the Trans-Mississippi West.103
ENDNOTES


2. Guy V. Henry, Jr., "Rough Notes on the Life of Guy V. Henry, Sr. for his Granddaughter, Patricia Williams, 1966," Henry family papers in the possession of Mrs. Edward Williams, hereafter referred to as "Rough Notes", Williams-Henry Papers. Detailed genealogical information on the Henry family may be obtained from Mr. B. William Henry, an historian with the National Park Service. See also William H. Eldridge, Henry Genealogy (Boston: T.R. Marvin and Son, 1915).


6. Ibid. See also Arietta Henry to General [name redacted], September 14, 1869, Henry-AGO file.

7. E.D. Post to Julia McNair Henry, May 12, 1900, Williams-Henry Papers.

8. Thompson Recollections.


10. Thompson Recollections.

11. Cadet record of Guy V. Henry, Sr., Special Collections Division, United States Military Academy Library.


13. Custer is certainly one of the most controversial figures in American history. Despite all that has been written about him, it is difficult to distinguish the man from the myth. For a balanced appraisal of Custer see Robert Utley, Custer and the Great Controversy: The Origin and Development of a Legend (Los Angeles: Western Lore Press, 1962); and Jay Monaghan, Custer (Boston: Little Brown, 1959).

Government Printing Office, 1885), p.323. Hereafter cited as OR. No series will be indicated unless other than Series I.

15 OR, XIV, p. 152.


17 Henry was never an official resident of any state. It is evident from his letter of acceptance of his appointment at Brevet Brigadier General of Volunteers that he was proud of this fact. Henry to General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant General, U.S. Army, December 8, 1864, AGO Commission (H1118-CB-1864), Letters Received by the Adjutant General's Office, National Archives, Microfilm publication M1064, Roll 98. Hereafter cited as Henry - AGO file.

18 James L. Bowen, Massachusetts in the War, 1861-1865, (Springfield: Bowen & Son, 1893), pp. 603-606.

19 Andrew to Edwin Stanton, Secretary of War, May 4, 1864, Henry - AGO file.

20 In July 1898 while he sailed with Henry to Cuba to take part in the Santiago Campaign of the war with Spain, Ames candidly expressed his life-long personal dislike for Henry in a diary that he kept. The diary is in the Adelbert Ames Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

21 Charles A. Currier, Recollection of Service with the Fortieth Massachusetts Infantry Volunteers, unpublished manuscript from the Massachusetts Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute, p. 62.


23 Currier, p. 63.

24 Ibid., pp. 62-64.

25 Ibid., p. 62.

26 Ibid., p. 65.

27 Ibid., p. 66.


30 Currier, p. 81.

31 OR, XXXV, pt I, p. 218.


33 OR, XXV, pt. 1, pp. 296.

34 Ibid., pp. 296, 346-347. See also Ridly and Crowinshield, pp. 259-260.

35 There is some question about who worsted whom at the Barber's Ford engagement. According to Brigadier General Joseph Finegan's reports, the Confederates inflicted considerable loss on the enemy while losing but "2 killed and 2 wounded" themselves; OR, XXV, pt. 1, pp. 324-326, 330-331. General Seymour acknowledged "a loss of 3 killed and 10 wounded," but claimed, that Henry's command inflict greater loss to the enemy," Ibid., p.296. Neither the report of Henry nor Major Robert Harrison, the Confederate Commander, are published in the *War of the Rebellion* official records. Neither of the eyewitness accounts in Ridly and Crowinshield mention numbers of casualties, but Private S.P. Ridley, who was slightly wounded himself, claimed that they "captured ten fine horses." Sergeant A.J. Clement, whose eyewitness account is in Crowinshield, pp. 260-261, wrote that "the enemy scattered as we reached the opposite bank, leaving quite a large number of horses behind," but that they had no time to count the enemy losses because they immediately pursued the rebels toward Sanderson. In some reports Barber's Ford is referred to as the South Fork of the Saint Mary's River.

36 Crowinshield, p. 261. Sergeant Clement stated that one of Henry's men was wounded. General Finegan had managed to concentrate a portion of his scattered command. He reported that he deployed "491 infantry and 110 cavalry, with two pieces of artillery." He estimated Henry's strength at 1,400; OR, XXV, pt. 1, pp. 325, 331. It is unlikely that Henry's force was even half that size. On March 1, 1864, Henry reported the total strength of his command to be 500; Ibid., p.365. Beauregard later warned Finegan about overestimating Union strength. "His regiments average 600 at most, composed largely of newly drafted men and recruits; not a match for one-half of our men." Ibid., p.620.


38 Ibid., pp. 263, 296; OR, LIII, p. 100.
39 OR, LIII, pp. 296-297. See also Henry to Montgomery Blair, July 4, 1864, and J.W. Price to Abraham Lincoln, September 2, 1864, Henry - AGO file. Price was Henry's guide throughout the Florida expedition.

40 OR, XXXV, pt. 1, p. 296; see also General Order, No. 5., p. 297.

41 OR, XXXV, pt. 1, p. 282.

42 Ibid., pp. 277, 282-283.


44 OR, XXXV, pt. 1, pp. 282, 284. Prophetically, Seymour wrote Gillmore on February 11, "To be thwarted, defeated, will be a sad termination to a project; brilliant thus far, but for which you could not answer, in case of mishap, to your military superiors." p. 282.


46 Sergeant A.J. Clement in Crowinshield, p. 263. See also OR, LIII, pp. 24-26.

47 S.P. Ridly, "In Florida," Boston Journal, June 17, 1893.

48 Letter to the editor by Bronte, Army and Navy Journal, July 24, 1875, p. 798. See also Bowen, p. 688.

49 Unidentified newspaper clipping from Williams-Henry Papers.

50 Finegan relived Colonel Caraway Smith, his cavalry brigade commander, for his lack of aggression in the pursuit. Smith's excuse was that he feared an ambush from the enemy's cavalry. OR, XXV, pt. 1, pp. 352-356.

51 Ibid., pp. 289-290.

52 Ibid., pp. 364-368, 369-384; OR, LIII, p. 103.

53 Bowen, p. 688.

54 Gordon to Andrew, April 25, 1864, (copy) Henry - AGO file.

56 Andrew to Stanton, May 5, 1864, Henry - AGO file.
57 Stanton to Andrew, May 24, 1864, Henry - AGO file.
58 Frank I. Howe, "Dodging Bombshells." See also Currier, passim.
59 Gordon made scant reference to his dispute with Gillmore, and no mention of Henry whatever, in his detailed Civil War memoir, War Diary of Events in the War of the Great Rebellion (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1885), pp. 195-197, 216, 271, 282. Gillmore left no memoir or personal papers regarding the incident. An account of the Gordon-Gillmore dispute with a vague description of the court-martial and Henry's role, may be found in John C. Gray and John C. Ropes, War Letters, 1862-1865 (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1927), pp. 282-286, 303-306. Gray speculated that Gillmore realized from the outset that his case against Gordon was weak, but by preferring charges he could arrest Gordon and at least temporarily get him out of the way. Furthermore, Gray thought Gillmore hoped to discredit Gordon or goad him into requesting a transfer.
60 Gray, pp. 311-314.
61 Cullum, II, 291-292.
62 Gordon, pp. 151, 238, 283.
63 "A Regiment Never Whipped," Boston Herald, September 9, 1871, from Williams-Henry Papers. Summary executions for desertion were not uncommon during the Civil War.
64 OR, XXV, pt. 1, p. 492. Ames did not arrive in Florida until February 15, and therefore did not witness any of Henry's performance in Florida prior to or during the Battle of Olustee. Gordon arrived even later.
65 OR, XXV, pt. 2, pp. 51, 54. Although the date that Hatch recommended charges against Henry is unknown, it may be assumed that it was before Hatch ordered Henry to St. Augustine since the later event coincided so closely with Henry's departure from Florida.
66 OR, XXXIII, p. 1056. Henry's brigade consisted of the 3d, 89th, 117th, 142d New York Volunteer Infantry regiments, in addition to his own 40th Massachusetts.
67 Unidentified newspaper clipping in Williams-Henry Papers.
68 Currier, p. 91 1/2.
The traditional interpretation of Butler’s campaign is that it was a complete failure. See for example Foote, p. 264. Using evidence overlooked by other scholars, a more recent study persuasive argues that the campaign achieved considerable success, since it secured an important base for future use, disrupted enemy supply lines, and tied down 20,000 Confederate troops. See Robertson, pp. 410-426. Henry supported the traditional interpretation. In a short essay entitled “Army of the James, 1864,” he wrote, “It was most unfortunate that with two such Corps as the 10th and 18th, seasoned troops, that nothing was accomplished.” (The essay is typed and unsigned but was obviously Henry’s since corrections are in his handwriting), Williams-Henry Papers.

Spencer carbines were not equipped with bayonets, so Henry’s men were at a decided disadvantage in hand-to-hand fighting. The 40th Massachusetts suffered some of its casualties on May 20 at an engagement near Hatchies, Virginia. See Bowen, p. 609, and Currier, pp. 100-101.

Henry to Smith, May 22, 1864, OR, XXXVI, pt. 3, p. 111.


Foote, III, 279-286.


Ibid. Although Hubbell felt Marshall's censure was unwarranted, he still obviously thought highly of Henry since it was his recommendation that resulted in Henry's award of the Congressional Medal of Honor; Hubbell to Lamont, November 1, 1893, Henry-AGO file. See also Currier, p. 103A.


FOote, III, 291-292, 312-315.


OR, LI, pt. 1, p. 1250. See also Henry-AGO file.


Grant to Mrs. Henry, August 25, 1864, Williams-Henry Papers.

Henry to Assistant Adjutant General Thomas, Oct 31, 1864; and Devens to the Adjutant General U.S. Army, November 4, 1864, Henry-AGO file.

War Department, Special Order No. 469, Williams-Henry Papers.

OR, LI, pt. 1, p. 1289; XLVI, pt. 2, pp. 335, 749. Bowen, p. 611. Henry was married on February 23, 1865.

OR, XLVII, pt. 1, pp. 7, 1240; pt. 2, pp. 32, 42, 55, 68, 149, 156.

Henry's command consisted of five companies of the 1st Colorado Cavalry, three companies of the 11th Ohio Cavalry, and a battalion of the California Infantry stationed at seven installations scattered throughout his subdistrict, OR, XLVII, pt. 2, pp. 239, 276.

52
For a description of the post-war reorganization of the Army and the promotion process see Robert M. Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), pp. 11-13, 34. Emory Upton went on to become the Army’s foremost military theorist. Adelbert Ames became one of the most successful “carpet baggers.” He resigned his commission while Military Governor of Mississippi in order to become Mississippi’s United States Senator. Ames subsequently became the elected governor, but had to resign quickly in order to keep from being impeached when Reconstruction ended. Judson Kilpatrick, who had perhaps the most distinguished record of any member of the Class of 1861, resigned his commission in 1865 in order to accept the appointment as United States envoy to Chili. Cullum, II, 768-811, 837-844. See also Ezra J. Warner, *Generals in Blue*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), pp. 5-6, 108-110, 266-267, 301-303, 519-529; and Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903), *passim*.

Adelbert Ames to Martha Ames, January 27, 1866, Ames Papers.


George A. Custer, *My Life on the Plains*, ed. Edgar I. Stewart (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962), *passim*. Stewart, in the introduction to the 1962 edition to this book, describes Custer's court-martial and his affair with the Indian maiden. As Stewart points out there is substantial but not conclusive evidence that Custer had an Indian mistress, pp. xxii-xxiv. For a balanced description of the Battle of the Washita see Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, pp. 150-152. Many of Custer's Army colleagues were severely critical of him for abandoning Major Joel Elliott, his second in command, and several of his men who were trapped and subsequently slaughtered by the Indians.

Henry to Adjutant General U.S. Army, August 30, 1870; and Henry to BG Edward D. Townsend, September 5, 1870, Henry-AGO file.
CHAPTER 3

TRIALS BY FIRE AND ICE

As Captain Guy V. Henry journeyed west to join his new regiment in 1871, the country was undergoing a major transition. The populace of the United States had sufficiently recovered from the shock of the Civil War so that now the flow of settlers to the West was moving at an unprecedented rate. White settlers became increasingly attracted to the prospects of frontier life as the national population swelled with the continuing influx of emigrants hungry for land and resources.

Unfortunately, free roaming Indian tribes still occupied much of the unsettled land. Other tribes had already been driven from their land, obliterated, or had resigned themselves to the White man's presence. Most of the free Indians were nomads who required a vast, unspoiled area to sustain their lifestyle. The land that remained undisturbed was shrinking, and the buffalo and other wild game that had previously existed in abundance were rapidly diminishing. The best grazing land fell victim to the plow, and the plains were criss-crossed with wagon trails and railroad tracks. Even the unarable mountainous and desert lands began filling with gold and silver prospectors. The federal government convinced virtually every tribe to sign a treaty and established numerous reservations, but these were only intermediate steps in the quest for the ultimate goal: separating the Indian from his homeland.1
Bloody conflict was inevitable. Incidents such as the 3rd Colorado Cavalry's wanton slaughter of innocent Cheyennes at Sand Creek in 1864 and the brutal desecration of the bodies of federal soldiers at the so-called "Fettermen Massacre" in 1866 had blotted out any hope that the white man and Indian could live together in peace. The government's principal instrument for pacifying the Indians and protecting the interests of the settlers was the United States Army. Captain Henry and his colleagues were ill-equipped for this task. Since the end of the war Congress had steadily pared the Army so that by 1871 its total strength was about 30,000 officers and men. Only a portion of the Army was available for frontier duty since many troops garrisoned coastal forts or were still needed to enforce Reconstruction in the South. Undaunted by this seemingly hopeless situation, Ulysses S. Grant, the newly elected President of the United States, inaugurated a "Peace Policy." He sought to control and civilize the Indians through joint civil-military operations. The first full test of this policy began in the Department of Arizona in 1870.

The Peace Policy produced mixed results. Some Apaches had settled peacefully near feeding stations, but others continued to raid cattle herds and ambush innocent white men. Out of frustration the citizens of Tucson decided to take the situation into their own hands by forming a vigilante force to punish the renegades. On April 30, 1871, a large party of Tucson citizens attacked an Indian village near Camp Grant. In less than an hour they slaughtered and mutilated 144 Apaches, mostly women and children, and drove the rest into the mountains. Such was the
situation when Troop D of the 3rd Cavalry and its new commander, Captain Guy V. Henry, reported for duty at Camp McDowell, Arizona Territory.

The Camp Grant massacre appalled President Grant. Concluding that more effective leadership was needed, he appointed Lieutenant Colonel George Crook as Commander of the Department of Arizona. Chosen over many more senior officers, Crook had proven his ability to subdue hostile Indians with minimum bloodshed in his campaign against the Paiutes in Oregon. Immediately upon his arrival in Arizona, he organized an expedition to seek out his new adversary. On July 11, 1871, Crook departed from Tucson with a force consisting of five troops of the 3rd Cavalry augmented by fifty Mexican scouts. Among the officers was Captain Guy Henry. On arriving at Camp Apache, Crook discharged his Mexican irregulars and replaced them with friendly Apaches. Crook was innovative in his use of Indian allies. His expertise in this technique helps explain the remarkable successes he achieved where others failed.

As his first experiment Crook combined three troops of cavalry with a sizeable group of Apache scouts. He placed the force under the command of Henry and directed him to engage any hostile Indians he might find on a march to Camp McDowell. It is quite remarkable that out of a command filled with officers who were veteran Indian fighters, Crook chose Henry, an utter novice at this form of warfare. Crook proved to be an excellent judge of leadership. As his official report indicated he was highly pleased with Henry's results: "Captain Henry reported this combination of the Indian with the soldier to exceed his most sanguine expectations; that the Indians were invaluable, and enabled him to kill
seven warriors and to take eleven women prisoners, under the most unfavorable circumstances.  

Henry had displayed remarkable flexibility in so quickly adapting to an entirely new method of warfare. He also demonstrated considerable initiative and creativity by developing some techniques of his own. For instance, he discovered that it was possible to sneak up on the camps of the wily Apache by having his soldiers wear moccasins.  

Crook was so impressed with Henry's success that he at once organized five similar expeditions to engage the remaining hostiles. This plan, however, had to be delayed. In September Vincent Colyer, Secretary of the Board of Indian Commissioners, arrived in Arizona with the mission of peacefully coaxing the Apaches to give up roaming and move to reservations. For more than a year Crook suspended military operations, waiting patiently while Colyer and later Brigadier General Oliver O. Howard attempted to pacify the hostiles through sheer benevolence. When the raids continued unabated, Crook reinitiated his offensive. In less than a year the methods that he and Henry had perfected succeeded in bringing about an extended period of relative tranquility.  

Henry was unable to take part in the second campaign. With his regiment he rotated to Wyoming in December 1871. His first year of Indian War campaigning had given him a taste of the dangers and hardships that he would endure for the next twenty years. Henry had one especially bitter memory from his service in Arizona. He had left his wife, daughter, and infant son in California when he deployed to Arizona. For some unexplained reason Henry's son suddenly died. Major
Thaddeus Stanton, an army paymaster, recalled having to relay the sad news to his friend:

"Henry" wheeled around in his saddle and looked across the desert. The emotions that swelled within him were manifested in his demeanor, but he was brave. He regained his composure and asked for further particulars. He bore his affliction with the true soldierly fortitude that was born in him, but it was a blow far worse to him than a bullet through his body.

Wyoming Territory was no more hospitable in 1871 than Arizona. For most of the next three years Henry remained assigned to Fort D.A. Russell, located outside of the raw, booming frontier town of Cheyenne. Although the living conditions were quite primitive, he was able to bring his family to the post. One officer's wife who lived at Russell during the same period poignantly recorded her impressions:

Frame quarters for a regiment had sprung up as it were, into a small village but the surroundings were destitute of any green to relieve the eye and the wind, constantly sweeping the parade ground bare, drove the garrison almost to despair with its monotony.

The frame quarters for officers were portable models manufactured in Chicago. Although they provided better shelter than the tents earlier inhabitants had lived in, they were inadequate shelter during the severe winters. Tragically, the harsh living conditions proved to be too much to bear for Frances Henry. She passed away at Fort Russell on January 19, 1873, a short time after having given birth to another son. Guy had no choice but to take his children to his mother in New York who assumed the task of raising them.

The spring and summer months were decidedly more pleasant in Wyoming. Warm weather also encouraged the numerous Sioux and Cheyenne Indians in the area to begin their annual nomadic wanderings in search
of the buffalo. Although presently not at war with the white man, they were even more formidable foes than the Apache. The Treaty of 1868 had established the Great Sioux Reservation in what is now western South Dakota. The Indians, however, did not confine themselves strictly to their reservation. They roamed freely throughout the vast unceded lands outside the perimeter of their domain as was their right according to the treaty. Although most drew rations and frequently camped near their government agencies, Indian bands continued to raid civilians and clash with small detachments of soldiers. The principal methods that the Army employed to combat these raids was to establish small base camps in the unceded territory from which cavalry troops conducted frequent scouting expeditions. From May through November 1873, Henry established such a camp on the Laramie River and conducted several extensive forays which helped keep the peace in his area of responsibility. When not on patrol, Henry trained his troops in daily mounted cavalry drills and target practice, skills that most troop commanders allowed to decay during frontier service.  

In December Guy himself became very ill, suffering from a "general derangement of the postal system." His army surgeon recommended that he be granted four months sick leave.  

Henry was quite upset because he had just received orders appointing him to serve on a board "to fix Cavalry Equipments and Supplies," subjects in which he had an avid interest. After forwarding the surgeon's certificate he wrote a letter to the Adjutant General's office requesting that any leave he would be granted would be delayed so that he could serve on the board. He stated, "I would rather drag myself there, than give up a chance of having
something to say in the matters.... Henry did serve on the board.

When he finally travelled east on leave, he took the occasion to marry Julia Faulkner McNair, an old friend of his and his late wife. Julia, or Gretchen as Guy called her, was an extraordinary women. She knew full well the hardships that faced the wife of an Army officer serving on the frontier, yet she married Guy and travelled back with him to Fort Russell.

For only one short period in his life did Henry keep a journal. Julia had gone back east in the fall of 1874 to attend her sister's funeral, and Henry was in Salt Lake City serving as the defense council in the court-martial of an enlisted man. He helped pass the time by recording his thoughts. Henry wrote frankly to himself for it is doubtful that he ever intended for even his wife to read his notes. The journal discloses much about his character. Although he was a stern disciplinarian, Henry expressed sincere sympathy for his defendant especially because it seemed as though everyone else had deserted the man. He wrote at great length of how deeply he loved his wife and revealed extremely strong moral and spiritual convictions. Henry noted that there was a house of "ill-fame" across from his hotel. He declared that he could resist such a temptation because of his total devotion to his wife and his religious faith. The journal provides a rare opportunity to examine the inner thoughts of a man who because of his personality and training consistently concealed his emotions.

Julia was apparently not altogether pleased with her first sample of frontier army life. While she was at her home in Philadelphia, unbeknown to Guy, she asked an old family friend, Anthony J. Drexel, the
most powerful banker in America, to see what he could do about having her husband transferred to the Paymaster Department. Drexel wrote directly to Secretary of War William Belknap. The secretary promised to do all that he could, but explained that there were no openings at the time. This was not the first nor the last time that the women in Henry's life interfered in his career. No doubt this was a source of considerable embarrassment.

Shortly after Julia returned to Fort Russell, Henry received orders transferring him and his troop to Camp Robinson, Nebraska. Compared to Camp Robinson, Fort Russell had been a garden spot. The Henry home was a combination of a log hut and a tent. The newly established camp was located near the Red Cloud Agency, the largest in the country, serving nearly 12,000 Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho Indians. Many of the Indians living near the agency were quite hostile. Earlier that year an Indian had killed the acting agent, and a large war party had ambushed a unit of Army troops and had slain Lieutenant Levi Robinson. The government established the camp near the agency in the hope of dissuading further violence and named the post in honor of the dead lieutenant.

The Indians were understandably upset over the government's deliberate violation of their sacred hunting grounds. The Treaty of 1868 had barred all white men from the Black Hills. The worst violation was made by a large expedition led by George Custer. His official report contained a glowing description of the tremendous economic potential of the region. In his typical, overly dramatic fashion, Custer also wrote that one could find "gold among the roots of grass." The expedition had
found traces of gold, but certainly not enough to warrant the gold fever suddenly whipped up by the press.19

The subsequent gold rush enraged the Indians. The Army tried its best to bar prospectors from the Black Hills, but they often did not learn of their presence until the miners were hard at work deep in the forbidden territory. When such incidents occurred a patrol would round up the illegal intruders and escort them out of the treaty land.

On the day before Christmas 1874, Henry's department commander ordered him to conduct one of these patrols. His mission was to expel a group of miners allegedly encamped at Elk Creek on the eastern slope of the Black Hills. Captain Henry dutifully departed two days later with Troop D and a detachment of infantry. The weather was exceptionally cold even for a region known for its severe winters. Upon reaching Elk Creek, Henry carefully scouted the area but found no trace of any miners. During the return trip the command was caught in a severe blizzard. Many of the men would have perished in the fierce, blinding snow storm with temperatures reaching forty degrees below zero but for Henry's extraordinary leadership. When many of the men thought that they could endure no more and wished to lay down in the snow to let death peacefully overtake them, Henry drove them on. Those men who were unable to ride he had strapped into their saddles and ordered their comrades to beat their arms and legs to keep them from freezing. The command finally reached Camp Robinson on January 9, 1875. Nearly everyone was badly frostbitten, but all had survived. Henry himself was in particularly bad shape for he had been more concerned about the welfare of his men than his own. His face was black and swollen, and his men had to cut the
bridle from his hands. When they removed his gloves pieces of skin came off with the leather. The surgeon had to amputate one of his fingers, and for the rest of his life Henry was unable to bend fully the fingers of his left hand.20

The Captain's men realized that had it not been for the perseverance and cool-headedness of their leader, at least some of them would have perished. Henry claimed no credit but praised the fortitude of his men and the efficiency of Lieutenant William Carpenter, his second in command. He stated that it was merely the instinct of the horses that carried them through the blizzard to shelter. Nevertheless, "Henry's March" became one of the most popular legends of the frontier Army, and earned for Henry the lasting admiration of his colleagues. To the frontier regulars the march was symbolic of the suffering and deprivations they endured while quietly performing their duty, unrecognized and unappreciated by the American public.21

Guy's close brush with death shocked Julia Henry. Shortly after his return, she prematurely gave birth to a son. Guy Vernon Henry, Jr. was born on January 28, 1875 in a rude hut in the midst of thousands of hostile Indians, a suitable entrance into the world for a future Chief of the Cavalry of the U.S. Army.22

In February 1876, while Henry was still on convalescent leave, Congressman Henry B. Banning (Democrat, Ohio) asked him to testify in special committee hearings he was conducting to consider reforms for the Army and the Indian Bureau. Banning was the well-known leader of a conservative faction that seemed determined to legislate the Army out of
existence. A study of Henry's testimony reveals much about his character as well as conditions on the frontier.

The committee was particularly interested in the Captain's opinions about the efficiency of the Indian Bureau because he had had an opportunity to view its operation in the field. Henry was frankly critical of the Indian agents he had observed. He verified reports that Indians were starving and stated that the agents were issuing some rations to unauthorized people. The "Squaw-men" who preyed upon the agencies he felt were the lowest class of white men in the West. Henry agreed with Banning's suggestion that the Indian Bureau should be transferred to the War Department. He thought such a move would save the government money while improving the welfare of the Indians, and he remarked that he had "never seen anything done to better the condition of the Indian by the Indian Department."

Captain Henry was equally candid in responding to questions regarding reforms for the Army. Most noteworthy were his comments regarding pay. When asked for his recommendations in reference to the salary of non-commissioned officers, Henry replied, "I would say take $5 a month from my own pay, if necessary, and give it to the non-commissioned officer, rather than to have their pay reduced." This was not nearly as frivolous a comment as one might imagine. He knew that the committee was intent on reducing military pay. The House of Representatives actually passed a bill later that session reducing officer pay, which the Senate rejected. Banning and his colleagues were parsimonious beyond belief. In explaining the wisdom of reducing the annual salary of infantry second lieutenants from $1,400 to $1,300, Banning
explained, "small salaries are best for young officers who know little of the real value of money. It teaches them to avoid extravagance and practice economy." 26

Henry had more to say about the importance of non-commissioned officers to the efficiency of a company. "I look upon a good set of non-commissioned officers as more important even than the Captain." He went on to say, "You may take a good Captain, but if he has poor non-commissioned officers, he will have a poor company." 27 These were remarkable statements considering the strict deferential system existing in the Army at that time and the low regard in which many officers held enlisted men.

Several of Henry's comments about conditions in the Army were quite revealing. He explained that although he had an authorized strength of over a hundred, only 63 men were presently serving with his troop. Both of his lieutenants had been on detached duty for the past three years. Regarding the field grade officer in his regiment, he declared that only the Colonel and a major were serving with their unit. One of the other majors had been an invalid for years. Henry felt that the quality of the officer corps would be considerably improved if Congress mandated a required retirement age, established a board to consider the dismissal of inefficient officers, and required officers to pass a board of examination prior to receiving a promotion. Henry spoke knowledgeably about the relative utility of cavalry and infantry for frontier duty, and about both the advantages and disadvantages of concentrating the widely dispersed frontier units on fewer posts. All of
his suggestions for improving the Army were quite reasonable, and his answers to the committee's questions were honest and forthright.28

While Captain Henry testified before Congress, war clouds were gathering over the western plains. It had become apparent to the last free roaming Indians that their lifestyle was doomed. White men already outnumbered the Indians many-fold and more whites moved to the West every day. Nevertheless, many of the Plains Indians were prepared to fight for their land and freedom. The federal government had neither the means nor the desire to stop the flood of settlers, but it knew it had to take some action. If left to their own devices renegade Indians would raid and pillage, and the white civilians would respond with punitive campaigns like that which resulted in the Camp Grant Massacre. By the winter of 1875-76 the Grant administration had concluded that it could no longer tolerate Indians roaming through the unceded territory. In response to a directive from Secretary of Interior Zachariah Chandler, on December 6, 1875, Sioux agents sent runners to notify all Indians in the unceded territory that they must return to the reservation immediately or be certified as hostile. When by the end of January Chandler had not detected any response, he turned the matter over to the War Department for such actions as it "may deem proper under the circumstances."29

To Lieutenant General Phil Sheridan, the military commander of this area, the directive was a clear declaration of war. Believing that his best chance for catching the Indians was to move against them while they were still in their vulnerable winter camps, he immediately ordered his subordinate commanders to advance into the disputed territory.
Sovereign winter weather inhibited operations. Only the resourceful old Indian fighter, George Crook, was able to launch a campaign before spring. Captain Henry returned from leave too late to accompany his regiment on this expedition, which culminated in an unsuccessful attack on a Cheyenne village.30

Undetered by this minor setback, Sheridan planned a major summer offensive. He concluded that his best course of action would be to send three converging columns into the disputed area. Brigadier General Alfred Terry would move westward through Dakota Territory, Colonel John Gibbon would travel southeast from his Montana base, while Brigadier General Crook moved northward through Wyoming. Sheridan realized that it would be impossible for his commanders to coordinate their movements, but he hoped that they would drive the Indians into one of the columns so that they would be unable to simply run away. He anticipated that each of his columns could easily defeat any Indian bands who were foolish enough to stand and fight. Gibbon, who had the greatest distance to travel, moved out in April. Thus began the "Big Horn Campaign," one of the largest and certainly the most famous Indian War campaign in American history.31

Henry was ready and eager to participate in this operation. While at Fort Russell preparing his unit, he became acquainted with John F. Finerty, a correspondent for the Chicago Times, who was to accompany the expedition. Finerty described Henry as "a very fine-looking, although slight and somewhat pale, officer, and what was still better he was well up in all things concerning the projected Indian campaign." When the march began on May 17, Finerty reported, "I well remember the martial
bearing of Guy V. Henry's fine troop of the Third, as with arms clanking and harness jingling it trotted rapidly along our whole flank in the dawn twilight to take its place at the head of the column. 32

George Custer was also ready for the campaign. On the same day he marched out of Fort Abraham Lincoln at the head of Terry's column. Custer narrowly escaped the ignominy of being left behind. The ever flamboyant cavalryman had become embroiled in partisan politics and testified indiscreetly before a Congressional Committee hostile to the administration. Grant was furious and only at the last moment yielded to Custer's supplications to allow him to resume command of the 7th Cavalry. 33

Crook directed all of his assigned units to assemble at Fort Fetterman. The command now included ten troops of the 3rd Cavalry, five troops from the 2nd, two companies from the 4th Infantry, and three from the 9th Infantry. There was also a substantial number of civilian packers, teamsters, guides, miners, and correspondents attached to the command. Altogether the force was one of the largest ever assembled for an Indian War campaign. Lieutenant Colonel William B. Royall, the commander of the 3rd Cavalry for this expedition, divided his regiment into three battalions, and placed Captain Henry in command of one consisting of four troops. At noon on May 29 the column left Fort Fetterman and with high spirits headed north. 34

A few humorous incidents occurred during the march. On June 2 the notorious "Calamity Jane" caused quite a stir when the wagon-master discovered her disguised as a teamster, allegedly because she failed to curse the mules with the same enthusiasm as her male counterparts. 35
Several days later Finerty, the correspondent, was nearly wounded when his revolver accidentally discharged. Concerned about his friend’s welfare, Henry inquired, "Is the bullet in your person?" Finerty answered, "I don’t know, Colonel," to which Henry replied, "Then by Jove it is about time you found out," and rode away laughing heartily. The story spread quickly and provided much amusement to the whole column.36

The march was also tinged with tragedy. On June 7 a young trooper succumbed to an accidentally self-inflicted wound that he had received several days earlier. The soldiers conducted a full military funeral in the presence of over 600 members of the expedition, and Henry read, in what one witness described as, "a very feeling manner" the burial service from the Book of Common Prayer.37

Two days later the troops had their first contact with the hostiles. Crook had established a base camp at the confluence of Prairie Dog Creek and the Tongue River to wait for some Crow and Shoshoni Indian allies to join him. Prior to their arrival he received an indication of what he might expect from his adversaries when a band of Cheyenne warriors launched a surprise attack. The so-called "Battle of Tongue River" was not much of a fight. The Indians fired into the camp wounding two soldiers and killing a few head of stock, but Captain Anson Mills' battalion drove them off before they could inflict any serious damage.38

On June 14, 176 Crow and 86 Shoshoni warriors finally arrived. Crook’s judgement in waiting for these allies would prove to be correct. They performed invaluable services for the next several days. With the addition of the friendly Indians, Crook’s force had swollen to over 1,300 men.
The General believed that the village of Crazy Horse, the fiercest Sioux chief, was located nearby, and he decided that his best chance of catching any hostile Indians there was to cut loose from his wagon train. Crook ordered his men to pack only enough supplies to last for a few days. In order to increase his mobility further, he mounted his infantry on pack mules, much to the consternation of both the infantry-men and the animals. When Crook gave the order to move out on June 16, he was confident that he would overtake the hostiles, and he was "bristling for a fight."

Meanwhile, Crazy Horse was likewise preparing to do battle. It was he who would choose the time and place for the attack. The Sioux and Cheyenne had been observing the movements of Crook's column for some time, and were waiting for an opportune moment to strike. That moment came on the morning of June 17, 1876. The "Battle of the Rosebud," as it is now called, would be one of the largest and most significant Indian War battles ever fought.

As Crook's column paused for a brief rest at a crossing site on Rosebud Creek, allied Indian scouts returned to the main body frantically shouting that a large enemy war party was approaching. The troops had barely enough time to organize themselves before a combined force of over a thousand Sioux and Cheyenne launched their attack. Crook was flabbergasted. No one had expected to encounter such a large force of Indians. Fierce fighting raged for much of the day with Captain Henry and his command playing a significant role.

Crook erred badly by splitting his forces. He sent Captain Mills' battalion north to attack Crazy Horse's village which he mistakenly
thought was nearby. Meanwhile Colonel Royall's command, including Henry's battalion, became decisively engaged in an attempt to hold Crook's left flank. Initially Royall ordered Henry to charge a large group of hostiles that appeared likely to turn the flank. According to Finerty's eyewitness account, "Henry executed the order with characteristic dash and promptitude and the Indians were compelled to fall back in great confusion all along the line." With the departure of Mills' battalion for the assault on the village, the Indians isolated Royall's command and heavily pressed it on three sides. At this point Crook thought the present action was only a diversionary attack. He therefore ordered Royall to withdraw and move to support Mills. When the hostiles observed Henry and Royall attempting to break contact, they believed the soldiers were routing. The Indians attacked with even greater vigor and inflicted the heaviest casualties of the day. While Henry rode back and forth behind the lines, rallying his men, a rifle bullet struck him in his left cheek under his eye. The bullet severed the optic nerve of his left eye, shattered several bones in his face, and passed out below his right eye. Although he was instantly blinded and blood was gushing from his mouth, he stubbornly remained on his horse. When finally he lost consciousness and slipped from the saddle, his troopers realized their leader was no longer with them and fell back in disorder. A swift counter-attack by Crow and Shoshoni allies saved Henry from a scalping. In what was certainly one of the most fantastic incidents in the Indian War history, Washakie, the Shoshoni chief, straddled Henry's prostrate body while he and a few of his followers engaged in brutal hand to hand combat with the enemy. Encouraged by
the actions of the friendly Indians and supported by flanking fire from two infantry companies, the cavalry troopers rallied. Crook recalled Mills who swept behind the enemy rear, causing the hostiles to break contact and effectively ending the fight.

As the battle raged Henry's men took him to the rear. After his wound was dressed he requested permission to return to his men, but the surgeon understandably forbade it. With only his horse for shade from the scorching sun and with numerous flies tormenting him, Henry lay on the battlefield for several hours. When Finerty stopped to comfort his friend, Henry made a statement that more than any other should have secured his place in history. His broken jaw made it difficult for him to speak but in a low, clear voice he said, "It is nothing. For this are we soldiers!"45

It was not immediately apparent which side had won the battle. General Crook claimed victory because his force retained the battlefield. The event that occurred eight days later and about fifty miles to the northwest on the Little Big Horn River, seriously clouded that appraisal. On 25 June, Custer's famous luck ran out. Essentially the same band of Indians who had fought Crook slaughtered the dashing cavalryman and all who were with him. Some historians have speculated that if Crook had driven on and linked up with Terry, the Custer disaster may never have happened. Certainly Crook should have sent messengers to the other columns informing them of what had occurred. Indians had never before attacked in such large numbers or with greater tenacity. Had Crook informed the other commanders, however, one might
still question whether the impulsive Custer would have advanced with more caution.

The greatest obstacle to Henry's survival was his perilous journey back to civilization. Shortly after the battle Henry told Anson Mills, 'The doctors have just told me that I must die, but I will not.' Mills concluded that 'nine out of ten under such circumstances would have died.' On the day after the battle troopers loaded Henry onto a mule-drawn litter. It was an eighty mile trek back to the base camp over extremely rugged terrain. Because the column had to move rapidly for fear of an Indian attack, an accident occurred that nearly cost Henry his life. A fellow officer remembered:

The mule that was dragging him over an exceedingly rough mountain, suddenly shied, bringing one of the poles of the travois over a large boulder and pitched him headlong down among the rocks some twenty feet below. When first picked up, the wounded officer could not speak at all, but after the dirt had been wiped off, and some water had cleared his throat, he was asked the somewhat absurd question of how he felt. 'Bully,' was his somewhat unexpected reply. 'Never felt better in my life.' 'Everybody is so kind,' he continued, and in this might possibly from this tone, have included the sad-eyed mule, which stood innocently winking and blinking nearby.

The same officer added that Henry never complained through the whole trip and insisted that 'everything was lovely and that he was perfectly happy.' Throughout his life Guy seemed to find things humorous when it was least expected but most needed.

Once the column reached the base camp, soldiers loaded the wounded into wagons for the 200 mile trip back to Fort Fetterman. Ten days later and after an extremely treacherous river crossing they reached the fort which stood literally on the edge of civilization. For the first time Henry received competent medical treatment and nourishment. He had
existed for nearly two weeks on broth and occasional teaspoons of brandy to relieve the pain. Following this there was a 300 mile train trip to his home at Fort Russell. Once he nearly succumbed to the accumulative effects of his weakened health and the chloral administered by the surgeon to allow him to sleep. Upon his arrival at Fort Russell, in a very touching scene, he was reunited with Julia. "Well" whispered the shattered man, as she took him tenderly by the hand, alluding to the fact that it was the Fourth of July, 'this is a fine way to celebrate isn't it?'.

As usual Henry's recuperative powers were remarkable. He returned to the frontier in less than a year, just in time to participate in the final episode of the subjugation of the Sioux. By May of 1877 the situation for the Sioux had become hopeless. The large number of soldiers, augmented by recently acquired Cheyenne allies, made the chances of remaining free extremely remote. Sitting Bull, the spiritual leader of the Sioux, escaped to Canada, but Crazy Horse decided to surrender. The short period of uneasy peace was broken when Crazy Horse and some of his followers attempted to escape. On September 4, Captain Henry commanded a battalion in the capture of the "Crazy Horse Village" and subsequent roundup of Indians. A few days later a guard killed Crazy Horse when he allegedly attempted to escape. Though regrettable, his death was instrumental in at least temporarily ending the hostilities of the Sioux.

Because he had not fully recovered from his wound, Henry remained in poor health throughout the campaign. He desperately wanted to lead his men, but on at least one occasion he fainted and fell from his
saddle. Despite orders to return for his own safety, he remained in the field for six weeks. In the summer of 1878 Guy decided to take an extended convalescent leave, and with Julia made a trip to Europe.

When Henry returned from Europe he heard that another Indian campaign was about to begin. He immediately requested permission to return to his command for this campaign against the Ute Indians of western Colorado.

Upon winning statehood Coloradans mounted a political campaign to have the federal government remove the Utes from their reservation which comprised about a third of western Colorado. New mineral discoveries around the reservation and awkward efforts by Indian agent Nathaniel Meeker to acculturate the Utes, greatly distressed the Indians. General John Pope, the department commander responsible for the reservation, dispatched Major Thomas Thornburgh and a small force of soldiers to protect Meeker's agency.

On September 29, 1879, a band of about 100 Utes intercepted Thornburgh's column at a crossing site of the Milk River. As Thornburgh approached the Indians he deployed his command. The Utes interpreted this as a hostile act and opened fire, killing Thornburgh almost instantly. Command devolved to Captain J. Scott Payne, who immediately laggard his force of about 120 cavalrymen around his supply train. The Indians trapped Payne in a position where they could fire at him from bluffs on two sides. They inflicted over thirty casualties on the troopers and killed nearly all of their horses. After nightfall Payne dispatched couriers to request assistance. The first reinforcements to arrive were Captain Francis S. Dodge's troop of the 9th Cavalry on
October 2. The siege continued until Colonel Wesley Merritt's command arrived on October 5 and drove off the hostiles. Captain Henry, commanding a battalion of the 3rd Cavalry, arrived at the site a few days after the battle.55

The "Battle of Milk River" was the only significant skirmish of the so-called Ute War. Acting with uncharacteristic diplomacy, the Interior Department quickly negotiated a settlement. Essentially the government agreed not to punish the Utes in exchange for the Indians giving up virtually their entire reservation.56

Although Henry played a minor role in the Ute campaign, the outcome had a significant effect on him. A Congressional Committee investigating the Ute affair asked Captain Payne to testify. While in Washington, Payne launched a campaign to acquire a promotion for himself for his role in the Battle of Milk River. The House Committee on Military Affairs reported a bill that would authorize the President to appoint the Captain to the next vacancy for Major in the Cavalry.57

Henry was understandably angry when he heard of this proposal. He presently stood second on the list among cavalry captains and had served in that grade for nearly fifteen years. Since 1866 the Army had promoted field grade officers strictly on the basis of seniority within their branch of service. In his testimony before the Military Affairs Committee in 1876, Henry advocated several reforms to the promotion system, but Congress had failed to heed his advice or that of many of the senior officers of the Army.58

Henry was so upset about Payne's proposed promotion that he wrote a letter to the Senate and House Committees on Military Affairs, through
the Secretary of War, expressing his displeasure. His letter stated in part:

I honestly believe the records of the War Department justify me in saying, without egotism, that my services as a soldier since 1861 entitle me to far greater consideration than is due Capt. Payne. I may also add that the seventy captains of cavalry, independent of those of artillery and infantry, who would thus be ranked by this officer, can nearly, if not all, claim, with myself, greater consideration for services rendered. The passage of the bill will establish a most dangerous precedent and work a very great injustice.

The editors of Army and Navy Journal reprinted the entire letter in an editorial strongly endorsing Henry's position.59

A number of Guy's brother officers wrote letters and articles in support of Henry. They were not nearly as modest as Henry in expounding upon his achievements. One officer went so far as to reprint the entire records of Henry and Payne from the Army Register in order to illustrate the sharp contrast in their achievements. Payne had no brevet promotions and had not served in the Civil War.60 An editorial in the Laramie, Wyoming Sentinel pointed out that Payne's conduct at the battle was "nothing extraordinary," and that Captain Joseph Lawton, also present at the battle had requested a court of inquiry because Payne had taken too much credit for himself.61

Captain Payne, apparently realizing that he was in danger of being ostracized from the close-knit officer corps, wrote a letter to the Army and Navy Journal explaining his position. He admitted that he had lobbied for a promotion while he was in Washington, but claimed that he desired his promotion in the Adjutant General Department. Payne denied that he had any role in introducing the amendment which empowered the President to promote him in the cavalry corps.62 Payne was apparent
very oily character. He failed to ever get promoted, and in 1882 an Army officer arrested him for illegally intruding into Oklahoma Indian Territory.63

This was a sad period for the Henry family. The Henrys' three year old daughter, Fanny, died after a sudden attack of diphtheria.64 Guy continued to suffer from the after effects of his gunshot wound. He frequently suffered from acute pain and finally became so debilitated that he applied for a year of convalescent leave.65 While he and his family were away a warehouse fire destroyed much of the Henrys' possessions.66

Life in the frontier Army was often unhealthy and uncomfortable for military families. The Henrys were living in a two room log cabin when Fanny contracted diphtheria.67 Officers made less money than civilians holding comparable positions, and they were paid in paper currency which had to be exchanged for coin at a discount. Most citizens looked upon the Army with condescension or with total indifference. Congress systematically dismantled the Army in the interest of economy. In the early 1880s there was never more than 19,000 enlisted men on the regimental roles and between June and October 1877 Congress stopped paying the Army altogether.68

Despite these harsh conditions and lack of public appreciation, esprit de corps was high. The frontier regulars shared traditions, common experiences, and a close familial bond.69 Henry loved army life, but certainly this alone would not have sustained him through twenty years of agonizing and thankless military service. Guy V. Henry unquestionably felt a strong sense of duty to his country and loyalty to the
Army and his comrades. This fact is clearly evident in an article he wrote about the Battle of the Rosebud. He wrote the piece many years after the event and, in his typically self-effacing manner, he refrained from explaining his role in the battle. Henry merely described the experience of being shot and evacuated from the battlefield. In ending the article he wrote, "Our little Army does its duty in this difficult and unappreciated service, and of it may be said:"

The ostentatious virtues which still press
For notice and for praise; the brilliant deeds
Which live but in the eyes of observation --
These have their meed at once; but there's a joy,
To the fond votaries of fame unknown,
To hear the still, small voice of conscience speak
Its whispering plaudits to the silent soul."
ENDNOTES

1 Utley, Frontier Regulars, pp. 2-9.

2 Ibid., pp. 15, 97, 104-115, 189-192.


4 Utley, Frontier Regulars, pp. 53-55. The techniques of using Indians against other Indians was not original. White Indian fighters had employed rival tribes in this manner from virtually the beginning of the Indian Wars. Crook had used Shoshoni Indians against Paiutes in Oregon. This operation was unique in that Crook used Apaches against other Apaches (White Mountain and Coyotero versus other Apache bands). See also George Crook, General George Crook: His Autobiography, ed. Martin F. Schmitt (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960), pp. 165-166.


6 Henry's report, September 10, 1871, Army and Navy Journal, October 14, 1971, p. 135; hereafter cited as ANJ. Henry also made other recommendations for modifications in supplies and equipment.

7 Thrapp, pp. 100-143. There are a series of unsigned articles in the ANJ written by a member of Troop D, 3rd Cavalry (possibly Henry) that describe in detail the entire Arizona campaign. The author praises Crook and is critical of Colyer. June 10, p. 632; July 15, p. 766; July 29, p. 799; Oct 7, p. 120; Oct 21, p. 152; Nov 18, 1871, p. 215.


9 Merrill J. Mattes, Indians, Infants and Infantry, Andrew and Elizabeth Burt on the Frontier (Denver: Old West Publishing Company, 1960), pp. 175-176. This is a quote from Mrs. Burt's unpublished memoirs.

10 Ibid., p. 179.


12 Article by unidentified correspondent for the ANJ, August 9, 1873, p. 824. The article provides many interesting details on camp
life, including the firing of a Gatling gun. See also the Fort Laramie
post returns for June through September 1873, Fort Laramie National
Historic Site. For a discussion of deficiencies in training see Utley,
*Frontier Regulars*, pp. 24-25.

13Medical Certificate, John F. Randolph, Surgeon, U.S. Army,
December 7, 1873, Henry-AGO file. More specifically Henry suffered from
"dyspepsia, hemorrhoids and functional trouble of the heart."

14Henry to Major Thomas Vincent, December 17, 1873, Henry-AGO
file.

15Handwritten journal dated October 24, 1874, Williams-Henry
Papers.

16Drexel to Belknap, October 13, 1874, and Belknap to Drexel,
November 2, 1874, Henry-AGO file.


18George T. Grange, Jr. *Fort Robinson Outpost on the Plains*,
Nebraska History, September 1958, pp. 195-196, 205.

19Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, pp. 243-244. Characteristic of
Custer's self-serving behavior was the fact that he named one of the
prominent peaks they discovered after himself. For a detailed descrip-
tion of the expedition see Donald Jackson, *Custer's Gold: The
United States Cavalry Expedition of 1874* (New Haven: Yale University

20Henry's official report, January 10, 1875, *ANI*, January 30,
1875, p. 387; Official report of Captain William H. Jordan, 9th
Infantry, commanding post, Williams-Henry Papers. See also Brady, np.
342-344. For the surgeons' reports see Henry-AGO file. Surgeon John
Ridgely stated that he believed Henry would be unable "to resume his
duties in a less period than one year - if then."

21When Colonel James B. Fr., published a book describing heroism in
the Army, "Henry's March" was the subject of one of his chapters. *Army
Sacrifices* (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1879), pp. 118-126. The Williams-
Henry Papers contains many newspaper clippings publicizing the march,
several of which were published years later to remind people of the
Army's sacrifices. Aside from his official report, Henry did not write
his story about the march until 1895. He still claimed no credit but
wished to remind the public of what soldiers had undergone while doing


Ibid., p. 189.

Congressional Record, 44th Cong., 1st sess., p. 2038 (March 29, 1876).


Ibid., pp. 188-193. Other topics that Henry discussed were chaplains, post-traders, sutlers, company laundresses, group life insurance, travel expenses, and the employment of soldiers as servants. Throughout his testimony Henry demonstrated remarkable insights. His observations and suggestions track very closely with those made by modern critics of the frontier Army. See for example Utley, Frontier Regulars; passim., and Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), Chapter 12.

Utley, Frontier Regulars, pp. 237-248. As Utley has noted, the administration had one other motive in starting a war with the Sioux. By 1876 the government had decided that it wanted to take back the Black Hills.


For an excellent strategic and operational overview of this campaign see John S. Gray, Centennial Campaign (Fort Collins, Colorado: Old Army Press, 1976).


Monaghan, Custer, pp. 365-369. Utley, Frontier Regulars, p. 252. Custer was technically only second in command of the regiment. Colonel Samuel D. Sturgis, the Colonel of the regiment was on detached duty.


Some estimates of the number of Sioux and Cheyenne involved range as high as 6,000. A more likely figure based on several eyewitness accounts from both sides would place the figure somewhere between 1,000 and 1,500.


Finerty further recalled that "forbidding he did me the honor of advising me to join the army!"

Mills also remarked that Henry was "one of the best cavalry officers I ever knew."

Azor Nickerson, "Major General George Crook and The Indians," unpublished memoir, Crook-Kennon Papers, Archives, U. S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. See also Linderman, p. 171, for an Indians account of the incident.

Henry served as commander of Benicia Barrack, California from November 14, 1876 to June 3, 1877.
Bourke, *On the Border*, pp. 421-422. For the Indian version of this highly controversial incident see Sandoz, pp. 387-413. There is some evidence to support the assertion that Crazy Horse was murdered in cold blood. The guard was not under Henry's command nor was Henry nearby when the incident occurred.

Brady, p. 351.

Julia Henry wrote a detailed account of their trip entitled "Foreign Leaves," Williams-Henry Papers.

An interesting incident occurred before Henry departed for Europe. In 1877 Congress considered passing a bill that would have substantially reduced the size of the Army and Navy. Thomas Nast, the famous political cartoonist, published a cartoon criticizing the proposal. Many servicemen felt that this was instrumental in defeating the bill. Henry was so grateful that he published a circular requesting every soldier and sailor contribute twenty-five cents toward the purchase of a testimonial for Nast. Over 3,500 servicemen contributed to the purchase of the beautiful custom-made vase. Nast was deeply touched by the gesture and personally thanked Henry when he discovered his role in the affair. Nast to Henry and Henry to Nast, excerpts reprinted in the *ANJ*, March 1, 1879, p. 530. See also "The Vase Presented to Thomas Nast," *New York Graphic*, February 4, 1879; "Reception to Mr. Nast," *New York Herald*, February 2, 1879; "The Nast Testimonial" *Harper's Weekly*, (supplement) February 15, 1879; and other unidentified newspaper clippings in Williams-Henry Papers.

Some Personal Items," *ANJ*, October 11, 1879, p. 179.


House Report No. 354, 44th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 190-191, 193. Henry advocated examination boards for promotions, elimination boards for inefficient officers, mandatory retirement at a certain age, and promotion of company grade officers by seniority within their branch of service rather than their regiment. Except for the mandatory retirement age Congress did not enact any of these reforms until 1890. See Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, p. 29.

"Rewards By Promotion," *ANJ*, June 5, 1880, p. 902. The *Army and Navy Journal* was the semi-official publication of the Army. See Donald


62. ANJ, July 3, 1880, p. 980.

63. The article describing Payne's arrest noted, "He is a plausible scamp, and can quote U.S. statutes as fast as words can flow." "Fort Sill, I.T.," ANJ, September 23, 1882, p. 167. Payne resigned from the Army in 1886, Cullum, III, 75-76.


66. ANJ, June 4, 1881, p. 915.


69. Ibid., p. 25.

70. Henry, "Wounded in an Indian Fight." See also "A Winter March to the Black Hills." The poem is an excerpt from "Humble and Unnoticed Virtue" by Hannah Moore.
CHAPTER 4

ARMY PROFESSIONALISM AND THE PASSING OF THE FRONTIER

Since the Civil War the Army had become increasingly isolated from the bulk of the population. Except for the unpopular role that it played in Reconstruction, quelling labor disorders, and overseeing elections, the Army served out of the public eye on the frontier. This isolation, coupled with public indifference, had one fortunate consequence. It caused the Army to turn inward and examine the values of its own institution. As a result the Army laid the foundation of American military professionalism. ¹ Guy V. Henry was not only present to witness the development of this phenomenon; he played an important role in stimulating its growth. Henry's role was not nearly as significant as that played by such early reformers as Sherman and Upton, but, in his unobtrusive fashion, he helped shape Army values and establish professional norms.

Throughout his military career Henry was a prolific writer, an oddity during a period when most officers had limited intellectual horizons. ² He made good use of extensive leave time taken in order to recover from his injuries. In 1881 he published a book entitled Army Catechism. The book had nothing to do with religion, as the name might imply. It was a compilation of 375 simple questions and answers for soldiers. Henry's intent was to establish reasonable standards of...
conduct for the performance of military duties, and to provide a basic body of knowledge on tactics and techniques.

Henry devoted much of his manual to definitions of technical military terms, and he even used some space to answer such mundane questions as how often a soldier should change the stuffing of his bed sack (Q.73) and how often he should bathe (Q.76). However, a greater portion of his questions and answers were his attempt to help establish ethical standards of conduct for the Army. Henry admonished soldiers against discussing the acts of their superiors (Q.18) and against the common, soldierly vices of the day: drinking, swearing, and gambling (Q.13, 14, 22). He was particularly concerned about the status of non-commissioned officers. Henry advised them to avoid socializing with privates (Q.167), and asserted that the discipline of a company depended on the honesty, intelligence, and efficiency of the first sergeant (Q.161). This portion of Henry's book amounted to nothing less than a code of conduct for the Army.

Duty was a pervasive theme of the manual. Henry began by reminding soldiers of their oath of allegiance, and warned them that any violations of that oath would dishonor them (Q.2, 4). He explained to his readers that military service was not just another job. A soldier was always on duty (Q.180). He advised soldiers that their prime duty was the prompt and cheerful obedience to all lawful orders (Q.8), and that they must always be respectful of their superiors and maintain a neat, soldierly appearance (Q.9). He also told soldiers that they had a duty to protect the welfare of each other (Q.15, 77).
The most remarkable portion of Henry's manual was that devoted to tactics and techniques for field operations. Henry stated that his motive for delineating specific standards of conduct was that Army regulations were vague and therefore variously interpreted. He might well have added that, on the subject of frontier operation and Indian warfare tactics, Army publications were non-existent. Although Indian fighting was the primary mission of the Army throughout most of the nineteenth century, the War Department never published a single manual that dealt with this subject. The few tactical manuals that the Army did issue focused exclusively on conventional warfare. Emory Upton, the Army's brilliant military theorist, wrote nothing on the subject of Indian warfare. Upton's writings reflected the prevailing view within the officer corps that Indian warfare was merely an aberration and that the military needed to focus its attention on preparing for the next foreign war.

Henry's experiences of the past ten years caused him to believe that there was indeed a pressing need for a manual on frontier operations. The large portion of his book devoted to Indian warfare was based primarily on his own experiences. Undoubtedly his colleagues also significantly influenced his views, especially his old mentor and master Indian warfare tactician, George Crook. Henry explained, for example, how and when to post pickets in Indian country (Q.194-102), and how to cross a defile (Q.238). No doubt his personal experience at the Rosebud inspired him to advise against ever retreating from Indians (Q.244). The manual also contained detailed instructions on cavalry tactics. Henry claimed a patent on the mounted formation he developed for receiving an attack from Indians (Q.332). Henry devoted a great deal of space to
describing how to survive under harsh field conditions, such as how to navigate (0.354,355), how to pitch tents (0.221,222), and basic first-aid techniques (0.367-374).

Henry’s manual touched on all of the major elements of professionalism. He provided a basic body of knowledge peculiar to the military vocation, recommended a set of social and ethical standards, and advocated the concepts of duty to the Army and service to one’s fellow man. Henry had no aspirations of instigating revolutionary change in the Army. His day to day experiences in the field and on a frontier post had simply caused him to believe that there was a need for a basic soldier’s manual. As he stated in his preface he merely hoped that his book could be used in connection with company schools of tactical instruction.

The impact of Henry’s manual on the Army is difficult to measure precisely. There were numerous favorable reviews of the book. The Army and Navy Journal, the semi-official publication of the services, gave the book a most favorable endorsement. The editors said of Henry, “No man in the army is more competent for such a work,’ and offered to take orders for the book. The New York Herald concluded that the manual would be of value to the Militia as well as the regular Army. No doubt the most satisfying reward to Henry was the favorable comments received from fellow officers. One example is a letter written by Colonel Edward Hatch, a veteran Indian fighter and commander of the 9th Cavalry Regiment. Hatch stated that he would encourage its use in his regiment and recommended it to the entire Army. He also remarked that he had seen a similar British Army manual, but he considered Henry’s ‘infinitely
superior. Another indication of the manual's considerable influence were the brisk sales. Throughout the Army an interest in training was steadily growing, and as one reviewer of Henry's book noted, it was hard to find so much useful information in one place.

The popularity of *Army Catechism* was not the only good news that greeted the Henry's when they returned from their year of leave. On June 26, 1881, Guy received his promotion to major. There was one catch. The promotion was to major of the 9th Cavalry, one of the two cavalry regiments with black enlisted men and white officers. Many of Henry's contemporaries refused to serve with blacks either because of their own prejudice or a fear of being ostracized by other officers. Henry was not at all adverse to the prospect and was pleased to be promoted finally to field grade after more than twenty years of service.

One can gain an appreciation for the respect that Henry's superiors had for him by examining the following telegram from General Pope, Commander of the Department of Missouri, to Colonel Hatch:

Major Guy V. Henry, just promoted to Major in your regiment leaves for Santa Fe today. He is one of the most intelligent and valuable officers in service, and suited to any responsible duty. You need such an officer, and should assign him to a command accordingly.

Enroute to his new duty station Henry was met by Troop D of the 3rd Cavalry as he stepped off the train in Laramie, Wyoming. They handed him a new custom-made saddle and bridle in appreciation for his long service as their captain. In addition, Sergeant Charles Murphy gave Henry a letter written on behalf of all the men. They wished him continued success in the future, expressed their regret at his departure, and closed by saying that "the reputation of the company shall be at all
times and places, a credit, to the successful exertions of our late Captain.\textsuperscript{15} Henry was deeply moved and expressed his appreciation in a most feeling manner, assuring his old comrades that "the memory of his relations with them would ever remain green in his heart."\textsuperscript{16}

Major Henry's initial assignment with his new regiment was command of Fort Stanton, New Mexico and scouting duty against renegade Apaches.\textsuperscript{17} In the fall of 1881 he assumed command of Fort Sill in the Oklahoma Indian Territory. At the time Fort Sill was one of the major military installations in the West.\textsuperscript{18} The garrison consisted of two troops of cavalry and six or seven companies of the 24th Infantry (also black soldiers). The quarters were relatively luxurious. Compared to some of the forts at which the family had lived, Mrs. Henry considered it "a Garden of Eden, but with its serpent." The serpent was malaria, and the disease took many lives which nearly included that of Guy Henry, Jr.\textsuperscript{19}

Major Henry immediately set to work renovating the post and improving training. Several visitors to Fort Sill marveled at the progress that Henry and his men had made. One frequent visitor to the post remarked that he had never seen the post cleaner or in better condition.\textsuperscript{20} Another visitor noted that Sill was now "the garden spot of the military life outside of Fort Leavenworth," and that in discipline, drill, and general knowledge of duties Henry's soldiers could not be excelled.\textsuperscript{21}

As he had always done in the past, Henry achieved outstanding results through the enforcement of strict discipline. A Fort Sill correspondent for the \textit{Army and Navy Journal} reported that there had been
no drunks after the last payday, and not a single desertion during the year, both distinct rarities in the frontier Army. The reporter added, however, that the post was not perfect as the high number of court-martial cases would show.22

Major Henry expressed his views on court-martials in his Army Catechism. In his opinion a soldier's first offense should be treated with a caution or reprimand, but succeeding offenses should be punished by court-martial.23 There is no question that Henry was a tough and demanding commander. His own son described him as a 'very stern and harsh disciplinarian.'24 However, Henry was never deliberately unjust, and he had great sympathy for his men.

He once wrote a letter to the Army and Navy Journal expressing his general views on discipline and the treatment of soldiers. Henry started by noting that "nagging" one's men did not constitute discipline, and that men should be rewarded for excellent performance. The central theme of his letter was that current Army regulations were too rigid and therefore inhibited officers in fulfilling their responsibilities for the discipline and efficiency of their commands. He recommended that regulations such as those that required frequent drill and roll call formations late in the evening (tattoo) should be eliminated. Henry believed that a commander should have the authority to excuse proficient men from drills and that tattoo formations needlessly restricted enlisted men. He bluntly stated that soldiers should be treated as men rather than as children. In referring to a specific unidentified garrison, which was obviously his own, he stated that for two and a half years the commander held no tattoo formations and in bad weather
replaced retreat formation with a roll call check. At the same time an
inspector reported that the post was the best drilled and policed post
in the department, and that the command had not had a drunken soldier
nor a deserter for the entire period. Henry pointed out that, while this
post had superb discipline, according to regulations the commander
should have been court-martialed. He further argued that mandatory drill
should be replaced by "practical or theoretical instruction," and that
all the Army should require of an officer is that his command be effi-
cient. Henry suggested that there should be a new article of war that
stated, if any command is "reported as not in an efficient condition,
charges shall be brought against its commander, and if sustained, the
said officer commander shall be wholly retired from the Service with one
year's pay." Henry added that this article should apply to staff
officers as well, and argued that this would stimulate an active
interest in duty while eliminating the large number of officers who were
"just hanging on for promotion." Guy Henry was a tough, demanding
leader, but he cared for his troops and was willing to pay the conse-
quences if he failed to do his duty.25

While Henry was strict, he was not humorless. Major Azor
Nickerson, the officer who described Henry's evacuation from the
Rosebud, noted that he was "reputed to be something of a faultfinder, or
'kicker,'" yet after he was grievously wounded everyone was amazed at
Henry's cheerfulness.26 Guy, Jr., noted that his father was a "great
tease."27 It seems that Henry had a rather wry sense of humor. He had
learned how to use humor to enforce his orders. Several years later,
when Henry commanded Fort Robinson, he had difficulty getting the post
residents to control their pets, so he published the following "Cat and Dog Circular:"

Numerous complaints are made of the above animals howling, chasing horses in front of quarters, mewing and rendering nocturnal serenades not laid down by any musical scale. To properly train these animals in respectable ways, all violators will be taken up and placed in the pound, ... and if not claimed at the end of 24 hours they are to be shot (not the owner).

The editors of the Army and Navy Journal who reprinted the circular noted that it "created quite a laugh at the War Department."

Despite all of the hard work at Fort Sill, life there was very pleasant compared to the Henry's previous experiences. Fox hunts and amateur theatrical productions in which both Guy and Julia participated, were common. Another frequent form of recreation was small game hunting. A visiting correspondent for Merriweather's Weekly wrote perhaps the most colorful description of life at Fort Sill during this period. In particular he found the ceremonies performed by the large number of Indians living in the vicinity most entertaining. The correspondent was very impressed with Henry. He found that the Major was hesitant to answer questions about his Indian War exploits, and noted that Henry spoke "simply and with modesty; his scars tell the tale for him in more vivid language."

A distinctive characteristic of Fort Sill was the fact that it was garrisoned by over 300 black enlisted men. Henry was impressed with the performance of his men and developed a life-long respect for the Negro trooper. In many respects he considered black soldiers superior to their white counterparts. Henry clearly expressed views on black soldiers in a letter written to General S.C. Armstrong, subsequently published in the
Army and Navy Journal in January 1884. Henry praised their cheerfulness under hardships, vigilance as sentinels, ability to learn their duties quickly, and their respectful, soldierly bearing. He noted that Army wide their rate of drunkeness and desertion, two of the most prevalent discipline problems of the time, was far lower than among their white contemporaries. However, he criticized them for their tendency to gamble and improperly care for government property. He felt they were unequal to white soldiers in their ability to perform individually without the close supervision of their officers. This he believed to be a direct result of a feeling of dependency that slavery had ingrained in them.  

While Henry was not a civil-rights crusader, his attitude was remarkably liberal for this period. There is no question that preconceived notions influenced some of his opinions, yet he based most of his views upon unbiased observations. 

Henry's liberal views toward Indians were even more remarkable. Once when asked his opinion of the advisability of enlisting Indians in the Army, he replied that Army discipline would "kill the Indian" in them. Henry went on to say:  

The greed and dishonesty of the white man, and failure to keep treaty stipulations, is the foundation of all our Indian troubles. To obtain his just rights the Indian has to go to, or threaten war, and, if I were an Indian, I would be worse than he has ever been. Keep faith with the Indian, for we have a moral responsibility, and then, if he fails, arrest the leaders and punish them, and, if necessary, the whole tribe.

This was a remarkable statement for an officer who had nearly lost his life to an Indian bullet, and had witnessed the results of murder, torture, and mutilation performed by hostile Indians.
During the last few decades of the nineteenth century, one of the clearest indications that the Army was becoming more professional was the interest in standardized training. In his role as Commanding General, William Tecumseh Sherman founded a series of professional training institutions. He began by reviving the Artillery School of Application at Fort Monroe, Virginia in 1868. During its first year and a half of operation, Henry served as a faculty member. For the soldiers serving at frontier posts the clearest indication of professionalism was the changes in rifle marksmanship training. With the exception of a few dedicated Indian fighters, such as George Custer, until 1880 frontier Army commanders shamefully neglected marksmanship. Henry required daily marksmanship training when he commanded his first post in Wyoming, but that was extraordinary. Budgetary restrictions and the lack of a satisfactory manual before 1879, made it difficult for commanders to conduct any sort of useful marksmanship training.

As commander of Fort Sill, Henry took full advantage of the Army's new found interest by launching an extensive daily training program. By September 30, 1883, Henry's command had the finest marksmanship record in the Army. Major General Pope, Commander of the Department of Missouri, claimed in his annual report that he had but two marksmen in his entire command in 1880. Major Henry had 274 on his post alone in 1883. Marksman was the highest level of proficiency that a soldier could earn at the time. Ninety percent of Henry’s men were marksmen and every man was at least qualified with his weapon. Once again Henry’s leadership had produced outstanding results.
In January of 1883, Major Henry decided that he would like to try his hand at being a staff officer. He wrote a letter through his department and division commanders to the Adjutant General requesting a transfer to the Inspector General Corps. Henry may have felt that he could make a greater contribution to the Army in that capacity, or perhaps he merely felt that he needed a change after more than twenty continuous years of command. This would have been a lateral transfer so he was not motivated by a desire for promotion. Henry asked his old mentor, General Crook, to write a letter of recommendation for him, and Crook graciously obliged. Crook noted in his letter that he "knew of no officer whose selection for the Inspector General's Corps would be of more value to the service or cause more general satisfaction." 

Julia Henry also became involved in the request. She once again asked her friend Anthony Drexel to use his influence to help her husband get the appointment. In his reply to Drexel, General Sherman noted that he knew Henry "very well" and that he had a good record, but Sherman advised against the transfer because he believed Guy would have a better chance for promotion if he stayed with the line. Sherman also asked Mr. Drexel to tell Mrs. Henry that he could not take any action based upon the known wishes of a wife. Although it is impossible to determine whether Henry had asked his wife to enlist Drexel's aid, it appears doubtful that he either knew of or approved her action. Drexel only noted Mrs. Henry's desires in the letter, and at the time of the request Julia was away from her husband visiting in the East. It is unlikely that Henry approved of Julia's action because on at least one other occasion, he wrote to his superior to apologize for his wife having...
written to him on "military matters" without his prior knowledge. No doubt Henry was well aware of General Sherman’s distinct aversion toward officers using civilian friends and relatives to influence staff appointments, and he would not have wished to offend the Commanding General. Apparently Julia had a bad habit that her husband could not convince her to break.

The Major did not get a transfer to the Inspector General Corps, but he did get a staff assignment. With the approval of General Sheridan, General Christopher Augur appointed Henry as his department’s Inspector of Rifle Practice. Henry served as inspector for the Department of the Missouri with duty station at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas until April 21, 1885, and then assumed the same position in the Department of the Platte.

During his tour at Fort Leavenworth, Guy nearly succumbed to the after effects of his old wound. A loose bone fragment severed an artery and very nearly caused him to bleed to death. According to one report Henry lost "seven pounds of blood," and the open artery was the size of a "goose quill." The report went on to note that his blood was restored by feeding Guy beef blood and red wine. Guy Jr. recalled that the doctor treated his father by shoving cotton plugs up his nose, bringing the strings out of his mouth and then tying them under his chin. Although his medical treatment was crude, Henry once again recovered. A year later his commander noted that Henry missed "very few" duty days on account of illness.

Henry's position as Inspector of Rifle practice gave him the opportunity to have a much more profound impact on the improvement of
Army marksmanship. He soon developed a reputation as being one of the Army's foremost experts in the field. Not satisfied merely teaching and studying the subject, Henry practiced marksmanship until he qualified as a sharpshooter. This was no mean task since sharpshooter was the highest level of proficiency, and among other things required a shooter to be able to consistently hit bullseyes at 1,000 yards.

One of Major Henry’s principal tasks was to supervise the construction of the Department of the Platte's extensive new range complex at Bellevue, Nebraska, a few miles south of Omaha. The local community found it very entertaining to visit the range, and Henry became a popular figure in the Omaha society.

Henry once again used his spare time to continue his career as a military writer. In 1884 he published a book entitled, Target Practice, or, Practical Information for the Rifle Range. In 1879 the Army published its first marksmanship manual since the Civil War but it was very vague on many of the particulars of how to conduct marksmanship training. Henry intended his book to be a supplement to the basic Army manual. General Stephen Vincent Benet, the Chief of Ordnance, was impressed with several of Henry’s training techniques and asked him to write an article describing them, which Benet published in the Ordnance Notes.

Henry also published a new tactics handbook. He entitled his new work Practical Information for Non-Commissioned Officers on Field Duty. In his introduction he noted that there were numerous books on tactics for officers but none specifically designed for non-commissioned officers. As always he considered the non-commissioned officers the
back-bone of the Army, but now, because of changes in tactics, he felt their role was even more important. Under the old linear formations with compact masses of troops, the non-commissioned officers were merely file closers. Under the new tactics, with semi-independent squads and sections, and units employing coordinated fire and movement, the non-commissioned officers had to become combat leaders. Henry believed that they needed to have ready access to detailed information about their duties in combat so that they could act with intelligence in making necessary decisions. By his own admission this pamphlet was merely a compilation of appropriate information that he had gleaned from other books. Nevertheless it was a contribution to Army training and yet another example of Henry's interest in the growth of professionalism of the United States Army.

One bit of original thought that Henry included in his book was a list of military maxims. They give a clear picture of his character and his other qualities as a leader. The following are but a few examples:

*Do not entertain too high an opinion of your abilities, and do not distrust those of others.*

*A strong will and the sense of duty often lead to greater results than enthusiasm; do not, therefore, despair if necessity more than inclination detains you in the army.*

*Be patient, brave, devoted to your duties, to your chief, and to your companions.*

The impact that Henry's new book had on improving technical competence within the Army is difficult to calculate. As with his earlier publication, this book was favorably reviewed by the press and most notably by the *Cavalry Journal.* The latter was the official organ of the U.S. Cavalry Association, one of the Army's first professional
associations dedicated to discussion and study of military theory. Henry was a member of the association and a frequent contributor to the Journal. Whatever his impact, there is no question that Guy Henry made every possible effort to contribute to the rising professionalism in the Army.

After six years of duty as a department inspector of rifle practice, Henry decided that he would like to return to duty with his regiment. In September 1889 he assumed command of a battalion consisting of two troops of the 9th Cavalry and one company of the 21st Infantry. Enroute to his new duty station, Henry stopped at Camp Crook, Nebraska and took part in training maneuvers. This was one of the earliest field maneuver exercises the United States Army ever conducted. As far as the men were concerned the training was extremely realistic. Some units took prisoners, and several fist-fights broke out. The Army was at least beginning to conduct the type of training that Upton and other reformers had envisioned, but there was obviously still a great deal to learn.

On September 26, 1889, Henry assumed command of Fort McKinney, Wyoming. The accommodations were similar to those at Fort Sill, and once again the Henrys found themselves largely isolated from the public. Education for the children was a particular problem at remote posts. Guy Jr. remembered attending the post school where his teachers were "two colored soldier deserters, both with heavy iron chain shackles around their ankles, as was customary for deserters and dangerous prisoners in those days." What Guy Jr. lacked in formal education he more than made up for by the experience he gained living on the plains.
The Henry children loved to pretend they were soldiers, and their parents allowed them to do anything that the soldiers did as long as it was not harmful to them. Even when Guy Jr. was a small child, Major Henry allowed his son to accompany him while he performed his duties, especially in the field. Henry often used his son as an orderly, and Guy Jr. recalled, "he rarely issued an order without consulting me about it; not that he paid much attention to my opinion, but at the same time he discussed it." His father was obviously a fine mentor. Young Henry went on to have a highly successful military career, and he felt his father deserved much credit for his early training.

Major Henry was a very popular figure in Northern Wyoming. Many of the citizens remembered Henry from his service in the territory during the last great Indian uprising in 1876. In 1890 when the United States Congress invited brevet nominations for Indian engagements since 1867, Wyoming's governor, Francis Warren, and many of the State's most prominent citizens, signed petitions requesting two brevets for Henry. Specifically they cited his "long and gallant services in the Indian Country," and in particular for his "brave and gallant" performance at the Battle of the Rosebud "where by his brave and heroic conduct, he saved a disaster to the troops engaged in that action."

Henry was grateful for their thoughtfulness, but he realized that his chances for any reward were slim unless he could document his performance at the Rosebud. Crook's official reports failed to describe any specific acts of heroism. In a general order to his troops published after the battle, Crook noted that in the future when "the avenues for recognition of distinguished service and gallant conduct are opened,"
those who rendered such actions in the campaign would be recommended for suitable reward. That time had finally come. Crook died suddenly just after the new brevet legislation passed, but he orally recommended Henry the day before he passed away. In order to strengthen his case Henry asked some army friends to write recommendations for him, and he asked some of the men who served with him at the Rosebud to describe their recollections of his performance. The responses were most gratifying. Generals Sherman, McDowell, Howard, Pope, and Merritt all wrote glowing recommendations. Nine fellow officers and a trumpeter who served at the Rosebud sent letters testifying to Henry's heroism. Major General John Schofield, the Commanding General of the Army, recommended to the Secretary of War that Henry receive a promotion to Brevet Brigadier General, U.S. Army. Red tape held up Henry's promotion until 1894. A hollow promotion eighteen years after the fact was not much compensation for a bullet hole through his head. No doubt Henry drew much greater satisfaction from the kind remarks made by his friends.

As the citizens of Wyoming drafted their petition for Major Henry, the last major episode of the Indian Wars began to unfold. Henry's old foes, the Sioux, had become increasingly frustrated with life on the reservations. Living conditions on the reservations had steadily deteriorated during the past decade to the point where some Indians were starving. In October Major Henry sent his scout, Frank Grouard, to investigate rumors of Indian unrest. From information provided by Grouard, Henry sent a report to Brigadier General John Brooke, his department commander, alerting him that a number of Sioux had adopted a new messianic religion and were leaving their reservations. This was the
first report of the emergence of the Ghost Dance religious moment among the Sioux. The Ghost Dance religion began in the Southwest as a peaceful movement. For the warlike Sioux, however, the religion took on a new connotation. They believed that their ceremonies and special Ghost Dance shirts made them invulnerable to bullets. Their new religion gave them the false hope that they could yet defeat the white man and return to their old lifestyle. By November 1890 the Ghost Dance movement had incited the Sioux in South Dakota to the verge of anarchy.

General Nelson Miles, the Commander of the Division of the Missouri, decided to launch a major military operation in order to disarm the Indians and keep the movement from spreading. The Army sent troops from as far away as California to converge on the troubled area. Extensive development of the railroad and telegraph systems over the past several decades now made it possible to concentrate large numbers of soldiers quickly. Major Henry arrived at the Pine Ridge Agency, the scene of the greatest turmoil, on November 25, and assumed command of a battalion of four troops (D, F, I, and K) of the 9th Cavalry.

As the troops arrived the Indians divided themselves into two factions. Those who wished to avoid hostilities gathered in camps near the agencies, while those most taken with the Ghost Dance movement withdrew to remote portions of the reservation. One particularly large group of rebellious Sioux encamped on a large plateau of the rugged Bad Lands region in the northwest corner of the Pine Ridge reservation. Rather than attack the Indians in their stronghold, Miles’ policy was to use
small groups of soldiers and Indian police to arrest hostile leaders and to try to coax rebellious bands back to camps near the agencies.

Henry expected that his troops and their mounts would have to be in excellent physical condition if they were called upon to engage in any major operation. He spent the next month conducting daily conditioning drills so that his men, horses, and pack mules would be able to endure long, rapid marches in winter weather. As he recalled, "nothing interfered; dust, wind and cold were ignored." His daily twelve mile marches with periodic "changes" drove many of his men and animals to the point of exhaustion, but by the end of the month they were all "tough as knots." Henry's extensive Indian war experience had taught him to be prepared for the unexpected. It is doubtful, however, that even he anticipated the tests that were to come.

At first it seemed that a major uprising would be avoided. The Indians were impressed by Miles' display of military might as troops continued to arrive from remote Western posts. They were especially impressed with Henry's black troopers. Each soldier wore a buffalo fur overcoat and a muskrat cap. The Indians called them "buffalo soldiers," but to their fellow troopers they were "Henry's Brunettes."

In the middle of December tensions suddenly increased. A group of Indian police killed Sitting Bull while attempting to arrest him, and Big Foot's band bolted from its camp located 100 miles north of the Pine Ridge Agency. General Miles was determined to prevent Big Foot from joining the hostiles in the stronghold. He ordered Henry's battalion to block his path. On Christmas Eve, the "Brunettes" moved out with an attached section of the 1st Artillery (two Hotchkiss guns). As the
battalion trotted through the agency, comrades from other units greeted them with cheers and shouts of "Merry Christmas." Henry moved his men at a brisk pace. They left the agency at about 2:30 PM and reached their objective, Cottonwood Creek, by 3:30 AM. They had traveled 56 miles at night through rugged territory in little more than twelve hours. General Brooke, Henry's department commander, was most impressed. He noted in his official report that this was "one of the best evidences of what can be done by an able and energetic commander with a well equipped and well disciplined body of troops." For the next week Henry conducted daily scouting patrols in search of Big Foot's trail. Unbeknown to Brooke or Henry, Big Foot had no intention of going to the stronghold. Instead he passed to the east of Henry's position and headed for the Pine Ridge Agency. On December 28, General Brooke ordered Henry to scout the Indian stronghold. The following day Henry took his battalion on a reconnaissance of the alleged impregnable fortress and found the defenses "ridiculously weak." His job was merely to scout, however, so he returned to his base camp. Henry's troopers were tired but in high spirits after the day's 42 mile ride. They had just turned in for the night when a messenger rode into camp on a steaming, foam flecked horse and announced that the 7th Cavalry had just been in a terrible fight at Wounded Knee Creek. The battle was over, but General Brooke wanted Henry to return to Pine Ridge at once, for he feared the flight of the thousands of Sioux camped nearby and an attack on the agency. Henry immediately ordered the trumpeters to sound "Boots and Saddles." Tents were struck, wagons and
mules were packed, and in less than 40 minutes the battalion was trotting toward Pine Ridge.

The Battle of Wounded Knee was one of the greatest tragedies of the Indian War. The 7th Cavalry intercepted Big Foot's band as it approached the Pine Ridge Agency. Miles and Brooke had ordered Colonel James Forsyth, the commander of the 7th, to disarm the Indians before escorting them into the agency. When a few of the Indians forcibly resisted, a melee broke out between the intermingled troopers and the Indians. In the ensuing firefight it was difficult to distinguish friend from foe or even warriors from women and children. The result was over 150 dead Indians, including over 60 women and children. The 7th Cavalry lost 25 killed and 37 wounded. Although the troopers had tried to spare the women and children, this was often impossible because of the smoke and confusion. The Indians understandably considered it to be a massacre and were more upset than ever.

Henry knew the situation at the agency 50 miles away might be desperate so he led his bone-weary men and horses at a rapid pace through the bitterly cold, moonless night. They occasionally caught a glimpse of figures lurking on the bluffs that paralleled the route of march. As they neared the agency the terrain opened up allowing Henry to quicken the pace. At this point his wagon train could not keep up, so Henry detached Troop D to serve as escort and moved on more rapidly with the bulk of his battalion. The Major and his lead element reached the agency at daybreak. When they found no immediate crisis, his men unsaddled their horses and flopped on the ground in exhaustion.
They had been resting but a short time, when a messenger from the escort troop rode up and announced that the wagon train was surrounded by hostiles a short distance from the agency and that one man had already been killed. The entire command immediately mounted, some troopers not bothering to saddle, and rode off to the rescue. Henry directed his men to sweep over the hills around the wagon train and thereby quickly drive off the Indians. The one trooper killed in the initial exchange was the only casualty. An Indian dressed in the uniform of a cavalry soldier had killed him in the first volley.

The battalion had no more than unsaddled after their arrival at their Pine Ridge camp when General Brooke ordered Forsyth and Henry to investigate a disturbance at the Drexel Mission. Henry explained to Brooke the condition of his men and requested permission to allow them to rest a bit. Brooke consented and ordered Colonel Forsyth to proceed alone. Forsyth ordered his eight troops of the 7th Cavalry to mount and moved down the road toward the mission with two Hotchkiss guns trailing behind.

When Forsyth reached the mission he found it unmolested and sent word back to Brooke that Henry's command would not be needed. A few rebellious Indians had merely ignited some small log cabins in the area. Since there were no Indians presently in sight Forsyth decided to return to the agency. As he was about to leave, one of his scouts reported that he heard shots coming from an area a few miles beyond the mission. Forsyth decided he had better investigate. The trail led through a 300 yard wide valley flanked by steep bluffs and hills. As Forsyth's scouts reached the bluff on the far side of the valley, they made contact with
a small band of hostile Indians. Forsyth moved the rest of the command up to the scouts' position and sent a dismounted troop forward. Unfortunately, he failed to send flankers out to secure the bluffs on either side of the valley. The Indians soon worked their way around his flanks making the position untenable. At this point Forsyth decided he could use reinforcements and sent a scout back to the agency to ask Henry to join him.

Although the Indians' rifle fire was long range and therefore not very effective, Forsyth decided it would be best to attempt to withdraw. He left two troops in position in order to cover his retreat and moved back toward the mission with the bulk of his command. Forsyth established a new position in the valley about 200 yards from the mission. He now tried to extricate his covering force, but before he could accomplish this his new position came under effective fire from the three directions. Forsyth realized that he had a serious problem and sent an officer, Lieutenant Guy H. Preston, to ask Henry to hurry up.

Henry received Forsyth's first message at about 1:00 PM. He immediately ordered his men to mount and they trotted off toward the mission as fast as their jaded horses could carry them. They were about three miles from the mission when they met Lieutenant Preston. On hearing that the 7th Cavalry was in a "bad fix," Henry ordered his men to spur their tired horses to the gallop. When he joined Forsyth at about 1:30 PM, Henry discovered the bulk of the 7th was effectively cut off. Two troops were still in the first position and were also unable to withdraw.
Major Henry immediately ordered the "Brunettes" into action. He directed two troops to sweep the bluffs along Forsyth's right flank and his other two troops to sweep the bluffs along the left. He employed a Hotchkiss gun on a commanding knoll on the right. The artillery piece supported the movements of the cavalrmen and scattered the collected groups of Indians. The Indians soon started to break contact and the 7th was able to withdraw under the covering fire of the 9th Cavalry troopers on their flanks. Once the 7th Cavalry was clear the 9th likewise withdrew back to the agency.

The 9th Cavalry suffered no casualties but the 7th had five enlisted men wounded and one killed. They also had one wounded officer, Lieutenant James Mann, who died less than a month later.

As "Henry's Brunettes" rode into the Pine Ridge Mission they had every right to be proud. In 32 hours they had ridden 102 miles and fought in two engagements. What the Major pointed to with greatest pride, however, was the fact that would appeal the most to another cavalryman: "there was not a sore-backed horse in the outfit."87

Newspaper reporters, eager for an exciting story, quickly dispatched articles that further glamorized the dramatic ride. As an example, one headline read: "Saved By Col. Henry - A Massacre Averted By The Timely Arrival Of The 'Buffalo' Veterans." The article went on to note that the troopers were opposed by "not less than 1,800" savages.88

Certainly Forsyth's men had been in serious danger, but a massacre was never very likely. Based upon the estimates of several reliable eyewitnesses the 7th was never attacked by more than 70 hostiles, although
there were hundreds of additional warriors who could have quickly reinforced them from a rebellious camp nearby.

The correspondents who covered the Wounded Knee Campaign were a different breed than the handful of honest reporters like John Finerty who had accurately covered the earlier campaigns in the trans-Mississippi West. Twenty-one correspondents gathered at Pine Ridge, more than had covered all preceding Indian war campaigns combined. In the 1880s the so-called New Journalism began to evolve. Expansion in the news industry created much stronger competition for circulation, resulting in reporters often sacrificing accuracy in their quest for interesting stories. Consequently many of the stories that came out of Pine Ridge were exaggerated, based on rumors, or perhaps even faked.89

Henry's battalion was the inspiration for more than one lurid tale. While they were away from the agency scouting for Big Foot's band, articles were published that reported that the savages had wiped out the 9th Cavalry and that Henry had committed suicide to avoid capture. In another article reporting the alleged massacre, the correspondent asserted that, knowing Henry, he believed the Major would have expended his last bullet on a savage. After the Drexel Mission Fight and their dramatic ride, however, Henry and his "Brunettes" became the heroes of the campaign.90

Not surprisingly, the press, in their efforts to over-dramatize the bloodshed and alleged disasters of the campaign, severely criticized Colonel Forsyth and the 7th Cavalry. One report went so far as to accuse the 7th Cavalry of wantonly slaughtering the Sioux at Wounded Knee as an act of revenge for the Custer Massacre.91
Henry had great sympathy for Forsyth and the 7th Cavalry. While Henry and most of the other officers who were aware of the details of the campaign realized that the Colonel had committed some serious blunders in his disposition of troops at Wounded Knee and throughout his operation at the Mission, they believed that Forsyth and the 7th were victims of circumstances. Who could confidently claim that the outcomes would have been substantially different if the 9th Cavalry had attempted to disarm Big Foot's band or had been the first to make contact with the hostiles at the mission? Years of experience had taught Henry that there was often a fine line between being a hero or a failure.

Henry wanted to see his men complimented and rewarded for their performance but not at the expense of Colonel Forsyth and the 7th Cavalry. In order to ease the criticism of his colleagues and help restore their confidence, Guy wrote the following letter to Forsyth:

General: Will you please say to your officers that my officers and myself do not feel the service rendered your regiment, during the Mission engagement, as entitled to the consideration which seems to be accorded us by the newspapers. No such catastrophe as indicated seemed imminent, and we certainly are not desirous of gaining a little glory at the expense of our comrades. The entente cordiale between the officers of the 7th and ours is perfect and we hope the newspaper statements may not change the same.

With equal magnanimity Forsyth replied:

My Dear Col. Henry: Your letter of yesterday received. Please accept our thanks for the spirit of kindness and good feeling in which it was written, and receive the assurance that the same feeling is reciprocated, and has not, nor can it be changed by any newspaper article. There is no doubt, however, that your (9th Cavalry) timely arrival on the 30th aided materially in the withdrawal of my troops, for at that moment it was hard to tell from which direction we were to expect the strongest force.
General Miles was far less sympathetic toward the Colonel of the 7th Cavalry. On January 4, he relieved Forsyth and convened a court of inquiry to determine whether the Colonel had been negligent in the performance of duty and disobedient of orders while in command of the operation at Wounded Knee. Miles subsequently ordered an additional investigation of Forsyth's alleged mismanagement of the Drexel Mission engagement. Henry provided testimony for the second investigation. He gave a detailed account of his own actions, but made no comments critical of Forsyth or the 7th Cavalry. 93

Both investigations produced reports highly critical of Colonel Forsyth. Colonel Edward Heyl, the investigating officer for the Mission Fight, noted in his official report that the 7th Cavalry had failed to recover the body of one of its soldiers, which was subsequently found horribly mutilated. Regarding the disposition of Forsyth's command, he wrote, "part of his command was actually surrounded, and had it not been for the timely arrival of Major Henry with his battalion of the 9th Cavalry the result would have in all probability been very serious." Despite these critical reports, General Schofield and the Secretary of War dismissed all charges and ordered Forsyth reinstated. Both men had serious questions about Miles' methods and motives, and they felt it would be unwise to bring discredit on the Army or an officer who otherwise had an outstanding record. 94

Major Henry was no doubt pleased to see his colleague exonerated, but he was disgusted later when he read Forsyth's official report. In an obvious attempt to put a good face on an embarrassing situation, Forsyth made it seem as though he had always had the situation at the Mission
well in hand. From reading his report it appeared as though the arrival of the 9th Cavalry was anticlimactic and hardly worthy of mention. Henry made no public complaints, but he noted in a personal letter to Miles that he hoped some day the facts would come out.

The Mission Fight was the last significant engagement of the campaign. The day after the engagement General Miles arrived at the Pine Ridge Agency to take personal command of the operation. Just when it seemed likely that general hostilities were about to break out, Miles employed a new tactic that quickly defused the situation. The rebellious Indians had abandoned their stronghold and now occupied a new camp closer to the Pine Ridge Agency. Miles deployed the 3,500 troops immediately available in a wide cordon around the hostile camp. Gradually he tightened the ring while simultaneously making peace overtures through Indian emissaries. It quickly became apparent to the Sioux that further resistance was futile. One by one the rebellious Indians surrendered. Kicking Bear, the last holdout, finally yielded his rifle to General Miles on January 15. Through a combination of diplomacy and a display of military power, Miles had managed to defuse a volatile situation and end the entire Ghost Dance uprising.

Six days after the final surrender Miles decided to stage a grand review, not because he wished to celebrate a great victory, but to further impress upon the thousands of disconsolate Indians the futility of further aggression. It was a bitterly cold day and a piercing wind buffeted General Miles as he took his position on a knoll overlooking his army's camp. The first unit in the parade was Lieutenant Charles Taylor's Oglala scouts. They were followed by a full brigade of infantry.
commanded by Colonel Frank Wheaton. Next Captain Allyn Capron's Light Battery E of the 1st Artillery with their Hotchkiss guns clattered by. At first Miles appeared only vaguely interested in the review, but he began to display the emotion that was obviously welling up within him when the old "War Eagle," Colonel Eugene Carr, rode past at the head of the 6th Cavalry. Then came "Henry's Brunettes." General Miles waved his hand at Major Henry "whose gaunt figure was almost lost in the folds of his buffalo overcoat." The black troopers held their carbines in a crisp salute as they pranced by with their bullet-torn guidons flapping in the stiff breeze. The last unit in the column was the 7th Cavalry, and as the battle-worn regiment rode past General Miles, the band struck up "Garry Owen," Custer's favorite marching tune. It was unquestionably the grandest review ever conducted by the Army in the West and provided a suitable ending to what some have termed the longest war in American history. At last the Indians were vanquished and America's frontier had disappeared. Guy Henry and thousands of other frontier regulars had performed their grim duties in fostering western expansion while simultaneously helping to nurture professionalism in the United States Army.
ENDNOTES


2Utley, Frontier Regulars, p.22.

3Guy V. Henry, Army Catechism; or, Simple Questions and Answers for Non-Commissioned Officers and Soldiers (Salt Lake City: Star Printing Company, 1881). The numbers of the specific questions are annotated with a (Q) when they are referred to in the text.

4Utley, Frontier Regulars, pp. 44-45.

5ANJ, July 23, 1881, p.1072.

6For a detailed discussion of the elements of military professionalism see Huntington, Chapter 1.

7Henry, Catechism, p. 1.

8See for example Army and Navy Register, June 18, 1881. There are numerous unidentified newspaper clippings of book reviews in the Williams-Henry Papers.

9ANJ, June 11, 1881, p. 942; and June 18, 1881, p. 963.


12Unidentified newspaper clipping, Williams-Henry Papers.

13General Eugene Carr was one who refused such a promotion and later regretted because it slowed his advancement in rank. Some of the most highly regarded officers such as Wesley Merritt and Nelson Miles served with blacks. See James T. King, War Eagle (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), p. 77; and Jack D. Foner, The United States Soldier Between Two Wars (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), p. 135.

14Pope to Hatch, August 3, 1881 (copy), Williams-Henry Papers.

15Murphy to Henry, July 13, 1881, Williams-Henry Papers. Original letters from enlisted men are quite rare.

16Laramie Times, quoted in the ANJ, August 6, 1881, p.6.

17Henry had little if any contact with the hostile Apaches during campaign. For a description of the situation in the Southwest at this
time see Thrapp, Chapter 16. See also ANJ, October, 1881, p. 179; October 8, 1881, p. 205; October 15, 1881, p. 224; October 22, 1881, p. 259; October 29, 1881, p. 269; and November 5, 1881, p. 301.


19 Guy Henry, Jr., *Brief Narrative,* pp. 5-6.

20 ANJ, October 7, 1882, p. 219.


22 ANJ, November 25, 1882, p. 372. For a discussion of the drunkeness, desertion, and discipline in the Army see Utley, Frontier Regulars, pp. 23, 84-85; and Foner, pp. 6-10, 30-41, 59-61, 80-83, 94-96.

23 Henry, Army Catechism, p. 42.


25 "Army Discipline," ANJ, November 16, 1889, pp. 222-223. The letter is signed "So Mote it Be," but according to annotations in Henry's personal scrapbook he wrote it. Although written several years after he gave up command of Fort Sill, he is probably referring to his command there since it was the only post he had commanded for approximately two and a half years. In his memoir, Guy Jr. stated that his father had eliminated the tattoo formation, *Brief Narrative,* p. 17.

26 Nickerson, p. 29.


28 ANJ, May 23, 1891, p. 659.

29 Ibid., January 29, 1882, p. 563; May 20, 1882, p. 960. See also Guy Henry, Jr., *Brief Narrative,* p. 6.

30 M.L.M. "A Week on the Frontier," Merriweather's Weekly, April 14, 1883, pp. 307-309. See also April 7, pp. 291-293; and April 21, pp. 323-326.

31 Henry to Armstrong, November 23, 1883, reprinted in the ANJ, January 26, 1884, p. 525.

32 "Indians as Soldiers" ANJ, April 25, 1891, p. 601. See also "Sioux Disturbances: Gallant 'Fighting Guy' Tells of the Wrongs Suffered by His Old Time Foeman," New York Herald, September 17, 1895.
Many frontier officers were sympathetic toward the plight of the Indian. For further information see Richard N. Ellis, "The Humanitarian Soldiers," *Journal of Arizona History*, X (Summer, 1969), 53-66.

33Huntington, pp. 239-240. See also Cullum, II, 797; and Henry to Cullum, January 22, 1873, Cullum Papers, Archives of the United States Military Academy Library, West Point, New York.


35ANJ, August 9, 1873, p. 824.

36McChristian, Chapter 2.

37Guy Henry, Jr., *Brief Narrative,* p. 8; and A. C. Markley "Target Practice," ANJ, November 24, 1883.

38McChristian, p. 57.


40Henry to Adjutant General, U.S. Army, January 5, 1883, Henry-AGO file.

41Crook to the President, March 13, 1884, Henry-AGO file.

42Sherman to Drexel, January 19, 1883, Williams-Henry Papers. One should note that Sherman obviously received Drexel's letter before he received Henry's request, although the latter was dated two weeks earlier.


44Henry to Nelson Miles, March 13, 1891, Miles-Cameron Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

45Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, pp. 31-32.

46Augur to Sheridan, July 29, 1884; Sheridan to Augur, August 25, 1884; and General Orders, No. 7., Department of the Platte, April 24, 1885, Henry-AGO file. Enroute to Leavenworth Henry served on the Board of Improvements to Cavalry equipment for several months.

47ANJ, April 18, 1885, p. 757. See also certificate of treatment by Surgeon P. Middleton, April 20, 1885, Williams-Henry Papers.
According to another report the bones in the upper portion of Henry's mouth were so necrosed that removing a loose tooth was too risky. His tooth had to be treated by cutting through the gums and injecting "different chemical solutions." ANJ, September 5, 1885, p. 99.


49 Oliver O. Howard to Adjutant General, U.S. Army, March 18, 1886, Henry-AGO file.

50 For a highly favorable appraisal of Henry's job performance by his department commander see, Howard to Adjutant General, U.S. Army, April 2, 1890, Henry-AGO file. Henry's personal scrapbook contains a number of unidentified newspaper clippings praising his efforts to improve marksmanship, Williams-Henry Papers.

51 ANJ, August 16, 1890, p. 938; McChristian, p. 58.

52 There are a number of newspaper articles and photographs in Henry's personal papers describing the Bellevue range. See for example the Omaha Bee, August 3, 1889.

Henry delivered a number of lectures to local clubs on his Indian War experiences. For details see Henry-Williams Papers and ANJ, December 17, 1887, p. 398.

For an example of the community's high regard for Henry see, "A Distinguished Officer," Omaha Bee, August 25, 1889.

53 Guy V. Henry, Target Practice, or, Practical Information for the Rifle Range (Leavenworth, Kansas: Ketcheson & Hubbell, 1884). The Williams-Henry Papers contain a number of favorable reviews on the book.

54 McChristian, pp. 21, 41-46, 61.


56 Guy V. Henry, Practical Information for Non-Commissioned Officers on Field Duty (Buffalo, Wyoming: The Echo Water Power Print, 1890).

57 Ibid., pp. 54-55. The emphasis is Henry's.

58 Cavalry Journal, 3 (September 1890), 354-355. See also Henry's correction Cavalry Journal, 3 (December 1890), 439. See also Williams-Henry Papers for numerous other reviews.

59 Guy V. Henry, "Cavalry Instruction," Cavalry Journal, 7 (December 1894), 292-308; "Remarks on Prince Hohenlohe's Sixteenth Letter on Cavalry," 4 (March 1891), 89-90. See also Henry's contribution to discussions on "Marching and Camping Cavalry and Caring for
Horses in the Field," 2 (June 1889), 166-168; and "Reorganization and Graded Retirement for Cavalry," 9 (September 1896), 227. The Cavalry Journal began publication in 1888. Henry also contributed to other new professional journals. See for example, Guy V. Henry, "Target Practice" Army and Navy Register, November 26, 1887, p. 2.

60 John R. Brooke to Henry, September 20, 1889, Williams-Henry Papers. In according to Henry's request, General Brooke expressed his regret at losing his services, praised him for his "untiring efforts," and credited him with the Department's accomplishments in rifle firing.

61 Guy Henry, Jr. "Brief Narrative," pp. 10-11. See also "Camp George Crook," ANJ, August 24, p. 1064; August 31, p. 3; September 7, p. 20; September 14, p. 43; and September 28, 1889, p. 83.

62 ANJ, October 12, 1889, pp. 186, 123.


65 Ibid., pp. 3, 7-12, 14, 16.

66 Secretary of War, Annual Report (1890), pp. 52-53. Warren to Whom it May Concern, April 25, 1890; Warren to Schofield, May 17, 1890; Congressman Joseph M. Carey to the President, May 10, 1890; Citizens of Northern Wyoming to Schofield (no date), Henry-AGO file. Congress suspended the award of brevets from 1867 to 1890. In the minds of many Congressman, most notably Senator John A. Logan, there was no glory in Indian warfare. See Utley, Frontier Regulars, p. 21.

67 Citizens of Northern Wyoming to Whom it May Concern, April 25, 1890, Henry-AGO file.

68 Crook's report, General Order No. 8, HQ Big Horn and Yellowstone Expedition, October 27, 1876, Henry-AGO file.

69 Crook's recommendation relayed by Captain G.M. Randall, A.D.C., Note No. 110, Henry-AGO file.

70 Henry-AGO file. The following is the list of officers who served at the Rosebud and wrote letters for Henry: Bainbridge Reynolds, A.J. Hartsuff, George F. Chase, Henry Seton, W.L. Carpenter, Andrew Burt, A.W. Evans, Henry E. Noyes, and Charles Mortan. The trumpeter was E. A. Snow.

71 Note No. 110, Henry-AGO file.

Murray, p. 151. Frank Grouard was one of the most famous Indian scouts and played a prominent role in much of the history of the Northern Plains. See Joe DeBarthe, The Life and Adventures of Frank Grouard, ed. Edgar I. Stewart (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958). This alleged autobiography is a mixture of fact and fiction, and should be used with caution.

Henry to Adjutant General, Department of the Platte, October 14, 1890, Reports of Correspondence Relating to the Army Investigation of the Battle of Wounded Knee and the Sioux Campaign of 1890-1891, National Archives, Microcopy 983.


Utley, Last Days, Chapters 9 and 10.


Ibid. See also Henry to Lt.Col. Samuel Breck, Asst. Adjutant General, Reports and Correspondence, Microcopy 983.

The primary source for information on the Mission Flight in the report of the investigation of that engagement made by Colonel E.M. Heyl, the Inspector General of the Division of the Missouri, January 28,
1891. This report contains testimony by Brooke, Henry, and several other eyewitnesses. It also contains Forsyth's report, December 31, 1890; Henry's report is in the form of a letter, Henry to Lt. Roe (aide to Gen. Brooke), January 17, 1891, Reports and Correspondence, Microcopy 983.

87Henry, "Indian Episode," p. 1274, and Henry "Remarks on Prince Hohenlohe's Sixteenth Letter on Cavalry," p. 90. One horse did drop dead from exhaustion after the march and another a few days later.

88Chicago Inter-Ocean, January 1, 1891. See Williams-Henry Papers for other unidentified articles that describe the incident.

89Oliver Knight, Following the Indian Wars (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960), p. 311. This book is a thorough analysis of the performance of correspondents during the entire Indian War period. For an analysis focused on the press coverage of this campaign see Elmo S. Watson, "The Last Indian War, 1890-91 - A Study of Newspaper Jingoism," Journalism Quarterly, XX (September 1943), 205-219.

90Unidentified newspaper clippings in Williams-Henry Papers. See also ANJ, January 17, 1891, p. 355.

91Utley, Last Days, pp. 229-30. Some reporters characterized the Wounded Knee affair as a glorious triumph, while others claimed that it was a disgrace. As Utley has pointed out, most interpretations that have been published since reflect either one or the other of these extremes. The notion that the 7th Cavalry were motivated by revenge is still a popular thesis whose advocates tend to overlook the fact that very few officers or men serving in the regiment in 1890 were with the 7th at the time of the Little Bighorn Massacre.

92The ANJ reprinted both letters, January 17, 1894, p. 355.

93Proceedings of an Investigation made Pursuant to Special Order Number 8, Headquarters Division of the Missouri, January 4, 1891; for Henry's testimony see the report of Colonel E.M. Heyl, January 26, 1891; Reports and Correspondence, Microcopy 983.

94Ibid. For analysis of both investigations and Schofield and Secretary Redfield Proctor's motives in dismissing all charges see Utley, Last Days, pp. 244-249.

95Forsyth's report, dated December 31, 1890, is included in Heyl's report, Reports and Correspondence, Microcopy 983.

96Henry to Miles, January 27, 1892, Miles-Cameron Papers.

97Utley, Last Days, pp. 251-261. See also Nelson A. Miles, "The War with the 'Messiah'," Cosmopolitan Magazine, LI (September 1911), 527-529.
CHAPTER 5

THE FINAL DECADE

Guy Henry's career prospects did not look promising as the last decade of the nineteenth century began. He was a fifty-one year old major with little opportunity for future promotions. With further Indian rebellions unlikely, many Americans considered their meager standing Army of less than 30,000 more superfluous than ever. The Army continued to concentrate its efforts on preparing for the next foreign war despite the fact that it had no likely opponents. The 1890s would be a decade of dramatic change for Major Henry, but it is doubtful that he could have imagined them as he sat in his tent at his winter camp in South Dakota.

Although the Ghost Dance rebellion had effectively ended, General Miles thought it best for some troops to stay near Pine Ridge in case any of the Sioux had second thoughts. He ordered Henry and his battalion to establish a winter camp near the agency. Thus Henry and his black troopers spent many more cold, damp nights sleeping in tents waiting for spring. At the end of March, Henry moved his battalion to Fort Robinson. His command of that post was short lived for in May he received orders placing him in command of Fort Myer, Virginia.1

Fort Myer was one of the plum assignments in the Army. The garrison provided troops for ceremonies in the nation's capital, and the post was a show-place for the Army. It was a tradition in the Army to send the best troops from the best cavalry battalions to this post. Henry felt that his black troopers deserved some formal recognition for their
performance in the recent campaign. At the end of January he wrote to
General Howard, now in command of the Department of the East, to ask if
he would use his influence to get a troop of the 9th Cavalry assigned to
Fort Myer. Howard responded: "I will do anything that is proper in the
recognition of reward of your gallant command." General Schofield
agreed with Howard that both Major Henry and his men deserved the
assignment and recommended their transfer to the Adjutant General and
the Secretary of War. On April 28, Secretary of War Redfield Proctor
announced that Troop K of the 9th Cavalry and Troop A of the 1st Cavalry
would relieve the units presently stationed at Fort Myer.

Although no one doubted that both troops deserved this reward, the
assignment was controversial because black and white soldiers would be
serving together on the same post. In sharply segregated Washington,
D.C., such an arrangement was extraordinary, especially since this
experiment at integration would occur in a place that was clearly in the
public eye. The Army never integrated units until well into the twen-
tieth century, but black and white soldiers had grown accustomed to
working with each other on the frontier. It was more likely that the
public rather than the troopers would oppose the new arrangement at Fort
Myer.

Several newspapers reported that Henry and his black troopers
richly deserved their new assignment. The Washington correspondent of
the New York Herald, however, noted that some people in Washington
considered it "detrimental to the best interests of the service to bring
white and colored troops together in the same garrison, especially at
the nation's capital, where the color line is so frequently the cause of
discussion." A few days later a Herald editorial angrily criticized this opposition, and remarked, "We don't care whether a man is white, black or green; he should have the reward of his daring." Major Henry had little difficulty establishing an amicable relationship among his troopers and the local community. In a letter to the Army and Navy Journal he described how well his men were getting along and quoted the captain of the white troop as saying "all is quiet along the Potomac." Unfortunately he was not as successful in his personal public relations.

Shortly after his arrival a reporter from the Washington Post interviewed Henry. As usual he spoke frankly and made a special point of praising his black troopers. Although the article was highly complimentary of Henry and his men, it was an example of the sensational feature stories that were coming into vogue. Most of Henry's alleged statements were quite restrained, but a few were very colorful. He spoke at length about the relative merits of black soldiers and remarked that they "are like children in their ignorance of fear. They would go to hell with me, those colored troopers." One of his alleged statements was much more inflammatory. Henry reputedly suggested that "colored troopers" would be especially useful in quelling Fenian outbreaks and German socialist riots because of the Negro's natural desire "to kill some of his hereditary enemies, Germans and Irish." Not surprisingly, the Major's comments brought him an onslaught of criticism. The Irish World, one of the nation's leading Irish papers, accused him of "Know-nothingism", and seeking to inflame racial prejudice.
No doubt Henry was dismayed by the negative reaction. Having served so many years in the West where people generally spoke their mind, he was obviously unaccustomed to the tact that was required of the commander of Fort Myer. In all likelihood the reporter spiced-up Henry's comments a bit, although he probably did not totally distort his sentiments. Henry was a hard-bitten old warrior who had always had a tendency to reveal thoughts that were best kept to himself. He had little tolerance for trouble makers and favored harsh punishments for anyone who violated the law, but certainly he did not hate all Irishmen and Germans. Most of his beloved old troopers in the 3rd Cavalry and the non-commissioned officers he respected so much were members of those ethnic groups.

The Post article did little to tarnish Henry's image. In fact he was becoming a bit of a celebrity. For the next several years articles continued to appear that praised Henry for the long distance ride. One article described it among the greatest riding feats in American history. Frederick Remington wrote Henry a letter complementing him on the famous ride, and John Finerly and Charles King wrote to request his assistance in providing information for books they were writing about the Indian Wars. William Cody (Buffalo Bill) was well acquainted with Henry from their service together on the frontier, and he frequently invited him to visit his popular Wild West show. Cody would tip-off the newspapers before hand to gain maximum publicity. Articles reporting these visits described Henry as one of the greatest Indian fighters ever known and referred to him as "Fighting Guy," a nickname he allegedly acquired from an admiring Indian warrior during the 1876 Campaign.
Henry's reputation within the Army continued to grow as well. The Fort Myer assignment was not the only official recognition that he received for his performance during the Pine Ridge Campaign. General Miles recommended him for another brevet. Henry had to settle for a special commendation in General Orders, because General Schofield's authority to forward recommendations for brevets to the President had expired.

An indication of what Henry's colleagues thought of him was perhaps best illustrated by his role in helping to promote a semi-official Army publication. In 1892 the L. R. Hamersly Company, with the assistance of the Adjutant General's office, published a book describing regular Army and Navy officers who had served in the Civil War. Major William H. Powell, the Army editor, asked Henry's permission to use his page as the official specimen that the company would distribute to promote the publication. Powell explained to Henry that they had chosen him from all of the possible Army and Navy officers because "there is no one who combines as much interesting record, and is so well known as yourself."

Henry's old Civil War colleagues also held him in high regard. The 1890s were the heyday of the Civil War reunions as veterans organizations flourished. The bitter memories of the war had faded yet there were still many veterans alive who wished to reminisce about past glories. Henry was a frequent honored guest at reunions of his old regiment. William A. Hubbell, a former volunteer officer who served under Henry in the Civil War, decided his old commander deserved special recognition. On November 1, 1893 Hubbell wrote a letter to the Secretary of War
requesting that Henry be awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his "conspicuous gallantry" while commanding a brigade at the Battle of Cold Harbor. General "Baldy" Smith, Henry’s old corps commander, heartily endorsed the recommendation. Acting with uncharacteristic promptness, the War Department quickly granted the award.16

While this sudden outpouring of awards and adulation after years of unappreciated service no doubt pleased Henry, they did little to improve his official status as a mere major in the Army. That status changed as well, however, when on February 8, 1892 he accepted promotion to Lieutenant Colonel of the 7th Cavalry, George Custer’s old position. Ironically he did not win this award for either gallantry in action or outstanding duty performance. Henry received the promotion simply because he was the senior cavalry major, and therefore moved up in grade when Colonel J.J. Upham retired.17

Although Henry remained in command of Fort Myer, his promotion severed his formal attachment to the 9th Cavalry. In his farewell message to his men he thanked them for their loyal service and noted with pride that his eleven years of service with the regiment was the longest of any field grade officer aside from their late lamented Colonel, Edward Hatch.18 A number of enlisted men who had served under Henry at Pine Ridge, extended their congratulations, and gave him the highest compliments soldiers could give to their leader. They wrote in part:

At no time would we hesitate to follow him in any and all dangers, be they ever so great, because we knew that we had a bold, courageous officer, and one who knew no fear, leading us. Again, any soldier of his command who might have any well grounded complaint, or who thought himself wronged,
Henry's 9th Cavalry troopers at Fort Myer paid him the additional compliment of naming their chapter of the Regular Army and Navy Union in his honor. 20

Despite his new found notoriety Henry remained humble. He agreed to write a series of three articles for Harper's Weekly describing his experiences in the frozen march of 1875, the Battle of the Rosebud, and the Pine Ridge Campaign. In each case he deliberately downplayed his personal role. He gave others credit for survival of his command on the frozen march; he merely described the experience of being wounded at the Rosebud; and he barely mentioned the fight at the Drexel Mission during the Pine Ridge Campaign. Henry explained that his only motive for writing the articles was to inform the public of what soldiers had endured while serving their country on the frontier. 21

During his assignment at Fort Myer, Henry was not content to rest on his laurels. As usual when time permitted he devoted himself to training his soldiers. This time his focus was on horsemanship, and he dedicated himself to this subject with the same alacrity as he had displayed in his marksmanship training at Fort Sill. Shortly after he assumed command of Fort Myer the Army authorized the construction of elaborate riding facilities including an arena for indoor training. The Army also rewarded two more troops, F Troop the 7th Cavalry and H Troop of the 8th by assigning them to Henry's command. 22

Henry scheduled drills every weekday morning in fair weather and in foul. The prime emphasis was on perfecting the basic skills of horsemanship and the proper techniques for mounted combat with sabers and
firearms. Once his men had mastered the basic individual skills and unit drills, Henry trained them in trick riding. The troopers were naturally delighted with the later form of training. Many of them perfected acrobatic stunts and precision riding routines most often associated with the circus. All of this training was of military benefit because it strengthened the horses and men physically, and increased the quality of horsemanship.

The Colonel also conducted extensive field training exercises. Here the emphasis was on mounted maneuvers and long distance marches using the regulation gate for maximum precision and efficiency. Henry occasionally marched his battalion to Civil War battlefields. The march he made to the Bull Run battlefield was most interesting. As Henry's command rode through the countryside, they were greeted with stony silence by the local residents. They were the first Yankees, and "Colored Yankees" at that, who had ridden through that portion of Virginia since the Civil War.

Mounted training at Fort Myer was a popular attraction for the Capital residents. Thousands would come to view the outdoor training, and people would vie for the opportunity to squeeze into the small gallery of the riding hall during the winter months. Henry reserved Fridays for exhibitions for distinguished guests. Foreign dignitaries and high ranking government officials were often among the visitors. After the exhibitions Mrs. Henry would entertain their guests at a formal brunch at the post commander's quarters. The Henrys soon found themselves well-acquainted with the highest social circle of Washington. On more than one occasion they were among the invited guests at formal state dinners at the White House.
The horse shows attracted considerable media attention. *Harper's Weekly* commissioned its star reporter, Frederick Remington, to write and illustrate an article on the activities at Fort Myer. Remington entitled his piece, "A Model Squadron." He began the article by stating: "I am not quite sure that I should not say 'The Model Colonel,'" referring to Colonel Henry, because a model squadron "is certain to owe its superiority to its commander." Remington gave detailed description of the various riding events and included a series of his typically realistic illustrations. One drawing was a striking portrait of Guy Henry mounted on his horse. The famous artist concluded with the remark that by visiting Fort Myer one could see "four troops of cavalry which cannot be beaten, and it is positively exhilarating to meet their creator, a thoroughly typical United States Cavalry officer." 25

Remington was not alone in his admiration of Henry and his command. The venerable old Confederate Cavalryman, General Fitzhugh Lee, said after his visit to Myer that this was the finest cavalry drill he had ever seen.26 A foreign correspondent for the *New York Evening Mail and Express* in an article describing the King of Greece, noted that the King possessed a photograph of Henry "who is justly known in Europe as one of the smartest cavalrymen of his day."27

The prowess of Henry and his command was recognized in official military channels as well. Colonel R.P. Hughes in an annual inspector general's reported noted:

The Command is the best instructed cavalry battalion I have yet seen in our Army. There is a promptness and alacrity, an exactness and simultaneousness of movement throughout the whole that I have never seen equalled in our service.28
Upon reading this report General Miles and Merritt both sent Henry letters of congratulations and expressed the desire that he be rewarded for his consistently outstanding performance.

Colonel Henry’s halcyon days at Fort Myer were marred by one unfortunate factor. For several months he was stricken with a severe case of pleurisy. Despite his wound and the ravages of his long service on the frontier, Henry was usually in excellent health. He was a firm believer in rigorous physical activity and had personally set the pace on many grueling marches. Occasionally, however, a sudden severe illness would take him out of action. While visiting his friend A.J. Drexel in Philadelphia in the winter of 1892–93, he acquired a severe lung infection. He spent the next four months convalescing in Georgia. It seemed as though illnesses struck him quickly and severely. He weighed only about 140 pounds and was of medium height. Despite his slight build, he was very resilient. When he did return to duty he was as energetic as ever.

Family life at Fort Myer was ideal. The Henrys had beautiful, spacious quarters, and Julia no doubt revelled at being in the social limelight. On one occasion Henry did take advantage of his status in Washington when he personally appealed to President Grover Cleveland for an appointment to West Point for Guy Jr. Young Henry remembered his father taking him to the White House to meet the President. Cleveland told the Colonel that he only had one appointment to give that year. Henry replied, “Well, Mr. President, I’m asking for one.” Guy Jr. got the appointment much to the delight of his father. There is no question that his middle son was the apple of his father’s eye. He had
followed in his father's footsteps literally since the day he began to walk.32

An interesting incident occurred when Henry first visited his son at West Point that revealed a great deal about the Colonel's judgment. Henry came upon a group of upperclassmen severely hazing his son. They were instantly struck with fear, certain that the Colonel would promptly arrange their dismissal from the academy. Instead he asked them if they were making it "hot enough" for his son and if they had made him eat soap. He explained to them that he had to eat soap as a plebe and saw no reason why his son should not have to do it. Guy Jr. noted with delight that the upperclassmen were amazed and were quite lenient on him from then on. The Colonel had obviously learned a great deal about how to handle men.33

In the fall of 1894 the time had come for Henry to rotate to his regiment's headquarters at Fort Riley. He decided that he would rather go to a drier climate and therefore requested an assignment to Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas. The move required him to transfer to the 5th Cavalry.34 The Fort Sam Houston assignment had a salubrious effect on Henry's health, but his position was far less challenging. At Fort Myer, Henry was the post commander and the commander of troops, while at Fort Sam Houston he was merely second in command of the 5th Cavalry and Brigadier General Frank Wheaton, Commander of the Department of Texas, commanded the post. Nevertheless, Henry got along well in his new position, and initiated a cavalry training program based upon methods he had perfected at Fort Myer. Colonel James F. Wade, the regimental commander of the 5th Cavalry, was apparently highly impressed with his new deputy.
Wade rated Henry as excellent in all categories in his annual efficiency report.  

The most interesting episode during Henry’s tour with the 5th Cavalry was the summer he spent with the New York National Guard. The Guardsmen were well aware of Henry’s reputation and were pleased to have a soldier of such stature to train them. Henry always seemed to enjoy an opportunity to train soldiers and promote the value of the regular army. He used a method of instruction that the Guardsmen thoroughly enjoyed. Henry began his classes with a lecture on a specific subject—such as how to defend or attack in woods or how to conduct operations in urban terrain. Once he was convinced that his students understood the basic principles he took them to an appropriate field location for practical exercises. This technique is a standard practice in the Army today, but it was a remarkable innovation at the time.

The highlight of the summer camp training was the “sham battle” or wargame that took place between Guard units. On one occasion a serious accident occurred that added additional scars to Henry’s body, but further increased his popularity among the men. While leading a breakneck cavalry charge Henry’s horse stumbled and turned a complete summersault, causing the Colonel to hit the ground square on his face. The blow loosened some of his teeth and cut completely through his lip. Henry remarked that it was his own fault and that there must be blood in every battle. He quickly remounted his horse and continued the charge amid the cheers of the men. One private who assisted the Colonel had his handkerchief spotted with Henry’s blood and stated that it would never be washed.
At the conclusion of the camp Henry submitted an extensive report. He reported the strengths and weaknesses of all of the Guard units. Realizing that the New York Guard units were very proud and cohesive, he was careful to add favorable comments to balance any criticisms and to note where progress was being made. He singled out the 7th New York Infantry as being the unit that most closely approached perfection and thus earned the life-long admiration of its members. He also had a number of general recommendations for improvement of the Guard. Among his suggestions were that Guard camps be held every year instead of every other year even if it meant the time in camp had to be reduced. This would allow the units to build on experiences that would otherwise be forgotten. He noted that units tended to devote too much effort to close-order drill and suggested that the time would be better spent on practical field work. Henry suggested that the time at camp would be more useful if units had lectures on the fundamental rules of tactics at their armories prior to the encampment. The Colonel also noted with pleasure that the regiments had athletic associations and concluded that this was worthy of imitation by the regular force. None of these comments today seem very exceptional, but one must realize that a Guard unit at this time was more of a social club than a serious military organization and that the regular Army was only beginning to emerge from the dark ages of military training. There is little question that Lieutenant Colonel Henry was one of the most progressive and accomplished drill masters of his day.38

Before Henry rejoined the 5th Cavalry in Texas, he received orders to take command of Jefferson Barracks in St. Louis. The War Department
had decided to expand this post and wanted a senior officer in command. The garrison included most of the 3rd Cavalry regiment, but its Colonel, Anson Mills, was on extended detached service. Samuel Whitside, who had just been promoted to lieutenant colonel, currently commanded the post. General Schofield asked Colonel Wade if he was interested in the command. Wade declined but suggested Henry. Secretary of War Daniel Lamont ordered Henry to assume the command at Schofield's request. 39

Henry found himself in an awkward position when he arrived at Jefferson Barracks, because he was not a member of the regiment he was to command and Lieutenant Colonel Whitside was still present. Whitside was furious and requested a formal court of inquiry. The War Department denied the request and assured Whitside that his relief from command was no reflection upon his professional ability or conduct. The Department further resolved the issue by transferring Henry to the 3rd Cavalry and Whitside to Henry's old position in the 5th Cavalry. 40

As commander of Jefferson Barracks and acting commander of the 3rd Cavalry, Henry displayed his customary interests in a high state of discipline and rigorous training. The controversy over his assumption of command inhibited his efforts to establish his demanding standards for his regiment. He approached the problem by clearly announcing his standards and then by patiently and persistently requiring his men to come up to them. As with all of his previous commands, his leadership of the 3rd Cavalry produced outstanding results. Local newspapers reported on Henry's progress and noted that, although he had established high standards, the Colonel had dispensed with several post regulations and duty requirements that needlessly taxed or restricted the men. 41
Training standards improved most markedly. After a year in command Henry decided to test his men with a 500 mile mounted march. They made the trip in 100 marching hours at a uniform rate of 5 miles per hour, and averaged 26 1/2 miles per day. Henry hardly congratulated his men on their accomplishment and especially commended Lieutenant H.H. Pattison for making an individual ride of 140 miles in less than 36 hours. Once again Guy Henry and his men had established high standards for the rest of the Army to attempt to match.42

Colonel Henry's tour at Jefferson Barracks ended as it began—on a sour note. In 1895 a dispute arose between the United States and Great Britain over British encroachment along the border of Venezuela. For a time it appeared that open hostilities might break-out between the U.S. and Britain. As a precaution in May 1897 the War Department ordered Henry to move his regimental headquarters to Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont, near the Canadian border. The citizens of St. Louis were upset because they feared that they might lose the entire Jefferson Barracks garrison. They openly criticized both Henry and Nelson Miles, the new Commanding General of the Army. Some St. Louisans believed that Henry and Miles had concocted a scheme to have Henry transferred because of his dissatisfaction with St. Louis society. A prominent St. Louisan, William W. Hoxton, came to Henry's rescue. He stated that the "scurrilous personal attacks" on Colonel Henry were totally unfounded, and he noted that Henry was "one of the most gallant and efficient officers in the Army."43

Henry's welcome in Vermont was as warm as his farewell from St. Louis was cold. Many New Englanders recalled with great fondness the
Colonel's service with them in the Civil War. The tour at Fort Ethan Allen proved to be one of the most enjoyable assignments of Henry's career.44

By 1897 it had become obvious to Henry that unless something extraordinary happened it was unlikely that he would advance within the Army much beyond his present station. At the current rate of promotion it would be virtually impossible for him to make general. Most of his seniors were approximately his age and were likely to stay on active duty until forced to retire. No doubt it upset Henry a great deal that many of these officers had records inferior to his own. They had simply fared better in the post Civil War reorganization. It was understandable if Henry was envious when he saw officers such as James Wade, his former regimental commander promoted to brigadier general. Wade was commissioned as a first lieutenant the same day as Guy, commanded no more than regiment in the Civil War, and yet received a promotion to major in 1866 while Henry remained a captain. Because after 1866 the Army based promotions strictly on seniority, both officers were locked in a rigid order of rank. As a result Wade was the Colonel of the 5th Cavalry in 1887 while Henry was still a major.45

There was one small chance for Henry to leap ahead of some of his colleagues. The President made all general officer appointments. Although Presidents usually made their choices from among the most senior full colonels, on rare occasions such as in the case of George Crook, a President violated this norm. Guy obviously had this in mind when he launched his promotion campaign in the spring of 1897. Because of his dignity and humility he elected to take an indirect approach. He
solicited the support of a number of his friends, and he had a small pamphlet that described his achievements. The unsigned pamphlet contained a synopsis of his record and excerpts from twenty-seven commendations and letters collected over the years that specifically recommended his promotion. Henry asked the Adjutant General to insert the pamphlet in his personnel file, and distributed copies to influential friends and associates.46

The support for Henry’s promotion was substantial. Among those submitting recommendations were former Senator Charles Manderson of Nebraska and T.S. Peck, the Adjutant General of the State of Vermont. Henry received some of his most fulsome praise from fellow Army officers. General A.W. Greely, the Chief Signal Officer, stated, “that of all field officers of the line with whose qualifications I am acquainted I consider Col. Henry to be the ablest.” General Frank Wheaton, Henry’s former department commander, asserted, “I know of no officer whose record for field efficiency can be compared to Henry’s.” He concluded by stating, “now is the time to right that injustice and give Guy V. Henry the promotion he has earned.”47

At the time it was unknown whether any of these appeals had an effect on President McKinley. The President made several appointments in May and June of 1897, but Henry did not receive one of them. No doubt Henry was severely disappointed. In an army with only six brigadier generals of the line such appointments were rare. The last previous appointment occurred in April 1895. On the brighter side the promotions to general opened up positions all down the line. As the senior cavalry

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lieutenant colonel in the Army, Henry ascended to the colonelcy of the 10th Cavalry when its commander was promoted.49

Colonel Henry appealed for a transfer to the 3rd Cavalry whose colonelcy also opened a few days later. The War Department refused to consider favorably the request much to the disappointment of both the Henrys and the citizens of Vermont.49 The Army’s decision may have been influenced by a protest made by a group of St. Louis residents who were still bitter over losing a portion of the regiment.50 Henry received some consolation when the War Department allowed him to remain in command at Ethan Allen for several more months.51

Colonel Henry’s next duty station was Fort Assinniboine, Montana.52 This was a pleasant locale, but Henry’s assignment to this post was only a little longer than his brief service at Fort Ethan Allen. Troubles with a foreign power arose again, but this time the adversary was Spain. The United States was angry with what it perceived as Spanish mismanagement of Cuba. Living conditions on the island were deplorable and civil war broke out in February 1895. Tensions between the two nations peaked on February 15, 1898 when the U.S. battleship Maine exploded and sank in Havana Harbor. The government hurriedly began to prepare for war. In March Congress unanimously voted a defense appropriation for the unheard of amount of $50 million dollars. The War Department began to transfer troops to the southeast on the chance that they might be needed in the Caribbean if war broke out with Spain. On April 20 Henry and the 10th Cavalry arrived at Chickamauga Park, Georgia. Four days later the United States declared war on Spain.53
The Army was unprepared for war. Its total strength still numbered less than 29,000, and for reasons of economy Congress had failed to make adequate provisions for rapid expansion of the force. One thing the Army did have was plenty of experienced, professional officers. Guy Henry, for one, was ready for action. A writer for the New York Sun speculating about the need for cavalry leaders in the war stated: "If there is no Sheridan now in the army, there is at least a Custer, and Henry is the man." The writer further remarked that Henry "has a dash and a brilliancy of leadership that is startling," and added, "He has a cooler head than Custer, which makes him a better leader." President McKinley likewise recognized Henry’s potential. Along with twenty-five other officers he offered the Colonel one of the first appointments to Brigadier General of Volunteers that had been granted since the Civil War. Henry graciously accepted.

Conditions at Chickamauga were chaotic. In addition to the regular Army troops that gathered there, several state militia regiments that volunteered in mass for federal service reported for duty. The volunteer units were mostly ill-equipped and poorly trained. The task of preparing these units for combat devolved upon the regular Army officers. Henry assumed command of the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, 1st Army Corps on April 25. For the next few months he trained his three volunteer regiments as best he could, given the conditions. The War Department was unprepared to support the sudden mobilization. The camp at Chickamauga was overcrowded, and, because of a lack of adequate sanitation, it quickly became a pest-hole. Many soldiers contracted typhoid fever and
chronic diarrhea. Henry had to spend most of the time trying to maintain the health of his men.\(^5\)

On May 28 Henry assumed command of the 1st Division of the newly formed 7th Corps at Tampa, Florida. This became the Army’s forward staging base, but conditions there were no better than at Chickamauga. Several volunteer regiments arrived without uniforms or arms. Henry reported five of his regiments unfit for field duty.\(^5\) Here again his most immediate concern was the health and morale of his men. A member of the 2d Georgia Volunteers recalled the General’s first visit to that regiment:

> While his address was firm and dignified, there was a kind of fatherly manner about it which won the hearts of the men at once .... He told them that no good could come of grumbling, that it was the duty of a good soldier to take things as he found them and make the best of them.

Henry specifically cautioned the men about the maintenance of their health, and he enjoined them to obey promptly all orders and respect their superiors. The observer concluded:

> Gen. Henry summed up in his five minutes’ address more instruction and good advice than most of the men received during all the remainder of their service and in arms. After that the men felt that they would be satisfied to go anywhere with Gen. Henry in charge.\(^5\)

Unfortunately Henry’s command at Tampa was short-lived. On June 22, he received orders from the Secretary of War directing him to come to Washington to provide information and advice on the situation in Florida.\(^6\) After his short visit, the War Department ordered Henry to proceed to Fort Monroe, Virginia, and assume command of the division of the 2d Corps that was preparing to depart for Cuba.\(^6\)
The war had begun in earnest on June 20 when Major General William R. Shafter's 5th Corps invaded Cuba. On July 1, Shafter launched a major attack that captured the heights overlooking the city of Santiago. Shafter's objective was to capture the Santiago harbor and thus immobilize the Spanish fleet anchored there. The attack isolated Santiago, but Shafter needed reinforcements before he could attempt to take the city.62

On July 3, the Army Adjutant General, H.C. Corbin sent a message to "Maj. Gen. Guy V. Henry" at Camp Alger, Virginia, through his Corps Commander, Major General William M. Graham, directing him to embark two of his strongest regiments on ships bound for Santiago. Graham cabled Corbin that he had no knowledge of Henry's whereabouts.63 This is a good example of the confusion that reigned in the War Department as the Army attempted to hastily reinforce its meager force in Cuba. The Adjutant General of the Army did not know either Henry's rank or location. Corbin finally figured out that Brigadier General Henry was at Fort Monroe and sent him a message on July 5 directing him to proceed to New York City to embark on the steamer that would take him and a portion of his command to Cuba.64

Henry arrived in Cuba on July 10. Two days later he deployed the leading elements of his command in the trenches surrounding Santiago, which allowed Shafter to extend and thicken his lines and thus completely isolate the Spanish garrison.65 The situation for the Spanish forces in Santiago had been futile ever since the U.S. Navy destroyed the Spanish Caribbean fleet when it attempted to break out of the harbor on July 3. The arrival of Henry's fresh troops merely reinforced the
hopelessness of the Spanish situation. The Spaniards offered no further attempts to break out and finally surrendered their entire army in Cuba on July 17. Prior to the Spanish surrender Henry was engaged in planning an amphibious landing west of Santiago designed to flank the enemy position and cut off a possible avenue of escape.66

With the Cuban campaign won, the United States' next objective was the conquest of Puerto Rico. General Miles, the Commanding General of the Army, decided to take personal command of this expedition. He made Henry's division part of his invasion force, but Henry had to leave the bulk of his command in Cuba because they had been exposed to yellow fever.67 Henry very nearly missed the Puerto Rican Campaign because the Navy captain who was to transport him and his staff refused to allow them to board his ship for fear of infecting his crew. At the last moment they were able to find another ship that would take them. Miles placed Henry in command of a provisional division comprised of units that the Army had sent to Cuba but were still on ships.68

Miles hastily concocted a plan that called for an initial landing at Guanica on the southeastern coast of the island. His purpose for choosing this site was to achieve surprise and to avoid the strongest enemy defenses that were located around San Juan on the northeastern coast. The initial landing at Guanica on July 25 was unopposed. Miles' next objective was the capture of Ponce, the major seaport east of Guanica. On July 27, Henry assumed command of all the troops at Guanica. Brigadier General George A. Garretson's brigade spear-headed the attack toward Ponce and ran into the first serious Spanish resistance of the campaign. After a brief but sharp skirmish, the Spaniards retired. Henry
reached Ponce on July 28 and made contact with Major General James H. Wilson's force which had disembarked and occupied the port that day. With the beachhead now secure, Miles' plan was to send four columns northward along different routes toward San Juan. His intent was to use a maneuver to outflank and isolate enemy forces. Henry commanded the column that was to attack north to Arecibo with the objective of isolating the western third of the island and also the column that was to sweep along the western coast. The two columns were to meet at Arecibo and then attack east along the northern coast toward San Juan. Henry accompanied the column that took the direct route across the island. This force met negligible enemy resistance but had to negotiate the most rugged terrain on the island. It soon became obvious to the Spaniards that their situation was hopeless. Henry had gotten about two-thirds of the way across the island by August 12, the day Spain surrendered the island. Although he did not participate in any major battles during this war, Henry nonetheless demonstrated considerable leadership ability in successfully commanding two different ad hoc forces in two different campaigns during a period of little more than a month. His flexibility, extensive experience, and strong character enabled him to meet the demanding requirements of these commands with ease.

Commanding troops was not the only challenge that faced Henry during the Santí and Puerto Rican Campaigns. President William McKinley asked Henry to take personal charge of his two nephews, Privates James McKinley and John Barber. They accompanied Henry on both campaigns and served as enlisted aides. Because of the President's keen interest in the boys, he personally corresponded with Henry. When the
General wrote to the President he took the opportunity to send impres-
sions of what he had seen. No doubt these were some of the most frank
and timely descriptions of what was occurring in Cuba and Puerto Rico
that McKinley received. For instance, Henry described the extent of the
yellow fever epidemic in Cuba and the decidedly pro-American sentiments
of the native Puerto Ricans. Although his special mission ended when he
sent the nephews home in September, Henry continued to correspond occa-
sionally with the President throughout the remainder of his life.71

American occupation of Puerto Rico soon presented the General with
an entirely new challenge. The War Department appointed Henry as the
Commander of the District of Ponce, comprising the western half of the
island. Henry wrote to his wife that it was "a great disappointment" to
him that Miles ordered him stay while most of his comrades went back to
the United States, but he cautioned her about complaining to anyone. His
attitude quickly changed as he developed a sincere affection for the
Puerto Ricans, and he found that he had important work to do establish-
ing new governmental institutions to replace the Spanish colonial admin-
istration.72

After his years of faithful service, Henry suddenly received a
wave of rewards. On October 11 the President appointed him a Brigadier
General in the regular Army, and on December 4 he became Commander of
the Department of Puerto Rico and Governor General of the entire island.
Three days later he received a promotion to Major General of Volunteers.
Henry was grateful but not the least bit overwhelmed by his increased
responsibility.73

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Living conditions in Puerto Rico at the time of the American conquest were horrible. Among the most prevalent problems were government corruption, banditry, rampant diseases, and poverty. Henry lost no time instigating his program of reform. On the day after he assumed the position of Governor General, he issued a proclamation to the president and secretaries of the native insular council outlining his plan. His top priority was granting as much independence as possible to the mayors and councils of the towns and holding them responsible for law and order, and sanitation. Reform of the educational system was another priority. He discovered that the literacy rate of the population was only 14%, and that increased opportunities for education was one of the foremost desires of the people. Henry asked the federal government and private agencies to recruit teachers for the island, and he went so far as to take his appeal to President McKinley's wife. In a letter that he wrote to her, he noted that when the Puerto Rican children were asked what they wanted for Christmas they said "teachers." Prison reform was also one of Henry's initial priorities. He ordered that prisoners no longer be kept in shackles and released those who were imprisoned without proper charges or evidence against them. Some of Henry's other significant reforms were the elimination of all taxes on food, establishment of a mandatory smallpox vaccination program, and a one year suspension of mortgage foreclosures in order to prevent the collapse of the agriculture industry. In every instance Henry's guiding principles were integrity, justice, and genuine compassion for the Puerto Rican people.

Mrs. Henry joined her husband in Puerto Rico and immediately lent her assistance. She visited hospitals, schools, and even prisons in
order to bolster morale and identify areas in need of correction. She played an especially important role in publicizing the plight of the Puerto Ricans to the people back home.77

The work of both of the Henrys was universally praised by all those who came to Puerto Rico to inspect their efforts. Many were surprised that a military man with no formal training in civil administration could so quickly and satisfactorily adapt to his position. One observer noted that a man in Henry's position of absolute authority needed special qualifications:

Such power can be safely invested only in the hands of such a man as Gen. Henry - a man not only inflexibly honest, but utterly devoted to the welfare of the people and the prosperity of the island, quick to find their needs and with the moral courage to do what he believes is right.78

The people of Puerto Rico were fortunate that the same character traits that made Henry an outstanding military leader also made him a superb military governor.

The tropical climate and the heavy workload took a toll on Henry's health. He gradually became debilitated, but persisted in doing his job even when surgeons advised him to return to the States for rest. On April 8, 1899 he finally sent President McKinley a request to be relieved. He believed that he now had the administration of the island well in hand, and he did not feel that he could endure another summer in the tropics. On May 9, 1899, Henry relinquished command to Brigadier General Charles W. Davis.79

Henry received a warm welcome when he returned to the United States. While he attempted to regain his strength, he and Mrs. Henry were in great demand as speakers to civic groups, eager to hear about
America's new colonial possession. Henry and his wife also took the time and effort to launch a fund drive to send relief to Puerto Ricans suffering from the effects of a recent hurricane. Mrs. Henry and some of her friends formed the Colonial Aid Society of the United States in order to further the relief effort.

After several months of convalescence it seemed as though Henry had regained his health, and he was eager to resume active service. The General was in New York City preparing to move to his new duty assignment as Commander of the Department of the Missouri when he suddenly contracted a severe cold. The cold quickly turned to pneumonia. A few days later, on October 27, he passed away, much to the shock of both his family and friends.

The public outpouring of sorrow was astounding. Virtually every major newspaper in the country carried a lengthy eulogy. An entire brigade of the New York National Guard escorted his body from his home in New York City to the train station. His funeral and burial at the Arlington National Cemetery was attended by President McKinley and many of the most important dignitaries in Washington. Several newspapers reported that it was the grandest military funeral since Sherman's.

Henry's untimely death cut short a career that perhaps could have been noted for additional achievements. He still had more than three years until he reached mandatory retirement. Henry died while at the pinnacle of his career, and, what is even more unfortunate, the American public which admired him so much, quickly forgot him.
ENDNOTES

1 Henry "Indian Episode," pp. 1274-1275; and ANJ, March 7, 1891, pp. 479, 483.

2 Henry to Howard, January 26, 1891; Howard to Henry, January 29, 1891; Oliver O. Howard Papers, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine. Quoted in Foner, p. 143.

3 Schofield to J.C. Kelton, February 11, 1891; Schofield to Redfield Proctor, March 6, 1891. Quoted in Foner, pp. 143-144. See also ANJ, February 28, 1891, p. 461.

4 See for example Randolph Reim "Col. Henry's Sable Troops," Philadelphia Inquirer, June 27, 1891; New York Sun, March 5, 1891; and other unidentified newspaper clippings in Williams-Henry Papers. See also Foner, p. 144.

5 New York Herald, March 2 and March 11, 1891.

6 Henry to the editor, June 2, 1891, ANJ, June 6, 1891, p. 694.

7 "Troopers at Fort Myer," Washington Post, June 6, 1891.

8 Irish World, June 27, 1891. See also Kansas City Times, June 14, 1891; 45th Cong., 2d sess, House Miscellaneous Document No. 64, pp. 20, 151; and Foner, pp. 131-132.


10 Remington to Henry, November 11 (no year is given but probably 1891 based upon contents of letter); Finerty to Henry, February 15, 1892; King to Henry, March 12, 1892, Williams-Henry Papers.

Both Finerty and King wrote popular books about the 1876 Campaign, but neither ever published a book that covered the Pine Ridge Campaign. Charles King wrote dozens of novels about the frontier Army and no individual did more to create its romantic image. See Utley, Frontier Regulars, xiv; Don Russell, "Captain Charles King, Chronicles of the Frontier," Western Brand Book, 9 (March 1952), 1-3, 7-8; and especially Oliver Knight Life and Manners in the Frontier Army (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978).


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13. General Orders No. 100, Headquarters of the Army, December 17, 1891, "Major Guy V. Henry, 9th Cavalry: For conspicuous gallantry and enterprise in action against hostile Sioux Indians, near the Catholic Mission, on White Clay Creek, South Dakota, and for efficient and distinguished services during the whole campaign." Williams-Henry Papers.

For action on Henry's brevet see note No. 110, Henry-AGO file.


16. Hubbell to D.C. Lamont, Secretary of War, November 1, 1893; Smith to Lamont, November 8, 1893; Colonel F.C. Ainsworth, "Case of Guy V. Henry, Application for a Medal of Honor," Record and Pension Office, War Department, November 14, 1893; Henry-AGO file. See also Ainsworth to Henry, December 5, 1893, Williams-Henry Papers.

Approximately half of all of the Medals of Honor that the War Department awarded for Civil War service were granted in the 1890s. At the time there was no stipulated time limit for applications. Most of the awards granted during the Civil War were to enlisted men who were color bearers or who had captured a Confederate flag. Many of the most popular Civil War heroes such as Joshua Chamberlain and Arthur MacArthur received their awards in the 1890s. See Medal of Honor Recipient's 1863–1978, 96th Cong., 1st sess, Senate Committee on Veteran's Affairs Print No. 3 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1979), passim, and Joseph L. Schott, Above and Beyond (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1963), pp. 61–62.

17. ANJ, April 16, 1892, p. 591.


19. ANJ, April 16, 1892, p. 591.

20. Troop K established the Guy V. Henry Garrison, No. 43, of the Regular Army and Navy Union on November 23, 1891. See unidentified newspaper clipping, "Guy V. Henry Garrison" in Williams-Henry Papers.

The Williams-Henry Papers contain numerous unidentified newspaper clippings describing cavalry drill and other activities at Fort Myer.


ANJ, March 17, 1894, p. 498; May 5, 1894, p. 634.

ANJ, March 17, 1894, p. 498; May 5, 1894, p. 634.

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Surgeon John H. Janeway, Medical Certificate, January 2, 1893; Special Order No. 190, HQ, Department of the East, December 28, 1892; Special Orders No. 9, HQ of the Army, January 13, 1893, Henry-AGO file. See also ANJ, December 31, 1892, p. 313; January 7, p. 328; January 21, p. 360; February 18, p. 428; March 18, p. 496; April 1, p. 528; and May 6, 1893, p. 609; Henry to Adjutant General, U.S. Army, April 30, 1893, Henry-AGO file.

Henry had another severe attack of malaria in the summer of 1894 and was on sick leave for approximately six weeks. Asst. Surgeon John L. Phillips, Medical Certificate, August 4, 1894; Special Orders No. 170, HQ of the Army, July 21, 1894, Henry-AGO file; ANJ, August 4, 1894, p. 856.

Guy Henry, Jr., "Brief Narrative," p. 16.

Guy Henry had four children who survived infancy. His two children from his first marriage, Sarah Wharton Henry known as Saidee, and Thomas Lloyd Henry, were raised by Guy's mother in Ossining, New York. Saidee came to live with her father at McKinney in 1889. About a year later she married Lt. James W. Benton, one of her father's young officers. Tragically Benton drowned in 1896. See ANJ, September 5, 1896, p. 5; 'Drowning of Lieutenant Benton,' Brooklyn Daily Eagle, September 4, 1896. For the next several years Saidee and her infant son Webb lived with her parents. Thomas is barely ever mentioned in the Henry family papers. He apparently was never very close to his father. Guy was close to his youngest son William Seton Henry. Seton, as he was called, was five years younger than Guy, Jr. and was still a teenager when his father died. Detailed information of the Henry genealogy was provided by
B. William Henry, Jr. of the National Park Service. See also Eldridge, Henry Genealogy.


34 ANJ, September 29, 1894, p.69.

35 The army instituted a system of standard, annual efficiency reports in the 1890s. See Weigley, p. 291. Most of Henry's raters had to admit that they had not directly observed his performance. All of his reports, however, were highly favorable. The most adverse statement that Henry every received came from his good friend Wesley Merritt who noted in his 1896 report that Henry was "inclined to command too much," and added that Henry would be a "good staff officer in almost any position." Henry-AGO file.

36 Special Orders No. 135, HQ of the Army, June 11, 1895, Henry-AGO file. ANJ, June 22, 1895, p. 704. There are a number of unidentified newspaper clippings in the Williams-Henry Papers describing Henry's service at the National Guard Camp.

Henry published a series of articles in the Seventh Regiment Gazette based upon his lectures. See for example "Marches" (September 1895), 255; "Defense and Attack of Woods and Villages" (April 1896), 118; "Rifle Practice" (May 1896), 132; "Obstacles to an Advance or Accessory Means of Defense" (July 1896), 164; "Defense Used in Street Fighting" (August 1896), 181. See also ANJ, February 27, 1896, p. 462.

37 ANJ, July 20, 1895, p. 772; "At the Camp," Daily Union, Schenectady, New York, July 13, 1895; Appleton to Henry, July 13, 1895, Williams-Henry Papers. There are also other unidentified articles in the Williams-henry Papers that describe the accident.


For information regarding militia and regular Army training during this period see Weigley, Chapter 12. New York borrowed the term "National Guard" from the French and applied it to its state militia units. The Dick Act of 1903 created the first federally standardized National

39 Special Orders No. 224, HQ of the Army, September 25, 1895. See also unsigned note from Adjutant General officer to Schofield, September 24, 1895, Henry-AGO file. Henry was not anxious to return to Fort Sam Houston but also not eager for an assignment to the 3rd Cavalry; Henry to Corbin, Adjutant General Office, July 30, 1895, Henry-AGO file. See also ANJ, September 28, 1895, p. 53; and October 5, 1895, p. 69. For Whitside's military record see Heitman, I, 1031.

40 ANJ, October 5; p. 69, October 12, p. 12; October 19, p. 101; October 26, 1895, p. 118. "Army Notes of Interest," New York Tribune, October 20 and 24, 1895. See also Henry to Miles, October 4, 1895, Miles-Cameron Papers, and Henry to Adjutant General, October 11, 1895, Henry-Williams. Henry was upset by the controversy and allegedly criticized the War Department by stating that the Department could have avoided the controversy if it had initially ordered him and Whitside to exchange positions. The affair apparently ignited ill-feelings throughout the Army. Some felt that Schofield favored Henry because he was a fellow West Pointer.

Before he transferred, Whitside forwarded court-martial charges against Henry for some alleged inappropriate remarks. General Merritt, the department commander did not believe that Henry made such statements and therefore disapproved the charges. There is no copy of the charges and specifications in Henry's AGO file. See note dated October 9, 1895, Henry-AGO file. In order to eliminate any question about Henry's performance as commander of Jefferson barracks, the Inspector General's office conducted a special investigation of the post from October 8 to 13, 1895. The report stated that Henry was a "zealous, able and accomplished officer," and that the "post is ably commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Guy V. Henry, 5th Cavalry." Major E.A. Garlington to Secretary of War, November 22, 1895, Henry-AGO file.

41 General Orders No. 69, October 27, 1895, and No. 10, February 25, 1896, HQ 3rd U.S. Cavalry by order of Lieutenant Colonel Henry. See also ANJ, January 2, 1894, p. 307. The Williams-Henry Papers contain three unidentified newspaper clippings which give a detailed description of life at Jefferson Barracks under Henry.

42 General Orders No. 51, October 26, 1896, HQ 3rd U.S. Cavalry, by order of Lieutenant Colonel Henry. Henry's command at Jefferson Barracks consisted of six troops of the 3rd Cavalry. The regiment's other four troops were stationed at Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont. All six troops made the march with only three men excused from duty.

Another interesting episode during Henry's tour at Jefferson Barracks was the regiment's service at the Tennessee Centennial in Nashville. Henry served as commander of all federal troops at the Centennial. ANJ, May 30, 1896, p. 708, and June 13, 1896, p. 743; Chicago Chronicle, June 3, 1896.
Hoxton to editor of the St Louis Post Dispatch, reprinted in ANJ, January 2, 1897, p. 335. Henry wrote a letter to Miles noting the unfavorable reaction in St. Louis. It is clear from this letter that these officers had not plotted to move the regiment for personal reasons. Henry to Miles, December 23, 1895, Miles-Cameron Papers. See also St. Louis Post Dispatch, October 27, 1899; St. Louis Democrat October 28, 1897. At the time of his death both of these papers praised Henry, but obviously still felt some bitterness from the role they felt he played in having the troops transferred.

The dispute between the U.S. and Britain ended amicably but was a clear indication of rising American nationalism and "jingoism." Henry's views on the dispute can be found in unidentified newspaper clippings in the Williams-Henry Papers and in Henry's letter to Miles. Not surprisingly he was distressed by America's lack of preparedness for war and asserted that the size of the Army should be doubled immediately. For a discussion of the Venezuelan crisis see Thomas G. Patterson, J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan, American Foreign Policy: A History (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1977), pp 187-191.

ANJ, June 27, 1897, p. 797. The Williams-Henry Papers contain numerous articles from local newspapers describing activities at Fort Ethan Allen. The Henrys were quite active in the community and were especially involved in religious activities.

For Wade's service record see Heitman, I, 991. For Henry's relative rank see the Official Army Register, 1897 (Washington: Adjutant General's Office), p. 271.

Henry to Adjutant General, U.S. Army, March 24, 1897, Henry-AGO file. There are several copies of Henry's pamphlet in the Williams-Henry Papers.

Manderson to the President, April 28, 1897 (copy), Williams-Henry Papers; Peck to McKinley, May 1, 1897, Henry-AGO file; Greely to the President, May 6, 1897, Henry-AGO file; Wheaton to Melvin H. Hanna, February 12, 1895, original in Williams-Henry Papers, copy in Henry-AGO file. Others whose letters reached Henry's AGO file were as follows: Cecil Clay to the President, April 29, 1897; Monsignor Seton, D.D. to the Secretary of War, May 1, 1897; Daniel Appleton to the President, May 4, 1897; Charles Currier to the President, May 11, 1897; and William T. Anderson to the President, January 17, 1898.

For an example of a letter that Henry wrote requesting assistance in obtaining an appointment see Henry to John Sherman, Secretary of State, April 25, 1897. Sherman referred the letter directly to the President for consideration. There is no evidence in any of the Henry Papers or the McKinley Papers that Henry ever made a direct appeal for an appointment.

Heitman, I, 23; Army Register, 1897.
of War, (telegram) July 16, 1897; Adjutant General to Peck, July 16, 1897, Henry-AGO file.

50 Citizens of St. Louis to the President, Samuel B.M. Young Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

51 ANJ, July 31, 1897, p. 891.

52 ANJ. November 13, 1897, p. 191.


54 Weigley, pp. 290-291, 295-70. See also Graham A Cosmas, An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War (Columbia: University of Missouri), Chapters 1 & 2.

55 New York Sun, March 28, 1898.


57 Trask, pp. 158-161. For the record of Henry's command assignments during the war see Adjutant General to Smith Thompson, Jr., 18 August 1900, and Adjutant General to Thompson, 20 August 1900, Henry-AGO file. See also Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, 2 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), pp. 509, 547, 548. Hereafter cited as CWS

58 Miles to Secretary of War Russell Alger, June 4, 1898, CWS, pp. 24-25. Henry wrote a series of letters to his wife describing the conditions at Tampa, Henry-Williams Papers.


60 Adjutant General to Smith Thompson, Jr., August 18, 1898, Henry-AGO file. Henry told Adelbert Ames about what he discussed in Washington as they sailed to Cuba for the Santiago Campaign; Ames Diary, Adelbert Ames Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute.

61 Special Orders No. 148, HQ of the Army, June 24, 1898; and BG J.C. Gilmore, "Memorandum for the Adjutant General," June 24, 1898, Henry-AGO file.

62 Trask, pp. 203-256.

63 Corbin to Henry through Graham, July 3, 1898; Graham to Corbin, July 3, 1898 - 4:30 PM, CWS, p. 77. Note that Corbin incorrectly addressed Henry as a Major General.

64 Corbin to Henry, July 5, 1898; Henry to Corbin, July 5, 1898 - 8:30 AM, CWS, p. 94. Corps were volatile, ad hoc organizations during
the war with Spain. Only the 5th and 8th Corps were deployed. The others were merely administrative headquarters.

65 Colonel Charles F. Humphrey to Adjutant General, July 10, 1898 - 6:57 PM; Shafter to Secretary to War R.A. Alger, July 11, 1898 - 1:30 AM; and Shafter to Adjutant General, July 12, 1898 - 9:30 AM, CWS.


67 Miles to Alger, July 18, 1898, CWS, p. 233.


70 Trask, pp. 358-365; Frank E Edwards, The '98 Campaign of the 6th Massachusetts, U.S.A. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1899), pp. 132-146; Cosmas, pp. 234-236. For Henry's full report of his advance from Ponce see Henry to Gilmore, August 19, 1898, Williams-Henry Papers. Neither Trask nor Cosmas give Henry credit for commanding the two western columns, but it is obvious that he did based upon his official report. See also Miles to Alger, August 8, 1898, CWS, pp. 369.

71 Henry to McKinley, July 13, August 14, August 26, and August 29, 1898, series 1, reel 4; August 26, 1898, series 1, reel 1; John Potter, Secretary to the President, to Henry, series 2, reel 33, McKinley Papers. McKinley to Henry, August 23, 1898, Williams-Henry Papers.


73 Cullum, IV, 127. Henry was promoted ahead of 23 more senior colonels, Army Register, 1898, p. 273.

74 Henry to President and Secretaries of Council, December 7, 1898, Williams-Henry Papers.

75 Henry to Mrs. McKinley, December 5, 1898, McKinley Papers, series 1, reel 5. See also "Education in Porto Rico," New York Sun, February 9, 1899; "Education in Porto Rico," New York Tribune, March 15, 1899; "Porto Rico Studies," Washington Post, March 24, 1899; and Guy V.


79 Henry to Corbin, April 8, 1899; Alger to Henry, April 19, 1899; Davis to Corbin, May 10, 1899, Henry-AGO file. See also Brady, pp. 354-355.


83 Lt. Peter E. Traub to Corbin, October 27, 1899, Henry-AGO file. The official cause of death was "Acute lobar pneumonia complicated by uraemia," Certificate and Record of Death, Guy V. Henry (copy),


Although Henry was forgotten by the public, he was remembered by his friends. Shortly after his death a group of his friends organized a committee to raise funds to present to Mrs. Henry as a testimonial to his memory. Some of the most prominent men in America, including J.P. Morgan and Theodore Roosevelt, were members of the committee. See The Henry Committee to The American Public, March 6, 1900, Williams-Henry Papers. See also ANJ, February 17, 1900, p. 547; March 31, 1900, p. 719; April 7, 1900, p. 744; July 7, 1900, p. 176; and March 2, 1901, p. 655.

The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives passed a bill granting Mrs. Henry an additional monthly pension of $75 per month. Her original pension was only $30 per month. Henry-AGO file. See also ANJ, May 5, 1900, p. 838; and May 26, 1900, p. 915.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

Immediately prior to his death, Guy Henry was certainly one of the most celebrated and widely respected soldiers in America. He was one of the last of the colorful Indian fighters, and his service in Puerto Rico was universally acclaimed whereas other leading Army officers such as Miles and Shafter had become embroiled in public controversy. One newspaper eulogist wrote: "It would be impossible to write too much concerning the military record on this hero."1 Ironically that was one of the last articles ever published about Henry. Journalists had made Henry a national hero, but like most other dead heroes the press soon forgot about him. New heroes such as Wesley Merritt and Arthur MacArthur were making a name for themselves in the Philippines and soon captured the public attention.

Journalists create heroes, but historians determine whether an individual will retain that status. Unfortunately, historians to date have shown little interest in Henry’s accomplishments. They tend to focus their attention on people who held prominent positions during decisive events. In the case of military men, historians are usually far more interested in the commanders of competing armies than in the key subordinates who may well have played a decisive role in causing victory or defeat. Henry never commanded an army and only briefly occupied what may be termed a prominent position. His Governor Generalship of Puerto Rico was marked by unqualified success. Puerto Rico, however, has seldom
been the center of American public attention. The relationship between the United States Government and the Puerto Ricans has remained consistently amicable since Henry’s tenure. Had his policies been an utter failure and resulted in an insurrection no doubt Henry’s name would be well-remembered.

While Henry’s accomplishments were relatively unknown they were by no means insignificant and were invariably commendable. In the Civil War he never commanded more than a brigade, but no one commanded a brigade better. Although he commanded no more than a battalion during the Indian Wars his service was significant because Indian warfare was characterized by small unit engagements. It was captains and majors like Henry who commanded the outposts that made the settlement of the West possible. Finally, Henry was one of the handful of key officers who oversaw the expansion of the Army for the war with Spain and played such a decisive role in establishing new governments for Spain’s former colonies that fell under American control.

Any comprehensive history of the United States Army in the nineteenth century would be incomplete without an examination of the careers of men like Guy Henry who formed the backbone of America’s newly developed professional officer corps. As historian Allan Millett has pointed out: "The Civil War killed some six hundred thousand American military amateurs and the concept of amateurism,..." Henry’s career corresponded precisely to the emergence of American military professionalism during the post Civil War period. According to the testimony of many of his colleagues he was an ideal Army officer, therefore it is not surprising
that he was in many respects a prototype of the American professional soldier.

Henry's performance clearly reflected the attributes of a professional. Although there is no consensus among scholars as to the precise list of characteristics of a profession, at a minimum they include the following: a standard body of knowledge peculiar to the vocation, a set of social and ethical standards, and a concept of duty to serve some higher ideal. Throughout his career, Henry rigorously enforced doctrinal standards in all of his training activities and used his skill as a writer to help define standards and promulgate new ones in areas in which Army doctrine was vague. He strictly adhered to the Army's ethical and social codes. While his ambition for promotion may seem to have been a character flaw, it was not a violation of the mores of the officer corps. Henry's keen sense of duty was one of his most pervasive attributes. He habitually placed the welfare of his men, his unit, and his country above his own. Henry consistently displayed the key attributes of a professional and thereby demonstrated the validity of considering military service as a profession.

Besides acting as a role model Guy Henry played an active role in promoting Army professionalism. Although his contributions to the establishment of professional standards were not as significant as those of Sherman or Upton, the important efforts of those two gentlemen would have gone for naught had it not been for men like Henry who were working at the grass roots level. Unlike Henry, Sherman and Upton did not spend the bulk of their careers serving at the austere, isolated frontier posts from which the professional Army emerged.
Military historians who merely write of great battles will continue to overlook Henry, but those who are concerned with the institutional development of the Army can learn a great deal from studying his career. Henry's service experience was typical of officers who served during the post-Civil War era. What is extraordinary about him is not what he did, but rather, the outstanding manner in which he performed his duties. Guy Henry is not the only deserving officer of this era who had been overlooked. Outstanding officers such as Frank Wheaton have been totally forgotten and even such well-known figures as George Crook and John Schofield lack full biographies. George Custer has so captured the interest of historians and the public alike that few others have received their due. Although there is already sufficient Custer literature to fill a small library, new books on him continue to appear. Custer's life, and especially the circumstances of his demise, was so extraordinary that it will never cease to be a source of fascination. Unfortunately, while Custer books are entertaining, they only analyze a small portion of the history of the post-Civil War Army.

The study of Guy Henry's career has even more to offer the United States Army than merely increasing its understanding of its past. Henry is in many respects an excellent role model for present and future Army officers. The Army hierarchy has discovered the usefulness of role models in the development of leaders and have made leadership the prime focus for training. Henry is an ideal leadership role model because, not only does he closely match the Army's criteria of what a leader should be, he is someone to whom the typical developing leaders could relate.
Guy Henry consistently lived according to the "Army ethic" as defined in FM 100-1, and in fact was one of those that helped develop it. He displayed extraordinary loyalty to the Army and his unit, personal responsibility, and selfless service when these were only beginning to become the norms for behavior within the American profession of arms.

Henry clearly exhibited commitment, competence, candor, and courage, the Army's "essential soldierly qualities." The fact that he continued to serve in the Army after the Civil War when the pay, prestige, and opportunity for advancement as an officer were low was one of the first clear indications that he was committed to a purpose larger than personal aggrandizement. He continued to demonstrate this fact throughout his career by the great vigor he displayed in the performance of his duties when it was obvious that his material rewards would be slight. No man merely interested in himself would disregard his own suffering in order to ensure that his men survived a blizzard or would offer to have his pay garnished in order that his non-commissioned officers might receive a decent wage. Henry displayed extraordinary competence in performing all of his military duties. Over the course of his career he earned the reputation as an authority on marksmanship and as the Army's premier drill master. His superb performance as Governor General of Puerto Rico demonstrated that he was equal to any task to which a military man might be assigned. Candor was one of his most characteristic attributes. He never minced words nor hesitated to speak his mind. If anything he could be criticized for being too outspoken. Lastly he was courageous almost to a fault. Henry never

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hesitated to expose himself to enemy fire when he felt it was essential
to the accomplishment of his mission. His personal resoluteness in the
face of danger was a constant inspiration to his men. Henry's courage-
geousness extended to non-combat situations as well. He had the courage
to stick by his convictions and he never shirked from the performance of
any duty from fear of failure or embarrassment. With regard to each of
the soldierly qualities, Henry's performance was once again nearly
ideal.

There are of course many other desirable character traits that
every leader should demonstrate. Among these are flexibility, endurance,
initiative, justice, compassion, bearing, and humility. Guy Henry
demonstrated each of these to a considerable degree. He displayed
remarkable flexibility in rapidly adjusting his tactics for fighting
Indians which was distinctly different from the warfare he had pre-
viously experienced. His endurance was legendary. He survived physical
punishment that would have easily killed lesser men, and he led his men
on long distance rides that set the standards for excellence. As for
initiative, Henry never required explicit instructions or direct super-
vision from his superiors. At the Drexel Mission fight he instantly
sensed what needed to be done to retrieve the 7th Cavalry from its
predicament and acted promptly without directions. Although Henry was a
stern disciplinarian he never deliberately treated anyone unfairly.
Considering the era in which he lived, he was remarkably unprejudiced
toward racial minorities. He fought for fair recognition of the out-
standing performance of his black troopers and resolutely criticized
white men for the abuses of Indians. While he placed severe demands upon
his men, he showed great empathy in his dealings with them. The compassion he displayed for his former adversaries, the much maligned Indians, was extraordinary. Henry had exceptionally fine military bearing. Although he had a slight build and only medium height, he consistently presented himself well. His erect posture and tidy uniform conveyed a sense of dignity and discipline. Lastly, he was an exceptionally humble man. This was perhaps his most endearing quality. For an era when many military men did not hesitate to extoll their own accomplishments it is refreshing to discover a man who performed many remarkable feats yet made so little of them.

When Henry's personality traits are examined collectively one can not help but conclude that he had outstanding character. His character, however, was not flawless. Like any human beings he had shortcomings. Near the end of his career he campaigned hard for promotions. Although his ambition never interfered with his duty performance, it demonstrated that he was not a purely selfless individual. Among his other flaws was a tendency to take unnecessary personal risks in combat, an occasional lack of tact, and excessive severity in discipline. In each of these cases Henry's problem was that he tended to push admirable qualities to the extreme. There is a small distinction between courageousness and foolhardiness, or candor and a lack of tact. Henry often attempted to tread near that fine line that separates perfection and excess. It is not surprising that he occasionally slipped over that line. These minor flaws when viewed in proper perspective do not seriously detract from the overall assessment of Henry's character.
The final quality that makes Guy Henry an ideal leadership role model is that he is someone to whom developing leaders can easily relate. Most of America's best known Army leaders are men like George Patton or Dwight Eisenhower who performed superbly at high levels of command. Non-commissioned officers and young commissioned officers find it difficult to identify with leaders who experiences were so different than their own. Henry on the other hand spent most of his career commanding at the battalion level and below. The scope of his leadership problems were similar to those which will face most Army leaders.

The other characteristic that makes Henry a particularly apt role model is that he was a regular Army officer. The regular Army leaders of today and even Guardsmen and Reservists will find it easier to relate to Guy Henry than with purely wartime soldiers like Joshua Chamberlain or Alvin York. Neither Chamberlain nor York served or even trained as a soldier during peacetime. There are special pressures placed upon people who serve their country as soldiers during peacetime regardless of whether they are members of an active or reserve component of the military. When America is not officially at war, soldiers are usually unappreciated or even scorned by the American public, and they are habitually underpaid for their services. Finally, Guardsmen, Reservists, as well as regulars could easily find themselves engaged in unconventional, undeclared wars where personal risks are high, public support is lacking, and the chances for any glory are slight.

Although he served in the Army a century ago, Guy Henry faced problems with which the peacetime soldier of today can identify. He served much of his career at remote, isolated posts. His working hours
were long and his pay was much lower than his civilian counterparts. Major problems he faced were combating prejudices against troops of minority races and the tendencies of soldiers to go AWOL and abuse alcohol. Maintaining unit readiness was a never ending task that required him to be an innovative trainer and efficient manager. The combat that Henry faced on the frontier was against an unconventional enemy who was likely to use what we would now call terrorist or guerrilla warfare tactics. In short Henry faced precisely the same leadership problems that junior leaders in the Army are most likely to face today.

Chamberlain and York were also great leaders, but unfortunately their experiences are less relevant to today's peacetime military leaders. Both entered the Army during a period a national crisis. They served in a popular war against a conventional enemy, and they immediately returned to civilian life once the war was over. It is clear that they have little in common with the volunteer soldiers of today aside from a strong sense of patriotism.

The value of studying the career of Guy Henry is two-fold. By examining his life one can learn a great deal about the development of the Army in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Secondly, one will discover a useful role model for current and future Army leaders. Both are important reasons. Often in our study of the past we tend to overlook men like Henry and instead we focus our attention on more famous people. Unfortunately, this approach does not always tell us very much about our past or have much relevance for charting our future. We would be wise to look a little more deeply.
ENDNOTES

1 *Minneapolis Tribune*, November 7, 1899.


3 Ibid., pp. 3-6. See also Huntington, Chapter 1.

4 FM 100-1, pp. 23-24.

5 Ibid., pp. 25-26.

6 These leadership traits are identified and described in FM 22-100, pp. 120-125.
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<td>4</td>
<td>Dr. Edward M. Coffman</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Combined Arms Research Library</td>
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<td>Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Ms. Thelma Crown</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Fort Leavenworth Museum</td>
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