CSI BATTLEBOOK

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REAR AREA SECURITY

Combat Studies Institute
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
CSI BATTLEBOOK 1-C
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Combat Studies Institute
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Battle Analysis, Wonsan, Rear Area Operations, November 1950.


In November 1950, the 3d Division relieved the 1st Marine Division in the Wonsan area and south of Hamburg to block the main roads in the southern part of the corps zone against guerrillas and bypassed North Koreans, and to protect the Wonsan–Hungarian coastal strip. One of the 109 separate guerrilla attacks in the corps zone involved the 15th RCT. Beginning on 12 November 1950, the 15 RCT had numerous engagements with North Korean forces in ambushes and roadblocks along the regimental main supply routes between Majon-ni and Tongyong.
BATTLE ANALYSIS

3d Infantry Division, Wonsan, Korea (November 1950)

REAR AREA SECURITY

BY

Staff Group C
Section 1
Division A

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BATTLE ANALYSIS
3d INFANTRY DIVISION, WONSAN, KOREA (NOVEMBER 1950)

REAR AREA SECURITY

BY

MAJ CLAUD BAILEY, JR., MAJ RAYMOND L. BANDEL
MAJ WALTER J. CUNNINGHAM, JR., MAJ WILLIAM J. DRAKE
MAJ CLARENCE T. EBBINGA, MAJ TERRY L. GARRETT
LTC LUIS J. HINCAPIE FORERO, MAJ YOUNG C. LIM
MAJ JAMES W. STONE, MAJ RAYMOND E. WATFORD, JR.

AND

MAJ JOHN S. WESTERLUND
. . . to Those Who Fought
In a war we could not win, we could not lose,
And we could not draw . . .
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CHAPTER I

THE STRATEGIC SETTING

... A Wrong War with Wrong Enemy in a Wrong Place at a Wrong Time ...

General of the Army, Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The study of the X Corps and the 3d Infantry Division in their defensive rear area protection measures in the vicinity of Wonsan, Korea in November, 1950, is unique in several aspects — not the least of which are the disparate national objectives, military systems, and previous performance of the opposing armies.

The North Korean attack across the 38th parallel began at 0740 hours, 25 June 1950. The Korean War marked the precarious middle of the Twentieth Century, a period when many nations were still licking their wounds from the Second World War. The United States was beginning to see the results from the massive influx of aid to Europe via the Marshall Plan, and the world watched the growth and prosperity of the new liberal German state. The atomic bomb had convinced Americans that strategy, along the lines of U. S. Grant, was to be defined in terms of annihilation. The occasional warning of limited warfare fell on deaf ears, and the Western nations did not anticipate a confrontation against Communism in anything less than World War III.¹

Wonsan rear area security operations of November, 1950, occurred in the early stages of the Korean War — five months following the North Korean attack and approximately one year before the stabilization of a general defensive line. By July 1950, the war was already an international effort with General of the
Army Douglas MacArthur commanding the United Nations Command. The Command received forces from England, Australia, Canada, Holland, New Zealand, and ten additional U. N. member nations. The opposing forces consisted of North Korea and in October of 1950, both North Korea and Communist China.

Following the stabilization of the U. N. defensive positions in south-eastern Korea around the Pusan perimeter in July 1950, MacArthur's Inchon landing on the western coast with the X Corps succeeded in cutting the north-south lines of communications and capturing the capital city, Seoul, in September. Subsequent operations started a partial route of North Korean forces and the U. N. push to the north. No sooner was X Corps successful at Inchon when MacArthur designated it to carry out an independent amphibious assault against Wonsan. J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, remarked: "The General (MacArthur) sketched his plan to land the X Corps at Wonsan and predicted that it would cut across Pyongyang in one week in a maneuver that he compared to Inchon." Consequently, the X Corps and the 1st Marine Division reembarked at Inchon in mid-October, causing a considerable disorder and interruption of the inbound supplies at the port.

As the X Corps was reembarking at Inchon, all Republic of Korea (ROK) Divisions except the 1st had crossed the frontier and were driving to the north. The 3d ROK Division averaged 15 miles a day against a considerable resistance and managed to take Wonsan on 11 October with some help from the ROK Capital Division. Both divisions left elements to secure Wonsan and then attacked to the north. Meanwhile, the X Corps and the 1st Marine Division arrived off Wonsan Coast to find the harbor protected by Soviet mines. Wonsan harbor, the only significant harbor on the North Korean east coast, was mined by the Soviets with their newest equipment.
After a considerable delay to clear the mines, the X Corps began a quiet administrative landing at Wonsan at 0730 hours on 26 October. The 1st Marine Division closed with all elements ashore by the evening of the 28th. The other X Corps division, the 7th Division, was landed to the north at Iwon on the 29th.\(^6\)

The axis of advance of the X Corps was shifted to the north, and the 3d (US) Infantry Division relieved the 1st Marine Division in the Wonsan area. The 3d Infantry Division's mission was to block the main roads in the southern part of the corps zone against the guerrillas and bypassed North Korean regulars and to protect the Wonsan-Hungnam coastal strip. This rear area security operation continued until 15 December when elements of the 3d Division and the ROK Marine Division were evacuated by sea from Wonsan due to the massive intervention by the Communist Chinese forces.\(^7\)

A comparison of the principal antagonists in the Korean War must begin with the closing of World War II. The occupation powers, Soviets in the north and the U.S. in the south, were requested to withdraw their forces from Korea by the United Nations. By the end of 1948, the Soviets reported all Soviet troops had left Korea and by June 29, 1949, the last of the American troops had departed, leaving behind a 500-man U.S. Military Advisory Group contingent. But peace never followed. As American soldiers, border incidents and minor "invasions" occurred regularly into the Onjin Peninsula.\(^8\)

On the eve of the Korean War, many disparities, as well as similarities, existed between the two Koreas. Buddhism and Shamanism were the major religions, although Soviet influence and the emerging Communist ideology of the North would
ultimately discourage any religious affiliation, both Seoul and Pyongyang were centers of missionary activities prior to the war. The major difference between the North and South, other than the form of government, was the location of industry. The 1945 division of the peninsula resulted in an unnatural partition of the natural and human resources. North Korea benefited in terms of both industry and natural resources, but it had only one-third of the work force. Approximately, 65% of Korea's heavy industry was in the North. However, the North had only 31% of light industry, 37% agriculture, and 18% of the peninsula's total commerce.9

The national strategic objectives of North Korea were evident from the period of its emergence as a Communist state. In September 1948, the Soviets established the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) north of the 38th parallel.10 The border violations mentioned above were a manifestation of the Korean intention to reunite Korea. Kim Il Sung's government openly and clearly broadcast its intentions to reunite Korea by force in the summer of 1949. In letters to the U. N. Secretary General Trygve Lie and to Carlos P. Romulo, the president of the General Assembly, Kim simply stated that he wanted to use military forces to unite the peninsula.11

There existed in 1950 no previous performance of the North Korean army, per se, upon which an analysis could be made of its fighting capabilities. However, Korea had been invaded, fought over, and influenced by its larger neighbors for most of its history. Following the hundreds of years of convergence of powers on her peninsula, Koreans accommodated to many modern influences. Among those were the ability to organize, train, and fight a war.12
In 1950, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) was prepared to fight a limited war. Kim Il Sung, who had once been a Soviet citizen and army major, formed a cadre of his army in 1948. He called 30,000 Korean veterans of the Communist Chinese and Soviet armies to return to Korea to form the nucleus of his Inmingoon, or People’s Army. By 1950, the army had expanded to include eight infantry divisions, all at full strength, a motorcycle reconnaissance regiment, an armored brigade equipped with T-34 medium tanks, and five brigades of border forces. The army’s total strength was 135,000 men under arms, many of whom had gone Soviet indoctrination. Divisions were commanded by officers who had served successfully with the Soviets in World War II, and each had approximately 15 Soviet army advisors.

The Republic of Korea (ROK) forces, on the other hand, were not so fortunate as the North in terms of equipment received from its allies before the war. While the North received from the Soviets everything from small arms, T-34 tanks, howitzers, to YAK trainers and bombers, the South had no tanks, medium artillery, fighter aircraft nor bombers. On the eve of the invasion, the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) had approximately 65,000 combat troops, about one-half that of North Korea. This inequity was not recognized by the United States military authorities, and the chief of the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) stated that if attacked from the North, the ROKA would have no problems stopping the invasion.

It was evident in 1947 that the United States was going to take little strategic interest in Korea. In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that “... from the standpoint of military security, the United States has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops and bases in Korea....” The American strategic planners were thinking in terms
OF THE NEW ATOMIC HORIZONS OF POWER, AND THE JCS BELIEVED THAT ANY AGGRESSION
BY NORTH KOREA COULD BE NEUTRALIZED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCES. AIR WOULD BE MORE
PRAGMATIC AND LESS COSTLY THAN GROUND OPERATIONS. THE JCS RECOMMENDED AGAINST
A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF THE U.S. FORCES, AND THEY RECOGNIZED THE POTENTIAL
POLITICAL IMPACT SUCH AN ACTION MIGHT HAVE UPON JAPAN.18

THREE MONUMENTAL STRATEGIC MISTAKES WERE MADE IN 1950. FIRST, THE
UNITED STATES’ STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE DID NOT CORRECTLY IDENTIFY THE DPRK
CAPABILITIES NOR DID THE MILITARY AND GOVERNMENTAL POWERS REMOTELY ACKNOWLEDGE
THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INVASION. SECONDLY, THE NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT DID
NOT ANTICIPATE THE RAPID RESPONSE BY THE UNITED STATES BY COMMITTING THE GROUND
FORCES. AND FINALLY, THE U.N. FORCES WERE STRATEGICALLY SURPRISED BY THE
CHINESE ARMY.19

ON JUNE 25, 1950, THE AMERICAN LEADERSHIP CORRECTLY SAW THE INVASION AS
SOVIET-SPONSORED AND REALIZED THAT A FAILURE TO REACT WOULD APPEAR TO THE WORLD
AS A MUNICH OF THE FAR EAST, ESPECIALLY IN LIEU OF THE 1948 LOSS OF CHINA TO
THE COMMUNISTS.20 CONSEQUENTLY, PRESIDENT TRUMAN ACCEPTED A LIMITED RESPONSE,
AND THE AMERICAN STRATEGY WHICH HAD FOLLOWED THE PRECEPTS OF U.S. GRANT’S
ANNIHILATION WAS NO LONGER APPROPRIATE. HOWEVER, IN THE STRATEGIC SETTING,
KOREA WAS AN EXTREMELY FORTUNATE LOCATION FOR A TEST OF UNITED STATES RESOLVE.
THE DEMOBILIZATION FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II HAD LEFT THE LARGEST CONCENTRATION
OF U.S. TROOPS OUTSIDE THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES IN JAPAN. MACARTHUR WAS
THE FAR EAST EXPERT, AND HE HAD FOUR DIVISIONS IN JAPAN. HE WAS ALSO WITHIN
REACH OF THE AMERICAN SEA FORCES.21
As the Marines and the X Corps prepared to go into Wonsan in October 1950, a new combatant changed the strategic parameters of the war. The prisoners captured near Unsan on 25 October spoke neither Korean nor Japanese. The fact that they were Chinese was incredulous to American leaders even though they had received precise information describing the Chinese intentions. In late September, the U.S. government received a Chinese warning through the Indian government. The Chinese conveyed explicitly that they would intervene if the U.N. forces crossed the 38th parallel. More specifically, on 3 October, the Chinese foreign minister assured the Indian Ambassador in Peking that if any troops other than South Koreans crossed the 38th parallel, China would send troops to assist the defense of North Korea.

Probably in one of the most brilliant strategic deployments of the Twentieth Century, the Chinese entered the Korean War unbeknown to the U.N. Command until the capture of the Chinese prisoners. The Communist Chinese Forces moved 300,000 men into position in October and November, and none were discovered by the U.N. planes flying reconnaissance overhead. The Chinese moved at night and lay perfectly camouflaged while planes flew above during the day. MacArthur identified 21 Chinese divisions in Korea on November 30, and in December, 27 divisions formed into nine corps.

The rear area security at Wonsan in November 1950 consisted more of combat operations than of consolidation or security operations.
The Chinese Communist Forces' plan was straightforward -- to envelope the inland flanks of the Eighth Army and the X Corps and to pocket their remnants against the coast for subsequent annihilation while the main Chinese thrust continued to the south through the peninsula. Consequently, the description of actions at Wonsan in November 1950 as 'rear area security' is somewhat misleading. The U.N. forces defended against the combined attacks of North Korean and Communist Chinese forces. The mission of the 3d (US) Infantry Division and the ROK Marine Division was in reality the defense of the Wonsan perimeter rather than a police action implied by the term, rear area security.

The 3d Infantry Division was a motley organization in 1950. The 65th Regiment of the 3d Infantry Division had embarked on two transports in Puerto Rico on 25 August and had arrived at Pusan on 22 September. The other two regiments, the 7th and 15th, and the division headquarters sailed from San Francisco between 30 August and 2 September. The division was augmented with 8,500 Korean draftees in Japan.

The 3d Division was an international organization by the time it reached Wonsan. Some squads consisted of two American enlisted men and eight Koreans. The 65th Regiment was composed of white Puerto Ricans, Virgin Island blacks, and white American soldiers. A tank company had all black American soldiers, and other units had numerous Americans of Japanese descent.
The 3d Division would ultimately participate in numerous major engagements with the North Korean forces along the regimental supply routes, beginning approximately from 12 November 1950 in the area west of Wonsan between Majon-ni and Tongyang. Several of these battles resulted in heavy losses in men and equipment and were by no means 'rear area security.' As Chinese and North Korean coordination improved, the 3d Division losses increased and ultimately resulted in the withdrawal of the Division and the ROK Marine Division by sea on 15 December.29

In summary, the strategic setting for the campaign at Wonsan included the vital interests of five powers: DPRK, ROK, Communist China, USSR, and the United States. The war's most significant surprises were the original attack by North Korea, the entrance of the United States into the war, and the intervention by Communist China. Wonsan, with its excellent harbor and accessibility, was destined to become a key terrain for the opposing armies. It would certainly have considerable influence over the tactical plans of both forces.
CHAPTER II
THE TACTICAL ENVIRONMENT

The Climate and Weather

Winters in North Korea range from very cold in the lowlands to severe, arctic weather in the highlands. The mean temperature is below freezing in the lowlands with the mean minimum temperature generally below zero degrees Fahrenheit in the highlands. Extreme minimum temperatures are 30 to 40 degrees below zero. The mountainous interior of northern Korea is a region of relatively high precipitation; however, the period from October through March is the dry season. The winter precipitation falls primarily as snow. The accumulation of snow on the ground seldom exceeds one foot except in the northern mountain valleys where the depth is increased by local drifting. Days of cloudless skies are not uncommon, and relatively clear skies may last for several days. The best sky conditions for aerial operations prevail in the winter when cloud cover averages .2 for 70% of the time in the interior. Visibility is also affected by radiation fogs. These form in the protected localities of the interior during calm periods or with very light winds usually late at night or in the early morning. The fog cover usually disappears by 1000 hours.

The cold and wet weather conditions in northern Korea resulted in instruction in the prevention of immersion (trench) foot and
FROSTBITE. THE LOW TEMPERATURES, PRODUCING ARCTIC-LIKE CONDITIONS, accounted for 85% of the 5,100 cold weather cases during the winter of 1950-51. Because extremely cold weather sometimes caused initial shock, troops were indoctrinated in the use of warming tents. An emphasis was placed on the care of feet. Medical officers and aid-men taught troops how to prevent and care for cold weather injuries. In addition, quartermaster teams from the General Headquarters were sent to the field in 1950, to demonstrate, instruct, and supervise the fitting of winter clothing. The most important consideration was the necessity for teaching cold weather habits so that combat operations would not be unnecessarily impeded by severe weather. When proper preventive measures were not taken, cold weather had an adverse effect on troop morale.

The extreme weather conditions greatly curtailed maintenance production particularly during the hours of darkness. Maintenance tents with adequate heating were added to each ordnance maintenance company operating in snow or extreme cold. During very cold weather, pre-heaters were used on vehicle engines to insure the ease of starting.

During November 1950, the weather was clear and the trafficability excellent on all roads and high grounds. Rice paddies remained soft, not allowing tanks to cross. As December approached and the weather remained clear and colder, the rice paddies froze allowing tanks good trafficability. Little snow was encountered
which did not significantly hamper operations. Ice caused the most trouble. Vehicles had trouble on ice or frozen ground in obtaining sufficient traction to cross two or three feet high dikes, even with high chevron tracks.

As the weather became colder, maintenance required more time to complete and frequent warm-up periods for vehicles were necessary. Logs or branches were required to keep tracks off the ground when parked, to prevent the tracks from freezing to the ground. Extreme cold also caused the oil on the operating parts of automatic weapons to stiffen resulting in the weapons failing to function properly. During severe cold weather, excess oil should be removed by cleaning with gasoline or other available solvent.

The Terrain

Korea is a land of many mountains, few roads, numerous small rivers, a few large ones, and many rice paddie areas. The area is difficult to traverse so that coordinated employment of ground forces is habitually difficult and frequently impossible. Numerous scattered peaks, some of which have elevations of more than 8,000 feet, are located principally in the eastern and northeastern parts of the country. Wonsan, the 3d Infantry Division’s area of operations, lies on the east coast of Korea in the middle of the mountain range which runs from the Yalu River in the north along the east coast of the country. There is a
SCARCITY OF ROADS IN THIS MOUNTAIN RANGE AREA. EXISTING ROADS ARE ROUGH, NARROW AND ROCKY, BUT ARE SOLID SUBSTANCE.

THE MOUNTAIN REGION PROVIDES EXCELLENT OBSERVATION INTO THE VALLEY AREAS. HOWEVER, FREQUENT GROUND FOG AND LOW CLOUDS OBSTRUCT OBSERVATION DURING EARLY MORNING HOURS. DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE WEAPONS WERE AFFECTED BY THE TERRAIN. THE 90MM TANK MAIN GUN, USED IN THE DIRECT FIRE ROLE, WOULD FIRE AS CLOSE AS 50 YARDS IN FRONT OF ATTACKING OR WITHDRAWING INFANTRY. THE 90MM WAS SOMETIMES EFFECTIVE AGAINST HIGH TRAJECTORY WEAPONSEMPLACED BEHIND RIDGES. THE TECHNIQUE USED WAS TO SET THE FUSE ON THE PROJECTILE ON DELAY AND FIRE SO AS TO RICOCHET THE ROUND OFF THE RIDGE AND ABOVE THE POSITION CAUSING AN AIR BURST OVER THE ENEMY POSITION. ARTILLERY FIRING IN SUPPORT OF THE MANEUVER FORCES RELIED ON THE USE OF WHITE PHOSPHOROUS IN ORDER TO LOCATE IMPACTING ROUNDS BECAUSE OF RUGGED TERRAIN. A 10-PER CENT INCREASE IN WHITE PHOSPHOROUS WAS RECOMMENDED BECAUSE OF THE TERRAIN AND TO DENY THE ENEMY COVER AND CONCEALMENT.

THE MOUNTAIN AREA AFFORDED EXCELLENT COVER BUT CONCEALMENT WAS LIMITED DUE TO THE SPARSE VEGETATION. NORTH KOREAN AND CHINESE FORCES COMPENSATED FOR THE LACK OF CONCEALMENT BY EFFECTIVE USE OF CAMOUFLAGE AND EXTENSIVE NIGHT OPERATIONS.

THE TERRAIN AND WEATHER PRIOR TO THE WINTER MONTHS PRESENTED THE BIGGEST OBSTACLE TO U.S. OPERATIONS. DURING THE WARM WEATHER, TRACKED AND WHEELED VEHICLES WERE CONFINED TO THE
EXISTING ROAD NETWORKS. Soft soil conditions and flooded rice paddies prevented cross-country movement. Narrow, winding roads presented easy interdiction targets to the North Korean and Chinese Communist Forces (CCF). The terrain in the area favors the defender. North Korean and CCF opposing the 3d Infantry Division operated in small unit elements and were effective in blocking the roads with rock slides and ambushing convoys. In the winter, once the rice paddies were drained and the ground frozen, cross-country mobility improved for armord vehicles but not for the wheeled vehicles due to the ruggedness of the terrain. The mechanization of the U.S. forces created an obstacle in itself by limiting the forces to be effectively employed. Communist forces operating in the area were pure infantry and as such often traversed the most difficult terrain features to avoid the overwhelming fire-power of the U.S.

For the Communist forces, all of Korea was an avenue of approach. Terrain was no barrier. Often the enemy selected an area of rugged, mountainous terrain with a poor road net as a main axis of advance. Ridgelines, mountains, valleys, and trails on the sides of hills were all used by the enemy.

The Enemy Forces

The 3d Infantry Division, placed behind the 1st Marine Division, fought both a forward area battle with the 65th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) and rear area protection operations with the 26th (ROK) Regiment operating to the north of Wonsan and the
remainder of the division operating to the south of Wonsan.

Enemy composition of the northern forces included elements of at least the 124th, 125th, and 126th Chinese Communist Forces divisions of the 42d Chinese Army. The mission of the CCF was to conduct coordinated attacks against the right flank of the X Corps (1st Marine and 3d ID sectors) to capture the port city of Wonsan.

Enemy forces opposing the division south of Wonsan were elements of the 2d, 5th, 10th, and 15th North Korean divisions that had been bypassed by the U.N forces. The total force structure of these units was estimated to be between 20,000 and 30,000 soldiers. However, the unit integrity had been lost and guerrilla bands of various sizes from 200 to 1,500 had been formed often times under the control of Chinese or Russian leaders. According to one source, guerrillas were to be formed into independent battalions of 700 personnel each to support the offensive by the CCF in the north.

The CCF offensive in the north was organized along conventional lines with a conventional force structure. Although the 3d Infantry Division encountered some of these conventional forces, the majority of the contacts were made with the guerrilla groups operating independently of each other. All of these elements, however, attacked convoys and villages as a means of resupply.
Except for a few instances, North Korean forces operating in the 3d ID sector were armed with only small arms, mortars, and automatic weapons. On a few occasions, the 3d ID elements would encounter North Korean units that were armed with artillery pieces generally of World War II vintage. On these few occasions, the U.S. fire-power proved to be the decisive factor in the battle forcing the North Korean elements to withdraw or abandon their artillery.

From a technological and logistical standpoint, North Korean forces were well behind the U.S. in weapons technology and employment, and because North Korean forces were operating behind U.S. lines, logistical support from the north was nonexistent, which meant conducting raids and ambushes in order to supply their forces.

Guerrilla type operations conducted by the North Korean forces was apparently controlled by hard core Chinese or Russian advisors infiltrated into the south for the purpose of organizing resistance. Little is known about the overall command and control, but the research indicates that the groups primarily operated independently of each other. Once an advisor had organized 150 to 200 personnel, he would begin conducting raids on targets of opportunity usually for food and ammunition.

The leadership provided by Chinese or Russian officers and NCOs was apparently not limited to the North Korean forces operating behind the U.S. lines but was also a practice of front line units.
as well. According to the prisoner of war reports, the North Korean leadership demonstrated toughness and determination during training. But during the battle, the leaders were often times the first to break and run. Chinese and Russian leadership reportedly was more determined. These officers and NCOs did not break and run during battle, and it was reported that they would shoot anyone who did.

The Communist leadership principle of using fear to keep the soldiers in line had an adverse effect on unit morale. This tactic, coupled with the recent U.N. successes, lack of adequate supplies, clothing and illness forced the Chinese to start replacing North Korean front line units with Chinese regulars.

Very little information on North Korean or Chinese intelligence gathering capabilities has come to light. However, one collection method known to have been used was simply by visual observation and pattern analysis. Using high ground to observe a target, soldiers would watch and record the activity in the target area looking for either a pattern or timing of events or trying to discover a weakness that could be exploited. This method proved to be very effective for the North and did not rely on technology for successful accomplishment.
CHAPTER III

THE BATTLE ANALYSIS

THE MISSIONS

The first commitment of the 3d (US) Infantry Division in the Korean War took place in the northeastern Korea during the month of November, 1950. It was integrated as rear area support into the X Corps drive north to the Yalu River. Specifically, the 3d Division's mission was detailed in the X Corps Operation Order #6 on 11 November as follows:

1. Relieve elements of the 1st Marine Division in zone by 1224001 November.
2. Secure the Wonsan area.
3. Destroy enemy in zone.
4. Establish battalion blocking positions in accordance with Annex C and protect X Corps left (west) flank in zone.
5. Prepare for offensive operations to the west (of Wonsan) on Yonghung - Hadongsan Ni (CU1283) axis and on Wonsan - Onjong Ni (CU1341) axis.
6. Provide one infantry battalion as Corps reserve, located at Hamhung.
7. Gain operational control of the 26th ROK Regiment to assist in destroying enemy forces in zone.
The 3d Infantry Division, commanded by Brigadier General Soule, was composed of three organic Regimental Combat Teams (7th, 15th, and 65th) and had attached to it the 1st ROK Marine Regiment and the 26th ROKA Regiment. By the 21st of November, the 3d ID completed its unopposed amphibious landing at Wonsan. The 65th RCT led the way. Its presence progressively released the majority of the 1st (US) Marine Division from security operations in the Wonsan - Hamhung area for its follow-on mission up north. In addition to the attachment of South Korean forces, one unique aspect of the task organization standard throughout the X Corps was the attachment of a Tactical Air Control Party to each of the infantry battalions. This provided simplified communication procedures and more responsive and direct close air support (CAS) missions.

The Enemy Objectives

Since the 3d Infantry Division's mission was rear area security with on-order offensive taskings, its principal adversary was a conglomerate of the bypassed North Korean soldiers and units, organized South Korean (Communist) guerrillas, bandits, the destitute, and the disaffected populace, many of whom sought not only political ideals but also their basic needs brought on by cold and hunger; they had been displaced by the fighting or cut off from their supply base in the north. In either case, they were desperate. In bands of 2,000 to 3,000 each, they could give a battalion fits for a day or two before
FADING AWAY INTO THE RUGGED COUNTRYSIDE. 33

THEIR NUMBERS AND ACTIVITIES REACHED A NEW HEIGHT DURING THE PERIOD IN MID-OCTOBER WHEN THE COMMUNIST CHINESE JOINED IN THE FIGHTING ON OTHER THAN A VOLUNTEER SCALE. BEGINNING ON 18 OCTOBER, COINCIDENTALLY THE SAME DATE ON WHICH THE X CORPS BEGAN ITS DEPARTURE FROM INCHON FOR THE WIDE SWEEP OF KOREA, CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES IN REGIMENTAL AND DIVISIONAL STRENGTH CROSSED THE YALU RIVER INTO KOREA AS THE VANGUARD OF A LONG PARADE OF NORTH KOREAN SUPPORTERS. THEY WERE ENCOUNTERED IN THE X CORPS ZONE IN ONLY ONE GENERAL AREA -- CHOSEN RESERVOIR. 34

IN GENERAL, THE ENEMY'S TACTICAL OBJECTIVES IN THE REAR AREAS ASSIGNED TO THE 3D INFANTRY DIVISION WERE DESIGNATED TO:

(1) DRAW MANPOWER FROM FRONT LINES

(2) INTERDICT U.N. LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPPLY CENTERS

(3) DESTROY REAR AREA INSTALLATIONS

(4) FURNISH THE NORTH KOREANS WITH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, AND

(5) TERRORIZE THE LOCAL POPULATION INTO COOPERATION. 35

THEY ALSO HAD A STRONG PERSONAL OBJECTIVE OF STAYING ALIVE, WHICH NECESSITATED PILFERAGE. THEIR MILITARY AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES INCLUDED:

(1) STRENGTHENING PARTY CELLS

(2) DISSEMINATION OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

20
(3) CREATION OF DISSATISFACTION TOWARD THE ROK GOVERNMENT

(4) FOSTERING OF ANTAGONISM TOWARD THE U.N. FORCES

(5) DISRUPTION OF ECONOMIC LIFE, AND

(6) THE INFILTRATION OF ROK GOVERNMENT, POLICE AND MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS. 36

THE ENEMY TACTICS

BY EMPLOYMENT OF THE FOLLOWING TACTICS, THE ENEMY WAS ABLE TO OPERATE IN SPITE OF THE FRIENDLY AIR, ARTILLERY, ARMOR, AND LOGISTIC SUPERIORITY:

MOVEMENT:

MOVEMENT WAS MADE AT NIGHT, BY FOOT, AND IN SMALL GROUPS ALONG DIVERSE ROUTES TO AVOID DETECTION. DURING THE DAY, THEY RESTED. THE OFFICERS AND COMMUNIST PARTY OFFICIALS USED HOUSES CONFISCATED FROM THE POPULACE, AND THE ENLISTED MEN DUG HOLES ALONG THE ROADS AND TRAILS THEY TRAVERSED. MANY WERE FOUND IN SUCH HOLES FROZEN TO DEATH FROM NIGHT-TIME TEMPERATURES THAT DIPPED IN THE LATE NOVEMBER TO -25°F. USING MOUNTAIN AND CROSS-COUNTRY PATHS, THEY COULD AVERAGE 22 MILES PER NIGHT, WITH FORCED MARCH DISTANCES REACHING 35 MILES WITHOUT IMPAIRING COMBAT EFFICIENCY. TRAILS WERE MARKED BY WOVEN GRASS OR STRAW RINGS ABOUT EIGHT INCHES IN DIAMETER PLACED EVERY 50 TO 100 METERS ALONG THE WAY.
PATROLS:

The enemy used small reconnaissance patrols to maintain contact with the U.N. units. Horses allowed them to cover larger areas. They were armed with automatic weapons and concussion grenades, often used to prod a U.N. response with the objective of determining location and strength. They would also assist artillery target acquisition by firing tracer rounds into known U.N. positions.

ATTACK:

The enemy often attacked at night supported by well-coordinated mortar, rocket, and automatic weapons fires. Because of transportability, camouflage, and logistic difficulties associated with artillery, the enemy used it very little. They conducted an infantry assault on the heels of their supporting fire using, literally, waves of humanity. Those who had weapons charged with rifles, sub-machineguns, and concussion grenades. (Only about 60% of the guerrillas did at any one time had weapons in their possession.) They used whistles, bugles, and flares to exercise command and control, and they capitalized on the confusion and fright those tools caused in the U.N. forces. When they seized their objective, they would quickly dig in and reorganize. If they failed, they would withdraw in an orderly fashion with their dead in tow.

The enemy always tried hard to infiltrate U.N. units during their attacks. Our inability to tell one oriental from another made the U.S. units particularly vulnerable to this tactic.
As with reconnaissance patrols, the enemy was particularly adept at tricking U.N. forces into disclosing their positions and strength by using probing fire or employing English-speaking members who would pose as friendly. Demonstrating great courage, they would walk right up to U.N. positions while in such disguise and then open fire on them.

Defense:

The enemy attempted to coax U.N. troops into their lines by opening access routes and then attacking on both flanks and the rear, preventing escape or reinforcement.

They avoided high ground where they were vulnerable to U.N. air observation or attack. Instead, they established their defensive positions on the reverse side of hills or well down on the front side. They made every attempt to outflank their enemy and deceptively hide their main force. For instance, sometimes they publicized their lines with large fires at night while they withdrew to safe ground in the rear. As a result, the U.N. forces would waste a lot of ammunition.

Guerrilla Operations:

Vehicle columns were allowed to enter an ambush and then the lead and rear vehicles were crippled. The enemy raked the trapped columns from high ground on both sides of the road.

The enemy used tank hunter-killer teams against armor. One type of team had three members -- one with anti-armor rocket launcher; two for security and to carry supplies. Another type
USED A MODIFIED BANGALORE TORPEDO AND STILL ANOTHER USED SATCHEL CHARSES SUSPENDED ON LONG BAMBOO POLES.

INFILTRATORS WOULD BUILD ROAD BLOCKS BEHIND U.N. FORCES AND CUT OFF THEIR ESCAPE PRIOR TO A MAJOR OFFENSIVE.

IN THE MOUNTAINS, SMALL ENEMY GROUPS WOULD OCCUPY THE HIGH GROUND AND ALLOW THEMSELVES TO BE OBSERVED, INVITING ATTACK. U. N. FORCES WOULD CONCENTRATE FIRE ON THEM, WHILE OTHER ENEMY GROUPS WOULD ENCIRCLE THEM THROUGH THE VALLEYS. THEY USED A SPECIAL HARPOON TO CLIMB STEEP MOUNTAIN CLIFFS.

LEADING ELEMENTS OF ATTACK GROUPS MINGLED WITH REFUGEE STRAGGLERS AND WOULD ATTACK BY SURPRISE. DISGUISED AS REFUGEES, THEY PREPARED AMBUSHES AND ROAD BLOCKS ALONG FRIENDLY AVENUES OF WITHDRAWAL.

THEY WOULD FEARLESSLY RAISE THEIR HANDS TO SURRENDER, AND, WHEN U.N. TROOPS MOVED CLOSE TO TAKE THE PRISONERS, LARGER ENEMY UNITS HIDDEN IN THE FOLIAGE WOULD OPEN FIRE.

THEY WOULD CONDUCT "MANSEI," KOREAN VERSION OF "BANZAI," ATTACKS IN GROUPS OF 50 OR MORE. WHEN U.N. FORCES CONCENTRATED THEIR FIRE ON THE HUMAN WAVE, OTHERS WOULD SLIP AROUND FOR A FLANKING ATTACK.

THEY WOULD EMPLOY EXTREMELY WELL CAMOUFLAGED TANKS AND DIRECT-FIRE ARTILLERY ALONG THE ROAD AS U.N. COLUMNS PASSED.

THEY WOULD OFFER UP A BRIGHTLY PAINTED, NEW LOOKING TANK TO AIR ATTACK AND HEAVILY DEFEND IT IN TIGHT TERRAIN WITH ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY - A FLAK TRAP.

ENEMY TROOPS WEARING WHITE ARM BANDS WOULD APPROACH U.N. POSITIONS CLAIMING TO BE GUARDS. WHEN CLOSE, THEY WOULD ATTACK.
Cover and Concealment:
North Korean troops were good at passive air defense. They stayed motionless even when being bombed and wore disguises and camouflage that made them hard to detect. It would be an interesting note that they learned to crawl on their back, looking at the aircraft above.

Their winter uniform could be reversed to make it white against the snow. Woven straw mats and other natural materials were used to cover up people and equipment. Most of their movement was conducted at night.

The Combat Actions

The first elements of the 65th RCT came ashore at Wonsan late on 5 November 1950. On the 6th, the 2d Battalion, 65th RCT moved into positions at Yonghung. They, together with the 96th Field Artillery Battalion, made the first contact with enemy forces at 0300 hours on 7 November. On the north edge of Yonghung, they were attacked by North Koreans in what was to be the first of many night-time engagements with the enemy. By morning, when visibility allowed more accurate firing, the attack was repulsed. A smaller force attacked again the next night with similar results.

On 9 November, the 65th RCT sent its 1st Battalion to the west to establish contact with Eighth Army elements. Meanwhile, the 58th Field Artillery Battalion closed in Yonghung. By the evening of the 10th, 1st Bn, 65th RCT had gone 31 miles without
resistance. However, they did encounter delays due to misinformation on bridges, which prompted the X Corps Commander, Major General Almond, to personally visit the scene and install a sense of urgency in the unit command. General Almond repeatedly exhibited similarly strong command and control throughout the X Corps operations in Korea.

The following day, 11 November, a patrol reached the Eighth Army contact point, Hadongsan-Ni, but made no contact with elements of the Eighth Army. On the same day, the 15th Infantry Regimental Combat Team began landing at Wonsan, and an estimated 25 enemy attacked a patrol of the 65th RCT, vicinity CU1594. After a short fire fight, the enemy was repulsed. By this time, it was clear that the insurgents would continue to ambush and attack convoys, supply trains, and other installations in a similar manner. It was also anticipated that guerrilla activities in the Hamhung area would increase as a result of the enemy's northerly movement.

On 12 November, elements of both the 15th and 65th RCTs made contact with unidentified enemy units, perhaps remnants of the retreating North Korean 10th Division. Near CU4687, an estimated 35 enemy were confronted by the 65th RCT; they were dispersed by artillery. Three road blocks were encountered between Wonsan and Majon-Ni. Similar light action characterized 13 November when guerrillas were reported in villages at CU1810 and CU5233. Some villagers were taken as conscripts when the
enemy withdraw toward Pakhoenyong Mountain in the Majon-Ni area. In another action, 17 of an estimated 30 enemy were killed or captured in fighting half a mile south of Hadongsan-Ni by the 65th RCT.

Contact was finally established with the Eighth Army on 14 November by ROK patrols operating out of a base 40 miles west of the coast. In addition, patrols of the 65th RCT thoroughly searched the Chowon area vicinity CU5591 for a large group of enemy reported, with no success. However, elements of the 15th RCT encountered and dispersed enemy units at Chuam-Ni vicinity CU5623 and Chigyey-Dong vicinity CU 5433 with large numbers of enemy killed in action.

On the 15th, a patrol of the 15th RCT contacted a group of enemy troops at Chung-Ni, vicinity CU6227, but they were unsuccessful in forcing an engagement before the enemy escaped to the south. Another element of the 15th RCT captured 200 enemy that same day at Kori. By this time, all the units in the 3d Infantry Division were engaged in their vigorous anti-guerrilla patrols in zone.

On 16 November, neither the 15th nor the 65th RCT reported significant enemy contact. The 7th RCT was still arriving on shore. However, the 26th ROK Regiment, headquartered at Chigyong, just south of Hamhung, encountered an enemy group dug in with two machineguns on a hill north of Huksii-Ri. Nearly 50 of the 26th
CONTINGENT WERE TURNED BACK BY THE ENEMY’S STRONG FIRE SUPPORT.

By 17 November, the 7th RCT completed landing at Wonsan and, on the following day, they began to move one battalion to the Hamhung area to take up security operations. This allowed the 26th ROK Regiment to attack west on the 18th of November about seven miles against light resistance to the town of Huksu-Ri. There they reported an estimated 1,500 enemy and called in an air strike to disperse them. They entered Huksu-Ri on the same day. The 3d Bn, Korean Marine Corps (KMC), on the other hand, had been stopped by a road block since late night of 16 November. They were on their way to Sanjague-Dong, vicinity CU3036, and had to continue on foot to avoid delays. Stream water levels were high due to ice jams and it, combined with poor road elevation and drainage, necessitated road repair before movement by vehicle could continue.

Elements of the 15th RCT engaged approximately 25 enemy dug in at CU4732, two and a half mile east of Majon-Ni, and seized enemy stockpiles of arms and ammunition at Yongpo-Ri, vicinity CU3735, on 17 November. There were also reports from civilian sources at 1723501 Nov that a village at CU4277, three miles west of Yonghung, was under a strong enemy attack, including artillery.

At this period in time, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the enemy was growing stronger in his ability to
conduct limited attacks on the X Corps west flank. Both plans and orders were beginning to emphasize contact with and support of the Eighth Army.

The 3d Infantry Division units spent their time on 18 and 19 November chasing down the leads of possible enemy locations and concentrations, although little contact was made. Thousands of safe passage invitations had been dropped on the countryside from the time the X Corps landed in hopes of prompting surrenders. One example of success in this program was a North Korean dental officer who turned himself in on 16 November. He said that such leaflets were well known by the enemy soldiers and would probably be much more successful if possession of them was not dealt with harsh punishment by the enemy leadership.38

The 20th of November saw only light patrol contacts by the 15th and 65th RCTs in scattered areas of the 3d Infantry Division zone. Enemy forces defending Huksu-Ri stubbornly resisted the 26th ROK Regiment, but were finally defeated and pushed out of town. During the action, 150 North Koreans were killed and seven were taken prisoner.

By 21 November, the 3d Infantry Division completed the landing of all its units. The 7th and 65th RCTs reported contact. The 7th RCT ran into a North Korean company, vicinity CU3566, and the 65th RCT engaged 50 to 75 enemy troops at CU1213. Enemy reinforcements raised that number to nearly 300. In other
INCIDENTS THAT DAY, NINE CRATERS WERE BLOWN IN THE ROAD LEADING FROM HAGARU-RI TO YUDAM-NI, MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR VEHICULAR MOVEMENTS. AT FOUR OTHER LOCATIONS ON THE SAME ROUTE, STONE OBSTACLES HAD BEEN BUILT AND COVERED WITH BRUSH TO DELAY TRAFFIC AND FACILITATE AMBUSH.

ON 22 NOVEMBER, THE X CORPS OPERATING INSTRUCTION #17 WAS ISSUED WITH THE FOLLOWING CONTENTS PERTINENT TO THE 3D Infantry Division operations:

1. Destroy enemy in zone.
2. Establish blocking position at Sachang-Ni (CU2439).
3. Continue present mission.

BY THIS TIME, THE X CORPS LEADERSHIP HAD AN EMERGING TENDENCY IN ENEMY ACTIVITY TO CONSIDER. THERE WAS AN OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE OF GROWING EFFICIENCY AND ORGANIZATION OF ENEMY FORCES OPERATING BEHIND THE X CORPS FRONT LINES AND IN THE EIGHTH ARMY ZONE NEAR THE X CORPS BOUNDARY. IN PREVIOUS WEEKS, ENEMY GROUPS CONSISTED OF STRAGGLERS AND DISORGANIZED REMNANTS OF RETREATING UNITS WHOSE ACTIVITIES WERE GENERALLY CONCERNED WITH MINOR RAIDS, AMBUSHES, AND ATTACKS ON VILLAGES TO OBTAIN FOOD AND CLOTHING. NOW THESE ELEMENTS HAD GRADUALLY BEEN INTEGRATED INTO FORCES WHICH WERE WELL ORGANIZED AND EQUIPPED WITH ORGANIC ARTILLERY. THEY WERE CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING COORDINATED ATTACKS IN CONSIDERABLE STRENGTH, AS EVIDENCED BY THE BATTLE AT MAJON-NI.

ON 23 NOVEMBER, THERE WAS A LOT GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN
LARGE STRENGTHS AND SPREAD OVER A WIDE AREA. HOWEVER, THE 26TH ROK REGIMENT PATROLLED WEST OF HUKSU-RI IN THE VICINITY OF THE X CORPS BOUNDARY AND CAPTURED SACHANG-NI IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH THE BLOCKING POSITION DIRECTED IN OI #17.

THE X CORPS OPERATION ORDER #7, DATED 252400I Nov 50, CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING DIRECTIONS FOR THE 3D INFANTRY DIVISION:

(1) GAIN AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE EIGHTH ARMY RIGHT FLANK.
(2) PROTECT THE X CORPS WEST FLANK IN ZONE.
(3) SUPPORT THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION ON ORDER.
(4) PROTECT THE AIRFIELD AND HARBOR FACILITIES IN THE WONSAN AREA.
(5) DESTROY ENEMY GUERRILLA FORCES IN ZONE.

THE 7TH RCT FOLLOWED THE 26TH ROK REGIMENT AND, DESPITE FRIGID -25°F TEMPERATURES AND HIGH WINDS TO RESULT IN SEVERAL CASES OF FROST BITE, ON 26 NOVEMBER, THE 1ST BN, 7TH RCT, COMPLETED RELIEF OF THE 26TH ROK REGIMENT IN THE VICINITY OF SACHANG-NI. AFTER RELIEF, THE 26TH WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION'S CONTROL AND ZONE IN ORDER TO HELP THE X CORPS PLANNED FINAL ATTACK NORTH. AGAINST MOUNTING RESISTANCE FROM AN INCREASING NUMBER OF NEWLY IDENTIFIED CCF DIVISIONS, THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION AND ELEMENTS OF THE 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION ATTACKED TO NORTH ON 27 NOVEMBER ALONG BOTH SIDES OF CHOSIN RESERVOIR.
Down south in the 3d Infantry Division zone, MG Almond, the corps commander, was summoned to a hastily called meeting at the Far East Command Headquarters in Tokyo on 28 November. At this meeting, covering the full situation of the Eighth Army and X Corps, General MacArthur directed that existing missions of the X Corps be continued except for the attack northwest from the Chosin Reservoir. He directed it be discontinued. The X Corps west flank was too weak and enemy forces too strong to risk it.

That same day, to give greater protection to the X Corps left flank, OI # 18 (2814171 Nov 50) was issued with the following consequences for the 3d Infantry Division:

1. New boundary between 3d ID and 7th ID placed Majon-Dong (CU5840) in 3d ID zone.
2. 3d Bn, 7th RCT, was released to control of 3d ID when relieved at Hamhung by an infantry battalion of 7th ID. Employ 3d Bn, 7th RCT, initially from base at Majon-Dong (CU5840) to protect X Corps main supply route in that vicinity and to operate on Majon-Dong - Huksu-Ri axis.

On 29 November, 1st Bn, 7th RCT, in the vicinity of Sachang-Ni, was attacked heavily on three sides in the early morning hours. The 2d Bn moved to relieve the 1st Bn. Company G, from Huksu-Ri, fought its way to the 1st Bn, and with this reinforcement, the 1st Bn conducted a successful defense of its position. The remainder of the 2d Bn, with a supply convoy, arrived after dark.

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ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, 30 November, and enemy contact had broken by that time.

This action conducted in defense of Huksu-Ri and Sachang-Ni may well have been the key operation in November by the 3d Infantry Division in support of the X Corps. It prevented the CCF forces from penetrating the Corps major service installations in the vicinity of Hamhung, cutting off the X Corps withdrawal route, and splitting the X Corps. However, the CCF counteroffensive had begun.

Responding to the CINCUNC orders to assist the Eighth Army, the X Corps OPORD #8 was published with the following directions for the 3d Infantry Division:

(1) Attack with a strong task force on Yonghung (CU4978) - Inhung-Ni (CU1891) axis without delay; develop enemy forces in Sansong-Ni (CU0291) area and assist the Eighth Army.
(2) Protect the X Corps left (west) flank and Hamhung (CU7518) - Sudong MSR in zone.
(3) Concentrate remaining elements of Division in Chigyong (CU6512) - Yonpo (CU7305) area.

It also created Task Force Charlie, under the command of Brigadier General A. D. Mead, composed of the 1st KMC Regiment and one battalion from the 3d Infantry Division with missions to destroy enemy in zone and to protect Wonsan and its airfield.
Because of the rapidly deteriorating situation in the II ROK Corps zone, OPORD #8 was never executed. It was overtaken by events. The X Corps forces were extended over a 400 mile front and the 3d Infantry Division had a 100 mile front. The decision to concentrate in the Hamhung - Hungnam area required rapid execution. The 3d ID had to move approximately 70 miles with the possibility of enemy attack enroute in order to accomplish missions contained in OI #20, dated 011636I Dec 50:

1. Establish command post at Hamhung.
2. Concentrate one RCT vicinity Oro-Ri (CU6950) and one RCT vicinity Chigyong (CU6612).
3. Cover movement of the X Corps elements into Hamhung - Hungnam area.
4. Continue covering force positions vicinity Huksu-Ri and along Inhung-Ni (CU1587) - Yonghung (CU4878) axis.

The speed to concentrate force was appreciably retarded when, on the next day, OI 20 was rescinded by OI 21 (020008I Dec 50). The new instruction ordered the 3d ID to concentrate to defend the Wonsan area. It also dissolved TF Charlie and detached the 1st KMC Regiment from the 3d ID so it could move without delay to the Hamhung - Hungnam area for attachment to the 7th ID. This change was directed by the CINCFE in hopes that the 3d ID could help plug the gap which had developed in the center of the Korean Peninsula. However, the CCF forces moved too fast to allow the 3d ID to respond and OI 24 (031927I Dec 50) changed their destination
back to the Hamhung - Hungnam defense perimeter. This requirement marked the end of the 3d Infantry Division's rear area security mission. From this point on, the 3d ID was to conduct a covering force role for the X Corps withdrawal.
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

Those who wage war in mountains should never pass through defiles without first making themselves masters of the heights.

Maurice de Saxe

The 3d (US) Infantry Division's performance around Wonsan in November 1950 offers little insight on the rear area combat operations. The 3d ID was, for most of the time, actually engaged in a conventional defensive role. However, there are some common points about RACO that are worth emphasizing based on the 3d ID's experience:

1. RACO is a normal tactical mission that should be viewed as an integral part of any combat operation.

2. Specialized units and personnel are not required for RACO. Any good tactical unit can conduct all the tasks associated with RACO. Our enemy, the bypassed North Korean troops, were after all conventional, regular troops that had to operate behind the lines as guerrillas. Sun Tsu said: "Water shapes its course according to the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing." Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.

3. Fluid offensive operations are going to leave large bodies of enemy soldiers in the rear creating the need for significant forces devoted to RACO.

4. RACO units must strive to break down the command
AND CONTROL OF THE BYPASSED UNITS. WE CANNOT ALLOW THE BYPASSED UNITS THE CAPABILITY TO ACT IN CONCERT.

5. THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY MUST BE DIVIDED AMONG THE SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS, AND EACH SUBORDINATE ELEMENT NEEDS COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS.

6. CONVOY MOVEMENT WITHIN THE REAR AREA MUST BE TREATED AS A COMBAT OPERATION. THERE SHOULD BE COORDINATION AT ALL LEVELS TO PROVIDE SECURITY AND FIRE SUPPORT. THE COMMAND AND CONTROL, ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE TO IDENTIFY POSSIBLE AMBUSH SITES, REHEARSAL OF ACTION TO BE TAKEN UPON ENCOUNTERING AMBUSH, AND CONVOY DISCIPLINE MUST BE REVIEWED PRIOR TO COMMENCING MOVEMENT.

7. SECURITY IS COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY. ALL UNITS, REGARDLESS OF TYPE AND SIZE, MUST PROVIDE THEIR OWN SECURITY; ALLROUND SECURITY.

8. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS MUST BE TRAINED TO PARTICIPATE IN SMALL UNIT COMBAT ACTIONS.

9. THE RACO UNIT SHOULD CONDUCT AGGRESSIVE NIGHT OPERATIONS TO DENY THE ENEMY'S EXPLOITATION OF DARKNESS AND INACTIVITY BY FRIENDLY FORCES. SURPRISE MUST NOT BE ALLOWED.

10. RACO UNITS SHOULD BE SUPPORTED BY STRONG CIVIL AFFAIRS ELEMENT TO HELP HANDLE POPULACE. WHENEVER POSSIBLE, FOOD AND MEDICAL AID SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO THE LOCAL CIVILIANS.

11. RACO OPERATIONS NEED ADDITIONAL COMBAT ENGINEER SUPPORT TO PROTECT AND MAINTAIN THE LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS.

12. INTEROPERABILITY IS A VIABLE CONCEPT FOR COALITION WARFARE. THE US AND ROK UNITS ACCOMPLISHED AN OUTSTANDING JOB
TOGETHER. HOWEVER, THE ENEMY WILL EXPLOIT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNITS FOR TACTICAL ADVANTAGE.

THE BATTLE ANALYSIS OF THE 3D US INFANTRY DIVISION WAS A WORTHWHILE PROJECT. THROUGH THE STUDIES MADE ON THE COMBAT ACTIONS IN KOREA, THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC PROBLEMS SURFACED FROM WHICH LESSONS COULD BE LEARNED:

1. UNITS MUST CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE IN EVERY DIRECTION TO AVOID SURPRISE. AN ASSUMPTION THAT A PARTICULAR FLANK IS COVERED IS DEADLY.

2. ALL UNITS MUST HABITUALLY CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE ALONG THE SUPPLY ROUTES. SECURED SUPPLY ROUTE IS THE KEY TO SUCCESS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

3. WHEN A UNIT IS ADVANCING THROUGH A CORRIDOR, SECURITY ELEMENTS MUST BE PLACED IN POSITION TO OBSERVE POSSIBLE ENEMY MOVEMENT IN ADJACENT COMPARTMENTS AND CORRIDORS. THE FEELING OF SAFETY OFFERED BY GOOD ROADS AND FINE WEATHER IS FALSE AND DANGEROUS.

4. DOMINANT TERRAIN, NEEDLESS TO SAY, MUST BE SECURED (OCCUPIED OR CONTROLLED) PRIOR TO ADVANCING THROUGH A CORRIDOR. PASSAGE IS DETERMINED BY THE SEIZURE OF THE KEY TERRAIN. THAT IS WHY DUKE OF WELLINGTON SAID: "THE WHOLE ART OF WAR CONSISTS IN GETTING AT WHAT IS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE HILL."

5. IF ENCIRCLED, LOSS OF LEADERS AND THE LACK OF REPLACEMENTS FOR CASUALTIES WILL BECOME A MAJOR PROBLEM.

6. CASUALTIES WILL OVER TAX THE MEDICAL FACILITIES.
7. Lack of shelter will pose a great morale problem.
8. Cold weather training (as low as -27°F without the consideration for wind chill factor in Korea), cold weather gear, command emphasis, and medical care for cold injury are all MUSTs.
9. There must be adequate evacuation capability.
10. Supply discipline must be strictly enforced. Conservation, as well as protection, is the key. Shortage of artillery ammunition, not to mention the small arms for individual rifleman, was a common place.
11. Often CAS support was wasted upon vague targets.
12. Loss of communication poses a major threat in all types of tactical environments.
13. There is a need for the US Army to develop theories and guidance for those who are encircled by the enemy. How to break out or how to fight within? What are the ground or air assets to assist them? What are the procedures?
FOOTNOTES


4. ESPOSITO, Section 3, p. 7.

5. Ibid., Section 3, p. 7.


7. ESPOSITO, Section 3, p. 9.


10. Ibid., p. 204.

11. BERGER, p. 95.

12. U.S. Department of State, p. 204.


15. APPLEMAN, pp. 12-17.

16. Ibid., p. 18.

17. FEHRENBACK, p. 49.

18. Ibid., p. 49.

19. WEIGLEY, p. 383.

20. Ibid., p. 383.
21 WEIGLEY, P. 383.  
22 FEHRENBACK, P. 292.  
24 APPLEMAN, P. 770.  
25 DE WEERD, PP. 31-32.  
26 ESPOSITO, SECTION 3, P. 9.  
27 APPLEMAN, PP. 739-740.  
28 Ibid., P. 740.  
29 Ibid., P. 741.  
31 Ibid., Para 3, P. 29.  
34 HEADQUARTERS, X CORPS, “CORPS OPERATIONS 16 OCTOBER - 31 DECEMBER 1950,” EPILOGUE.  
35 SPECIAL OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE, P. 117.  
36 Ibid., P. 117.  
37 Ibid., P. 117.  
38 WAR DIARY, P. 23.  
39 Ibid., P. 53.  
40 CORPS OPERATIONS 16 OCTOBER - 31 DECEMBER 1950.  
41 WAR DIARY, P. 53.  
42 Ibid., P. 16.  
43 Ibid., P. 19.
44 War Diary, p. 55.
45 Corps Operations 16 October - 31 December 1950.
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