Cohesion in the US Military

Defense Management Study Group on Military Cohesion

An Industrial College of the Armed Forces Study in Mobilization and Defense Management

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ON MILITARY COHESION

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FOREWORD

No aspect of a nation's military strength has proven more important than the attitudes of its soldiers, sailors, and airmen toward their profession and toward one another. The Industrial College of the Armed Forces believes it most fitting that the second volume in its Mobilization and Defense Management series, published in cooperation with the National Defense University Press, addresses the critical subject of cohesion. The effectiveness that military officers achieve in managing their resources, both on the battlefield and in higher headquarters, stems in large part from how they view themselves and how well they are able to harness their energies for the common good.

As this study reveals, crucial questions affecting the behavior of the military demand greater scrutiny. To what extent do today's military feel that they follow an occupation rather than a calling? What difference does their perception make? Do people in uniform respond chiefly to money and other material benefits or to a high moral commitment? In what ways has burgeoning technology changed the nature of the military profession and group behavior within military organizations? Has the art of leadership lost its relevance?

To come to grips with such questions, the authors of this study employed rigorous research methods, including an in-depth survey of field-grade officers. Based on their findings, the authors suggest concrete policy, institutional, and procedural steps that military organizations could take to enhance cohesion among their members.

The Industrial College of the Armed Forces offers this study to broaden the knowledge and understanding of interested communities in this important element of defense management.

C. D. DEAN
Major General, US Marine Corps
Commandant, Industrial College of the Armed Forces
PREFACE

In the aftermath of the Vietnam war, a number of military analysts have commented on the apparent deterioration of unit morale and cohesion during the latter stages of that conflict. While other analysts have disputed that conclusion, there is a rather widespread view among military professionals that cohesion was a problem. Moreover, many believe this deficiency still exists.

There is little or no empirical data to support the allegation that cohesion in the U.S. military is less than in the past, but there has been no research designed to gather such data. The evidence presented in the literature has been in the nature of theoretical arguments that the military has changed in ways that would likely affect cohesion. Several writers have focused on the adoption of bureaucratic management techniques in the military as a condition that will ipso facto affect esprit and cohesion. Similarly, the alleged shift of the military from an institutional organization characterized by moral commitment of members, to an occupational form characterized by calculative commitment based on economic interests, has been suggested as a trend having ominous implications for military cohesion.

There is considerable social science research that suggests a causative relationship does indeed exist between the kind of leadership and incentives used to gain membership and compliance in an organization and the kind of commitment elicited. Of equal or greater importance, however, is the need to identify and understand those variables that have caused the shifts in leader behavior and organizational culture, if indeed such shifts have occurred.

This study was designed to do several things that we believe are necessary if the cohesion issue is to receive the systematic study it needs. First, we undertook to develop a conceptual framework that would identify the principal components of military cohesion. Second, we analyzed the major systemic, macro variables we believed to be causatively related to the intervening factors of leader behavior and organizational culture. Third, we focused a great deal of the effort on the Officers Corps, which is believed to be the key organizational element with respect to cohesion. To measure officers' perceptions of their service and their personal orientation, a survey was developed and ad-
ministered to over 1,300 officers of field and flag rank. Finally, we made conclusions and recommendations that we believe deserve serious consideration.

The conclusions and recommendations in this study are targeted for decisionmakers in the Pentagon, OMB, and Congress. Our proposals deserve to be acted upon if valid and rejected if invalid. We hope, however, that rejection would be based on sound analysis and not passive disinterest. The stakes are too high for continued neglect of this important issue.

Military cohesion is perhaps the most critical factor in combat success. There is abundant evidence that cohesion in the US military needs significant improvement. This study is not offered as a comprehensive analysis of the cohesion issue; rather, we hope it will stimulate the more thorough research that the subject deserves.

JOHN H. JOHNS
Washington, D.C.
1983
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

...My first wish would be that my Military family, and the whole Army, should consider themselves as a band of brothers, willing and ready to die for each other.

George Washington
October 21, 1798
Writing to Henry Knox

Introduction

This study examines cohesion in the U.S. military—its nature, determinant factors, current condition, and what needs to be done to influence it systematically.

In the most general sense, "military cohesion" refers to a condition that causes members of the Armed Forces to conform to standards of behavior and to subordinate self-interest to that of the military. This condition is essential for organizational effectiveness, especially in ground combat units.

Cohesion can be defined at the highest level of the military institution or at the primary group level; i.e. the small, intimate, face-to-face squad or platoon. In the primary group the control of behavior is most intense; however, these groups must also be integrated vertically with the larger organization.

To encompass these elements, we define military cohesion as the bonding together of members of a unit or organization in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit, and the mission.

The kind of commitment required for cohesion is moral commitment, which results from the internalization of the values and norms (standards of behavior) of the group and sensitivity to social sanctions of other group members. Such commitment corresponds to a "calling" or "professional" orientation.
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Moral commitment tends to be present in organizations with certain characteristics, the most important of which is the kind of power used to control members. Moral commitment is most likely elicited by psychological and sociological sanctions such as esteem, affection, prestige, and ritualistic symbols. These sanctions are both vertical (between different ranks) and horizontal (among members of primary groups). Traditionally, the military has relied heavily on such control. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., calls this kind of organization an "institutional model."

Organizations that use remunerative power based on material benefits, e.g. pay and commodities, tend to elicit calculative commitment. Calculative commitment is transitory, of low intensity, and in the nature of a contractual relationship, where membership is viewed as a job. In contrast to the self-sacrifice of moral commitment, calculative commitment is self-serving. Moskos calls this kind of organization an "occupational model."

Cohesion in the U.S. Military

There is a widespread perception that cohesion in the U.S. military has deteriorated. Although little hard evidence of this exists, many social scientists have presented persuasive arguments. Some of these arguments revolve around the perception that the military as an organization has shifted from its traditional institutional form to that of an occupational model. Other analysts focus on the officer corps, alleging that officers have shifted from the traditional heroic warrior/professional with a calling, to that of a technical manager who views the military as a job.

We examined the most respectable of these "theories" and find some validity to their fundamental premises. We have attempted to go beyond officer behavior and changes in the nature of the military as an organization, however, to identify the more generic causative factors that are antecedent to those intervening variables. We do not believe that most policymakers now understand these factors well.

Intervening Causative Factors

The intervening variables that have caused the military to shift toward an occupational model can be grouped into two broad categories: (1) Systemic factors that permeate the entire military community, and (2) individual behavior of officers.
Systemic factors identified with an occupational model include emphasis on pay for recruiting and retention; proposals to eliminate or reduce such "institutional benefits" as commissaries, health care for dependents, on-post housing, or retirement benefits; consolidation of messhalls, personnel administration; below-the-zero promotions; elimination of nonappropriated funds for the club system; reduction in the number of marching bands; increase in number of married junior enlisted who live off-base; management practices that emphasize quantifiable factors; reduction of ritual and ceremony; convergence of military and civilian technical skills; privacy for first-term enlisted; increased number of women; and the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) policy.

There is a widespread perception, among officers as well as among military sociologists, that officers manage more than lead; place personal welfare before professional duty; are too career-minded; often retire when there is economic gain to do so; are more interested in technology and ideas than in people; and have a managerial ethic rather than a professional ethic of duty, honor, and country.

Antecedent Factors

The intervening variables just described are the consequences of more fundamental factors that must be understood if a systematic effort is to be made to influence military cohesion. The most basic factors are historical forces that are changing the entire modern world—ideas and technological developments.

Ideas. The most important area of thought relevant to cohesion is the philosophy of rationalism, particularly its application to organizational design and control. Two manifestations of this philosophy—bureaucracy and scientific management—have had a profound impact on the U.S. military.

Bureaucracy. The epitome of rational organization, bureaucracy, is characterized by specialized functions; hierarchical structure; detailed, impersonal rules; highly skilled specialists; and rational decision-making. As Max Weber, who introduced the term, noted, an organization is bureaucratic to the extent that it is dehumanized and to the degree that it eliminates from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements that do not fit into rational calculation. Weber's model was the Prussian/German Army, which had been designed and organized by the General Staff. Elihu Root was impressed with its efficiency and brought the concepts to the U.S. military at the turn of the century. Thus, bureaucracy, with its focus on rational management, was introduced to the U.S. military.
Executive Summary

Scientific management. Rational management of the military was strengthened by the adoption of the philosophy of scientific management, which assumed a rational economic man motivated by material benefits. OR/SA, PPBS, and cost-benefit analysis are DoD variants of this school of management.

Bureaucratic organization and scientific management suggest an occupational model with managers who use impersonal material sanctions to motivate members. The Gates Commission explicitly offered such rationale for recommending the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). The intervening systemic factors listed previously are natural products of these concepts.

Technology. The rapid development of technology has changed the entire nature of the military. Not only has it changed how people live, eat, and work; it has also changed their relationships to each other and to the organization. Military skills converge with civilian skills, offering alternative employment. Technicians focus on equipment rather than on people. Highly skilled technicians require differential pay. Technical workers and staffers have more expertise in their areas than their superiors do. Communication and control technology encourage micromanagement from centralized headquarters.

Impact on Military Cohesion

The antecedent factors of ideas and technology have permeated the entire military system. Policies are made in the Pentagon based largely on quantification. Although PPBS was designed to accommodate nonquantifiable input such as professional judgment and systematic analysis based on logical reasons, in practice cost-benefit analysis drives the PPBS.

The General Staff concept (bureaucracy) has resulted in more and more specialized personnel who make analyses from a narrow economic perspective. At the national level, civilian analysts, most of whom have little or no military experience, perform the functions of a General Staff. These civilian analysts were originally confined to OSD. Now they are in OMB, GAO, and congressional staffs.

These forces have transformed the U.S. military. Not only do they create an occupational organization, but they also send “authority demands” through the system emphasizing quantifiable, short-term goals leading to management by statistics.
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Officers' Behavior

The officer corps has two critical functions to perform in producing military cohesion: (1) providing leadership of primary groups, and (2) integrating and linking the primary groups to the larger military institution and the nation. Each of these functions requires a certain kind of behavior.

Leadership behavior requires personal, empathic relationships with subordinates. The leader controls members largely through the use of normative power. Management behavior controls through an impersonal relationship, using rules, regulations, and sanctions based on bureaucratic authority. Leadership is emphasized in the institutional model organization and elicits moral commitment; management is emphasized in the occupational model and elicits calculative commitment. The integration/linking function requires moral commitment, i.e. a calling or professionalism rather than an occupational orientation.

It is difficult to say what effect, if any, these antecedent variables have had on officers' attitudes and behavior. In an attempt to obtain empirical data on this issue, we surveyed 1,303 field-grade and 52 flag-rank officers. We cannot compare our results with previous data and show trends inasmuch as no baseline data exist. To establish a standard, however, we asked the flag-rank officers to complete the survey the way they would prefer their field-grade officers to respond. Although this technique has obvious shortcomings, it was the best standard "ideal" we could come up with, and it had some interesting results.

The survey was designed to measure officers' orientation toward the military (professional vs. job) and officers' perception of their service as an institutional or occupational model (per Moskos concept). The results are discussed in Chapter 4. In general, the respondents tend to perceive themselves individually as having a professional orientation, but they perceive their peers to be significantly less so. In fact, their attitudes on certain issues indicate that they are significantly more occupational in orientation than they think they are. Moreover, the field-grade officers fall short of the "ideal" in many significant ways.

We do not know whether officers' orientation is different now than it was in the past, but we do believe it is too occupational, which accounts for much of the careerism and management behavior that has been written about so much. Parades, rituals, and ceremonies—which help foster group identity and cohesion—tend to be neglected in occupational organizations. Support units in particular resemble more and more a civilian industry, but combat units as well are similarly affected.
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It is not uncommon to find a combat arms unit that has not conducted a retreat parade in more than a year. Management, rather than leadership, is rewarded. Few commanders seem to be able to resist these systemic influences.

Leadership behavior is more difficult to achieve in high-technology units. Members of such units tend to be technicians interested in equipment; much time is required to maintain equipment and technical skills; officers are required to have technical knowledge, which requires full attention and is rewarded; and work units tend to be fragmented, making unit identification more difficult.

The dilemma of managerial versus leadership functions must be solved. The two functions require different skills, different personalities, and different perspectives. The dilemma could be resolved with the establishment of a formal General Staff Corps.

Summary

Historical forces in the form of ideas and technology have caused profound changes in the U.S. military, pushing it from its traditional institutional form to that of simply a job.

Some people will argue that attributing such influence to those systemic forces is a gross exaggeration, that “good leaders” are not constrained by such forces. Others will deny that management and leadership are incompatible. The thesis of this paper is to the contrary. Consolidated dining and administrative facilities, for example, may save money, but they do not foster unit identification. A straight salary system that eliminates commissaries, exchanges, and on-base housing may be persuasively defended by economic analysis; but it pushes the military from an institutional to an occupational model of organization. Ritual and ceremony, too, are essential for maintaining an institutional model.

Citing the dysfunctions of bureaucratic organization, systems analysis, PPBS, and the General Staff concept should not be interpreted to be a call for the abolition of these tools. It is sentimental folly to argue for a return to the “good old days” when every commander was given a mission and resources and left on his own. Those conditions produced the inefficiency and chaos that led to the adoption of modern management techniques. One can hardly imagine a complex modern organization without the characteristics associated with bureaucracy. Indeed, to be “organized” is to be bureaucratized. Systems analysis, PPBS, and cost-benefit analysis have brought rigor to the decisionmaking process of resource allocation. Systematic, analytical planning is absolutely essential to modern organizations, especially the military.
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The purpose of this paper is to try to find a middle path between the equally distasteful alternatives of pure bureaucratic organization and scientific management, and disorganized chaos. We believe that the first step down this path is to understand the historical forces at work.

We are not sure of the consequences of the shift of the military toward an occupational model, nor are we sure that much can be done to affect the trend. We are certain, however, that policymakers must understand these changes and try to predict consequences. Combat troops who view the military as a job and have a calculative commitment may coalesce into cohesive fighting units. Based on our study, we think they will not.

Conclusions

1. Powerful forces are changing the U.S. military from an institutional organization emphasizing normative control to an occupation using remunerative controls. Bureaucratic and scientific management principles manifested in OR/SA, PPBS, cost-benefit analysis, and other quantitative decisionmaking tools, along with technology, are the principal causes of this shift. This shift has weakened cohesion.

2. Associated with the shift of the military from an institutional to an occupational model is a shift in the officer corps from a professional orientation to an occupational (job) orientation. Consequences include:
   - More careerism, less professionalism.
   - Managerial behavior.
   - Weakening of group cohesion.

3. The U.S. military has made no systematic effort to influence this trend toward an occupational model and occupational orientation of the officer corps.

4. Senior officials in DoD, OMB, GAO, and congressional staffs are largely unaware of the nature of the changing military and the factors involved.

5. The command functions of management and leadership require different skills rarely found in the same person. Even the rare person who possesses both sets of skills finds it difficult to perform both functions simultaneously, especially in units with complex technology (equipment or ideas).
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Recommendations

1. OSD and the Military Departments should conduct a comprehensive study to define cohesion issues accurately and thoroughly.

2. OSD should systematically inform officials in OMB, GAO, the White House, and Congress about the issues related to military cohesion.

3. Military Departments should develop concepts and doctrine that provide guidelines for systematic efforts to build military cohesion.

4. Military Departments should emphasize the socialization of officers, enlisted personnel, and family throughout the entire military system.

5. Military Departments should educate all officers on the nature of cohesion, the factors involved, and ways to improve cohesion.

6. Military Departments should examine all policies to determine their impact on cohesion.

7. Military Departments should "institutionalize" the consideration of cohesion in their decisionmaking process. This should include, but not be limited to, the designation of a staff element responsible for evaluating policies for their impact on cohesion. Persons in that staff element must have a thorough understanding of the scientific technology related to organizational behavior in the military.

8. Military Departments should make full use of scientific technology related to organizational behavior in general and cohesion in particular.

9. Military Departments should establish a General Staff Corps to provide management in the military.
Chapter 1

Can Cohesion be Increased in Today's Military?

Problem

This study examines cohesion in the U.S. military—its nature, its determinants, its the current status, and ways to influence it.

In a broad sense, the term "cohesion" refers to the degree to which members of a group or organization are willing to subordi- nate their individual welfare to that of the group and to conform to the standards of behavior, or norms, of the group. This condition is often referred to as "national will" or "patriotism" when the reference group is a nation and "group morale," "esprit," or "elan" when referring to the military. As we will use the term "cohesion" in this study, however, it has a more precise meaning than any of those terms.

Napoleon is alleged to have said that success on the battlefield is dependent on morale (esprit, elan) rather than physical resources by a three to one margin. Whether such a ratio applies to modern warfare (or, for that matter, in Napoleon's day) is debatable. What is not debatable is that it is a critical element of organizational effectiveness.

The military has recently evidenced revived interest in cohesion, partly because of the "Vietnam experience," which caused an inward look, especially in the Army. Serious questions were raised about the state of cohesion of military units in Vietnam.

Military cohesion can exist at various levels. If the U.S. military is to be effective, it must be cohesive at all levels, from the primary group to the national level. The primary group is the principal unit of behavior control; these units must be integrated laterally and vertically into the larger organization. The officer corps plays a critical role in both primary group cohesion and the integration function.
Can Cohesion Be Increased in Today's Military?

The literature, both fictional and scientific, abounds with references to the importance of fraternal bonding of military men in combat. Most of this literature has focused on small combat units where group members develop personal relationships based on daily face-to-face association. The classic works on World War II, *The American Soldier* \(^{58}\) and "Cohesion and disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," \(^{54}\) provide strong evidence that small-unit cohesion is the key factor in combat performance, although not all social scientists agree that it is the principal determinant. (Note: numbered citations refer to bibliographic listing.)

Our initial research convinced us that organizational cohesion remains a key determinant of group performance, not only in wartime, but in peacetime as well. We found strong support for this conclusion among students at the National Defense University. We found little consensus, however, on the nature of cohesion, its determinants, and ways to influence it.

We found that the factors that influence cohesion of primary groups and their integration into the larger organization are inadequately appreciated. Especially ignored are the macro, or systemic, factors that affect cohesion.

As early as 1960, Janowitz\(^{30}\) saw a long-term convergence of military and civilian professions, one consequence of which would be the introduction of "more and more contractual relations between the officer and the state." He did not believe, however, that such a transformation would necessarily undermine professional affiliations and cohesion among the officer corps.

More recently, several critics have argued that a shift in orientation of the officer corps has indeed adversely affected cohesion. Gabriel and Savage, in *Crisis in Command,* \(^{6}\) allege that the shift toward the "managerial ethos" of the civilian industrial world has eroded the military professionalism of the officer corps, leading to self-serving behavior, lack of mutual trust, and weakening of corporate cohesion.

Charles C. Moskos, Jr., has captured the imagination of many people with his writings on an alleged shift of the military from an "institution" (where membership is legitimated in terms of a "calling" or profession, which implies self-sacrifice and moral commitment) to an "occupational" model (where membership is legitimated in terms of the economic marketplace; that is, duties are performed in exchange for material benefits).\(^{44}\) If Moskos is correct, the shift from an institutional to an occupational model has important implications for military cohesion.
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Other systemic factors have equally important implications for military cohesion. The design of messhalls, the form of compensation, the number of marching bands, housing policy, and recruiting policies also affect cohesion.

The orientation of the officers corps and DoD/service policies are, however, intervening variables. They are both cause and effect. If military officials are to influence cohesion systematically, they must understand the antecedent causative variables that underlie these intervening variables. Our research leads us to believe that those antecedent causative variables are poorly understood. Although those factors have been described in the theoretical literature, they have not been translated into concepts useful to military policymakers.

Although all services are making efforts to improve cohesion and all senior officers we interviewed are obviously aware of the importance of this phenomenon, we found the efforts to be piecemeal, based on initiatives from the top officials themselves and mostly focused on improving leadership. We agree that leader behavior is a critical element in developing unit cohesion, but we believe it is a mistake to ignore other factors that also play key roles.

If the allegations of deteriorating cohesion in the military are valid, the implications are especially serious for ground combat units. The nature of cohesion in the military needs to be systematically examined, therefore, and the principal determinants that adversely influence cohesion need to be identified.

**Purpose of Study**

This study was undertaken to examine the nature of military cohesion and to identify the principal factors that must be understood if there is to be a systematic effort to influence this phenomenon. Specifically, the following objectives were sought:

- Articulate a broad conceptual framework that encompasses the principal dimensions of military cohesion. This effort, which addresses both systemic variables and small-group processes, is designed to provide policymakers with a framework for developing a systematic, analytical program for influencing cohesion.

- Conduct a survey of field-grade and flag-grade officers to determine their orientation toward the military in terms of the institutional occupational model articulated by Moskos. The surveyed officers were also asked to evaluate the current military along that dimension.
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- This study does not purport to be a comprehensive analysis of the subject and therefore makes no attempt to present a blueprint for action. In specific instances, however, we are confident enough about our conclusions to offer concrete recommendations.

**Study Design**

Our data collection involved three elements.

**Literature search.** We searched the scientific literature on cohesion and examined official Pentagon files regarding policy decisions affecting cohesion (e.g. staffing documents related to the President's Commission on Military Compensation).

**Interviews.** We interviewed fourteen senior officials who are influential in regard to policy decisions affecting cohesion.

**Survey.** We surveyed more than 1,300 field-grade and 52 flag-rank officers. The results were factor analyzed, identifying two major factors: Orientation of officers toward the military, and evaluation of the military as an institutional model. Both factors were stated in terms of Moskos' institutional/occupational model.

**Basic Concepts**

**Cohesion.** The term "cohesion" has not been widely used in the military until recently, but it is becoming more familiar, especially in the Army. The military has shown a preference for such terms as "group morale," "esprit," or "elan." Although such terms are roughly equivalent to cohesion, they are not the same. Social scientists usually define "group cohesion" from the standpoint of the individual (desire to remain in the group) or the group (the resultant of all forces operating to keep members in the group). In either case, strong cohesion implies a commitment to conform to group standards of behavior (norms) and to respond to pressures from other members of the group even under adverse circumstances.

**Military cohesion.** For purposes of this study, the term is defined as the bonding together of members of an organization or unit in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit, and the mission. Group cohesion does not always contribute to organizational effectiveness; therefore, commitment to unit and mission is an essential element of the definition. The definition also implies a willingness of individuals to subordinate their personal welfare—including life if necessary—to that of their comrades, unit, and mission.

**Group norms.** Group standards of behavior may be formal, written standards (e.g. rules and regulations) or informal, unwritten agreed-upon
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rules of conduct. Cohesion can be measured in terms of the degree to which group members conform to the norms. In strongly cohesive groups members will conform even under stress.

**Commitment.** Commitment refers to the positive orientation of a person toward the group. A negative orientation is referred to as alienation. According to Etzioni's a member may have three basic kinds of orientation toward a group—moral commitment, calculative orientation, or alienative orientation.

**Moral commitment.** This is the strongest degree of commitment and results from the internalization of group values and norms (pure type) or sensitivity to pressure of primary groups and their members (social type). The pure type of moral commitment is represented by a sense of “calling”; the social type is the kind found in small cohesive combat units. The extreme form of moral commitment can elicit martyrdom. Conformity with norms is willing (self-discipline). If it is the pure type, the individual will conform even when away from the group. (It is part of his self-concept, or conscience.)

**Calculative orientation.** This is either a negative orientation or a low-intensity positive orientation. It is based on a contractual relationship where membership and performance are exchanged for material benefits. This type of commitment is represented by the average industrial worker. Conformity with norms is calculated to receive material benefits. If deviant behavior cannot be observed, conformity is problematic.

**Alienative orientation.** This is a negative orientation such as is found in prisons and POW camps. Conformity is achieved by coercive power and is situational.

**Controls and commitment.** The kind of commitment elicited from group members is correlated with the kind of power used to control member behavior.

- **Coercive power** (the use, or threat of use, of physical sanctions) elicits alienative orientation.
- **Remunerative power** (the use of material incentives such as money) elicits calculative orientation.
- **Normative power** (the use of psychological sanctions—internalized norms and values—and social sanctions—peer pressures) elicits moral commitment.
Can Cohesion Be Increased in Today's Military?

The U.S. military has traditionally used all three types of control but has emphasized normative controls until recently, when remuneration has begun to be emphasized. Normative controls in the military have been based on the notion of the military as a way of life, a calling, a fraternal organization that "cares for its own." The goal is to have members internalize the norms and values of the military. Commanders have been taught to care for their subordinates in a personal way rather than through impersonal bureaucratic rules and regulations and material sanctions. Manuals on leadership have long emphasized the point that the best discipline derives from the use of normative controls, which develop self-discipline and moral commitment. To the extent that we control members by material rewards, we will elicit calculative commitment. To the extent that we rely on coercive power, we will tend to elicit alienative orientation, although this does not necessarily happen if this kind of control is used selectively and sparingly. Clearly, the most desirable kind of commitment for members of the military is moral commitment.

Primary group. A small group characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation. The result of this intimate association is a fusion of individualities into a common whole, so that one's very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group. Primary groups are the principal social units through which values and ideals are imparted and social control exercised.

Institutional-Occupational model. Moskos has developed a concept that describes the shift of the military from an organization that elicits moral commitment and self-sacrifice for the group welfare to one whose members view their relationship to the organization as contractual, which calls for material benefits in exchange for job performance. Moskos has developed this concept over time and has used different terms. Relating his terms to the concepts defined here, we come up with the following terms with respect to officers.

Calling. Pure moral commitment where the values and norms of the military are internalized by the officer, and the military purpose transcends personal welfare.

Institution. An organization whose membership is based on normative controls; it is legitimated in terms of values and norms that define a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good.

Occupation. An organization whose membership is based on remunerative controls; it is legitimated in terms of the marketplace, and the relationship is contractual.
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According to Moskos, an institutional model elicits the kind of orientation he terms a "calling," which equates to moral commitment; and the occupational model is based on a calculative orientation. The models are a continuum, however, and real-life organizations fall somewhere along the institutional–occupational dimension.

Military professionalism. We believe the model would be more useful if another term, "military profession," is added. Moskos used the term "profession" in an earlier version of his model, implying that profession is somewhere between the institutional and occupational models. We want to put it back in, but with a slightly different connotation than that used by Moskos. For purposes of this study, we draw on Janowitz to define a "military profession" as an association of military members with five essential characteristics: (1) skill in the services they offer their clients; (2) trustworthy to each other and to their clients; (3) personal welfare subordinated to professional duties; (4) a high degree of self-regulation; and (5) strong corporate cohesion.

Based on this concept, a military professional would have a moral commitment to the military. It could be the pure type of moral commitment, or social commitment, or both. We believe this term is useful because it is widely used in the military. Moreover, there is reason to believe that few officers consider their military service a calling. We would hope, however, that most career officers would be professionals. Therefore, we place the term back into Moskos' model.

Leadership and management. A central factor in military cohesion is the type of behavior used to control members of the military. This control is most often referred to as "leadership and/or management." The literature abounds with these terms, but as yet no definitions of the two concepts have been commonly accepted. Much of the distinction seems to be semantic, but we believe the kinds of authority the terms represent are substantively different as reflected in the conventional connotations of students at the National Defense University. Much of the literature makes distinctions similar to those we will use. The following discussion omits the decisionmaking aspect of both terms and focuses on control of people.

The term "management" is generally used to refer to behavior that controls organizational members through an impersonal process of rules and regulations based on bureaucratic authority vested in one's position. Influence is exercised by the manipulation of material sanctions, either rewards or punishments. There is a tendency to associate this kind of behavior with relying heavily on quantifiable indicators. Control
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is exercised exclusively through the formal organization. This concept of management approximates Weber's definition of bureaucratic authority, which seeks to "dehumanize" the organization by eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements that escape rational calculation.

"Leadership," on the other hand, is viewed as a broader concept that subsumes the management functions. In addition to the impersonal means of control, leadership involves personal, empathic relationships with subordinates. Although leaders use their bureaucratic authority, it is minimized in favor of personal, inspirational influence. The leader seeks to gain compliance based on normative controls stemming from the members' identification with the leader and the values of the military. The epitome of leadership qualities approximates charisma and heroic behavior.

These distinctions have no official status, but they seem to represent the conventional connotations of the terms. We do not endorse the meanings but will use the terms in this study because we believe they reflect two distinct kinds of behavior that are crucial to understanding the role of leadership in military cohesion.

Military Cohesion

The need for teamwork, group solidarity, and commitment to the standards of conduct when the group is under stress are necessary elements of organizational effectiveness, whether that organization be a nation or a small, intimate group. There must be a degree of commitment that calls for self-sacrifice for the welfare of the group.

All military organizations do not require the same degree of cohesion, nor the same degree of moral commitment from their members. The need for cohesion is a function of, among other things, the amount of teamwork required to accomplish a mission and the amount of self-sacrifice required to conform to group norms. At one end of the continuum, ground units that engage in close combat would require strong cohesion. Units with stateside missions that require little self-sacrifice would fall at the other extreme. In the latter case, calculative commitment may be sufficient even though moral commitment might be more desirable.

The primary group is the key to combat performance, but it must be linked to the larger organization and the nation if we are to have an effective fighting force. The officer corps provides that linkage, both horizontally and vertically. Officer behavior, both in the primary group
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and in its orientation toward the military institution and nation, is therefore critical.

Primary group cohesion requires the kind of behavior we have defined as "leadership" rather than impersonal managerial controls, and officers must be morally committed toward the military institution if we are to have a cohesive military. This commitment must be in the form of a "calling" or military professionalism.

Although we can present no quantitative data to support the notion that the behavior of U.S. military officers has shifted toward an occupational orientation and the management mode of control, we have found strong, logically persuasive evidence that it has. Furthermore, there is a widespread perception among students at the National Defense University that such a shift has occurred and is continuing. This phenomenon has important implications for cohesion in the military.

The shift toward a managerial style of control in the military tends to change the orientation of members of the military from moral commitment to calculative commitment. The military comes to be viewed as "a job." This shift is due to many factors that must be understood and controlled if the trend toward an occupational model is to be reversed.

Summary

Historically, cohesion among groups of people has been crucial to an effective U.S. military organization. In recent years, however, a shift has been noted among military personnel toward a job orientation instead of a professional commitment, with consequent deterioration of cohesion. The National Defense University undertook a study to determine the present status of group cohesion in the military, to identify factors that influence it, and to recommend ways to improve it. This report will describe the study and its findings.
Chapter 2
SYSTEMIC FACTORS THAT AFFECT COHESION

Many complex factors influence the nature of the military, and we make no pretense of having analyzed them comprehensively. That is a task for someone else; rather, we will discuss what we consider to be the two most critical factors: technology and ideas.

Technology

Social analysts and astute observers have long recognized that technological developments change the way we work, the way we live, and the way we relate to each other. The reader is referred to Toffler's *The Third Wave* for some observations on how technology forces vast social change. We also know that technological developments have had a profound impact on how military people relate to each other and to their units. Complex weapon systems break functional units into smaller groups that tend to be connected to other members of the organization by electronic means. Rarely, if ever, do these groups work together in face-to-face interaction that forms "cohesive bonds." Affluence, transportation, and housing, along with other changes, have made almost meaningless the concept of "unit integrity" in billeting military personnel. Consolidated dining facilities weaken small-unit identification. Paying by the JUMPS rather than face-to-face interaction with the unit commander, with the attendant ritual, is another oft-cited example. These, and many other consequences of technological development, are incompatible with the principle that cohesion is strongest when members of a group perform most activities together.

Technology in the military affects cohesion in another way. Sophisticated equipment requires highly trained operators whose attention is necessarily oriented toward the equipment rather than toward other people in the group. Leaders, too, are required to be technically oriented. Much time is required to learn technical skills, and leaders often become more "thing oriented" than "people oriented." Although
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this situation does not necessitate the neglect of interpersonal relations, the evidence is that it does so to an extensive degree.

The technical skills required for the modern military can also result in weakened commitment to the military. First, the skills are often transferable to the civilian job market; thus economic alternatives are available to the highly skilled technician.

In addition, strong evidence indicates that military personnel working with highly sophisticated equipment join and stay in the military because of the equipment instead of for the more traditional reasons of patriotism and desire to belong to the military community.41

Technology has also radically changed the nature of management. Rapid communication and automatic data processing provide the capability for highly centralized management. Officials in higher headquarters, OMB, and Congress have not neglected their opportunity for micro-management.

Ideas

Technological developments and ideas about how to organize and manage the people in an organization are interdependent. New technology requires new skills, new organizations, and new ways of managing people. Ideas, however, are a force in their own right and not merely dependent variables. Although technology puts constraints on management procedures, ideas determine how people are organized and controlled.

The most fundamental idea that affects military cohesion is what has come to be called rationalism. Growing out of the age of enlightenment, this philosophy adopts the view that individual and social life can be interpreted and regulated in terms of principles derived from logical reason. This fundamental assumption underlies much of the political, economic, and social thought of the western world. It also serves as the foundation for much management philosophy in the modern nations. A central feature of most rational management philosophy is the assumption that people are motivated primarily by economic incentives.

Bureaucracy. The popular concept of management is closely related to "bureaucratic" behavior. This is not by happenstance. The first systematic study of the formal aspects of rational organizations was done by a German social scientist, Max Weber. He concluded that the most efficient way of organizing large numbers of people to achieve common goals was through specialization of tasks; detailed, rational, nonpersonal rules; rational, efficient management; continuity through standard operating procedures and written files; direction and control

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of members by centralized authority based on legal appointment; and interchangeability of personnel. He called the extreme form of such rational organization "bureaucracy." Any study of modern management and leadership behavior must include an understanding of the concept of bureaucracy. It is especially important for students of U.S. military leadership and management, because the model for Weber's concept of bureaucracy (nineteenth century Prussian Army) was the very model used by Elihu Root around 1900 to bring "management" to the U.S. Army. Contrary to the widespread notion that McNamara and his "whiz kids" brought the management ethos to the military, one must look to the turn of the century for the origin.70

According to Weber, the decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its technical superiority over any other form of organization:21

Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization—that is, the monocratic variety of bureaucracy—is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rationally known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes possible a particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of the organization and for those acting in relation to it. It is finally superior both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations, and is formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks. [p. 214]

Thus, bureaucracy represents the most efficient organization based on logical, rational analysis of objectives, assignment of jobs needed to accomplish these objectives, and rational administrative controls to ensure compliance. Implicit in this whole concept is the assumption that well-trained persons will learn their jobs, follow the logical rules, and conduct themselves according to their job description—if given sufficient incentives. Given that basic assumption, bureaucracy is the best organizational structure for achieving efficiency.

Weber noted some undesirable consequences of bureaucratic organization, however. He noted that each man becomes a little cog in the machine and his one preoccupation is trying to become a bigger cog. Moreover, behavior becomes habitual and noninnovative. Perhaps the most serious defect Weber noted is the impact on organizational esprit: "The dominance of a spirit of formalistic impersonality...without hatred or passion, and hence without affection or enthusiasm."21 Later
students of bureaucratic behavior have elaborated on Weber's observations. Blau and Meyer point out that "although the formally established structure and procedures are designed to further efficiency, some of these emergent processes defeat the formal design and create bureaucratic rigidity, which interferes with adaptation to changing conditions and impedes efficiency." They further state:

Centralized authority, even if it results in superior decisions, undermines the ability of middle managers to assume responsibilities. Detailed rules, even if they improve performance, prevent adaptation to changing situations. Strict discipline, even if it facilitates managerial direction, creates resentments that reduce effort. Generally, there are no formal arrangements that can assure efficiency because it depends on flexible adjustments to varying and changing conditions in the organization. [p. 59]³

Blau and Meyer consider critical reviews from below a necessary condition to maintain organizational vitality and to prevent ossification. Unfortunately, they say, conditions for preventing rigidity are difficult to maintain in practice. One of the principal reasons is that subordinates, afraid of their superiors, protect themselves with overconformity. They suggest that "the major task of management is not to lay down rules on how to do the work, but to maintain conditions in which adjustments spontaneously occur when new problems arise and to protect these conditions from bureaucratic processes of ossification" [p. 41].³

Weber's concept of the bureaucratic organization was developed largely on his study of the German Army, in which he briefly served. The German Army Weber studied was, of course, a product of the planning and direction of the German General Staff. Its clearcut hierarchical structure of authority fitted his idea of an efficient organization. Military organizations represent a special case of bureaucratic organization in the sense that they require extremely close coordination and teamwork under stressful conditions. This suggests a set of detailed rules and regulations followed by highly disciplined personnel. Such conditions, unfortunately, tend to produce the very characteristics that can make an organization less efficient (i.e. overconformity, poor upward communication).

Because of the dysfunctions of bureaucratic organization, the term "bureaucracy" is widely used now in a pejorative sense to refer to organizations characterized by red tape and rigid behavior dictated by impersonal rules. Although such behavior is frequently found in bureaucratic organizations, the term as used in the scientific literature follows the meaning given by Weber and represents a detached, ob-
jective, scholarly description of modern organizations characterized by a hierarchy of authority, specialized positions defined by systematic, impersonal rules, with authority resting in the office rather than the person. It is difficult to imagine any large, complex organization without such characteristics, especially a military organization requiring strict conformity under stressful conditions. Complexity itself suggests some sort of bureaucratic organization. Each element of bureaucratic organization can contribute to an effective and efficient group effort, but each one also contains the seed of inefficiency and ineffectiveness.

From an abstract standpoint, the most rational method of effecting uniformity of work and coordination in a large organization would seem to be to devise efficient procedures for every task, train people to perform these tasks, and insist that rules and regulations be strictly followed. In practice, however, it doesn't work so well for several reasons. First, no set of rules and regulations anticipates all contingencies that may arise. People must be given some latitude for judgment and innovation. Thus, military regulations are commonly referred to as "guides" to behavior. On the other hand, who determines under what conditions the individual is free to innovate? And for which regulations? Moreover, some impediments to efficiency cannot be eradicated by official decree. Informal, cohesive groups, each with its leadership, exist in all large organizations. They develop their own standards of conduct and enforce them among their members. The design, and management, of organizations cannot ignore this fact without cost. When managers do ignore the informal system, they pay dearly.

Although the formally established structure and procedures of bureaucracies are designed to foster efficiency, some of the unintended, informal processes defeat the formal design and create rigidity that interferes with efficiency and adaptation to changing conditions. A fundamental dilemma of bureaucratic administration is that the very arrangements officially instituted to improve efficiency often generate byproducts that impede it.

Perhaps more important than the more direct dysfunctions of bureaucratic organization is the indirect psychological impact on the people who are members of such organizations. Rationality does not always enhance job satisfaction and commitment to the organization. On the contrary, many consider it to be the culprit in the growing frustration and alienation of modern society. With an emphasis on rationality goes an impersonal, "objective" approach to management without regard for people. Weber viewed bureaucracy as more "pure" to the
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extent that it was dehumanized and to the degree that it eliminated from
official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and
emotional elements that do not fit into rational calculation.

The benefits of rational organization are widely agreed, however,
to outweigh the costs. Not everything that enhances rationality leads
to alienation; but, in general, the less an organization alienates its
members, the more effective it is. This dilemma has led Etzioni\textsuperscript{14} to
state: “The problem of modern organizations is thus, how to construct
human groupings that are as rational as possible, and at the same time
produce a minimum of undesirable side effects and a maximum of
satisfaction”\textsuperscript{[p. 4]}. How managers solve this dilemma depends to a large
extent on how they manage or lead their bureaucracy.

Philosophies of management. The problem of how best to organize
numbers of people to achieve common goals has been, of necessity,
a central concern of managers throughout history. Whether rationally
or by happenstance, the person “in charge” must be concerned with
the shape of the organization (e.g. hierarchical or flat), the focus of deci-
sionmaking, means of obtaining compliance of group members, and
leadership “style.” These decisions obviously rest on assumptions, im-
licit or explicit, about the nature of human behavior in organizations;
i.e. what set of conditions will best motivate group members to comply
with the requirements that must be satisfied to accomplish the organiza-
tional goals and objectives?

Although different approaches to managing large numbers of peo-
ple have existed as long as organized groups have existed, only dur-
ing the past century has any systematic study of this phenomenon been
made by the scientific community. This field of science has expanded
rapidly during the post–World War II period until there is now a large
body of literature on the subject. As might be expected of a subject
so complex, there are numerous ways to “slice the pie.” Consequently,
one should not be surprised to find different ways of describing the same
phenomenon. Although scientific management is just one way of classi-
ifying the different approaches to management, it is widely accepted
and is useful for understanding management in the U.S. military.

Scientific management. In the early part of this century, Frederick
Taylor launched the philosophy of scientific management. Weber’s con-
cept of bureaucracy preceded Taylor’s work and, in a sense, repre-
sented the seminal work in looking at organizations in a systematic,
scientific way. Nonetheless, it was Taylor who focused on the appli-
cation of science to the day-to-day operations of bureaucracies. Taylor
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was a practitioner—a worker, an engineer, and a foreman—and he had a strong sense of the "pragmatic emphasis." His major thesis was that maximum prosperity comes from the cooperation of both management and workers in the application of the scientific method to all forms of common endeavor. He looked closely at the tasks involved in work and carefully analyzed them to determine how to perform them more efficiently. The scientific method was applied to solving problems through research and study, rather than relying on subjective judgment and intuition. Frederick Taylor published his text, The Principles of Scientific Management, in which he called for (1) the development of a true science in analyzing work, (2) scientific selection of workers, (3) scientific education and development of workers, and (4) cooperation between management and workers.

The practice of scientific management was advanced significantly by several other trends of thought. In the area of industrial engineering, the techniques of time and motion study, methods design and analysis, and work simplification became an "applied-science" route to the *one best way* of optimal performance. The objectives were to (1) eliminate unnecessary motions and tasks, (2) group and combine related tasks, (3) coordinate the sequence and flow of work processes, and (4) simplify the process to basic operations. These approaches moved beyond the scientific management orientation in the 1920s and 1930s to such areas as production management and control as work processes grew larger.

By 1940, the research and analysis of operations had incorporated methods from statistics, mathematics, economics, and engineering to achieve better operational performance. Interdisciplinary techniques were applied to problems in military operations during World War II in such areas as planning the employment of scarce radar resources in the Battle for Britain, the composition and routing of convoys in the North Atlantic, and strategic bombing. After the war, the term "operations research" was applied to the interdisciplinary techniques that were introduced into the burgeoning peacetime economy. These techniques offered greater precision in predicting the outcomes of decisions. The advent of the computer enabled greater use of mathematical model-building of decision situations to develop optimal decision strategies according to criteria of economic value or performing measures.

At about the same time that Taylorism was gaining popularity, Henri Fayol made his contribution to management philosophy. Fayol was a Frenchman who took over a mining company on the verge of bankruptcy...
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and converted it into a highly successful financial venture. On the basis of his experience, he projected several observations about the functions of the manager and the process of management. Fayol set forth elements of management—planning, organizing, commanding, controlling, and coordinating—that still appear in one form or another in most basic texts. He also identified fourteen principles of management that paved the way for many who followed him in the search for "principles." Fayol felt that there was a sort of universality about his elements and principles of management that made them appropriate for all kinds of organizations.¹²

Concurrent with these events, public administration was another area of study in the field of management. The studies of bureaucracy and the development of management concepts in business contributed greatly to public administration. The concern for efficiency that dominated scientific management became a central theme of writers in literature about public administration. Efficient administration became an end to be achieved by better organization, more effective planning and control, and other administrative techniques.

These trends of thought represented a blend of academic study and management practice. The concept of bureaucracy, as the forerunner of this approach to management, was developed for the most part by sociologists, who took a detached, scholarly, descriptive point of view. The other "theories" were developed by writers who were practitioners in management and were primarily interested in improving management.

Although the various trends viewed management from somewhat different perspectives, they shared a focus on the formal structure of the organization and the rational aspects of human behavior. Moreover, they assumed (sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly, as in the case of Taylor) a rational, economic worker. As will be seen in the discussion of the human relations and systems philosophies, the focus on the formal structure of the organization and the assumption of the rational, economic man, differs significantly from the latter two approaches.

Focus on the formal structure of organizations, coupled with the assumption that members of organizations behave in a rational, economic way, naturally leads to a preoccupation with "sound engineering principles" as the core of management concern. Some of the most sophisticated of the modern techniques to management engineering are found in the theories and practices of operations research and
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systems analysis (OR/SA) technicians. Their attention focuses mostly on analysis of economic or engineering variables that are quantifiable and amenable to management decisions that will optimize time, financial cost, and product effectiveness in an organizational context. In its purest form, this approach to management is an operational, production-oriented strategy rather than an organizational (people) maintenance orientation represented by the human relations philosophy, to be discussed later. OR/SA technicians seldom devote much attention to the kinds of satisfactions that organization members derive from work and membership in the work group. Although these analysts recognize that certain minimal degrees of job satisfaction may be required to maintain organizational capabilities for any great period of time and that the maintenance of morale may be a necessary cost item in their analyses, they clearly take second place behind "getting the job done" effectively, efficiently, and in the most cost-beneficial way possible. Incentives to motivate employees, whether to recruit or to gain commitment, are usually considered in terms of pay and material remuneration.

It is doubtful that any experienced manager would deny that most of the principles of scientific management are useful, indeed necessary, for managing complex organizations. Even the time-and-motion techniques of job classification and training make a great deal of sense in the abstract. As in many endeavors, however, the technologists of the scientific management school were much more successful in demonstrating efficient procedures for maximum productivity than they were in getting workers to behave as they were "supposed to." Not only did some workers not respond to the pay-for-production linkage, but they developed norms of production and sanctioned "rate busters." As affluence expanded in the United States, managers discovered that economic incentives were not the only factor in keeping workers. Turnover increased, absenteeism soared, faulty workmanship became common, and production lagged.

It is widely recognized now that the failure of scientific management was the inevitable result of its basic assumption about workers' motivation—most evident in "scientific" wage incentive systems—that rational, economic interests alone govern the conduct of workers. More generally, the narrow focus on the formal structure of the organization and the rational component of behavior is itself irrational in the sense that it ignores the nonrational (not irrational) aspects of human behavior, including the social needs of employees. It was the "human relations" movement that crystallized the reaction to the narrow focus of the scientific management school.
Human relations. The "human relations" school of management had its birth in the well-known "Hawthorne studies" conducted from 1927 to 1932 in the Western Electric Company's Hawthorne Works in Chicago by Elton Mayo and his associates. These studies were, in a sense, an extension of the belief in solving management problems by the use of science. The studies, however, focused on aspects of the organization that had been ignored by the scientific management technologists, i.e. the informal organization and noneconomic factors of motivation. Many of the findings were highly unexpected—and accidental.

While testing variables in the work setting such as lighting and room colors, the investigators discovered that no simple relationship existed between physical working conditions and productivity. Rather, they found that increased productivity resulted from the fact that the workers were being given special attention (which later came to be referred to as "the Hawthorne effect"). This discovery sparked a series of studies that led to the conclusion that (1) the amount of work carried out by a worker is not determined by his physical capacity alone, but by his "social" capacity as well; (2) noneconomic rewards play a central role in determining the motivation and happiness of the worker; (3) the highest degree of specialization is by no means the most efficient form of division of labor; and (4) workers do not react to management and its norms and sanctions as individuals, but as members of groups. Within these "informal" groups are norms and leaders that exert equal or greater influence on the behavior of workers than do the formal norms and appointed leaders of the organization.

Mayo concluded that the traditional view of the scientific management school—that principles of management should be based on a formal structure of relationships prescribed in organizational charts, manuals, and job descriptions—was incomplete. His evidence showed clearly that psychological and sociological factors also affect productivity and efficiency. To the modern student of management theory, this finding is now a truism. At the time of the Hawthorne studies, however, such was not the case.

The studies by Mayo stimulated a whole series of studies in motivation theory, group dynamics, and leadership theory. By characterizing people as complex and not as rational, economic automatons, Mayo triggered what came to be known as the "human relations" school of management. The works of Abraham Maslow and Kurt Lewin contributed significantly to the development of this movement. These theorists saw workers in a different light than did the scientific management theorists. Man has a hierarchy of needs; and, once the basic
physiological needs are satisfied by material rewards, "higher-order" psychological and sociological rewards are the motivators. The reader is familiar with these theories, and they need not be repeated in detail here. Suffice it to say that, although some of the theorists overstate the case, the theories have a great deal of validity. The thrust of these motivational theories, as adapted by the human relations advocates, is that workers are self-motivated if they have meaningful jobs and can participate in goal-setting, organizational and job design, and so forth.

In general, the human relations school focused on individual needs rather than on production. The assumption was that happy workers are productive workers. This approach swung the balance to the democratic end of the autocratic-democratic continuum. The most effective organization was one where workers were motivated by intrinsic rewards (self-discipline). Small-group cohesiveness, characterized by open communication, peer leadership, and participative decision making would provide these intrinsic rewards.

As with the scientific management philosophy, the human relations approach also was found to be too simplistic. Happiness and productivity did not have a direct correlation. The replacement of centralized, autocratic authority by participative decision making did not have the effects envisioned by the advocates of human relations. Workers continued to have conflict with managers; and poor workmanship, absenteeism, and lack of commitment to the organization remained.

Notwithstanding the disappointments in some of the cherished beliefs of the human relations devotees, the movement profoundly affected management practices in the United States. Millions of executives and supervisors have participated in "human relations" workshops and other executive development activities based on the theories underlying this movement. The philosophy of considering the informal organization and needs of individuals has become an integral part of most management programs. The movement brought into clear focus the need to pay more attention to the nonrational component of worker behavior as a key element of morale and productivity.

Systems management. Howard Vollmer, a social scientist who has done extensive research for the military, refers to the balanced approach to management as the "systems strategy." Comparing this approach to the scientific management and human relations approaches, he characterizes the systems approach as follows:

1. Focuses on all four elements of the organizational process—the diagnosis of organizational problems in systematic terms; the
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Structuring of organizational functions, authority, communications, and technology; the implementation of organizational designs or planned change so that such changes are incorporated into day-to-day behavior patterns of members or employees; and the evaluation of the effectiveness of organizational designs.

2. Casts managers in a fully professional role, in which they must bring expert knowledge of technology, organizational structure, human behavior, economic factors, and other relevant subjects to bear on the needs of their organization.

3. Devotes attention to systemic problems involving both maintenance goals and production goals of the organization and the means to obtain the desired balance between them.

Vollmer says that only a “systems strategy” of management can be ultimately satisfactory for the needs of high-technology organizations in modern society. Management’s objective is to create an organizational environment in which task performance is maximized. To do this, however, scientific management is likely to concentrate on technology and structure, human relations is concerned with people, and the systems strategy is concerned with all these elements simultaneously. The systems manager draws on the insights, concepts, techniques, and data that are offered by behavioral scientists as well as by management scientists, economists, and systems analysts.

The way in which a manager or leader approaches the problem of balancing concern for production and for people has been treated by a number of management theorists. One of the best known “models” is that developed by Blake and Mouton. They suggest that concern for production and concern for people (“organizational maintenance”) can be represented on a two-dimensional grid. They describe the various styles of management as follows:

- Style 1,1: Low concern for both people and production; there is an “impoverished management.”
- Style 9,1: Low concern for people and high concern for production; there is “task management.”
- Style 1,9: High concern for people and low concern for production produces “country club management.”
- Style 9,9: High in both dimensions leads to “team management”; work is accomplished by committed people.
- Style 5,5: Balance of concern for people and production produces “middle-of-the-road management.”
From this basic scheme, Blake and Mouton have developed a comprehensive "systems" approach to management. A detailed description of their theory is beyond the scope of this work. The model is merely introduced here as a sample of the kinds of attempts that have been made to balance the concern for production and the concern for people. The Blake and Mouton model has a great deal of data to support it, and it has "common sense validity."

Comparison of management philosophies. Few modern theorists, or managers, espouse solely either a scientific management or human relations approach to management. The evidence is too overwhelming that both ends of the spectrum are based on invalid assumptions of one sort or another. No one denies the value of a rationally organized hierarchy, nor the value of economic remuneration to influence compliance of group members. But to assume that the informal network of the human organization and nonmaterial sanctions can be ignored, is folly. On the other hand, to view the organization as a place that should be one big happy family without power struggles, is naïve. Most modern-day theorists and managers include in their philosophy of management the following:

- Both formal and informal elements of the organization and their articulation.
- The scope of informal groups and the relations between such groups inside and outside the organization.
- Both lower and higher ranks.
- Both social and material rewards and their effects on each other.
- The interaction between the organization and its environment.

The philosophy of management and organization adopts, of course, has far-reaching implications for people throughout the organization. With the particular philosophy comes structural changes in which the system operates. The location of decisionmaking, the kinds of rewards for compliance, the nature of communications, and the behavior of individual executives at all levels are influenced to a large extent by the philosophical orientation of the top executives. That orientation permeates the entire organization.

Management vs. Leadership in Today's U.S. Military

Adoption of the General Staff concept introduced bureaucratic management to the U.S. military at the turn of the century, and it was spread throughout the Army in World War I when Pershing adapted
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it to the field. Notwithstanding the adoption of bureaucratic management techniques, before World War II military authority was still exercised in an organizational climate that tended to be paternalistic and fraternalistic, with a great deal of ritual and ceremony and a carefully orchestrated symbol system that sought a cohesive community. Economic and material benefits were deemphasized, and normative controls were emphasized. Those conditions tended to counteract the impersonal relationships suggested by bureaucratic organization. Moreover, authority was decentralized to a great extent.

Ironically, just at the time civilian industry was recognizing (largely through the work started by the Hawthorne studies) that to administer an organization solely on the basis of rationality was insufficient, the military moved farther toward scientific management. Since World War II, the military has steadily increased the use of rational, systematic techniques of management to replace the "common sense" approach characteristic of earlier periods, when the term "leadership" described the process of resource management and was considered an art.

The widespread application of Operations Research/Systems Analysis (OR/SA) procedures and the official adoption of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) as a management tool have had far-reaching implications for the military organization. Combined with the highly developed information processing tools of the Automatic Data Processing System (ADPS), these management techniques provide an unprecedented capability for centrally organizing and managing a large organization.

The adoption of the tools of scientific management technology has placed the DoD in the mainstream of the movement toward rational bureaucratic organization. The strategy of management resulting from the use of OR/SA and PPBS is based on a cost-benefit analysis model that focuses attention on quantifiable economic and engineering variables. The goal is to optimize resource cost to obtain maximum efficiency.

The use of scientific management tools, particularly cost-benefit analysis, improves management's ability to allocate tangible resources in a rational, systematic manner. These techniques, however, emphasize operational, mission-oriented factors and pay little attention to building solidarity and commitment to the organization. Decisionmakers who use these tools do not necessarily deny the importance of esprit and morale; rather, they simply do not give systematic attention to the "soft" areas of job satisfaction, commitment, and morale in the same
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way they do to the management of resources. It is difficult to quantify the benefits of marching bands, for example.

The tendency of PPBS and systems analysis to emphasize the economic variables of management was reinforced in the late 1960s and early 1970s when a presidential commission (Gates Commission) recommended an All-Volunteer Force based on economic incentives. Theoretically, the market economy would dictate salaries required to recruit and retain the military force. Manpower and personnel management decisions have come to be dominated by econometric models.

Various bureaucratic and scientific management techniques have permeated the entire military structure. Evaluation of performance is heavily weighted with statistical measures, focusing on variables that are readily quantifiable. Requirements from above, i.e. "authority demands," tend to focus on measurable task outputs rather than on the more intangible, long-term factors associated with unit identification, cohesion, and esprit. Commanders, even though personally committed to "leadership" rather than to "management," find themselves having to satisfy demands for task performance. Although many of these commanders would prefer a 9,9 style on Blake and Mouton's grid, they find themselves pushed toward the 9,1 corner of the matrix.

Some will argue that attributing such influence to those systemic forces is a gross exaggeration, i.e. that "good leaders" are not constrained by such forces. Others will deny that leadership and those systemic management forces are incompatible. Obviously, the thesis of this paper is to the contrary. Consolidated dining and administrative facilities may be cost-effective, but they do not foster unit identification. A straight salary system that eliminates commissaries, exchanges, and on-base housing may be defended by economic analysis, but it pushes the military from an institutional to an occupational model of organization.

Bureaucratic management practices are not, of course, limited to the "bureaucrats" in the Pentagon. The staff system goes all the way down to the O5 level of command. Each level performs its functions on the General Staff model taught at the respective Service Staff Colleges. Regardless of the level of staff, the subordinate commanders complain of micromanagement and ask to get the staff "off their backs."

Citing the dysfunctions of bureaucratic organization, systems analysis, PPBS, and the General Staff concept should not be interpreted as a call for abolishing these tools. It is sentimental folly to argue for a return to the "good old days" when every commander was given a
mission and resources and left on his own. Those conditions produced the inefficiency and chaos that led to the adoption of modern management techniques. One can hardly imagine a complex modern organization without the characteristics associated with bureaucracy. Indeed, to be "organized" is to be bureaucratized. Systems analysis, PPBS, and cost-benefit analysis have brought rigor to the process of resource allocation. Systematic, analytical staff planning is absolutely essential to modern organizations, especially the military.

The purpose of this study is to find a middle path between the extremes of pure bureaucratic organization and scientific management, and disorganized chaos. We believe that the first step is to understand the historical forces at work.

The trend toward bureaucratic management, with its centralized decisionmaking, control, and coordination, was inevitable—and necessary. No well informed student of management can deny the benefits of these modern techniques. Without them, the military could not function effectively. Some serious costs, however, are associated with these management techniques, especially in the areas of cohesion, esprit, and leader behavior.

What, if anything, can, or should, be done about this dilemma? How can we, as Etzioni suggested, "construct human groupings that are as rational as possible, and at the same time produce a minimum of undesirable side effects and a maximum of satisfaction"? There is no simple answer. Exhortations for more "leadership" and less "management" may be inspirational, but behavior is rarely changed by such appeals. Similarly, efforts to develop executives and leaders, whether they are traditional leadership courses or experiential techniques of organizational development, have shown little measurable impact.

We do not mean to denigrate training and education. Little empirical data exist to justify many of our educational activities: For example, no data link the Service Academies or Senior Service Colleges to performance as officers. The fact that graduates of such institutions succeed more often (in terms of promotions) than nongraduates may be entirely due to the selection process, or the "halo" effect, rather than the education itself. The argument that education produces better thinkers and better leaders is inherently logical, however; so we continue the emphasis notwithstanding the lack of evidence of a true causal relationship.
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The same intuitive belief in the value of education leads us to believe that understanding of organizational behavior, such as discussed in this paper, can contribute to more effective leadership. It stands to reason that one can more effectively cope with forces influencing one's behavior if those forces are understood.

Education and training of individual leaders cannot, however, be expected to influence the trend of events that affect military leadership and management unless the organizational environment in which these individuals behave changes. Systemic and structural forces stemming from the philosophy of control (e.g. bureaucracy and scientific management) and the tools for implementing that philosophy (e.g. PPBS, a General Staff) will continue to foster "authority demands" throughout the system. The behavior of individuals, regardless of their desires, will be greatly influenced by those demands. Thus, if evaluation of performance is based on quantitative indices, activities that are easily quantified will be given priority. Lip service will be paid to "telling it like it is," "people are our most important resource," long-term effectiveness versus short-term results, and so forth; but behavior will reflect the systemic forces.

Summary

Technological developments and ideas about effective management techniques are pushing the military toward rational control of people. These forces are manifest in the form of management philosophies, i.e. bureaucratic organization, scientific management, PPBS, and cost/benefit analysis. These management tools have weakened the role of professional judgment in decisionmaking and have led to a number of policy decisions that have adversely affected leader behavior and, ultimately, cohesion in primary groups.
Chapter 3
SMALL-UNIT COHESION

Importance of Primary Group

Of all the factors that probably contribute to self-sacrifice in combat, normative influence of the primary groups to which a person belongs is the most critical. These small groups have received the most attention in research on military combat effectiveness. Studies of the Wehrmacht in World War II suggested two principal hypotheses:

It appears that a soldier's ability to resist is a function of the capacity of his immediate primary group (his squad or section) to avoid social disintegration. When the individual's immediate group, and its supporting formations, met his basic organic needs, offered him affection and esteem from both officers and comrades, supplied him with a sense of power, authority, the element of self-concern in battle, which would lead to disruption of the effective functioning of his primary group, was minimized.

The capacity of the primary group to resist disintegration was dependent on the acceptance of political, ideological, and cultural symbols (all secondary symbols) only to the extent that these secondary symbols became directly associated with primary gratifications.

The fictional literature provides similar testimony for the key role played by the primary group. In All Quiet on the Western Front, Eric Remarque has a World War I soldier saying:

These voices, these quiet words, these footsteps in the trench behind me recall me at a bound from the terrible loneliness and fear of death by which I had been almost destroyed. They are more to me than life, those voices, they are more than motherliness and more than fear; they are the strongest, most comforting thing there is anywhere, they are the voices of my comrades.
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Writing about World War II, S.L.A. Marshall, in "Men Against Fire," said:40

I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or the personal presence of a comrade... he is sustained by his fellows... 

A generation later, James Webb wrote of Vietnam in Fields of Fire.69

The bold, red hills with their sandbag bunkers, the banter and frolic of dirt-covered grunts, the fearful intensity of contact... Down South his men were on patrol, or digging new perimeters, or dying, and he was nothing if he did not share that misery.

Not all social scientists agree with the emphasis placed on primary groups as the principal determinant of combat performance. In The New Military,38 Little emphasizes the soldier's relationship to some meaningful element of the larger society, especially the family. Little also finds a key role played by dyadic "buddy" relationships. Moskos has also questioned the role of primary group pressures as the principal motivation for combat performance.43 Although Moskos does not deny the important role of the primary group, he suggests that it has certain limitations in explaining combat behavior. He offers several additional factors that motivated fighters in Vietnam: self-interest (survival); latent ideological convictions (belief in democracy); anti-ideology (anti-communism); Americanism; materialism (contrast of material comforts of U.S. compared to communist countries); and manly honor.43 Moskos argued that we should consider the primary group explanation as compatible with, and interrelated with, these other factors.

We endorse Moskos' argument. Undoubtedly, many factors contribute to combat performance, the influence of the primary group being only one. A great deal of evidence, however, indicates that patriotism and ideology play a stronger role when they are related to the concrete experiences of the primary group. As will be discussed later, the military must have a systematic program for relating these symbols to the military mission if they are to have a strong impact. The heart of such a program must be small-group activities, not mass media. The primary group, therefore, remains a critical element in combat behavior. Moreover, it is the factor that we in the military can influence the most. If the primary group is the key element in organizational effectiveness—and we believe it is—the dynamics of this phenomenon must be thoroughly understood if maximum use is to be made in influencing military cohesion.
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Nature of Primary Group Cohesion

The primary group is the major source of social and psychological sustenance from birth through adulthood. The term, coined by Charles H. Cooley in 1920, suggests that among an individual’s social interactions the primary influences are characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation. Out of this association comes a fusion of individualities into a common whole. The result, says Cooley, is sympathy and mutual identification, for which “we” is the natural expression. The primary group gives meaning to the secondary symbols of society (political and ideological). According to LaPiere, “On the whole, it may be said that unless a cultural definition is reified for the individual by one or another of the primary groups to which he belongs, it will have no bearing on his conduct; he may believe in it; he cannot and will not be guided by it.”

A large body of research evidence—and common sense observation—supports the theory advanced by Cooley and LaPiere. The role of the family, peer groups, play groups, and similar groups in social control is well established. Not all small groups provide the same control of behavior, however.

The degree of control depends on the sanctions that the particular group can bring to bear. These sanctions are of four kinds—physical, economic, social, and psychological. Physical (coercive) and economic (remunerative) controls are transitory and have undesirable side-effects when relied on too much. Cooperative behavior under such conditions is a product of individual self-interest and persists only as long as individual interests of group members converge.

Social and psychological sanctions elicit a moral commitment to the values of the group, but they are effective only to the extent that cohesion exists in the group. Social sanctions are effective only when individuals are sensitive to pressures of the primary group and its members. Psychological sanctions are based on internalization of the group norms. When norms are internalized, they become part of the individual’s personality (conscience and ego-ideal) and thus are present even when the individual is separated from the group. Strong evidence indicates that internalization of values and norms generally develops from vertical relations (teachers, parents, leaders), whereas social commitment is a function of peer relationships. Leadership, therefore, comes to the fore as the critical element in cohesion.

These theoretical principles of primary group processes are easily converted to simple military language. Leadership manuals abound with
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guidance about developing self-discipline by the use of "positive leadership," rather than conformity by the use of coercive measures (superficial, apparent discipline). Self-discipline, however, is a product of peer pressure (social sanctions) as well as of internalized norms. Leadership is a key element in creating cohesive primary groups that will exert social and psychological sanctions, but it is not the only element.

Cohesive primary military groups are the product of many factors. In chapter 2 we discussed the principal systemic variables in society and the military institution that we believe most influence cohesion. In this chapter, we will focus on factors that operate at the grassroots level to foster or hinder primary group cohesion.

Factors Influencing Primary Group Cohesion

Primary group cohesion is a function of two sets of factors: the personalities of the individuals in the group and the structural and situational variables existing at any given time. The personalities of the group members are the product of each person's social experiences. Although each person brings a unique set of experiences to the group, certain personality characteristics are conducive, or antithetical, to group cohesiveness.

Structural factors. LaPiere has identified four structural characteristics of groups that, all other factors remaining equal, will determine the degree of control a group will exercise over its members:

Numbers. Control is inverse to the size of a group.

Duration. Control is directly related to the length of time that the members may be expected to maintain relations.

Frequency. Control is directly related to the frequency with which the members of the group enter into actual associations.

Structuration. The more fully structured the relationships of the members of a group, the more control that group will have over the individual member. Structuration also refers to the existence of a clear distinction between members and nonmembers. This may be in the form of dress, activities, or other behavior.

Situational factors. Several situational factors also affect cohesion:

Tradition. A long-established group develops a body of historical knowledge that defines its meaning, its heritage, its distinction from other groups, and its record of achievements. This tradition is preserved in many ways; i.e. ritual and ceremony, holidays, or visual symbols (such as streamers). This heritage, however, must be systematically transmitted to new members and periodically reinforced for older members.
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Trend of recent experience. Nothing succeeds like success. Recent success builds expectations and thus becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. This experience can be deliberately and carefully engineered by selecting tasks that can be accomplished and recognized.

Crises. When a group is faced with a clearly defined external threat (physical threat or threat to its status), it tends to pull together if it has moderate or high cohesion at the time of crisis. This threat can be arranged (athletic competition) or natural (combat).

Equity. A sense of fairness (not equality) is critical. All members must perceive (reality is irrelevant if it is not perceived as such) that they are being treated fairly in terms of rights and obligations. This perception is especially critical when historical factors have created expectations of inequity, e.g. racial and sex discrimination. (A perception of reverse discrimination can also hurt cohesion.)

Quality of leadership. In all the literature, the one constant is the finding that leadership is the most critical element in achieving cohesive, effective organizations. As Etzioni has noted:

A central finding of the comparative analysis of organizations is that organizations which differ in the kinds of control they use, and in the alienation or commitment they elicit, also differ in their organizational structure in many significant respects. Foremost among these structural differences are those of the place and role of leadership [p. 61].

Personality variables. In addition to structural factors, cohesion is a function of the personalities of the group members. Although all personalities are unique, certain characteristics have been shown to be related to cohesion in groups.

Attitude and value similarity. Interpersonal attraction among members of a group enhances cohesion. Evidence indicates that similar values, interests, attitudes, and beliefs that are important to the members of a group usually heighten attraction. Newcomb considers similar attitudes necessary and believes they account for variance in interpersonal attraction more than does any other single variable. Moreover, if similar attitudes do not exist, frequent interaction of group members will often result in intensified antipathies, especially if the interaction is induced by others (authorities).

Congruence of individual and group values. If cohesion is to contribute to organizational effectiveness, then individual values must be congruent with those of the formal organization. Insofar as possible,
then, new members should be selected on a basis of congruent values. If this is not possible, a systematic effort must be made to socialize new members into the value system of the group. The more effective the socialization, the less need there will be for formal controls within the organization.

**Policy Implications**

Tradition, equity, and leadership have always been recognized as critical factors by military policymakers. In spite of the obvious implications, however, actual policies and practices do not seem to be based on these theoretical principles. This section will discuss several areas where we believe each service can translate theory into practice.

**Personnel policies.** An obvious step is to stabilize personnel to reduce turbulence. The Army's plan to develop a regimental system with unit rotation is an excellent example of what can be done. Even if such a policy entails dollar costs and additional transient accounts, the benefits can far outweigh those costs. The problem will come in quantifying benefits. Lower attrition and other measures can be quantified, but cohesion should be factored into the equation.

**Recruiting.** The military should attempt to recruit people with values congruent with those of the military and should strengthen that congruence with a systematic socialization process. If recruits with incongruent values must be accepted, they should be susceptible to resocialization to make their values congruent. The military socialization process will be more difficult and will require consistent attention until military values have been internalized, not merely given superficial compliance.

There is no evidence that the military has made any systematic effort to attract recruits with specific values other than emphasizing the desirability of being a high school graduate. This emphasis is based on the hypothesis that being a high school graduate indicates the motivation to stick with something. Empirical evidence confirms that high school graduates do perform better, have fewer disciplinary problems, and have a higher retention rate. Personality variables relevant to cohesion, however, should be identified and considered in recruiting. There is a wide diversity of views on the dominant values of American youth and their compatibility with the values required in the military. The U.S. culture is heterogeneous, of course, and generalizations are difficult. Clearly, many youths have values congruent with military requirements, and many do not. We believe there are sufficient numbers of the former to staff the force. The task is to attract that element of the population.
Ideally, the military should attract people with the following values if cohesion is desired: willingness to sacrifice personal welfare for group welfare, desire to belong to a structured group, a sense of community obligation, and respect for authority. Certain elements of the military are recruiting large numbers of people who do not possess those values; rather, it seems that many recruits are alienated from society. Wesbrook, for example, found Army recruits highly alienated, with a sense of cynicism toward, and lack of trust in, social institutions and authority. Many have a sense of isolation from society and a feeling that they are not getting a fair shake.

It seems that the AVF, with its emphasis on the economic marketplace, may be attracting many people who view the military as a "job of last resort." This emphasis tends to draw recruits disproportionately from segments of the population who have not had "a fair shake"; thus, they are more likely to be alienated. Moreover, those segments possess less sense of community obligation than middle class segments do.

Regardless of the motivation of recruits, our research indicates that moral commitment can be elicited by the military for the vast majority of youth. Most youth—even those who are alienated—strongly desire a structured environment that provides a sense of belonging and caring on the part of authority figures.

Other than the educational factor, however, apparently no attempt has been made to identify or use personality dimensions as criteria for recruitment. In fact, many of the manpower management policies suggest that such variables are ignored. For example, scientific data show that persons who are attracted by bonuses and high initial salaries have short-range goals and motivation, whereas educational benefits attract people with long-range goals and motivation. Research also shows that the latter type of person is more disciplined, has a stronger sense of community obligation, and in general has values more congruent with traditional military values. Yet, DoD has consistently rejected a G.I. Bill in favor of bonuses, arguing that bonuses are more cost-effective.

The emphasis on bonuses for recruiting and retaining personnel is only one manifestation of the dominance of econometrics in the All-Volunteer Force. The Gates Commission approached the task of maintaining an AVF strictly on economic terms. As Moskos observed, one assumption of the Commission was that cohesion and commitment are essentially unmeasurable and are therefore inappropriate objects of
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analysis. The Commission approached the issue of the AVF from the standpoint of the military as an occupation. We agree with Moskos that the philosophy of that group shifted recruiting to an emphasis on monetary inducements.

Socialization. If an organization wishes to rely mostly on normative control, an effective socialization process is essential. This process should begin at induction and continue throughout the “life cycle” of a member. In the military, initial-entry training—whether it be “beast barracks” at the academies or basic training for enlisted personnel—must be designed to have maximum impact on new members.

All services need to pay more attention to the socialization process, although recently each of the services seems to have paid more attention to this function. Some of the deficiencies in this function have resulted from decisions outside the services, but some are self-generated.

Several years ago, resources allocated to the training base were severely cut. The length of training courses, from initial-entry training to career courses, was drastically cut. Subjects related to socialization were hit hardest. This cut was particularly damaging to basic and advanced individual training for recruits, where less time was allocated for drills, ceremonies, customs, and traditions of the military.

The senior author of this study is aware that in 1977 the basic officer course for a combat arms in the Army, a course for newly commissioned officers, contained no leadership subjects nor customs and traditions of the military. At another Army school, where the Officer Career Course had been cut from thirty nine to twenty six weeks, the cuts had forced painful choices, and technical skills had to be given first priority. The major commander had instructed all schools to emphasize “hard skills” that could be “systems engineered” starting with “front-end analysis” of actual job skills. The “softer” skills pertaining to interpersonal skills were neglected. Once again, the philosophy of scientific management with its emphasis on measurement dealt a blow to the “people” element. This happened in the Air Force also, but General Bennie Davis reversed it when he became commander of the Air Training Command.

The Army needed no outside pressure to modify its basic training policy to afford more “dignity” to recruits. A committee of general officers recommended that, among other changes, recruits should be called “soldier” from the time they were sworn in rather than at the completion of basic training, as had been previous practice. Also, “white
sidewalls" were out. Trainees would abide by the Army-wide standard for haircuts. These two effective tools for socialization were taken from the drill sergeants, who consistently registered dissent to the changes.

The Army has recently made a healthy swing back in the other direction. It has asked for and received permission to extend basic training another week. As could be expected, the General Accounting Office opposed the extension because cost-benefit analysis determined to their satisfaction that skills could be imparted more efficiently in another manner. Completely ignored was the value of the extra week to the socialization process, which, of course, could not be quantified and therefore was considered irrelevant.

Socialization is most effective, however, when it is continued in the primary groups of the member's permanent assignment.

Integration of formal and informal organizations. Like all large organizations, military organizations are composed of formal and informal social systems. Although membership comes from the same population, patterns of relationships are different and the group norms are different. The formal military organization is a bureaucracy. Hierarchies are defined by organizational charts that provide channels of communication and role assignments. Impersonal rules and regulations define standards of conduct and sanctions for deviant behavior. Formal organizations are managed through those formal channels and by those impersonal rules and regulations. Emotions and personal feelings have no place in this organization.

Informal groups have no formal organizational charts; rather, they are social organizations of people who interact more frequently with each other than with outsiders and who share common values when working toward a goal or mission. Informal groups are highly personalized. Close, communal ties charged with feelings, emotions, and other sociopsychological characteristics, govern behavior.

The informal organizations elicit moral commitment from their members. If the values of these informal groups coincide with those of the formal organization, there will be strong military cohesion. If the values are incongruent, there will be informal cohesion (e.g. drug abuser groups) but weak military cohesion. These informal groups, therefore, are fundamental in maintaining cohesiveness in formal military organizations. They cannot be abolished by authoritative fiat, nor can they be ignored. Commanders must make an effort to foster congruence. This effort is a function of leadership.
Leadership in Small Units

Leadership involves personal relationships between leader and the led. This kind of relationship is usually referred to as referent power vs. the coercive, reward, or legal power used by a superior based on his formal authority. Referent power corresponds closely to what Weber called charismatic authority. Whatever it is termed, it represents the kind of personal concern and caring similar to that between father and son. All services emphasize the importance of this kind of behavior; speakers give emotional charges to subordinates to provide that kind of leadership. For example, a leadership manual of one service contains these comments:

- Develop a genuine interest in people, acquire the human touch.
- Be loyal to your seniors and subordinates.
- Be friendly and approachable.
- Develop a knowledge and understanding of your subordinates.

In spite of the recognition of the importance of the kind of leadership required to integrate informal and formal organization values, bureaucratic management is the dominant type of behavior. It is essential that military authorities understand why such behavior persists in spite of repeated exhortations for "concerned leadership." A persistent finding in surveys on leadership is that junior personnel do not believe their leaders really care for them as individuals. Either there is a problem of perception or leaders actually do not have the proper concern. We believe the latter is primarily true. There is too much management behavior. Studies on leadership in the Army in the early 70's document this conclusion. We believe the findings of those studies remain valid today, not only for the Army, but for the other services as well, with the possible exception of the Marine Corps.

That we consider systemic factors to be a prime culprit in causing supervisors to behave like impersonal managers should be obvious to the reader by now. The entire military system is permeated with an emphasis on rational management. Authority demands coming down through the chain-of-command tend to focus on measurable indicators. In units with high technology, this tendency is magnified. Although a supervisor may genuinely want to spend most of his time on personal relationships, he must devote attention to problems in other areas. Time spent on people is often focused on "problem types," e.g. drug abusers. Moreover, the commander is faced with many conditions that make it more difficult now to foster military cohesion than it was in the past.
The majority of enlisted personnel are married; many others choose to live out of the barracks; single people have large disposable incomes, leading to off-post activities; they eat in large, impersonal dining facilities; personnel matters are handled at higher headquarters.

These conditions are incompatible with the goal of fostering primary group cohesion. Clearly, these handicaps can be overcome only if a commander makes a systematic effort based on a thorough understanding of the nature of the problem and a clearly defined set of objectives. Exhortations for "good leadership" and good intentions on the part of the individual commander will not be sufficient. This is why the emphasis on "leadership" as the solution to the problem can be an obstacle in itself unless the systemic factors are addressed. Many of these systemic factors must be addressed by higher authorities.

In spite of the factors operating to weaken military cohesion, local commanders can develop strong cohesion if they go about it in the right way. Personal leadership qualities are important, of course. Commanders who are poor decisionmakers or incompetent or lack the interpersonal skills to be a leader should be replaced. Assuming a certain level of these leadership qualities, however, an intelligent, well-developed plan, methodically implemented, is required. In other words, influencing the emotional, nonrational, sociopsychological world of the informal organization should be done on a rational, systematic basis.

Commanders in the field need to be provided concepts and doctrine that provide guidelines for such a systematic effort. They know detailed concepts and doctrine on training, maintenance, tactics, and other functions that have been analyzed and "systems engineered." Why do they not have such guidance for "organizational maintenance"?

This study did not undertake the task of developing specific concepts and doctrine for building military cohesion. We have provided some theoretical principles that can be used as a starting point, but the services should develop their own doctrine and concepts. Appendix C lists the most commonly mentioned traditional techniques reported by students in an elective course on military cohesion given at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

The important point to be made is that each commander should develop and implement a written plan for developing cohesion in his organization. The plan must include provisions for program evaluation just as methodically as in training, maintenance, and similar functions. The plan must be implemented, however, by empathic, personalized
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leadership. Each commander must create a climate for, and demand for, the kind of officer behavior described by Shils.53

Enlisted man's desire for some type of personal relationship with his officer, particularly for a protective personal relationship, is well documented. . . . Veteran enlisted men mentioned helpfulness toward their men, and the display of personal interest in their men and their problems, in describing the characteristics of the best officer they had known in combat.

As the Wehrmacht study suggested, affection and esteem must be offered the group member by both officers and comrades. This does not mean "touchy-feely" coddling; it means genuine affection. This simple truth seems to elude many of our officers.

Organizational Development

Traditional techniques of building cohesion should be supplemented with more systematic techniques if we are to overcome the systemic factors that are hindering small-unit cohesion.

A large body of applied knowledge (technology) focusing on organizational behavior has been developed since World War II. This body of knowledge—commonly referred to as Organizational Development (OD)—focuses on minimizing the undesirable side-effects of bureaucracy. Growing out of the famous Hawthorne studies of the early 1930s, OD seeks to change organizational cultures through planned, systematic, long-term efforts. It focuses on the total organization—formal and informal groups—and attempts to make the values of the two congruent, with both oriented toward organizational effectiveness. There is no need to go into detail on the nature of OD because three of the services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) are making some use of this knowledge, and specialists can provide details of this technology.

We believe the OD technology is ideally suited for use in programs to build organizational cohesion if commands accept it. Such acceptance has been spotty, although we found much more support than expected. In general, commanders who have had personal experience with OD are overwhelmingly positive toward its value. The programs get mixed reviews from senior officials, however, and are under constant attack in the PPBS process because they are difficult to assess with cost-benefit analysis.

We found some hostility toward OD because of what we consider to be invalid perceptions. First, there is a basic distrust of anything associated with behavioral or social science. This distrust stems partly from the mistaken notion that behavioral and social sciences promote
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"touchy-feely" coddling rather than strong leadership. Some of this distrust comes from a traditional faith in "common sense" as the best kind of knowledge for dealing with people. The implicit assumption, of course, is that objective, empirical knowledge developed by scientific inquiry is somehow incompatible with "common sense."

Second, there is a perception that the use of specially trained persons (OD "consultants") violates the chain-of-command. We could find no logical basis for this perception, especially when data gathered by those consultants are given only to the commander who uses the consultants. In fact, consultants seem to be less threatening to the chain-of-command than are traditional activities such as the Inspector General functions or maintenance inspection teams.

Third, some commanders (usually those who have never used OD) believe that asking for such help would be admission that they cannot handle their commands. Why these officers distinguish between the use of management "consultants" in other areas—e.g. maintenance, supply—and in OD, we do not know. This inconsistency seems to have no rational basis.

Senior officials should look more closely (and rationally) at the benefits to be derived from OD technology. It does not threaten leadership; rather, it can be a powerful tool to complement traditional leadership in an effort to build cohesion. It is especially appropriate to address the many changes that are acting to shift the military toward an occupational model.

Summary

The primary group is the principal unit of social control in the military. These groups control behavior to the extent that they are cohesive. To the extent that the informal group norms of primary groups are congruent with the values and norms of the formal military organization, organizational effectiveness will be enhanced. That congruence is what we call "military cohesion"; that is, there is moral commitment to the unit's goals and mission.

Primary group cohesion is a function of structural factors, situational variables, and personalities of group members. These factors can be influenced systematically by the military, beginning with initial-entry training and continuing in permanent duty units. Leadership is a critical factor in this process, but systemic variables must also be understood and controlled. A substantial body of scientific technology (OD) can be useful in efforts to develop military cohesion.
Chapter 4
OFFICER CORPS AND COHESION

Introduction

The officer corps serves two critical functions in military cohesion: leadership of organizational elements; and linking these elements to each other, to the larger military institution, and to the nation. The effectiveness of the officer corps in performing these functions depends on the orientation of the individual officers toward the military and their behavior in leading organizational elements.

In field commands, the kind of behavior that promotes cohesion is what we call “leadership”; that is, it emphasizes normative power to influence subordinates and involves personal, empathic relationships with enlisted personnel. Ideally, an officer possesses charismatic and heroic qualities, but, as a minimum, he should have inspirational qualities. To the extent an officer relies on bureaucratic management, he will weaken cohesion. The commander must use some bureaucratic management techniques but should emphasize leadership if military cohesion is to be achieved.

Integrating small units into an integrated military organization committed to the national purpose can be performed best if the officer corps is morally committed to the military; that is, if membership is based on internalized values and norms of the military and if members are sensitive to social sanctions of other members of the corps. This kind of behavior contrasts to a calculative orientation, in which performance of duty is exchanged for material benefits.

Critics in recent years allege that officer behavior in the U.S. military has shifted from leadership to management, and from moral commitment to a calculative orientation. Gabriel and Savage alleged that primary group cohesion broke down in Vietnam because of that shift. Moskos has described what he sees as a shift from the “institutional model” to an “occupational model” in the military.
As early as 1960, Morris Janowitz predicted a long-term transformation whereby the military would converge with civilian professions; that is, the "civilianization" of the military. An essential characteristic of this process, according to Janowitz, is the introduction of "more and more contractual relations between the officer and the state."

Janowitz has traced the evolution of the officer corps during the past half-century and has described what he considers a change in the military profession from a focus on the "heroic" warrior-type leader toward new roles of "military manager" and "military technologist." He suggests that the military must keep a balance between these different types of military officers. Janowitz attributes this change to changing technology and the transformation of the societal context in which the armed forces operate. He summarizes the changes in the officer corps by a series of propositions:

1. Changing Organizational Authority. The basis of authority has shifted from that of authoritarian domination to manipulation, persuasion and group consensus. This happened not only because of changing societal values, but also because the impact of technology has forced the shift. Highly skilled specialists cannot be controlled by authoritarian discipline.

2. Shift in Officer Recruitment. The officer corps has been recruited from a broader base than the high social status base at the turn of the century.

3. Significance of Career Patterns. The conflict between the need for technical skills and the more general interpersonal skills has been heightened.

4. Narrowing Skill Differential Between Military and Civilian Elites. The military requires skills and orientations similar to those for civilian managers and administrators.

5. Trends in Political Indoctrination. New missions requiring politico-military integration have strained the traditional warrior concept.

Janowitz does not believe that the shift in orientation of the officer corps would necessarily undermine professional affiliations and cohesion of the corps.

Moskos has viewed these changes from a different perspective than Janowitz. Without focusing on the officer corps explicitly, Moskos has stimulated a great deal of interest with his notion that the military has shifted from an institutional model to an occupational model. According to Moskos:
Institution.

An institution is legitimated in terms of values and norms, i.e., a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good. Members of an institution are often viewed as following a calling; they generally regard themselves as being different or apart from the broader society and are so regarded by others. To the degree one's institutional membership is congruent with notions of self-sacrifice and dedication, it will usually enjoy esteem from the larger community. Although remuneration may not be comparable to what one might expect in the economy of the marketplace, this is often compensated by an array of social benefits associated with an institutional format as well as psychic income. When grievances are felt, members of an institution do not organize themselves into interest groups. Rather, if redress is sought, it takes the form of "one-on-one" recourse to superiors, with its implications of trust in the paternalism of the institution to take care of its own.

Military service traditionally has had many institutional features. One thinks of the extended tours abroad, the fixed terms of enlistment, liability for 24-hour service availability, frequent movements of self and family, subjection to military discipline and law, and inability to resign, strike, or negotiate over working conditions. All this is above and beyond the dangers inherent in military maneuvers and actual combat operations. It is also significant that a paternalistic remuneration system has evolved in the military corresponding to the institutional model: compensation received in noncash (e.g., food, housing, uniforms), subsidized consumer facilities on the base, payments to service members partly determined by family status, and a large proportion of compensation received as deferred pay in the form of retirement benefits.

Occupation.

An occupation is legitimated in terms of the marketplace, i.e., prevailing monetary rewards for equivalent competencies. In a modern industrial society employees usually enjoy some voice in the determination of appropriate salary and work conditions. Such rights are counterbalanced by responsibilities to meet contractual obligations. The occupational model implies priority of self-interest rather than that of the employing organization. A common form of interest articulation in industrial— and increasingly governmental— occupations is the trade union.

Traditionally, the military has sought to avoid the organizational outcomes of the occupational model. This is in the face of repeated recommendations of governmental commissions that the armed services adopt a salary system which would incorporate all basic pay,
Officers Corps and Cohesion

allowances, and tax benefits into one cash payment, and which would eliminate compensation differences between married and single personnel, thus conforming to the equal-pay-for-equal-work principle of civilian occupations. Such a salary system would set up an employer-employee relationship quite at variance with military traditions. Nevertheless, even in the conventional military system there has been some accommodation to occupational imperatives. Special supplements and proficiency pay have long been found necessary to recruit and retain highly skilled enlisted personnel.

[pp. 3-4]

According to Moskos, career military members (including officers) have different orientations toward the military, and these orientations are closely correlated to the kind of model the military is. Officers view their membership in the military as a “calling” or “profession” to the extent the military is an institutional model.45

A profession is legitimated in terms of specialized expertise, i.e., a skill level formally accredited after long, intensive, academic training. The prerogatives of the professional center around conditions supportive of skill levels, control of the work situation, and determination of ethical practices by one’s peers. Compensation is often in the form of fee for service and a function of individual expertise. There is also the presumption that the practice of one’s specialty will be a lifetime career. A profession typically advances its group interests through the form of professional associations.

The military variant of professionalism historically has been consistent with the institutional mode. The traditional milieu of the service academies has been likened to that of a seminary. Certainly the multitiered military educational system for career officers—as typified by the command schools and the war colleges—is as much institutional reinforcement as it is narrow professional training. Moreover, unlike civilian professionals for whom compensation is heavily determined by individual expertise and can even be in the form of fee for service, the compensation received by the military professional is a function of rank, seniority, and need—not strictly speaking, professional expertise. (The exception to this occurs, interestingly enough, when the military organization takes into account—via the mechanism of off-scale compensation—certain professionals whose skills are intrinsically nonmilitary, the notable example being physicians.) To compound matters, there are societal forces eroding the institutional features of the professions within and outside the military [p. 43].

We believe Moskos’ concept of military professionalism needs clarification if it is to be useful in our analysis. For purposes of this study,
"military profession" is defined as "an association of military members with five essential characteristics: (1) skilled in the services they offer their clients; (2) trustworthy to each other and to their clients; (3) personal welfare subordinated to professional duties; (4) a high degree of self-regulation; and (5) strong corporate cohesion."

As defined here, military professionalism (officers, NCOs or enlisted) implies moral commitment to the military and loyalty to the nation. This moral commitment could be the pure type (a calling) or social commitment without the internalized values normally associated with the term "calling." We believe this distinction is useful because the term "professional" is widely used in the military, with a connotation similar to our definition. Moreover, the notion of a "calling" has little appeal in today's military. We would hope that professionals would internalize the values and norms of the military profession, but it is essential that they be sensitive to the social sanctions of their peers.

Moskos views the All-Volunteer Force (AVF), with its emphasis on remuneration, as a prime factor in the shift of the military toward an occupational model:

Although antecedents predated the appearance of the all-volunteer force in early 1973, it was the end of the draft which served as the major thrust to move the military toward the occupational model. In contrast to the all-volunteer force, the selective service system was premised on the notion of citizenship obligation—with concomitant low salaries for lower enlisted personnel—and the ideal of a broadly representative enlisted force (though this ideal was not always realized in practice). In point of fact, it was the occupational model which clearly underpinned the philosophic rationale of the 1970 report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force ("Gates Commission Report"). Instead of a military system anchored in the normative values of a calling—captured in words like "Duty," "Honor," "Country"—the Gates Commission explicitly argued that primary reliance in recruiting an armed force should be on monetary inducements guided by market place standards.

It is important to stress that although the Army was the only service to rely directly on large numbers of draftees for its manpower needs, all the services were beneficiaries of the selective service system. It is estimated that close to half of all voluntary accessions into the military in the peacetime years between the wars in Korea and Vietnam were draft-motivated. The draft was also the major impetus for recruitment into the ROTC and the reserve/guard units.
Officers Corps and Cohesion

While the termination of the selective service system is the most dramatic change in the contemporary military system, other indicators of the trend toward the occupational model can also be noted: (1) the significant pay increases given the armed forces since 1971 in an effort to make military compensation competitive with civilian rates; (2) the previously mentioned recommendations of governmental panels to establish a military salary system, thus making civilian-military remuneration "comparable"; (3) proposals to eliminate or reduce a host of military benefits, e.g., subsidies for commissaries and exchanges, health care for dependents, and the pension system; (4) the separation of work and residence locales accompanying the growing proportion of single enlisted men living off base; (5) the incipient resistance of many military wives at officer and noncom levels to taking part in customary social functions; and (6) the unacceptably high rate of attrition and desertion among enlisted personnel in the post-Vietnam military. The sum of these and related changes confirms the ascendancy of the occupational model in the social organization of the emergent all-volunteer military [p. 4].

The Janowitz and Moskos analyses are compatible with, and complementary to, the concepts we introduced in chapter 1. A shift from the institutional model to the occupational model, if indeed it has occurred, will be accompanied by a shift from moral commitment to a calculative orientation similar to that found in most civilian industrial organizations. This, then, would be cause for serious concern if it weakens cohesion among the officer corps.

The allegation that the U.S. military is moving from a profession to an occupation has gained a large number of supporters. We found much evidence to support the notion. Little data are available on officers, however. Studies of the French military found such a shift there, especially in certain parts of the military. Research on U.S. military officers' orientation, however, has been limited to studies of Air Force officers at the Air War College.

Survey Instrument

We could find no survey instrument that we considered to be a valid measure of the institutional vs. occupational model as described by Moskos. We therefore constructed an instrument based on previous research on this subject, with a few items added by our research group. Items taken from work by Cotton in the Canadian Army purport to measure the institutional or occupational orientation of officers. Dr.
Moskos considers the Cotton scale as the closest approximation available (personal communication). Items on professionalism were taken from a scale used by Bonen, and items designed to measure perceptions of the organizational climate in the military were taken from organizational assessment instruments being used in the Air Force and Navy.

The survey instrument (appendix A) consists of seventy-eight items. Part I contains twenty-nine items asking for biographical data. Items 30 to 61 and 65 to 73 ask respondents to indicate agreement or disagreement with statements, using a five-point Likert-type scale. Items 62 to 64 are multiple-choice items. Items 74 to 78 ask respondents to rank factors that influence them to stay in the military.

Because of time constraints, the survey was not pretested; inasmuch as most of the items were selected from previously tested instruments, however, this was not considered a serious shortcoming.

Sample

The sample consisted of 1,303 field and 52 flag-rank officers in the National Defense University, the three Service Senior Colleges, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the Pentagon (table 1). Time constraints prevented us from selecting a broader sample that would include officers in troop units. We suspect the results would have been significantly different. More than 90 percent of the surveys were returned in a usable form.

TABLE 1
Survey Respondents by Grade and Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>USN</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07—09</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>1,355</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Officers Corps and Cohesion

Inasmuch as no baseline data exist to use a standard, we asked the flag-rank officers to complete the survey the way they would prefer to have the field-grade officers respond. These data were used as the ideal standard against which we could compare the responses of the field-grade officers.

Data Analysis

The survey was factor analyzed, which produced four clear factors. Only one item, "My spouse plays a critical role in my career decisions," had a factor loading of less than 0.20 on at least one of the four factors. Only three others were below 0.25. Factor I contained sixteen items and factor II, twenty-four items; nine items were in both factors. This is not surprising, inasmuch as the factors can be assumed to be correlated.

FACTOR I

U.S. Military Institutional Qualities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>The chain-of-command is receptive to my ideas and suggestions.</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Members of my service are held in high esteem by the American public.</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>My service takes care of its own.</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>I am proud of my service.</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>My service does a good job of keeping me informed.</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>I would recommend a career in my service to a close friend's or my own child.</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>I would recommend a career in another branch of the armed forces to a close friend's or my own child.</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>My grievances are best handled by the chain-of-command.</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>My wife is an integral part of the military community.</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>My service is very interested in the welfare of its people.</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Commanders have sufficient authority to carry out their responsibilities.</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

50
50 The chain-of-command allows decisions to be made at a level where the most adequate information is available. 0.63
55 My service has a strong spirit of teamwork. 0.57
58 Authority is too centralized in my service. 0.57
60 When decisions are being made, my service asks for suggestions from the people affected. 0.52
61 My service motivates me to contribute my best effort. 0.63

**FACTOR II**

**Professional Orientation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Item Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Military personnel should perform their duty regardless of personal or family consequences.</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>No one should be forced to accept an assignment against his/her will.</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>What I do in my private life should be of no concern to my supervisor or commander.</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Military rituals, traditions, and symbols are no longer important in today's highly technical military environment.</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>My service takes care of its own.</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>There are few differences between our nation's military and civilian societies.</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>I am proud of my service.</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>I would recommend a career in my service to a close friend's or my own child.</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>I would recommend a career in another branch of the armed forces to a close friend's or my own child.</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Differences in rank should not be important after duty hours.</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Personal interests and desires must take second place to military requirements.</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>I would prefer that the advertised dollar value of military &quot;benefits&quot; be added to my pay and the benefits be stopped.</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Compensation should be based on proficiency instead of rank and seniority.</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Officers Corps and Cohesion

46 My grievances are best handled by the chain-of-command. 0.43
47 My wife is an integral part of the military community. 0.40
48 My service is very interested in the welfare of its people. 0.29
51 I have a deep personal commitment, a "calling" to serve the Nation. 0.46
52 Disregarding all economic considerations, both positive and negative, I would prefer to live in military housing. 0.36
53 Military members should be allowed to bargain collectively on issues like pay, benefits, and health services. 0.37
54 If I suddenly became a millionaire, I would not change my military career plans. 0.31
55 My service has a strong spirit of teamwork. 0.23
57 All officers should actively support the officers' club. 0.46
59 What I do during my "off-duty" hours is none of my service's business. 0.33
61 My service motivates me to contribute my best effort. 0.25

A third factor was identified by items 65 and 67, with correlations of 0.82, and 0.77. These two items asked the respondents to describe whether they had an institutional or occupational orientation (item 65) and how officers in their service should be oriented. We labeled this factor Professional Self-concept. As will be seen later, this factor differs significantly from the professional orientations as measured by factor II. A fourth factor contained two items, 34 and 59, concerning off-duty behavior, with correlations of 0.81 and 0.77, and we labeled it Off-Duty Behavior.

Results

Mean scores and distribution measures were computed for factors I and II, with a score of 1 representing a pure professional or institutional orientation and a score of 5 representing a pure occupational orientation.

Fifty-two flag officers completed the survey and were asked to answer the way they would prefer to have the field-grade officers respond. The results are shown in table 2.
TABLE 2

Ideals as Expressed by Flag-Rank Officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>MEAN SCORE</th>
<th>MEAN SCORE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PROFESSIONAL</td>
<td>PERCEPTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ORIENTATION</td>
<td>OF SERVICE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA (N=18)</td>
<td>1.885</td>
<td>2.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN (N=14)</td>
<td>1.882</td>
<td>1.835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF (N=11)</td>
<td>1.923</td>
<td>2.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC (N=9)</td>
<td>1.714</td>
<td>1.632</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because of the small number of respondents in each category, statistical comparisons were not made. It will be noted, however, that the Army and Air Force generals tend to evaluate their services as being more "occupational" than they would prefer to have their officers' orientation. The Navy admirals tend to view their service as roughly equivalent to what they wanted their officers' orientation to be, whereas the Marine generals tend to view their service as very institutional.

The distribution of flag-rank responses is shown in appendix B. Their answers correspond to the factor analysis and show a strong preference for professional orientation of their field-grade officers. The responses also reveal a perception that their services are institutional rather occupational. There are several exceptions, however, on both factors.

With respect to the ideal professional orientation, the flag officers differ from the "pure" concept that we have described earlier. A significant number, for example, disagree that officers should perform their duty regardless of personal or family consequences (items 31 and 43). Also, several prefer a straight salary system (item 44), and a significant number prefer off-base housing (items 52 and 64). A fourth of the flag ranks are neutral regarding the statement that all officers should actively support the officers' club (item 57). These divergences are incongruent with the traditional concept of professionalism we have described.

The only deviation from a strong evaluation of their service as institutional was related to centralized decisionmaking (items 49, 50, 58 and 60). A significant number of the flag officers believe authority is
Officers Corps and Cohesion

too centralized. Also, their strong approval of their service does not apply
to the other services (items 40 and 41).

Using the flag-rank results as the ideal orientation for military profes-
sionals, we compared the actual orientations of the field-grade of-
cicers to those ideals (table 3).

**TABLE 3**

Ideal vs. Field-Grade Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>IDEAL MEAN SCORE</th>
<th>ACTUAL MEAN SCORE</th>
<th>DIFFERENCE</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>T*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1.885</td>
<td>2.393</td>
<td>.508</td>
<td>.109</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>4.661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>1.882</td>
<td>2.481</td>
<td>.599</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>6.441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>1.923</td>
<td>2.480</td>
<td>.557</td>
<td>.102</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>5.461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>1.714</td>
<td>2.114</td>
<td>.400</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>3.509</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at .01 level

A considerable gap exists between the ideal and actual, even
among Marine Corps officers. The specific areas of disagreement be-
tween flag-rank and field-grade officers are analyzed in appendix B.
The divergences vary by service and by grade.

The field-officers of three of the four services differ significantly from
their flag-rank superiors on four items. The Navy, Army, and Air Force
field grades are much more critical of their services on items 36 and
48, which relate to "taking care of its own" and "interest in the welfare
of its people." The Marine, Navy, and Air Force field grades differ
significantly in their preference for living off-base.

The Army and Air Force field grades are significantly less positive
than their general officers regarding teamwork and motivation to con-
tribute the best effort. The Navy and Marine field grades differ from their
flag ranks regarding support for the officers' clubs.

There were also significant differences based on rank regardless
of service. The O6s do not see the same degree of teamwork in their
service as do their superiors and subordinates. The O5s and O4s shift toward the attitude that what they do in their off-duty time is their own business. As a group the O4s to O6s do not view their wives’ role in the same way as the flag-ranks; they strongly prefer living off-base, do not believe in mandatory active support of the clubs, yet perceive themselves as more institutional than their flag ranks view them.

As the literature suggests, combat arms officers tend to be more professionally oriented than support personnel are. Ground combat forces (Army and Marine Corps) tend to be more professionally oriented than the Navy and Air Force, whose officers are more technology oriented (table 4).

### TABLE 4

**Professional Orientation, Combat vs. Combat Support Field Grade**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>MEAN COMBAT</th>
<th>MEAN SUPPORT</th>
<th>DIFF</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2.350</td>
<td>2.443</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>1.962*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>2.476</td>
<td>2.480</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>2.099</td>
<td>2.207</td>
<td>.108</td>
<td>.109</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>.991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>2.454</td>
<td>2.504</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>.877</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at .01 level.

The field grade officers tend to see their own service as being more occupational than is their individual professional orientation. Only the Marine Corps officers had no significant gap (table 5). The biggest discrepancy is in the Army responses.
Officers Corps and Cohesion

TABLE 5
Professional Orientation vs. Perception of Service Orientation
(Field-Grade Officers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>MEAN SCORE PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATION</th>
<th>MEAN SCORE SERVICE ORIENTATION</th>
<th>DIFF</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2.393</td>
<td>2.622</td>
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*S Significant at .01 level.
**Significant at .05 level.

Discussion

The results of the survey support the literature suggesting that officers in organizations with high technology tend to be more occupation oriented than those in combat units that focus on less technology. These results are compatible with the study results on Canadian military forces.

The absence of data from other eras prevents us from making inferences about whether the officer corps and the military services are moving toward an occupational orientation. The data make clear, however, that neither officers nor the services meet expectations of the desired orientation. Some differences are not surprising, e.g. centralization of authority.

The number of respondents preferring off-base housing is probably a function of the sample. Few field-grade officers in our sample are currently living in base housing. It would not be surprising, however, to find a similar response pattern in field units, although the distribution would be more evenly balanced. The economics of housing equity, together with the deterioration of family housing, has clearly changed attitudes toward living on-base, regardless of professional orientation.
The ambivalence toward support of officers' clubs can also be attributed in part to our biased sample. The clubs do not have the same institutional value in the Washington, D.C., area as they do in isolated installations. Here again, however, conditions have changed, and the clubs are no longer the center of military social life as they were in the past years.

Regardless of whether the present orientation of officers is more or less occupational than in the past, some aspects of the survey results are disturbing. In all services other than the Marine Corps, the orientation of field-grade officers approaches the neutral point (3.0) between professional and occupational. Such ambivalence represents a danger signal. Again with the exception of the Marine Corps, the services themselves are perceived as inclining even more toward the occupational model.

Perhaps most disturbing are the responses to items 74 to 78, in which respondents ranked five factors that influence their military career. More than half of the flag-rank officers listed "pay and benefits" as their first choice, and a fourth listed promotion opportunity as the first choice. Three-fifths of field grades listed one of the two as their first choice. Several respondents criticized the choices offered, citing the absence of "job satisfaction." Nonetheless, these responses are strongly occupational.

If officers are indeed shifting to an occupational orientation and the services themselves are becoming more occupational, we can expect more and more management behavior and less leadership. Yet management and leadership functions must be performed at each command level.

As commanders reach higher levels, they can take steps to overcome systemic obstacles to leadership behavior. At these higher levels, the commander has a staff and a chief of that staff. Leadership and management functions can be divided between the commander and assistant. Only the commander can perform the leadership role; therefore, the assistant can be assigned the day-to-day management functions, thus freeing the commander to perform the personal contacts required of the leadership role. After all, that is what the General Staff concept was all about. Staff specialists manage; the commander leads.

Our research indicates that many commanders find it difficult to relinquish the management role, especially in an organization with high technology. First, the military "system" seems to demand that each com-
mander have detailed knowledge of the technical aspects of his command (not merely knowledge of sound operational tactics, but detailed knowledge of the equipment and its status). As systems become more complex and commanders assume higher authority, this requirement seems unreasonable; but detailed technical knowledge seems to be rewarded. Commanders are allowed to depend on their staff specialists to provide technical supervision. A ship captain must personally check forty-eight equipment functions. How can the "people" component receive proper attention?

Second, evidence indicates that the emphasis on rational management has changed the values of individuals themselves. The curriculum of the military education system is biased toward physical sciences and technical skills, beginning with the service academies. The Navy requires 80 percent of their ROTC scholarship recipients to major in a physical science. We believe the system is designed to produce managers rather than leaders.

The emphasis on graduate degrees, although valuable from the standpoint of developing critical decisionmaking skills, may be "intellectualizing" officers to the extent that they become more interested in ideas than in people. This possibility needs further research.

Another reason for managerial behavior may stem from the practice of trying to develop officers who are both leaders and managers. The notion of the General Staff system was based on the development of highly skilled staff specialists who had rational, analytical decision-making skills. Managerial skills will continue to grow in importance in the military and will be required at each level of command. Yet there will be an increased need for leadership to offset the strong systemic forces pushing the military toward an occupational orientation. These requirements present a dilemma. The two sets of skills are quite different and, to a large extent, incompatible. Although some individuals are capable of being either managers or leaders, it is difficult to be both at the same time. They require a different mindset.

In attempting to develop both managers and leaders, the military seems to be doing neither very well. The system favors the manager, however, and managers seem to rise to the top in peacetime. Deliberate action needs to be taken to reverse this trend. One service chief told us he ensured that leaders rather than management specialists got the promotions to higher grades by carefully instructing boards. Another service chief is reputed to have attempted to choose leaders rather than managers for his senior command billets. Although these efforts are commendable, they are not sufficient.
All services should seriously consider the establishment of a formal General Staff Corps. After O3 command experience, certain officers would be chosen for their managerial potential. Thereafter, they would serve as staff officers at each level, becoming highly proficient in their area of expertise. They would serve as executives, chiefs of staff, vice commanders, and so forth, all the way to the position of Vice Chief of Staff of their respective service and on the Joint Staff. Field staff duty would keep them from becoming ivory-tower specialists.

Officers chosen for their leadership skills would fill all command positions above the O3 level. They would have longer tours as commanders (as the Army is now doing) but would also serve as staff officers on occasion. These staff assignments would be in positions requiring sound professional judgment, but not highly technical skills.

The General Staff concept was designed to operate in this manner. Bureaucratic management requires the kind of specialization that comes from repeated assignments. Yet, the organization also needs people with inspirational leadership qualities. We do not believe both can be developed without the latter suffering. Let the second-in-command manage the organization, freeing the commander to devote his energies to making decisions and leading.

Summary

The survey suggests that military officers in the Army, Navy, and Air Force are approaching ambivalence toward their professional orientation. Moreover, they view their services as being more occupational than they are as individuals. Of particular concern is the perception that their services do not “take care of their own” and “look out for the welfare of their people.”

All services need to look closely at their policies to determine if they are creating an occupational organization, and they need to socialize their officers more systematically to ensure that professional values are inculcated.
Chapter 5
CHANGING THE TRENDS UNDERMINING COHESION

Conclusions

1. Technology and ideas are changing the U.S. military organization from an *institution* characterized by normative controls and moral commitment to an *occupation* emphasizing remunerative controls and calculative commitment.

Discussion: The U.S. military has steadily acquired the characteristics of a bureaucratic organization; i.e. specialization, a hierarchy of authority, a system of detailed rules and regulations, and impersonality. Complex technology and the need to control the complex military organization have necessitated this bureaucratization. Bureaucratic organization offers many benefits and is essential for complex modern organizations. It has unintended adverse consequences, however, especially from the standpoint of cohesion. Formal impersonal relationships alienate members and take the "spirit out of the corps."

Scientific management was added to military management during and after World War II. Systems analysis, systems engineering, administrative science, and other quantitative tools were brought to military management. They were combined in an integrated system when PPBS, with its emphasis on cost-benefit analysis, was established as the management process in DoD. Although PPBS was not designed to rely completely on quantification, in practice decisions favor numbers over verbal "professional" judgment.

The low regard for "professional judgment" has been due in part to the tendency of military officials to present parochial arguments based on vested interests rather than rigorous analysis. Thus, senior policymakers in OSD, OMB, and Congress have lost confidence in "professional judgment" and give more credence to the numbers provided by system analysts.
2. The U.S. military has made a systematic effort to stop the trend toward an occupational form of organization. In fact, the military has been expediting the change.

Discussion: Civilians brought bureaucracy and scientific management techniques to the military, but once initial resistance was overcome, uniformed officials have embraced the ideas and implemented them zealously. Yet there seems to have been a total unawareness of the costs of these changes in terms of esprit and commitment, which were considered functions of "good leadership." Little effort has been made to bring scientific knowledge to bear to counter the impersonality of bureaucracy and scientific management. In the past few years, three of the services have made some use of Organizational Development (OD), but a great deal of resistance to OD techniques has been encountered.

The services have implemented policies that have speeded the change to an occupational model. The socialization process, for both officers and enlisted personnel, has been systematically weakened. Initial-entry training has been significantly shortened, and technical skills have been emphasized rather than the inculcation of military values that promote moral commitment. Ritual and ceremony have decreased drastically. The number of marching bands has been cut in half during the past twenty years. (The Navy went from 53 to 17.) Mess halls have been consolidated and personnel services centralized. Management is rewarded more than leadership, with bureaucratic technicians rising to top positions.

3. The shift toward an occupational form of organization has caused officers' orientation to shift from professionalism to occupationalism.

The officer corps provides the corporate cohesion and leadership that is necessary for a cohesive military loyal to the nation. The shift in orientation of the officers has weakened that corporate cohesion. Many officers view the military as a job that offers material rewards and individual success. This attitude has led to careerism and self-serving behavior. The dominant mode of behavior in command positions is that of technical, bureaucratic managers rather than leaders.

4. The command functions of management and leadership are inherently incompatible, and most officers find it difficult to perform both functions, especially in high-technology units. Management is rewarded in peacetime and usually prevails over leadership.

Management emphasizes impersonal analytical skills; leadership emphasizes empathic interpersonal skills that inspire people. Although
some officers can do both, it is difficult to do both simultaneously. Moreover, many management skills require lengthy technical training and repeated assignments to develop. Such activities tend to develop interests in technology and ideas rather than in people. Many brilliant staff specialists are poor leaders.

5. Senior officials in DoD, OMB, GAO, the White House, and Congress are largely unaware of the forces operating to change the military into an occupational model and the consequences of this shift.

Most senior military officers are dissatisfied with the current decisionmaking process. Our interviews indicate, however, that they do not understand why the process is not working to their satisfaction. A large number expressed the view that it was a matter of personalities and if the right people are chosen for the top decisionmaking positions, the system will work well. Moreover, they discount the influence of systemic factors on individual leader behavior.

Although we did not interview officials outside DoD, our personal experience and the literature suggest that analysts in OMB, GAO, and congressional staffs are almost totally unaware of the issues discussed in this paper. They tend to be "pure" rationalists who assume the rational, economic man.

Recommendations

1. OSD and the Military Departments should conduct a comprehensive study of military cohesion to define the issues accurately and thoroughly.

Discussion. The first and essential step is to understand the dynamics of military cohesion. This study only touches the surface. We believe that if the issues are clearly identified and articulated well, officials will recognize the importance of taking systematic steps to influence factors that affect cohesion. We could find no such study in existence; rather, decisions on "pride and professionalism," "leadership," and so forth are being made piecemeal and on an ad hoc basis.

2. OSD must systematically inform officials in DoD, OMB, GAO, the White House, and Congress about issues related to military cohesion.

Discussion. We believe many decisions that affect cohesion—e.g. shortened basic training, reduction of marching bands, efforts to adopt a straight salary system—are made without conscious thought about their effect on the nature of the military. We believe many of the decisionmakers, and perhaps some of the analysts, would change their views if they understood how those decisions affect the total military system.
3. Military Departments should develop concepts and doctrine that provide guidelines for systematic efforts to build military cohesion.

Discussion. Building cohesion requires systematic planning and follow-through just as does training, maintenance, and other functions. This planning can be enhanced by concepts and doctrine to complement the manuals on leadership, which are excellent in most cases.

4. Military Departments should emphasize the socialization of officers, NCOs, junior enlisted personnel, and family members. This effort must permeate the entire military system, starting with precommissioning and initial-entry training, and continuing until separation.

Discussion. Our research revealed serious deficiencies in military socialization. Basic training is too short and lacks the proper emphasis on socialization; officer and NCO courses lack emphasis on subjects relevant to leadership and professionalism; ritual and ceremony are neglected in many units; Officers' Call and NCOs' Call are not utilized much for developing professional values; little is done to influence spouses' commitment to traditional military values.

5. Military Departments should educate all officers on the nature of cohesion, the factors involved, and ways to influence it systematically.

Discussion. The forces operating to weaken cohesion are powerful. These forces cannot be countered unless they are understood and systematically addressed by all commanders. This requires knowledge that most officers do not now have.

6. Military Departments should examine all policies to determine their impact on cohesion.

Discussion. Many policies have been instituted based on rational management analysis (e.g. assignment, policies, up-or-out, below-the-zone promotions, barracks design). They should be reviewed to determine whether the negative impact on cohesion can be ameliorated. The impact on cohesion is just one factor to evaluate, but it should be explicitly considered.

7. Military Departments should "institutionalize" the consideration of cohesion in their decisionmaking process.

Discussion. None of the Military Departments has charged any specific staff element with responsibility for cohesion issues. This is understandable, because all staff functions affect cohesion. Our research indicates, however, that cohesion is little understood and largely ignored in the staffing process. We believe a specific staff element (e.g. the Human Resources Development element) should be charged
Changing the Trends Undermining Cohesion

with ensuring that the effect on cohesion is considered in every major decision. This responsibility would require officers with a thorough understanding of organizational behavior and leadership.

8. Military Departments should make full use of scientific technology related to organizational behavior in general and cohesion in particular.

Discussion. The military has made extensive use of scientific knowledge in most aspects of management. One body of technology, usually referred to as Organizational Development (OD), is directly applicable to building moral commitment and cohesion. The Army, Navy, and Air Force are using it quite well in certain areas; but its full potential has not been realized. OD has its origins in a movement to counter bureaucratic behavior. We urge the Departments to take a closer look at its value.

9. Military Departments should establish a General Staff Corps.

Discussion. A General Staff Corps would solve many of the dilemmas now faced in our attempt to develop "jacks-of-all-trades." We now have commanders who are good managers but poor leaders; we have staff officers who are good leaders but poor analysts. The military will continue to require more and more technical managers. It is time to stop expecting officers be both leaders and managers, inasmuch as the skills of these two functions are quite different and in many ways are incompatible. General Staff Corps officers should be selected for their analytical skills, with entry after command at the O3 level. These officers need not possess the emaphic, interpersonal skills of leaders. They would fill staff positions at all levels up to and including the Vice Chief's position and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The second in command at each level from O5 command would be a General Staff Corps officer.
Appendix A
COHESION SURVEY

With Instruction Sheets
for the Flag Officers and
Field-Grade Officers
Appendix A—Cohesion Survey

Instructions (Field-Grade Respondents)

There has been a great deal of concern recently expressed regarding the importance of cohesion in the military. General Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has identified cohesion as one of the critical elements of an effective military. Cohesion is a complex phenomenon; however, one element that has received some attention is the attitude officers have toward the military. Some research on this has been done on the French and Canadian military forces and with a small sample of US Air Force officers.

This survey is being done as part of a research project on military cohesion by students at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. It is designed to broaden the base of data on this important subject and to contribute a modest amount to a better understanding of some of the concerns being expressed about officer commitment and retention. We believe the 30–40 minutes you take to complete the survey will be a significant contribution.

This survey contains 78 items. It seeks information about you—your background and experiences—and asks for your thoughts about various aspects of military life.

Standard Answer Sheet-C is provided for you to record your responses to the questions. Please use a #2 pencil when filling in each answer space. Do not fill out the areas of the answer sheet which are above, below, or to the left of Parts I and II. No personal identification is required or desired.

Please do not fold answer sheet!
Appendix A—Cohesion Survey

Instructions (Flag-Rank Respondents)

There has been a great deal of concern recently expressed regarding the importance of cohesion in the military. General Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has identified cohesion as one of the critical elements of an effective military. Cohesion is a complex phenomenon; however, one element that has received some attention is the attitude officers have toward the military. Some research on this has been done on the French and Canadian military forces and with a small sample of US Air Force officers.

This survey is being done as part of a research project on military cohesion by students at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. It is designed to broaden the base of data on this important subject and to contribute a modest amount to a better understanding of some of the concerns being expressed about officer commitment and retention. We believe the 30–40 minutes you take to complete the survey will be a significant contribution.

The first 29 items seek information about you—your background and experiences. The remaining 49 items (30 thru 78) seek attitudinal information. PLEASE ANSWER ITEMS 30 THRU 78 AS YOU WOULD PREFER FIELD GRADE (LCDR THRU CAPT) OFFICERS TO RESPOND.

Standard Answer Sheet-C is provided for you to record your responses to the questions. Please use a #2 pencil when filling in each answer space. Do not fill out the areas of the answer sheet which are above, below, or to the left of Parts I and II. No personal identification is required or desired.

Please do not fold the answer sheet!
Appendix A—Cohesion Survey

Biographical Information (Items 1 thru 29)

Please answer the following questions by blackening the appropriate spaces on the answer sheet.

1-2 What is your grade?
     Major/LtCdr Blacken 1A & 2A
     LtCol/Cdr Blacken 1B & 2B
     Col/Capt Blacken 1C & 2C
     BGenc/MGen/RAdm Blacken 1D & 2D
     LtGen/Vice Adm & above Blacken 1E & 2E
     Other Blacken 1A & 2B

3-4 What is your current assignment?
     OSD Staff Blacken 3A & 4A
     Joint Staff Blacken 3B & 4B
     Service Staff Blacken 3C & 4C
     Industrial College student Blacken 3D & 4D
     National War College student Blacken 3E & 4E
     Army War College student Blacken 3A & 4B
     Naval War College student Blacken 3A & 4C
     Air War College student Blacken 3A & 4D
     Armed Forces Staff College student Blacken 3A & 4E
     Other Blacken 3B & 4A

5. What is your marital status?
     Never married Blacken 5A
     Married Blacken 5B
     Legally separated Blacken 5C
     Divorced Blacken 5D
     Widowed Blacken 5E

6. How many years of service have you completed?
    10 or less Blacken 6A
    11-15 Blacken 6B
    16-20 Blacken 6C
    21-25 Blacken 6D
    25 or more Blacken 6E

7. How old were you on your last birthday?
    30 or less Blacken 7A
    31-35 Blacken 7B
    36-40 Blacken 7C
    41-45 Blacken 7D
    46 or more Blacken 7E

8. What is the highest educational level you have completed?
    Bachelor’s degree Blacken 8A
    Master’s degree Blacken 8B
    Doctor’s degree Blacken 8C
    Other Blacken 8D
Appendix A—Cohesion Survey

9–10. What was your source of commission?
- ROTC
- PLC
- OCS
- Commissioned from the ranks
- Service academy
- Other

11. What type of quarters do you live in?
- BOQ on base/post
- Family housing on post/base
- Rented civilian quarters
- Purchased civilian quarters
- Other

12. How many unaccompanied deployments have you had which have lasted over three months?
- 0
- 1–3
- 4–6
- 7–9
- 10 or more

13. What was your father’s military experience?
- A career officer (20 or more years)
- An officer
- A career enlisted man (20 or more years)
- An enlisted man
- Other

14–15. Which one of the following choices best describes the place you were raised?
- Farm/rural
- Town less than 5,000
- Town 6,000 to 25,000
- City 26,000 to 100,000
- City 101,000 to 500,000
- City over 500,000
- Several of these places

16–17 In what region of the country were you raised?
- Northeast
- Southeast
- Northcentral
- Southcentral
- Northwest
- Southwest
- Several of these regions

18. What is your service?
- Army
- Navy
- Marine Corps
- Air Force
- Coast Guard

74
Appendix A—Cohesion Survey

19. What is your sex?
   Male       Blacken 19A
   Female     Blacken 19B

20. How many children do you have?
    None       Blacken 20A
    1 or 2     Blacken 20B
    3 or 4     Blacken 20C
    4 or 5     Blacken 20D
    6 or more  Blacken 20E

21. How many children do you have in elementary school?
    None       Blacken 21A
    1          Blacken 21B
    2          Blacken 21C
    3          Blacken 21D
    4 or more  Blacken 21E

22. How many children do you have in high school?
    None       Blacken 22A
    1          Blacken 22B
    2          Blacken 22C
    3          Blacken 22D
    4 or more  Blacken 22E

23. Which of the following choices best describes your spouse's employment?
    I am not married       Blacken 23A
    Works in the home      Blacken 23B
    Part-time work outside the home Blacken 23C
    Full-time work outside the home Blacken 23D
    Other                  Blacken 23E

24–25. Which term best describes your career to this point?
    Land combat           Blacken 24A & 25A
    Sea combat            Blacken 24B & 25B
    Air combat            Blacken 24C & 25C
    Technical support     Blacken 24D & 25D
    Administrative support Blacken 24E & 25E
    Other                 Blacken 24A & 25B

26–27. What is the highest level of education your spouse has completed?
    Less than 12 years    Blacken 26A & 27A
    High school diploma   Blacken 26B & 27B
    Bachelor's degree     Blacken 26C & 27C
    Master's degree       Blacken 26D & 27D
    Doctor's degree       Blacken 26E & 27E
    Professional training beyond high school (nursing, trade, etc.) Blacken 26A & 27B
    Other                 Blacken 26B & 27C
Appendix A — Cohesion Survey

28. If your spouse worked outside the home within the past five years, what percentage of the family income did she contribute?

- Less than 10%  Blacken 28A
- 11% to 25%  Blacken 28B
- 26% to 50%  Blacken 28C
- 51% or more  Blacken 28D
- Not applicable  Blacken 28E

29. What are your career plans?

- Retire at the earliest possible date  Blacken 29A
- Retire between 20th & 25th year of commissioned service  Blacken 29B
- Retire between 26th & 30th year of commissioned service  Blacken 29C
- Stay on active duty as long as I can  Blacken 29D
- No decision to retire after a set number of years  Blacken 29E

Attitudinal Survey (Items 30 thru 78)

For questions 30 thru 61, indicate the DEGREE to which you AGREE or DISAGREE with the statement or concept presented by using the following scale:

A  B  C  D  E
Strongly agree  Agree  Neutral  Disagree  Strongly disagree

30. The chain-of-command is receptive to my ideas and suggestions.

31. Military personnel should perform their duty regardless of personal or family consequences.

32. No one should be forced to accept an assignment against his/her will.

33. Members of my service are held in high esteem by the American public.

34. What I do in my private life should be of no concern to my supervisor or commander.

35. Military rituals, traditions, and symbols are no longer important in today's highly technical military environment.

36. My service cares of its own.

37. There are few differences between our nation's military and civilian societies.

38. I am proud of my service.

39. My service does a good job of keeping me informed.

40. I would recommend a career in my service to a close friend's or my own child.

41. I would recommend a career in another branch of the armed forces to a close friend's or my own child.
Appendix A—Cohesion Survey

42. Differences in rank should not be important after duty hours.
43. Personal interests and desires must take second place to military requirements.
44. I would prefer that the advertised dollar value of military "benefits" be added to my pay and the "benefits" be stopped.
45. Compensation should be based on proficiency instead of rank and seniority.
46. My grievances are best handled by the chain-of-command.
47. My wife is an integral part of the military community.
48. My service is very interested in the welfare of its people.
49. Commanders have sufficient authority to carry out their responsibilities.
50. The chain-of-command allows decisions to be made at a level where the most adequate information is available.
51. I have a deep personal commitment, a "calling," to serve the nation.
52. Disregarding all economic considerations, both positive and negative, I would prefer to live in military housing.
53. Military members should be allowed to bargain collectively on issues like pay, benefits, and health services.
54. If I suddenly became a millionaire, I would not change my military career plans.
55. My service has a strong spirit of teamwork.
56. My spouse plays a critical role in my career decisions.
57. All officers should actively support the officers' club.
58. Authority is too centralized in my service.
59. What I do during my "off-duty" hours is none of my service's business.
60. When decisions are being made, my service asks for suggestions from the people affected.
61. My service motivates me to contribute my best effort.

For questions 62 thru 78, select the response you consider most appropriate.

62. Which of the following do you most closely identify with?
   A. Your service
   B. Your service's officer corps
   C. People in your career field
   D. People in your unit or workplace

63. Do you consider yourself a "specialist" in the sense that you have worked primarily in one or two occupational/specialty fields or a "generalist" in the sense that you have had considerable experience in three or more fields?
   A. Specialist
   B. Generalist
Appendix A—Cohesion Survey

64. In what type of quarters do you prefer to live?
   A. BOQ on base/post
   B. Family housing on base/post
   C. Rented civilian quarters
   D. Purchased civilian quarters
   E. Other.

Items 65 thru 67. Dr. Charles Moskos describes two alternate concepts of
   the military organization: institutional and occupational.

A. The institutional concept portrays service personnel in the following ways:
   - Dedicated to values (duty, honor, country, etc.) which transcend
     individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good;
   - Different or apart from the general population of the nation (part of a
     separate society);
   - Enjoying high esteem from the nation for self-sacrifice and complete
     dedication;
   - Receiving remuneration (cash and institutional benefits) below what
     might be expected in the economy of the marketplace; and
   - Trusting in the paternalism of the institution.

B. The occupational concept portrays service personnel in the following ways:
   - Seeking monetary rewards equivalent to those rewards found in the
     marketplace;
   - Seeking a salary (cash instead of institutional benefits);
   - Self-interest first and service-tasks second;
   - Seeking a voice in determining an appropriate salary and working con-
     ditions; and
   - Meeting contractual obligations.

Use the following scale to respond to items 65 thru 67:
   A. Institution (0%), occupation (100%)
   B. Institution (25%), occupation (75%)
   C. Institution (50%), occupation (50%)
   D. Institution (75%), occupation (25%)
   E. Institution (100%), occupation (0%)

65. Select from the choices the one that most closely describes your
    orientation.

66. Select from the choices the one that most closely describes your
    perception of the orientation of most officers in your service.

67. Select from the choices the one most closely describes how you think
    officers in your service should be oriented.
Appendix A—Cohesion Survey

Items 68 thru 73. Mark your answer sheet using the following question and scale:

How much respect do you think persons of your rank and in your military specialty have among the following groups of people?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very high respect</td>
<td>High respect</td>
<td>Indifferent respect</td>
<td>Low respect</td>
<td>Very low respect</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

68. Land combat officers
69. Sea combat officers
70. Air combat officers
71. Technical support officers
72. Administrative support officers
73. The public

Items 74 thru 78. Rank the following five factors as to their importance in influencing you to stay in the military. Put the letter of the most important factor in the corresponding space after number 74 on your answer sheet. Continue down the list until the least important factor is placed after number 78 on your answer sheet.

A. Stable family life
B. Patriotism
C. Esprit de corps
D. Promotion opportunity
E. Pay and benefits

Personal Comments: If you care to make personalized comments which may be of help in this study, please make them below.
Appendix B
ANALYSIS OF SURVEY

Distribution of Flag-Rank Responses
Analysis of Responses by Service
Analysis of Responses by Rank
Analysis of Career Field
Appendix B—Analysis of Survey

Preferred (Ideal) Responses of the Flag Officers to the Attitudes/Values Portions of the Survey*

Use the following scale of Questions 30–61

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree (SA)</th>
<th>Agree (A)</th>
<th>Neutral (N)</th>
<th>Disagree (D)</th>
<th>Strongly disagree (SD)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30. The chain-of-command is receptive to my ideas and suggestions.</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>59.6%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Military personnel should perform their duty regardless of personal or family consequences.</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. No one should be forced to accept an assignment against his/her will.</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Members of my service are held in high esteem by the American public.</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. What I do in my private life should be of no concern to my supervisor or commander.</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Military rituals, traditions, and symbols are no longer important in today's highly technical military environment.</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. My service takes care of its own.</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. There are few differences between our nation's military and civilian societies.</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. I am proud of my service.</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. My service does a good job of keeping me informed.</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. I would recommend a career in my service to a close friend's or my own child.</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. I would recommend a career in another branch of the armed forces to a close friend's or my own child.</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Differences in rank should not be important after duty hours.</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The responses to Questions 63 and 68–73 are not shown because they do not lend themselves to meaningful comparisons with the replies of the O4–O6 respondents.
Appendix B—Analysis of Survey

43. Personal interests and desires must take second place to military requirements.

|        | 32.7 | 50.0 | 1.9 | 11.5 | 3.8 |

44. I would prefer that the advertised dollar value of military “benefits” be added to my pay and the “benefits” be stopped.

|        | 9.6  | 17.3 | 15.4 | 36.5 | 21.2 |

45. Compensation should be based on proficiency instead of rank and seniority.

|        | 0.0  | 5.8  | 5.8  | 53.8 | 34.6 |

46. My grievances are best handled by the chain-of-command.

|        | 40.4 | 53.8 | 5.8  | 0.0  | 0.0  |

47. My wife is an integral part of the military community.

|        | 34.0 | 54.0 | 4.0  | 6.0  | 2.0  |

48. My service is very interested in the welfare of its people.

|        | 48.1 | 50.0 | 0.0  | 1.9  | 0.0  |

49. Commanders have sufficient authority to carry out their responsibilities.

|        | 25.0 | 46.2 | 5.8  | 21.2 | 1.9  |

50. The chain-of-command allows decisions to be made at a level where the most adequate information is available.

|        | 19.2 | 50.0 | 9.6  | 19.2 | 1.9  |

51. I have a deep personal commitment, a “calling,” to serve the Nation.

|        | 50.0 | 42.3 | 5.8  | 1.9  | 0.0  |

52. Disregarding all economic considerations, both positive and negative, I would prefer to live in military housing.

|        | 23.1 | 28.2 | 19.2 | 17.3 | 11.5 |

53. Military members should be allowed to bargain collectively on issues like pay, benefits, and health services.

|        | 0.0  | 1.9  | 1.9  | 13.5 | 82.7 |

54. If I suddenly became a millionaire, I would not change my military career plans.

|        | 36.5 | 48.1 | 7.7  | 5.8  | 1.9  |

55. My service has a strong spirit of teamwork.

|        | 42.3 | 46.2 | 5.8  | 3.8  | 1.9  |

56. My spouse plays a critical role in my career decisions.

|        | 25.0 | 51.9 | 15.4 | 7.7  | 0.0  |

57. All officers should actively support the officers’ club.

|        | 23.1 | 44.2 | 25.0 | 5.8  | 1.9  |
Appendix B—Analysis of Survey

58. Authority is too centralized in my service.
   
   3.8 13.5 9.6 59.6 13.5

59. What I do during my "off-duty" hours is none of my service's business.
   
   1.9 3.8 0.0 42.3 51.9

60. When decisions are being made, my service asks for suggestions from the people affected.
   
   9.6 44.2 26.9 19.2 0.0

61. My service motivates me to contribute my best effort.
   
   38.5 51.9 7.7 1.9 0.0

62. Which of the following do you most closely identify with?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Your service</th>
<th>Service officer</th>
<th>People in career</th>
<th>People in unit/field</th>
<th>People in workplace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

63. Omitted.

64. In what type of quarters do you prefer to live?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOQ</th>
<th>Fam.Hsg.</th>
<th>Rent</th>
<th>Purchase</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>55.8%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Use the following scale for questions 65 thru 67:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inst: 0%</th>
<th>Inst: 25%</th>
<th>Inst: 50%</th>
<th>Inst: 75%</th>
<th>Inst: 100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occu: 100%</td>
<td>Occu: 75%</td>
<td>Occu: 50%</td>
<td>Occu: 25%</td>
<td>Occu: 0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

65. Select from the choices the one that most closely describes your personal orientation to your service.

| 7.7% | 5.8% | 3.8% | 51.9% | 30.8% |

66. Select from the choices the one that most closely describes your perception of the orientation of most officers in your service.

| 9.6 | 5.8 | 3.8 | 53.8 | 26.9 |

68–73. Omitted.

74–78. Rank the following five factors as to their importance in influencing you to stay in the military.

The matrix below displays the preferred (Ideal or I) flag officer responses to Questions 74–78 and those of the field grade (FG) officers. The chart shows, for example, that 15.7% of the flag officers preferred that the field-grade respondents select ESPRIT DE CORPS as a First Choice whereas actually 14.9% of the field grades so selected. Similarly, 20.0% of the flag officers preferred PROMOTION OPPORTUNITY be selected as a Fourth Choice whereas actually 23.5% of the field graders picked it as their Fourth Choice.

84
## IDEAL vs. FIELD GRADE RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS 74–78

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice</th>
<th>I(%)</th>
<th>FG(%)</th>
<th>I(%)</th>
<th>FG(%)</th>
<th>I(%)</th>
<th>FG(%)</th>
<th>I(%)</th>
<th>FG(%)</th>
<th>I(%)</th>
<th>FG(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stable family life</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esprit de corps</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion opportunity</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay and benefits</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### MARINE CORPS

47. My wife is an integral part of the military community.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MC O4–O6(%)</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

49. Commanders have sufficient authority to carry out their responsibilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MC O4–O6(%)</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52. Disregarding all economic considerations, both positive and negative, I would prefer to live in military housing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MC O4–O6(%)</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

64. In what type quarters do you prefer to live?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>BOQ</th>
<th>Hsg.</th>
<th>Rent</th>
<th>Purchase</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MC O4–O6(%)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

66. Select from the choices the one that most closely describes your perception of the orientation of most officers in your service.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>Inst: %</th>
<th>Inst: 25%</th>
<th>Inst: 50%</th>
<th>Inst: 75%</th>
<th>Inst: 100%</th>
<th>Occu:100%</th>
<th>Occu:75%</th>
<th>Occu:50%</th>
<th>Occu:25%</th>
<th>Occu:0%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MC O4–O6(%)</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>60.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B—Analysis of Survey

**NAVY**

36. My service takes care of its own.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N 04–06(%)</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

48. My service is very interested in the welfare of its people.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N 04–06(%)</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52. Disregarding all economic considerations, both positive and negative, I would prefer to live in military housing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N 04–06(%)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

57. All offices should actively support the officers' club.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N 04–06(%)</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

64. In what type of quarters do you prefer to live?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fam.</th>
<th>BOQ</th>
<th>Hsg.</th>
<th>Rent</th>
<th>Purchase</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal (%)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N 04–06(%)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

66. Select from the choices the one that most closely describes your perception of the orientation of most officers in your service.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inst: 0%</th>
<th>Inst: 25%</th>
<th>Inst: 50%</th>
<th>Inst: 75%</th>
<th>Inst: 100%</th>
<th>Occu: 100%</th>
<th>Occu: 75%</th>
<th>Occu: 50%</th>
<th>Occu: 25%</th>
<th>Occu: 0%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal 0(%)</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N 04–06(%)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ARMY**

33. Members of my service are held in high esteem by the American public.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 04–06(%)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36. My service takes care of its own.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 04–06(%)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

48. My service is very interested in the welfare of its people.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 04–06(%)</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
55. My service has a strong spirit of teamwork.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>A 04–06 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42.3 46.2</td>
<td>5.8 3.8 1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

60. When decisions are being made, my service asks for suggestions from the people affected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>A 04–06 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.6 44.2 26.9 19.2</td>
<td>6.1 27.3 31.9 35.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

61. My service motivates me to contribute my best effort.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>A 04–06 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38.5 51.9 7.7 1.9</td>
<td>6.7 45.4 26.7 19.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AIR FORCE**

36. My service takes care of its own.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal (%)</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF 04–06 (%)</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

48. My service is very interested in the welfare of its people.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>A 04–06 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48.1 50.0 0.0 1.9</td>
<td>8.7 58.5 19.9 10.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

50. The chain-of-command allows decisions to be made at a level where the most adequate information is available.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>A 04–06 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19.2 50.0 9.6 19.2</td>
<td>1.6 27.2 22.8 36.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52. Disregarding all economic considerations, both positive and negative, I would prefer to live in military housing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>A 04–06 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23.1 28.8 19.2 17.3</td>
<td>3.0 17.3 6.6 32.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

55. My service has a strong spirit of teamwork.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>A 04–06 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42.3 46.2</td>
<td>5.8 3.8 1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

61. My service motivates me to contribute my best effort.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>A 04–06 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38.5 51.9 7.7 1.9</td>
<td>5.4 52.2 25.8 15.7</td>
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</table>

64. In what type of quarters do you prefer to live?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fam.</th>
<th>BOQ</th>
<th>Hsg.</th>
<th>Rent</th>
<th>Purchase</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal (%)</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>55.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF 04–06 (%)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B—Analysis of Survey

Areas of Disagreement. This section identified the areas in which the responses of the field-grade officers most strongly disagreed with responses preferred by the flag officers (i.e. the ideal responses).

O6s

33. Members of my service are held in high esteem by the American public.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
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<th>SD</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Ideal (%)</td>
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<td>30.8</td>
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36. My service takes care of its own.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal (%)</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>48.9</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>15.1</td>
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43. My service is very interested in the welfare of its people.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>50.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<td>18.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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</table>

53. My service has a strong spirit of teamwork.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>46.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O6 (%)</td>
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<td>61.8</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

59. Authority is too centralized in my service.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal (%)</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
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<td>59.6</td>
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<td>28.5</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>35.7</td>
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</table>

61. My service motivates me to contribute my best effort.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>51.9</td>
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<td>O6 (%)</td>
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<td>53.1</td>
<td>22.6</td>
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</table>

O5s

36. My service takes care of its own.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal (%)</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O5 (%)</td>
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<td>47.4</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

48. My service is very interested in the welfare of its people.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal (%)</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O5 (%)</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

50. The chain-of-command allows decisions to be made at a level where the most adequate information is available.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal (%)</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O5 (%)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

59. What I do during my "off-duty" hours is none of my service's business.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal (%)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O5 (%)</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B—Analysis of Survey

61. My service motivates me to contribute my best effort.
   
   Ideal (%)  | 38.5  | 51.9  |  7.7  |  1.9  |  0.0
   O4 (%)     |  9.0  | 50.7  | 21.6  | 16.5  |  2.2

64. In what type of quarters do you prefer to live?
   
   Fam.        | BOQ | Hsng. | Rent | Purchase | Other|
   Ideal (%)   |  0.0 | 55.8  |  3.8 |  40.4    |  0.0 |
   O4 (%)      |  1.2 | 18.5  |  1.4 |  73.7    |  0.3 |

36. My service takes care of its own.
   
   SA        | A  | N  | D  | SD|
   Ideal (%) | 38.5| 53.8|  3.8|  1.9| 1.9
   O4 (%)    |  4.5| 36.3| 28.1| 24.5| 6.6

48. My service is very interested in the welfare of its people.
   
   Ideal (%) | 48.1|  50.0| 0.0|  1.9| 0.0
   O4 (%)    |  7.5| 45.6| 22.7| 18.7| 5.4

50. The chain-of-command allows decisions to be made at a level where the most adequate information is available.
   
   Ideal (%) | 19.2|  50.0|  9.6| 19.2| 1.9
   O4 (%)    |  1.8| 29.7| 23.0| 35.2|10.3

59. What I do during my “off-duty” hours is none of my service’s business.
   
   Ideal (%) |  1.9|  3.8| 0.0| 42.3| 51.9
   O4 (%)    |  6.9| 17.5|12.4| 50.2|13.0

61. My service motivates me to contribute my best effort.
   
   Ideal (%) | 38.5| 51.9|  7.7|  1.9|  0.0
   O4 (%)    |  7.6| 43.3| 28.2| 17.9|  3.0

Combat Arms

36. My service takes care of its own.
   
   SA        | A  | N  | D  | SD|
   Ideal (%) | 38.5| 53.8|  3.8|  1.9| 1.9
   Combat (%)|  6.0| 45.2| 25.3| 18.4| 5.1

48. My service is very interested in the welfare of its people.
   
   Ideal (%) | 48.1| 50.0|  0.0|  1.9|  0.0
   Combat (%)| 11.6| 54.4| 18.7| 12.1|  3.1
Appendix B—Analysis of Survey

Combat Support

36. My service takes care of its own.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Ideal</td>
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<td>53.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
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<td>44.3</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
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48. My service is very interested in the welfare of its people.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>Support(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>58.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

50. The chain-of-command allows decisions to be made at a level where the most adequate information is available.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>Support(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>34.8</td>
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</table>

55. My service has a strong spirit of teamwork.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>Support(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

61. My service motivates me to contribute my best effort.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ideal (%)</th>
<th>Support(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C
Techniques for Building Organizational Cohesion

This appendix lists the items most often mentioned by students as techniques for building cohesion. Although the list is not comprehensive, it should serve as a starter for developing a plan for building cohesion. The first step is to determine what the situation is in one's organization and what needs to be done.

One's personal style of leadership, the situation (kind of unit, current state of cohesion), and the overall climate created by higher headquarters will determine the specific techniques chosen. The important point is to approach the goal of developing cohesion in a systematic, analytical fashion similar to training or maintenance. Cohesion is often assumed to be a natural product of good training, maintenance, and "inspirational" leadership. Although these factors do contribute to cohesion, commanders should approach "people maintenance" in a direct, active way based on planning and allocation of time and money. A plan to build cohesion should have goals and objectives, in-process reviews, and revisions.

Command/NCO Involvement. Both should be actively involved with troops; coaching and educating subordinates.

Living, working, and playing together as a unit. Do as many things together as can be arranged without forcing participation. Schedule unit activities.

Emphasize unit uniqueness by—
- Grouping by functional similarity vs. large heterogeneous organization (e.g. headquarters units).
- Distinctive crests/patches, flags, etc.
- Historical events involving unit.

Conduct tough, realistic training and other activities, and give immediate recognition for achievements.
- Set clear goals and objectives visible to troops.
- Emphasize fewer activities that are important and do them well.
- Compare results with similar units.

Induct new members in systematic way, to include—
- Welcoming letters if feasible.
- Dedicated sponsors (some have 30 days sponsorship).
Appendix C—Techniques for Building Organizational Cohesion

—Welcome packets.
—Thorough orientation.
—Formal introduction at formations.
—Include families where appropriate.

Conduct Officers-and-NCOs Call on regular basis. Include both formal agenda and socializing. Teach leadership and ways to build cohesion.

Support Wives’ Club activities. Commanding Officer meet with wives on regular basis. Meet with ombudsman (Navy).

Conduct NCO “confirmation” ceremony upon promotion. Administer oath, and emphasize status, responsibility.

Have NCO/soldier/sailor/airman-of-month/quarter accompany commander for day.

Conduct parades/ceremonies/rituals. Use occasions for promotions, awards, welcomes, goodbyes, retirements, reenlistments, etc.

Give recognition on systematic basis to individuals and units. If possible, associate individual awards with unit; e.g. give entire unit free time for soldier/sailor/airman selection. Recognize wife’s role in promotions/awards.

Conduct PT/sports on Intramural basis to engender competition and unit identification. Schedule on duty time when feasible and have entire units attend. Chain-of-command presence is important.

Have regular social activities:
—Parties.
—Picnics.
—Dining-in; dining-out.
—Organization Day (perhaps as often as once per month).
—Include families when feasible. Have activities to let families know what service member does.

Leadership behavior. Review principles of leadership on a regular basis and check yourself. Have subordinates do same. Important behaviors:
—Praise in public; criticize in private.
—Be visible, especially during inclement weather and stressful times.
—Stand in line at eating facilities, in field and garrison (unless separate mess used).
—Visit subordinate commanders on a regular basis at their workplace. Have informal discussions on work and personal topics (depends a lot on your personality).
—Put stress on subordinates at appropriate times by demanding unusual performance and then recognize achievements.
—Show genuine concern for people.
—Be loyal, upward and downward.
—Demonstrate high ethical behavior.
—Reward demonstrations of leadership behavior in your subordinates as much as you do direct-mission output (e.g. training and maintenance achievements).
Appendix C—Techniques for Building Organizational Cohesion

Stabilize leadership, both officer and NCO.
Decentralize authority to reward and punish, including promotion authority.
Emphasize military courtesy and discipline.
Appendix D
Summary of Interviews

Fifteen flag-rank officers and equivalent grade civilian officials were interviewed: five Air Force, three Navy, three Marine Corps, two Army, and two OSD. Six of the top eight military officers in the four services were interviewed. Interviews averaged a little more than an hour. The officials were unusually candid and cooperative. The interviews were unstructured because the intent was to obtain spontaneous views. The study group members ended this phase of the project with the conclusion that the system is working well when it promotes military officers of such quality to the top positions.

The term "cohesion" was familiar only to the Army officials, but even the top official there does not like the term, preferring "esprit" and "pride" in unit and service. Most officers interviewed preferred the term "esprit." Our use of the term "cohesion" is roughly equivalent to "esprit." Thus defined, interviewees unanimously agreed that cohesion is essential for today's military, in peace and war. There was recognition, however, that different services have different requirements. The Army and Marine Corps have the more traditional concept as we have described it in our study report and as it is described in the literature. Cohesion in the Navy and Air Force seems to be viewed more as teamwork and cooperation. We sensed that Air Force officials in particular see less requirement for moral commitment.

Little evidence was presented of any systematic efforts to influence military cohesion, except in the Army, which is devoting a great deal of attention to it. The other services have some efforts underway, but on a much smaller scale than the Army. We believe this situation may be an outcome of widespread criticism that seems to have focused on the Army and the fact that recruiting and retention has been more of a problem for the Army.

Other than in the Army, activities to influence cohesion seem to focus on leadership development. The Navy's "Pride and Professionalism" and the Air Force's "Project Warrior" are examples. We heard no mention of structural changes such as policy reviews or major changes such as the Army's COHORT project.

None of the services has a specific staff element charged with addressing cohesion per se, although the Army sees a need for one. When asked where such an element might logically reside, three services mentioned the HRD element of their personnel office. Only the Army expressed a need to "institu-"
Appendix D—Summary of Interviews

tionalize" the function. Also, none of the officials expressed any plans for his service to develop concepts and doctrine that would provide a blueprint for systematically influencing cohesion.

All military interviewees identified leadership as a key element in cohesion. The officers in one service were unanimous that proper leadership and training would guarantee cohesion. The Army officials spontaneously identified other factors such as personnel stability (COHORT), command stabilization, and Pentagon policies.

Officials unanimously agreed that traditional military activities such as ritual and ceremony promote cohesion. There were strong emotional responses to questions about how we justified resources for marching bands and time spent on ritual and ceremony. Most felt that the current OSD leadership (Weinberger and Carlucci) were sympathetic to "professional judgment" on these hard-to-quantify issues, and on important matters, reason would prevail. One Service Chief admitted, however, that the reduction of marching bands in his service from 53 to 17 was overdone. He expressed outrage at the system analyst who had recently recommended denial of his request to add two bands. (The senior author of this report had seen the issue paper written by the OSD analyst; it reflected a pure cost-benefit approach and ignorance of the value of ritual and ceremony.) It is interesting to note that the services now have 50 percent of the number of bands they had in 1964.

Interviewees seemed unaware of the profound impact of the decision-making process and other systemic factors on cohesion. With the exception of one senior military officer and most civilians, all agreed that the PPBS relies too much on quantification at the expense of professional judgment. Cost-benefit analysis conducted by civilian analysts in OSD, OMB, GAO, and the congressional staffs is seen to be too influential. All agreed, however, that the current Secretary and Deputy Secretary were unusual in the sense that they were receptive to personal appeals from service secretaries and chiefs. Congress also seems receptive to professional judgment. Some believed, therefore, that personalities and personal relationships are more important than the system of decisionmaking (PPBS). None offered evidence that any systematic effort had been made to change the process itself.

Micromanagement by OSD and Congress was considered a problem, and centralization was thought to hurt cohesion. Concern was expressed that senior DoD civilian appointees exercise authority without being in the chain of command and that decisions focus on the short term, with little consideration for the long-term impact. Some sentiment was expressed for reducing OSD and the military departments headquarters staff.

We discerned a difference in philosophical approach between the uniformed military and the civilian appointees. Whereas the civilian appointees acknowledged that cohesion is important, apparently the subject had not previously been considered (except for the Army civilian official, who was ex-
Appendix D—Summary of Interviews

tremely knowledgeable). One interviewee firmly believed that DoD policies have not hurt cohesion and seriously questioned whether there is any validity to the institutional/occupation model. There was a tendency to attribute policies to the personality of the top man in the organization rather than to the decision-making process itself.

Some of the military officials saw a clear distinction between management and leadership; others did not. One very high civilian official termed the issue a red herring—an excuse for people to hide behind. This same official considered the institutional/occupational concept to be nothing more than "intellectual mush." On the other hand, the top two officers in one service had a clear concept of the leadership/management issue (at least the way we in the study groups define it). They believe the top man must be a leader, while the second in command manages. Several of the "top eight" emphasized the importance of selecting leaders as commanders. All agreed that in peacetime the system tends to reward managers, but each felt his service took steps to see that leaders are promoted to high positions. (This is inconsistent with the perceptions of field-grade officers.) All expressed a need for strengthening leadership.

Interviewees acknowledged the changing nature of society. Today's lifestyle expectations are higher. Young officers think in terms of what is best for "me and/or my family." More wives work. Clubs are no longer the center of military community activities. More military members are married, and marriages where both are in the military are increasing. All these factors create a different atmosphere that generally reduces cohesion. Some compromises have to be made with past notions, however, and one must start from the positive. For example, the question of barracks design elicited no supporters for a return to open squad bays. As one senior official put it: "Times change. The Friday night GI party no longer makes sense if three-fourths of the people live out of the barracks. Besides, I question whether the barracks arrangement, whatever it is, affects unit cohesion anymore, one way or another. We've put more sacrifices on that particular altar than were necessary. Now some compromises have to be made with notions based on the past. We should start with a positive attitude. We can still have a focus for unit and cohesion, but it will be elsewhere than in the barracks. After all, I don't think the married percent in the ranks will ever be what it was in the past. Instead of focusing on the barracks, then, let's give the company a central place to assemble each day with lockers, equipment, classrooms, orderly rooms, and arms rooms, which would be equally important to all, regardless of where they live." He called for some innovative ideas on how to create cohesion in the military as it is, not how we would like it to be. This is sage advice.

The issue of technology and leader behavior elicited diverse responses. The vast majority discounted the impact of high technology on individual officers' behavior. When asked about the emphasis on technical skills in our school systems and on demands of commanders, Navy and Air Force officers took the position that technical skills are necessary and have to to have primacy,
Appendix D—Summary of Interviews

but that this should not impact on leadership skills. The top people expressed a real appreciation for the need to emphasize leadership skills, but we had the impression that they do not appreciate the systemic factors that foster management behavior rather than leadership.

Pay policy was one systemic force they identified as affecting cohesion. Bonuses and special pay create haves and have nots. Congress, OMB, and OSD are increasingly comparing military with civilian industry's skill requirements, with corresponding pay for skill/proficiency. The officials viewed this concept as a potential disaster because it would be extremely divisive and a logical step leading to unions.


Bibliography


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