A UNITED STATES POLICY POSITION ON
EXPULSION OF ISRAEL FROM THE UNITED NATIONS

RESEARCH REPORT

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**A United States Policy Position on Expulsion of Israel from the United Nations**

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**See Attached**
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by

Mark A. Hanna, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH
REQUIREMENT

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA
April 1981
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Title: A United States Policy Position on Expulsion of Israel from the United Nations

Author: Mark A. Hanna, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Brief remarks on the evolution of political activity to expel Israel from the UN introduce a discussion of a current United States foreign policy problem: What position should the US take in the event of a future attempt to expel Israel from the UN? These remarks are followed by an outline of current strategic, economic, and political factors influencing a US policy decision on the expulsion question. An examination of the utility of the United Nations in a contemporary world follows in order to provide a background for the author's views on the probability of a future expulsion attempt being made against Israel, and what policy alternatives the US has. Four possible US courses of action are outlined with arguments both for and against their adoption. A preferred policy position is recommended.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Mark A. Hanna (M.B.A., University of Missouri; M.S., Troy State University) has been interested in the Middle East and international relations since the early 1970s when he was stationed in Germany and had the opportunity to experience, firsthand, the effect an oil cutoff had on Western Europe. Subsequent to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War Colonel Hanna included Middle East study in his graduate work in international relations. He traveled extensively throughout Europe while assigned to the 36th Tactical Fighter Wing at Bitburg Air Base, Germany. Other assignments have been: Strategic Air Command Headquarters, the 351st Strategic Missile Wing, and the Air Reserve Personnel Center. Colonel Hanna holds the Meritorious Service Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, the Air Force Commendation Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters, and is a graduate of Squadron Office School Class 69A, Air Command and Staff College (seminar), Industrial College of the Armed Forces (correspondence), the Air War College, class of 1981.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

This research study will address a contemporary problem in international relations facing the United States. That problem, simply stated, is: What should the position of the United States be toward an attempt by United Nations (UN) member states to expel Israel from the UN or make an attempt to restrict Israeli participation in the UN General Assembly? The expulsion question is important to the US as a policy matter since expulsion of Israel could adversely affect support by the US of the UN and severely disrupt movement toward an overall Middle East peace.

Problem Evolution

Since its establishment, the UN has moved toward wider membership through the process of seating more states in the General Assembly and by increased participation (more positions) on the Security Council. From a membership of 50 in 1945 the UN has grown to 154 members today. Security Council positions have shown a like growth, expanding from 11 members to 15.

From the onset, however, a spirit of universalism appeared to be lacking in that bloc voting emerged and political reprisal seemed to become the order of the day. This form of hostility toward member states has surfaced on several
occasions, culminating in 1974 with the attempted expulsion of South Africa from the UN. ⁴

When total expulsion was thwarted by France, Great Britain, and the US, using the veto in the Security Council, the issue was injected into the General Assembly, where South Africa was denied participation rights through the vehicle of rejecting the credentials of the South African delegation. ⁵ Once the precedent for such an action had been set, it immediately became obvious to observers that similar political reprisals could be expected, especially if bloc states were hostile to one particular member state. ⁶

Israel is such a state, and political reprisals should be anticipated. In fact, as recently as September 1980 the expulsion of Israel from the UN was called for by leaders of Arab States. ⁷ Hence, it behooves the US to plan for such a contingency and develop a policy position before the fact. As the Israeli expulsion question is interconnected with the entire Middle East situation, it must be examined in a global context if valid policy recommendations are to be made. For this reason, we will concern ourselves with broader issues than would normally be implied by the above stated policy question.
CHAPTER II
CONSTRAINTS ON UNITED STATES POLICY

The purpose of this chapter is to examine critical issues external to the UN political process which the US must consider in formulating its policy position.* These issues are: (1) the strategic importance of the Middle East, (2) the merits of Arab positions, and (3) historical United States support for Israel and the moral implications of such support.

Strategic Importance of the Middle East

The strategic importance of the Middle East has become an established fact because of geopolitical and economic factors. How vital United States' interests are in this area seems to be the major point of contention between Middle East observers.

One point generally agreed upon as a reason for the definition of the Middle East as an area of vital US interest is the potential for superpower confrontation arising out of Middle East instability. Cecil Crabb, in his book _American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age_ states:

> Among the far-reaching changes in the international community brought about by World War II, few surpass in importance the emergence of the Middle East as a maelstrom

*Issues concerning the United Nations will be discussed in chapter III.
of great power conflict. . . . The strategic significance of the Middle East makes it one of the central arenas of international politics and an area of continuing concern to the United States.1

That the Middle East is unstable and that the likelihood of another Arab-Israeli War remains a distinct possibility are also points agreed upon by many.

Yasir Arafat stated in 1974 that preparations were being made for war.2 Senator J. W. Fulbright echoed the same sentiments when he said, "All indeed that can be predicted . . . is that as long as we temporize on . . . the Middle East, these time bombs will keep ticking away."3 Not only have different nations voiced concern over this subject, but spokesmen from diverse positions on the American political spectrum have as well.

One can ascertain from the above what Fulbright, a liberal, thinks on this subject. Spokesmen from the political right did view the situation in the same light. William F. Buckley points out that another war is being "coaxed" along, as does James Burnham.4 Former president Gerald Ford (a foreign policy moderate) has also made many statements on this subject. The following bears quoting, "I can only say that we think it is of maximum importance that continued movement toward peace on a justifiable basis in the Middle East is vital to that area of the world, and probably to the world as a whole."5 The "vital" question, of course, refers to "Great Powers" confrontation, which in a future Middle East Arab-Israeli war is highly likely.6

4
Another facet of a future Middle East war that concerns many observers of international affairs is the spectre of a nuclear war.\(^7\) This point was driven home most forcibly by Senator Fulbright when he said that the probability of another war is acute and elaborated with the following: "Israel . . . is generally assumed to have acquired nuclear weapons and if Mr Joseph Alsop . . . is to be believed, Israel is prepared to use these weapons. . . ."\(^8\)

Renewed Middle East war with big-power confrontation is not the only reason for the interest of the US in the Middle East. Oil and economics also play a role. Again, Cecil Crabb offers insight when he says, "The vast oil resources of the Middle East rank as a . . . reason why the region is strategically vital."\(^9\) Linked with Crabb's view is the fact that US dependence on Middle Eastern oil has increased since the oil crisis of 1973-74.\(^10\) Lastly, the region is vital to the US if for no other reason than it contains Western European and Japanese petroleum reserves.\(^11\)

Economic considerations other than supply also play a part in this assessment. Once again, oil is the lever. This time, however, price is the weapon. By pricing Arab oil at near ruinous rates, a hostile Middle East could wreck the European and Japanese industrial economies and greatly damage the United States economy as well. This fact has been dramatically demonstrated by worldwide economic conditions which followed Arab use of the oil weapon in 1973-74.
Counterviews to this point exist, however, and should be examined. J. B. Kelley, in his book *Arabia, The Gulf and the West*, takes the West to task for failing to stand up to Arab demands or threatened oil embargoes. As one reviewer of Kelly's book points out:

Kelly . . . instructs the US not to make energy policy with oil embargoes in mind. This fatalistic speculation condemns the policy from its inception. Realistically, the prospects of OPEC retribution are slim due to their central lack of cohesion and their recent adoption of a Western standard of living.12

Moreover, in a *Forbes* article, one can read that the functioning free market will handle the surplus wealth garnered by oil-producing Middle East states by returning "petrodollars" to the industrialized countries. This article goes on to say that if these petrodollars are not returned to the industrialized countries then the value of oil reserves will diminish because demand will slacken.13

Geographically, the area itself is strategic, controlling water routes to the Black Sea, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean and the land bridge between Africa, Asia, and Europe. A further strategic consideration is that Middle Eastern land-based air forces dominate areas which may possibly become important to US strategic nuclear forces. Thus when considering all the arguments (geopolitical, economic, military), it becomes evident that the Middle East is a highly strategic area of vital United States interest.
Merits of the Arab Position

The merits of Arab positions are often overlooked by the American people but nonetheless influence US action on the world stage. By and large Arab positions have merit, especially in the context of achieving a final peace solution in the Middle East. First, one must accept that Arab Palestinians too have a right to a national homeland. Closely allied with the desire for a Palestinian homeland is the Arab demand that land captured by Israel be returned to the Arabs. The importance of returning Arab land cannot be overstated insofar as the Arabs are concerned. As Syrian Minister of Information, Ahmed Iskander, recently said, "... there is no power in the world that can compel us to forget our right to liberate our occupied territories. ..." To understand the Arab position fully, one must grasp the fact that Arab land is a "key element" in Arab security. As Paul Jacobs points out, "The close Arab family, rooted to a specific piece of land, is a key element in a diffused social structure. The family is the always dependable source of support. ..." Another facet of the Arab position is the treatment Arabs receive inside the Jewish State. Israeli-Arab citizens do not enjoy first-class citizenship, nor are Arabs ever expected to obtain equal status with Jews. In the Israeli view, Arabs belong to the "Arab Nation" on one hand and to the "Israeli State" on the other.
A third aspect of the Arab position is the role of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in an overall Middle East settlement. Arafat obviously feels the PLO must play an important role. So, too, does Paul Jacobs if for no other reason than that the PLO is a "force" in Middle East politics. As Jacobs points out, the power of Arafat's Fatah permeates all aspects of Arab policy, and the PLO is dominated by the Fatah. Jacobs goes on to say, by way of example, that non-Fatah spokesmen would not discuss political topics with him unless the discussion was approved by Fatah. As early as 1974 no less a personage than President Nixon hinted at PLO involvement in future negotiations when he stated, "There must be . . . settlement . . . between Israel and Jordan or the PLO*. . . ." More recently other authorities have discussed PLO involvement as well. Signals are present that the PLO is prepared to play a constructive role in achieving a lasting Middle East peace--providing the Palestinian homeland question is solved to the satisfaction of the Palestinians and Arab States.

On the whole, it seems reasonable to accept the Arab position that the PLO must be a player and recognized as a legitimate representative of the stateless Palestinians. Furthermore, it does no good steadfastly to maintain that the

*My emphasis added.
PLO is not a legitimate representative of Palestinian interests when all Arab states (and most of the world) hold the opposite to be true.

United States Support for Israel

US support for Israel is the major factor bearing on the problem to be addressed. In this section historical US support for Israel will be examined and conclusions drawn concerning the moral implications of this support.

US support for Israel over the past 33 years is manifest. However, the history of US support (de facto if not de jure) goes much further back than 1948. Well before Israel's birth, prominent and influential Americans were laboring toward the establishment of a Jewish state. In the period 1890-1939 United States Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis helped gather $1,496,094.52 in gifts for the soon-to-emerge Jewish State. That such a state was the ultimate goal of Brandeis and other prominent Americans (as well as American Zionism) was clearly pointed out by Brandeis in a speech delivered at Carnegie Hall in April 1915: "The Jewish Renaissance has come—the nation is reborn, and the Jewish state in its beginning is already here. We have been faithful over a few things—we are prepared to rule over many."24

US support continued during the interwar years when the holocaust of World War II spurred to new heights public sentiment for establishment of a Jewish State. The efforts of
many culminated in 1948 with the creation of the Jewish State in Palestine. This action took place politically in the UN with strong US support. The General Assembly vote, taken late in the evening of 29 November 1947, was for the partition of Palestine into an Arab State, a Jewish State, and an internationally administered Jerusalem; the measure passed 33 to 13.

War between Arabs and Jews broke out almost immediately, and once again US assistance was apparent. For example, when Count Bernadotte of Sweden (United Nations mediator in the Middle East) was assassinated on 17 September 1948, Ralph J. Bunche, an American, assumed the role of mediator and effected armistice agreements. Also, when the new state of Israel had been proclaimed by Jewish leaders on 14 May 1948, it took the US exactly one day to provide de facto recognition to the new Middle Eastern power.

Subsequent to 1948 US support for Israel has grown, perhaps to the detriment of US interests in this vital part of the world. But, in any case, considering the central question of this paper, it is only necessary to recognize that the US has supported Israel almost to the exclusion of other Middle Eastern Arab States. The US vigorously supported Israel not only in its War of Independence (1948-1949) but in subsequent wars as well (1967, 1973). Even today, in the face of a Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, an Iraq-Iran war, and an Iranian revolution bitterly hostile to the US, the US still strongly supports Israeli positions on Middle East issues.
What are the moral implications of this support? Does the US have a continuing moral obligation to support Israel in the Middle East or the UN? These are questions central to the formulation of a policy position on the issue addressed by this paper. This is also a subject of controversy among many experts in the field.

Senator Fulbright believes the US does have a moral responsibility to Israel. Fulbright has stated that the significance of US support for Israel has reached the point where Israel is tied to the United States as a client state. Fulbright also believes there can be no overall Middle East settlement without clear recognition of Israel as a legitimate state and that such recognition involves the US—for only through a direct US treaty guarantee can Israel be assured of its independence and territorial integrity.28

The opposite aspect of the "moral" question is outlined by James Burnham, who feels that the US should mainly interested in making sure the Middle East is not dominated by a "superpower" other than the US, and that the US should not care who rules Palestine so long as the above goal is achieved. Burnham also points out that Israel is not the only anti-communist state in the Middle East but that the largest Arab States are anti-communist as well.29 In this same line of thought, Bruce Russett, in referring to US-Middle East activity, says, "In some respects it may be better for the United States to do nothing rather than continue some of the
wrong things it has been doing. . . "30 A third Middle
East commentator, Paul Jacobs, says much the same, " . . . some
[Americans] are becoming disturbed by implications of the
Israeli position vis-a-vis the American government. A conflict
of values and loyalties is developing."31 Lastly, Alfred
Lilienthal devotes a whole book to the thesis that the US
should re-evaluate its current pro-Israeli stand and Middle
East positions. Lilienthal asks the US to examine at what
price to American national interests the US pro-Israeli stand
has been taken.32

There is another side of the "moral" question, and this
has to do with international law. Does a state for example
incur moral obligations as a result of its dealings with other
states in the international arena? H. L. A. Hart thinks not.
In Hart's book, The Concept of Law, one reads:

International law is not morality . . . the rules of
international law . . . are often morally quite indif-
ferent. . . . It is difficult to see why or in what
sense it [morality] must exist as a condition of the
existence of international law.33

However, this writer considers the "moral" issue to
be a "nonquestion." The US has supported Israel effectively
with the complete concurrence of the American people. For
policy formulation purposes it is more than reasonable to
expect the American people to continue their support of
Israel. Thus, considering the negative political consequences
to an administration for drastically altering the present
policy of supporting Israel, questions of morality must be
relegated to the sphere of academic speculation. In short, given today's political climate the US government will continue to support Israel for political reasons which the government believes most important when considering the formulation of policy alternatives.
CHAPTER III
UNITED NATIONS INTERNAL ISSUES

We have shown that US vital interests are tied to the Middle East and that while basic requirements for a permanent Middle East settlement seem simple on the surface they are in actuality complex problems which will require the involvement not only of the US but of others as well.

What will be demonstrated in this chapter is the importance of the role of the UN in the world and the linkage that role has to an overall Middle East solution. Also to be examined is the probability that states hostile to Israel will attempt to take political-reprisal actions against her (e.g., by either expelling Israel through charter provisions—de jure expulsion, or eliminating Israel's participation in the General Assembly—de facto expulsion). The effect such reprisal action will have on US support for the UN as a political institution is another factor to be addressed.

The United Nations—Concept, Purpose, and Utility

Among the world's international organizations, the UN is a unique actor in many respects. The UN is not a world government, it is not a parliament, it has no binding authority over its member states. The UN is an association of autonomous, sovereign states bound together in mutual self-interest. Such being the case, any UN political action must consider the
national interests of all member states. This is the basic UN conceptual foundation as a social and political institution.

This "oneness" of world view--universalism--clearly sets the UN apart from the rest of the world's international organizations, as pointed out by Lynn H. Miller:

... It is accurate to describe the UN as the only universalistic organization in existence... Only the United Nations includes most of the independent nations of the world... Only the United Nations [has] been created to deal with the international issues throughout the entire world...

Miller goes on to point out that UN universalism was not an accident but the result of deliberate design, "... the harmonious coexistence of two such organizations would be... logically impossible." Universalism, then, is the unique concept underlying the UN political process, a process wherein states of all political persuasion should be able to express their views and lobby for their national interests without fear of reprisal.

Less difficult to appreciate are the basic UN goals as expressed in the Charter where one observes goals associated with almost all social and political groups: (1) conflict management and (2) welfare. The Charter outlines these goals clearly when it states in its preamble that member states jointly pledge themselves "to save succeeding generations from the source of war" and to promote social progress.

The Charter then elaborates on the two themes of conflict management and welfare in Article 1 as follows:
The purpose of the United Nations is:

1. To maintain international peace and security ... to take effective, collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, ... and to bring about by peaceful means ... adjustments or settlement of international disputes of situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations ... and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all ...; and

4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attempt of these common objectives.5

Of the two functions conflict management is the best known and will be examined in some detail as it is in the capacity of a conflict manager that the UN may play its most important Middle East role.

UN conflict management mechanisms fall into three general categories: collective security, peaceful settlement (or resolution) of disputes, and peacekeeping.

Collective security in its most basic form can best be described by the phrase "one for all and all for one."6 In other words, collective security is the banding together of member states for self-protection against outside threats. Collective security implies the use, or threat of use, of force to either deter an aggressor from attacking a member state or defeat an aggressor after an attack has been made. Collective security is clearly implied in Article 1 of the Charter. How-
ever, as A. F. K. Organski points out, collective security may be a false concept, resting as it does on five basic assumptions which must be met before collective security arrangements can work. Organski's five assumptions are:

1. All will agree upon who is the aggressor
2. All are equally interested in stopping the aggression
3. All are equally free and able to join the collective action
4. The combined collective power is great enough to overcome any aggression
5. Knowing the above four conditions exist, the aggressor will do nothing or go down in defeat.

Clearly, within the UN framework, the first three assumptions are probably impossible to achieve. It is difficult for one to see how so many states of differing persuasions could ever be expected to agree on who was an aggressor, let alone have the same interest in stopping the aggression. Thus, collective security, except possibly in the case of Korea, has never been practiced by the UN.

Since collective security is not practiced by the UN, this leads one to examine the other two UN conflict-management mechanisms: peacekeeping and peaceful settlement of disputes. Also, one is led to ask oneself how successful the UN has been in fulfilling this role and through what medium the successes were achieved.

Contrary to popular opinion, many observers credit the UN with significant success in employing the conflict-management
tools of peaceful resolution and peacekeeping. Cecil Crabb points out a long list of accomplishments. John Stoessinger, after an extensive study of the UN, concludes that the UN has gained strength over the years and has made positive contributions to the maintenance of world peace.

Peaceful resolution activity, which means taking all diplomatic and political actions possible to defuse what would otherwise be highly dangerous confrontations, can take many forms. One unique facet of UN operations with clear peaceful resolution utility is the UN ability to provide a forum for the airing of differences. While seemingly simple and insignificant on the surface, the forum function is felt to have high utility. Pope John Paul II expressed this point well when he said, "... in view of its universal character, the United Nations will never cease to be the forum, the high tribunal from which all man's problems are appraised." The UN Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, elaborated on this UN role as follows:

One of the most important and least recognized functions of the United Nations is to keep alive ideas and principles which cannot immediately be realized, but which remain as an objective to be strived for and eventually won. The organization can have an extremely important long-term effect in focusing attention on problems, in changing the accepted thinking about them, and in formulating programmes, strategies, and guidelines which provide the framework in which governments can approach great problems. The United Nations was intended to provide a forum where injustices could be righted and international conflicts resolved.
John Scali also apparently appreciated the utility of the UN in effecting change in a member state's behavior through exposure to the forum of world opinion. Speaking on South Africa's racial policies, Scali said of maintaining South Africa's UN membership:

"... it [the UN] is a unique international forum for the exchanging of ideas, where those practicing obnoxious doctrines and policies may be made to feel the full weight of world opinion. ... My delegation believes that South Africa should continue to be exposed, over and over again, to the blunt expressions of the abhorrence of mankind for apartheid. South Africans could hear ... only from afar were we to cast them from our ranks. ..."

Thus, it appears the UN utility for effecting change through exposure to world opinion is generally recognized as being a positive factor in reducing international tensions and a valuable tool for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Also valuable are the more activist UN conflict resolution techniques of investigation, conciliation, recommendation, and appeal.

Investigation means exactly what one would expect—the examination of a situation to determine the facts and then the reporting of those facts to the UN. Examples of this type of activity abound but its importance is sometimes questioned. However, as H. G. Nicholas points out:

"... the search for the indisputable fact is liable to prove as difficult as the quest for the rainbow's end, but it is a rare piece of U.N. investigation which does not result in some unravelling of the skein of allegation and counterallegation."
Conciliation is a term with historic diplomatic implications. It simply means providing the "honest broker" or "good offices" function. That is, the conciliator acts as a dispassionate, neutral, third party, go-between in an effort to effect peaceful settlement of a dispute between antagonistic states.

Recommendation takes place when some constructive changes in a situation are clearly necessary but the antagonists fail to see them. In such cases the UN can formulate problem statements and point out solutions that recognize the interests of both parties. "Cease-fires" are examples of the use of the recommendation techniques to cool down obviously hostile and dangerous situations.

Appeal, simply stated, is a request that the disputants stop what they are doing. In the UN, resolutions are used for this purpose, usually with such lack of success that the usefulness of this technique is questionable. On the other hand, an appeal can have the political effect of showing a member state's activity to be outside the acceptable normal and may thus facilitate subsequent successful negotiations.

Over the years, much has been made of the UN's lack of success with the above-mentioned peaceful resolution machinery; the point usually being made that no progress can be obtained without the cooperation of all parties and especially the disputants themselves. Suffice it to say, however, that all UN conflict-control political activities
are employed successfully to some degree. Thus, the utility of such peaceful resolution actively enhances the UN role in the international arena.

Peacekeeping is the last major conflict-resolution function to be examined. Peacekeeping, as used in this paper, is the active role the UN can take to prevent armed forces from engaging in actual armed conflict. Peacekeeping is, perhaps, the most important (or has become the most important) tool the UN has for effecting peaceful settlement.

Peacekeeping is the interposition by the UN of a peacekeeping force between the opposing armed forces of the hostile states. This force is normally a military one but does not necessarily have to be. Peacekeeping has been used numerous times in the past and is, in fact, in use in the Middle East at the time of this writing.

UN-organized cease fires and UN-sponsored peacekeeping forces have been used all over the world—in Africa, in the Far East, in the Middle East. Notable successes have been achieved, probably not the least of which is the fact that superpower armed confrontation has been avoided over the 35 years of the UN's existence. Some possible confrontations have clearly been avoided by the moderating influence of UN peacekeeping forces on the scene.

While conflict management is the best-known UN function, the UN has shown real strength in providing welfare-type functions. Welfare as used in the lexicon of international
relations means providing an arena for cooperative action to achieve mutually agreed upon humanitarian goals. In the UN case the welfare role has been referred to as "the good war," and, while less publicized than that of conflict management, it has been a role in which the UN has shown real utility. As pointed out by Crabb:

... often [overlooked is] the solid record of accomplishment [in eliminating] disease, malnutrition, poverty, illiteracy, and any other conditions hindering human progress; and ... in the promotion and protection of human rights ... the myriad operations carried on by the UN in economic and social affairs touching hundreds of millions of people.

UN welfare operations are administered through the UN staff and a multiplicity of subsidiary organs, generally under the overall supervision of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

ECOSOC, which meets twice yearly, has drawn mixed reviews in dealings with subjects that range from women's right to the narcotics trade and economic development. As pointed out by one critic of ECOSOC's work in the UN:

With its erratic sprawling organizational chart and its social-worker stance, ECOSOC tends to look like a billowing, do-gooding spinster trying to cope with an oversized brood of rambunctious children. Naturally, the quality of its service ranges from very good to empty talkativeness.

Be that as it may, member states do receive real benefits from UN "welfare" suborganizations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank); the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); the Universal Postal Union (UPU); etc. The benefit realized might range from data upon which to base studies to billions of dollars in development money. The same ECOSOC critic has said, "... some experts rate ECOSOC very highly, considering it potentially the most important organ in the world today. Seventeen of every 20 UN employees and 80 cents of every UN dollar are engaged in economic, social, and technical enterprises." 

Without belaboring the point, one can see the UN does provide a wide range of services to member states—services ranging from the lowest level of welfare assistance to cooling down superpower confrontations. Also equally clear is the effect the superpowers have on UN operations, especially with respect to UN utility. This aspect deserves mention here.

John Stoessinger, in his book *The United Nations and the Superpowers*, sums up the case for UN utility well:

> ... the interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union has been central to the UN's development. ... The UN's evolution has been forced in part by the pressure of the superpowers striving to achieve their national interests. ... The organization [UN] has responded to political problems in a political manner, relying heavily on the acts of improvisation and compromise. ... On the most practical level, if the United Nations did not serve some* national interest of the superpowers, it would be ignored by them. To be relevant in world politics, the United Nations must be used; to be used it must serve.20

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*Emphasis in the original*
Thus, since the UN is not ignored by the US or Soviet Union, and since it is used by the superpowers (as well as all the other member states), it does serve a useful political purpose. The extent to which the UN can serve is directly proportional to the national interests of the member states themselves. How UN Member States see their national interests being served by UN involvement will determine the degree they will support the UN. C. William Maynes, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, put the value of US-UN membership in perspective:

We get a lot of practical things out of the U.N., such as help in controlling nuclear materials. Also, we are a major power in the world community. If we want to be a major power, we have to have a major voice and a message, and we have to be willing to deliver it. The U.N. is one of the most important places to express oneself as a great power.21

This point has a direct bearing on the policy questions of expelling Israel from the UN; that is, how important are UN contributions toward an overall Middle East solution and what can the UN contributions be, given US and USSR national interests? These factors need to be weighed if a realistic policy approach to the expulsion question is to be developed.

The United Nations and an Overall Middle East Settlement

The importance of the UN to an overall Middle East settlement is an issue upon which not all commentators on international affairs agree. Recent US-Middle East initiatives appear to stress either a bilateral or regional approach. The
Camp David meeting wherein the US mediated an accord between Israel and Egypt is an example of a more bilateral approach. Also, one sees calls for regional involvement (as opposed to the universally oriented UN one) to effect a solution. This idea recently was a subject of discussion at a Johns Hopkins Institute Foreign Relations Seminar in which Senator Lugar discussed the wisdom of increased Western European involvement in the Middle East peace process. Senator Lugar indicated that it is logical for the Reagan administration to depart from the Carter administration's approach. The point being that while the Carter administration stressed a more bilateral (trilateral?) approach to effecting a Middle East settlement, the Reagan administration did not find increased Western European involvement detrimental to the process started at Camp David.22 West European leaders also see Europe's regional involvement as a logical and positive problem-solution approach.23

Arguments for the universalist approach, of course, abound. UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim provides one:

"... In the United Nations we shall continue our practical task of peacekeeping and conflict control. I believe that the time will also come when the Organization will once again be vitally necessary as the forum in which a peace in the Middle East will be achieved."

It is in the peacekeeping role, however, that the UN appears to offer the greatest utility for effecting a Middle East solution. In 1978 President Carter pointed this fact out in an address before the UN:
The United Nations is now more involved than ever before with many of the central issues of our time, and we cannot fully advance our national interests or help build a more peaceful world if we ignore the potential of the United Nations. . . As a peacekeeper, the United Nations at this moment has four major operations in the Middle East. . .

Two other recognized authorities on international affairs have studied the UN-Middle East peacekeeping role and developed similarly positive assessments. These observers, Brian Urquhart and James O. C. Jonah, see real, tangible utility throughout the history of UN-Middle East involvement.

Urquhart points out, for example:

The United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Middle East have now come to be largely taken for granted and it is even sometimes said that the United Nations plays little current part in the peace process in the Middle East. The easiest way to demonstrate the fallacy of this conclusion would be to remove the United Nations peacekeeping operations in the area prematurely.

A similar appraisal of UN utility was made by James O. C. Jonah, who noted that the UN peacekeeping role, "is an indispensable element in any viable framework for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East." Mr Jonah goes on to note that these UN contributions have not gone unnoticed by the world community, "A gratifying development is the recognition by responsible officials on all sides . . . that the United Nations, in its peacekeeping functions, is performing a vital role in the search for a just and lasting [Middle East] peace."

Commentators other than the above have expressed like views. Arguments as to the value of UN involvement in the
Middle East and the utility of that involvement will continue to be made. But, perhaps, Urquhart made the final (and accurate) statement on this subject when he observed, "... It is now generally recognized that the presence of a peacekeeping operation at the most explosive contact points of the Arab-Israeli problem is a key factor in maintaining peace and providing the climate for negotiation."30

From the above discussion on the UN one can determine that it does provide the world community a broad spectrum of needed services. Furthermore, those needed services have an application in the Middle East peace process, thus perhaps, in this arena the UN is playing a vital role.

United States Support for United Nations

To say that the US has been supportive of the UN in the past would be an understatement. The UN was founded and has prospered with firm US political, moral, and financial support. Whether this support would survive a catastrophic political act of reprisal against Israel is another question, and one to be examined here.

That the net effect of an attempt to expel Israel from, or limit Israel's participation in, the UN would be negative from a US point of view is almost a universally accepted position. The "political-reprisal-against-Israel" question is important to the US as a policy matter since it would clearly have a deleterious effect on peaceful resolution
of the entire Middle East situation and adversely affect US support for and participation in the United Nations.

US policy toward both the UN and peaceful resolution of the Middle East question is clear. The US has, on numerous occasions, publicly declared US policy to be one of seeking a negotiated solution. That negotiations and the UN are bound together is clear when one considers Ambassador Scali's comments before the UN on 22 November 1974:

The question of Palestine . . . has demanded more attention from the United Nations than almost any other single issue. The United Nations . . . has limited the terrible consequences of this dispute. . . . only a just and lasting solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute can halt the killing . . . the goal of this organization must be to seek ways to promote movement to that end. . . . The sole alternative to the sterile pursuit of change through violence is negotiation.31

Given this strong position and support, what are the dangers to the UN should reprisal action be taken against Israel?

First, one must examine the nature of the US support for the UN and the foundation for this support. Simply stated, US government support for the UN is based in the popular support of the UN by the American people. In the final analysis, to maintain support for US foreign policy the foreign policy maker must develop positive public support or opinion for his policies because public support connotes a power relationship that gives the policy viability. This is known as the process of employing diplomatic mobilization, which is defined as, "assembling national resources in pursuit of foreign policy."32

28
That public opinion is a resource to be mobilized may seem strange to some, but it is a concept long recognized by experts in the public relations field. For example, speaking of the American population, Ithiel de Sola Pool states:

No force [public opinion] is more powerful in American government. Cynics believe that public opinion matters little and that policy is made by some mysterious "they"; but the cynics are wrong. The ways in which public opinion enters into the democratic decision process in this country are indeed complex and subtle. But the relationship between public opinion and public policy certainly does exist in a most significant way.

Considering this concept, one can see how an erosion of US public support will degrade the UN as an instrument of US foreign policy. What remains to be determined is the extent to which public support could be degraded by a successful expulsion attempt.

If one considers the South African episode, one is forced to conclude that erosion of American popular support for the UN would be extensive. William F. Buckley, writing at the time of South Africa's ouster, put it nicely when he said that the UN General Assembly had, "taken actions which indicate its usefulness is waning," and that it "will gradually phase out as an organization with which serious people do business." America's Ambassador to the UN at that time, John Scali, also pointed out that Americans were "deeply disturbed" by UN decisions to exclude member states, restrict participation, or convert humanitarian and cultural programs into tools of political reprisal. Scali went on to say that the US cannot participate in the UN without the support of the American people.
Today, one hears the same fears and hopes expressed, fears that US participation in the UN might be damaged or hopes that the US will pull out.

In the Chicago Tribune one reads, for example, "Mr Stockman also wants to reduce contributions to those world development organizations which pursue aims contrary to our interests, a step both overdue and perfectly consistent with the more assertive foreign policy promised by the President." Mr Stockman, of course, is President Reagan's director of the Office of Management and Budget and the principle architect of the Reagan administration's budget-cutting program and not one to be taken lightly when fund cuts are mentioned.

An even more strident note was sounded in The New Republic concerning a UN vote to equate Zionism to racism or, put another way, concerning a much milder form of Israeli harassment than expulsion. The New Republic article said:

Last week, for the first time since Hitler, naked Jew-hatred reappeared in a "respectable" international forum. The stage for this odious spectacle, needless to say, was the General Assembly of the United Nations. . . . We . . . have warned that the stench of anti-Semitism pervades that corrupt institution. . . . Now we are treated, quite without adornment, to the words and spirit of Goebbels and Streicher. . . . We can now hope that President-elect Reagan will adopt a new attitude toward the factory of lies on the East River: either by shaking it upside down or by putting us out entirely. Short of the latter, he might send the whole show packing to Ouagadougou, or somewhere equally appropriate and cheerful. 37

While this last opinion is not typical, it does demonstrate the extent to which anti-Israeli actions in the UN can be expected to damage US support for the UN.
Another factor to be considered is the current overall US political philosophy and world view. Bruce Russett points out that there is currently a shift toward political isolationism in the US that is "reinforced by generational and ideological change in the population." Russett goes on to say that this shift is likely to complicate efforts to deal with global problems.38

If this is so, then such a shift, when coupled with eroded public support, could clearly pose a significant threat to US participation in the UN. For this reason, US policy must facilitate a successful conclusion to any political reprisal actions taken against Israel, assuming, of course, it is in the best interest of Israel to remain a UN member.

**Political Reprisal Against Israel**

This issue is the central question being addressed and its consideration is far from being an academic exercise. It appears that a future attempt to either expel Israel from the UN or to limit Israeli participation in the General Assembly will be made. For background, South Africa's experience with the UN provides an example of the lengths to which hostile member states will go with political reprisal.

In September 1974 the General Assembly, angered over South Africa's apartheid policies, sent to the Security Council a resolution requesting South Africa's relations with the UN be reviewed. This request was specifically made "in the light of the constant violation by South Africa of the principles of
the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Obviously, the General Assembly action had forged a link between South Africa's persistent violations of the UN Declaration for Human Rights and Article 6 of the UN Charter. This linkage would allow South Africa to be expelled from the UN by the General Assembly. Expulsion could only take place, however, if recommended by the Security Council, hence, the General Assembly resolution asking the Security Council to take action.

In the Security Council, the General Assembly resolution was vetoed by Britain, France, and the US. These vetoes should have ended the expulsion attempt (which was the first in the UN's 29-year history), but the General Assembly was not to give up so easily. Thwarted in this attempt to oust South Africa, the anti-South African states decided to use the UN's accreditation procedures for reprisal. Basically, for a state's representative to be seated in the General Assembly the Credentials Committee reviews a delegate's papers to ensure they are "authentic." Usually this is a routine action involving verification that a delegate's papers are signed by a bona fide official of the government sending the delegate to the UN. In the South African case, however, the Accreditation Committee denied accreditation on the grounds the government of South Africa was not a legal government. Then, by a vote of 91 to 22, the General Assembly refused to allow the South African
delegate to be seated since the delegates were not accredited.\textsuperscript{41} The effect, of course, is the same as expelling South Africa from the UN, since a state not seated may not vote. South Africa was subsequently readmitted, but since 1974 South Africa has been denied seating twice more—once in June 1979 and most recently on 2 March 1981.

Does the South African experience hold a message for Israel? Many indicators point to the fact that it does. In 1974, when referring to the above mentioned Security Council veto, France's UN Ambassador Louis de Guiringand pointed out that ousting a member state was "a radical measure that may call forth other ones in an endless chain that we must not encourage."\textsuperscript{42} On this same occasion, Israel was directly linked to the South African experience by Great Britain's UN Ambassador Ivor Richard, who said: "I doubt whether any Israeli student of the records of our [Security Council] meeting over the past 12 days would so readily exclude the possibility of the expulsion of some other state from the United Nations."\textsuperscript{43}

Since 1974 the idea of expelling Israel from the UN has gained favor among anti-Israeli states and organizations. A great deal of rhetoric on this idea has been heard in the past year or so. For example, in reacting to a General Assembly resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, Dr Clovis Maksoud, UN representative of the Arab League, stated that the Arab states would seek sanctions against
Israel if Israel did not withdraw from all occupied territories by the General Assembly's 15 November 1980 deadline. Dr Maksoud, stating that expulsion of Israel was "under active consideration," said sanctions would first be requested in the Security Council and then the General Assembly. During the same period, on 30 September 1980, Syria asked that the General Assembly suspend Israel's UN membership. Said Syria's Foreign Minister Abdel Abdelhalim Khaddam, "It is most pressing for the world community to re-examine Israel's membership to the United Nations because Israel not only rejects the United Nations resolutions but also defies them."

This same view was expressed by the PLO's UN representative, Zehdi Labib Terzi, who said, "If Israel does not pull out of the occupied territories and is still denying our rights . . . then Israel has no place in the United Nations."

A different approach has been initiated by the Islamic Conference. Rather than attack Israel directly in the General Assembly or Security Council, the Islamic Conference decided to use the World Court. In an October 1980 resolution to the General Assembly, the Islamic Conference asked the General Assembly to request a legal opinion from the International Court of Justice in the Hague on "whether Israel, having annexed Jerusalem in violation of various binding Security Council resolutions, has not forfeited its obligations under the UN Charter and ought not to be expelled from that organization."
Other oblique attacks have been made against Israel as well. For example, at the 21st General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Arab delegates attempted to block participation by Israeli delegates because the Israeli accreditation letters were signed in Jerusalem as opposed to Tel Aviv. In this case Israel was seated through a compromise solution. But, at the United Nation's sponsored World Tourism Conference, the Arab states did successfully block Israeli accreditation for the above-stated reason.

Perhaps these two cases portend things to come. In both cases the Arabs argued Israeli accreditation letters were not valid with the lack of validity being caused by the letters originating in a capital not recognized by the UN General Assembly (Jerusalem is being used by the Israelis as their capital in defiance of a UN Security Council resolution.)

One can easily imagine this argument being conducted before the General Assembly with Israeli participation being at stake and imagine what the results of a vote on the matter would be. In any event, given increasing Israeli intransigency and Arab frustrations (not to say passions, in both instances), it appears that one could expect an ouster attempt to be made against Israel.

Justification for UN Expulsion

The expulsion of a member state of the UN appears to be not so much a "legal" question as it is a political one.
As to the legality and the "due process" required, those questions were answered by the Legal Counsel of the UN in an 11 November 1970 legal opinion. In this opinion the Legal Counsel ruled:

Article 5 of the charter lays down the following requirements for the suspension of a member state for the rights and privileges of membership:

(a) Preventive or enforcement action has to be taken by the Security Council against the member state concerned;

(b) The Security Council has to recommend to the General Assembly that the member state concerned be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership;

(c) The General Assembly has to act affirmatively on the foregoing recommendation by a two-thirds vote, in accordance with Article 18, paragraph 2, of the Charter, which lists "the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership" as an "important question."

The participation in meetings of the General Assembly is quite clearly one of the important rights and privileges of membership. Suspension of this right through the rejection of credentials would not satisfy the foregoing requirements and would therefore be contrary to the Charter.

From this opinion it follows that since the rules and procedures for expulsion are clear, the real decision is a political one. The decision whether expulsion (or curtailment of participation) is politically justifiable rests with the General Assembly, and past Assembly votes are illuminating. When confronted with the Legal Counsel's clear opinion on expulsion in the South African case, the General Assembly demonstrated its "acceptance" of the Counsel's view by voting 91 to 22 (19 abstentions) to exclude the South African delegation.
From this lopsided vote it can be seen that the majority of member states view expulsion as politically justifiable if not "legal" under Charter provisions.

As a result of the South African ouster, the US articulated a position on expulsion which has been maintained to date. The position of the US, presented to the General Assembly on November 12, 1974, by John Scali, is as follows:

My delegation cannot accept the argument that the vote in the Security Council on the South African issue last October 30 [1974] in any way changes the clear wording of article 5 and 6 of the Charter. Nor, in our view, does it in any way permit this or any other assembly to deprive a member of the rights and privileges of membership. . . . My delegation further believes that the expulsion of South Africa would reverse the evolution of the United Nations toward an even wider membership. . . . The legal opinion given at the 25th session remains as valid today . . . as it was then.

Thus, basically the US position is that expulsion of a member state is not "legal" unless done in the Security Council and that limitation of participation is not an acceptable political action. This position was most recently reaffirmed by US Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane T. Kirkpatrick, on March 2, 1981. Said Ambassador Kirkpatrick: "The passage of time has not given the General Assembly a better basis for doing in 1981 what it did improperly in 1974."

As might be imagined, South Africa's views on the propriety of this UN political activity are hardly enthusiastic. In fact, South Africa's Foreign Minister F. R. Botha called the action, "scandalous and revengeful," and elaborated:
It must be remembered that South Africa is told daily to help achieve a peaceful settlement in Southwest Africa--Namibia, and therefore to act internationally responsible in that sense. . . . But now you can see for yourself just how impossible this is being made.99

Thus, one has the two sides of the coin. On the one hand, there is the position of the US and on the other the political opinions of the majority of the UN membership--that expulsion is justified if a member state does not abide by the resolutions of the General Assembly majority.

**Importance of Continued Israeli UN Membership**

It has already been noted that John Scali, former US ambassador to the UN, feels that a state should be kept a member if for no other reason than to expose that state to the illumination of world public opinion. It has also been noted that there are cultural and economic advantages to be gained from UN membership. Whether these are strong enough reasons for Israel and the US to labor for Israel's continued membership in the face of a determined expulsion action remains to be seen. But, there are more cognizant reasons to do so than the above.


. . . modern man is desperately in need of "integration." His need to "belong" and to experience satisfying relations with others can be fulfilled if he is able to "identify" himself with an adequate group, one which will provide him with membership; that is, a defined role and assured expectations.56
This is a psychological reason for retaining membership, but there is one grounded in organizational theory as well:

Organizations attend to the basic political facts of life—the authoritative allocation of resources.* Their decision makers constantly work the allocation problem of who gets what, when, where, and why. . . . It encompasses the process of legitimacy,** authority, and power.57

Obviously, to be in on the decision-making process one must be a member of the organization. This follows for an international political association like the UN as much as for a business or any other type of organization and provides a reason for continued Israeli UN membership.

However, the best reason is still probably the one provided by a number of international observers at the time of South Africa’s expulsion experience. The reasoning goes like this: Israel's only hope for security is a general overall Middle East settlement; for a general settlement to evolve, all participants (the Arab States, Israel, the US, the USSR, etc.) must cooperate; the best way for this to happen is under UN auspices.58 Ambassador Scali specifically tied this effort to the work of the UN and continued Israeli UN membership in a statement to the Security Council on 23 October 1974, when he called for "a progressive series of agreements."59

*Emphasis in the original.

**My emphasis added.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In this chapter, conclusions will be drawn and an overall policy environment will be formulated. Following these, a set of policy alternatives will be proposed and recommendations will be made as to each alternative's relative value.

Conclusions

One comes to the conclusion that the Middle East is a strategic area and that the US has vital interests there. The Middle East is of vital strategic concern for geopolitical reasons as well as economic ones. The Middle East is vital to US interests if for no other reason than it supplies the US with a significant amount of oil and US dependence on Middle East oil has grown since the oil crisis of 1973-74. Coupled with this fact, the Middle East also supplies almost all the oil for Western Europe and Japan--staunch US allies and trading partners. The location of the Middle East is also a strategic factor, being as it is a land bridge linking Africa, Asia, and Europe which controls water routes through the Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean. Thus, a major US strategic foreign policy goal should be to keep a hostile or even antagonistic major power from achieving hegemony in this vital region of the world.
Woven into the Middle East fabric are two considerations of special importance to the policy questions being addressed: the validity of Arab positions and US support for Israel. Arab positions have merit, a proposition often overlooked by Americans, and a case can be made that it is in the US national interests to recognize the legitimacy of Arab positions. Considering the US desire for Middle East stability, an acknowledgment of Arab positions by the US can help to achieve an overall settlement. This point was recently underscored by Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Nasser Quador, who acknowledged positive aspects of a balanced US Middle East involvement when he welcomed US assistance in solving the Golan Heights annexation issue.¹

In contrast, when considering US support for Israel, it is obvious that the US has been pro-Israeli (if not anti-Arab). For the past 33 years Israel has enjoyed significant US support, so much so that today Israel has a clear dependency upon the US for its survival. This dependency, fostered by the US, has virtually reached client-state status. From this US-fostered dependency springs the US legitimate national interest in Israel's survival as a Jewish State. Israel is a product of many things, not the least of which is US diplomatic effort, and it is ludicrous to suggest that the US could abandon Israel in the UN without grave moral and political consequences to the US in the international arena.
Almost as clear has been the role played by the UN in the Middle East and the interrelationships of that world body with US policy. As with Israel, the UN is partially a product of intense US diplomatic effort, and (again like Israel) has enjoyed considerable US support. To date, the UN-Middle East role has been productive, with the UN demonstrating utility in many ways. As a result of these (and other) successes, the UN has earned the respect and popular support of the American people.\(^2\) This situation could change, however, should states hostile to Israel successfully mount an action against Israel within the UN.\(^3\) Hence, given the worldwide utility of the UN, it is in the national interests of all member states to avoid such a situation.

**Suggested US Policy and Recommendations**

1. Preferable: The United States should publicly recognize both Arab and Israeli positions as being legitimate and use this recognition as a tool to work within the UN bloc system to keep Israel a participating member.

2. Second best alternative: Considering political realities, the US should privately recognize the legitimacy of Arab positions and let that recognition be known to Arab powers. Concurrently, the US should publicly support Israel as now, but privately guide Israel in a persuasive manner toward a UN-sponsored Middle East settlement.
3. Fallback position: Combat any attempts to expel Israel from the UN or limit Israeli participation in the General Assembly with the same tactics used in the South African case, i.e., use the veto.


The preferable solution would, it is estimated, have a high probability of success in achieving its purpose: that of keeping Israel in the United Nations. An added benefit is that a solution to the overall Middle East problem would also be more likely. Additionally, the preferable solution is an attempt to preclude conditions that caused previous US policy defeats in the UN while recognizing the strategic importance of the Middle East to US interests. Also recognized are vital economic considerations and the fact that the UN can play a valuable role in solving the Middle East situation only if all protagonists are members.

By publicly recognizing Arab positions as legitimate, the US would put the world on notice that it desired a just and equitable solution. By demanding that this solution be worked out within the UN framework, the US would ensure that keeping Israel a participating UN member would be in the national interests of most Arab states. Thus, the US could neutralize the one bloc that desires political reprisals against Israel. Obviously, progress toward a lasting peace would have to be forthcoming or the Arab bloc might once again begin to agitate for political reprisal. However, with the above US policy
position clearly known, progress toward a just, negotiated solution would appear to be inevitable. Political realities, however, may make such an ideal solution unobtainable, as will be discussed below.

The second best alternative recognizes a significant factor in the Middle East calculus. That is, the strength of the American people's basic fundamental support for Israel is based on the historic Old Testament interrelationships between the Jewish and Christian religions. This force, which could be called Christian Zionism, must be recognized as a potent force and the basis for the political dilemma of the United States in trying to resolve any Arab-Israeli dispute. For this reason, it might very well be political suicide for any US administration to espouse publicly Arab positions. If such a political danger exists, then the administration should circumvent a direct political clash by tacit acceptance and recognition of Arab claims with covert transmission of this policy to Arab and Israeli leaders. Concurrently, the US should publicly support Israel and vigorously defend the right of Israel and all states to remain in the UN and work towards problem solutions through that organization. The US delegation should emphasize not only the value of the UN as a synthesizer of world opinion but also that a state is subject to pressure by the UN only if it is a participating member.

Alternative two, thus, has the advantage of making it in the best interest of the Arab states to have Israel a UN
member while maintaining US public support for Israel. Such a tactic should diminish US internal fears and criticism that a public-policy shift supporting Arab positions would bring.

Balanced against this approach, however, is the disadvantage that this alternative would appear to be deceitful to the great mass of the American public even though well founded in terms of the pragmatism of the international arena. For this reason, this approach could be fraught with great political risk (given the trauma of Watergate, etc.) and, thus, is considered the second best alternative only when compared against the last two options.

Option three, the fallback position, is exactly that: a policy position with few redeeming features and almost no probability of success. If the US is forced to resort to the veto and other such tactics to maintain Israeli-UN membership, then only one other avenue not explored in the South African experience remains open. That avenue is to impress upon the members of the UN how strongly the US considers the Middle East an area of vital interest and that the US is determined to keep Israel a UN member virtually at all costs. The US should point out that this determination extends even to the point of curtailing US support for the UN if serious and positive consideration is not given the US point of view. Obviously, any curtailment actions the US would consider must remain unspecified.
The unacceptable position--do nothing--is unacceptable because of the extreme damage to US prestige (and, hence, self-interest) that abandoning Israel to her fate would have. Of prime importance is a clear statement and understanding of the commitment of the United States to both Israel and a just Middle East peace. To do nothing would appear to the rest of the world that the US had sacrificed Israel for less than honorable reasons. Basically, the US must stand for something on the world scene, and what the US does in the UN says a lot about the US to the rest of the world. As Cecil Crabb clearly puts it:

Foreigners draw conclusions about the American ideology or the "democratic way of life" from the way the United States conducts itself abroad and from the statements of its foreign policy makers. This fact obligates America to see to it that its goals and philosophical goals and values are interpreted correctly* by societies outside its borders.5

This point is well taken and bears heavily on policy recommendations.

*Emphasis in the original.
NOTES ON CHAPTER I (Pages 1-2)

1. The author recognizes treatment given issues critical to problem resolution in this chapter is truncated but feels said treatment is adequate for the purpose of providing a background. Elaboration of these points occurs in following chapters.


NOTES ON CHAPTER II (Pages 3-13)


9. Crabb, American Foreign Policy, p. 278.


11. Crabb, American Foreign Policy, p. 278.


20. Jacobs, Between the Rock, p. 70.


22. Interview with Brigadier General A. Hamdy (Egyptian Air Force), Montgomery, Alabama, 1 November 1980.


24. Ibid., p. 448.


32. Lilienthal, The Other Side, pp. 3-352.

NOTES ON CHAPTER III (Pages 14-39)


3. Ibid., p. 11.


5. Ibid., p. 464.


8. Crabb, American Foreign Policy, p. 431. Crabb states: "Critics of the UN often overlook the solid record of accomplishment which it has amassed throughout the post-war period. Notable achievements have been the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran's northern provinces in 1946; termination of colonial rule over Syria and Lebanon in the same year; resolution of the conflict between Indonesia and the Netherlands in 1947-1949; successful adjudication of a dispute between Great Britain and Albania in 1947; assistance in preserving the sovereignty of Greece in 1946-1948; prevention of war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir from 1948 down to 1965; partial responsibility for ending the Berlin blockade in 1949; resistance to armed Communist attack against South Korea from 1950 to 1953; and supervision of the Korean truce; conclusion and subsequent supervision of an armistice between Israel and the Arab states in 1950; a major contribution in terminating the Suez crisis of 1956 and ongoing UN efforts after the Middle East crisis of 1967 to promote an Arab-Israeli truce; . . . ."

10. As quoted in "Secretary-General Stresses in UN Role in Keeping Ideas Alive," UN Chronicle, November 1980, p. 57.

11. Ibid., pp. 57, 70.


14. Miller, Organizing Mankind, p. 15. Although in the United Nations some suborganizations generally associated with the welfare role have achieved integration which is defined as the organization actually taking over the function as opposed to providing an arena in which cooperation can take place. Integration refers to integration of purposes and process and is, politically, on a plane higher than the one sought by the UN Charter. That is, integration implies a loss of sovereignty since it means states are willing to allow the international organization to work toward achieving agreed-upon goals while foregoing any individual activity on their own part to achieve them.

15. Crabb, American Foreign Policy, p. 431.

16. Ibid., pp. 431, 439.


28. Ibid., p. 110.

29. Stoessinger's book, The United Nations and the Superpowers, contains many examples of positive UN Middle East involvement, as does Claude's Swords into Plowshares.


40. Ibid.


43. Ibid.


50. Ibid.


52. Ibid., p. 813.

53. Ibid., pp. 811, 812.


55. Ibid.


NOTES ON CHAPTER IV (Pages 40-46)


3. William F. Buckley, Jr., "On the Right--South Africa and the General Assembly," National Review, 6 December 1974, p. 1428. On the subject of popular support for the UN Buckley said, "... life outside the United Nations is altogether possible, and it would be cheaper, and allows a country that extraordinary liberation of divesting itself of institutional attachments altogether hypocritical in nature."

4. This is a point open to argument, but a point accepted by many political scientists as being valid nonetheless. The author, however, was not able to prove the validity of this opinion through research as he did not find an opinion poll that specifically addressed why the American people so strongly support Israel. As stated in the text, the author feels this support is based on the fact the people of the US see a kinship between the Christian and Jewish religions but fail to see any common bond with Islam. This is, of course, despite the fact that all three religions share a common heritage—the Old Testament. For the reader who wishes to explore counter views to the above argument Stephen D. Isaacs, Jews and American Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974) is recommended.

5. President Carter clearly recognized this political danger, as he pointed out in his farewell address when discussing special interest groups: "[The growing power of special groups] is a disturbing factor in American political life. It tends to distort our purposes because the national interest is not always the sum of our single and special interests," quoted in Edward Walsh, "Carter's Farewell Foresees 'Uneasy Era,'" New York Times, 15 January 1981, p. 1.

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