1983

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT/
DEPUTY COMMANDER
VISIT TO
Seventh Army
Training Command
AFTER ACTION REPORT

PREPARED BY
AIRMAND BATTLE TRAINING DIVISION
UNIT TRAINING SUPPORT DIRECTORATE

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release; Distribution Unlimited

84 08 27 223
SUBJECT: 1983 Assistant Commandant/Deputy Commandant Visit to Seventh Army Training Command

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Enclosed is the After Action Report for the 1983 Assistant Commandant/Deputy Commandant (AC/DC) Visit to Seventh Army Training Command.

2. This is one in a series of reports published by the Combined Arms Center, reflecting concerns of field commanders and TRADOC observers in regard to TRADOC products. The widest possible dissemination is made in an effort to stimulate thought on current training and doctrinal issues as well as to keep field units informed.

3. TRADOC agencies are requested to review the report for proponent assignments upon receipt. Proponents are additionally requested to notify this headquarters of their point of contact for followup action once their review is complete. The suspense for proponent followup actions is 29 Feb 84. The Combined Arms Center will provide the Commander, TRADOC with the consolidated followup status in March 84.

4. Points of contact at this headquarters are MAJ(P) Cliff Reed or MAJ Mark Spitler, Unit Training Support Directorate, CGSC, Av 552-3839/4317.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

MAJ J. DECKER
MAJ, GS
Secretary General Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

See Inside Back Cover
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>Background, objectives, and concepts</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>TRADOC Participants in the 1983 AC/DC Visit</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART ONE: BACKGROUND, OBJECTIVES, AND CONCEPTS

1. REFERENCES

   A. Message, CDR USACAC and Fort Leavenworth, ATZL-DL-S, 24143OZ Mar 80, subject: Assistant Commandant/Deputy Commandant (AC/DC) Visits to USAREUR.

   B. Message, CINCUSAREUR, AEAGC-ATC, 111102Z Jan 83, subject: 1983 Assistant Commandant/Deputy Commandant (AC/DC) Visit to USAREUR.

   C. Message, CDR USACAC and Fort Leavenworth, ATZL-SWU-E, 151215Z Apr 83, subject: 1983 AC/DC Visit to USAREUR.

2. GENERAL BACKGROUND

   A. The 1983 Assistant Commandant/Deputy Commandant (AC/DC) Visit to USAREUR was the fifth in a series of visits resulting from an agreement between the CINCUSAREUR and the Commander, TRADOC in December 1978.

   B. In March 1980, the Combined Arms Center (CAC) requested USAREUR's comments on a proposal to split the visit into two categories: combat developments and training developments. USAREUR's counterproposal called for alternating visits between REFORGER and more routine training hosted by 7th Army Training Command (7 ATC). CAC agreed with the USAREUR proposal—a training visit one year followed by a REFORGER visit on an alternating basis.

   C. Sixteen TRADOC service schools and three integrating centers participated in the 1983 AC/DC visit to 7 ATC. Those officers and institutions that were represented are listed in Part Two.

   D. TRADOC representatives initially visited 7 ATC to observe the USAREUR institutional training base. The remainder of the visit afforded each participant the opportunity to visit units in training while in garrison as well as in major and local training areas.

   E. Observations made during the visit were analyzed during a TRADOC workshop in preparation for the formal participant outbrief to the USAREUR Chief of Staff on 9 August 1983. These observations were forwarded to the CAC representatives for consolidation. The senior CAC representative informally briefed the CINCUSAREUR regarding the observations noted during the visit on 8 August 1983.

3. VISIT OBJECTIVES

   A. The objectives of the AC/DC visitation program are—

      (1) To improve the TRADOC-USAREUR interface.
(2) To provide an opportunity to observe Army field operations under conditions approximating combat in NATO Europe.

(3) To generate input to ongoing TRADOC efforts.

B. The primary focus of these visits is the evaluation of TRADOC performance, especially the existence, soundness, and applicability of doctrine. As a corollary, the performance capabilities of graduates of the TRADOC training base are informally evaluated. TRADOC representatives view these visits as an opportunity to evaluate their effectiveness in providing adequate training products. Additionally, the visits provide an excellent opportunity to discuss ongoing TRADOC projects with field commanders as well as solicit valuable input for these projects.

4. REPORT ORGANIZATION

A. This report provides identification, followup, and resolution of TRADOC issues that have surfaced during AC/DC visits.

(1) Part Three contains participant observations noted during the 1983 visit to 7 ATC. The term "observation" is selected to permit field concerns to be addressed informally. As used in this report, the word "observation" does not necessarily represent command positions, but provided a sensing of field perceptions.

B. This report is edited to eliminate redundancy, amplify observations, and establish proponents for actions that fall within a TRADOC area of responsibility.

5. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

A. The Combined Arms Center publishes a report following each visit. These reports update unresolved issues from previous reports as well as assign proponents for new issues. A followup report is published approximately 6 months after each visit to allow for a continuous update until identified issues are resolved.

B. Each observation is assigned a proponent for action. Proponents are required to provide the followup status on each issue until it is resolved. Followup actions are provided to CAC 60 days prior to publication of subsequent semiannual reports. Issues are resolved when no further action is required.
PART TWO: 1983 AC/DC VISIT TO 7 ATC

The following TRADOC Representatives participated in the 1983 AC/DC visit:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USA Combined Arms Center</th>
<th>MG Crosbie E. Saint</th>
<th>DCOMDT, USACGSC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COL Jon C. Stillman</td>
<td>Dir, Unit Trng Spt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MAJ Mark G. Spitler</td>
<td>Program Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Logistics Center</td>
<td>COL James R. Klugh</td>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Soldier Support Center</td>
<td>COL Lawerence N. Brockway</td>
<td>DCDR For Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MAJ Richard G. DeMoya</td>
<td>Ch, Prof Dev, AG Sch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Infantry School</td>
<td>BG Edwin H. Burba</td>
<td>Assistant Commandant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MAJ(P) William P. Moffitt</td>
<td>Ch, Ofc Inf Prop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Armor School</td>
<td>COL Michael H. Crumley</td>
<td>Dep Asst Cmdt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LTC(P) James M. Lyle</td>
<td>Ch, Doc Dev; Cmd, Staff, Doc, Dpt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Field Artillery School</td>
<td>BG Thomas J. P. Jones</td>
<td>Assistant Commandant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LTC Alvin Ginsberg</td>
<td>Dep Dir, Wpns Dpt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>Leader Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Air Defense School</td>
<td>COL Charles C. Clark</td>
<td>Dep Asst Cmdt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COL Leslie L. Custer</td>
<td>Dir, Trng Dev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Engineer School</td>
<td>COL James W. Ray</td>
<td>Deputy Commandant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COL Stanley R. Johnson</td>
<td>Dir, Trng Dev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Signal School</td>
<td>COL Robert L. Bishop</td>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COL Edwin Chandler</td>
<td>Pres, C-E Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Military Police School</td>
<td>COL John Valieant</td>
<td>Dir, Trng Dev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Chemical School</td>
<td>COL John Spencer</td>
<td>Assistant Commandant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LTC Robert Graham</td>
<td>Ch, Sys Trng Dev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Div, DTD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Aviation School</td>
<td>BG Charles L. Teeter</td>
<td>Assistant Commandant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COL Ernest F. Estes</td>
<td>Dir, Trng Dev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Intelligence School</td>
<td>COL John Pattison</td>
<td>Dir, Trng and Doc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COL Joseph Short</td>
<td>DCDR, USAICS-Devens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA John F. Kennedy Special</td>
<td>COL David L. Pemberton</td>
<td>Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warfare Center</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WPC0910B/OCT83 -5-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Commandant</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA Ordnance Center and School</td>
<td>COL William H. Foy</td>
<td>Dir, Training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Missile and Munitions Center and School</td>
<td>COL Regis P. Dietrich</td>
<td>Assistant Commandant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MAJ Robert Dye</td>
<td>Dir, Trng Dev</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Quartermaster School</td>
<td>COL James E. Rupp</td>
<td>Assistant Commandant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Transportation School</td>
<td>COL Albert Luster</td>
<td>Assistant Commandant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LTC Gary Johnson</td>
<td>Ch, Proponency Ofc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Academy of Health Sciences</td>
<td>COL Raymond Leahey</td>
<td>Dir, Trng Dev</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART THREE: OBSERVATIONS

The following agencies noted observations during the 1983 AC/DC visit to 7 ATC:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA Combined Arms Center</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Logistics Center</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Soldier Support Center</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Academy of Health Sciences</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Air Defense School</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Armor School</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Aviation School</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Chemical School</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Engineer School</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Field Artillery School</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Infantry School</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Intelligence School</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Military Police School</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Missile and Munitions School</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Ordnance School</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Quartermaster School</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Signal School</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Transportation School</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There is a limited application of AirLand Battle doctrine in USAREUR training programs.

a. **Discussion:** Overriding political issues appear to limit execution of AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine in higher level exercises. In brigades and battalions, there is a general lack of understanding of how the ALB will differ from previous doctrine for operations/training at those levels. It is the perception of the field that USAF participation in ALB has been negligible. For those reasons there is no current outcry for supporting doctrine to the capstone FM 100-5. Of significance is the remarkable progress that VII Corps has made in refining the McClintic War Game. Once ALB gains acceptance in USAREUR, this game will play an important role in training higher headquarters in the new concepts.

b. **Recommendation:** That political acceptance of AirLand Battle in Europe be pursued. In the interim, schools continue development of brigade, battalions and company level supporting FM's on a priority basis.

c. **Proponent for action:** USACGSC
The Warrior Preparation Center offers an excellent opportunity for corps and division commanders to train their staffs.

a. **Discussion:** To insure that Army units exercising at the Warrior Preparation Center can capitalize on the staff training experience, Army doctrine, staff procedures and operations must be clearly understood and integrated in the developmental process.

b. **Recommendation:** That CGSC provide assistance to Seventh Army Training Command, as requested, in the development of Army participation at the Warrior Preparation Center and CAORA provide modeling support.

c. **Proponent for action:** USACGSC
TRADEC desires to become more involved in the USAREUR series of exercises to improve the development of doctrine, techniques, procedures and training.

a. **Discussion:** USAREUR/FORSCOM/TRADOC Regulation 11-11 provides for the doctrinal relationship between the TRADOC community and USAREUR/FORSCOM units. Increased involvement by TRADOC in the scenario development and evaluation of TRADOC products during exercises will increase support to the field. The relationship that TRADOC enjoys with REDCOM and FORSCOM in their series of Joint Readiness Exercises is very effective.

b. **Recommendation:** That TRADOC increase involvement in the USAREUR series of exercises in an active participant role using subject matter experts to provide doctrinal assistance to the exercise director.

c. **Proponent for action:** USACGSC
A need exists to send selected captains filling critical staff positions to CAS3 while assigned to USAREUR.

a. **Discussion**: Field commanders and staff officers are satisfied with the CAS3 graduates being assigned to USAREUR. Many of these graduates are filling major positions and are performing well overall. However, USAREUR continues to fill many major positions at division, corps and USAREUR headquarters with captains who possess in excess of one year retainability, but have not had the opportunity to attend CAS3. CAS3 completion is viewed by USAREUR as essential for these captains to effectively serve on a higher level staff.

b. **Recommendation**: That a specified number of seats in CAS3 be allocated to USAREUR on a recurring basis to support training selected captains for critical staff positions.

c. **Proponent for action**: USATRADOC
Fire support for Rear Area Combat Operations is not effectively addressed in the current concept.

a. **Discussion:** The intensive coordination and action required for rear area combat operations dictates the need for effective fire support. At present, field units are not equipped to provide adequate fire support to the forward as well as the rear battle. Some units in USAREUR have designated available FA officers assigned to DISCOM units to form ad hoc fire support elements (FSE) for coordination of fire support in the rear area. However, this organization is purely contingency oriented.

b. **Recommendation:** That the concept for fire support in rear area combat operations be re-evaluated, doctrine established and that a rear area FSE be developed and incorporated into existing TOE's.

c. **Proponent for action:** USACGSC
The need for a simulation to exercise and train battle staffs is critical.

a. **Discussion:** A recurring concern from battalion through corps commanders in USAREUR is the critical need for a simulation that exercises and trains staffs at all levels. The myriad of simulations which exist are cumbersome and resource intensive that only focus at selected levels. Though FIRST BATTLE: Battalion through Corps, will assist in solving the problem, an automated system that portrays and challenges staffs at all levels in a closed loop system is needed.

b. **Recommendation:** That an automated battle simulation that exercises battalion through corps be resourced for earliest possible fielding.

c. **Proponent for action:** USATRADOC
Dependence on Host Nation Support (HNS) places an added burden on logistics support and requires additional training for LOG personnel.

a. Discussion:

- Europe relies heavily on HNS, especially for LOG support.
- Treaty (agreement) formalizes functions and procedures.
- Functions of supply, handling and transportation are especially affected.
- Language differences will complicate effectiveness of HNS.
- Much progress has been made in Europe, but questions of reliability, capability and dependability remain.

b. Recommendation: That USALOGC review the extent and impact of HNS to insure that orientations and detailed training (i.e., language training) are included in POI's to prepare LOG personnel to cope with this reality in all Theaters.

c. Proponent for action: USALOGC
Unfamiliarity with current physical readiness philosophy and training principles exists in Europe.

a. Discussion:
   1. Concern raised with inadequate female standards on the APRT.
   2. Standardization of APRT testing requirement has become an issue.
   3. Many units have no formalized PT program at all.
   4. Some units using inappropriate physical training protocol in the conduct of PT.
   5. Exported master fitness trainer course conducted in Augsburg, 19 July-12 August 1983, not attended by divisional unit students.

b. Recommendation: That USASSC export a resident O3C (Physical Activities Specialist Course) to Europe.

c. Proponent for action: USASSC
OBSERVATION: 83-9

Although AG/FI officers are satisfied with the modular Officer Advanced Course (OAC) concept and curriculum, several concerns are evident.

a. Discussion:

1. Concept to be piloted Jul 84-Jul 86 in IN, FA, QM, MP, AG.

2. Officers particularly enthused with initial standard five week common skills instruction.

3. Concept may promote increased family separation especially as 10% of Army is female, 35% of FI/AG are female. A high percentage of these officers are married to service members.

4. Concern raised about funding and administrative control of single parents on TDY at OAC.

5. Concern regarding OAC attendance while in an TDY status to/from short tour.

b. Recommendation: That SSC surface, in coordination with MILPERCEN, modular OAC concerns with TRADOC.

c. Proponent for action: USASSC
The resident DPCA course does not provide sufficient instruction in procurement, accounting, and ADP education required of USAREUR DPCA positions.

a. Discussion:
   1. Increased emphasis on community activities and concomitant increase in size of budget and procurement dictates that more technical and management background is necessary.
   2. DPCA course is currently three weeks in length.
   3. A great number of DPCA's have not worked in the area prior to that assignment.

b. Recommendations:
   1. That SSC explore the feasibility of extending the DPCA course from three to five weeks.
   2. That SSC export a resident DPCA course to Europe that would include procurement and accounting instruction unique to USAREUR policies.

c. Proponent for action: USASSC
The standardized packing criteria for the updated medical set, kits and outfits currently being issued to units providing division level medical service has not been received.

a. **Discussion:** The medical sets found in all division units have been updated in support of the technology for Division 86. The sets are being built and issued to Division units at this time. The criteria for placing the components in each of the 30 plus different chests has not been received in USAREUR.

b. **Recommendations:**

1. That USAAHS take the initiative to trace the shortfall and insure the US Army Medical Materiel Agency incorporates packing criteria in all future shipments.

2. That USAAHS produce a training package which reviews and explains this criteria for distribution to all division and separate medical battalions.

c. **Proponent for action:** USAAHS
A requirement exists to develop a reference book which incorporates standardized data for facility space and other logistic requirements for hospital units deployed at corps and echelons above corps.

a. Discussion: USAREUR is developing planning estimates and locations for prepositioning and deployment of hospital units. The 807th Hospital Center Reserves has developed a reference book for use in making planning estimates.

b. Recommendations:

1. That USAAHS incorporate the book prepared by the 807th Hospital Center into its Doctrine and Training Literature Program.

2. That USAAHS further develop the book in concert with reserve components and USAREUR Surgeons Staff.

c. Proponent for action: USAAHS
The discontinuance of amyl nitrate as the antidote of choice as a blood agent antidote is unclear.

a. Discussion:

1. The HQDA Medical Technical Committee has decided that amyl nitrate is no longer the antidote of choice for treatment of blood agent chemical casualties. Disposition instructions for the stocks on hand as well as communication explaining the final decision has not been received by USAREUR.

b. Recommendation: That USAAHS request HQDA, DASG-HCO to release disposition instructions and decision criteria for amyl nitrate.

c. Proponent for action: USAAHS
The enlisted structure for MOS 91A, 91B, and 91C have significant changes in support of Division 86. These changes are not clearly understood within Division level medical units.

a. Discussion:

1. The final decision approving the MOS adjustments for CMF 91 had not been made by DCSPER, HQDA at the time the Div 86 New Organization Training Team (NOTT) briefed USAREUR units.

2. The change of MOS structure for MOS 91B vice 91C in maneuver battalions is not clearly understood.

b. Recommendation: That USAAHS provide USAREUR with a self explanatory follow-on briefing package that incorporates the final decision for CMF 91 MOS changes found in Division 86 structure.

c. Proponent for action: USAAHS
Medical treatment of casualties in a chemical environment continues to be an area of misunderstanding of the lowest triage and levels of treatment.

a. Discussion:

1. The understanding of triage priorities and the handling of casualties in a chemical environment are not well understood by medical evacuation and treatment NCO's.

2. The levels of care to be rendered, as well as utilization of shelter and individual protection, needs to be explained and trained in detail.

b. Recommendations:

1. That USAAHS continue to expand treatment procedures in a chemical environment for resident courses.

2. That USAAHS develop an exportable information and training program that is targeted at medical personnel who are faced with medical triage and treatment of casualties in a chemical environment. The package should be aimed at developing confidence in their equipment and explaining the realities of the treatment.

c. Proponent for action: USAAHS
Training and doctrine publications are readily available and received on a timely basis; however, the availability of the catalog which describes the video tapes produced by the AHS satellite TV is limited.

a. **Discussion:** The catalog of AHS video tapes is available at headquarters but not at maneuver battalions or isolated medical units.

b. **Recommendations:**

1. That USAAHS increase its catalog distribution to insure that copies are available for maneuver battalions and isolated medical units.

2. That USAAHS coordinate with the USAREUR Surgeons Staff to revise the distribution plan.

c. **Proponent for action:** USAAHS
There is a lack of doctrine for automation of the Theater Army Air Defense Command.

a. **Discussion:** Available doctrinal literature does not describe procedures needed or to be used to manage assets in the Theater Army Air Defense Command. Separate support units in the Command have been provided automated management equipment, such as the Decentralized Automated Supply Support System (DASS), or the Maintenance Automated Management System (MAMS) for use at the direct support level only. **There are no doctrinal procedures available to take advantage of this data and accomplish command level management reviews.** Further, the command has continued to manage all Class VII major items using manual procedures in lieu of automated systems that have been made available to divisions, but not designed for non-divisional units.

b. **Recommendation:** That the development of standard automation systems also include organizations such as the Theater Army Air Defense Command so that these non-divisional units will be able to take advantage of automation available to the rest of the Army. **The command requires a system to be able to review the assets available in all Class IX direct support units and to make management decisions based on that data. Automated Class VII management is also required to properly account for all the property in the command.** The new systems must be able to provide asset balance information, location, and status.

c. **Proponent for action:** USAADS
Current published doctrine does not accurately describe new concepts in support of the Theater Army Air Defense Command.

a. **Discussion:** Current sources of doctrine, e.g. FM 44-1, show a support organization that keeps missile direct support units subordinate to the ADA battalions and that missile GS is provided by an external source. This concept of support has been changed to provide a more efficient system and to provide better support. The current system consists of a support battalion, core MMC, one GS company (Hawk, Herco), and subordinate DS companies providing DS support to a particular ADA battalion. This concept has been studied and endorsed by TRADOC. TOE documents and associated authorized unit reference sheets have been prepared to support the Air Defense Support Command. These documents were forwarded to HQDA in July 1983 for their approval. USAADA School was a party in all studies that led to the development of this concept.

b. **Recommendation:** That doctrinal manuals be updated to reflect new concepts in the support of a Theater Army Air Defense Command.

c. **Proponent for action:** USAADS
The complexity of communication equipment and lack of familiarity with requirements to support Theater Army Air Defense Artillery dictates the need for specialized courses to be developed for Air Defense Artillery and Signal personnel.

a. **Discussion:** Signal personnel assigned to units supporting the Theater Army Air Defense should have a minimum of four weeks training (TDY in route) to become familiar with the communication, operation, and procedures of the High Medium Air Defense (HIMAD) Hawk, Hercules, and Patriot systems that the non-divisional Signal battalions support.

b. **Recommendation:** That proponent commander of Air Defense in coordination with Signal School commander establish a communication division at the Air Defense School for training of Signal personnel assigned to Signal non-divisional units in support of the Theater Army Air Defense Artillery (HIMAD systems).

c. **Proponent for action:** USASIGS, in conjunction with USAADS
Operational concepts for airbase defense are being developed within 32d AADCOM which appear innovative and potentially most effective.

a. Discussion: 32d AADCOM, specifically the 108th Air Defense Brigade, has been working closely with 4th ATAF and US air base staffs on operational concepts to provide for air space management in the vicinity of US air bases. These concepts seem promising, need to be tested, and translated to AD doctrine for reflection in appropriate field manuals and service school courses of instruction.

b. Recommendation: That USAADS and 32d AADCOM coordinate their efforts more closely in the airbase defense doctrine arena.

c. Proponent for action: USAADS
Non-dedicated Stinger personnel are used in HIMAD units.

a. Discussion: In Hawk units, MANPADS Systems are being operated by other than qualified Stinger personnel.

b. Recommendation: That USAADS determine the feasibility of changing the TOE/FORCE structure to allow for all HIMAD systems dedicated MANPADS personnel.

c. Proponent for action: USAADS
Several commands (6/52d ADA Hawk; 3/67th ADA C/V; 69th, 108th, and 10th ADA Bdes) are field testing operational concepts and equipment with a view of providing real time data information transfer to HIMAD and SHORAD ADA on early warning, weapons control status, and air activity within adjacent airspace.

a. Discussion: The challenge of providing integrated and coordinated air defense is dependent on interoperability of automatic data links, voice communications, and standardized operational procedures. The initiatives being taken within 32d AADCOM and divisional SHORAD ADA, while promising, affect non-divisional and divisional ADA operations and should be closely coordinated, monitored, and supported with communications equipment, documentation, and testing.

b. Recommendation: That USAADS analyze procedures tested to date in order to determine the equipment required to transfer real time information; and if practical/feasible, include such in appropriate doctrinal/procedural manuals.

c. Proponent for action: USAADS
The current Vulcan training approach offers little in the way of sustainment training, instruction feedback capability, realistic evaluation of gunner effectiveness, or real time evaluation of hits. Although the Vulcan Training System (VTS) was shown to be effective in increasing gunner proficiency, to date it has not been fielded. Vulcan gunners cannot achieve STRAC standards without a training device that does not require range time and is superior to the VTS.

a. Discussion: 32d AADCOM believes the Dornier system will remedy their Vulcan sustainment training problem. It will significantly increase gunner effectiveness, allow real time evaluation of hits, and can be used with or without ammunition. The German ADA units have used the system for the last two years and it has proved to be both reliable and cost effective. They have realized a 300 percent increase in gunner proficiency, coupled with a one-third reduction in ammunition consumption. The 32d AADCOM's STRAC requirement is 16,320 rounds per weapon system. Their current FY 84 allocation is 6,601 rounds per weapon system. Given the current budget and ammunition constraints, the STRAC requirement will be difficult to validate and resource. Use of the Dornier trainer will reduce 32d AADCOM's FY 86 Vulcan ammunition allocation by 30 percent and they are willing to accept this. Based on their current FY 84 allocation, they will realize a savings of at least $720K.

b. Recommendation: That USAADS support USAREUR's efforts to procure the Dornier Trainer and assist in formalizing a Program of Instruction (POI). Additionally, USAADS should actively pursue the application of the training technology and the training device for National Guard/Reserve Components as it applies to the Realistic Air Defense Engagement Simulator (RADES).

c. Proponent for action: USAADS
The 32d AADCOM has an urgent need for an improved ECCM training device at battery level. Current device, TPQ-25, was fielded in the mid-sixties and does not meet current needs or training standards. PIP I was slipped to PIP II and, finally, to PIP III for FY 88—all due to funding limitations. There exists an urgent need to improve the quality of Hawk ECCM.

a. Discussion: NATO Allies have long recognized the deficiencies of the current Hawk Trainer (TPQ-25). All NATO nations with Hawk, except Italy and the United States, have purchased an improved trainer, the Operator Training Simulator (OTS). The purchase of a Hawk trainer now would assure a quality training device for the life of the system. USAREUR has a requirement for one OTS per ADA battery. USAADA School has a requirement for four in the training base.

b. Recommendation: That USAADS support USAREUR's efforts to procure the OTS and assist in formalizing a training Program of Instruction (POI).

c. Proponent for action: USAADS
There is an upbeat feeling about evolution of tank gunnery programs in USAREUR.

a. Discussion: New ranges at Grafenwoehr are good and will be superior once bugs are worked out. Calibration policy is well accepted and used. Master gunners are good (never enough). FM 17-12-3 (draft) is being used; final draft is needed ASAP. "Black Hat" revitalization effort for Table VIII will be accepted. Focus on gunnery programs is clearly Table VIII; however, not all units give Table VIII gunnery equal training emphasis. There is a need to standardize target sizes on ranges (full size?).

b. Recommendations:

1. That publication of FM 17-12-3 be expedited.
2. That the master gunner transition course A1 to A3 or M1 be continued.
3. That dialogue with 7th ATC on standardization of tables be continued and mutually agreed upon positions/fires be disseminated.
4. That a return of graded "crew cuts" on all individual tables be examined.
5. That the importance of a balanced program of tank crew qualification and platoon (live fire ARTEP) qualification be stressed in training.

c. Proponent for action: USAARMS
OFFICER AND NCO EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING DEFICIENCIES: General impressions of quality of officers and NCO's arriving from USAARMS courses are very favorable with some negative comments on abilities in areas of: writing and speaking skills, "hands on" maintenance, supply operations and situational leadership skills in leading soldiers.

a. Discussion: The above negative comments were not aimed at specific groups of people and were general impressions. Technical and tactical competence of officers and ANCOC/BNCOC graduates is good! Soldiers (especially 19D's) are well motivated and trained in basics. There is general acceptance of add-on training responsibilities for Skill Level 1.

b. Recommendations: That the USAARMS continue to refine POI's in above areas with concentration on:

1. Writing and speaking requirements.
2. Hands-on maintenance.
3. Recovery operations.
4. Supply operations.
5. Leadership.

c. Proponent for action: USAARMS
The combination of eye-safe laser ranges and aircraft (AH-64, OH-58D) are essential to the effective conduct of combined arms collective training in the space constrained European environment.

a. **Discussion:** Noticeable improvement has been made at integrating aviation training with combined arms training and range operation since previous visits. Limited terrain and ranges available re-emphasize the necessity of fielding key training devices at the same time major end items are fielded, and that training devices permit safe, economical collective training.

b. **Recommendation:** That the development and fielding of eye-safe laser training devices be a priority effort.

c. **Proponent for action:** USAAVNS, in conjunction with HQ TRADOC
Aviation units in USAREUR are ready to move to Division 86 CBAA organization now.

a. Discussion: Many aviation battalions are now configured similar to the CBAA organization. Units are thinking AirLand Battle and are concerned about the fielding of new systems. Both events would be facilitated by moving to the CBAA organization without further delay.

b. Recommendation: That USAVNS take those actions necessary to expedite transition to the CBAA equipped with current aircraft.

c. Proponent for action: USAVNS
The absence of aviation doctrine was again noted by all units visited.

a. Discussion: Much thought is being given to both aviation doctrine and tactics by the units visited. Among the topics of most concern to units were: Deep attack, air-to-air, fast moving operations (especially at rates of the M-1 tank), and RACO. Units were briefed on activities in progress at the Aviation Center to produce doctrine quickly. Essential to that effort is the input of tactical units, and the material obtained in Europe will be helpful to this end.

b. Recommendation: That USAAVNS maintain the priority effort to gather and write needed aviation doctrine.

c. Proponent for action: USAAVNS
Personnel and administrative policies do not encourage Warrant Officers to participate in the non-resident Warrant Officer Senior Course (WOSC).

a. **Discussion:** Officer Record Briefs of those Warrant Officers completing the WOSC are not coded to reflect course completion. Officers completing the WOSC by correspondence are no longer eligible to attend the resident course. These procedures discourage participation and professional growth.

b. **Recommendation:** That USAAVNS, as proponent, work with MILPERCEN to change both procedures.

c. **Proponent for action:** USAAVNS
Aviation Center programs of instruction need to provide more flight time and specific training in Doppler, opposite seat, tactics, night vision goggles (NVG), combat skills, Aircrew Training Manual (ATM) program, International Code For Aviation Operation (ICAO) regulations, and unit orientations.

a. Discussion:

1. UH-60 students need to be given more flying time during the UH-60 Aircraft Qualification Course. Currently, the approved syllabus provides for 35 flight hours, yet only 15 can be provided due to HQDA budgetary constraints.

2. AH-1S students should get more training in the front seat, (copilot/gunner position), use of the Doppler navigation system, visual approaches from the front seat, and instrument approaches.

3. Instructor Pilot students need additional training time in tactics, NVG, combat skills, and ATM program management.

4. All aviation students on orders for USAREUR require more training in ICAO procedures.

5. All aviation students need more training and orientation on how aviation units are organized and operate. Further, students need to be oriented on the next aviation unit of assignment.

b. Recommendation: That USAAVNS continue to articulate increased training requirements through the PARR process, and identify trade-offs in current training programs in order to provide improved training in the areas identified above.

c. Proponent for action: USAAVNS
USAREUR requires more current and complete doctrine which preferably is compatible with NATO doctrine and policy regarding NBC defense operations, smoke operations, and chemical weapons employment procedures.

a. Discussion: The void in doctrine for NBC defense, smoke operations, and chemical weapons employment procedures continues to provide major problems for USAREUR chemical staff officers and chemical units. Doctrine published in outdated manuals conflicts with current procedures and with new and updated technical manuals published for NBC equipment. Doctrine and policy established by NATO is incompatible in many cases with the published US doctrine. To avoid this conflict, evaluation of NATO doctrine/policy should be conducted to determine if it should be adopted as US doctrine. The lack of current and complete doctrine is a recognized problem not only in USAREUR but in all active and reserve units. It is the USACMLLS number one priority.

b. Recommendations:

1. That every effort be made to standardize procedures between NATO and US doctrine and that USACMLLS evaluate current USAREUR/NATO procedures and policies for applicability as US doctrine.

2. That USACMLLS publish the results in implementing field circulars (FC) pending inclusion in appropriate field manuals.

c. Proponent for action: USACMLLS
OBSERVATION: 83-33

Doctrine for the divisional chemical company as presently stated delineates functions and responsibilities requiring a battalion sized organization. Therefore, doctrine needs to be realigned to a company-size effort.

a. Discussion: Personnel authorizations for the Division Chemical Sections are insufficient to manage defensive and offensive NBC Staff Operations and perform operational and logistical planning for decontamination and smoke operations. Examination of the functional duties of the supported units is needed.

b. Recommendations: That the USACMLS:

1. Evaluate unit personnel and equipment decontamination responsibilities to reduce the chemical company workload.

2. Evaluate the need for the Division Chemical office to have OPCON of the chemical companies that is more responsive to the division's needs.

3. Examine feasibility of organizing Division Chemical Officer and enlisted assets less the Battalion/Brigade office and NCO under OPCON of the Division Chemical Office with the possibility of forming a provisional battalion.

c. Proponent for action: USACMLS
Maneuver training and individual skill training in USAREUR is hampered by a lack of sufficient quantities of effective training mines.

a. Discussion: Mine warfare will play a major role in any NATO/WP conflict in Europe. Proper training of maneuver units is essential to avoid unreasonable early losses due to lack of knowledge of proper procedures when encountering minefield obstacles. Maneuver Commanders in USAREUR need a reliable device which will train their units to cope with the requirement for detection and breaching of minefield obstacles while providing realistic feedback for improper procedures. Similarly, a device is needed which will enable minefield installers to train individual and collective mine emplacement skills in terms of logistics, laying, arming, detection, and removal of mines. The devices should be funded and procured in such a way as to assure availability in the quantities needed. The existing training mines do not accommodate these needs. An effort is underway in TRADOC to develop a series of new training mines which will satisfy these multiple training needs. This effort should be accelerated. For maneuver training, the Mine Effects Simulator (MES) will provide a safe, non-pyrotechnic flash-bang-smoke signal and will activate the appropriate MILES system. For individual skill training the Conventional Training Mine (CTM) will be a low cost accurate facsimile of each type of US mine. It will be funded through TASC channels. It will feature accuracy in functional training and will provide a means for feedback when a task is performed improperly (e.g., a buzzer would sound if the mine is armed improperly). The FASCAM Effects Simulator (FES) is also part of the program. It will provide training for artillery, maneuver and engineer units. Its development is tied to the development of a MILES interoperative artillery simulator. Both mines are in competition with other training devices for funding. At present, a best-technical-approach MES prototype has been demonstrated by Jet Propulsion Laboratories working under contract with PM TRADE. The maneuver training at Hohenfels will be incomplete without a penalty-producing mine trainer which will cause commanders to react realistically when contending with minefield obstacles.

b. Recommendation: That TRADOC field these items as quickly as possible.

c. Proponent for action: USATRADOC
Remote Anti-Armor Munition (RAAM) and Area Denial Artillery Munition (ADAM) are delivered by the 155mm Howitzer. A number of problems have been noted in the area of coordination for RAAMS/ADAM employment.

a. **Discussion:** RAAM is anti-tank with 9 mines/round. ADAM is anti-personnel with 36 mines/round. Both types self destruct. The "standard" RAAM/ADAM minefield is 400 x 400 meters and consists of 24 RAAM rounds and 6 ADAM rounds. If no other specifics are planned or given in the call for fire, the "standard" minefield will be delivered. TC 6-20-5, Jan 82, provides guidance for FA delivered mines. FM 5-102, Countermobility, spells out doctrine employment of all scatterable mine systems. In recent exercises, a number of problems were noted in the area of coordination for RAAMS/ADAM employment. Recording of RAAMS/ADAM fire missions was not consistent and resulted in poor dissemination of the locations, size, and self-destruct times of emplaced minefields. These gaps in coordination negated the advantages inherent in RAAM/ADAM employment.

b. **Recommendation:** That the Engineer School in coordination with the Artillery School develop additional doctrinal guidance to overcome the problems in coordination between engineer, artillery and maneuver units for the employment of RAAMS/ADAM.

c. **Proponent for action:** USAES, in conjunction with USAFAS
The M113 cannot maneuver as fast as the M1 or Bradley Fighting Vehicle.

a. **Discussion:** Discussions with commanders in 3ID indicate that there is a serious problem in mobility with respect to the speed of the M113 compared to the M1 or Bradley Fighting Vehicle. In short, the M113 cannot keep up on the battlefield and FIST chiefs are often left behind once the attack of an objective commences. Further, operation of the M113 at the extreme limits of its capabilities has resulted in excessive maintenance failures.

b. **Recommendation:** That USAFAS examine this problem further, determine doctrinal and logistics impacts, and provide recommendations to the FIST V Program Manager.

c. **Proponent for action:** USAFAS
OBSERVATION: 83-37  

56th Brigade is short Parts Vans.

a. Discussion: Presently the 56th Brigade is short eight parts vans. The fielding of Pershing II will require a plus up of 12. In the past, the parts vans have not been available. DARCOM is aware of the problem and is working on an acceptable substitution.

b. Recommendation: That USAFAS, in conjunction with PII PM and USAREUR, continue to monitor DARCOM progress to find an acceptable solution.

c. Proponent for action: USAFAS
Firefinder radars do not have the capability to provide effective support of all-weather indirect fire training.

a. Discussion: The weather conditions in FRG frequently preclude visual observation of the impact area at Grafenwoehr. It has been a long standing rule within the field artillery community that rounds must be observed in order to insure that safe data is being fired. In the past, FA units used AN/TPQ4 radars to observe the impact area during inclement weather. These radars are being replaced with Firefinder radars and are being phased out of the Army inventory. VII Corps Artillery units have conducted extensive tests using the Firefinder radars. The results of the tests are summarized below:

1. When properly positioned (optimum angle T less than 400 mils) the Firefinder provides reliable and accurate "friendly" fire data.

2. Because of positioning requirements, each firing battalion will require a dedicated firefinder radar during inclement weather.

3. The Firefinder radar will not record all rounds fired in a battery mission or battalion mass. Because of software parameters, only one round is tracked and recorded. In order to track all rounds, batteries must fire right by piece at 25-30 second intervals. In conclusion, Firefinder radars can be used to observe safe firing under controlled situations. Close coordination between radar and FDC will be required. Missions will have to be shot at the radar operators command, right by piece. In addition, there are obvious logistics and support problems which make this method of observation less than satisfactory in the long run.

b. Recommendations:

1. That USAFAS discuss possible software changes with the program manager to expand the friendly fire mode.

2. That USAFAS, with 7th ATC input, explore other possible solutions such as commercial radar or other commercial devices which could be used to observe and record rounds in the impact area during inclement weather.

c. Proponent for action: USAFAS
Production schedule slippages for new equipment fieldings have a major impact on field units when lateral and vertical considerations are not addressed.

a. **Discussion:** One example: The 1st Armored Division Artillery has been issued two Position Azimuth Determining System (PADS). The remaining set will not be issued for at least one year due to production and contract problems. MTOEs have been implemented and personnel spaces have been reduced based on the fielding of three PADS sets. USAREUR FM is working these problems; however, if manpower constraints prevent the restoration of personnel spaces, the DIVARTY will lose survey teams which will impact on mission accomplishment. The same kind of problem exists in the TAB battery where wire teams are being replaced by radio data links which have not been fielded yet.

b. **Recommendation:** That USAFAS, with USAREUR and TRADOC input, monitor and review production slippages in conjunction with the TOE/MTOE to reduce the impacts on fielded units.

c. **Proponent for action:** USAFAS
Pershing C3 is 1950 vintage.

a. Discussion: The 56th Brigade's communication systems have not kept pace with technological advances. Current trends in military communication are towards digital systems with various automatic features such as direct dial telephones and on line encryption. The 56th Brigade needs a switched communication system that permits the transmission of voice, digital data, and record copy. The primary system should be multichannel, with single channel radio and mobile subscriber terminal (MST). Presently, there is an ongoing USACAC action to develop a "strawman" Pershing signal battalion which would enhance communication to the 56th FA Brigade. Further, the TSM Pershing II is working to develop an objective communications system for Pershing II. USAFAS has submitted two proposed study topics for development by CGSC concerning Pershing II communications vulnerabilities and defensive measures; and the potential use of the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) for Pershing II.

b. Recommendation: That USAFAS and USACAC continue to develop improved communication systems for 56th Brigade.

c. Proponent for action: USAFAS, in conjunction with USACACDA
Integrated fielding strategies for new weapons/mobility systems are well planned but executed in a spotty manner.

a. Discussion: Although an Army-wide awareness of force modernization challenges exists and significant equipment fielding planning has been accomplished, fielding execution problems still occur. Major glitches embrace the purity of TOE's, assignment of critical MOS personnel, prompt arrival of ancillary equipment, training devices, technical and tactical doctrine, participation of new organization and tactical training teams, the construction of new ranges and the modification of training areas. It was also clear that NETT sustainment training will have to occur if modernizing units are not to lose their expertise after the first year. NETT must be improved to address organizational, tactical, and night operational issues. A clear need to expedite gunnery simulators exists. At present, ITV presents a bigger challenge than the BIFV. Major concerns of USAREUR units relative to reorganization under Division 86 relate to the new maintenance concepts and the size of the Headquarters and Tank Companies.

b. Recommendations:

1. That a hot line be established for receiving unit commanders to Service School Assistant Commandants.

2. That NETT sustainment training in the Service Schools be established.

3. That NOTT and tactical MTT's be fielded with NETT Program.

c. Proponent for action: USATRADOC
There are no Field Manuals (FM) on Abrams/Bradley Teams explaining movement, maneuver, and drills.

a. Discussion: LTC Downing, Seventh Army New Equipment Training Team, expressed concern over the lack of a FM on Abrams/Bradley Teams. The 3rd ID currently has the M-1 tank and NET training on the Bradley has begun. He believes, that these FMs are critical if the two organizations are to properly train together. He suggests that these FMs explain how the two organizations move together, maneuver together, and contain joint drills.

b. Recommendation: That the USAIS and USAARMS assess the possibility of producing this FM in the near future.

c. Proponent for action: USAIS, in conjunction with USAARMS
USAIS Firing Tables for both tank and Bradley fighting vehicles do not specify which size targets to use.

a. Discussion: The Commander, Seventh Army Training Center, expressed his concern over standardization of OPFOR targets. He stated that FORSCOM, USAREUR, and NATO all have different size targets which represent OPFOR vehicles. Soldiers in FORSCOM fire at one size while USAREUR units fire at another. He suggested that as part of the Army's standardization program, that target sizes be standardized.

b. Recommendation: That TRADOC, in conjunction with FORSCOM, USAREUR, and NATO, assess the possibility of standardizing OPFOR vehicle targets.

c. Proponent for action: USATRADOC
USAREUR Commanders expressed a desire to have a standard in the conduct of live fire exercises for squads and platoons.

a. **Discussion:** Several commanders expressed their desire for a standard for platoon/squad live fire exercises. (Exactly how many targets, expressed in percentages should the platoon/squad hit, i.e., 40% of the targets engaged or 80%.) These standards should include "E" type targets as well as vehicle type targets. Also, the condition for each percentage should be specified (i.e., "X" percentage under conditions of limited visibility and "X" percentage in daylight). A standard must also be established for the number of soldiers firing (i.e., if the squad has only five soldiers, should it be required to hit as many targets as a squad with 10 soldiers).

b. **Recommendation:** That USAIS assess the possibility of establishing standards for platoon/squad live fire exercises.

c. **Proponent for action:** USAIS
The field has enough manuals that tell what to do. What they need now are manuals/texts that explain how it's done.

a. **Discussion:** USAREUR brigade and battalion commanders expressed concern that TRADOC was publishing more than enough manuals that told the NCO and company grade officer what to do.

b. **Recommendation:** That the USAIS assess the possibility of publishing a wide variety of drills that explain to Squad/Platoon Leaders "How To" execute actions.

c. **Proponent for action:** USAIS
OBSERVATION: 83-46  SOURCE: USAIS

IOBC/IOAC does not provide adequate maintenance training.

a. Discussion: USAREUR Commanders, (Brigade, Battalion, Company, and Platoon Leaders) expressed concern over the lack of maintenance training provided Infantry Lieutenants and Captains. Their concerns generally centered on the inability of these officers to adequately inspect a piece of equipment (M113, 50 cal. M.G., etc) in order to determine its operability and to diagnose problems. Additional concern was expressed over the lack of experience/knowledge possessed in the area of PLL. It was suggested that these officers should be able to trace the "audit trail" of a requisition to determine the status of parts on order and how to read PLL computer printouts. An analysis of the IOBC/IOAC maintenance POI appears to be in order.

b. Recommendation: That USAIS evaluate the adequacy of IOBC/IOAC maintenance training.

c. Proponent for action: USAIS
OBSERVATION: 83-47

The Infantry BNCOC/ANCOC POI's do not provide adequate maintenance training.

a. **Discussion:** USAREUR commanders and senior NCO's expressed concern over the inadequate maintenance training provided Infantry NCO's attending the BNCOC/ANCOC courses. The commanders/NCO's suggested that too much time was dedicated to teaching skill level 1 subjects that could be better used teaching hands-on maintenance. The maintenance training suggested was not limited only to vehicle but included Infantry weapons systems and communications equipment.

b. **Recommendation:** That the USAIS evaluate the adequacy of the total maintenance training in the BNCOC/ANCOC POI's.

c. **Proponent for action:** USAIS
USAIS Noncommissioned Officers arriving in USAREUR from CONUS Light Infantry Divisions are inadequately trained on maintenance relative to M-l13 personnel carriers.

a. Discussion: USAREUR Commanders and senior NCOs expressed concern over the lack of maintenance experience/knowledge possessed by NCOs arriving in Europe from CONUS based Light/Airborne/Airmobile units. This lack of knowledge/experience allows junior enlisted soldiers to be more knowledgeable than their supervisors/leaders. This experience "GAP" often causes the inexperienced NCO to avoid becoming involved in the area of maintenance and, thus, compounding the problem. A system to train these NCOs prior to their arrival in USAREUR appears to be necessary.

b. Recommendation: That USAIS, in coordination with MILPERCEN, assess the possibility of providing a maintenance course for these NCOs enroute to USAREUR.

c. Proponent for action: USAIS
The POI for BNCOC has no common core subjects for all NCOs, does not require passing the APRT test, is not up to date on force modernization, and does not teach the NCO how to properly use training devices.

a. Discussion: The Commander, 7th Army Training Center expressed his concern over the current BNCOC POI. He expressed a desire for a "common core" of subjects to be taught to all NCOs. He also expressed his concern that the POI was not up to date with force modernization, Division 86, and the AirLand Battle. He expressed some concern about the lack of instruction provided the NCOs on how to use all of the extensive training devices such as MILES, Launch Effects Simulator (LES), and subcaliber devices. Finally, he would like to see a requirement established requiring passing the APRT as part of the POI.

b. Recommendations:

1. That TRADOC examine a concept of "common core" of subjects for the BNCOC POI and requisite requirements for course completion.

2. That a standardized program of instruction be implemented for BNCOC in regard to training devices.

c. Proponent for action: USATRADOC
The Commander's Packet, containing the Job Book, APRT scores, etc, placed in the Infantry OSUT trainees file, is not arriving in USAREUR.

a. Discussion: The VII Corps G1 stated that the unit commanders were not receiving the "Commander's Packet" from Infantry OSUT soldiers arriving in USAREUR. As a former Infantry OSUT Battalion Commander, he initiated a study to see where the packets were being lost. He found that the packets were not arriving with the soldiers' field file in USAREUR. He could not comment on the proponent's Commander's Packet.

b. Recommendation: That the Fort Benning ATC Commander assess the possibility of modifying the current procedures for transmitting the "Commander's Packet" to the receiving unit.

c. Proponent for action: USAIS
Expanded training concerning All-Source Collection Management and Dissemination is required.

a. Discussion: Training is provided in MI Advanced Officer, Warrant Officer and Imagery Exploitation Officer Courses. All-Source is recognized as a key factor in managing and disseminating information from a variety of sources—-from Division to National levels. To strengthen capabilities within Division, it is advantageous to provide appropriate training to ANCOC and MOS Courses (e.g., 98C, 96B, 98J).

b. Recommendation: That USAICS examine appropriate enlisted courses and determine if additional training is required in All-Source Collection Management and Dissemination.

c. Proponent for action: USAICS
MI analytical personnel (e.g., 98C), as well as certain collection/analyst personnel (e.g., 98G), need to become more familiar with basic computer/automation technology.

a. **Discussion:** New automated systems being fielded require considerable interface with basic computer technology/operations (e.g., TCAC). Field units report that a number of MOS require extensive exposure to basic fundamentals of automation—computer technology to allow expeditious integration into field operations.

b. **Recommendation:** That USAICS examine/evaluate all courses of instruction, particularly analytical courses, to determine requirement for additional training in computer technology. Officer and NCOES courses should be similarly evaluated.

c. **Proponent for action:** USAICS
EW doctrine to support CEWI operations is inadequate.

a. Discussion: This is regarded as a long standing problem. Field units require base-line doctrine soonest to facilitate standardized procedures and operations. USAICS is currently developing FM 34-1 (EW Operations) in final draft, as well as "How To" manual for C & J Platoon operations in support of Brigade operations. The umbrella document of FM 34-1 and foundation C & J platoon document should serve as initial vehicles to further develop follow-on requirements.

b. Recommendations:

1. That USAICS insure above documents are published as scheduled, and accelerate development of follow-on publications.

2. That the doctrine be made available to other service schools for immediate incorporation within appropriate courses to facilitate understanding by the user.

c. Proponent for action: USAICS
Field units still require documented doctrine concerning exchange of compacted intelligence data during field training exercises, as well as facilitating dissemination to supported Commanders in an expeditious manner.

a. Discussion: If information is to be of value, procedures must be developed to allow both the exercising of functions and provisions to rapidly report perishable information to supported Commanders. USAICS is currently coordinating with NSA to modify existing regulations or publish new document(s) to facilitate requirement.

b. Recommendations:

1. That USAICS go forward with an official request, through channels, to NSA to resolve this issue expeditiously.

2. That efforts be expanded to include all Corps, Theater and National assets to clearly determine roles, responsibilities, channels, and hand-off procedures.

c. Proponent for action: USAICS
Certain MI specialties need to increase their awareness of the battlefield dynamics to facilitate expeditious reporting of perishable information.

a. Discussion: In a fast moving, dynamic situation, MI collectors, as well as analysts, need to be familiar with the dynamics of the battlefield. In particular, the operator (e.g., 98 CMF Collectors) must be able to identify, alert, and/or report, those critical events which are time sensitive. Field units see a requirement to further develop this capability with selective analysts and operators.

b. Recommendation: That USAICS further evaluate requirement to provide additional training regarding dynamics of battlefield; review existing courses of instruction and determine adequacy of noted training.

c. Proponent for action: USAICS
Qualification of personnel assigned to the US Military Liaison Mission (USMLM).

a. **Discussion:** Special Operations (SF) enlisted personnel have been assigned to the USMLM upon request. In view of current mission and training of personnel for their roles, ASI 'S' identifier (to become MOS 18 in FY 84) should be assigned to drivers and enlisted assistants. FAO trained officers would assist the effort.

b. **Recommendations:**
   1. That ASI 'S' (subsequently MOS 18 in FY 84) NCO's be assigned to USMLM on a permanent basis.

c. **Proponent for action:** USAJFKSWC
Reconnaissance role for Special Operations Forces (SOF).

a. Discussion:

1. A draft Land Strategic Reconnaissance (LSR) study (TS) was initiated at the direction of the CG, TRADOC. This study is to serve as an adjustment of the SOF Mission Area Analysis (MAA). Additionally, LSR will articulate requirements of the mission of strategic reconnaissance (strategic intelligence) for Special Forces and will examine current units' capabilities, limitations, and equipment shortfalls in the performance of this mission. Guidance has been provided to expand the study to theaters other than Europe.

2. Based on comments received from DA DCSOPS, a coordinated effort between Cdr, TRADOC; Cdr, USAIS; Cdr, USAIC; Cdr, USAAVNC; Cdr, USACAC; and Cdr, USAJFKSWC will be required to produce the LSR study. The DA DCSOPS current position regarding the study is that the reconnaissance requirement should be based on voids in our ability to gain information by other means and on the need for redundancy. The requirements to form reconnaissance elements in a given theater must be related to all intelligence collection means to include other HUMINT sources such as agents. Their relationship should be articulated in a fully developed operational concept.

b. Recommendation: That DA obtain EUCOM/USAREUR comments on draft LSR study.

c. Proponent for action: USAJFKSWC
There are insufficient camouflage screens in the Division Military Police Company (19-217J).

a. Discussion: Division provost marshals recommend that each vehicle within the company have camouflage screens. Units often submit MTOE's to get additional camouflage screens for each vehicle. However, this is not the solution for this problem; the TOE's need to be changed to authorize each company the appropriate number of camouflage screens.

b. Recommendation: That USAMPS evaluate this deficiency and attempt to obtain sufficient camouflage screens for each vehicle.

c. Proponent for action: USAMPS
Enlisted soldiers in Military Police (95B) are receiving back-to-back assignments in nuclear security.

a. Discussion: In both V Corps and the 59th Ordnance Bde, commanders and NCO's indicated that soldiers are receiving back to back assignments to nuclear security units rather than alternate assignments to Division Military Police Companies and other Military Police duties.

b. Recommendation: That USAMPS coordinate with MILPERCEN to insure as much as possible that enlisted personnel do not receive back to back assignments to nuclear security units.

c. Proponent for action: USAMPS
Rear area battle command and control in VII Corps is the responsibility of the Corps DCG, and not COSCOM commander as indicated in TRADOC Pam 525-30.

a. **Discussion:** VII Corps (14th MP Gp Cdr) does not agree with the operational concept. The COSCOM commander is too busy supporting; is not interested in RAP; is interested in being protected. COSCOM does not have communications, equipment or staff to do RAP. The rear area commander should be the Corps DCG.

b. **Recommendation:** That CAC evaluate VII Corps position.

c. **Proponent for action:** USACGSC
CMF 55 and 27 NCOs (SR., E-5’s and E-6’s) lack basic soldiering, management, communication, and leadership skills.

a. Discussion: USAREUR commanders (from Corps to Company) expressed concern over the lack of basic soldiering, management, communication, and leadership skills among non-commissioned officers. NCOs for the most part are technically competent (CMF 55 and 27). These same NCOs, however, have difficulty in basic soldiering skills such as perimeter defense in support of rear area protection plans. They are not doing well in supervising and providing leadership for young soldiers. These NCOs need more and better training in leadership, communication, and management skills. NCOs also lack a good understanding of logistical doctrine.

b. Recommendation: That USAMMCS assess this weakness among NCOs in CMFs 55 and 27 and consider emphasizing these areas in the common core for the basic technical course or in the soldierization training conducted by the school brigade.

c. Proponent for action: USAMMCS
CSS junior officers are weak in basic unit skills, rear area protection techniques, and duties and responsibilities of an officer.

a. Discussion: CSS junior officers need more training in basic unit skills such as unit supply, organization maintenance, and unit training. CSS junior officers also lack competence in rear area protection concepts and relative basic soldiering skills (perimeter defense, patrolling techniques, etc). Some junior officers also need more emphasis on duties and responsibilities of an officer (e.g., duties and responsibilities in dealing with drug abuse and other misconduct among soldiers). In the technical area, CSS officers need more hands-on and practical exercise type training.

b. Recommendation: That USAMMCS consider tasking the school brigade to establish a basic soldiering skills program with emphasis on rear area protection tasks for their officer basic course students. USAMMCS should also consider increasing their POI training time dedicated to basic unit skills in the officer basic and advance courses and increasing hands-on and practical exercise type training.

c. Proponent for action: USAMMCS
The MMCS officer advanced course should be tailored to meet individual needs.

a. Discussion: The MMCS officer advanced course should be tailored to the experience and needs of students. The varying needs of students who have or have not had command, who have had the ordnance basic course, or have transferred from another branch must be recognized. Training requirements for the officers next duty assignment should be stressed during his instruction at USAMMCS (e.g., providing a DAO track for those officers being assigned as DAOs). More emphasis is also needed in the areas of RAP, doctrine concepts, force modernization, and Division 86 organizations.

b. Recommendation: That USAMMCS consider expanding its modular concept for the officer advanced course and add instruction on the areas mentioned above.

c. Proponent for action: USAMMCS
OBSERVATION: 83-64  
SOURCE: USAMMCS

There appears to be a lack of understanding of emerging ammunition doctrine (DIV 86) among USAREUR personnel.

a. Discussion: USAREUR personnel do not have a complete understanding of ammunition doctrine. For example:
   - Ammunition flow.
   - Ammunition - Transportation interface.
   - Ammunition - Communications interface.
   - Integration of modernized munition supply and resupply vehicles into doctrine.
   - Impact of new munitions packaging concepts.
   - Impact of new missile handling equipment, munition containerization and emerging ROBOTICS concepts.

b. Recommendation: That USAMMCS review doctrinal instruction and include doctrine articles in the USAMMCS courses as well as other bulletins.

c. Proponent for action: USAMMCS
USAREUR is uncertain or lacks an understanding of chemical ammo logistical procedures.

a. Discussion: Ammo handlers and users currently do not have a grasp on the procedures and techniques for the requisitioning, receipt, issue, storage, safety and handling of chemical ammunition. MMCS trained personnel lack the experience and knowledge to effectively advise the user concerning chemical ammo log matters.

b. Recommendation: That USAMMCS review chemical ammo data presented in all courses of instruction and add the coverage of chemical ammunition and logistic matters where appropriate.

c. Proponent for action: USAMMCS
TOW Dragon Repairer duties (MOS 27E) are too extensive in connection with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle.

a. **Discussion:** MOS 27E is currently responsible for repair of the following systems:

- DRAGON.
- Ground TOW.
- TOW II.
- TOW Field Test Set (TFTS).
- Bradley Fighting Vehicle (TOW).

The TFTS and BFV are separate ASIs for MOS 27E. These responsibilities have become too extensive for one MOS.

b. **Recommendation:** That USAMMCS study MOS 27E to determine the appropriate duties and responsibilities.

c. **Proponent for action:** USAMMCS
OBSERVATION: 83-67

Metal Inert Gas and Tungsten Inert Gas (MIG/TIG) welding equipment repair responsibility is not assigned.

a. Discussion: MOS 44B personnel are taught basic adjustment and repair procedures for MIG/TIG welding equipment, but if more extensive repair is required (particularly on the welding gun itself) there does not appear to be a clearly defined responsibility assigned as to who will/can do it. Unserviceable welding guns are common in maintenance units and they do not know how/where to have them repaired.

b. Recommendation: That USALOGC study the situation and affix responsibility for repair training and repair; consideration should be given to the inclusion of this issue in the Communications and Electronics (CE) repair study.

c. Proponent for action: USALOGC
Many officers and enlisted personnel come from TRADOC schools in CONUS and are lacking in detailed or specific training required by USAREUR commanders. USAREUR has certain unique training requirements that are not totally compatible with current Army doctrine being developed and taught by TRADOC schools.

a. Discussion: The 7th Army Training Center and many major USAREUR units have established their own training programs tailored to suit their respective situations. Generally, this is done well; however, training may not necessarily be in line with standard Army policy and doctrine. Possible problems with many "off-line" courses are: duplication, redundancy, lack of standardization, and lack of quality control.

b. Recommendation: That TRADOC explore teaching more USAREUR unique subjects, policies, and procedures to those persons identified for European assignment.

c. Proponent for action: USATRADOC
ADA units have specialized communication requirements that require institutional training.

a. Discussion: Communication assemblages within the existing HAWK units and the soon to be fielded PATRIOT units have unique features, interface devices and requirements. The major assemblages are common items and are taught within TRADOC schools but few sources (exportable as well as institutional) are available for the special needs. The procedures and requirements are sufficiently difficult so as to eliminate OJT as the sole training methodology. Additionally, knowledge of ADA doctrine and employment procedures is vital to Signal supervisors within ADA units (officers and key NCO's) to plan and implement General Electronic support.

b. Recommendation: That USASIGS and USAADS coordinate on exportable and institutional training for Signal personnel assigned to ADA units.

c. Proponent for action: USASIGS, in conjunction with USAADS.
Some crypto equipment repairers are arriving in USAREUR without formal certification for VINSON repair.

a. Discussion: Crypto repairers (MOS 31S, 3IT, 32F and 32G) must be formally certified on each item of crypto within their MOS. Certification can be accomplished only by TRADOC instructors, NSA and selected other activities. Trainees are awarded VINSON certification, among others, upon successful completion of the appropriate AIT course. The current problem lies with career soldiers who completed AIT prior to the fielding of VINSON and now arrive in Germany without the requisite training and certification.

b. Recommendations:

1. That USASIGS coordinate with MILPERCEN, to identify those individuals alerted for USAREUR, lacking certification and schedule appropriate TDY enroute.

2. That USASIGS arrange for in-country training for those requiring certification.

c. Proponent for action: USASIGS, in conjunction with MILPERCEN.
OBSERVATION: 83-71  SOURCE: USASIGS

Manual control procedures for C-E functions are inadequate for the automated systems and the fast-moving scenarios within USAREUR.

a. **Discussion:** The current method of controlling frequency allocations, VINSON variable schemes, programming sheets for automatic switchboards and circuit designations are totally manual, paper-based and inflexible. Literally dozens of pages are required to control the operations of any signal node. Upon displacement and/or force structure changes, multiple changes are required--this involves pen and ink changes and/or new coding sheets and the distribution and control of those changes during major exercises is virtually impossible. Network configuration is totally dependent on determining the proper, revised parameters, converting these to machine instructions, distributing the instructions throughout the network and ordering execution of the revised instructions. The current procedures do not allow any of these procedures to occur in an efficient manner. The problem is especially critical at division and higher signal nodes.

b. **Recommendation:** That USASIGS provide a POC to coordinate ongoing efforts and develop common procedures/hardware, etc.

c. **Proponent for action:** USASIGS
Commercial facsimile is a fact in the divisions and corps in Europe and CONUS.

a. **Discussion:** The fielding of a tactical facsimile has been delayed. Units have filled the void by leasing a significant number of commercial machines. These have proven the need for facsimile in the field. Record traffic as we used to know it has all but disappeared in the division, and has been greatly reduced in the corps. A problem exists in that no standard commercial fax is being used and therefore a possibility exists for a lack of interoperability between units. This is especially true when CONUS units deploy to Europe.

b. **Recommendation:** That USASIGS followup on the interface of facsimile machines and distribute results of the C-E test board to the field.

c. **Proponent for action:** USASIGS
Within the C-E arena, modernization and integration actions are overtaxing the capabilities of in-country coordinators.

a. Discussion: The Force Modernization program is producing over 300 new C-E items, several of which are already being fielded within USAREUR with many more on the way. All of these systems require packaging of end items, spare parts, manuals, TAADS updates and trained individuals. Not all of these items are within the purview of the PM/TSM system; the items are generated by multiple developers and cover the range of weapons systems components, avionics upgrades, intelligence programs, strategic communications, NBC equipment, command and control systems, CSS automation, TMDE and automated test facilities and families or cryptographic equipment. Fielding schedules are dynamic; much of the logistics package is contractor-provided; many items require unique ASI or functional course training; most items require authorization changes; the information flow to in-country coordinators is slow and in-country constraints/needs are not fully appreciated by developers. It is especially critical that fielding be scheduled around the major exercise schedules and that a new scheme of changing TAADS documents be used--toploading is probably the only means to simultaneously and accurately revise all documents within required windows. The TAADS issue must also be viewed from the aspect that most C-E items are being fielded in non-signal units: virtually every branch and TOE/MTOE/TDA series is impacted.

b. Recommendation: That USASIGS continue to push the case for a C-E integration process.

c. Proponent for action: USASIGS
OBSERVATION: 83-74

SOURCE: USASIGS

There is an increased requirement for low fidelity equipment and system simulation in Europe.

a. Discussion: The fielding of new equipment and systems in Europe makes realistic training between major exercises an absolute necessity. Signal units cannot use major exercises to train operators and maintenance personnel. Resources preclude the use of major signal only exercises for training. Europe, in conjunction with the Signal School, has purchased 20 Video Disc systems. These will be deployed in the 7th, 22d, 93d Sig Bde and at the C-E school at Bad Toelz.

b. Recommendations:

1. That USASIGS provide Europe low fidelity simulation (Video Disc) as it is developed for use in the school.

2. That USASIGS, in coordination with Europe, set priorities for additional disc production based on European needs.

c. Proponent for action: USASIGS
Operators of most tactical communications assemblages are required to possess a USAREUR motor vehicle operator's license and operate a power generator.

a. **Discussion:** An integral part of most Signal Corps operators' job is the operation of a motor vehicle and associated power equipment. Lack of qualified licensed drivers in tactical signal units has been a problem in USAREUR for many years. Most soldiers arrive in Europe without the required training and experience to pass the USAREUR drivers test. The burden for training those soldiers on rules of the road, road signs and driving skills is placed on the unit. Most units do not have the required assets for providing such training and the lack of qualified drivers severely strains their ability to mobilize. Virtually all operators must operate power generators. Training within institutions is sketchy.

b. **Recommendation:** That the Signal Center review and study the problem of driver and generator training and provide assistance to field commanders in resolving the problem.

c. **Proponent for action:** USASIGS
There is a critical shortage of certain signal MOS in Europe (31M, 26L, 31E and 31Z).

a. Discussion: Visits to units surfaced personnel shortages in critical MOS. While not all units suffered shortages in the same MOS, it was evident that there is a Europe-wide problem. Many CONUS units are short these same MOS, yet the Army-wide figures show that these MOS are near 100% strength. There is little or no shortfall in the programmed training of these MOS in the Signal School.

b. Recommendation: That USASIGS coordinate with MILPERCEN to determine if the Army-wide figures are correct. If correct, USASIGS determine where overages exist and request actions be taken to reallocate these critical personnel resources.

c. Proponent for action: USASIGS
Mid-level NCO training throughout Signal MOS is seriously deficient. The problem is especially acute in this era of high technology and force modernization.

a. **Discussion:** The issue pertains throughout the Signal Corps but is critical in USAREUR because of the mission and arrival of many new items/systems. USASIGS is initiating 16 PTC/BTC courses in FY 84 to fill this need but the number of people to be trained, mission requirements and travel constraints will preclude USAREUR units from taking full advantage of CONUS courses.

b. **Recommendation:** That USASIGS, in coordination with 7ATC, develop a strategy to implement critical PTC/BTC course in theater (e.g., MOS 05G, 31M, 31E).

c. **Proponent for action:** USASIGS
Non-Divisional Aviation Intermediate Maintenance: TOE 55-459H is inadequate to support the organizational and operational concepts for the AirLand Battle.

a. Discussion: Draft TOE 55-459J has been sent to field units, staffs and agencies for review and comments. The basic concept of this new TOE is to provide an organizational structure for the Bn to task organize and fix forward to support AirLand Battle concepts. Comments received to date confirm that the concept is sound. Upon receipt of all comments, a final review will be made.

b. Recommendation: That comments received be reviewed in detail and considered for incorporation as they apply to worldwide application of this TOE in support of the AirLand Battle.

c. Proponent for action: USATSCH
Medium Lift Helicopter Units: Concerns were expressed that personnel authorizations for Medium Lift Helicopter Units in USAREUR are not commensurate with the number of aircraft assigned.

a. Discussion: Three CH-47 Medium Lift Helicopter Companies assigned to USAREUR have 20 aircraft each with MTOE authorization for personnel to support only 16 aircraft.

b. Recommendation: Recommend that USATSCH, LOGC, USAAVNC, and CAC explore, with DA DCSLOG and DA DCSOPS, the feasibility of either increasing personnel authorizations or reducing the number of aircraft assigned to Medium Lift Companies in USAREUR.

c. Proponent for action: USALOGC
Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Support for the Aerial Exploitation Battalion: Concerns were expressed that the necessary aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM) support for the 1st Aerial Exploitation Battalion (AEB) does not presently exist within USAREUR.

a. **Discussion:** Doctrinally, AVIM support for the AEB is provided by a separate augmentation to TOE 55-459H (non-divisional AVIM Bn). TOE 55-459J has been revised to include the AEB support augmentation and has been received in USAREUR as part of the worldwide staffing process. Verbal comments indicate that the new organization is adequate, provided that the capability can be colocated with the AEB. The decision to augment the non-divisional AVIM rather than make the support organic to the AEB was based on space constraints and to take maximum advantage of the common skills and test equipment that exists in the AVIM Bn. Stationing considerations create unique problems for USAREUR but the support concept being pursued for support of the 1st AEB embraces the augmentation to TOE 55-459J.

b. **Recommendation:** That the proponent continue to fine-tune the augmentation to TOE 55-459J for support of the Aerial Exploitation Battalion.

c. **Proponent for action:** USATSCH
PART FOUR: DISTRIBUTION

ARMY STAFF


MACOM and DA Agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEAGC-EX</td>
<td>APO New York 09403</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEAGC-TRADOC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEAGC-ATC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J5, RCJ5-E (10)</td>
<td>Mac Dill AFB, FL 33068</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG (5)</td>
<td>Hawaii 96861</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFOP-OXJ (5)</td>
<td>Ft McPherson, GA 30330</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSOP-SO (5)</td>
<td>Ft Sam Houston, TX 78234</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAOPS-PL (5)</td>
<td>Arlington Hall Station, VA 22212</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTP-P (25)</td>
<td>Ft Monroe, VA 23651</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APOP-SP-M (5)</td>
<td>Ft Shafter, HI 96858</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC-OPS-OI (5)</td>
<td>Ft Huachuca, AZ 85613</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF-ED (5)</td>
<td>APO San Francisco 96301</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRCRE-FM (5)</td>
<td>5001 Eisenhower Avenue,</td>
<td>Alexandria,</td>
<td>VA 22333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAPC-MOC (5)</td>
<td>200 Stovall Street,</td>
<td>Alexandria,</td>
<td>VA 22332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT-PLO (5)</td>
<td>WASH DC 20315</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGUZ-RO (5)</td>
<td>9700 Page Blvd,</td>
<td>St Louis,</td>
<td>MO 63132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATCT-BA-SPS (5)</td>
<td>Fort Hood, TX 76544</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIPP-TS (5)</td>
<td>5611 Columbia Pike,</td>
<td>Falls Church,</td>
<td>VA 22041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACSC-POP (5)</td>
<td>Ft Belvoir, VA 22060</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAEN-CWO-E (5)</td>
<td>Pulaski Bldg, WASH DC 20314</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOAV-MO (5)</td>
<td>Rm 5A462, Pentagon,</td>
<td>WASH DC 20310</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANOPS-OP (5)</td>
<td>Bldg 46, Ft McNair,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJQC-OT (5)</td>
<td>APO San Francisco 96343</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINCA-I (5)</td>
<td>Bldg #1, Ft Benjamin Harrison,</td>
<td></td>
<td>IN 46249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DALO-LEP (5)</td>
<td>New Cumberland Army Depot,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEACRM-FM (5)</td>
<td>New Cumberland, PA 17070</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ft Sheridan, IL 60037</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>CDR USATHIRD</td>
<td>AFRD-DT (5)</td>
<td>Ft McPherson, GA 30330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR 193IB</td>
<td>AFZU-DPT-FM (5)</td>
<td>Ft Clayton, PN, APO Miami 34004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR I CORPS</td>
<td>G3 (5)</td>
<td>Ft Lewis, WA 98433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR III CORPS</td>
<td>G3 (5)</td>
<td>Ft Hood, TX 76544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR V CORPS</td>
<td>G3 (5)</td>
<td>APO New York 09079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR VII CORPS</td>
<td>G3 (5)</td>
<td>APO New York 09107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR XVIII ABN CORPS</td>
<td>AFZA-DPT-EX (5)</td>
<td>Ft Bragg, NC 28307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR 1ST ARM DIV</td>
<td>G3 (5)</td>
<td>APO New York 09326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR 2D ARM DIV</td>
<td>G3 (5)</td>
<td>Ft Hood, TX 76544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR 3D ARM DIV</td>
<td>G3 (5)</td>
<td>APO New York 09039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR 1ST INF DIV</td>
<td>G3 (5)</td>
<td>Ft Riley, KS 66442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR 2D INF DIV</td>
<td>G3 (5)</td>
<td>APO San Francisco 96224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR 3D INF DIV</td>
<td>G3 (5)</td>
<td>APO New York 09036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR 4TH INF DIV</td>
<td>G3 (5)</td>
<td>Ft Carson, CO 80913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR 5TH INF DIV</td>
<td>G3 (5)</td>
<td>Ft Polk, LA 71459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR 7TH INF DIV</td>
<td>G3 (5)</td>
<td>Ft Ord, CA 93941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR 8TH INF DIV</td>
<td>G3 (5)</td>
<td>APO New York 09111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR 9TH INF DIV</td>
<td>G3 (5)</td>
<td>Ft Lewis, WA 98433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR 24TH INF DIV</td>
<td>G3 (5)</td>
<td>Ft Stewart, GA 31313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR 25TH INF DIV</td>
<td>G3 (5)</td>
<td>Schofield Barracks, HI 96857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR 1ST AIR CAV DIV</td>
<td>G3 (5)</td>
<td>Ft Hood, TX 76544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR 82D ABN DIV</td>
<td>G3 (5)</td>
<td>Ft Bragg, NC 28307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDR 101ST ABN DIV</td>
<td>G3 (5)</td>
<td>Ft Campbell, KY 42223</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CENTERS AND SCHOOLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMDT USAHC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDT USACAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDT USALOGC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDT USASSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDT USAENS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDT USAIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDT USAADS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDT USATRANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDT USASIGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDT USAARMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDT USAGMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDT USAMPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDT USAAVNS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDT USAFAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDT USACMLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDT USAIMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDT USAICS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDT USAISD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDT USAOCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDT USAMMCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDT USAAHS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AFPP Ft-Lvn 84-0144-1M-10 January 1984

-89-