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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Herbert E. Koenigsbauer, LTC, AR

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The AirLand Battle doctrine provides the US Army an approach to fighting and winning against a numerically superior force. For the United States Army in Europe, realistic maneuver training is essential to effective execution of this doctrine. However, the inadequacy of maneuver space under US control dictates that maneuver training must be conducted in maneuver right areas on the German countryside. The high cost of maneuver damage coupled with ever growing environmental protection efforts by the host nation conflicts with this need and is: USAREURS MANEUVER DAMAGE DILEMMA. This essay establishes USAREURS need to conduct maneuver training, explores the costs and problems associated with maneuver damage, analyzes USAREURS approach to the "maneuver damage dilemma" and provides insight and recommendations concerning this approach based on the experience of the author.
The fundamental mission of the US Army is to deter war. If deterrence fails, the Army must be prepared to win the land battle. The August 1982 editor of FM 100-5 provides the doctrine that deals with the worldwide challenges associated with preparing the Army to win. Specifically, these challenges are identified as "the battlefield, leadership, readiness, and training." Although the Army must prepare to win on any battlefield with scenarios ranging from low intensity, unconventional warfare to general war involving nuclear weapons; the focus of Army preparedness has been and will continue to be for the foreseeable future, the European environment and the potential confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Political and military strategists have long debated the many scenarios by which a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict might unfold in Europe, however, there are several fundamentals which are commonly accepted. First, NATO's current strategy is tied to the concepts of "forward defense" and "flexible response" and second, although there is probable parity of East-West strategic nuclear weapons, NATO is at a distinct disadvantage with regards to conventional forces. This disparity in conventional forces adds an additional dimension to the Army's challenges with regards to its role as a part of NATO: it must be prepared "to fight outnumbered and win." One solution to the numerical conventional force imbalance is the commitment of additional resources by all NATO countries to achieve parity in quantity and quality of conventional forces with the Warsaw Pact. Although much rhetoric is devoted to this option, the chance of it coming to fruition appears slim. Therefore, the leadership, readiness, and training challenges, as applied to the Army at large and the Army in Europe specifically, must confront the force imbalance issue.
The Army's AirLand Battle doctrine, although not a NATO doctrine, provides a refreshing approach to fighting outnumbered and winning. Two principle elements of the new doctrine are the concepts of the "deep attack" and a reemergence of "maneuver" as a combat multiplier. These two concepts are inextricably linked and provide the critical ingredients to a doctrine which must be capable of defeating a numerically superior enemy force. The central purpose of the deep attack is to prevent the enemy from massing and to create "windows of opportunity" for offensive action by US forces. The relationship of deep attack and maneuver creates the opportunity to maneuver locally generated superior forces against isolated enemy forces and defeat them in detail. The result is a shift from a no-win firepower attrition doctrine to a war-winning maneuver doctrine. Maneuver has always had a place in Army doctrine, but its emphasis has fluctuated due to "technological developments" and the nature "the THREAT". Its reemergence as a key element of the AirLand Battle doctrine is abundantly clear. FM 100-5 states:

Maneuver is the dynamic element of combat, the means of concentrating forces in critical areas to gain and use the advantages of surprise, psychological shock, position, and momentum which enable smaller forces to defeat larger ones. More specifically, it is the employment of forces through movement supported by fire to achieve a position of advantage from which to destroy or to threaten destruction of the enemy. The object of maneuver at the operational level is to focus maximum strength against the enemy's weakest point, thereby gaining strategic advantage... at the tactical level, maneuver contributes significantly to sustaining the initiative, to exploiting success, to preserving freedom of action, and to reducing vulnerability. Successful maneuver at this level depends upon skillful movement along indirect approaches supported by direct and indirect fire. The effect created by maneuver is the first element of combat power. Effective maneuver demands battlefield mobility, knowledge of the enemy and terrain generated by reconnaissance and other intelligence activities; effective command and control; flexible operational practices; sound organization; and reliable logistical support. It requires imaginative, bold, competent, and independent leaders; discipline, coordination, and speed; well trained troops; and logistically ready units.
It is the opinion of this writer that "maneuver" is the dynamic element of combat as presented in FM 100-5 and in conjunction with "deep attack" provides the only option to fight and win against a numerically superior force. Implicit in this opinion is the reality that once the value of maneuver as a combat multiplier is accepted, it is essential that forces be trained adequately so as to first achieve and then sustain a level of combat readiness which is capable of successfully executing a maneuver doctrine. As FM 100-5 points out, successful maneuver at the tactical level depends upon skillful movement along indirect approaches and it demands flexible operational practices, bold, competent leaders, and well trained troops. The challenges of leadership, readiness and training are further highlighted in FM 100-5 as evidenced by the following statements:

Leaders must set the preconditions for winning on the battlefield; therefore superior combat power has its roots in proper preparation.

Continuous training under all conditions insures positive skills that will contribute to success in combat.

Once the force is engaged, superior combat power derives from the courage of soldiers, the excellence of their training, and the quality of their leadership.

Soldiers who are always required to do it right in training will instinctively do so in combat.

These statements amplify the challenges and tasks associated with achieving an acceptable level of maneuver readiness. Specifically the responsibility of leadership is to ensure that preparations to fight are conducted under conditions similar to those in which the force expects to fight. Simply put the "force will fight the way it trains." If this is applied to the US Army in Europe it implies that in order to maneuver successfully the force must train in a manner commensurate with the way it will be required to maneuver against Warsaw Pact forces. The force must be
prepared to take advantage of the "windows of opportunity" when they are created. The maneuver training challenge for USAREUR is clear. Further, given that the basic combined arms maneuver element is the battalion task force (organized from infantry battalions, tank battalions) or cavalry squadron the specific challenge is to conduct maneuver training for USAREUR battalions/squadrons both independently and as a part of larger units (brigade/division) under realistic conditions. The need to conduct realistic training is not an outgrowth of the AirLand Battle doctrine. The Army has long recognized this need and the Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEP) clearly establish it by pointing out:

    The Army should train the way it fights. Realism must be the foundation of all training and evaluation programs. If realism is lacking, lessons learned will be of little value in diagnosing training weaknesses.

For the USAREUR maneuver battalions the challenge of realistic maneuver training is especially critical. These battalions must sustain a level of combat readiness which enables them to go to war at any moment and at that moment they must be prepared to fight and win. What appears to be obvious on one hand (need for realistic maneuver training), becomes a dangerous dilemma on the other. The dilemma centers on the inadequacy of the dedicated (under US control) major training areas (MTA) in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Inadequacy results from two factors. First, and most significant, existing training areas are too small to conduct realistic battalion level maneuver training and secondly, the number of maneuver battalions exceed the capacity of existing facilities to accommodate maneuver training. This is true for US battalions and is exacerbated considerably when other NATO forces compete for valuable training space at MTAs.
The three major training areas under US control in the FRG are:

Grafenwoehr Training Area (GTA), Hohenfels Training Area (HTA) and Wildflecken Training Area (WTA). The type of training supported concurrently at each training area is:

- Grafenwoehr (21 Battalions)
  - 3 BNs - Tank Gunnery Qualification
  - 2 BNs - Tank Gunnery Sustainment
  - 2 BNs - Infantry Qualification
  - 2 BNs - Infantry Sustainment
  - 2 BNs - Brigade Headquarters, Division Support Command (DISCOM)
  - 10 BNs - Artillery

- Hohenfels (7 Battalions)
  - 2 BNs - Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP)
  - 2 BNs - Individual Weapons/Maneuver (to company level)
  - 1 BN - DISCOM
  - 2 BNs - ARTEP Aggressor Support

- Wildflecken (3 Battalions)
  - 1 BN - Tank Gunnery Sustainment or Infantry Qualification/Sustainment Gunnery
  - 1 BN - Engineer ARTEP
  - 1 BN - Artillery ARTEP

It is evident that HTA is the only MTA under US control providing any maneuver training. The actual training area is approximately 21 Kms in length and at its widest point is approximately 10 Kms. If the space available is compared to the maneuver area recommended in the ARTEP's it becomes clear that there is insufficient maneuver area under US control to conduct maneuver training. Recommended maneuver area for a battalion task force or a cavalry squadron is:
### Cavalry Squadron

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Width</th>
<th>Depth</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>20 Km</td>
<td>25 Km</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Screen</td>
<td>30 Km</td>
<td>15 Km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard</td>
<td>12 Km</td>
<td>30 Km</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attack</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Movement to Control</td>
<td>7 Km</td>
<td>10 Km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberate Attack</td>
<td>5 Km</td>
<td>15 Km</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Deep Objective)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<th>Defend</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>10 Km</td>
<td>10 Km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delay</td>
<td>15 Km</td>
<td>20 Km</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Task Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Width</th>
<th>Depth</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement to Contact</td>
<td>7 Km</td>
<td>10 Km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberate Attack</td>
<td>5 Km</td>
<td>10 Km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Deep Objective)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defend</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>8 Km</td>
<td>10 Km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delay</td>
<td>10 Km</td>
<td>20 Km</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is the opinion of the writer that the recommended areas are conservative particularly when applied to mission requirements for maneuver battalions/squadrons in the NATO general defense plan. Even if HTA was considered to provide adequate space to accommodate maneuver training for a task force or squadron, the key point is—scheduling six division equivalents (four divisions, two Armored Cavalry Regiments, two separate brigades) of maneuver battalions through one training area with sufficient frequency to sustain an acceptable level of maneuver readiness is technically impossible. This statement is made based on the assumption that three battalion level field training exercises are required annually to sustain maneuver readiness. The final inadequacy of HTA (even if scheduling was possible)
is that continuous use of the same training area does not provide a realistic challenge to the unit i.e., familiarity with the terrain over time will stifle initiative and inhibit the development of leader and soldier skills essential to sustaining maneuver readiness.

A solution to the dilemma of inadequate training areas under US control is provided in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Article 45 of the Supplementary Agreement to the NATO SOFA states,

Insofar as a force is not able to carry out its training program on the accommodation made available for its permanent use without impairing the purpose of such training, the force shall have the right to conduct maneuvers and other training exercises outside such accommodation in such measure as necessary to the accomplishment of its defense mission.

Article 45 of the Supplementary Agreement clearly establishes the right for US forces (and other signatory powers) to conduct training exercises on FRG land not under its control. This right is exercised frequently as evidenced by a recent unofficial estimate from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Host Nations Activities, HQs USAREUR, which states that on any given day in CY 1981 and CY 1982 over 4,000 USAREUR soldiers with 1,300 wheeled and 440 tracked vehicles, and 22 helicopters were conducting exercises. Although unofficial "ball-park figures," they are indicative of the heavy maneuver load borne by parts of the host nation population in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement. The impact of this maneuver load is even more significant since USAREUR units conduct practically all of their exercises on 20,800 square miles of the FRG territory which is less than half the size of the state of Pennsylvania (45,333 square miles). Considering that there are approximately 27 divisions of different nationalities stationed in the FRG, all of which need to train and maintain readiness, suitable maneuver space (referred to as maneuver right areas-MRA) is scarce and overused.
This situation is not simply a function of square miles and troop density. The areas in which units must maneuver are densely populated and training activities have a marked impact on the German people and their properties. Every exercise conducted on the German countryside, whether it be a platoon or a deployed corps, results in "Maneuver Damage." This, coupled by a growing awareness among the German people concerning their environment and the need for its protection, is making it more difficult to exercise realistically. Over the years maneuvering has been subjected to a slow but steady process of restrictions which USAREUR has had to accept (because they appear justified) or self imposed (to minimize maneuver damage costs). Commanders in USAREUR are confronted with the critical need to conduct realistic maneuver training on the German countryside; but the conduct of this training results in maneuver damage, which impacts adversely with regard to the need for dollars to pay damage costs and the need to maintain the goodwill of the host nation government and people. This conflict of needs is "USAREURs Maneuver Damage Dilemma." This dilemma is not new. In June 1962, Headquarters USAREUR published a Report of Stewardship October 1960 - April 1962 highlighting the command of General Clarke which commented:

Maneuver damage occurring during field training of USAREUR forces was a major problem to the command. As land values in West Germany increased as a result of growing population and developing economy, maneuver damages became more expensive in terms of both money and impairment of German-American relations. Manoeuvers of combat forces... have been conducted in areas outside the major training areas to provide sufficient space to employ these forces over realistic distances... General Clarke directed that command attention be given to reducing maneuver damage, at the same time maintaining proper field training standards.

Twenty years later, USAREUR is addressing the same problem; however, the political, economic, and social environment in West Germany has changed and the potential adverse impact on support of training rights in accordance
with the SOFA is significant. As a result of an extensive study of the continuing dilemma, USAREUR published a revised USAREUR Regulation 350-22 on 16 March 1982. The regulation is titled "Maneuver and Field Training Exercise Rights in the Federal Republic of Germany" and highlights the seriousness of the situation when it states:

failure to comply with this regulation will affect adversely inter-allied relations, cause confusion over maneuver damages, result in excessive claim payments for maneuver damages, and impair the right of US forces to use public and private land for maneuvers and field training exercises.

Before discussing the current regulation and the guidance it provides commanders to cope with the "maneuvers damage dilemma" it is essential to explore the magnitude of the dilemma in more detail.

The cost of maneuver damage has increased significantly in recent years. The following figures represent US reimbursements to the FRG since FY 1976:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>$15.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>18.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>19.0 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>38.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>46.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>42.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>48.0 million</td>
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</table>

There are several key factors to consider concerning these reimbursements. First, the US government pays 75% of the damage claim while the FRG pays 25% of the claim. Secondly, the dollar amounts for each FY might not reflect actual damages for that year. There can be and often is, substantial passage of time between the damage incident and the actual payment of the claim. Variables such as litigated cases and inordinately large maneuvers cause a spillover from one FY to another. Third, reimbursements are made in the host nation currency (German Marks-DM). Thus, reimbursement totals are affected not only by the amount of maneuvering and the care with which it is accomplished, but also by the dollar/DM exchange rate. DM
reimbursement figures, which are a more accurate reflection of actual damages, have increased each year from FY 76 thru FY 82; the decline in dollar terms of reimbursements processed from FY 80 to FY 81 was caused solely by an increase in the exchange rate.

A breakout of costs by unit (BN, BDE, DIV) is not possible, however figures for the large REFORGER type exercise have been isolated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXERCISE</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CLAIMS</th>
<th>COST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CERTAIN SHIELD</td>
<td>SEP 78</td>
<td>11,724</td>
<td>$12 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERTAIN SENTINEL</td>
<td>JAN 79</td>
<td>15,612</td>
<td>$7.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERTAIN RAMPART</td>
<td>SEP 80</td>
<td>12,608</td>
<td>$7.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERTAIN ENCOUNTER</td>
<td>SEP 81</td>
<td>9,185</td>
<td>$8.0 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*CARBINE FORTRESS</td>
<td>SEP 82</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>$117,000(td)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures are as of January 1983.13

These figures do not represent any significant trend, however for the REFORGER type exercise USAREUR expects in excess of 10,000 claims and reimbursements in the neighborhood of $10 million. Factors which influence the cost of large exercises are the type of units involved, the area of the maneuver, the time of year, and the weather conditions. The most significant observation is the doubling of maneuver damage reimbursements from FY 78 to FY 79. The US Army Claims Service, Europe states that USAREUR has never been able to establish definitively the reasons for the drastic increase in FY 79. The best evidence indicates that it was a combination of increased large-scale maneuvering with better equipped units, made possible by the diversion of effort and resources from Vietnam to Europe, along with a number of economic factors, most notably the lack of strength of the US dollar in relation to the German Mark (DM) and inflation in the German economy. In addition, this writer suggests that during this period an awareness of the need to conduct realistic maneuver training on the part

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of commanders began to emerge in Europe. Further, as commanders began to get serious about preparing to fight and win there was a gap between realistic training and efforts to minimize maneuver damage to include consideration given to the political and social side effects. Significantly, the trend has been increasing and there is little evidence that maneuver damage costs will fall back to the pre-FY 79 levels. As alarming as this situation has been to USAREUR, the sharp rise in costs has attracted high level attention in the US. In FY 80 the House Appropriation Committee, expressing its concern that maneuver damage payments to the FRG were excessive initiated the following actions:

- Directed a GAO investigation into maneuver damage payments to the FRG.
- Underfunded DOD claims appropriations.
- Expressed its desire that the cost-sharing provisions of the NATO SOFA be renegotiated (US 75% FRG 25%). The Department of Defense and State have opposed this recommendation.14

The significant follow-on from these initial actions has been continued congressional cuts in the DOD claims requests for FY 81, 82 and most likely this will continue in FY 83.

In addition to the US Congress, another dimension of increased maneuver activities and the resulting increased maneuver damage costs is the impact on the host nation. The trend has been a growing concern by the host nation authorities particularly in those areas where troop concentrations lead to a concentration of maneuvers. Concurrent with the steady concern for increasing maneuver damage, there is a growing defense weariness on the part of the German civilian population which could be transferred into anti-militarism and anti-American feelings by:
elements within the German society who regard neutralism and pacifism to be a better alternative than defense preparedness and its burdens.

- The German media which, like all free world media, tend to exaggerate the extent of "bad news" and ignore or downplay "good news."

- German local, state and federal politicians who up until now have been comparatively brave in standing up for the US Forces right to train in a way and in places which will maximize US combat readiness, but who cannot be expected to defend this right if the going gets rough in the future.

- The action of USAREUR commanders and maneuvers units if they make major mistakes or fail to appear appropriately sensitive to German concerns involving training activities.  

The stakes involved with the USAREUR "maneuver damage dilemma" are high. The readiness of US forces to take advantage of the "windows of opportunity" created by the deep attack and to maneuver successfully against Warsaw Pact forces can be developed and sustained only through training on the German countryside. A failure to reverse the recent trend by the US Congress and the potential further deterioration of goodwill and support by the host nation will adversely affect combat readiness and reduce our capability to fight and win.

USAREUR is attacking the "maneuver damage dilemma." The philosophy guiding the attack is based on several tenets:

- The primary USAREUR mission is combat readiness.

- There is an increasing requirement for maneuver right areas.
To maintain the goodwill of the host nation government and people, maneuver training requirements must be closely coordinated with them.

Accomplishment of training goals is of paramount importance, but the prevention of maneuver damage is of equal importance.

The details of this philosophy have been prescribed in two publications: USAREUR Regulations 350-22 and USAREUR PAM 350-23. Both of these documents were published in March 1982 and provide specific guidance to commanders for planning and conducting maneuver training on the German countryside. Specifically USAREUR PAM 350-23 points out that the right to maneuver (Article 45, SOFA) entails:

- Notifying the host nation authorities of exercise plans and providing them with necessary details.
- Complying with host nation laws in conducting maneuvers and exercises.
- Taking "all necessary measures to ensure that damage during the conduct of maneuvers and other training exercises will be prevented as far as possible and that the economic use of plots of land is not substantially impaired."

Both the "Reg and the Pam" provide substantive details and procedures for commanders to follow in order to protect the right to conduct maneuver training. Much of the guidance is administrative and addresses such things as:

- Exercise plan/timing/selection of proposed maneuver area.
- Coordination with CENTAG.
- Pre-coordination with managing commands.
- Preparation of maneuver rights requests and overlays.
- Receipt of USAREUR maneuver right approval.
- Maneuver credits.
- River closures.
- Submission of Master Maneuver Damage Report and Report of Pre-Maneuver Damage.

Completion of these administrative tasks is important and essential to the effort to reduce maneuver damage. The heart of the USAREUR program, however, is the action involved with the requirement to conduct:

- Pre-maneuver Reconnaissance
- Pre-maneuver Liaison and Coordination
- Maneuver Damage Prevention and Control Program

With regards to these actions USAREUR Regulation 350-22 directs the following:

**Pre-maneuver Reconnaissance.** Immediately before each exercise, requesting unit will reconnoiter approved maneuver area to assess the condition of roads, land, and forests taking into consideration existing or agreed on local restrictions. Results of reconnaissance may necessitate changes in the exercise plan to prevent unnecessary maneuver damage or unnecessary hardship for the host nation population.

**Pre-maneuver Liaison and Coordination.** On receipt of maneuver rights, commanders will coordinate exercise plan quickly with local German authorities, including local government officials, police, forestry personnel, road supervisors, and, if necessary property owners. For major exercises (2,000 or more participants), the requesting unit will present pre-maneuver briefing to the appropriate German government officials and press representatives, in addition to coordinating exercise plans with local public officials. Briefings and coordination will be made sufficiently before the maneuver to ensure advance public notice of training activities is given.

**Maneuver Damage Prevention and Control Program.** To keep maneuver damage and resultant costs to a minimum, all commanders will review training programs periodically to ensure a maximum emphasis is placed on maneuver damage prevention. Full-scale command information programs on maneuver damage prevention and control will be conducted to ensure a maximum of maneuver right training with a minimum of damage and disturbance to the host nation's people.
The manner in which these actions are implemented is critical to the effectiveness of the maneuver damage prevention or reduction program. The benefits of pre-maneuver reconnaissance appear obvious and it might seem too fundamental, i.e., one would assume that units would do this routinely without requiring a regulation. Experience has shown however, that many units moved into a maneuver right area without previous knowledge of the terrain conditions. Typical observations or perceptions by host nation officials or people are "optimum routes and passages are not carefully enough selected while in another one the subordinate leaders are insufficiently familiar with the terrain and thus forced to drive through areas which had been intended to be spared" or "units in training do not carefully enough reconnoiter the terrain thus causing them to end up in situations which are adverse for the farmers." In addition to responding to host nation concerns, this action makes "good tactical sense" and as such should be exploited by commanders. That is, the reconnaissance should not be conducted only as a maneuver damage measure but should be a part of the tactical planning phase. Terrain analysis is a critical element of maneuver training and leaders at all levels should use this opportunity to maximize one of their most valuable training resources--TIME.

Whereas pre-maneuver reconnaissance is easily accepted, the actions associated with pre-maneuver liaison and coordination are more difficult. USAREUR Pam 350-23 provides general guidelines for conducting pre-maneuver briefings, but it is the opinion of this writer that there are shortcomings in both "the Reg and the Pam" with regards to this action. Commanders conducting maneuvers involving more than 2,000 participants are "required" to conduct pre-maneuver briefings. This eliminates the battalion/squadron size unit--the unit which needs to maneuver most frequently and if they train realistically, potentially contributes to considerable
maneuver damage. Further, this criteria could conceivably apply to two or three maneuver battalions operating under the provision of one maneuver right area request without a briefing of host nation officials. (Based on tank battalion strength of 550 and infantry battalion 800.) Coordination is required regardless of the number of participants. However, this potentially omits key persons and lacks the necessary structure to adequately prepare local officials either to understand or to support the maneuver exercise. A coordinated pre-maneuver briefing is the only procedure acceptable to satisfy the serious efforts required to reduce the impact of inevitable maneuver damage and should be mandatory for battalion level exercises.

The guidelines for conducting a briefing are generally adequate, but based on experience, some refinements are appropriate. Guidance is provided with regard to language, welcoming remarks, scenario, maneuver damage control, traffic control, and handouts. As stipulated it is essential that briefings be conducted by someone who speaks German with native fluency. This may be difficult for battalion size units however a search at battalion, brigade, community, or if necessary, at division level usually results in finding the right person. The failure to communicate effectively and accurately might defeat the purpose of the briefing. Welcoming remarks must be done by the commanders. German officials are rank conscious and the presence of the commander lends the proper authenticity to the briefing—briefings conducted without the commander’s introduction and presence are less credible. In the absence of the commander the executive officials must fill in. A key point which the current guidance does not state is that the senior German official should also make opening remarks. This should be carefully coordinated before the briefing. The purpose is to have the senior German official “on your side” and it has an important
psychological effect upon the attendees by establishing a cooperative and supportive spirit. Pre-maneuver briefings must have an active German participation in order to be effective. The briefing of the scenario or scope of maneuver is the critical information portion of the agenda. Insure that what is going to happen and the where and when are clearly presented. German attendees will be most interested in what impact the maneuver will have on their land, local property and the population. Special emphasis should be directed to arrangements made with military police agencies both US and the local German police to control traffic within the maneuver area. Procedures for maneuver damage claim submission must be presented accurately and German officials should be asked to disseminate this information to the local population. The best agency to accomplish this is the "press." Unfortunately, there is a tendency for US units to stay away from the press and the USAREUR guidance, while recommending an invitation to the press, does not require or elaborate on its value. The press is extremely valuable for maneuver information dissemination. They should be asked to print a map of the maneuver area (usually provided as a handout) and provide warnings of convoy movements. Additionally the German radio should be used to augment the press. This media should be used immediately prior to and during the exercise. Another critical aspect of the pre-maneuver conference is the attitude and approach used by the US participants. The mood must be cooperative and reflect openness and honesty. Don't present training objectives or plans which are less ambitious than actually contemplated. To present a limited scenario for fear of public reaction is a guaranteed formula for further jeopardizing the right to maneuver. An example of a pre-condition that is often made is that "maneuver will be restricted to the roads if it rains." Maneuver can never be restricted solely to roads. Units will always have to move to assembly
areas—the exercise is in trouble before it starts. The point is to be consistent and live up to promises.

A technique which has been used successfully, but is not found in the USAREUR guidance is the concept of the "maneuver leg" and "the more we use the less we abuse." With due consideration to the scarcity of maneuver space, the exercise area must be sufficiently large to permit unrestricted maneuver because small restricted areas cause repeated and concentrated maneuver damage areas. For a battalion versus battalion exercise, the area should be approximately 40 Km by 40 Km. The "maneuver leg" concept should be used in the maneuver right area. This means that the maneuver elements move in one general direction. When the scenario requires a reversing of the roles then the elements move to a completely new area and commence the battle anew without moving repeatedly over the same ground. This concept excludes areas from repeated maneuver and extensive abuse. Concurrently the concept reinforces sound maneuver readiness training, by causing commanders to maneuver over constantly changing terrain which maximizes training realism.

In addition to these refinements to the USAREUR approach to the "maneuver damage dilemma" there is another dimension which commanders should pursue. Existing guidance/directives make fleeting references to the German Territorial Defense forces. USAREUR Reg 350-22 states:

Regional and local German Territorial Defense Agencies (Verteidigungskreiskommando and Verteidigungsbereichskommando (VKK and VBEK) are prepared to render limited assistance to requesting units in accomplishing local coordination and conducting pre-maneuver briefings. Commanders are encouraged to establish and maintain close contacts with these agencies and, if necessary, obtain their assistance in dealing with local German officials and property owners.

The VKK and VBEK are valuable resources which should be used extensively as suggested by the above guidance. The technique should be to integrate
territorial defense personnel with US civil affairs (G-5/S-5) personnel and create Civil-Military Cooperation Centers (CIMIC) during maneuver training. US resources to support this action are normally found at the brigade/regimental level and above. Battalions/squadrons if operating separately must draw upon higher headquarters for appropriate support. Regardless, the concept described below which has been used successfully by at least one USAREUR unit, should become standard procedure for all maneuver exercises. The CIMIC Center operates as the focal point for all contact between the maneuver element and the German population in the area of operations. It assists in the coordination of resources—civil and military in the prevention of and response to civil-military confrontations arising from maneuver training. Its critical functions therefore are geared to "real world" problem solving and coordination—no "exercise" play is involved. The emphasis is on liaison with government officials, coordination of maneuver damage and press activities, and recording/reporting of accidents/incidents involving US forces and the civilian population. During the maneuver the CIMIC Center should be set up in an area near to but not co-located with the Tactical Operations Center (TOC). A Bundespost telephone should be available and manned 24 hours a day by a unit CIMIC officer or NCO. A Territorial Army liaison team should be there to assist in contacting civil agencies. The importance of the German Territorial Army support cannot be overemphasized. Most US Army units neither have people who speak fluent German (a point discussed earlier), know German protocol intimately, know German civil officials nor are familiar with specific geographical areas of Germany. The German Territorial Army has proven to be more than anxious to provide this expertise. Additionally one of their primary missions in support of the general defense plan is civil-military coordination. Territorial Army liaison teams need to be included
early in the exercise planning and used extensively throughout every phase of the exercise. These liaison teams locate water sources, find trash points, obtain use of German facilities, report accidents to the German police, and conduct continuous maneuver coordination with the local inhabitants. It should be apparent that this type of indigenous assistance is absolutely essential for any serious effort to reduce maneuver damage and its impact on the host nation people.

All US Army units in Germany have a designated Territorial Army Headquarters for coordination which should be included for all training conducted in maneuver right areas. The experience will prove invaluable to them and provide an opportunity to practice their mission while contributing to the "realism" of the maneuver training. The combined US-German team provides a capability to react to "hot spots" during the maneuver which is extremely valuable because it shows the local inhabitants that the maneuver unit does respect their property and safety. It also demonstrates a comradeship between respected civilian agencies such as the local police and the unit during the maneuver. This relationship is critical in maintaining a positive attitude in the civilian community and reinforces the credibility of information provided earlier during the pre-maneuver briefing. The relationship of the CIMIC Center and pre-maneuver briefing is further reinforced by providing quick answers to inquiries from people who have sustained some maneuver damage. Rapid and accurate information to the claimant helps to reduce the psychological shock that accompanies most maneuver damage and reduces the delays caused by inadequate information for filing their damage claims. The benefits to be accrued from a CIMIC Center are limited only to the imagination and effort made by the commander and his staff. The key point is that the concept must be implemented in order to maximize the potential contribution to be made by the German Territorial
forces. The advantages inherent in this concept are too significant to be left to chance.

In summary, maneuver is the dynamic element of combat. Firepower, linear confrontation (attrition) with the enemy must be avoided at all costs because we are outnumbered and outgunned. If we cannot move we cannot win and for this reason one of our most important training tasks is to obtain a maneuver capability. Maneuver is the only way we can seize the initiative in a battle against a numerically superior force. For the US Army in Europe this skill can only be maintained through training on the German countryside. Major training areas under US control are inadequate to the challenge since they do not provide sufficient space for realistic maneuver training to support AirLand Battle doctrine and the standards outlined in Army Training and Evaluation Programs. The increasing requirement for maneuver right areas is being countered by an increasing number of restrictions being imposed as a result of the growing cost for claims from maneuver damage and by the ever growing environmental protection efforts of the host nation. The dilemma faced by commanders at all levels of needing to train on the German countryside while confronted with increasing costs and environmental awareness of the host nation people has been addressed by USAREUR with the publication of specific guidance and directives. This guidance although a major step forward should be refined in accordance with the analysis and discussion presented in this essay.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., pp. 2-6

3. Ibid., pp. 2-10


9. M. Langner, Chief Maneuver and Exercise Coordination Branch, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Host Nation Activities, United States Army Europe, and Seventh Army, letter to author, 3 March 1983.


11. United States Army Europe, and Seventh Army, USAREUR Regulation 350-22, Maneuver and Field Training Exercise Rights in the Federal Republic of Germany, APO NY 09403, 16 March 1982, p. 3 (hereafter referred to as "UR 350-22")

12. Deputy Chief of Staff Host Nation Activities, Reduction of Maneuver Damage, Decision Memorandum to Chief of Staff, Heidelberg, 31 August 1981, unnumbered page.


14. Deputy Chief of Staff Host Nation Activities, Reduction of Maneuver Damage, unnumbered page.

15. Ibid., unnumbered page.

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18. Ibid., p. 9.
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