Pari-Mutuel as a System of Aggregation of Information

by

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A bettor is faced with the problem of choosing optimal bets, given his (subjective) probabilities of outcomes of an experiment and the payoff odds on these outcomes. Conversely, a bookie (pari-mutuel system), faced by several bettors with different subjective probabilities, has the problem of choosing payoff odds so as to avoid the risk of loss. It is shown that, under certain reasonably broad conditions on the several
bettors' utilities and subjective probabilities, such an equilibrium set of payoff odds always exists. Some examples are worked out in detail.
1. The Individual Bettor

Let us consider the problem faced by a bettor at a race track. There are \( n \) horses, with (subjective) probabilities \( p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n \) of winning. He has \( A \) dollars to bet on these horses, and a bet of \( x \) dollars on horse \( j \) will return \( x/q_j \) dollars if that horse wins. (The \( x/q_j \) includes the bettor's original \( x \) dollar bet.) It is assumed that the \( p_j \) and \( q_j \) satisfy the standard conditions

\[
\sum_{j=1}^{n} p_j = 1 ; \quad p_j \geq 0
\]

and

\[
\sum_{j=1}^{n} q_j = 1 ; \quad q_j \geq 0
\]

Condition (1) means the bettor's subjective probabilities are consistent; condition (2) means the payoff odds are fair. (Though, in fact, they seldom are, and most bookies will normally announce odds such that \( \sum q_j \) is substantially greater than 1, i.e., they pay less than a "fair" system would.)

The bettor has a utility function \( u \) for money; it will be assumed that \( u \) is monotone non-decreasing and continuous. The bettor's problem then, is to choose his bets, \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \), so as to maximize his expected utility, given as

\[
F(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} p_j \left( \frac{x_j}{q_j} - D + A \right).
\]
where

(4) \[ B = \sum_{j=1}^{n} x_j \]

subject to

(5) \[ B \leq A \]

(6) \[ x_j \geq 0 \]

The first thing we notice is that, assuming the fairness conditions (2), the bettor might as well set \( B = A \), i.e. bet all his available funds. In fact, suppose we had \( B < A \). We could then set \( \epsilon = A - B \), and

\[ x_j' = x_j + \epsilon q_j \quad j = 1, \ldots, n \]

In this case,

(7) \[ B' = \sum x_j' = B + \epsilon = A \]

and, moreover,

\[ F(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = \sum p_j \ U \left( \frac{x_j}{q_j} + \epsilon \right) \]

\[ F(x_1', \ldots, x_n') = \sum p_j \ U \left( \frac{x_j' + \epsilon q_j}{q_j} \right) \]

so that \( F(x') = F(x) \), i.e. the bettor can do at least as well with bets \( x_j' \) such that \( B' = A \) as with any other bets with \( B \leq A \).

We simplify the problem, then, to one of maximizing

(7) \[ F(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = \sum_{j} p_j \ U \left( \frac{x_j}{q_j} \right) \]
subject to

(8) \[ \sum_{j} x_j = A \]

(9) \[ x_j \geq 0 \]

Assuming differentiability of \( u \), the first-order conditions for optimality will be

(10a) \[ \frac{p_j}{q_j} u\left(\frac{x_j}{q_j}\right) = \lambda \quad \text{if} \quad x_j > 0 \]

(10b) \[ \frac{p_j}{q_j} u\left(0\right) \leq \lambda \quad \text{if} \quad x_j = 0 \]

where \( \lambda \) is a Lagrange multiplier representing the marginal utility of money.

In case \( u \) is not differentiable at the point \( x_j/q_j \), conditions (10) must be modified, in terms of the right-hand and left-hand derivatives of \( u \) to give

(11) \[ \frac{p_j}{q_j} u\left(\frac{x_j}{q_j}\right)^+ \leq \lambda \leq \frac{p_j}{q_j} u\left(\frac{x_j}{q_j}\right)^- \]

Now (10a) can be rewritten as

\[ p_j u\left(\frac{x_j}{q_j}\right) = \lambda q_j. \]

In the simplest case, all \( x_j \) are positive, so that (10a) holds for all \( j \). Adding with respect to \( j \), we have, by (2)

(12) \[ \lambda = \sum_{j} p_j u\left(\frac{x_j}{q_j}\right) \]

so that \( \lambda \) is simply the expected value of \( u' \).

More generally, of course, (12) does not hold for all \( j \), and
so we can only state that \( \lambda \) is at least equal to the expected value of \( u' \).

In case \( u \) is concave, the first-order conditions (10) are sufficient for optimality. We rewrite these as

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{\lambda q_j}{p_j} &= u' \left( \frac{x_j}{q_j} \right) & \text{if } x_j > 0 \\
\frac{\lambda q_j}{p_j} &\leq u' \left( 0 \right) & \text{if } x_j = 0
\end{align*}
\]

(14)

Using the fact that \( u' \) is monotone non-increasing (for concave \( u \)), we obtain the interesting result

\[
\frac{x_j}{q_j} \geq \frac{x_k}{q_k} \quad \text{whenever } \frac{p_j}{q_j} > \frac{p_k}{q_k}
\]

(15)

with the stronger result that, for strictly concave \( u \), (15) holds even if the second inequality is loose.

Thus, a discrepancy between the bettor's subjective probabilities and the payoff odds leads the bettor to bet so that his conditional winnings will be greater for horses for which the ratio \( p_j/q_j \) is greater, and conversely.

Conditions (13) and (14) are meaningful if both \( p_j \) and \( q_j \) are positive. In case \( p_j = 0, q_j > 0 \), it is easily seen that optimality requires \( x_j = 0 \), i.e. never bet on a horse which (subjectively) has no chance of winning. It is not clear what happens if \( q_j = 0 \), though in practice it is difficult to imagine a situation in which infinite odds were offered. In case \( p_j = q_j = 0 \), we imagine the bettor will still set \( x_j = 0 \); in case \( p_j > q_j = 0 \), however, we seem to reach some sort of contradiction. We note, then that \( q_j = 0 \) leads to contradictions which would best
be avoided; among other things, the payoff functions are discontinuous or fail to exist here.

In case $u$ is strictly concave, we may use the inverse function $w = (u')^{-1}$ and (13) - (14) now take the form

\begin{equation}
    x_j = q_j w \left( \frac{\lambda q_j}{p_j} \right) \quad \text{if} \quad w \left( \frac{\lambda q_j}{p_j} \right) > 0
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
    x_j = 0 \quad \text{if} \quad w \left( \frac{\lambda q_j}{p_j} \right) \leq 0
\end{equation}

Condition (8) can be restated as

\begin{equation}
    \lambda = \sum' q_j w \left( \frac{\lambda q_j}{p_j} \right)
\end{equation}

where the prime on the summation symbol means that it should consider only those $j$ such that (16) holds, i.e. such that

\begin{equation}
    \lambda q_j < p_j u'(0)
\end{equation}

The right side (18) can be seen to be a monotone non-increasing function of $\lambda$ and thus (18) can be solved, numerically or analytically, for $\lambda$. This presumably solves the single bettor's problem.
2. The Equilibrium Odds

In general, bookies tend to be risk-averse and seek to set payoff odds in such a way as to eliminate the possibility of loss. Of course, a bookie is not bound by the fairness condition (2), so that, in practice, the sum of the $q_j$ is greater than 1. If (2) were to be enforced, however (perhaps under cutthroat competition among bookies), the bookie could only eliminate the risk of loss if the amounts bet on the several horses were proportional to the $q_j$, i.e. if

(20) \[ b_j = q_j c \]

where $b_j$ is the total amount bet on horse $j$ (by all bettors) and $c$ is the total amount of all wagers.

If there is only one bettor, it is easy to see that this can be accomplished by setting $q_j = p_j$. For then $x_j = q_j A$ will satisfy conditions (10) (with $\lambda = u'(\lambda)$). In case $u$ is strictly concave, moreover, this is the bettor's unique optimum, so that $q_j = p_j$ gives rise to an equilibrium. (Clearly, with one bettor, $b_j = x_j$ and $c = A$).

If there are two or more bettors, the bookie must look for some way of combining the several bettors' subjective probabilities so as to avoid risk. At a race track, this is normally accomplished by a pari-mutuel system, which simply sets $q_j = b_j/c$, so that (20) is automatically achieved, after the amounts bet are known. In effect, the players bet against each other, with the track as intermediary. This has the disadvantage - from the players' point of view - that bets are made with only partial knowledge of the
payoff odds. Thus, a player might well feel he would have changed his bets, had he known the true payoff odds in advance. Of course such a change would in turn cause the \( q_j \) to change, leading to a further change in bets, \textit{et sic ad infinitum}, or at least until some equilibrium is reached. The question is whether such an equilibrium exists.

Assume, then, \( m \) bettors. Bettor \( i \) (\( i = 1, \ldots, m \)) has a subjective probability distribution \((p_{i1}, p_{i2}, \ldots, p_{in})\) satisfying

\[
p_{ij} \geq 0, \text{ and } \sum_{j=1}^{n} p_{ij} = 1.
\]

This same bettor has a sum of money, \( A_i \), available for betting, and a utility function for money, \( u_i \). If the odds are posted as \( (q_1, q_2, \ldots, q_n) \), then each bettor will choose \((x_{i1}, x_{i2}, \ldots, x_{in})\) so as to maximize his expected utility, as discussed above. Total bets on horse \( j \) are then

\[
b_j = \sum_{i=1}^{m} x_{ij}
\]

and the total amount bet on all horses is

\[
c = \sum_{i=1}^{m} A_i = \sum_{j=1}^{n} b_j.
\]

There will be an equilibrium if (20) holds for all \( j \).

As was mentioned above, difficulties arise if \( q_j = 0 \) for any \( j \). We will therefore try to avoid this, and will specifically rule out such equilibria. We make then the following assumption.

\textit{Assumption 2.} For every \( j \), there is some \( i \) such that \( p_{ij} > 0 \).
We prove the existence of equilibrium under the further assumption that the utility functions are strictly concave. Essentially, this uses a fixed-point theorem. Some care must however be used to avoid the possibility that the fixed point lies on the boundary of the simplex.

**Theorem 1.** Suppose Assumption 2 holds, and suppose moreover that all the utility functions are strictly concave. Then there is an equilibrium \( n \)-tuple of payoff odds, \( q_j^* > 0 \).

**Proof:** Let \( \mathcal{Q} \) be the unit \( n \)-simplex, i.e. the set of vectors \((q_1', \ldots, q_n')\) satisfying (2). Let \( \mathcal{Q}^0 \) be the interior of \( \mathcal{Q} \) (the set of \( q \) with all components positive) and let \( \partial \mathcal{Q} \) be the boundary of \( \mathcal{Q} \) (the set of \( q \) with at least one \( q_j = 0 \)).

For \( q \in \mathcal{Q}^0 \), consider bettor \( i \)'s optimal choice of bets. As discussed above, it cannot be optimal for him to bet on a horse with no chance of winning, so his bets must satisfy, not just \((8)\) and \((9)\), but also the condition \( x_{ik} = 0 \) whenever \( p_{ik} = 0 \).

Restricted to that set, bettor \( i \)'s expected utility,

\[
F_i (x_i, q) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} p_{ij} u_i \left( \frac{x_{ij}}{q_i} \right)
\]

is strictly concave, and so has a unique maximizing vector, \( x^*_i(q) \). Since \( F \) is continuous for all \( x_i \) and all \( q \in \mathcal{Q}^0 \), it will follow that \( x^*_i(q) \) is continuous for \( q \in \mathcal{Q}^0 \).

Let, now,

\[
b^*(q) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} x^*_i(q)\]

Then \( b^* \) is a continuous mapping from \( \mathcal{Q}^0 \) into \( \mathbb{R}^n \). Let, finally,
Clearly, $J$ assigns to each $q \in Q^0$ a non-empty subset of
$\mathcal{Y} = \{ 1, 2, \ldots, n \}$. By the continuity of $b^*$, $J$ is upper semi-
continuous.

Next, for $q \in \partial Q$, define

$$J(q) = \left\{ j \mid q_j = 0 \right\}.$$

Since $q \in \partial Q$, $J(q)$ is non-empty here also. Trivially, it is upper semi-continuous if restricted to $\partial Q$.

In this way, the mapping $J$ is defined over the entire simplex $Q$. We wish to show it is upper semi-continuous, i.e. if $q \to \bar{q}$
and $j \in J(q)$, then $j \in J(\bar{q})$.

In this, we can dispense with the case in which $\bar{q} \in Q^0$, since
such $\bar{q}$ can only be approached through $\tau \in Q^0$, and we know $J$, re-
stricted to $Q^0$, is semi-continuous. Similarly, we can dispense
with the case that $q \to \bar{q}$, with all $q$ and $\bar{q} \in \partial Q$, since we know
$J$, restricted to $\partial Q$, is semi-continuous.

It remains to consider the case in which $q \to \bar{q}$ with $q \in Q^0$ and $\bar{q} \in \partial Q$. Let $K = J(\bar{q})$. We must show that, for $q$ sufficiently
close to $\bar{q}$, $J(q) \subset K$.

Take some (fixed) $k \in K$; we have $\bar{q}_k = 0$. By assumption 2,
there is some better, $h$, with $p_{hk} > 0$. Keeping $h$ fixed, let $l(q)$
be the set of all $j$ for which $p_{hj}/q_j$ is maximal.

Suppose $q_j > 0$. As $q \to \bar{q}$, the ratio $p_{hk}/q_k$ increases without
bound, whereas $p_{hj}/q_j$ approaches the finite limit, $p_{hj}/\bar{q}_j$. Thus
$j \notin l(q)$, and we conclude there exists $\epsilon_1 > 0$ such that, if
Let \( r \) be the minimum of all \( q_j \) such that \( q_j > 0 \). Let 
\[ \varepsilon_2 = r/2. \]
Then, for all \( q \) such that \( |q - q| < \varepsilon_2 \) and all \( j \notin \kappa \), we will have \( q_j > r/2 \).

Let \( s \) be the minimum of all \( p_{hj} \) such that \( q_j = 0 \) and \( p_{hj} > 0 \).

Since \( u_h \) is strictly increasing and concave, we know \( u_h'(y^+) > 0 \)
for all \( y \). Set, then,
\[ \varepsilon_j = \frac{r s}{2} u_h' \left( \frac{2c}{r} \right) \frac{1}{u_h' \left( \frac{1}{2} \right)} \]

Finally, let \( \varepsilon_4 = \frac{r}{4n c} \)

Let now \( \varepsilon \) be the smallest of \( \varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_3, \) and \( \varepsilon_4 \). Assume \( q \in \mathcal{Q}^0, |q - \varepsilon| < \varepsilon \). We will show \( J(q) \in \kappa \).

Let \( x_{h*}(q) \) be better \( h \)'s optimal response to the payoff odds \( q \), and suppose \( x_{h*} > q_j/2 \) for some \( j \notin \kappa \). Let \( \ell \in \ell(q) \). Since \( |q - q| < \varepsilon_1, \ell \notin \kappa \). Moreover, \( j \notin \ell(q) \), so
\[ \frac{p_{h\ell}}{q}\frac{p_{hj}}{q_j} \]
and hence, by (15),
\[ \frac{x_{h\ell}}{q}\frac{x_{hj}}{q_j} \]
Thus \( x_{h\ell} \) and \( x_{hj} \) are both positive, and so we can apply (13) to get
\[ u_h' \left( \frac{x_{h\ell}}{q}\frac{x_{hj}}{q_j} \right) = \frac{q_j}{q}\frac{p_{hj}}{p_{h\ell}} u_h' \left( \frac{x_{hj}}{q_j} \right) \]

Now, since \( |q - q| < \varepsilon \), we will have \( q_j > r/2, q_{\ell} < \varepsilon_3 \), and
\[ p_{h\ell} > s. \]
Also, $P_{pq} \leq 1$. Finally, $x_{pq}/q > \frac{1}{2}$, so by monotonicity
\[ u_h' \left( \frac{x_{pq}}{q} \right) \leq u_h' \left( \frac{1}{2} \right) . \]
Thus
\[ u_h' \left( \frac{x_{pq}}{q} \right) < \frac{2 \epsilon}{r} \leq u_h' \left( \frac{1}{2} \right) . \]
and, using the definition of $\epsilon_2$,
\[ u_h' \left( \frac{x_{pq}}{q} \right) < u_h' \left( \frac{2C}{r} \right) . \]
By the monotonicity of $u'$, this gives
\[ \frac{x_{pq}}{q} \geq \frac{2C}{r} . \]
Clearly, $b^* \geq x_{pq}$, and so $b^*/q \geq \frac{2C}{r} . \]

On the other hand, for any $k \in K$, $b^*_k \leq C$ and $q_k > r/2$. Thus
\[ \frac{b^*_k}{q_k} < \frac{2C}{r} \leq \frac{b^*_k}{q_k} . \]
and we see that $k \notin J(q)$. We conclude that $J(q) \subseteq K$.

Suppose, on the other hand, there is no $j$, $j \notin K$, with $x^*_j > q_j/2$.

In this case,
\[ \sum_{j \notin K} x^*_j \leq \frac{1}{2} \sum_{j \notin K} q_j < \frac{1}{2} \]
and so
\[ \sum_{j \notin K} x^*_j > A_h - \frac{1}{2} \geq \frac{1}{2} . \]

Thus there is some $l \in K$ with $x^*_l > \frac{1}{2n}$. Since $|q - q| < \epsilon_4$ and $q_l = 0$, we have $q_l < \epsilon_4$ and so
\[ \frac{b^*_l}{q_l} \geq \frac{x^*_l}{q_l} > \frac{1}{2n \epsilon_4} = \frac{2C}{r} . \]

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Once again $b_j^*/q_j < 2c/r$ for all $j \in K$, and so $b_j^*/q_j < b_{L_i}^*/q_{L_i}$.

Thus we conclude once that $J(q) \in K$.

We see then that $J$ is an upper semi-continuous mapping, assigning a non-empty subset of $N$ to each $q \in Q$. Define, now, for $S \subset N$,

$$\phi(S) = \left\{ q \in Q \mid q_j = 0 \text{ if } j \not\in S \right\}.$$  

Clearly, $\phi$ is an upper semi-continuous mapping from the subset of $N$ to $Q$. The composition, $\phi = \phi \circ J$, is then an upper semi-continuous mapping assigning a non-empty, closed convex subset of $Q$ to each $q \in Q$. By the Kakutani fixed-point theorem, such a mapping must have a fixed point, i.e. there is $q^* \in Q$, such that $q^* \in \phi(q^*)$.

Clearly $q^* \notin Q$ since, for $q \in Q$, $J(q)$ consists of those indices $j$ with $q_j = 0$, and so $\phi(q)$ will consist of those vectors $z \in Q$ such that $z_j = 0$ whenever $q_j > 0$. Thus $q^* \in Q^o$. But, if $q^* \in Q^o$, the only $S \subset N$ such that $q^* \in \phi(S)$ is $N$ itself, i.e. $J(q^*) = N$. This means that $\frac{b_j^*(q^*)}{q_j^*}$ is equal for all $j$, and this will mean that $b_j^*(q^*) = q_j^* c$.

Thus $q^*$ is the desired equilibrium odds vector.

The hypothesis of Theorem 1 - mainly, strict concavity - is overly restrictive. We can weaken it to require only (weak) concavity together with strict monotonicity of the utility functions.

Assume, then, that the $u_i$ are merely concave functions of money. For $t > 0$, define

$$w_i(x,t) = u_i(x) - t e^{-x}$$

Then $w_i(x,0) = u_i(x)$. We have, however,
\[
\omega'_i(x,t) = U'_i(x) + t e^{-x}
\]
\[
\omega''(x,t) = U''(x) - t e^{-x}
\]
(where, in all cases, the primes denote differentiation with respect to \(x\)) and so we find \(\omega_i\) is strictly concave and monotone in \(x\) for each \(t > 0\).

Suppose, then, that each bettor's utility function \(U_i(x)\) is replaced by the strictly concave \(\omega_i(x;t)\). For each \(t > 0\), there is an equilibrium \(n\)-tuple \(q^*(t)\). As \(t \rightarrow 0\), these \(q^*(t)\) will have an accumulation point, \(q^{**}\). The only difficulty is that, though all \(q^*(t) \in \mathcal{Q}\), \(q^{**}\) could conceivably belong to \(3\mathcal{Q}\). Theorem 2 says this will not happen.

**Theorem 2.** Assume all the functions \(U_i\) are concave, strictly monotone increasing, and suppose Assumption Z holds. Then there exists an equilibrium \(n\)-tuple \(q^{**} \in \mathcal{Q}\).

**Proof:** As discussed above, let \(q^*(t)\) be the equilibrium obtained with the utility functions \(\omega_i(x;t)\). Let \(t \rightarrow 0\); by the compactness of \(\mathcal{Q}\), the points \(q^*(t)\) will have some accumulation point \(q^{**} \in \mathcal{Q}\). We must show \(q^{**} \in \mathcal{Q}\).

Suppose, then, \(q \in \mathcal{Q}\). We will show that, if \(|q - q| \) and \(t\) are sufficiently small, \(q = q^*(t)\).

In fact, if \(q = q^*(t)\), then \(J_e(q) = N\), where \(J_e(q)\) is the set \(J\), as described above, with \(U_i\) replaced by \(\omega_i(x,t)\).

Define \(\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2, \epsilon_3, \epsilon_4\), as in the proof of Theorem 1, and let \(\epsilon_5 = \epsilon_3/2\). Let \(\delta < U_i' (1/2)\).

Suppose, now, that \(\epsilon\) is the minimum of \(\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2, \epsilon_4, \epsilon_5\), that \(|q - q| < \epsilon\), and that \(0 < t < \delta\). We have, now,
\[ w_h' \left( \frac{2C}{r}, t \right) = u_h' \left( \frac{2C}{r} \right) + t e^{\frac{2C}{r}} > u_h' \left( \frac{2C}{r} \right) \]

\[ w_h' \left( \frac{1}{2}, t \right) = u_h' \left( \frac{1}{2} \right) + t e^{-\frac{1}{2}} < u_h' \left( \frac{1}{2} \right) + \delta < 2u_h' \left( \frac{1}{2} \right) \]

and so

\[ \varepsilon_4 = \frac{\varepsilon_3}{2} = \frac{\varepsilon_3}{4} \cdot \frac{u_h' \left( \frac{2C}{r} \right)}{u_h' \left( \frac{1}{2} \right)} < \frac{\varepsilon_3}{2} \cdot \frac{w_h' \left( \frac{2C}{r}, t \right)}{w_h' \left( \frac{1}{2}, t \right)} \]

The proof then proceeds as in that of Theorem 1, leading to the conclusion that

\[ J_{e}(q) \subseteq K = N \]

and so \( q = q^*(t) \). Thus \( q = q^{**} \), i.e. \( q^{**} \in Q^0 \) as desired.

It is easy to see that, if \( q^*(t) \) is an equilibrium for each \( t \), then \( q^{**} \) will be an equilibrium for \( t = 0 \), i.e. for the utility functions \( u_i \).

It is possible to weaken the conditions on the utility functions further - so that they are not strictly increasing, but only if we strengthen condition 2. Consider then

**Assumption 2.** For all \( i \) and \( j \), \( p_{ij} > 0 \).

**Theorem 3.** Assume all the utility functions are concave and non-decreasing, and suppose Assumption 2 holds. Then there is an equilibrium \( q^{**} \in Q^0 \).

**Proof:** We consider first the trivial case in which, for each bettor \( i \), \( u_i(x) \) is maximized at \( x = A_i \) (or less). In this case, it is clear that, for any \( q \in Q^0 \), \( x_{ij} = A_i q_j \) will be optimal for bettor \( i \), and so every \( q \in Q^0 \) will give an equilibrium.
Suppose, then, that for some bettor, say bettor 1, \( u \), is not maximized at \( A_1 \). Then \( u'_{1\,1}(A_1,+) > 0 \), and we will set

\[
    r = \frac{u'_{1\,1}(A_1, +)}{u'_{1\,1}(A_1, -)}.
\]

Clearly \( 0 < r \leq 1 \).

As before, we replace the utility functions \( u_i(x) \) by \( w_i(x, t) = u_i(x) - t e^{-x} \), and consider the equilibria \( q^*(t) \) obtained in this manner. (Theorem 1 guarantees their existence.) As \( t \to 0 \), these \( q^*(t) \) have an accumulation point \( q^{**} \in \mathcal{Q} \). If \( q^{**} \in \mathcal{Q}^0 \), it is the desired equilibrium. We must show \( q^{**} \notin \mathcal{Q} \).

In fact, assume \( q \in \mathcal{Q} \), and let \( K \) be the set of all \( k \) such that \( q_k = 0 \). Let \( \epsilon > 0 \) be such that, if \( |q - q| < \epsilon \),

\[
    \frac{P_{ij}}{q_j} < r \frac{P_{ik}}{q_k}
\]

for all \( i \), all \( k \in K \), and \( j \notin K \). (This can be done since all \( P_{ik} > 0 \).)

By (15), and since \( r \leq 1 \), we have

(24)

\[
    \frac{x_{ik}}{q_k} \geq \frac{x_{ij}}{q_j}
\]

for all \( i \), all \( j \notin K \), \( k \in K \).

Since (24) holds for all \( i \), the equilibrium condition (20) can hold only if (24) holds as an equation throughout. This will mean

\[
    \frac{x_{1\,j}}{q_j} = A_1 \quad j = 1, \ldots, n
\]

Then, for \( k \in K \), \( j \notin K \),

\[
    \frac{P_{1\,j}}{q_j} < r \frac{P_{1\,k}}{q_k}
\]

15
and, by (11)
\[
\frac{w_i'(\lambda_i^+; t)}{w_i'(\lambda_i^-; t)} < \frac{r}{2}
\]
or
\[
\frac{U_i'(\lambda_i^+)}{U_i'(\lambda_i^-)} < \frac{r}{2}
\]
so that, since \( r \leq 1 \),
\[
\frac{U_i'(\lambda_i^+)}{U_i'(\lambda_i^-)} < \frac{r}{2}
\]
and this is a contradiction. Thus \( q \) cannot be \( q^*(t) \) for any \( t \), and therefore \( q = q^{**} \). We conclude that \( q^{**} \in c^0 \), and is the desired equilibrium.

3. Examples

We consider here several examples. The first three consider some "reasonable" utility functions; the last shows that the conditions of Theorems 2 and 3 cannot be further weakened.

(a) Logarithmic utility

Assume that each bettor has a utility function
\[
U_i(x) = \log (K_i + x)
\]
where \( K_i \) is a parameter, representing perhaps player \( i \)'s reserves. In this case, the optimability conditions (10) - (11) take the form
\[
\frac{p_{ij}}{K_iq_j + k_i} = \lambda_i \quad \text{if } x_{ij} > 0
\]
or, equivalently,
\[
x_{ij} = \frac{p_{ij}}{\lambda_i} - K_iq_j \quad \text{if positive}
\]
\[
x_{ij} = 0 \quad \text{if } p_{ij} < K_iq_j \lambda_i
\]
In the simplest case, when all \( x_{ij} > 0 \), this will give us

\[
\lambda_i = \sum_{j=1}^{n} x_{ij} = \frac{1}{\lambda_i} - k_i
\]

and so

\[
\lambda_i = \frac{1}{A_i + K_i}.
\]

Substituting in (25), this gives us

\[
x_{ij} = (A_i + K_i) p_{ij} - K_i q_j.
\]

To look for the equilibrium, we have, from (20) - (21)

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{m} x_{ij} = q_j^* c.
\]

Thus

\[
\sum_{i} (A_i + K_i) p_{ij} - q_j^* \sum_{i} K_i = q_j^* c
\]

so

\[
(27) \quad q_j^* = \frac{\sum_{i} (A_i + K_i) p_{ij}}{c + \sum_{i} K_i}
\]

But \( c = \sum A_i \), and we see that \( q_j^* \) is then simply a weighted average, with weights \( A_i + K_i \), of the several subjective probabilities \( p_{ij} \).

(b) Exponential utilities

Consider, next, the exponential utility functions

\[
U_i(x) = -e^{-a_i x}
\]

where \( a_i \) is a parameter, measuring, in some sense, bettor \( i \)'s risk aversion. (Essentially, \( 1/a_i \) can be thought of as representing the sum of money which \( i \) would be "hurt" by losing.)
In this case, the optimality conditions (10)-(11) take the form
\[ a_i p_{ij} \exp \left\{ - \frac{a_i x_{ij}}{q_j} \right\} = \lambda_i q_j \text{ if } x_{ij} > 0 \]
which reduces to
\[ a_i x_{ij} = q_j (\log a_i - \log \lambda_i) + q_i \log \frac{p_{ij}}{q_j} \, . \tag{28} \]
if this (right side) is positive, and \( x_{ij} = 0 \) otherwise (i.e. \( x_{ij} = 0 \) if \( a_i p_{ij} < \lambda_i q_j \)).

Assuming, again, that all \( x_{ij} > 0 \), summation with respect to \( j \) gives us
\[ a_i A_i = \log a_i - \log \lambda_i + \sum_j q_j \log \frac{p_{ij}}{q_j} \]
so that, substituting in (28),
\[ \frac{x_{ik}}{q_k} = \frac{1}{a_i} \left[ \log \frac{p_{ik}}{q_k} - \sum_j q_j \log \frac{p_{ij}}{q_j} \right] + \lambda_i \]

For the equilibrium odds, we add with respect to \( i \), obtaining
\[ c = \sum_i \frac{1}{a_i} \left[ \log \frac{p_{ik}}{q_k} - \sum_j q_j \log \frac{p_{ij}}{q_j} \right] + c \]
or
\[ \sum_i \frac{1}{a_i} \log \frac{p_{ik}}{q_k} = \sum_i \sum_j \frac{1}{a_i} q_j \log \frac{p_{ij}}{q_j} \, . \]

The right side of this last expression is independent of \( k \), and so
\[ \sum_i \frac{1}{a_i} \log p_{ik} - \log q_k \sum_i \frac{1}{a_i} = \gamma \]
where \( \gamma \) is independent of \( k \). Then
\[ \log q_k^* = \frac{\sum_i r_i \log p_{ik} - \gamma}{\sum r_i} \]
or

\[ q_k^* = \Gamma \left( \prod_{i=1}^{n} p_{ik} r_i \right)^{\frac{l}{r_i + \ldots + r_n}} \]

where \( r_i = \frac{1}{a_i} \), and \( \Gamma \) is constant. Thus in this case \( q_k^* \) is proportional to a weighted geometric mean, with weights \( \frac{1}{a_i} \), of the probabilities \( p_{ik} \).

(c) Linear utility.

Yet another possibility is to equate utility with money. This case was treated in detail by Gale and Eisenberg (1959) and so we will merely refer the reader to that interesting article.

(d) A counter-example.

Let us consider a two-horse, two-bettor situation. Bettor 1 is certain horse 1 will win whereas bettor 2 feels the race is up for grabs. They have equal capital. Thus

\[
\begin{align*}
p_{11} &= 1 & p_{12} &= 0 \\
p_{21} &= \frac{1}{2} & p_{22} &= \frac{1}{2} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\( \lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = 1 \)

Bettor 1's utility function does not much matter - he will bet all his money on horse 1. Bettor 2 has a utility function

\[
u_2(x) = \begin{cases} 
  x & \text{if } x \leq \frac{3}{2} \\
  \frac{3}{2} & \text{if } x > \frac{3}{2} 
\end{cases}
\]

It is easily seen that, if \( q_1 < \frac{1}{2} \), then bettor 2 will choose

\[
x_{21} = \frac{3q_1}{2} \quad x_{22} = 1 - \frac{3q_1}{2}
\]

whereas, if \( q_1 > \frac{1}{2} \), then 2 will choose
\[ x_{21} = 1 - \frac{3q_2}{2}, \quad x_{22} = \frac{3q_2}{2} \]

For \( q_1 = q_2 = \frac{1}{2} \), we would have \( \frac{1}{4} \leq x_{21} \leq \frac{3}{4}, \quad x_{22} = 1 - x_{21} \).

Since \( x_{11} = 1, \; x_{12} = 0 \) whatever \( q \) is, we will then have

\[
\begin{align*}
\nonumber b_1^*(q) &= 1 + \frac{3q_1}{2} \quad \text{if } q_1 < \frac{1}{2} \\
\nonumber b_1^*(q) &= 2 - \frac{3q_2}{2} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{3q_1}{2} \quad \text{if } q_1 > \frac{1}{2} \\
\nonumber \frac{5}{4} \leq b_1^*(q) \leq \frac{7}{4} \quad \text{if } q_1 = \frac{1}{2}.
\end{align*}
\]

For an equilibrium, we must have \( b_1^*(q) = 2q_1 \) (since \( c = A_1 + A_2 = 2 \)). But, from the above, we see this holds only if \( q_1 = 1 \). But this leads to the undesirable discontinuity on the boundary of the simplex, and we must conclude that there is no equilibrium for this situation.
Concavity and Convexity

A function $f$ from $\mathbb{R}^m$ to $\mathbb{R}$ is said to be **concave** if, for every $x, y \in \mathbb{R}^m$, and $0 \leq \lambda \leq 1$

(30) \[ f(\lambda x + (1-\lambda) y) \geq \lambda f(x) + (1-\lambda) f(y). \]

It is **strictly concave** if strict inequality holds in (30) whenever $x \neq y$ and $0 < \lambda < 1$. A function $F$ is convex [strictly convex] if $-f$ is concave [strictly concave].

A set $S \subset \mathbb{R}^m$ is **convex** if, for any $x, y \in S$ and $0 \leq \lambda \leq 1$,

\[ \lambda x + (1-\lambda) y \in S. \]

Generally, if $f$ is a concave function, for any $q$, the set

\[ S_q = \{ x \mid f(x) \geq q \} \]

is convex. In particular, the set of all $x$ which maximize $f(x)$ is convex (though it may be empty).

If a function $f$ is strictly concave, it need not have a maximum. If there is a maximum, however, the maximizing point is unique.

If $f: \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$ is concave, it will be differentiable almost everywhere in its domain. Even when not differentiable, however, $f$ has both right and left derivatives, $f'(x^+)$ and $f'(x^-)$. The derivative is monotone non-increasing, satisfying

31(a) \[ f'(x^+) \leq f'(x^-) \quad \text{for all } x \]

31(b) \[ f'(x^-) \leq f'(y^+) \quad \text{if } y < x. \]

If $f$ is strictly concave, its derivative is strictly monotone, satisfying 31(a) and satisfying 31(b) with strict inequality.
Upper Semi-Continuity

Let $x, y$ be topological spaces. A set-valued mapping from $x$ to $y$ is a mapping $\phi$ which assigns, to each $x \in x$, a subset $\phi(x) \subseteq y$. It is a correspondence if $\phi(x) \neq \emptyset$ for all $x \in x$.

The set-valued mapping $\phi$ is said to be upper semi-continuous if, whenever $x_n \rightarrow x^*$, $y_n \in \phi(x_n)$, and $y_n \rightarrow y^*$ then $y^* \in \phi(x^*)$.

Theorem. Let $f$ be a continuous real-valued function defined on the product space $x \times y$. Define for $x \in x$,

$$\phi(x) = \left\{ y \mid f(x,y) = \max_{t \in y} f(x,t) \right\}$$

then $\phi$ is an upper semi-continuous set-valued mapping from $x$ to $y$. If $y$ is compact and non-empty, then $\phi$ is also a correspondence.

Kakutani's Fixed-Point Theorem.

Let $x$ be a simplex in $\mathbb{R}^n$, and let $\phi$ be an upper semi-continuous correspondence from $x$ to $x$, such that, for all $x$, $\phi(x)$ is compact and convex. Then there is some $x^* \in x$ such that $x^* \in \phi(x^*)$. 


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