Analysis of Local Planning Interviews

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Analysis of Local Planning Interviews

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Emergency Operation Plans, Region X, IEMS, NCP, public-private sector interviews, plan development, attitudes, trends, program and policy emphasis.

This report provides the reader with an insight on information collected and applied through the interview process developing state and local Emergency Operations Plans over a seven year period within FEMA's Region X. The report will show the transition from Nuclear Civil Protection (Crisis Relocation) plans to Integrated Emergency Management plans. The Contractor conducted over 2000 interviews of private, public and quasi-public agencies. This document takes the cumulative information from the interviews and categorizes it according to functional areas and by public or private sector.
20. continued

The interviews documented in the report show the change in emergency management over the past seven years. This change can be attributed to 1) an increased emphasis on all-hazard planning, 2) younger, more aggressive and qualified directors with planning and management backgrounds, 3) the upgrading of the position of Emergency Manager to department status, 4) increased involvement of public safety agencies such as police and fire, 5) better public information and awareness, 6) better training programs and materials through FEMA, and 7) more recruitment and involvement of the private sector and volunteer agencies.

The interviews showed a desire for improvement in several areas: 1) local budget support, 2) FEMA budget support for national program emphasis, 3) recovery, particularly war-caused, 4) training (bring training to local areas), 5) program stability (too much shifting of program emphasis) and 6) legislation (national and state) clearly setting the "responsibility" for emergency management.
ANALYSIS OF LOCAL PLANNING INTERVIEWS

Charles A. Wittenberg and Paul J. Parham
WCA, Inc.

Summary

This report summarizes information collected through the interview process for developing state and local Emergency Operations Plans over a seven year period. The report shows the transition from Nuclear Civil Protection (Crisis Relocation) plans to Integrated Emergency Management plans. The Contractor conducted over 2000 interviews of private, public and quasi-public agencies. Part of this effort was supported, when available, by FEMA, Region X, population protection personnel, state NCP planners and local directors. The information derived from the interviews was used to determine or build preparedness and response capability of state and local governments.

This document takes the cumulative information from the interviews and categorizes it according to functional areas and by public or private sector. The interviews were reviewed by the project team for the following information:

- Attitudes - could any significant change of attitude be detected relating to emergency management?
- Trends - could any trends be determined dealing with a wide range of emergency planning?
- Policy - what FEMA policies had an impact on plans development?
- Program - what effects did FEMA's change in program emphasis have - i.e., NCP to IEMS?

Emergency management today, compared to the concept within which it operated seven years ago, has changed considerably in this region. Governments are more aware of the need for mitigation, preparedness, and response for all hazards. They are more willing to participate and to include all departments in the formulation of plans, tests and exercises. This change can be attributed to 1) an increased emphasis on all-hazard planning, 2) younger, more aggressive and qualified directors with planning and management backgrounds, 3) the upgrading of the position of Emergency Manager to department status, 4)
increased involvement of public safety agencies such as police and fire, 5) better public information and awareness, 6) better training programs and materials through FEMA, and (7) more recruitment and involvement of the private sector and volunteer agencies.

The also revealed that

* Public Works Directors had very little contact or involvement with the local emergency managers. Many were not aware of the local emergency plan, what its contents include and their role and responsibilities.
* Public Works usually will respond to requests for assistance in an emergency. They take it for granted that if there is an emergency requiring their resources they will be involved.
* Once Public Works is involved in the planning process they become more active in emergency management and contribute greatly to the development of the local emergency plan. This usually resulted in establishing a cooperative relationship with other departments not previously established.
* Throughout the seven year program the question of resource management was one of the major concerns or problems encountered by the planners. Under the general heading of resource management are the questions of availability, allocation, needs and surpluses, timeliness of response and cooperative agreements.

The interviews showed a needed improvement in several areas: 1) local budget support, 2) FEMA budget support for national program emphasis, 3) recovery, particularly from war-caused damage, 4) training (bring training to local areas), 5) program stability (too much shifting of program emphasis) 6) legislation (national and state) clearly setting the "responsibility" for emergency management.
ANALYSIS OF LOCAL PLANNING INTERVIEWS

FINAL REPORT

by

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for

Federal Emergency Management Agency
Washington, D.C. 20472

Prepared under FEMA Contract Number EMW83C1349

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FEMA Review Notice

This report has been reviewed in the Federal Emergency Management Agency and approved for publication. Approval does not signify that the contents necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

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ANALYSIS OF LOCAL PLANNING INTERVIEWS

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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II. BACKGROUND

Wehrman Consultants Associated, Inc. contracted with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region X (formerly Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Region 8) in 1977 to develop state and local Crisis Relocation Plans (CRP) for the states of Washington, Idaho and Oregon. It was soon realized that the state and local emergency operations plans were considerably out of date with no continuity of form or format between them. To accomplish CRP and Shelter in-Place plans, it would be necessary in some cases to develop new plans; in others, the emergency operations plans in use at that time would need to be updated. Consequently the contract was modified and Scope of Work expanded to include the development or updating of the state and local plans. The Contractor then proceeded with the new direction. The Emergency Operations Plans form includes a Basic Plan and service annexes covering Direction and Control and the basic emergency functions (Warning, RADEF, Law Enforcement, Fire, Communications, Public Information, Health, Medical, Evacuation, Reception and Care, Feeding, Shelter and Public Works).

The initial plan development process was to update each of the state's emergency plans. This task required complete revision and formatting of the existing plans. It was determined that it was more cost effective to "start over" and develop the plans from scratch than to try to adjust and shuffle existing plans. The contractor was careful to retain and/or refine those areas of the existing plan which were still applicable and to ensure that state law or Executive Orders were followed. The same process applied to the development of local plans. The planning process is illustrated on page 4.

The development of an emergency operations plan in both the necessary scope and scale required involvement by the users and resource providers. Emergency assignments and responsibilities had to be reaffirmed or established. This task was possible through a structured data gathering process which included briefings, meetings and interviews. The interviews were structured to gain the maximum amount of information needed. Some individuals had to be interviewed more than once, either for clarification or changes which were the result of other interviews. The interview process also served another purpose besides information gathering: it became part of the review and approval process. County and City Commissioners and "annex chiefs" (persons assigned
primary responsibility for a functional area of the plan) were interviewed for review and approval purposes, commitment of support roles, resources and the establishment of a point of contact for the local emergency manager.

The interviews became an excellent source of documentation for future ongoing planning and provided basic support and information for planning and developing follow-up tests and exercises.

The Region X contractor's (WCA, Inc.) primary planning responsibility was Nuclear Civil Protection. However, the past two years of planning evolved from strictly NCP Emergency Operations Planning to Comprehensive Emergency Management Planning and finally to the application of the Integrated Emergency Management System concept. Many local jurisdictions were opposed to only single purpose plans such as Crisis Relocation. The Contractor, through the guidance of FEMA's Region X, began developing local plans emphasizing multi-hazard planning. The format of the plans was changed to emphasize the functional areas of emergency management, thereby eliminating the departmental operations format which was commonly used nationally for many years. The first section of the new plan format was devoted to the Basic Plan which was generic in form – followed by the functional annexes, also "generic" in form.

The Generic Basic Plan and annexes were developed for all-hazards and were written to cover all the commonalities of emergency functions. Only those functions which were hazard-specific (applying only to a particular incident) were separated from the generic plan and developed as an attachment to the Basic Plan. These were developed as annexes or placed in a separately related "Part II or III" document. The Contractor did develop Nuclear Civil Protection elements (NCP-CRP) in all of the state and local plans. It should be noted that all of the plans (over forty) that were completed, whether strictly NCP EOP's or multi-hazard, were approved and adopted by the local governments and published.

The experience related in this background section highlights the changing emphasis by governing bodies of what is acceptable in local emergency plans. The interviews clearly show that the planning process remains the same even...
though program emphasis trends and attitudes change. It also shows that these
trends and attitudes have an impact on content and acceptance.

The re-examination of the more than two thousand interviews must be viewed at
their face value and do not necessarily reflect trends or attitudes in other
FEMA regions. Each state within Region X had different emphases, attitudes
and priorities. However, the local emergency managers in all these states
could, with few exceptions, be grouped under the same basic characteristics.
III. REVIEW OF PROJECT METHODOLOGY

The methodology for this project was set forth in the work plan and only minor changes were made. To ascertain trends in some of the areas of local emergency services it was necessary to interview some of the planners and local directors who were involved in the FEMA Region X/WCA project. This was done because the interview notes at the time of the plan development did not, in and of themselves, display any trends. It was beneficial to gain the reflections of the above mentioned people as they perceived things from the time the plans were initially developed to the period following. By analyzing these interviews, attitudes, and responses over this period of time certain trends could be established.

In general, once interviews of those responsible for specific functions were completed, the data were organized into the various sectors (private, public and local) and then analyzed. Other data analyzed consisted of information from planning reports, government staff and private business interviews, trip reports by the project planners, field notes and material gathered from or provided to WCA by emergency management agencies and others throughout Region X.

All of the data, save those which were generated from personal interviews, were retained in the files or the library of WCA. Most of the data were filed by jurisdictional unit and year of development. This allowed for an orderly review of both the public and private sector data since most of the interviews were conducted for plan development purposes.

By far the easiest category to determine was the capabilities of both the local emergency management and private support resources. The capabilities of support agencies were difficult to determine because the agencies were unfamiliar with Emergency Management and did not know what role they actually played.
IV. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND INTERVIEW NOTES

A. Public Sector

1. The public sector responsibility in emergency management is well defined. This is usually determined by state law and/or by local ordinance. Problems occur in the interpretation of the law, and the overlap of responders' functions (police - fire) during a disaster. Government is charged with providing for the protection and the health and welfare of its constituents. While there will always be turf battles (who is in charge, budgets, etc.) between the traditional responders, there is a definite trend toward improved relations. This improvement can be attributed to: 1) better definition within the interpretation of the law; 2) more effective and better communications; 3) realization of the need for a cooperative attitude; 4) budget constraints; 5) consolidation of resources; 6) use of the planning process to develop local plans; and 7) better qualified emergency managers. In general, better government administrative techniques.

2. Early interviews (1977-1981) showed limited interest or concern by some people who had a primary role in an emergency. This might be attributed to the fact that the planning being conducted was strictly war-related and nuclear attack oriented. It was found that interviewees reviewed plans in greater depth when they were conducted on a one-to-one basis than if plans were dropped off or sent to them for review. The interview process (one or more meetings) clearly revealed who had "done their homework." Usually it took more than one interview to gain the total interest and cooperation of the reluctant individual. Analysis indicates that no single reason for resistance dominated, however several observations are noted: 1) too busy with day-to-day responsibilities; 2) first time involved in the emergency plan development; 3) not much to contribute; 4) NCP planning didn't warrant the effort; and 5) did not understand role.

The interviews conducted the past three to four years showed a definite trend of growing interest in emergency planning. Two things may have contributed to that growing interest:
a. The introduction of Comprehensive Emergency Management and more recently the Integrated Emergency Management System has given more relevance to the planning process. This process, which deals with multi-hazard planning and seems to have more probability of occurrence, sparks interest and appeals to the day-to-day understanding of local officials. (A hazardous material spill seems to local persons more likely than a nuclear attack. They feel satisfied to develop the capability to cope with disasters within their own area rather than moving response to an outside [host] area.)

b. The nuclear freeze debate and the association of Civil Defense with defense strategy, particularly Crisis Relocation, opened debates on a scale never before experienced within the civil population protection area.

Growing interest did not necessarily mean wholesale support. The interest did reveal the need for emergency planning and its complications when planning for protection from nuclear attack or a major natural disaster were perceived. The questions usually asked during interviews were about basic survivability and recovery.

In very few instances did people or jurisdictions refuse to participate in the emergency plans development for their jurisdiction. However, there were a lot more questions and concerns because of their increased awareness of the inherent danger, such as attack or an event like the Mt. St. Helens eruption. Many times these questions and concerns arose during the interviews and the interviewers were able to provide the answers or logic of the planning. This was simpler to do when planning for multi-hazards than for nuclear attack as a single issue. People could relate easier to natural or technological hazards and how they would respond. Again, with the exception of very few cases, government officials and staff understood and cooperated in the planning process and in plans development with full understanding that the NCP was a part of their responsibility along with other hazards.

3. The plan development process for emergency management was a learning experience for both the planners developing the plan and the individuals reviewing it. The following conclusions were reached:
a. Local directors in Region X do not have the time or resources to develop their own plans; they are mostly part-time paid staff or volunteers. Even when they are full-time they are busy with day to day administrative tasks. Many plans developed prior to this planning process were incomplete, "someone else's" plan with a name change, or were developed "in-house" without input from other departments or governments.

b. The contract planner, as the writer, was able to act as an independent force so that objectivity, schedule, quality control and product delivery were able to be maintained.

c. The plan was able to be developed from initial contact to approval and publication within six to nine months. This time schedule could not be accomplished if the planner were required to do hazard-specific plans.

4. The interview phase of plan development was critical to the overall process for a number of reasons:

a. The local emergency manager was able to have direct contact with individuals and personnel with whom he would not normally have contact in the course of his duties, and/or have a basis for discussing areas of mutual interest.

b. The input of individuals responsible for emergency functions gave additional credibility to emergency planning.

c. The interviews (both the initial and followup) kept the planning process on schedule and were used for documentation and reference purposes.

d. A tremendous amount of data was assembled, particularly about resources and manpower support. Most of this was applicable to the Emergency Manager's function.

B. Private Sector

Local plan preparation required an understanding of the support and resources available from the private sector. A careful inventory and interview procedure was developed to document the support and available resources. The process helped to develop the liaison and coordination points between local government and the private sector. These efforts were very successful and
many important and cooperative relations were developed. This was particular-
ly evidenced in the three major urban areas of Region X: Seattle/Tacoma,
Portland/Vancouver and Spokane.

The response, cooperation, and participation of the private sector was largely
an unknown factor at the start of the planning program. There was little or
no formal emergency planning which included the private sector anywhere in the
region with the exception of some joint training exercises between Boeing and
King County. Some members of the emergency management community in the Puget
Sound area were active members in the local chapter of the National Defense
Transportation Association (NDTA), but beyond that point there was no ongoing
forum.

The following general statements may be made with regards to the private
sector:

1. Almost all of the private industries, associations, and councils, e.g.
medical associations and chambers of commerce were very willing to
help in whatever way they could. The only provision to this statement
is that some companies wanted to know beforehand if this was a govern-
ment data collection effort and not some attempt by a competitor to
learn proprietary information. This assurance was made and strictly
adhered to. All information provided to the Contractor by private
industry remained in a closed file. No industries or their capability
were specifically referred to. Capabilities or resources were grouped
and reported anonymously. No formal interview questions or forms were
utilized. All interviews were informal and no form was required to be
filled out. Interview summaries were in the form of memoranda to the
jurisdiction file but not reproduced in any plans or reports.

2. Emergency Management is a new area of activity within the private
sector. They are just beginning to realize the importance of devel-
oping their own plans at plant and company level to meet potential
emergencies. Many of the larger industries have plans varying in
scope and detail dealing with major natural or technological disas-
ters. Few, except in the defense industry, have plans in the event of
an attack (conventional, nuclear, chemical or biological). All indus-
tries were interested in knowing how local government could assist

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SPECIFIC INTERVIEW CATEGORIES

PRIVATE SECTOR

- FOOD
  - WHOLESALE
    - RETAIL
  - MANUFACTURING
    - AIRLINES
    - RAILROADS
    - PUBLIC
      - TRANSIT
    - TRUCK LINES

- TRANSPORTATION

- FUEL
  - SUPPLIERS
    - MANUFACTURER
  - DISTRIBUTOR

- COMMUNICATIONS
  - TELEPHONE
  - NEWSPAPER
  - T.V.
    - CABLE
  - RADIO

- DEFENSE
  - NATIONAL

- EQUIPMENT & MANPOWER
  - CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT
  - LABOR
  - MATERIAL SUPPLIERS
  - ELECTRIC POWER
    - NATURAL GAS
    - CLINICS
    - SUPPLIERS
    - WATER
    - SEWER

- ELECTRIC POWER UTILITIES

- MEDICAL
  - HOSPITALS
them in maintaining operations (at some scale) during and after a disaster.

3. There was a great deal of talk but very little action on both the state and federal levels on ways of developing and maintaining the coordination and liaison roles between the public and private sectors in emergency planning. Guidance materials were limited and did not provide a framework for the private sector to develop or prepare plans. FEMA's new or expanded programs for business and industry is a step in the right direction and should gain support nationwide. The results of this effort will help close the circle of involvement necessary to properly motivate, prepare, respond and recover from a disaster be it natural, technological or attack.

4. It is important that contacts with private business or industry be initiated at the executive level of management. Experience taught that anything less than that usually resulted in limited cooperation and a lack of commitment.

5. Industry management is genuinely interested in emergency planning whether it involves just their own plant, the community or the nation. They are interested as citizens with families, and as industrialists, and that provides the reasons for cooperation. The impact of a major emergency or disaster on any company is evident, ranging as it might from resource requirements, supplies and liability.
V. SPECIFIC OBSERVATIONS BY SECTOR AND USE

Federal  The planners were not required to work with federal agencies on local and state plans. However, they were contacted primarily at the local level and briefed on what was happening within their jurisdictional area and their possible role. Some federal agencies such as the Coast Guard, Department of Agriculture (Forest Service), Department of Transportation and Department of Interior (Bureau of Land Management and U.S. Park Service) were found to have the capability to assist local governments during an emergency.

Some local federal agencies which might be impacted or have a support role in case of an emergency, were asked to review parts of local emergency plans. Most responses were immediate and they were able to identify their role, i.e. operational or resource provider. Some agencies had to refer to their national office for clarification of policy and its interagency cooperative agreements with FEMA and legislative requirements.

Overall the federal agencies worked with local governments, and stayed within that agency's established policy. It was found that there was little or no ongoing coordination between the local governments and federal agencies for disasters. The Contractor, state and FEMA Region X personnel facilitated better communications and awareness between both the local governments (particularly the emergency managers) and federal agencies in their areas. FEMA Region X was visible and known in the emergency management area at state and local levels. This tended to give credibility to the "FEMA program" despite the criticism and opposition to their programs, particularly to the NCP/CRP.

1. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
   FEMA Region X was the contract office for this planning program. Most of the observations for this regional office and FEMA national are contained in Section VI.

2. Department of Defense
   Individual military installations in the region were interested in the local planning process but it was difficult to involve them. Those located in the Puget Sound Area were most responsive. They assigned representatives to attend and participate in the Puget Sound NCP Planning Committee. Military installations represented were McChord Air Force Base, Bremerton Naval Shipyard, Bangor (Trident), Ft. Lewis
Army Base, Corps of Engineers and the Coast Guard. A number of information requests on transportation, movement, civilian population, disaster support, and communication channels were either referred to higher authorities or listed as classified. All military installations regarded civilian employees on the base and military dependents on and off the base as part of the civilian population in the Crisis Relocation mode.

3. Department of Energy (DOE)

There was very little contact with the DOE on emergency planning with regards to local plans even though there were a number of questions about power production, power transmission, and power supplies. Planners were not able to establish an effective information channel at DOE on a regional level so that most of these questions were never able to be answered or had to be deferred to other channels. The planners were provided DOE plans which were of national scope in emergency electrical power, etc.; however they were not applicable to local emergency operations plans.

4. Department of Agriculture (USDA)

Many interviews prompted questions about the availability of food to support a large relocated population such as mass evacuation in the event of a probable attack or major natural disaster. The primary concern was the government's policy on "who controls the food stored in elevators, warehouses and distributors when a national emergency is declared." Secondly, how is this food to be shipped and distributed? A recent study on food distribution conducted by Systan for FEMA answers most of these questions but the information is not yet available to the state and local governments to ease their concern. The USDA does not maintain updated inventories of stored or warehoused foods. The information is available but not compiled. The difficulty of maintaining such a list is predicated on 1) seasonal variations, 2) harvest quantities, 3) reporting/auditing time variations and 4) proprietary information of the private food industry. Therefore most estimates on available food stocks in either "risk areas" or "host areas" were provided by county extension offices.
5. Forestry Services
The Forest Service of USDA was the most visible and most accessible federal agency during local plans development in Region X. Because of its regional distribution and forest fire control operations, the Forest Service has traditionally worked with local and state agencies on fire control through mutual aid agreements. There is a good understanding of resources and support arrangements with emergency managers on the state and local level. They also provided other support resources such as backup for radio communications, manpower, search and rescue, warning and radiological monitoring.

Substate Regional Governments Substate regional governments were used as a source for data and information during the planning process. Highway and roadway capability, population (existing and projected) for evacuation and resource movement figures were developed from regional data. In some instances like the Puget Sound Council of Government (PSCOG) there was interest in emergency planning as it related to hazardous materials and earthquake due to the high probability of occurrence. However, many regional governments are still trying to define their role with regards to emergency planning and management. They have no material resources but can provide a point of information and coordination. Most regional governments or councils of government stay at arms length from planning for nuclear attack but welcome and will involve themselves when addressing natural disasters.

State State government is most active and visible in emergency planning. They form the nucleus of disaster preparedness on the state level and set the trend and direction for local governments. Most agencies of state government are active participants in an emergency and are part of the emergency management for state plans. In Idaho, Washington and Oregon all state agencies were assigned and assumed their role and responsibilities. Some agencies were limited only to state activities within the state emergency plan while others were directly involved with local emergency plans. Some of the local support agencies were from State Police, Department of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Welfare, State Parks, various state boards and the Departments of Emergency Services.
State agency interviews conducted resulted in total cooperation of all departments. Initially many were not aware of their role or responsibility, but after briefings and a review of the draft "annexes" that involved them there was understanding and acceptance. Basic interview concerns were 1) state law, 2) agency mission, 3) resource requirements, 4) testing and exercises and 5) budget requirements.

**Judicial** Within the public sector the judicial system is the least flexible to respond or cope with any major disaster: a number of arrests can jam the system; it cannot function without records; and there is a great reluctance to do anything to interfere with "due process."

If evacuation of an area is required the judicial system is unclear about their jurisdictional authority to try cases, pass sentence, or issue opinions while located in a different geographical area even though their constituents are there.

**Special Purpose Governments**

**Special Purpose-Medical/Health** Not only do the urban areas in the Northwest have excellent medical facilities but they also have excellent emergency medical planning committees and communication systems between various urban hospitals. The Physicians Associations in Portland and the Emergency Medical Doctors group in Puget Sound have up-to-date contact lists to respond to disasters. The Nurses Association in all locations has good up-to-date registries.

**School Districts** By law school districts operate independently from the governing jurisdictions and levy their own taxes, programs and policies. They are not subject to local governing body decisions although decisions of either the school district or local government impact on each other. School districts overlap local political boundaries and many times will even cross major political boundaries such as county lines.

Schools are also one of the largest single sources of resource support in emergency situations. Many do have the capability to provide large number of congregate care spaces, mass feeding, and reception. They are the most fami-
iliar locations to the general public, and are neighborhood oriented. Interviews concluded the following:

- School district officials and principals gave total cooperation to the local planning effort.
- They provided the necessary information to the emergency planner on school disaster plans, feeding capabilities, reception plans, staff support during an emergency and facility availability.
- Most school districts did not have an "emergency plan" for all contingencies. They primarily had earthquake and fire evacuation plans, and held periodic fire drills. Some staff training was conducted on emergency actions.
- More emphasis was placed on earthquake planning the past few years thanks to the national earthquake awareness programs.
- Schools did not have adequate resources for extended congregate care requirements. They would depend on outside sources to provide food, cots, blankets, medical supplies, sanitation supplies and security. They all assumed the American Red Cross, Salvation Army or other like volunteer agencies would provide these added resources.
- Nuclear war contingency planning did not cause any problems for school districts. They did express concern on what to do if school is in session. Do they release the children to "go home," keep them, etc.? The planner/interviewer had to explain the warning time factor and the capability of a particular school to protect and care for the children until such time as they could be released to their parents. This question and solution usually remained unsolved and was left to the individual school or district to formulate its SOP policy. The local emergency plan did not address these decisions to that level of specifics except in the Shelter In-place plan and its public information document.
- Schools usually have a large fuel storage reserve. This emergency contingency was initiated during the 1973 gas shortage. Many could operate several months or longer if fuel (heating or gasoline) supplies became unavailable or in case of inconsistency of delivery or rapidly fluctuating prices.
- Most schools are equipped to mass feed many more people than normal daily requirements.
- They are excellent temporary emergency medical care facilities during an emergency.
Fire Districts

Fire Districts are the backbone of emergency response. They, like law enforcement, are the first responders. They are well-trained, have excellent communications, are community oriented and have perhaps the highest degree of competency to deal with an emergency. Fire Districts and departments usually work independently of the local Emergency Manager unless the Emergency Manager happens to be part of the Fire Service.

Conclusions gained from the interviews were:

- Fire departments will work closely with Emergency Management if emergency managers solicit their help and involve them in the planning, in tests and exercises.
- Fire departments usually do not have an emergency operations plan. They are run primarily through Standing Operations Procedures and "reactionary responses." The latter is gradually disappearing as a policy. This is due to the new awareness and need to be prepared for all disasters, and possible liability for hazardous materials incidents, mass casualties caused from earthquake, fire in high rise building, terrorism, etc.
- Fire, like police, emphasize an ongoing training program for all levels in the department. They also conduct a number of cross training activities.
- Many fire services complained of the decrease of training available through FEMA for radiological monitoring and RDO courses. Many felt it was one of the best programs offered and emphasize it as part of their training requirements. The lack of available follow-up RADEF courses was a common concern.
- Fire would evacuate to the fringe of a risk area if there was a danger to the base station or the whole community. They would respond to an emergency call from their alternate base of operations.
- Most fire departments have mutual aid agreements with surrounding districts.

Local Government

Executive interviews of county and municipal officials were the most essential and critical to be conducted. They determined the direction and cooperation of their jurisdiction. The executive interviews were conducted prior to any others in the jurisdiction with the exception of the Emergency Manager or immediate supervisor (sometimes the Sheriff or Fire Chief). The interview
process with the chief executive was ongoing from the initial briefing through plans development review and approval.

- They were frequently referred to when a policy decision was required.
- It was essential that the initial interview resulted in the executive understanding several things: 1) what the emergency planning program entails, 2) who's sponsoring it (state, FEMA, etc.), 3) what it's going to cost the jurisdiction (money or in-kind services), 4) who we are coordinating with, and 5) what do the planners expect from the executives.

The county and municipal executives usually approved the work to be done when properly briefed on the program. Many passed resolutions authorizing the planning to be conducted in their jurisdictions and directed their department heads and staff to cooperate. They were concerned with the succession order in the event the executives were unavailable when a disaster occurred.

Public Safety Public Safety, in time of disaster, is called upon to perform a wide range of functions. The capability to respond to a disaster depends on the size of the jurisdiction being served and the organizational structure of the jurisdiction. Public Safety is primarily a law enforcement function and other "public safety functions." Interviews identified the emergency public safety function as: on-scene control of law enforcement-oriented disasters, maintenance of the law and order, traffic control, cc trolling and limiting access to the disaster area, property protection, security, warning and evacuation, search, rescue, communications, damage assessment and liaison with other law enforcement agencies.

In approximately one-third of the jurisdictions the contract planners worked with, the law enforcement agencies were assigned the emergency management function. The Sheriff or Chief of Police was the designated director; however the day-to-day coordination and responsibility was usually assigned to a deputy or civilian working within the agency.

- Public Safety agencies are highly involved and visible in emergency management.
- They and Fire are the only agencies capable and prepared on a moments notice to respond to a disaster situation.
Together with fire districts or departments they are usually the first on the scene of an emergency and direct the operations from there or an emergency operations center.

They were willing participants in all types of disaster planning, including attack.

All felt large scale evacuation was possible but they could not accept many of the FEMA CPG planning guides. They had neither the manpower nor communication control to operate as suggested by federal guidance.

Most public safety agencies had mutual aid agreements with neighboring jurisdictions.

Most public safety agencies felt the local emergency management function should be within their agency.

Most agencies had similar shortfalls to adequately respond to or prepare for a major disaster, Those being: 1) communications, 2) properly constructed and equipped Emergency Operations Center, 3) manpower, 4) mobile command and control center, and 5) training.

Legal Legal officials primarily served an advisory role to the local executive officials. The interviews conducted with the local county counsel or city attorney involved in their reviewing the "proposed plan" on the basis of 1) is there a legal requirement to prepare an emergency plan, 2) the jurisdictional authority, 3) the legal establishment of the office or department of emergency management, 4) the drawing of the approval or adoption of resolutions or ordinances, 5) joint powers agreements, and 6) compliance with state and Federal laws.

How to deal with arraignment, prosecuting large numbers of people during or after a major disaster which involves rioting, looting and terrorism were the primary questions raised. Local prosecutors have limited staffs, facilities and time to deal with a major disaster involving the need for court arraignment and prosecution.

Planning Planning and the agencies responsible for it at the local level, concern themselves more with land use and social issues. They seldom consider any emergency planning with the exception of establishing standards for develop-
Development. These standards usually were mitigating actions such as flood plain regulation, sanitation, noise and transportation.

• Few planners or their agencies were directly involved in emergency planning.
• Many were not sure or did not feel they even had a role or responsibility in the local emergency plan.
• Initially many were not anxious to be part of the local emergency organization. The interviewers usually had to convince the planners they did have a role and were valuable during all phases of an emergency management program.
• Planners usually identified their roles as a support to hazard and vulnerability analysis, research, data collection, population analysis, transportation systems, maps, etc. Some accepted a role as support to emergency housing and congregate care.
• The interviews revealed the local emergency manager had a tremendous resource provider within its government structure and was not aware of it or did not know how to use it. Emergency managers should involve the planning departments to the greatest extent possible. The Integrated Emergency Management System Concept is tailored perfectly for the cooperative effort for Emergency Management and community planners.

Public Works In the area of emergency management, Public Works receives the least public attention or emphasis. The interview process clearly indicated the critical importance of public works and how all the other departments and agencies depend on their support. Public Works is involved in all types of disasters. They are responsible for streets, sanitation, utilities, maintenance and repair, water, etc. They can provide more resources required in an emergency than any other department. They have equipment for debris removal, rescue, construction, communications, and manpower. They support fire and police during most emergencies where damage has occurred or there is an imminent threat to local populace.

Interviews revealed that:
• Public Works Directors had very little contact or involvement with the local emergency managers and many were not aware of the local emergency plan and what their role and responsibilities were.
• They usually respond to requests for assistance.
Once Public Works is involved in the planning process they become more active in the process and contribute greatly to the development of their section of the emergency plan as well as other sections. This usually resulted in cooperation with other departments not previously established. Public Works organizational framework differs from one jurisdiction to another. In some communities all the city utilities, streets, buildings, etc. are under one manager. In others these functions may split between two or more departments. Interviewers had to be aware of these differences and of the "turf protection," which was a common occurrence, when assigning or identifying responsibilities. Interviews revealed that at times public works would respond to an emergency situation even before an emergency was declared. They, like police and fire, have to respond immediately to situations when there is a threat to life or property.

Administration Local government administration supports the executive. They comprise the clerk, auditor, purchasing agent, custodial, maintenance, clerical, data processing, etc. They are a major support role in an emergency, the same as their day-to-day responsibility and function. They provide and support "paper process" and documentation to local government. During an actual emergency they perform and provide the administrative functions in the Emergency Operations Center.

With the exception of the County Auditor, who does have a major role in resource management, and the County Emergency Board, it was not required that the other administrative support people perform a major active role in the planning process. All were interviewed and involved as resource support persons. All were willing participants and had no problems accepting their role for any type of disaster.

Assessors Assessors were identified as having the prime responsibility for damage analysis. This function tended to overlap with public works. Interviews showed that the assessor and public works (sometimes within the same department) could define their separate functions but required coordination...
between them. The larger the jurisdiction the easier it was to separate their emergency functions.

- Jurisdictions with small population centers usually had limited staff with little capability to conduct damage assessment. They concentrated their efforts in the value assessment of property.
- Larger jurisdictions were able to provide a more diversified staff which also was capable of doing damage analysis and hazard vulnerability.
- Interviewers found assessor's offices totally cooperative and willing to contribute to and be part of the local emergency planning effort. Interviewers were told that their offices were seldom involved in earlier plans development simply because "no one asked them."

The assessor's office will play an important function in the early Integrated Emergency Management System development. They should be directly involved in the current Hazard Analysis for Emergency Management CPG 1-101/September 1983. Nothing in CPG 1-101 describes or recommends the source of local agencies which can provide input to this important function of emergency management.
VI. IMPACT ON CURRENT AND PROPOSED FEMA POLICIES AND PROGRAM STRATEGIES

All of the observations and statements made in the preceding chapters were based on empirical data gathered over the past seven years. Their perceived impact on either existing or proposed FEMA policies or program strategies must in large part be deductive in nature.

The success or failure of past efforts can be documented, but the reasons for these successes or failures are often harder to pin-down. The control aspects of the efforts are at so many different levels and the communication so diffused that a program’s success or failure cannot be gauged until it has been running at a large scale for a long period of time.

Policy directives of FEMA have differed over the past seven years. In addition to this, state policies and priorities have changed in the three states. The section which follows on recurring issues or problems points out where many of the changes have taken place.

A. Recurring Issues or Problems

In addition to reviewing the trends, attitudes, and capabilities of those local officials involved in the planning process, WCA also noted those issues or problem areas which have appeared during the course of plan preparation over the past seven years. Some of the issues may be beyond the scope of FEMA programs or concern, but most will have some bearing on emergency services and its future success at the state and local level.

Resource Management Throughout the seven year program the question of resource management was one of the major concerns or problems encountered by the planners. Under the general heading of resource management are the questions of availability, allocation, needs and surpluses, timeliness of response and cooperative agreements. Interviews in the rural counties showed that their available food, fuel, and medical supplies range from two days to two months and they have only limited heavy construction equipment. Almost everyone involved in the planning process expressed concern about ensuring that supplies follow the people from the area at risk to the hosting area in a major evacuation and relocation of the general population.
Recovery  The issue of recovery in a post-attack period was dealt with on a very general basis. The local plans covered the preparation and response phases of the emergency operation plans. Initially, the question of recovery in a war-caused disaster was the only one raised by local officials. As the planning was broadened into all-hazard planning many of the counties struggled with the issue of recovery from any major disaster. This became a concern of all government units in the Northwest, prompted by the eruption of Mt. St. Helens. The first assumptions developed by FEMA for the crisis relocation planners on this issue were not well received and open to much criticism as being impractical. The problem was not with the proposed action but with assumptions which were not binding and were without legislative guarantees.

Training and Follow-through of Plan Development  One of the most difficult stages of the emergency planning process is the ongoing maintenance of the plan after initial development, approval and publication. Periodic training and testing of the plan and personnel, and annual review for possible update are essential to maintaining a capability for preparedness and response. The plan development and review process generated the interest and the participation of the local officials. Exercising the plan and follow-up training have proven to be excellent ways to maintain that interest and involve new people such as commissioners, councilmen, department heads, etc., who are replacing those no longer available to be part of the emergency management group. Unfortunately, because most directors are part-time and budgets are very small, the local governments look toward their State Emergency Management Agency and FEMA to be the lead catalyst for funds. This has not been forthcoming because of FEMA's limited budgets, shifting priorities, and staffing limitations on both state and federal levels. An expanded training, test and exercise program by FEMA (Train the Trainer) brought to local government would be the most feasible way to reach the greatest number of people in the shortest time, and would allow local governments to conduct their own training.

Financial Commitment - Continuous Funding  Local budgets in the Northwest have been severely impacted by the downturn in the timber, aerospace, and mining industries over the past three years. These funding reductions have been felt on the state, county, and city levels. Coupled with federal budget reductions, many local officials have reduced or moved to eliminate emergency
management operations. Very few have increased the budgets except for costs.
of living. Budgets have been reduced from full-time to half-time or quarter-
time, or the function has been transferred into a line operation such as a
sheriff's department with a provision that it be performed after other duties
have been accomplished, other duties having priority except during an emergen-
cy. Day-to-day emergency management activities usually have a low priority.
This has reduced the visibility of the Emergency Manager in small populated
jurisdictions and removed emergency services from the management or department
level who answers only directly to the county or city officials whom they
serve. In larger populated jurisdictions the placement of emergency services
in line operations has a tendency to result in more effective coverage, i.e.
King County and Spokane, Washington which are within the Sheriff's Office as a
Division.

Guidance Material Federal guidance material, its value and practical use,
have been a source of discussion during local plan development. The problem
encountered is primarily two-fold. The style or tone in which the material
has been written has presented, at times, a high "fog" index of bureaucratic
or academic jargon. Also, many of the assumptions have been criticized as
being unrealistic or presenting no documentation or commitment on the govern-
ment's part, e.g. the statement that normal banking procedures would be car-
rried-on during a crisis relocation situation presented no documentation that
this policy had been worked out with the Treasury Department, S.E.C. or Feder-
al Reserve. The early years of plan development found the planner spending a
good deal of time explaining what was and what was not being said by the guid-
ance assumptions and they would have to be accepted with a good deal of faith.

FEMA guidance material which provided general structure or outlines of possi-
bile actions was well accepted and used by local government. Most guidance
materials were usable by professional planners who have worked with it for
years. However, outside the professional planning field it was too cumbersome
and academic for local emergency managers to develop their own plans. WCA
planners many times had to deviate from or modify the use of guidance mater-
ials in order to accomplish the tasks within a contracted time line and to be
cost effective. Despite this the contractor was able to remain within the
general requirements of the guidance.
Military Operations The discussions with Federal military operations officials initially provided no clear discussion or commitment of resource sharing. Civil government recognized that there are aspects of the military operations which are classified but the basic lack of communication between the local government and the local military installation or any military spokesman left many questions about mutual aid, dependent support, and resource availability unanswered. The establishment of the regional emergency planning board in the Puget Sound area composed of state, local, federal, and military representatives, and the freeing of certain state military support for disaster assistance made it possible to answer many of these concerns when the local plans were developed in the Puget Sound area.

Evacuation Whether for Crisis Relocation or other major disasters, local governments had many concerns and doubts about the logistical arrangements and the mechanisms of large scale evacuations involving multiple jurisdictions. Route selection, communication, public information, time, panic, and traffic control were common points of discussion during the planning efforts in Spokane, Portland, and Puget Sound. One successful approach to these discussions was the founding of a regional emergency planning association in the Puget Sound area. This group worked with the contract planners on problems which involved movements crossing jurisdictional boundaries, pass through, overlap of communications and media, etc. It was found that no large scale evacuation could be accomplished unless there was an established multi-jurisdictional control council representing all the major jurisdictions involved.

Shelters and Sheltering Reception and care and shelters, both fallout and "all-hazard" were issues during the preparations of each plan. There were several sub-issues involved under these general categories. The data compiled in the National Fallout Shelter Survey (NFSS) have been inconsistent throughout the course of the planning effort. There are a number of reasons for this: 1) the survey crews have been "summer hires" who were working within a short timeframe in unfamiliar jurisdictions with a large area to cover, so errors of geography, address placement, and omission are bound to occur; 2) it appears the crews are charged to survey only to the number of spaces determined by FEMA to meet the expected influx at predetermined risk areas. This
could create a large number of facilities qualified to be shelter but not surveyed. In certain situations these omissions or errors have led some local officials to question the accuracy of that element of the emergency plan itself. Much of the survey data was time-dated with no annual update to allow for changes such as demolitions, ownership or use changes, street changes, new or remodeled structures and follow-up verifications. None of the above comments reflect any negligence of program or competency. But it does point out the need for better survey analysis methods, transfer of field information to printouts, field survey control and, most important, the involvement of local emergency services directors to report changes and keep the listing current.

Finally, the advent of IEMS has opened the question of "all-purpose" and "hazard-specific" shelters and how one goes about determining which of these shelters are incorporated into what part of the plan. The Oregon experience quickly qualified the "generic shelter" problem. Many shelter needs are hazard specific and cannot be simply dealt with as an overlay solution. Fall-out shelter is unique unto itself. It does not cross into other disaster areas except for a fixed nuclear facility disaster.

**Loss of Access to Federal Programs** An area of concern for most small rural counties has been the loss of the federal surplus property and defense excess property programs which provided many emergency management departments with equipment they could not possibly get county commission to purchase.

**Conclusion** Emergency management today has changed considerably over the past seven years in Region X. As an element of government it has evolved from a nearly isolated function to an involved comprehensive program. More areas of government and the private sector are aware of their emergency responsibilities and the integrated system in which they operate. They know the emergency management is more than response and it includes mitigation, preparedness and recovery. Local government and the private sector now are more willing to participate in the emergency management program including all departments in the formulation of plans, tests and exercise and training. This change is attributed to: 1) an increased emphasis on emergency management beyond the emergency managers, 2) younger, more aggressive and qualified directors with planning and management backgrounds entering the field; 3) the upgrading of
the position of Emergency Manager to department status; 3) increased involvement of public safety agencies such as police and fire; 5) better public information and awareness; 6) better training programs and materials through FEMA and 7) more recruitment and involvement of the private sector.

Other significant conclusions of the interview analysis revealed:

- Public Works Directors had very little contact or involvement with the local emergency managers. Many were not aware of the local emergency plan, what its contents include and their role and responsibilities.
- Public Works usually will respond to requests for assistance in an emergency. They take it for granted that if there is an emergency requiring their resources they will be involved.
- Once Public Works is involved in the planning process they become more active in emergency management and contribute greatly to the development of the local emergency plan. This usually resulted in establishing a cooperative relationship with other departments not previously established.
- Throughout the seven year program the question of resource management was one of the major concerns or problems encountered by the planners. Under the general heading of resource management are the questions of availability, allocation, needs and surpluses, timeliness of response and cooperative agreements.

The interviews showed a needed improvement in several areas:

- Local budget support
- FEMA budget support for national program emphasis
- Recovery, particularly from war-caused damage
- Training (bring training to local areas)
- Program stability (too much shifting of program emphasis)
- Legislation (national and state) clearly setting the "responsibility" for emergency management.
APPENDIX I
LOCATION OF LOCAL PLANNING INTERVIEWS
1977 - 1983

State and Local Plans
- Washington - Emergency Operations Plan (NCP)
- Idaho - Emergency Plan (Part I NCP)
- Oregon - Emergency Operations Plan (Part II - NCP)

Local Emergency Operations or Management Plans
- Spokane County, WA - Kootenal County, ID Conglomerate
- Spokane County - Fairchild APB
- City of Spokane - Consolidated City/County Plan (R-H)
- Stevens County, WA (H)
- Pend Oreille County, WA (H)
- Lincoln County, WA (H)
- Whitman County, WA (H)
- Nez Perce County, ID (H)
- Latah County, ID (H)
- Kootenai County, ID (R-H)
- Boundary County, ID (H)
- Bonner County, ID (H)
- Shoshone County, ID (H)
- Benewah County, ID (H)

- Mountain Home, ID Conglomerate
- Elmore County (Mt. Home AFB) (R)
- Twin Falls County (H)

- Bremerton, Bangor, WA Conglomerate
- Kitsap County, WA Bremerton/Bangor (Trident) (R)
- Jefferson County, WA (H)
- Clallam County, WA (H)
- Mason County, WA (H)
* Puget Sound Conglomerate
  * Puget Sound Area Concept Report - Crisis Relocation
  * King County, WA (R-H)
  * City of Seattle (R)
  * Pierce County, WA (R-H)
  * City of Tacoma, WA (R)
  * Snohomish County, WA (R-H)
  * Thurston County, WA (R-H)

* Portland, OR-Vancouver, WA Area
  * City of Portland, OR (R)
  * Multnomah County, OR (R)
  * Washington County, OR (R-H)
  * Clackamas County, OR (R)
  * Clark County, WA (R-H)
  * City of Vancouver, WA (R)

* Oregon Counties
  * Malheur County, OR
  * Coos County, OR
  * Tillamook County, OR
  * Clatsop County, OR
  * Douglas County, OR
  * Deschutes County, OR
  * Linn County, OR

NOTE: All planning included development of full emergency operations plans (nuclear and all-hazard) including service annex development, crisis relocation and shelter in-place. Also provided evacuation plans, congregate care, reception and public information (EPI) for Crisis Relocation and Community Shelter Plans.
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Analysis of Local Planning Interviews
Charles A. Wittenberg and Paul J. Parham
WCA, Inc., Kirkland, WA
Contract: EMH-83-C-1340
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May 1984
31 pages

This report provides the reader with insight on information collected and applied through the interview process developing and local Emergency Operations plans over a seven year period within FEMA's Region X. The report will show the transition from Nuclear Civil Protection (Crisis Relocation) plans to Integrated Emergency Management plans. This document takes the cumulative information from over 2000 interviews and categorizes it according to functional areas and by public and private sector.
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