A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF PLANNING IMPERATIVES APPLICABLE TO HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATIONS

BY

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16 APRIL 1984

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Approved for public release distribution unlimited.
This paper will provide the reader a better understanding of specific planning imperatives that must be taken into consideration when planning for military hostage rescue operations. In order to accomplish this, the paper will critically examine four major rescue missions that were attempted or completed between the period November 1970 and April 1980. Operations discussed, in chronological order, include the Son Tay raid (November 1970), the Mayaguez crisis (May 1975), the Entebbe raid (July 1976), and the Iranian hostage rescue attempt (April 1980). A brief overview of the specifics of each of the four
operations will be provided followed by a discussion of hostage rescue operations in general. Based on the historical lessons of success and failure gleaned from the above operations, the paper will identify specific planning imperatives that appear to be common to all such missions. Since the frequency of terrorist and hostage taking incidents appears to be on the increase, the ultimate intent of this paper is to provide future military contingency planners a broad but comprehensive analysis of these imperatives to aid them in their planning task.
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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM

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INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

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INTRODUCTION

Hostage rescue operations are like icebergs. Occasionally, after a brief but brilliant success or a dismal failure, we are allowed a momentary glimpse of only the very tip of the berg. Most often, due to operational security and sensitivity requirements, we seldom immediately see the nine tenths of the operation that has purposely remained hidden beneath the waves. However, in today’s world of mass media, with its rapid proliferation of the spoken and written word, it is only a matter of time before we are exposed to the details of an attempted or completed hostage rescue mission is its entirety. No sooner had the word of the aborted US rescue attempt in Iran on 25 April 1980 hit the news media, when dozens of columnists, journalists, editors, congressional committees, defense analysts, political candidates and armchair strategists began to expound a surfeit of commentary as to the inadequacy of the planning effort, the mistakes in execution and their own personal theories as to the reasons for failure. Though some of the more perceptive of these individuals have hit upon several valid criticisms of the operation, it is this author’s contention that most can never fully appreciate the enormity of the task at hand until they have personally participated in the actual planning for such an operation under the omnipresent constraints that inevitably surround that effort.

The purpose of this paper is to give the reader a better appreciation of hostage rescue operations in general, particularly with regard to the planning imperatives behind them. To do this, we will critically examine four attempted or completed hostage rescue operations: Son Tay
The first of the operations chronologically, was the raid (code name "Kingpin") on the Son Tay prison compound approximately 23 miles from Hanoi, capital of North Vietnam, on 21 November 1970. The mission of the 56-man heliborne assault force was to rescue 61 US prisoners of war (PWs) believed to have been held captive there. Planning for the raid had begun six months earlier. During that period the rescue force secretly rehearsed the primary and several backup assault plans. On the evening of 20 November, the rescue force, including 105 aircraft from five air bases in Thailand and three aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin (for diversionary airstrikes), launched so as to converge on their respective targets in what was to become the most extensive night operation of the Southeast Asia conflict.\footnote{After a grueling 340 mile, air-refueled flight, the assault force successfully landed in the Son Tay compound at 2:18 AM (local time) on 21 November to find the prison camp empty. Despite a firefight with what appeared to be about 200 Chinese or Russian troops as a result of a helicopter inadvertently landing in a wrong location, total friendly casualties for the entire operation}
consisted of only one man slightly wounded and a broken ankle. Estimates of enemy dead vary between 100 and 200 KIA. After only 27 minutes on the ground at Son Tay the force successfully withdrew to their launch/recovery bases in Thailand. Though the tactical plans were meticulously executed, the mission was considered a failure, primarily due to a major intelligence oversight. It was later revealed that the POWs held at Son Tay had been removed from the camp by the North Vietnamese some four and a half months earlier because of persistent flooding in the area. The terrible irony was that the flooding had most likely been caused by Operation "Popeye," a covert US weather modification/cloud seeding experimental program in the region. For some Americans the Son Tay raid became yet another manifestation of the US failure in Vietnam. For others, the mission became a symbol of hope for eventual recovery of all our POWs and some listed as MIA. In any case, a major positive effect of the mission was that the North Vietnamese were forced to consolidate our POWs, thus "liberating" many prisoners from an existence of years of isolation and near isolation.

The Mayaguez incident occurred during the period 12-15 May 1975. Unlike the Son Tay rescue operation, which had been carefully planned and executed by special operations forces in the utmost secrecy, the recovery of the US merchant ship, SS Mayaguez, was conducted in an open, ad hoc, crisis response environment by conventional military forces. The Mayaguez, an obscure vessel of US registry (and the first fully containerised ship in the merchant fleet) had been enroute from Hong Kong to Sattahip, Thailand with a containerised cargo of commercial items including food, clothing, medical supplies and mail. On the afternoon of 12 May 1975, in the vicinity of Poulo Wai Island, approximately 60
miles southwest of the Cambodian port of Kompong Som, Cambodian revolutionary government naval forces fired upon and boarded the Mayaguez, seized the vessel and her 40-man crew and began to proceed to the Cambodian mainland. During the next three and one-half days, the US mounted a major, joint military assault and recovery operation involving Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force personnel and assets against Cambodian communist forces on Koh Tang Island, another offshore island 30 miles to the north of Poulo Wai, where the Mayaguez lay anchored and her crew was believed to be held prisoner. Additional retaliatory airstrikes were conducted against the Cambodian mainland at Ream airfield. On 15 May the Mayaguez was recovered intact and her crew returned by the Cambodians to US custody, but not without cost. Another intelligence failure had grossly underestimated the Cambodian military forces and weapons on Koh Tang Island and US casualties were high with 18 killed in the assault and 50 wounded. Eight helicopters were lost in action on or near the island and one crashed in Thailand enroute to the crisis area which accounted for an additional 23 dead. Prompt and decisive action on the part of the Ford Administration had resulted in the successful recovery of the ship and her crew and a concomitant boost in US self-image.

The incident did, however, refocus Congressional attention on the 1973 War Powers Resolution which affects the President’s ability to commit US military forces in crisis situations.

The Entebbe operation of 4 July 1976 was originally code named "Thunderbolt" and later renamed "Operation Jonathan" after Lieutenant Colonel Yonni (Jonathan) Netanyahu, the commander of the Israeli assault force who was killed in action during the rescue mission. The gesture of renaming the operation reflected an overwhelming national sentiment of gratitude on the part of the Israeli people. The Entebbe rescue was
similar to both the Son Tay and Mayaguez operations in that like Son Tay, the operation was conducted with Operations Security (OPSEC) and the need for absolute secrecy as driving factors, and, as with the Mayaguez crisis, time was of the essence. The crisis began on 27 June 1976, when Air France Flight 139, enroute from Tel Aviv via Athens to Paris, was skyjacked by ten Palestinian terrorists (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and taken, via a refueling stop in Libya, to Entebbe airport in Uganda. Facts surrounding the skyjack operation would indicate a high degree of complicity on the part of Ugandan President Idi Amin. In exchange for the passengers the skyjackers demanded release of other terrorists being held in Israel, France, Switzerland, Kenya and West Germany. Threats to kill the passengers and blow up the aircraft were made and deadlines for demands were established. Some non-Israeli hostages were released eventually, but 93 remained and an additional 12 airline crew members. Shortly after the aircraft had been hijacked, Israeli commando forces were secretly placed on alert, preliminary plans for a rescue attempt were drawn up and training exercises and rehearsals were conducted. After receiving a second terrorist ultimatum, the rescue force, consisting of four C-130 transport aircraft loaded with assault teams, was launched on 3 July 1976 from Tel Aviv and quietly landed at Entebbe airport shortly after midnight on 4 July. Within minutes, seven of the terrorists had been eliminated and it is believed three were taken prisoner for later interrogation. Only 53 minutes after initial touchdown of the rescue force, the surviving 102 hostages were enroute to Israel via a refueling stop in Nairobi. Total ground time for the entire operation was 90 minutes. Casualties included three civilian hostages, five civilians wounded, one officer killed and four
soldiers wounded (one seriously). The raid was deemed an unquestionable success in the eyes of Israel and the rest of the world and became a model to be emulated in part, by the planners of the Iranian rescue attempt.

The Iranian hostage crisis began on 4 November 1979 with the seizure of the US embassy in Teheran by Iranian militants. It marked the beginning of an extremely difficult period for both the Carter Administration and the American people. During the 444 days following the seizure until the 53 hostages were released, President Carter listened to a myriad of proposals for freeing them, to include the use of nuclear weapons against Iran. At Presidential direction, preliminary planning for a rescue operation began only two days after the embassy was taken. Operation "Eagle Claw" became the name of the operation to free the hostages with "Rice Bowl" the code name for the planning phase of that mission. The final plan was, of necessity, extremely complex and demanding. Time, distances involved and the location of the hostages became major obstacles. Essentially, three US Air Force troop-carrying MC-130 Combat Talons (special operations configured C-130s) and three ground-refueling configured EC-130s would depart from the island of Masirah off the coast of Oman and fly to a site in Iran's Dasht-e-Kavir desert, called "Desert One," some 200 miles southeast of Teheran. Here, they would await the arrival of eight Navy RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters (flown by Marine pilots) which had launched from the carrier Nimitz in the Gulf of Oman and flown the 600 miles to the rendezvous site. On arrival, the helicopters would refuel from the C-130s and onload a specially trained US Army assault team of 90 men. Early in the planning for the rescue operation it was identified that an absolute minimum of six flyable helicopters would be required at this point to
lift the assault force and their equipment to the next location. If this criterion was not met, the mission would have to be aborted at Desert One. (The number of helicopters selected for the operation was to become a key issue for debate long after the rescue attempt had failed.) Once the helicopters had refueled and unloaded the assault force, the C-130s would return to Masirah and the helicopters would proceed to several hide sites—one for the assault team and one for the helicopters in the vicinity of Garmser. Virtually all operations were to take place under cover of darkness. The assault team would eventually be met by DOD agents who had been placed in Teheran several days before and after a series of covert linkups, would be provided a number of Mercedes trucks that had been stored in a warehouse on the outskirts of Teheran. The team would be divided into three elements and use the trucks to position themselves for an assault on the Embassy compound. Once the tactical assault plan had been executed and the hostages freed, the helicopters orbiting north of Teheran would land in the vicinity of the compound (or in nearby Amjadieh soccer stadium, if the compound was blocked) and extract the hostages and assault team to Manzariyeh airfield, thirty-five miles to the south, which had been seized and secured earlier by US Army Rangers. Once the assault force and hostages had recovered to Manzariyeh, they would transload onto USAF C-141 aircraft and recover to a friendly country.

As the world learned on the morning of 25 April, the mission had been ordered aborted by the President at the Desert One site after equipment failure left the assault force with less than the minimum number of helicopters determined to be required by mission planners to successfully execute the rescue operation. Of the six helicopters that
finally arrived at Desert One, after an extremely difficult flight through an unforeseen local weather phenomenon known as a "haboob" (dust cloud of suspended particles), only five were determined to be flyable—one less than the minimum number required to proceed. Enroute to Desert One, one helicopter had been forced down due to an indication of impending rotor blade failure and a second helicopter lost its navigation and flight instruments and returned to the Nimitz. A third helicopter at Desert One suffered hydraulic failure and was judged to be unsafe for further flight. After direct consultation with the on-scene commander via secure satellite radio communications, the mission was cancelled by President Carter. As the entire force prepared to withdraw from Desert One to their launch/recovery bases, one of the RH-53Ds that was changing position to allow a second helicopter to refuel, collided with a C-130 and both aircraft burst into flames. Eight crewmen (three in the helicopter and five in the C-130) died in the conflagration. Because of the intense heat, exploding ammunition and impending daylight, the remainder of the force evacuated the Desert One site, leaving behind the bodies of the eight men in the burning wreckage and the five remaining operational helicopters. President Carter announced to the American public at 1:00 AM (Washington time) that an attempt to rescue the hostages had been made but that the mission had ended in failure. Costs of the failed mission included eight dead and several seriously wounded. According to Congressional testimony, monetary cost of the attempt was estimated at around 193 million dollars. An additional cost that cannot be measured in absolute terms was the diminution of the United States' reputation for military skill and power. In all fairness to the brave men who took part in the rescue attempt, just plain bad luck had as much to do with the failure as any oversight in planning or execution.
HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATIONS IN GENERAL

Rescue missions are somewhat unique from conventional military operations in wartime in that motives behind the individual mission are distinctly and expressly political. The responsibility for ordering the planning and execution of such missions is solely and ultimately the responsibility of the leadership in power. The rescue mission shares the Clausewitzean dictum that it too, is an extension of politics by other means. Unlike conventional military operations, it is expected that the rescue mission be accomplished flawlessly, with all hostages recovered alive, no casualties be incurred by the rescuing force, that the use of violence be solely directed against the captors, and that the existing political situation become no worse than it was prior to the attempt. In other words, hostage rescue missions are unreasonably expected to be perfect. In all cases the preferred solution to any hostage crisis situation is negotiation, since this approach all but negates casualties unless the captors begin selective or indiscriminate execution of their captives. Negotiation buys time, allows one to gather additional intelligence and provides a means for covering rescue preparations prior to an actual assault. It is important to emphasize that negotiation and military preparation and training must be carried out simultaneously, for economy of time reasons and if emergency assault operations are suddenly required.

Closely tied to the notion of the rescue mission as a political act is the fact that it is also an expression of national will. During the Mayaguez crisis it became apparent that the Administration sought to avoid another ignominy such as the 1968 Pueblo incident, where the US reluctance to use force in a swift and decisive manner cost the nation a
great deal of respect and loss of face, particularly in the Far East. President Ford felt that seizure of a US vessel and crew by a country (Cambodia) which had so recently caused us embarrassment was a very serious matter. Secretary Kissinger was emphatic on the use of force and felt that in addition to sending a strong signal to North Korean President Kim-Il Sung, that the issues at stake went far beyond the isolated seizure of a US merchant ship on the high seas to questions of international perceptions of power and US national will. Kissinger feared that if the Cambodians used the Mayaguez crew the way the North Koreans manipulated the crew of the Pueblo, those actions could radically deteriorate the American political posture in the rest of Asia. The crisis pointed out the need for the US to act promptly to dispel doubts concerning our national will and capacity to respond to provocation. For President Ford, the ship had become a symbol: "I felt it would be far better to take strong action even though the odds might be against us. It was far better than failing and doing nothing."

It is equally important to realize that the aggressors, whether they be a totalitarian communist government, leftist militants or a group of terrorists, have also selected their victims as a symbol of that government or system which they hope to eventually overthrow or at least, cause political embarrassment to on a global scale. Immediately after the skyjacking which precipitated the Entebbe rescue mission, Israeli Transport Minister Gad Yaakobi was quick to point out to the task force formed to deal with the situation, that the terrorists' target was indeed, the nation of Israel. The decision to go ahead with the Iranian hostage rescue attempt was clearly tied to national will. Critics of that decision voiced opposing sentiments stating that President Carter let public opinion drive him toward the military solution. As one critic
phrased it, "he decided to ride the tiger.""\textsuperscript{12} Others, including his closest advisors, saw the raid as a means to politically demonstrate his courage to act decisively as the Chief Executive, while bolstering world opinion of American power.\textsuperscript{13} On 11 April 1980 at a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), the President made his final decision to proceed with the military option. As his National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski so aptly phrased it, he decided to "lance the boil of American frustration."\textsuperscript{14}

In the case of the Son Tay and Iranian rescue missions, sufficient time was available to adequately plan the mission, choosing time and place of execution. During both the Mayaguez and Entebbe operations, time was a particularly critical factor if lives were to be saved and national prestige restored. Both these latter crises highlighted the need for in-being, workable crisis-response mechanisms within each of the respective governments. The Joint Staff Officers' Guide defines a crisis as:

an incident external to the continental United States that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, political, or military importance to the US government that commitment of US military forces is contemplated to achieve national objectives.

Resolution of crises are therefore vital to US national objectives and national strategy and are usually time constrained. In the case of the skyjacking leading to Entebbe, a carefully tailored crisis management team was quickly formed two hours after the first intelligence reports of the incident arrived. Each member of the crisis task force was supported by teams of specialists from various military, political and diplomatic organizations. During the Mayaguez incident, only four hours after President Ford was notified of the seizure, the first of many NSC
meetings was convened to discuss an appropriate response to the situation. Notification of the incident was made by the watch team on duty in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) in the Pentagon, which is operated by J-3, JCS and responsible for the "situation monitoring" phase of the six-phase Crisis Action System (CAS) as specified in Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) Volume IV. This system provides that existing mechanism called for to deal with crisis situations that may require the use of quickly tailored conventional forces or specially trained units which have been formed to cope specifically with hostage situations. (Details concerning such units have been omitted in this paper for classification and strict need-to-know reasons.)

At this point let us briefly discuss the type of forces that are appropriate for conduct of most hostage rescue operations. It is this author's contention that special operations units are best suited for these purposes, not because of any false elitist pride, but because the individuals within these units, through natural inclination, operational experience or training, have developed a particular mind-set that is essential for survival. Special operations, since their origins in the days of the OSS, have been small in size, covert or clandestine by nature and imaginative due to necessity or design. During such operations the chances of success are small, the uncertainties are great and the odds for getting killed even greater. As one author put it, the use of such forces might be compared to the "quiet use of a surgical knife" as opposed to using a "big stick." The Israelis have historically assigned such missions to their commando units. US special operations forces include US Army Special Forces (Green Berets), Navy SEALs and US Air Force special operations units. Unfortunately, throughout the
history of these units and their predecessor organizations, each of the services have displayed an obvious inherent distrust of these non-standard, so called "elitist" units and responded, as would be expected, with low personnel promotion rates and benign neglect in the fiscal support arena. Some progress has been made in this latter area with the rising national interest in our ability to respond to global transnational terrorism. Training and equipment are important to special operations personnel but imagination and ingenuity are paramount.

Colonel Charlie Beckwith, leader of the assault force on the Iranian rescue attempt described special operations as a "rare and exotic bird." The ability to improvise and use standard equipment in non-standard ways becomes critically important when funds are lacking, time is short and OPSEC dictates that routine supply channels be avoided at all costs. The Son Tay raiders were particularly adept at using Sears Roebuck catalogues to obtain ideas and rough specifications for a host of mission-peculiar items that would be needed on the raid. Israeli Major General (retired) Shlomo Gazit served as Director of Military Intelligence from 1974 to 1979 and was a participant in the planning for the Entebbe raid. He very adequately portrayed the special operations mind-set when he stated that the planner for a rescue operation requires "the mentality and expertise of a bank robber." Further requirements for both planners and operations in this field include attention to detail, an extreme awareness of the need for precise timing in the conduct of operations and a willingness to accept unusual orders and missions without question. The motto of the US Air Force 1st Special Operations Wing says it yet another way: "Anytime, Anyplace."
Prior to attempting a rescue mission, serious consideration must be given to defining success, assessing risk and determining political, operational and technical feasibility. Definitions of success vary from mission completion with no friendly casualties to partial rescue with an "acceptable" number of losses, whatever that figure may be. A factor taken into consideration by the Son Tay planners when attempting to define success was what retaliatory measures the North Vietnamese would take against those prisoners left behind in other POW camps. It was generally accepted that the North Vietnamese would not make reprisals against those POWs who had nothing to do with and were probably unaware of the raid. The Israelis decided that the Entebbe rescue must be attempted at all costs even though odds for success were assessed as being small due to the great distances involved and the lack of information concerning the terrorists. The deciding factor for the Israeli government was when the terrorists began a "selection" process among the hostages, separating Jew from non-Jew that portended ominous bodings reminiscent of Dachau and Buchenwald. Success during the Mayaguez crisis, for political reasons previously discussed, was determined to be rapid recovery of the ship and her 40-man crew. This was achieved at a cost of 41 US Dead, 50 wounded and millions of dollars of military equipment. Some would say the true measure of success was in achieving a restoration of US stature as a highly capable military power in the eyes of the world. Mission success can be defined in many ways. As a result of the "failed" Son Tay raid, all US POWs were relocated to Hanoi. Many who had been incommunicado and isolated for years were now confined with other prisoners, thereby providing support for one another by communicating and organizing. POW morale soared and the general feeling was that the raid clearly demonstrated the US had not forgotten their
plight. Most importantly, the raid was a blow to the North Vietnamese psyche, leaving them with a feeling of vulnerability. As Colonel "Bull" Simons, assault leader on the raid stated, "Christ, the thing was worth doing without getting them." 20

In addition to defining success and assessing political risks, when contemplating rescue missions, the utmost scrutiny must be given to assessing operational and technical feasibility of the plan. For lack of one flyable helicopter at Desert One, the course of history was changed. Speculation abounds as to whether the plan would have been successful or resulted in disaster and the world will never know.

Planners for the Iran mission assigned a 96.5% probability factor that six of the eight helicopters would arrive at their hide site in a flyable condition. An increase of two more helicopters would have boosted that probability to 99.2%, however this would have also required the addition of yet another fuel carrying C-130 and thereby increased both chances of detection and maintenance failures. The decision was made to accept the additional 2.7% risk factor and keep the number at eight helicopters. 21 Many critics have argued, after the fact, that a failure to conduct a serious operational analysis considering all the various phases of the rescue plan predetermined the failure of the entire operation. According to Dr. Stefan T. Possony, Associate Editor of Defense and Foreign Affairs, using eight helicopters in the five distinct phases of the Eagle Claw operation yields a probability of overall success of only 0.3, while increasing the number of helicopters to 18 increases that probability to 0.9. 22 Political considerations can impact heavily on the technical aspects of the plan. President Carter felt that the number of helicopters (eight) deemed necessary by the JCS
was acceptable since he wished to present this mission to the world as one with humanitarian overtones and not an act of war against Iran. The point to be made here is that during the planning process a balance must be achieved between hard requirements dictated by operational analysis and those dictated by availability of equipment, additional risk factors incurred and political considerations. As alluded to earlier, special operations rescue missions have historically had low probabilities of success. At one point during the initial planning for the Iran attempt, the Chairman of the JCS, General David Jones, queried Colonel Beckwith as to the probability of success and the risks. Colonel Beckwith replied, "Sir, the probability of success is zero and the risks are high." Carter's Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, was totally convinced the plan would not work and that any attempt to conduct a rescue would result in considerable harm to both the rescue force and ultimately, the hostages. He stressed the need for continued negotiation in State Department channels and expressed concern about an adverse Soviet response to the raid. Although he was aware of the planning for the attempt prior to execution, he resigned his post in protest following its failure.

The resignation cited above was yet another political "price" that had to be paid by the Carter Administration. The Iranians were quick to exploit the equipment, sensitive documents and (sadly) the human remains left behind, for propaganda purposes. The technical failure on Desert One dealt a heavy blow to the psychological well-being of the United States and sounded the political death knell for the Carter Administration. Political responsibility for the failed mission was borne solely by the President. The lesson learned is that when planning for success one must also be prepared for failure. Rescue missions are inherently high risk ventures.
and planners must analyze the implications of failure both at the tactical and strategic level and be prepared to accept the consequences of failure. This is particularly true for special operations missions while have critical visibility to the world and which, often despite their small size, can shape perceptions of the United States as a world power.

Historically such missions have failed much more than they have succeeded. This is not to say, however, that the reasons behind them were not cogent enough to warrant their attempt. An average of at least three out of four commando, British intelligence and OSS operations during World War II in the European theater were considered failures and French special operations in Indochina and Algeria did not seem to fare any better. The Son Tay raid was, by no means, the first such POW rescue attempt in Southeast Asia, but actually the 71st "dry hole!"

Between 1966 and 1970, 91 such POW rescue attempts were conducted in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos based on intelligence reports. Of the 91 attempts, 20 were successful, recovering 318 South Vietnamese and 60 civilians. Forty-five of those raids were mounted for the purpose of rescuing American POWs, however, only one was successful, recovering one US Army Specialist Fourth Class who died 15 hours after his liberation, of wounds inflicted by his captors prior to arrival of the rescuing force.24

The use of history as precedent is seen repeatedly in the planning for the conduct of rescue missions. The chief value in studying history is that those who study it may learn lessons for the future. In 1968 the USS Pueblo was captured by the North Koreans and 82 American sailors were incarcerated for 10 months. The lesson was painfully learned that
any possibility of rescuing the ship and crew had been reduced to zero once the ship reached the harbor in North Korea. When the Mayaguez crisis unfolded in May 1975, President Ford lost no time in committing military forces to prevent the ship from being taken to a Cambodian port. The Pueblo "lesson" had not been wasted on the Administration. Negotiation is one avenue of release that must be pursued simultaneously with tactical mission planning; however, in maritime crisis situations such as those cited above, history has taught us that the best time to resolve the crisis militarily, is immediately after it occurs. Planners for the Entebbe operation carefully studied lessons learned during Son Tay and were continually plagued by doubt and "planner's remorse" that they would strike and find the airport void of hostages as the Americans had experienced some six years earlier. After having successfully executed one of the most successful commando raids in history, Israel was quick to offer the benefit of lessons learned to the Carter Administration only 18 hours after the seizure of the US embassy in Teheran in the form of a rescue plan modelled on their earlier success. The President initially opted to pursue negotiation instead and shortly thereafter set the wheels in motion to initiate a US planning effort.

Once the political decision has been reached to proceed with planning a rescue mission, the first step should be to examine the characteristics and capabilities of both the captor and the captive. In both the Son Tay and Mayaguez operations the captors were conventional military personnel (guards and soldiers) and for Iran, were militant students; however, for discussion and brevity's sake let us refer to the captor as the "terrorist" and the captive as the "hostage" from this point on. Knowing not only the size but the type of terrorist group you are facing is important in that the larger, transnational groups have
well-known, historically documented modus operandi. Transnational
terrorist groups are state sponsored and have political objectives that
clearly transcend national boundaries. Group composition is equally
important to ascertain. Are there any women or varied nationalities
within the group? The ten PLFP terrorists that seized Air France Flight
139 (Entebbe crisis) were led by a German couple of remarkably different
personality types. Other important Essential Elements of Information
(EEI) that should be actively sought are the number and kinds of weapons,
explosives or boobytraps they possess, the probability they will carry
out any threats and the types of demands they are likely to make.
Terrorists today are becoming increasingly sophisticated and high tech-
ology can provide them enhanced capabilities in communications and
counter-surveillance techniques as well. Besides current disposition of
the group, perhaps the most important and difficult to ascertain infor-
mation is that regarding the terrorists' states of mind and actual
intentions. (An odd axiom of terrorism is that historically, if hos-
tages are not killed in the first few days after their capture, they
probably never will be and eventually become a burden to their captors.)
During the Entebbe crisis, non-Israeli passengers that had been released
prior to the assault were able to provide planners with much of this
essential information. Rescue planners should actively seek inside
sources of information whenever possible. This type of intelligence is
usually the most difficult to obtain and at the same time the most
critical to the final assault phase of the operation. In studying the
objective, equal consideration must be given to number and composition
of the hostage group as well. The presence of women, children, clergymen
or important personages may dictate the type and level of violence
to be used by the assault force. The ethnic composition of the hostage
group must also be taken into account, since the rescuing force will
probably only issue commands upon ingress in one language, such as "Lie
down!" or "Remain still!" During the Entebbe raid each squad had a
soldier with a loudspeaker who shouted commands to the hostages to lie
down. Those that remained standing stood a chance of being deliberately
shot or caught in a crossfire. Hostage behavior can be expected to be
quite unpredictable, especially after long months of incarceration.
Positive relationships may develop over time between the captive and the
captor, often referred to as the "Stockholm Syndrome," after a Swedish
bank robbery incident in 1973 where the hostages began to identify with
the bank robbers and became sympathetic to their plight. During the
Entebbe crisis, the male German terrorist leader, very much unlike the
female, adopted a pleasant manner and was considered quiet and even
affable by many of the hostages. Others were not so easily deceived.28
Planners must be aware that basic human needs compel the hostage to see
the human qualities in his tormentor and adjust their assault plans
accordingly. A good rule of thumb with regard to hostage behavior
during the assault phase is to "expect the unexpected." Some may
freeze, faint or scream and others will run. The most difficult to deal
with and dangerous to himself is the hostage who heroically tries to
assist the rescuers by seizing a terrorist weapon, and therefore puts
himself in peril. A visible symbol, such as an American flag on the
assault uniform or a spoken familiar word or phrase (the Israeli commandos
shouted "Israel") will do much to instantly bring the hostage to abrupt
realization of the rescue that is taking place around him. During
planning for the Iranian rescue, Colonel Beckwith requested permission
from President Carter to use the phrase, "The President of the United States has sent us."29

PLANNING IMPERATIVES

It is this author's contention that any planning element for a hostage rescue operation must take into consideration three basic principles, two of which are classic Principles of War. They are: speed, simplicity and surprise. Speed in responding to a crisis situation is predicated on recognition that a crisis exists. During the Mayaguez incident, the elapsed time from receipt of the initial report of the seizure of the ship in the NMCC until launch of a Navy reconnaissance aircraft for on-scene surveillance was on the order of only two hours and twenty minutes.30 Speed in planning and execution is paramount since windows of time, meteorological or climatological considerations may restrict a planned operation to certain periods. Speed in execution is important since terrorists are vulnerable during the initial hours of a hostage situation, for they have often not had time to sufficiently organize shift schedules and surveillance plans. Regarding "windows," the Son Tay planners were conscious of the need to execute the raid prior to the arrival of the monsoon season. Planners for the Teheran raid were aware that any delay in execution would exclude a helicopter option due to impending high summer temperatures in the Iranian desert and resultant loss of aerodynamic lift.

Simplicity in a plan is highly desirable but very often difficult to achieve. There is a measure of elegance in simplicity. The simpler the plan the fewer things can go wrong. (In philosophy, Occam’s Razor states that in choosing between two similar hypotheses, the simpler is preferred.) During the Mayaguez affair, no less than five different options were
presented by General Jones, then acting Chairman of the JCS. Planning for the Iran rescue attempt yielded a considerably greater number due to the difficulties involved. The tendency is usually to provide too many options. In addition to seeking simplicity with regard to both numbers and complexity of courses of action, forces should be kept as small as the situation will allow. Larger forces mean greater logistics requirements and more chance for mission compromise. There is an Israeli Defense Force adage that says, "Lean forces fight best."\textsuperscript{31} It is also axiomatic that during any planning for missions of this type, the size of the rescue force will grow, as more difficult planning problems are encountered.

The final basic principle and the single most critical element the planner must attempt to achieve is that of surprise. The Soviets refer to it as "vnezapnost" and consider it one of their basic principles of military art. Stevens and Marsh define surprise as "an event which comes to be known, and perhaps understood, almost exclusively after it has happened."\textsuperscript{32} In an assault operation, the element of surprise, used in concert with violence and speed, is the critical element and the sine qua non on which the very lives of the hostages depend. Loss of surprise should nearly always be cause for a decision to abort the mission. Inherent in planning for surprise is the element of deception, which could be defined as the deliberate misrepresentation of reality to gain competitive advantage. The Soviet word for deception is "maskirovka" and since the concept is considered as interdependent with surprise (vnezapnost), it is not assigned status as a separate principle of Soviet military art.\textsuperscript{33} All but the Mayaguez rescue had deception schemes as part of the basic plan. During the Son Tay raid, firefight
simulators were airdropped by mission aircraft to distract, confuse and
demoralize the North Vietnamese. Navy air diversionary missions drop-
ping flares, were flown over Haiphong harbor to divert attention away
from the sector of the prison camp and US Air Force F-105 Wild Weasel
electronic warfare/defense suppression aircraft were used as "bait" to
jam enemy radars and divert Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) defenses away
from the ingressing assault force. A valid criticism of the naval air
diversion is that for some time prior to the event, the Navy had virtually
stopped all airstrikes in the vicinity; the caution here is that an
overly elaborate ruse can arouse suspicion and become a liability and
counterproductive to the primary mission. A criterion which should
serve as a litmus test for a deception scheme is believability, above
all else. The planners should lead the enemy to believe what he is
predisposed and preconditioned to believe. The Israelis used deception
to the maximum during Entebbe. Two of the C-135 (Boeing 707) support
aircraft used during the raid were painted with El Al airline colors and
made to appear, both inside and out, as commercial aircraft. The occu-
pants wore civilian clothes and carried bogus identification documents.
One aircraft was, in fact, a completely equipped airborne command post
for the Israeli Air Force commander, and the other a medical evacuation
configured aircraft that would stand by to meet the egressing force in
Nairobi. The most publicized deception scheme was the black Mercedes
Benz sedan, complete with a burly Israeli paratrooper in black makeup,
made to look like Idi Amin. The Mercedes preceded the Israeli convoy of
Land Rovers as they rolled off the C-130s and rapidly carried the assault
force to the old terminal building where the hostages where held. The
Israelis determined correctly that the Mercedes was the official car and
a symbol of authority in Uganda which would be allowed to pass security
points without question. The Ugandan guards fell for the ruse and no alarm was sounded. Lastly, with regard to the use of deception, prior to the Iranian rescue attempt, the frequency of C-130 flights in and out of Egypt was increased as well as the number of night helicopter sorties from the carrier Nimitz as part of a conditioning mechanism in the larger deception plan.34

Timely and accurate intelligence is the quintessential element that ultimately determines the difference between success and failure, between victory and humiliation and between saving lives or losing them. Detailed intelligence of the last-minute variety is the hallmark requirement of special operations missions. Every possible source for this type of information must be actively sought and utilized. Just before launch of the rescue mission into Teheran, an embassy cook was permitted to leave the country. By mere chance, a CIA agent discovered the fact and learned from the cook that the 53 hostages were all together in one location—a vital and hitherto unknown piece of intelligence which was relayed to the assault force commander and caused the assault plan to be modified considerably.35 Because human beings are predisposed to believe what they want to believe, very often last-minute intelligence is looked upon with suspicion, for it will no doubt generate a requirement to change the plan. Planners and operators will ultimately reach a point where the tendency is to want to go with the final plan as it was practiced and rehearsed, for there is comfort in familiarity. Approximately 24 hours after the execute message had been transmitted to the deploying Son Tay raiding force (they had not launched on the final assault phase yet), the mission commander received word that a Vietnamese stay-behind agent in North Vietnam, classified by intelligence
sources as "usually reliable," had reported that the camp was empty and the prisoners had been removed. Lingering doubts about the reliability of the agent and conflicting information from overhead infrared imagery caused the commander to execute the raid as planned. Another key lesson learned at Son Tay with regard to the use of aerial photography was that what appears on a photograph is not necessarily the reality of the moment. The plan called for one helicopter to purposely crash land between two small spindly trees shown on SR-71 photography. Because of the length of time between the reconnaissance mission and the raid, the helicopter pilot that was to crash land had to adjust his approach during the final moments to avoid what would have been fatal contact with two huge trees which had grown considerably since last seen by photo interpretation personnel.

The best use of last-minute, reliable intelligence will nearly always remain Human Intelligence (HUMINT) with human eyes on the target. The seizure of the embassy in Teheran in November 1979 left the CIA without a single stay-behind agent in the country until late December when an agent identified as "Bob" was finally reintroduced to provide critical on-scene intelligence. The next best thing to these inside sources or "invisibles" as the Israelis refer to them, are people who have previously had experience in the objective area. Prior to the Entebbe assault, the Israelis interviewed Idi Amin's former personal pilot and the former Israeli attache to Uganda, since both were intimately familiar with the physical layout of the Entebbe airport.

Weather reconnaissance is a form of intelligence that is especially crucial to a plan involving use of air (or maritime) assets. Prior to the Son Tay raid, aerial weather reconnaissance flights were flown along the borders of Laos and North Vietnam because of the increasing threat
of an approaching typhoon and associated cloud systems which could jeopardize the mission. During the Iranian attempt, planners elected not to fly a C-130 weather recce due to the risk of arousing suspicion and possible mission compromise. As it turned out, had a weather ship been flown or had secure radio communications procedures been utilized between the ingressing helicopters and the C-130s ahead of them approaching the clear conditions at Desert One, number five helicopter would probably have continued on through the weakening suspended dust phenomenon (haboob) without instruments, instead of electing to reverse course and return to the Nimitz. In this author's opinion, where aircraft are concerned and the weather is in doubt, the use of weather reconnaissance flights is a planning imperative that is usually worth the risk, especially in areas where enemy Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities are known to be weak.

Intelligence failures are often attributed to the fact that worst-case scenarios are often ignored or only partially believed. As a rule of thumb, planners should consider "Murphy" to be an optimist. During the Mayaguez crisis, estimates of enemy strength in Koh Tang varied from 18 Cambodian irregulars with their families to a DIA estimate as high as 200 Khmer Rouge soldiers armed with automatic weapons, mortars and recoilless rifles. As it turned out the DIA estimate proved to be very accurate, however the 175 man Marine assault force was predicated on a considerably smaller and weaker enemy strength estimate of between 20 and 100 lightly armed troops. The decision to use the low estimate resulted in considerable loss of life and equipment.

The final point regarding the processing and evaluation of intelligence is that one central point of collection and collation must be
established within the planning cell where all types of intelligence to include visual imagery from manned and unmanned overhead collection systems, HUMINT and SIGINT can be gathered. This multiplicity of sources will provide planners a means of crosschecking sources in order to determine both verifiability and timeliness of the information.

Operations Security (OPSEC) is the unwritten rubric that must be religiously maintained during the planning, training, deployment, execution and redeployment phases of the mission. OPSEC literally means the difference between getting to the objective undetected and mission compromise. There are as many ways to ensure OPSEC as there are ways to compromise it. During final planning and preparation for Operation Jonathan (Entebbe), anyone associated with the mission, to include high level Cabinet ministers, was cautioned to avoid doing anything out of the ordinary that would arouse suspicion. Personnel travelled about in civilian clothes and used private and commercial rather than military transportation to move to debarkation locations. Perhaps the most difficult aspect with regard to the maintenance of OPSEC is determining to what degree the operation and associated planning will be compartmentalized. Determining who should know, how many should know and what they should know varies with each operation, the political sensitivity of the mission and the guidance from the governing authority. Training of the assault force itself, is a threat to OPSEC. When an amalgam of various type units is brought together for the first time, it clearly signals that something unusual is in the making. Other indicators of impending military action are cancellation of personnel leaves and passes, interruption or cancellation of unit social and athletic events and prolonged absences of key personnel in the unit command structure.

During the planning for Son Tay, OPSEC was considered paramount and the
feeling was that the more personnel that knew about the mission, the
greater the risk of compromise. As a result, access lists were kept
small. Compartmentalization was maintained to the extent that headquar-
ters personnel at the Strategic Air Command (SAC) responsible for SR-71,
Buffalo Hunter (drone) and Big Bird (satellite) reconnaissance missions
over North Vietnam were not told of what they were trying to photograph.
SAC personnel would later state that knowledge of the exact requirement
(pinpoint target location rather than area coverage) would have aided
considerably in getting the desired photo coverage. With regard to
Son Tay, virtually the entire staff directing the war in Southeast Asia
was kept in the dark concerning one of the most critical operations ever
launched in that theater. The Commander, Pacific Fleet, who was ulti-
mately responsible for the Navy air diversion operation, was never told
of the reason for it, though Commander, Carrier Task Force 77 was event-
tually briefed prior to the raid. Security requirements were so string-
gent that even the men of the assault force were not told of their
mission until airborne and enroute to their final staging location.
Three days before the raid, only four key personnel in the ground force
knew the target and details of the mission. An effective OPSEC
technique used by the Son Tay planners and operators was to routinely
disassemble the mockup of the Son Tay camp erected at the training
location prior to daylight and especially at those times when the Soviet
Cosmos satellite was projected to be overhead. Yet another scheme used
during the planning and training effort was to purposely employ US counter-
intelligence teams during all phases of the operation to see if they
could break the code and determine mission details and objectives.
Though the counter-intelligence units were only partially successful in
their efforts, quite by accident, a young intelligence officer in the Evasion and Escape Branch of Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, was eventually able to determine the mission objective and precise target location by noticing the upgrading in security classification of requests for photo reconnaissance over a certain area of North Vietnam. Additionally, a request for a medical evacuation aircraft configured to accommodate the exact number of prisoners thought to be held at Son Tay confirmed his suspicions.

How well OPSEC was truly maintained can only be determined after mission execution. Planners for the Teheran rescue attempt, like the Son Tay group, sought to preserve OPSEC above all other considerations. The commander of the Joint Task Force (JTF) assigned to the mission, was selected not only because he was an extremely capable officer and already assigned to the Pentagon, but also because selection of any other high visibility combat unit commander would arouse undue suspicion and speculation. Only the Carter Administration's top level personnel were aware of the mission, to include the Vice President (Mondale), Secretary of Defense (Brown), National Security Advisor (Brzezinski), Director of the CIA (Turner) and the White House Chief of Staff (Jordan). In the post mortem following the aborted raid, the JTF effort was critiqued by the Holloway Commission in a formal report covering 23 separate issues regarding planning and execution. OPSEC (issue #1) criticisms were that planning may have been too compartmentalized, thereby inhibiting the flow of information between players; the lack of a full dress rehearsal involving all participants, because of perceived security risks was to result in some operational problems not being identified that would eventually occur on the mission; and the extreme emphasis on the need for Communications Security (COMSEC—an essential element of OPSEC)
during mission execution which resulted in a lack of coordination between mission air crews which could have enhanced their capability to handle unforeseen emergencies. The Holloway report concluded that "slightly greater selectivity and flexibility in the OPSEC arena, particularly within the JTF, could have been beneficial in operational terms without necessarily sacrificing security." The bottom line regarding OPSEC is that it must be maintained at all costs; however, the degree to which measures are taken to ensure this is strictly a judgement call. A given cost in decreasing OPSEC measures is an increased probability of operational compromise. A lesson learned in the Iranian experience is that OPSEC must not become an obsession. OPSEC requirements and the need for secrecy must be carefully balanced with operational requirements (such as joint training) necessary to accomplish the mission. There is no simple formula or solution for success in this arena. A final word regarding OPSEC is that though we have historically been weak in this area, post-strike OPSEC regarding special operations rescue missions is nearly equally as important as pre-mission OPSEC. Too much light on the mission details can imperil the use of sensitive techniques and equipment in future missions. Both in the Son Tay and Iranian planning, the intent was to never reveal if the missions were unsuccessful, if that was the way they turned out to be. Ideally, for preservation of OPSEC, we should adhere to the principal of silence, but in our open society and given the nature of Congressional inquiry and the American "fourth estate," it is doubtful this could ever be realistically achieved.

The planning process itself for a mission of this type is unique in many ways. Before planning begins, it is important that an agreed upon, limited (for OPSEC purposes) number of personnel from requisite specialties
be collocated in a central planning cell, where face-to-face exchanges of views can be facilitated. Once again, the nature and urgency of the crisis will ultimately dictate both the speed of the selection process and the tempo of the planning effort. Expertise in one's field is, of course, a basic requirement for a planner. An additional requirement would be a personality temperament that is capable of coping with a rapidly changing and dynamic crisis situation. Once the planning cell is formed, the planning process must allow for easy exchange of ideas and information as well as clear channels of communication and coordination. Brainstorming and free-wheeling should be encouraged, with no idea considered too implausible until fully evaluated. Hostage rescue operations depend wholly upon the element of surprise to achieve success and the maximum employment of imaginative concepts provides the key to that success. Frequent changes to the basic operational concept are the rule in this type of planning effort. It is important to resist the urge to choose one course of action and stick with it for expediency's sake. The basic plan must be refined or radically changed as necessary until chances of mission success are optimised. One recommended way to insure avoidance of the "groupthink" mentality is to initially establish independent planning teams and isolate them from one another. These teams can then be used to formulate independent plans which can be evaluated later as to operational acceptability, feasibility and suitability. Planning should proceed from the general to the specific. The central planning unit should concentrate on the general concept of the operation while the unit commanders are left unimpeded to pursue the formulation of detailed tactical execution plans. As mentioned earlier, individual unit training, preparation and rehearsal should occur simultaneously with the general planning effort in the interest of time.
During crisis situations, immediate, no-plan emergency assault options should be devised in the event of hostage executions. Early involvement of political authorities at the highest levels is a necessary element so that Rules of Engagement (ROE) may be established and politically unacceptable ideas may be discarded at the outset of the planning effort. Legal aspects of the mission, in terms of international law and world opinion must also be taken into account. Diplomatic negotiation is the preferred method of obtaining hostage release; however, a dual-track approach, simultaneously considering a military option is always prudent. In many cases, as with the Entebbe operation, negotiation can also serve as deception means in lulling the captors into believing that the diplomatic channel is the only recourse open to the "hostage" government.

An important element of the planning process is the mechanism that has come to be known as the "what-if drill." Once the basic plan is formulated, an attempt should be made to examine it in the light of various contingencies, taking into account possible and most probable technological and human failures. Planners must practice in "thinking the unthinkable." Although anticipation of every possible contingency is an admirable goal, experience has shown this can never be truly achieved. Alexander Scott asserts that the Clausewitzian "fog of war" is five times as thick for special operations such as hostage rescue missions and therefore the chances of failure, five times as great. The what-if drill, as a thought process, should be used continuously by mission planners during development of the basic plan. Prior to formal acceptance of a particular plan or course of action, a separate review group, frequently referred to as a "murder board," should be established to conduct an independent review of the plan and play the "devil's
advocate." The Israelis used an "officer's rap session" for just such a purpose, prior to the raid at Entebbe.46 The what-if drill should be used to determine the need for alternate and backup plans. The number of these plans, in keeping with the principle of simplicity, should be kept to an absolute minimum. The Son Tay planners developed four backup plans in addition to the primary assault plan. As it turned out, alternate Plan Green was effectively used by the second-in-command when the lead assault helicopter, carrying the tactical mission commander, landed in the wrong location. In cultivating a mind-set that enables the planner to formulate backup plans, it is often helpful to anticipate the worst in every situation. "Murphy" is alive and well in this arena, and if something has not been planned for you can be assured it will "fall through the crack" during mission execution. In airborne rescue operations, especially those involving the use of helicopters, history has taught us that cross-loading of key personnel and equipment to accommodate various backup plans is a planning imperative. Failure to cross-load helicopters is an invitation to disaster. During the Mayaguez crisis, one of the first helicopters shot down at Koh Tang contained every available radio belonging to the Marine command and control and fire support group, thereby greatly hindering subsequent tactical operations.47 During the Iranian attempt, the number five helicopter that aborted enroute to Desert One and returned to the Nimitz, carried all the spare parts for the remaining mission helicopters.

Destruct plans for sensitive, disabled or purposely abandoned equipment are another sub-task of the what-if planning process. During Son Tay, the assault helicopters were fitted with explosives and detonators. As a safety precaution, electrical initiators were placed apart from the explosives and the electrical leads were left disconnected.
When the time came to destroy one helicopter, according to plan, the initiators were connected to the explosives and a built-in timing device provided a time buffer for the egressing rescue party. To further reduce the possibility of technical failure, Colonel Simons ordered that dual fuses be installed in the helicopter to be destroyed. Failure to destroy the five abandoned helicopters at Desert One in Iran, resulted in the loss of the aircraft themselves and the loss of classified documents such as satellite photographs and lists of safe houses, native Iranian sympathizers, and foreign as well as CIA operatives. The recovery of these items by the Iranians resulted in further propaganda efforts to embarrass the Carter Administration.

The failure of the Iranian attempt highlights yet another important planning consideration. There must be clearly defined, mandatory abort and go—no go decisions at key points in the tactical plan. When the mishap occurred at Desert One after the decision was made to abort the raid due to an insufficient number of operable helicopters, it was discovered that the force had never anticipated nor practiced aborting the mission at that point and outloading on C-130s for egress operations. Despite anticipation of many contingencies, such as the arrival of a busload of Iranians, it appeared not to have occurred to mission planners that an abort order might be necessitated at so late a point in the operation. Changes to the original plan are not always due to unfavorable events. The need for flexibility can be dictated by fortuitous circumstances as well. During final planning for Entebbe, the plan called for ground refueling of the C-130 aircraft at Entebbe during the tactical operation. At the last minute, a shift in the "political winds" allowed refueling on the return route to Israel at Nairobi,
Kenyas, thereby necessitating a last minute, but propitious change of plans.

Flexibility in planning and execution of the mission is achieved in part, by proper selection of the assault force. Special operations missions of this type are, by their nature, joint operations. Planners must insist however, on tailoring the assault force to mission requirements without regard to service composition. Hostage rescue operations are an emotional experience for everyone involved. During the planning for the Iranian mission, some felt that members of the JCS wanted to make sure each of the services had a "piece of the action." As a result, Marine helicopter pilots were used where perhaps Air Force pilots would have been more readily suited for the mission profile. The issue (Number 12 in the Holloway Report) was certainly not which service had the more capable pilots. The facts were that during the training period the Air Force helicopter pilot resources included 114 qualified RH-53 pilots, instructors and flight examiners, of whom 96 were current in long range flight and aerial refueling. Most importantly, 86 of these pilots had recent special operations experience. The bottom line was that the Navy possessed the helicopters (RH-53) with the appropriate mission capabilities and the Air Force had on hand, the pilots with the requisite special operations background to fly them, given a brief period of transition training. History has shown that experienced pilots can transition far more easily and quickly to a variant of their aircraft than an inexperienced pilot can train to a new and highly complex mission. This issue is used merely to illustrate the point that service parochialism should be considered anathema to the planning and conduct of hostage rescue missions. An equal share of the glory and credit to each of the four services should never be considered an
essential requirement for the rescue operation. In the final analysis, the hostage could care less what uniform or insignia his rescuer wears. Conflict and competition between services (and individual organizations within those services) inhibits effective planning and must be recognized for what it is and held in check.

Logistic support requirements for missions of this type will vary from scenario to scenario; however, they are always unique and demanding not so much in a quantitative sense but because of the types of equipment that may be required. OPSEC requirements dictate that routine supply channels be avoided and exigencies of the mission require issuance of a supply priority code of the highest order. During planning and training for the Son Tay raid, the unit supply section became quickly saturated with requests and supply personnel had difficulty in insuring prompt reaction to sudden equipment requirements. A dedicated, fully manned, centralized supply section armed with requisite blanket authority, preferably in letter format, is highly recommended. Additionally, another highly useful technique is to have on hand sufficient cash funds to allow immediate purchase of hard-to-find or readily accessible items on the local economy.

Medical planning is a particularly important aspect of these type missions. It is a general rule of thumb that casualties and hostages should almost always be loaded on the first helicopter or fixed wing aircraft to leave the objective location. During Entebbe, the Israelis used doctors and medical orderlies trained as combat troops to provide an on-the-scene emergency medical capability. These personnel arrived on the second of the four C-130s to land at Entebbe and were able to treat the five civilian and four military casualties almost immediately in
the lowest tactical level. It is important to note, that as undesirable to a tactical commander as this situation at first might seem, it is important in a fast-breaking hostage crisis situation that the political authority be in constant (secure) communication with the assault force in order to relay latest diplomatic or political developments and intelligence findings, or even intervene and cancel the mission if required. What is important to emphasize is that the ultimate responsibility for the success or failure of the mission rests with the highest political authority and not the military. The principles of centralized command and control and decentralized execution are equally valid for hostage rescue operations. The political leader must not attempt to make tactical decisions for his assault force commander. During the Iranian raid the decision to abort the rescue attempt was made by President Carter only after a recommendation to do so was submitted by the senior military officer on the ground at Desert One. Similarly, during Entebbe, tactical decisions were made by the assault force commander. During both operations, as long as the operation proceeded according to plan, the national authorities were to remain silent.

During a tactical operation of this nature, the natural human tendency is for planners to try to increase the number of mandatory reporting requirements over communications channels so the progress of the operation may be followed by all concerned. A concerted effort should be made to keep the number of these reports down to an absolute minimum. A recommended technique is to develop an "execution checklist" consisting of numbered events by item number, event description and code word. Essential, key events which must happen for the plan to succeed would be designated "mandatory," with all others "non-mandatory"
that aircraft which had been configured with operating tables and full hospital equipment.¹¹ The planners for the raid had also positioned a similarly configured C-135 aircraft at Nairobi, Kenya for emergency treatment of an expected total of 85 casualties. In sum, medical planning must include provision for on-the-spot treatment of wounds resulting from gunshot, explosives and fire, as well as treatment of shock and trauma. A surgical capability is highly recommended, especially where availability of aircraft will permit configuration of an airborne hospital while enroute to permanent medical facilities.

Thorough command, control and communications planning for hostage rescue operations, like the element of surprise, is absolutely critical to mission success. The ability to communicate both laterally within the assault force and horizontally to the command authorities is more than essential. Even during the brief ten year period of the four rescue operations discussed in this paper, the impact of quantum technological advances in communications can be seen. In the Son Tay raid, Colonel Simons and his men carried 92 radios into the objective area—almost as many as possessed by a standard infantry battalion. They were assessed as being able to communicate nearly 12 times better than the average soldier.¹² During the Mayaguez crisis, the NSC was aware of the Cambodian firing on the Navy P-3 reconnaissance aircraft within 20 minutes of the incident. The Israelis used their second C-135 as an airborne command post near Entebbe to provide a communications link between the ground force commander and their national leaders. The age of satellite communications has thrust us into what General T. R. Milton (USAF Ret.) has described as the era of "his-eye-is-on-the-sparrow" command and control.¹³ Key US policymakers have increased their command and control (and communications) in various crisis situations down to
or optional. Non-mandatory events would be reported by exception and then only if non-occurrence would seriously impair chances of mission success. It is essential that the political authority, overall mission commander and tactical assault commanders agree upon those events to be reported and thoroughly brief all mission personnel of these requirements. The "what-if" events and alternate tactical plans would also be assigned code words and would only be reported if they occurred. Even over secure channels, a system such as this would provide brevity and speed in reporting and allow key personnel to follow critical events in the assault operation.

Command lines during these operations must be streamlined and relatively simple in order to insure the principle of Unity of Command. To illustrate this, during Entebbe the command lines ran from the political-ministerial crisis action team to the Chief of Staff, Israeli Defense Forces (LTG Mordechai Gur). From there, the military structure ran from General Gur directly to the Task Force commander, with no intervening agencies. This type of command and control structure facilitated political-military interface, increased information flow and enhanced secrecy. During the Iranian crisis the chain of command ran from President Carter to the Secretary of Defense (Brown), to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (General Jones), to the Joint Task Force Commander (MG Vaught). The Holloway Report, however, found that from COMJTF downward, command channels were "fuzzy" and less well defined in some areas and only implied in others. Even amongst the planners and mission forces it was not always readily apparent who was in charge of what aspect of training and what mission responsibility. Only twelve days prior to mission execution, and for no apparent reason, a new Deputy COMJTF was designated partially because he had recent experience in
Iran. The lesson here is that a sound organizational structure is needed, with clear and streamlined command channels that are readily understood by mission personnel. Rigid compartmentalization and OPSEC requirements must not be allowed to interfere with or have an adverse effect on one of the basic Principles of War—Unity of Command.

The importance of both comprehensive mission briefings and full tactical rehearsals cannot be overemphasized. Once again, because of OPSEC requirements we paid the price in preparation for the Iranian rescue attempt. Planners for this operation decided that security requirements overrode the need for a full dress rehearsal involving all of the mission forces. Training exercises were accomplished by individual units at widely separated locations. Though an admittedly much smaller and less complex operation, preparation for the Entebbe raid involved a complete rehearsal by all the Israeli forces on the night preceding the actual operation. Comprehensive, joint mission briefings including at least key personnel from all the units are a planning imperative. These briefings should be conducted as close in time to the actual operation as possible so that last minute intelligence can be disseminated, changes or refinements to plans and procedures can be addressed and critical mission data such as weather and flight conditions evaluated. Coordination and communications should occur continuously throughout the planning cycle, but are especially critical during the final briefing prior to mission execution.

Prior to and during the operation itself there are ways to further facilitate communication other than direct verbal means. Mission briefing and equipment checklists can be devised by planners to ensure that no critical item of equipment is left unchecked or any key mission area
guidance as to what may be discussed and what may not. Following the Entebbe raid, the hostages were first brought to an Israeli Air Force base and debriefed and then subsequently flown to Ben Gurion International Airport to face the media. This type of planning forethought allowed Israeli mission commanders an opportunity to not only protect sensitive operational techniques and procedures but permitted an occasion to leak false stories to the press for deception purposes.

CONCLUSIONS

It is unfortunate that based on historical trends, the prospect for a decrease in the number of incidents of hostage taking and transnational terrorism is highly unlikely. Quite the opposite is true. The United States presently has 282 embassies and diplomatic posts staffed with almost 14,000 Foreign Service personnel in 144 host countries around the world. It would not be unreasonable to expect that terrorists will continue to actively target this population as well as senior military officers and government officials. Many nations, reeling under the impact of their own internal terrorist threat, have formed organic Counter-Terrorist (CT) units to deal with the problem. Many have called for the formation of an international counter-terrorist agency to deal with the global aspects of highly organized and state-sponsored transnational terrorism. To my knowledge, this organization has yet to be formed. In the interim, however, national CT units have joined together to exchange ideas and techniques for combating the problem. (Security classification restrictions prohibit further discussion on this point.) Each of the rescue missions discussed in this paper has cried out for the formation of a US counter-terrorist task force with a viable and
is left open to question. Recognition codes and light signals become important in areas where radio emissions must be kept to a minimum and engine noise or rotor blast may inhibit direct verbal communication. Personnel recognition is especially important during night operations. During the Entebbe raid, Israeli forces wore white hats (similar to US Navy caps) with brims down, enabling the force to quickly identify one another in the dark and the confusion of the assault. The assault force for the Iran attempt wore an American flag on the right shoulder of their assault clothing and covered it with tape for easy removal prior to entry into the embassy compound. This was primarily, however, for benefit of the hostages rather than the assault force. Face-to-face communications between personnel on the ground at Desert One during the retrograde outloading operation became all but impossible due to the darkness, dust and noise of the C-130 engines and helicopter rotor blades. A device such as a neon, color-coded arm band might have aided in recognition of key personnel and should be considered for use by planners for future similar operations. Personal recognition devices would additionally aid in discriminating recovered hostages from assault force personnel during critical personnel accountability procedures conducted under conditions of duress.

Once the operation is completed, it is critical to the success of future operations that lessons learned be captured and recorded as soon as possible. Special operations forces and personnel are as subject to the vagaries of the personnel system as the remainder of the military community and normal personnel rotation and retirement will result in an inevitable corporate memory loss. Of immediate importance following a successful operation is the need to debrief both mission personnel and hostages as to the sensitive details of the operation and provide
effective crisis management structure, capable of responding rapidly to terrorist incidents on a global scale. This force would require a multitude of capabilities, a high degree of readiness and training for selectively assigned personnel and the requisite funding and equipment to carry out its mission. Suffice it to say, we have such a force! The days of the ad hoc unit, thrown together to deal with a particular scenario, are over. Yet the basic problems facing the military planner still remain. The planning imperatives briefly touched upon in this paper only scratch the surface of the problems that will have to be overcome. Each scenario will be different and will dictate its own unique set of imperatives. Service parochialism will continue to haunt the most joint of planning efforts as long as competition exists for scarce fiscal resources. The challenge to military planners will be to put aside petty interservice rivalries and take up the gauntlet that has been thrown at our feet by the specter of transnational terrorism. In this author's opinion, with the formation of these national CT organi-

tions we have reached a watershed in the fight against the malignant disease that is terrorism. Like cancer, however, it will be with us for some time to come. The hostage rescue operation is but one stroke of the surgeon's knife. In the words of Theodore Roosevelt, we must never fail to try:

Far better it is to dare mighty things, to win glorious triumphs, even though checkered by failure, than to take rank with those poor spirits who neither enjoy much nor suffer much, because they live in the grey twilight that knows not victory nor defeat.

2. Ibid., p. 364.


8. Ibid., p. 112.


11. Stevenson, p. 17.


30. Head, Short and McFarlane, p. 106.


36. Stevenson, p. 78.

37. Head, Short and McFarlane, p. 120.

38. Stevenson, pp. 68-89.


44. Gasit, p. 121.


47. Head, Short and McFarlane, p. 132.


51. Stevenson, p. 119.

52. Schemmer, p. 127.


54. Manarchik, p. 74.


56. Gazit, p. 128.


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