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

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by

Curtis W. Tarr

Adjunct Senior Research Fellow
National Defense University

1981

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To

Pam, Cindy and Betty

who in those anxious days

strengthened me with courage,

inspired me with trust,

and nurtured me with love.

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Foreword

The Armed Forces of the United States reportedly are finding it increasingly difficult to recruit and retain enough qualified men and women to defend the Nation. The available pool of service-eligible males is shrinking and will continue to decrease into the 1990s. This trend has serious implications for either a volunteer or a conscripted force. Since the military cannot affect such demographic phenomena, manpower seems destined to be a crucial defense issue for the remainder of this century.

Curtis W. Tarr, the author of this book, presided over the Selective Service System during a period of transition. He arrived in 1970 when conscription was in full swing and under attack, instituted significant changes, and departed in 1972 as the All-Volunteer Force was emerging. In the Selective Service System, change did not come about easily. The story of how it eventually succeeded is doubly instructive: as an important episode of American history narrated by an articulate observer, and as an account by a key participant, who had to face in seminal form many of the manpower problems maturing in the 1980s. This book is also a story of organizational reform, a topic of perennial interest to managers in the government and the private sector.

The National Defense University is privileged to publish this original work by a distinguished American public servant and educator who was affiliated with us as an Adjunct Senior Research Fellow. We at the University share in Mr. Tarr's concerns and are hopeful that his insights will provide uniquely useful perspectives on the Nation's intensifying military manpower problems. We especially appreciate the opportunity Mr. Tarr has afforded us to publish this timely contribution to the emerging national debate on the appropriate method for manning the Armed Forces of the United States.

R. G. GARD, JR.
Lieutenant General, USA
President, National Defense University

The Author

Curtis W. Tarr is currently Vice President, Deere and Company, Moline, Illinois; he has served in this position since 1973. His multifaceted career has also included positions in government and education. Previous to his appointment as Director of the Selective Service System from 1970 to 1972, he was Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. He subsequently served as the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance (1972-73) and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (1973). Mr. Tarr was a Republican candidate for Congress in California (1958) and Chairman of the Defense Manpower Commission (1974-76).

Mr. Tarr taught at Harvard University and Stanford University, where he was an assistant dean; and, from 1963 to 1969, he was President of Lawrence University in Wisconsin.

After service in World War II in Europe, Mr. Tarr earned his bachelor's and doctoral degrees at Stanford University. He holds an M.B.A. from Harvard University; L.H.D. degrees from Ripon, Grinnell, and Lincoln Colleges; and LL.D. degrees from Lawrence and Illinois Wesleyan Universities. Mr. Tarr received the Exceptional Civilian Service Medal from the Air Force and the Distinguished Service Award from the Selective Service System. He is the author of *Private Soldier* (1976).

Preface

After many years of experience with the *All-Volunteer Force*, some of our Nation's leaders talk again about conscription. As I write, the news media carry accounts of public reaction to President Carter's call for renewed registration in the event a national emergency forces us to draft young people into the armed services. Sufficient time has passed so that the American people can view selective service with somewhat less emotion than during the anguish over the fighting in Southeast Asia.

Thus it seems fitting to look again at the efforts of our government in 1970 and 1971 to reform the processes of conscription, and to recall some of the difficulties existing then that the Nation hardly could avoid were we to adopt similar methods in the future to provide people for the military forces. Because I served as Director of Selective Service during that time, I have some insight as I review that national experience.

Coming reluctantly to the post, I served with the assistance of a fine Deputy Director and an unusual amount of good fortune. But the issue could easily have gone another way: we nearly failed to meet the requirements placed upon us, mired as we were in controversy, plagued by dissent, and frustrated by the courts. Thus history issues stern warning to those who would act with haste, unaware of the underlying forces that gained strength in opposition to the draft.

The early chapters of this book follow chronologically. But beginning with Chapter 4 I have developed topics, each of which held my interest during much of the time I served. To gain some awareness of the way these concerns overlapped on the calendar, the reader may wish to refer to the list of Significant Dates and Events found at the end of the book.

I wish to give special thanks to Eunice Lohman, who typed this material cheerfully despite continual revisions; to Byron Pepitone, who read what I wrote and reacted with characteristic forthrightness and wisdom; and to my lovely wife, Marilyn, who viewed the entire process of writing and revision with generous patience and understanding.

CURTIS W. TARR

Moline, Illinois
April 1980

1

Drafted

As I stepped from an airplane at San Francisco on the afternoon of March 2, 1970, a young Coast Guardsman handed me a slip of paper that changed my life. "The Secretary of Defense wants you to call him," it read.

As an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, I had gone to California to talk with Reserve Officer Training Corps Commanding Officers at Stanford University and San Francisco State College. The storm of protest over United States participation in the Southeast Asian War had concentrated particularly at ROTC units, and nowhere else did the assault gain force as it had at San Francisco State College. President S. I. Hayakawa had made a courageous stand, defending the right of the college to operate, but this firmness only made that campus a more threatening environment for an ROTC program.

Many ROTC unit officers in 1970 admitted that they would rather return to combat missions in Vietnam than to continue their campus assignments. One must recall the violent nature of some segments of the antiwar movement that peaked at this time. The political and social climate of the country was extremely volatile; and there existed a real element of personal risk, not to mention verbal abuse, for a Government official in any way associated with our defense efforts. So I went to San Francisco to support these men at an ominous time.

On the telephone, I quickly reached the Secretary's office and then heard the voice of my friend Mel Laird. We shared a Wisconsin background, he as congressman from the Seventh District and I as a college president.

"Curtis, I hate to do this to you."

"Well then, Mel, don't do it!"

"I have to; the President made me promise that I would." I knew what was coming: another discussion about my becoming Director of Selective Service.

"You know that Selective Service job you talked with Peter Flanigan about and you didn't want?"

"Yes, I still don't want it."

"I know, but will you see the President about it?"

"Of course I will talk with him; I can't refuse to do that. But Mel, isn't there some way you can get me out of this? Can't you tell him that you need me?"

"Well, I have tried to impress upon the President that you are doing a good job where you are, but I think you had better try to convince him yourself." Quite obviously, I could persuade Mel to do nothing more. I was on my own with the President.

My wife, Betty, and I talked for two hours that evening in the Fairmont Hotel, reviewing our objections to this assignment. Betty pleaded with me to tell President Nixon that I could not take the job. It would pose threats to her and to our daughters, Pam and Cindy, make life more difficult for them at school, and certainly complicate and perhaps endanger my life. A term at Selective Service, even if successful, might destroy my eligibility to return to higher education after serving in the Government. Furthermore, Betty knew how happy I was with my work in the Air Force.

The next day I left Betty in San Francisco and continued my visit to ROTC units in Seattle and North Dakota before returning that night to Washington. During those flights I thought about my present assignment.

I had come to Washington in June of the previous year (1969) to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, leaving Lawrence University where I had experienced six challenging years as President. In the Air Force I saw a new, larger opportunity. The Nation needed all of the help patriots could give during the most anxious political period of the century.

The American Government had committed our people to a war that they did not understand; we had fought it with a logic that could not be explained; we had thrown mountainous resources into a conflict for which we saw neither a military nor a political solution; and we had lost the respect of our youth in the process. I thought that if somehow I could help to define an appropriate national course of action, modifying in the process some of the programs that affected

young Americans, and then could assist in the transition to peace, I would serve the youth of the Nation better than I could on the campus. My work in the Air Force during eight months had exceeded my expectations for it.

As I ruminated on the past, a message was beamed to our aircraft: "Dr. Tarr has an appointment with the President on Wednesday morning, March 4, 1970, at 11:30 a.m." That jerked me out of my reflections and forced me to concentrate on the future.

I had thought a great deal about Selective Service, beginning my career in the Air Force with memoranda to my friend, Roger Kelley, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, calling for necessary draft reforms.

In the early fall of 1969, I heard rumors that I was being considered for the post of Director of Selective Service. General Lewis B. Hershey already had submitted his resignation, and an active search was underway for a replacement.

Just before Thanksgiving, Peter Flanigan, Special Assistant to the President, had called me to the White House to learn if I had an interest in succeeding General Hershey. I admitted that I had none. I had just begun an assignment for the administration, one that someone had to do well. Much of my time already had been spent in orientation, which largely would be wasted if I were to shift now to a new responsibility. Peter conceded this, and despite the obvious necessity of finding someone for Selective Service, he stated that the post should not be offered to me if I would rather not take it. What a relief!

I heard nothing further about the position except what I read in the press or gathered from conversation with friends. A few days after my visit with Peter, Steve Enke came to see me, anxious to learn if I might be the new director. Steve was on loan to the White House from industry to study draft reform, and he wanted to know who eventually would use his material. In mid-December Mel Laird reported that he had told Peter I was the best man in the country for Selective Service, but that I should be left in the Air Force; I had been given responsibility for the Vietnamization Program for the Air Force, including helicopter training and maintenance. Just before Christmas a reporter from the Milwaukee *Sentinel* asked me about the job, and I knew nothing to tell him. The next day the *Sentinel* carried a headline that I had been offered the post! On Christmas I read in the local paper that I might take the job.

Meanwhile my Air Force duties drew me into the debate on how the Selective Service Act should be revised. I and counterparts in the

other services, Don Hittle in the Navy and Bill Brehm in the Army, worked with Paul Wollstadt, Roger Kelley's deputy for manpower, to provide the Secretary of Defense with comments on Steve Enke's preliminary recommendations to the National Security Council. We favored abolishing deferments for paternity, occupation, agricultural work, and study in colleges and vocational schools.

I also received copies of the correspondence related to changes in draft procedures. The Enke report, sympathetic with the Department of Defense position, was accepted by Dr. Henry Kissinger, National Security Advisor to the President. (General Hershey had opposed the work of the Enke group, in a January 6th memorandum, judging it superficial and not taking into account the problems of Selective Service or the objections of that agency.) Within the White House and throughout the Nation there was pressure on the President to announce Selective Service changes by the end of March.

Together with the growing enthusiasm for correcting deficiencies in the draft, an even more popular effort sought to eliminate conscription entirely. The President had appointed a Commission for an All-Volunteer Force (popularly known as the Gates Commission after former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates who served as Chairman). I participated in the Air Force presentation to the staff of the commission during the summer of 1969. Early in January, I appeared before the entire commission, meeting over dinner at the quaint Alibi Club in Washington. There, I felt compelled to differ with an Army position.

Chairman Gates had posed a specific question: "Aside from whatever the costs might be, and if you had the assurance that sufficient numbers of qualified men could be made available, either by draft or by a system of voluntary enlistment, which would you prefer?" The Secretary of the Army, Stan Resor, admitted that the Army would prefer the draft because a volunteer force would draw too many of its people from the poorer classes, whereas the armed forces should be composed of persons from all economic strata of society.

It seemed to me that the draft also discriminated against the poor, because sons of the affluent often found ways to avoid service. In my statement I said that the great issue before the Gates Commission was whether sufficient numbers of capable men could be attracted by voluntary means, and that this issue must be balanced with the concern over whether the American people much longer would support conscription. I had doubts that they would do so.

In the Pentagon, we suspected that the White House staff might accept volunteerism sooner than we could test the improvements to make it feasible. We wanted to augment substantially the financial incentives available to young people. And we argued that these incentives should be offered while the draft continued, measuring their attractiveness before the Nation committed itself to an all-volunteer force.

When the Gates Commission submitted its findings to the President on the weekend of February 21-22, the press enthusiastically reported the recommendations, particularly the assurance that the Nation could maintain its forces with volunteers after it had instituted easily-taken steps. The Department of Defense concurred with the idea of volunteerism, but Secretary Laird cautioned the President against precipitate action. Frankly, we feared that the administration for political reasons might act prematurely on the recommendations.

Earlier that month, Don Hittle gave a luncheon for General Hershey, who would depart from Selective Service in a few days. There I learned that the administration had quietly sent the name of another person to the leadership of the Senate Armed Services Committee, prior to formal appointment, and that the message went back to the White House requesting that the President not seek that candidate's confirmation. Apparently the candidate had indicated too much enthusiasm for volunteerism.

On February 19th the President gave a reception at the White House to show some Washingtonians the paintings of Andrew Wyeth. As Betty and I went through the reception line, my name was announced to the President. He Immediately said, "I know Curtis Tarr. He ran for Congress in California and later served as president of a university in Wisconsin." He then looked at me, smiled, and shook my hand warmly as he introduced me to Mr. Wyeth. I had met President Nixon on other occasions. But this awareness of my background was uncomfortably specific.

So with conflicting thoughts racing through my mind, I prepared for my appointment at the White House on March 4th. As Peter Flanigan and I walked into the Oval Office, I still believed, naively, that I had a chance to convince the President to continue my service to the Air Force. But this notion was dispelled immediately when he rose from his desk, grasped my hand enthusiastically, and said, "Dr. Tarr, I wanted to take this opportunity to tell you how grateful I am that you are willing to accept this difficult responsibility." I confessed that I came reluctantly. The President replied that he understood this

and recognized the important work I had undertaken in the Air Force, but that the country needed me now in Selective Service.

How could I respond to that? "Furthermore," he added, "it will be a feather in your cap if you do this job well, and I am convinced that you will."

We talked for half an hour about Selective Service, the latitude I would have as director, the Civil Service positions reserved for me to staff the agency, and then finally we discussed general defense problems. I had some difficulty trying to concentrate on the conversation: my mind whirled with the anxious thoughts of the many jobs I must tackle simultaneously.

As I rode back to my office in the Pentagon, I could think only about being drafted twice, this time to accept the responsibility for deciding who should fight in the most unpopular war in our history.

2

Transition

From March 4 until April 6, 1970, the day of my swearing-in at Selective Service, I made the transition from Air Force responsibilities to new ones. A Presidential appointee in the Department of Defense has an almost endless stream of papers requiring his signature; the prelude to signing usually is study and sometimes rather long briefings, because no issue seems trivial and most of them are complicated. So I continued to maintain my office in the Pentagon while I tried to move prudently toward my new role.

Meeting Congress and the Press

First I had to be confirmed. On March 6, I went with Ken Belieu of the White House staff to see Senator Margaret Chase Smith, the ranking Republican on the Armed Services Committee. Although Mrs. Smith had helped me with Air Force matters, I never took her support for granted. On this day she spoke to me intently about a volunteer force, something she doubted the Nation could accept soon. I replied that I was hopeful in time, but cautious for the immediate future. When we terminated our serious conversation, she supported my candidacy.

A few days later I saw Senator John Stennis, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee. He too wanted to learn my views on volunteerism—a subject about which he had made his pessimism known. But he asked me also about possible legislation to modify the Selective Service Act. Senator Stennis was frank with me, but he did not attempt to assess what his colleagues on the committee or in the

chamber would do. Nevertheless, I felt confident of his support as I left his office.

We now were ready to release the news of my candidacy. Delay for a day resulted in a leak to the press, but the people in the Nixon White House were not as concerned about leaks of impending appointments as their counterparts in the former administration. Although I was eager to make the word public, I appreciated the delay because Mel Laird asked Dan Henkin, his public affairs official and one of the best I have ever met, to draft some "dirty questions" to prepare me for the press.

Dan conducted a tough inquiry. Why did you agree to accept this assignment when so many others have turned it down? Do you favor an all-volunteer force? Have you met General Hershey, and if not do you plan to do so? As a former college president, do you favor the elimination of college deferments? When you were at Lawrence, were there antidraft demonstrations? Does your wife favor this assignment? Do you agree with Senator Scott (a prominent Republican) that we should not extend the draft? Won't the fact that you are the President's 10th, 12th, or 30th choice for this job degrade your effectiveness? We hear that Selective Service has failed for the last three months to deliver the men requested by the Defense Department; do you have a comment?

These were serious issues that I had to meet. But Dan was a stern taskmaster; as I struggled with answers, his stony facial expression revealed no hint of whether I was on the right or wrong track. Instead he probed my weaknesses, and he explained how ridiculous my replies had been. In this situation one needs sharp criticism, not praise. When I left Dan I was better prepared, but feeling a sense of increased apprehension.

The next day, March 12, I met the press in the White House. Press Secretary Ron Ziegler introduced me, I made a short statement, and then questions followed rapidly. I did not give my views on a volunteer force or deferments, believing that I should await confirmation hearings to do so. This upset a few reporters who saw little point in the conference without exploring such issues.

But after some sparring, the questioning permitted me to make several points. I admitted that I would prefer to stay in the Pentagon. I accepted the challenge because the President asked me to do so. I had never advised anyone to avoid service in the armed forces. When asked about the Vietnam moratorium in Washington during the fall, I

replied that a substantial number of young people were expressing honest feelings that were important to them, and thus we must take their concerns seriously.

A reporter asked if I had any philosophical differences with General Hershey or whether I would approach the job as he did. I replied,

> You remember the line from Emerson's essay on "Self-Reliance," about how the institution is the lengthened shadow of the man? We might add that the man has to be an individual. He cannot copy anyone else. I have no intention to copy anybody else's life style or personal philosophy.

I promised to transform the Selective Service System, welcome news to the press who reported on the conference sympathetically and with remarkable fidelity. It was the start of a fine relationship with the print and electronic media, with reporters as well as technical crews.

Between the White House press conference and my confirmation hearings a week later, I kept busy answering telephone calls from friends, reading mail and press reports, acknowledging letters, and studying reports on selective service and recommendations to reform the draft.

Most of the hundreds of letters I received warmed my heart, and many came from those I had not seen nor heard from for years. Others were critical both of the draft and of me personally for accepting the position. Most of these were helpful, forcing me more clearly to sharpen my thinking. I replied to each writer, attempting to include thoughts and questions that would be helpful and sometimes provocative. I recall only one truly angry note from a man in Wisconsin who wrote:

> Congratulations on your appointment. General Hershey seemed to enjoy sending American boys to their death. Hitler's gauleiters seemed to enjoy consigning people to the gas burners. Given a little luck, in your career you should be able to be responsible for the death of over 100,000 Americans by selecting them to be killed for the country's warmongers.

We narrowly averted disaster in the Selective Service mailroom at about the same time. Someone in Seattle sent an explosive device to President Nixon, and when Secret Service agents inspected the package they found a shotgun shell attached to a trigger that would trip when the top of the box was removed. Also inside the box was a warning note that a similar device would be sent to the Director of

Selective Service. Secret Service personnel immediately warned us, undoubtedly preventing injury or loss of life. We quickly established a procedure in the mailroom prohibiting the opening of any package that could not be identified satisfactorily by the label (we sent all such questionable items out for X-ray). At the same time we notified the Post Office not to deliver packages to our homes. Of course, all of this caused Betty and me to worry about our daughters.

On March 19, 1970, I walked to the familiar room of the Senate Armed Services Committee for my confirmation hearings. My friend Senator Edward Brooke came early to wish me luck. Senator Stennis introduced me, let me read my statement to the committee, and then gave me a fatherly lecture on the difficulty of the position I aspired to assume. He also complimented me on saying that I would not try to "be a General Hershey," for no one could do so. The senator emphasized that hearings on changes to the Selective Service Act would begin soon, at which time the committee would expect to hear from me. The chairman stated unequivocally that his committee would carefully watch and assess everything we did in the agency. Then he permitted his colleagues to question me.

Senator Dominick asked for my views on a volunteer force. I replied as I had to Senator Smith, expressing cautious optimism. Next he asked about deferments. On occupational deferments, I could not believe that a youth of nineteen had critical occupational skills. The draft long had been used as a means of "channeling" people into occupations, jobs, or schools which they otherwise would have avoided, and I thought that to do so was wrong. On draft boards, I admitted that a decentralized system creates a series of dissimilar local policies rather than a national one, and this unevenness should be overcome by appropriate instructions to local boards as well as a careful review of board actions. The responsibility of the National Headquarters of Selective Service was to make certain that laws enacted by the Congress would be carried out uniformly throughout the Nation. Finally, Senator Dominick asked what would happen if Congress failed to extend the Selective Service Act. I admitted bluntly that "this could be a real emergency."

Senator Symington wanted to know if the Nixon administration was prepared to ask for appropriations to make the all-volunteer force a reality. I had no information on this although I knew that an attempt would be made in the forthcoming budget to improve the starting pay of enlisted and officer personnel. When he asked me about the 1 July 1970 date recommended by the Gates Commission for the termination of the draft, I admitted that the administration

could not provide sufficient funds on that schedule to make the volunteer force a reality.

Senator Inouye asked about student deferments. I told him that I thought they should be abolished. He wondered if college graduates would volunteer for the infantry. I admitted that probably they would not, but I added that the Army seldom assigned college graduates to infantry positions. Would a volunteer force be an all-black one, or one made up entirely of disadvantaged youth? I replied that I did not believe that it would be. And finally, Senator Inouye wanted to know if induction should be used as a means of punishing people for demonstrating against the war. I replied:

> Senator, it is my feeling that even though many people are not inclined to enlist, it is a privilege, and not a punishment, to serve. I think that if people have violated civil laws, they should be punished in civil courts. The attempt to make service in the armed services a punishment is not the right thing to do. I think there is a dignity in serving our Nation, and I would like to do everything I can to continue to maintain the services as a dignified place. And if people disobey laws, then we have appropriate procedures to take care of that.

Thereafter Senators McIntyre, Smith, and Stennis all complimented me as Senator Schweiker earlier had done. I had visited during Air Force days with all of these people and the setting seemed comfortable. As soon as I departed, the committee unanimously recommended my confirmation. The next day Senator Thurmond called to say that the Senate had done so. I had a new job.

Briefing the National Security Council

In my public statements, both before the press and the Senate committee, I had hinted at the manner in which I thought Selective Service should change in the future: we must establish a national system rather than a loose federation of local ones; deferments for education, occupation, and fatherhood should be abolished; the administration of the System should be humane, concerned with the problems of youth, and attempt to communicate with them; and we should continue inductions until we could provide the inducements to insure the success of volunteerism.

Now I started to carry out that program.

First, I prepared for a meeting of the National Security Council on the subject of draft reform. When the council met on March 24,

the members had before them two papers that I had studied thoroughly. One was the staff study based upon the work of Steve Enke, and supporting material from the Department of Defense. The staff paper outlined four options to move the Nation from the draft to an all-volunteer military establishment, but it did not recommend any one of these. On draft reform the study was more specific. First, it advised the President to ask Congress to change the Selective Service Act by giving him discretion to eliminate student deferments (the President at one time had that authority, but a change in the law a few years before made student deferments mandatory). Second, it recommended that the President issue an Executive Order abolishing occupational, agricultural, and paternity deferments. Finally, the study advocated legislation establishing a uniform national call by random sequence number, rather than the existing procedure where each local draft board met its quota by selecting the lowest numbered man first. Doing so, some boards were inducting men with much higher numbers than were others.

The council also had before it a paper submitted a day earlier by General Hershey, now the President's advisor on manpower problems. General Hershey opposed each of the Enke recommendations.

The meeting began in the Cabinet Room at four o'clock There I met Vice President Ford; Secretary of State Rogers; Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Finch; Secretary Laird; General Westmoreland; Roger Kelley; Under Secretary of the Army Ted Beal; General Hershey; National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger; Peter Flanigan; and several young people who had worked on draft reform.

The President began by saying that he wanted a discussion to help him consider the problems of draft extension and reform. He explained that he would make the final decision, but he invited an open discussion at the meeting. Then he asked me to present the program for reforming Selective Service.

I began by indicating that the present draft law was being evaded in many parts of the Nation. I provided figures on the number of people who were called for preinduction physical examinations in some states to produce sufficient numbers to fill the draft quotas. For instance, in Massachusetts, the boards called 320 men in order ultimately to induct 100. I suggested that the law required alteration so that the public would support it more generally.

Next, I described the reforms in deferments and the national call that I thought should be instituted. First I explored the difficulty on student deferments. Here the President interrupted me to say that

some time ago someone had put a line in one of his speeches supporting student deferments; he did not agree, he favored abolishing them, and he wanted to press Congress to let him do so. This relieved me because I had heard that the President might not support this recommendation.

I described the disadvantages of occupational, agricultural, and paternity deferments, suggesting that they should be eliminated by the issuance of an Executive Order. While most people agreed with this view, differences existed over the timing of the order. The more cautious group preferred to delay until Congress permitted the President to act on student deferments. I argued that much improvement could be realized if these deferments were removed regardless of congressional action on student deferments. Thus I asked for immediate issuance of an Executive Order, with the plea that these deferments should have less justification in the future since they would affect 19-year-old rather than 26-year-old men. Young men were liable for service from ages 18 to 26. Historically the oldest men in that group were called by local boards. The Random Selection System reversed that procedure by requiring 19-year-old youth to be called first.

Finally, I talked about the national call. I explained that the lottery system could be viewed in two ways: either as a way by which men with the same sequence number would be drafted simultaneously throughout the Nation, or as a means by which the local board selected among men in its I-A manpower pool. There was some evidence that the Congress preferred the latter interpretation. But it seemed quite clear to me that the people of the Nation expected the former. That issue had to be met clearly because the committees of the Congress soon would want to know how well the lottery system functioned. Plainly, the lottery system was not working well. I told the President that the only way to make it effective was to institute a national call.

The President then asked General Hershey for his views. The General talked in his usual style with a rambling but negative response on those changes I had suggested. The points he made were those included in his paper, one prepared so recently that probably few in the meeting besides myself had read it. In short, the General saw no reason for reform; he judged that the system could continue to operate satisfactorily in the indefinite future. The President drummed his fingers impatiently as the General talked.

During the discussion that followed, no one commented on the recommendations I made. In fact, the President had difficulty encouraging anyone to speak. Secretary Rogers thought that failure to

extend the draft would seriously threaten our position in the North Atlantic Alliance. Secretary Finch did not want to comment. Except for Mel Laird, the President was the only one ready to explore the subject. The Vice President said that enlistments in peacetime might be greater than during the Vietnamese War. At this point, thankfully, the President terminated the meeting by asking for recommendations to include in his message to the Congress.

Visiting National Headquarters

Meanwhile, I wanted to introduce myself to the people in the National Headquarters of Selective Service. I had not entered the building before the hearings on my confirmation, believing that it would be presumptuous for me to do so. Colonel Byron "Pep" Pepitone, my Air Force Executive Officer, had gone at my direction, and what he reported did not encourage me. On March 23, I made my first visit.

I met Colonel Dee Ingold, the Acting Director, on the steps of the main building at 1724 "F" Street, and together we walked around each floor, greeting those we encountered. I wanted to talk briefly with staff members at work rather than to call a meeting to do so. What I saw often alarmed me. I found boxes piled in offices and hallways and clutter everywhere. The interior walls painted light green depressed me. Shabby posters were hung haphazardly here and there. Evidently, the people at Selective Service did not take much pride in their surroundings. General Hershey, being nearly blind, could not see the squalor.

In one room I met a fellow standing on his desk with a broom in hand. Although I was trying to adapt to a changing world, this seemed unusual by any standard. Therefore, I asked him what he was doing. "I sweep off my desk several times each day because the walls flake so badly that I can't write on the desk top." I wondered why the walls flaked. "The roof leaks so often that we can't keep paint on the walls." He pointed to the unsightly walls of the office and opened a drawer in his desk that was partially filled with water. Dee assured me that the entire south wall posed problems because the roof had leaked for years. I made a mental note that we needed either a new roof or a new building.

In another office, in the bright sun, I found a man working on a collection of parts that filled his desk top and most of the room. When I asked about his task he said, "Oh, the warm weather is

coming and it's about time to overhaul my air conditioner." I wondered what he was doing with two air conditioners, because by then I had recognized the equipment. "That's an old junker that I'm using for spare parts." I noticed that the venetian blind behind his desk hung by one tape; that several slats were broken and many others missing; and that the untaped side fanned downward. A torn piece of cardboard, plastered to the window, reduced the bright sunlight where the blind was missing. I asked the man about his work in the agency. "I'm on the staff of the General Counsel." An odd way to use a lawyer, I thought.

Dee took me to the infirmary in the building, something I could not believe existed. But it was a four-bed hospital section with a large collection of instruments for minor surgery, drugs, glass cases filled with equipment and books, and a doctor and nurse ready to respond. This facility seemed like extraordinary insurance in a city with abundant medical resources, particularly considering that Selective Service had fewer than 400 employees at its National Headquarters. But Dee noted that many of these were old.

Two days later I continued my tour with Dee, visiting the two smaller buildings across the street. In one of these I found a rather large library. Most of the collection had only historical interest, not useful in future planning. All of the material there and whatever else that we needed would be available at no cost to us from several Government collections nearby.

In one small office, I noted a four-drawer locked file cabinet, and I asked a lady if I could inspect it. She wondered why I wanted to do so, and I was not sure myself, but I admitted that I was naturally curious. When she unlocked the cabinet, I found each drawer filled with identical packages bearing the dust of undisturbed repose. The lady did not know what the packages contained so I opened one and found several dozen leaflets titled, "How to Build a Bomb Shelter," issued in Britain in 1942. "Why have we saved all of these?" I asked. "Oh, Dr. Tarr, you don't understand. Here at Selective Service we don't throw away anything!" Apparently not.

First Impressions

At the completion of my tour I had much to consider. The people had treated me suspiciously but kindly; many of them were of retirement age or beyond, and I met almost no young people. Most of the men were military reserve officers in uniform, and the preponderance of these were Army colonels. It was painfully evident that we

had to change the attitude of these people toward their work or we could not possibly transform the agency soon enough to carry out needed reforms.

Thinking that one way to do this would be to move the agency to a new location, I visited with Arthur Sampson, Commissioner of Federal Supply Services at the General Services Administration, on the following day. Although he seemed to want to help me, it became evident that we would have difficulty relocating soon. I concluded that we must explore other alternatives immediately.

Certainly the agency needed a transfusion of new people with fresh ideas. Steve Enke recommended that I keep the bright, young military officers who had assisted him in studying draft reform. Pep made arrangements with the services to do so.

Most important, I needed a deputy who could carry out the needed overhaul of the National Headquarters, a person completely loyal to my cause of draft reform. I knew I must spend time with state directors, observing the work of local boards. National policy required some centralization, making the reorientation of the National Headquarters essential. But we would meet our calls only if local boards operated effectively. I needed the cooperation of the state directors who had some measure of independence since by law they received their appointments from the President on the recommendation of the governor of the state. Thus, I must begin to visit state headquarters as soon as I was sworn into office.

Without difficulty I decided that Byron Pepitone should be my Deputy Director. He and I had worked together well in the Air Force. With long service as a personnel officer he knew more than I would ever learn about the Federal bureaucracy, the Civil Service System, and the laws relating to military personnel. Most of what I subsequently accomplished I could not have done without Pep; I have never for a moment regretted inviting him to join me. He retired from the Air Force not long after we moved to Selective Service.

In addition, I brought with me my able and loyal secretary, Lois Delaney, and my superb driver, Dennis Floberg. Thus I started with a small personal staff of dedicated, talented people. I would have been hopelessly alone without them, but with them I had a chance to control the bureaucracy.

To gain the attention of the officers in National Headquarters, Pep and I sent a series of memoranda directing that certain matters related to conscription be studied and reports prepared. The reviews and reports responding to these memoranda generated too many

words and too few thoughts, but they did influence the mental attitudes of my new associates.

It soon became evident that the Selective Service System was not performing. During the early months of 1970, the first under the lottery authorizd by legislation passed the previous fall, results were woeful and worsening, as the following table demonstrates:

	Call	Deliveries	Shortfall
January	12,500	11,353	1,147
February	19,000	14,413	4,587
March	19,000	13,284	5,716
	50,500	39,050	11,450

Some skeptics doubted if the System could be revived.

Part of the problem resulted from too many people both in the White House and the Department of Defense trying to help run the System. At an early meeting, I directed our people to take orders from Pep and me, but no one else. However, beyond the confusion that too many directives had caused, we faced a more fundamental problem. Random selection had been superimposed upon an old system with objectives quite different from what the Nation now demanded. My responsibility was to make this poorly designed hybrid system function smoothly.

To gain control over personnel policies, I ordered a hold on all appointments anywhere in the System without my approval. Doing so would be poor administrative practice under normal circumstances, because it prevented the organization from operating in a normal way. But at the time, that was exactly what I wanted: to halt business as usual until I could gain control of the machinery.

In addition to becoming acquainted with people and problems in National Headquarters, I began to learn about Selective Service in the states and local communities. The System had a state headquarters in each of the 50 states and also in New York City, Washington, DC, Panama, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and Guam, or 56 in all. These states had 4,102 local boards and 110 appeal boards, where a registrant could appeal an action by a local board.

Selective Service embraced 50,293 employees, 8,743 paid and 41,550 volunteers. The uncompensated personnel served as advisors to registrants and local board members with 10.6 percent of the latter

being minority persons. Compensated personnel included 6,665 full-time and 1,736 part-time civilians, and 342 active duty military people. In addition, 1,500 reserve officers assisted Selective Service in regular operations and emergencies. We had a budget of $76 million.

The decentralized system emphasized the autonomy of the local board, making policy for the community it served. State directors felt free to alter what advice they received from National Headquarters. The National Director had not chosen often to proclaim national policies or to demand their acceptance. Yet the Judicial Branch of the government insisted upon uniformity to preserve justice.

Without question we faced a bureaucratic nightmare.

I had delayed my swearing-in, hoping that the President would participate. With grave problems facing Selective Service, it would have helped us greatly if he would have taken a few minutes to give me a start that implied his full backing. But Mel Laird told me on April second that there was no chance the President would do so. Thus I made arrangements for Associate Justice Potter Stewart to handle the ceremony on April sixth.

On that day we called our employees to a large meeting room on the first floor of the National Headquarters. Many of my friends from the Department of Defense came to give me moral support. Following the brief ceremony, which was a far cry from the polished formalities Mel Laird arranged in the Pentagon, I gave a short speech to those assembled, telling my new associates that I would be fair with them to the best of my ability and that I would be firm for the good of the Nation. On the same morning I had cut my ties with Defense by writing to the President, resigning from the Air Force; my transition to Selective Service was now complete.

Thus at age 45 I began the most difficult task of my life.

New Directions

The new leader of an organization, at the beginning, has two approaches. He can maintain the programs of the previous administration, gradually forming new initiatives and building upon existing strengths. Or he can set a new course and try to force the organization to bend to his will.

Congressman Mendel Rivers, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, wanted me to follow the gradualist approach. One morning at seven, he called me at home to suggest that I visit immediately with General Hershey. It was obvious to the congressman that I had moved in directions counter to those of my distinguished predecessor, and he wanted to give me fatherly advice that I might be headed for trouble. To have taken this advice would have been an easy choice in many ways. It would have pleased the people in the agency, nearly eliminating disruption with the change in leadership. It would have insured support among powerful elements of the Congress, particularly in the House. It would have taken advantage of the many strengths of the organization General Hershey had built.

But President Nixon had removed General Hershey from the position because he felt that the times required dramatic changes. So too did most of the people who had viewed the workings of the agency from the outside. When I accepted the charge from the President, I agreed with the need for new directions, even though he and I had not talked in those terms.

If you seek new directions, you must initiate change as soon as you enter the office. The longer you wait, the more difficult it

becomes to innovate. Everyone around a new leader searches intuitively for signs that indicate what the future holds. The sooner you telegraph change, if that is your desire, the better for everyone. I believed that the Selective Service could not function much longer without a real shaking. I began immediately to do that.

Pep and I decided that we should change the attitude of our people towards their work, eliminating a "business as usual" mentality that had struck me so forcefully when I made my introductory tour of the facilities. So we posted a notice on the bulletin board that within a week Colonel Pepitone would inspect the premises. Everyone in National Headquarters considered Selective Service a military organization; so for purposes of our shake-up inspection, we decided to treat it as such. Shortly after we posted the notice, a Government truck pulled up to the front entry of the building. Soon people were throwing from the windows the refuse of years of aimless possessiveness. When the truck was filled, we sent it to the dump and another truck took its place. The housecleaning continued for a busy week.

On the appointed morning, when Pep arrived in full uniform with white gloves, people in the agency stood expectantly to await his scrutiny. Almost everyone failed the inspection. Despite the loads of junk hauled away, tons remained. So we posted notice of another inspection the next week. By then the word had traveled widely that the new people in the director's office meant seriously to remove the lassitude of the past.

Reorganizing and Recruiting

During this time I held a meeting with General Hershey's staff. The General had a huge office with leather-covered straight chairs along each of the walls. About thirty people reported directly to him. When the staff met, people (mostly Army colonels in uniform) filed in to take their places, awaiting instructions from the General seated behind his large desk in the middle of the spacious, stark room. Discussion, I gathered, was perfunctory.

Seeing these military officers seated before me, I decided not to use military titles that traditionally the agency had employed. Someone immediately asked me the logic of this new policy. "So that no one will call me 'Sergeant,' " I replied. (During World War II, my highest rank was Technician Fourth Grade, usually referred to as "Sergeant.")

I began the meeting emphasizing the need for new initiatives. Had the President not wanted these, I argued, he never would have replaced General Hershey, a great patriot with a deserved reputation for his important contribution to the Nation.

We faced many tasks immediately. We required more civilian, minority, and youthful faces. We had to learn how to make the Selective Service System work under random selection. We needed to alter the image of the agency to one that was modern, efficient, and humane in dealing with America's youth. I announced that Pep immediately would become the Acting Deputy Director.

Most of the staff listened with faces of stone. Only now and then did a smile come across the lips of someone trying to communicate with me. But some of what might seem to be smiles proved to be nervous twitches. I sensed both fear and hostility. This, my first, would also be my last meeting with General Hershey's staff.

Pep used a unique stratagem to reorganize National Headquarters. He appointed a group of men who had been close associates of the General to help him evaluate suggestions on restructuring that he solicited from each of the principal department heads. This organization committee collected so many ideas that it was both enlightening to Pep to read them and not difficult to select those that would contribute to a sound organization.

Under this arrangement Pep soon submitted to me a plan that I quickly accepted. We announced the new organization on May 11, 35 days after my swearing-in. Reporting to the Director and Deputy Director would be the Offices of Public Information, General Counsel, Legislation and Liaison, the Assistant Deputy Director for Operations, and the Assistant Deputy Director for Administration. Also the 56 state directors reported directly to the National Director; even though this imposed a difficult burden organizationally, we could not avoid that arrangement. Although not reporting to the Director, the National Advisory Committee for the Selection of Physicians, Dentists, and Allied Specialists and the National Selective Service Appeal Board would have direct access to him.

Under the Assistant Deputy Director for Operations we placed three divisions. The Operations Division really controlled the workings of the Selective Service System, determining the calls for the states, answering questions, drafting regulations, and administering the conscientious objector work program. The Plans and Analysis Division made the plans by which we charted our course. The Inspection Services Division, operating from several regional offices, determined whether the system in the states and local boards really

functioned as we intended. Not previously undertaken in a formal way, this new function soon helped to move us toward a national system rather than a collection of local systems.

Reporting to the Assistant Deputy Director for Administration were three officers. The Comptroller had a budget office as well as a fiscal and procurement branch. Another officer directed the Personnel and Training Division, maintaining the records and carrying out the necessary actions for all military as well as civilian personnel in Selective Service. With two distinct personnel systems, we had problems similar to those of each of the military services. Finally, the Administrative Division supported the National and State Headquarters, providing forms and printing, maintaining files and records, distributing information, and keeping us supplied with what we needed to operate at each location.

Before we could recruit people to fill these positions, we established standards for what we expected Selective Service to become. Definitely we wanted a more youthful image. We wanted to attract more civilians into top positions in the agency. We wanted minorities to be represented much more than they had been. We sought women for responsible positions.

We had some personnel authorizations available to us from the Civil Service Commission, and these would accommodate our needs in some critical responsibilities. But obviously we required people who could provide new ideas at all levels. Pep, with his characteristic resourcefulness, produced a plan that I readily accepted: to retire by the end of June all reserve military officers at age 60, to retire all other reserve officers at the normal time for military retirement, to apply normal civil service retirement rules, and to enforce all of these for state directors. General Hershey had used an exception in the law to retain military officers beyond retirement age, something we were determined not to continue.

In due time, allowing people to make the necessary human adjustments preparatory to retirement, we carried out all of these steps. Our plan was most difficult to carry out in the case of state directors. General Hershey had remained in government service long af' ' normal retirement age and he felt compelled to permit his associates the same latitude. Thus we had one spry octogenarian as director in a large state, an astute and distinguished man, but one who spent only a few hours each day at work and with whom a younger generation of registrants could hardly identify.

In a western state, the oldest Navy captain on active duty served as state director. When I asked him to retire, he said he would do so if

I arranged for his promotion to rear admiral. I replied that I had a fatally weak case to present to the Chief of Naval Operations, since the captain had never served on a Navy ship. He countered that he had made a two-week cruise as a college student enrolled in the Naval Reserve program, and besides he deserved the promotion because General Hershey had been promoted to General! But even while he said that, he admitted by his mien that he did not come under the same political rules as the General. Finally, we agreed that I would decorate him at his retirement ceremony. I did so, awarding the Legion of Merit to a man justifiably proud of his long and devoted service to the Nation.

A more pitiful case involved a state director in the South who had suffered for years from mental illness. On his clairvoyant days, he gave parents and registrants a concise judgment of their rights under the law—the law, that is, as it had existed many years earlier. On those good days, sadly infrequent, he demonstrated a former capability of a high order. Most days he was unable to take care of himself. When I visited that state, his staff members brought him to meet me at the airport. After we had greeted each other, he became lost along the flight line and we had to devote several minutes to searching for him. My determined effort to retire him gracefully never came to fruition; he died in a military hospital, still on active duty as a colonel in the Army.

Gradually we were able to replace these older directors with new ones who presented a much different image to the youth of America. They joined ranks with the many superb men who remained with the System during my administration of it, men like Taylor Davidson in Kentucky, Herb Hope in Oklahoma, Art Holmes in Michigan, Paul Akst in New York City, and Jimmy Davis in Mississippi—individuals who exemplified the qualities you would seek if you started the System anew.

The director in Washington, D.C. Headquarters, Colonel Tom Martin, was our only black state director when I came to Selective Service. He did a superb job counseling the young blacks in the Nation's capital, helping them to find themselves in a world confused by war and racial strife. Pep and I wanted to add a black director in another state, believing that this would help to represent us to the youth of the land where 13 percent were black.

We began working with the staffs of various governors, because by law the President could appoint a state director only from names nominated by a governor. In due time, Governor Linwood Holton of Virginia provided us with a splendid candidate, Ernie Fears, a big,

handsome black man and a basketball coach. Ernie had such an engaging smile and easy way with people, combined with his natural talent for organization, that he was an obvious choice of both the governor and the President. Tom Martin and I even persuaded Ernie to join us in tennis upon several occasions. Ernie knew little about the game, but he had such athletic ability that he made the rest of us wonder at his skill. His keen wit made each encounter with him a joyful occasion.

Soon after he took the post, Ernie asked me how to approach the assignment. I advised him to visit boards throughout the state. In a few days, he called to tell me that he was at his westernmost board, closer to Chicago than to Washington! On that same trip Ernie had an experience that soon generated conversation throughout the System. He went in to one board where the secretary apparently harbored prejudice against blacks. She was on the telephone at the time, occupied with a lengthy personal conversation. She interrupted this briefly to look with disdain on Ernie and say, "Boy, I will be with you in a minute."

Her conversation continued much longer than that, while Ernie waited patiently at the counter. Finally, she hung up the telephone, and asked Ernie none too politely what he wanted there. The board was located in a small town where she knew everyone and thus recognized Ernie as an outsider. He put out his huge hand, flashed his contagiously friendly smile, and said politely, "I'm Ernie Fears, your new state director." Nothing could have advanced better our goals for equal opportunity in the System, equal treatment of registrants, and increasing minority representation on local boards, as did Ernie's beautiful reaction to humiliating treatment.

We could not be content with the appointment of a black state director. We needed minority people working in our offices and participating more fully on our local boards. We accomplished the former through the dedication of our top people, and by the appointment of Rey Maduro, a fine man and a Spanish-American, as our Equal Opportunity Officer. Rey coordinated our efforts, reminding each of us when we did less than we could or should.

To improve minority representation on local boards, we needed the support of state directors who in turn had to work with governors to concur in the appointments of local board members. I cannot remember an instance where state directors withheld full cooperation. During the two years of my administration, minority representation increased from about 1,950 to nearly 2,900, out of a total in 1972

of about 17,500 board members; thus our minority participation rose from 10.6 to 16.6 percent.

Progress sometimes came only through persistence. I remember vividly a visit in a southern state where the governor had given the state director permission to appoint blacks without publicity to local boards. Unfortunately, on the morning of my call, the New Orleans *Times-Picayune* carried a story about blacks finally being appointed. We learned about this just before seeing the governor, who was seething. He told us bluntly that there was no point in trying to appoint "niggers" to local boards because they did not have the ability to serve. I left that office shocked and discouraged. The state director told me not to worry; that he would overcome the difficulty as soon as the publicity died. And he did so, quietly continuing the appointment of blacks who made a splendid contribution.

Changing Attitudes

Meanwhile, in addition to changing the System in the states, we continued our constructive work back at National Headquarters. One way was to improve the physical appearance of the building. We ordered a new roof. Then we worked with the General Services Administration (GSA) to apply liberal coats of paint, bringing bright colors to walls that had been antiseptic green. We ordered new furniture, blinds, and drapes. I was amazed at how much Pep improved the ambience of our building with modest expenditures. We found gifted people in GSA who helped us choose fabrics and colors to give our people a real enthusiasm for their place of work. I asked each of the armed services to loan us oil and watercolor paintings by military artists so that we had handsome wall coverings depicting the life of the young men with whom we worked. The services responded generously, as they did consistently whenever I asked their support.

We employed another device for changing attitudes. People had been working so long in one place, with those about them similarly immobile, that Pep and I decided to change the orientation of people towards their colleagues as well as offices in relation to one another. So we began a massive movement of desks and files. At the same time we decided to relinquish the two small buildings across the street, forcing ourselves to move those occupants to the main building. For a short time, this necessitated putting people into hallways. Inevitably some employees could not keep up with their desks. One morning an elderly lady confronted me in the elevator, delivered a stern lecture on how confused I was, admitted that she had wanted

to help me, but then decided I was hopeless and vowed to quit that afternoon. Why should I discourage that kind of resolve? So I gained one more space to appoint a young person with new ideas and energy.

Without reservation I closed our library rather than move it across the street. We never missed its old collections. The hospital suite soon followed, but in a somewhat different way. One morning a man came to my office asking for my signature. I inquired what he wanted me to sign, and he replied that I must take responsibility for our morphine! "Why do we have morphine?" He replied that we kept a supply in the hospital worth about $700 and that I had to take personal responsibility for it by signing the form.

"What happens if I refuse to sign the form?"

"Then we must return the morphine to GSA."

"Fine. Return it."

"But," he persisted, "then we won't be able to keep our hospital."

"Perfect. Return it," I ordered. So we soon had resignations from a librarian, a doctor, and a nurse. We also had to give away books and surgical tools. But that did not take long.

As people left us, convinced that we did not know how to run the agency, we gained personnel spaces to recruit those who would carry out our new programs. Pep really headed this recruiting effort, although I talked to all serious candidates as well. In a short time we had brought to the agency a talented management group as well as many excellent people in crucial supporting roles. John Dewhurst became our Assistant Deputy Director for Administration bringing to us an awareness of industrial practices, a unique approach to problems, and a toughminded refusal to be bludgeoned by the bureaucracy. Dan Cronin joined our team as Assistant Deputy Director for Operations. Dan had had a political career in Maryland as well as experience in the insurance business, and he had the ideal personality to work with the thousands of people in the System who needed help to change direction. Pep recruited most of the division heads from the National Headquarters staff, and these people proved to be able and highly competent. As with the state directors, the National Headquarters group blended new and old faces in a gratifying way.

To work for us on Capitol Hill, we persuaded Sam Shaw to join us. Sam had retired as a brigadier general in the Marine Corps and more recently had worked on the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee. So he had many friends in town who could help us. We appointed a lawyer from the Midwest as our General Counsel, but he decided rather quickly not to stay in Washington. In his place we

selected Walter Morse, a Princetonian with good legal experience in the government and an able counselor on the difficult problems in the law that we faced almost daily. Ken Coffey soon made a giant contribution in our Office of Public Information. Ken came to Selective Service from the United States Information Agency. Shortly after starting his new duties, Ken asked my attitude on working with the media.

"Always tell the truth," I counseled. "There will be times when you cannot tell all you know, because to do so would invite abuse and give some people unfair advantage. But never tell something that you know is false. Simply say that you cannot comment at that time. And finally, don't mislead anyone by trying to answer a question when you do not know the answer. Just tell people you will try to find the information they want." Ken admitted that my view was the most refreshing he had encountered in Government service, both in the Peace Corps and USIA. We held to that attitude throughout the two years we worked together, never sorry for a moment that we were willing to be truthful and open.

The Hershey administration had avoided the media; we courted its representatives. We knew that we faced a mammoth job of public education. We could not possibly carry it out without the help of those who were willing to print and broadcast the facts that we gave them. Thus I held news conferences at each place I visited and frequently in Washington. I spent a great deal of time talking with newsmen and editorial writers in my office, usually each day. Often television crews would come for taped interviews. Instead of shunning these people, I cultivated them. Ken arranged numerous appearances for me on national television shows. He invited journalists to visit with me. In the two-year time span, he arranged for the comprehensive coverage of our work that we could not have accomplished without his intelligent program of cooperation. He and his staff supplemented this public education program with our own publication effort directed to both registrants and local board members.

In addition to these talented executives, we gained inspiration and intellectual honesty from the young men and women who worked in our various departments. I have always believed that young people, properly motivated, can offer novel and often refreshing approaches to difficult problems. Usually the direction of people can be undertaken best by those who have had considerable experience as managers and leaders, and seldom is this the case with a young person. But age and experience do not greatly enhance one's

ability to understand complicated problems or to determine logical solutions. For this, we relied heavily upon young people, deciding what policies we should follow only after they had been consulted and explained their reasoning on the issues.

We recruited these young people from many places. The nucleus came with the group of young officers who had worked with Steve Enke in the White House. We supplemented these by asking the services for talented junior officers. We recruited some young people from civilian life; one of our brightest was a lovely young lady who had been an executive secretary for a local board in Ohio. We also relied heavily upon members of our State Youth Advisory Boards by asking them to come to National Headquarters for conferences to give us the benefit of their wisdom. It was from these youth, largely, that we gained the insight we needed to reform the System in an intelligent way.

More Surprises

In these early days, Pep and I kept finding organizational peculiarities that we could not have anticipated. One afternoon a superannuated colonel visited with us, representing himself as General Hershey's envoy to veterans' organizations. His full-time duty was to attend each annual convention of the various groups of veterans who met throughout the country. In addition, the colonel attended many of the state and local meetings of these groups. He also went to the places the General intended to visit, serving as an advance man to make arrangements for accommodations and transportation. But this effort cost the government dearly. Pep and I could not see where it helped Selective Service in any way corresponding to the expense incurred. So we asked the man to retire. About a year later, Pep came into my office with a sly grin on his face.

"You know that old colonel we retired who traveled the veteran's circuit? Well, he is still traveling and he still has government travel vouchers. We have no idea where he is getting them." Someone, somewhere was willing to provide them.

Another visitor one morning asked about the next test of the Selective Service radio net.

"What radio net?" I questioned.

"We have our own radio net in case of enemy attack."

So Pep investigated this curiosity. He found that most of the state headquarters had someone interested in radio communications who had surplus and often antiquated radio equipment. This

redundant capability was to serve the agency if telephone lines went dead for any reason. Pep, who knew a great deal about the communications capability of the armed services available to us if ever the need arose, could not believe that mature people would take seriously such an effort. Further, we found that on most tests only a few stations could respond because of the state of repair of the equipment. We quickly retired this "hobby" from our activities.

A senior officer of the System one day invited Pep to go with him to our "relocation site," a modern building constructed on a college campus in Maryland. Since Pep knew nothing of this activity, he went there to investigate. He found a nearly empty building, constructed with Government funds, intended as a site in the event that Washington came under enemy attack. But only inadequate, amateurish preparations were in place to accommodate such a move.

We soon learned that the Government also had a large emergency command post complex in the Virginia mountains; there also space was reserved for Selective Service. When we visited there, a much more appropriate location for us in the event of an emergency than the Maryland site, we found that again no preparations had been made to utilize the facility. We rapidly furnished the offices, providing current copies of our regulations and local board memoranda, vital records, and all other material we would require in an emergency. With that, we closed the Maryland building and gave it to the college under the terms of the contract by which it was built.

Shortly after I had established my office, I received a lady who told me that her responsibility was to prepare the director's semiannual reports to the Congress. I had not heard of this requirement. The lady asked me if I had any desire to change the style of them. I told her I had not thought about that matter but that I would do all of the drafting myself. She seemed astonished that I would do so. I explained that if the report had my name signed to it I would prefer to write it. Few officials in Washington do so. But I had written my own letters, reports, and speeches in the Air Force, and I was determined to do so in Selective Service. I continued that practice throughout my service in the Government.

I had another surprise when an officer came to me with a large cardboard carton.

"What do you want to do with the shoe laces?" he asked.

"Why do we have shoe laces?" I wanted to know.

"General Hershey liked to talk with Boy Scouts, who came here in rather large numbers. After he had visited with them, he wanted to give something to them, so he always offered each one a pair of shoe laces."

I remembered my own youth and the trouble I had keeping laces in my shoes. During the depression we did not have money to maintain a home inventory of them. But I had not heard a boy complain about the lack of shoe laces for years. I wondered if this were not symptomatic of other ways in which the General had lost touch with young America. The next day we gave a large box of shoe laces to a local welfare agency.

"We Never Throw Away Anything. . . ."

I still had not forgotten the lady who promised that "in Selective Service, we never throw away anything." One day, after I had visited the headquarters for Ohio in the Federal Building at Columbus, the staff member conducting the tour asked if I would like to see the floor above. Inquiring what we would find there, I learned that "it is for the storage of records." So we walked up one flight to see a huge loft filled with four-drawer file cabinets.

"What records are these?" I asked.

"These are registrants' records," the officer replied.

"From how far back in history?"

"These are all the records for Ohio registrants since we began registration in October of 1940."

"But why keep these old records when the men no longer have any legal liability to serve?"

"Because we never have been ordered to destroy them," he admitted.

I pondered this matter for the remainder of the trip. When I returned to my office, I asked California headquarters personnel if they still had my records. The word promptly came back that of course they did. I asked to see my file. When it arrived, I noted the last entry had been the date of my discharge from the Army in February of 1946. Since that time, I reflected, I had lived in a dozen different residences and my parents long since had moved from the address shown in the record. Furthermore, much of the information about me had changed dramatically. Although I had similar physical characteristics, I had received a complete education through the doctoral degree, I had experience that would qualify me to perform services to the Nation that I could not have imagined when I was discharged, and I was married with two daughters. I wondered how representative I might be of change in the lives of most registrants of that time. I asked some of our people to investigate the matter.

The report that soon came to me indicated that I was not unique. In more than 90 percent of the cases sampled, we could not have

located the registrant from the information shown on his Selective Service record without an extensive search of other local records and interviews. Once located, the registrant would hardly resemble the young man of record. Some had died, others had become crippled, most had family responsibilities, many were employed in jobs from which the Nation could hardly have taken them, most had added to their knowledge through education and experience, and a few had become incompetent.

I found also that the records could not be searched without the permission of the registrant. We could not, for instance, open the records to a medical research team or to a sociologist or historian. Any researcher would need written permission from each registrant to look at the material in his file. It made no sense to keep such records.

I visited with the Archivist of the United States, Dr. James B. Rhodes. He and I had become acquainted earlier, and I asked him for permission to destroy these records. He explained that I would need the permission of Congress while it was in session, something that would be most difficult to obtain. But he had authority to permit that destruction after Congress had recessed for a certain period of time. I promptly asked him to let me know as soon as those conditions of congressional absence had been met.

A few weeks later he called to grant permission for the destruction of the records of all registrants no longer obligated under the law to serve. I immediately sent messages to each headquarters asking that the records be destroyed within 30 days. A few hours later one state director called me to complain:

"There is no way that I can destroy all of those records in that time," he protested.

"I understand that," I replied.

"Then why did you ask that it be done?"

"Because people in my own headquarters delight in telling congressional committee staff members everything that I am doing, and I suspect that rather soon I will receive a call from someone asking me what I am doing and telling me to stop it. If you work fast enough, most of those files will be destroyed before anyone can halt us."

"You're smarter than I thought you were," was his only reply.

But I had misjudged the difficulty of destroying the records. I thought naively that they could be shredded and sold to paper mills. But wastepaper buyers would not take them because they contained too much foreign material, mostly staples, paper clips, and x-rays. It would cost too much to separate them by hand. So our people had to

burn them under careful supervision since the law required a witness to the destruction. In many places, we had difficulty finding adequate incinerators. Rhode Island had only one that could take such a quantity of material, and officials there permitted us to burn only from two to four in the morning, one or two nights a week. It seemed ironic: at the same time we had difficulty protecting our necessary records from draft protesters, we encountered equal difficulty from our own societal safeguards when we attempted to burn obsolete records!

Some of our people used great ingenuity in the destruction. In Florida, one of our staff belonged to a volunteer fire department. When he learned that one of the fire companies intended to burn an old house to demonstrate firefighting techniques to some new recruits, he gained permission to fill the dwelling with Selective Service records. The only trouble was that it burned for days rather than hours!

The disposal program I liked best was one I learned about when I visited our headquarters in Guam. There a fire has festive connotations. So our headquarters people gathered all the records, went to the beach, dug a trench, filled it with a pig and the paperwork, and hours later had a magnificent barbecue, apparently made even more memorable with the liberal addition of Guamanian libations.

As I anticipated, I soon received a call from the Hill asking that I come up to answer some questions. Sensing that I needed more time to burn records, I agreed upon a date a few weeks hence. When I arrived for hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, I was asked about destroying records, part of an extensive inquiry into all of our problems and plans. I commented that I was destroying the records because I had judged that in the event of an emergency we could not afford to have that information available.

Naturally that prompted further questioning. I reasoned that in an emergency, someone might try to put records and people together, an immense burden that, when successful, would require extra work to bring the records up to date. Much easier would be to register people once again if indeed that ever were needed. I doubted that it would be. So, with the admonition that committee members in the future would want to know about such plans, the questioning took a different course.

One of our young people calculated the extent of our destruction effort. If we had placed all of these records into a single file drawer, it would have been 56 miles long! We achieved the triumph of returning legions of four-drawer file cabinets to GSA. We also made

available prime space in expensive government buildings. In the process, we destroyed the antiquated records of the standby reserve. Perhaps more important, we convinced our people that we had a *primary job of working on present problems without a preoccupation* with the past. Thus the destruction of records became a major step in the new directions that we took for Selective Service.

Learning and Teaching

Our early, and to many people bizarre, moves had started us in new directions. But clearly we had to introduce much more substance to our reform of Selective Service. Most of what we had done thus far only made possible the restructuring of draft machinery. Before we could find satisfaction in our work, we needed to learn how the system had functioned and how to improve it in the light of recent changes.

One logical place to start, I thought, was to visit my friend Tom Martin at a local board in Washington, DC, and go through the process of registering for the draft. Of course I was too old to do so officially, but I wanted to find out what a young person encountered when he registered for Selective Service. I learned a great deal. As I questioned the purpose of each of the pieces of paper involved, I began to formulate ideas to simplify the process. This awareness helped me later when we began to accomplish sweeping paperwork changes, primarily through data processing techniques.

Visiting State Headquarters

Just a few days following my swearing-in ceremony I made my first visit to a state headquarters, beginning in Mississippi. The pattern that Colonel James Davis used was adopted later by nearly every other state director. I visited with the members of the director's staff, met all of the people in the headquarters, made a courtesy call on the governor, and visited local boards.

In this process I became acquainted with local problems. I found what people in the field needed to carry out the requirements of the

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law. As in the case of my registration, I began to learn how to improve the System. But most of all, I met in Mississippi and elsewhere across the Nation the patriotic and persevering people who operated Selective Service. I gained confidence as I became acquainted with them. In the state headquarters and local board offices, I found people who wanted to help me reshape a bureaucracy that they recognized could not survive the requirements of a new day. Thus I obtained helpful information on my visits. As I shared my thoughts, I grew optimistic that we could accomplish our purposes despite formidable opposition.

Within 15 months I visited every state headquarters including those in Panama, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. During the same time, I stopped at about 900 local boards. General Hershey seldom visited these headquarters, although he often saw the state directors. Thus my visits provided the first opportunity for employees of the System to meet the National Director. Although I began traveling to the state headquarters mentally prepared to encounter considerable resistance, I soon found that merely by meeting people I gained cooperation.

The use of military aircraft made travel easier on some trips. When I had several states to visit I would "rent" a plane from the Department of Defense. For example, one evening I arrived at a late hour in North Dakota. The next morning at seven I had breakfast with Major General LaClair Melhouse, State Director and also Adjutant General for North Dakota. His staff joined us for a thoughtful consideration of problems and opportunities. Next we stopped at the state headquarters to meet each employee before going to the capital building to visit with Governor William L. Guy, who had many excellent ideas about what we should do. Then I flew to South Dakota to meet Major General Duane L. Corning, State Director and also Adjutant General. Again I met the people in the headquarters office before going to a local board. During luncheon I discussed local issues and national policies with members of the state director's staff. In the early afternoon I flew to Cheyenne to meet Colonel Jack Brubaker, the able Director of Wyoming Headquarters. After talking to the staff I went with Jack to see Governor Stanley K. Hathaway, another staunch patriot. Before leaving for Denver, I talked with the members of the National Guard unit assigned to Selective Service. Later in the evening I flew to Los Angeles on a commercial flight. Such a productive day would not have been possible without the use of military aircraft. I believe the rapid reorientation of the entire System depended upon support gained from these extensive personal contacts.

Most of the time I traveled on commercial aircraft, where I had numerous experiences, many of them humorous. One day when I flew to Minneapolis I encountered a stewardess who thought I must be a minister because I read a leather-bound book and looked so peaceful. Coming one evening to Washington from Pittsburgh, I saw a man in front of me looking at *Life* magazine with my picture in it. He turned, showed it to me, and asked if it looked familiar. He was an Annapolis graduate, selling for Alcoa.

Another stewardess, this one on an early flight to Columbus, became confused over my identity. She made certain of my comfort, importuned me to tell her what special attention I needed, sang a little song for my benefit, brought me breakfast (we were alone in the first class section), and finally sat on the armrest of the seat ahead, looked into my eyes, and asked the most important question of all, "Now please let me get your title straight. Are you the Director of Passenger Service?" After my reply, I did not see her again, even when we landed in Columbus.

Random Selection

Back at National Headquarters, we had urgent business to determine best how to make random selection work. Random selection came into being when President Nixon signed Public Law 91-124 and Executive Order 11497 on November 26, 1969. The President stated then that he wanted the new procedure to reduce the period of prime draft vulnerability from seven years to one year and to establish a fair and understandable method of impartial selection among eligible young men.

A minimum period of prime draft vulnerability should have existed from the beginning of conscription, for it would have alleviated untold heartache and anxiety. Under the previous system a young man registered at age 18, but often he would not be drafted until immediately prior to his 26th birthday, because the law instructed boards to draft the oldest eligible man first. In most cases a young man would be much more free to enter the service at 18, before he incurred family and work responsibilities. With the threat of the draft hanging over his head, he had difficulty adjusting himself to work or to college, and some employers had little interest in hiring a young man until he had completed his service or no longer was liable to be called.

The new law required the reverse of this traditional process. A lottery had been held in December 1969 to determine the order of

selection among men 19 to 25 years of age. Thus the year 1970 was one of transition, when all eligible men would be liable for call based upon their random sequence numbers. In the following year, 1971, young men would be called if they had reached their 19th birthday and were not deferred. Also, men under age 26 whose deferments ended in 1971 would join the eligible pool.

Until the time the new law took effect, boards had been sending men for preinduction physical examinations on the basis of age, the oldest first. We quickly adjusted this procedure and sent registrants for examination with the lowest random sequence numbers. For the early months of the year, some boards could meet their calls only by sending men for induction with high numbers, contrary to the intent of the law.

In order to eliminate gross injustices, Selective Service arbitrarily set national random sequence number (RSN) ceilings for induction, following an understanding with the Department of Defense that it would accept the inevitable shortages of inductees during the transition. As I have shown earlier, the shortfalls were considerable, over 11,000 by the end of March 1970. The RSN ceiling in March had been 90. Without disciplining the people in the System to use only low numbers, we soon would have faced two failures of the lottery system because some boards would have called men with RSNs up to 365.

In order to establish a realistic ceiling, we needed information from local boards on the number of men available by RSN. This imposed another reporting requirement on local boards, but we could not operate well without it. We also received information from the Department of Defense on men who had been given examinations each week. With this data, our operations people began to fine-tune the System.

Some of this work had begun before I became director, although I had followed it closely. Pep and I made one additional decision. We could have met Department of Defense needs by imposing added calls on the states that had been able to deliver the quota of men within the RSN ceiling. But doing so would have violated the spirit of the law that required an equitable distribution among states based upon eligible registrants. It also would have eliminated the incentive for careful operations in each state, since any relaxation in one area could be offset by diligence elsewhere.

To a degree we experienced this injustice between boards; in some instances board members granted deferments without much concern for the merit of individual petitions so long as sufficient men

remained in the eligible pool to meet local calls. Instead of choosing an easy solution, we decided to ask each state director to make up his own shortfall by the end of the year. We also asked the Department of Defense to assume that we would eliminate all shortages by the end of the year and thus not add to future calls because of previously inadequate performance.

We set RSN ceilings of 115 in April, 145 in May, and 170 in June. At midyear we anticipated that student deferments terminating in June would provide sufficient numbers of men to fill calls for the remainder of 1970. Thus in July we set the ceiling for August and for the remainder of the year at 195. Within this ceiling we delivered 162,746 men to meet a total call for the year of 163,500. During the following year, we employed the same techniques with added refinements, inducting 94,317 men to meet a call of 98,000 with an RSN ceiling of 125. By mid-June of 1971, the Army reached its trained strength authorization for the first time in five years.

During the summer of 1970, we began to understand a problem that we would encounter by the end of the year. Traditionally, men in the manpower pool became vulnerable or ineligible to call depending upon age and deferments. Thus after August of 1970, men with numbers above 195 could drop their deferments and make 1970 their year of exposure, an advantage because in a later year they might be subject to call when the deferment ended. We could not prevent this, and indeed had no reason to do so. Accordingly we employed every resource we could muster to encourage young men with numbers above 195 to make 1970 their year of exposure, and this took many men out of the pool for future years; the logic in publicizing this alternative was to insure equity, since some young men had much better information about Selective Service than did others.

But difficulty arose because most states used higher numbers to meet their calls in August than they did in December. This situation resulted from the considerable numbers of men who lost their student deferments after the school year ended at midyear (usually it took several months to reclassify these men and give them physical examinations).

For example, suppose a state required all those men with RSN 179 to meet the call for August. But because of the large numbers of former students becoming eligible, the state could fill calls in the last three months by using RSN 155. Thus, a registrant with RSN 160 could give up his deferment after August and not be called even though he would have been called had he done so prior to the August call. It did not seem fair to permit a man to do this.

After much discussion, we finally settled the "year-end" problem. We issued instructions to local boards (after the President signed an Executive Order permitting us to do so) to place these men with an RSN below that used in the state in 1970 into the pool for call during the first three months of 1971. These registrants then would be called before anyone in the 1971 pool. If the man was not called in the first quarter of 1971, he would go into the second priority group that would be vulnerable only if there were not sufficient men in the 1971 year group to meet the Nation's manpower needs. To explain these instructions to local board members and avoid errors of induction, we asked our young staff people to train our inspectors, using all types of questions so that each inspector was certain of the policy. With this preparation the inspectors performed well in the field and no major problems developed.

One requirement of the original law avoided solution just as it had during World War II and thereafter. Legislators who wrote the original law wanted to give credit to the various states, in the allocation of calls, for the men from each state who had enlisted in the services. But the obscure language of the law did not make clear how this should be done. For example, how does one give credit for those who reenlist? Those who make a career of the service generally lose their identification with a "home" state. Also, many young men enlist in order to find employment, not merely to avoid the draft, and thus those states with fewer economic opportunities would be the ones with the smallest calls.

Despite these difficulties, I continued to search for the means of carrying out the intent of the law. One afternoon I did an analysis of enlistments and inductions in many states. I was surprised and gratified to learn that some of the states where we had difficulty inducting people had heavy enlistments. For example, the New England states contributed many more enlistments than did states of comparable population in the South. Probably we could have determined some arbitrary method of crediting enlistments, such as using the enlistments during one quarter to modify the calls in the following quarter, but doing so would have required an Executive Order. My guess is that the circulation of a draft of such an order would have created such political turmoil that the President would not have signed it. We never solved this problem and finally found relief from it by the legislative changes of 1971.

Physical Examinations

Physical examinations continued to cause problems throughout the time I served. As I began studying the statistics that came routinely to me, I questioned the numbers of men who failed their preinduction and induction physical examinations. From January to June, 1970, 45.2 percent of those who appeared for preinduction examinations were found not to be qualified for military service. Of those found qualified at the preinduction physical examination, 17.8 percent during the same period failed to pass the induction examination that sought to measure fitness in the same manner. Thus out of 100 men appearing at the Armed Forces Entrance and Examining Station (AFEES) for the preinduction physical, 55 would qualify; out of this group of 55, only 45 would be inducted. But medical advisors to local boards and the boards themselves also disqualified young men obviously not fit, such as the blind, those without limbs, and the mentally incompetent. Thus the low percentage of those qualified was even more shocking.

Many people argue that the Army should accept men with lower physical qualifications for less demanding military duties. While feasible, this procedure would complicate the assignment of men. Also the Government assumes some liability for the treatment of disabilities upon the discharge of a soldier, often for the remainder of the man's life. Thus it is critical to determine as thoroughly as possible the condition of the person before he enters the armed forces. But in the eyes of the new director, this hemorrhage in the eligible pool appeared serious, even though the numbers had not changed significantly for two decades.

But we had other problems with physical examinations that dwarfed these. Many of the AFEES were located in neglected sections of communities. Young men from distant boards often had to stay overnight for the examination, and some of them were attacked at night. I remember a visit to the Oakland, California AFEES, located in dilapidated quarters surrounded by draft counseling agencies. Representatives of these groups stationed themselves at the AFEES entrances, intent upon showing young men how they could avoid the draft by deferment (usually conscientious objection) or by "failing" the examination. Many of the draftees must have been confused by the process.

The examinations often were marred by riotous proceedings. Registrants hoping to fail the examination sometimes doctored themselves to distort temporarily the results of blood tests. Others

appeared confused, hoping that the Army would refuse them on mental grounds. Some talked intelligently about mental difficulties of the past that would make them a risk. The same was true of physical disorders such as liver problems, ulcers, heart and lung difficulties, or injuries to knees or back.

In many cases, registrants brought letters from their physicians explaining the problems. In most cases, this documentation was helpful to AFEES personnel. But we collected evidence, in a small minority of cases, where it was not; one New York City psychiatrist wrote nearly identical letters to support the disqualification of several hundred registrants, and we had no legal way to question that practice.

Most pitiful of all were the situations where young men would commit unusual acts in an attempt to disqualify themselves. Some would perform as homosexuals in the presence of AFEES personnel. Others would defecate or urinate on the floor of the station. Some would attempt to appear as coprophiliacs. Examining station personnel witnessed a great deal of marijuana use, as well as injections of harder drugs. A few registrants would dress like women. Some would smear blood or vomit or feces on their bodies to make them offensive.

The most unusual story I heard came from the New York AFEES, where a young man appeared for examination wearing a huge robe. When asked to undress he did so to reveal a snake coiled around his naked body. Station personnel told him to remove his snake, but he refused. So they sought the aid of a tough sergeant, familiar with a variety of antics. The sergeant ordered the snake removed and the registrant again objected. So the sergeant disappeared to return with a .45 caliber service revolver. He deftly grasped the head of the snake, put the revolver against it, and told the frightened registrant that he had three seconds to disentangle himself from the snake! The examination quickly proceeded.

We worked with the Army to improve conditions and procedures in the stations. Those in the US Army Recruiting Command with whom we worked cooperated fully with us. We did alleviate some of the worst situations, but the burden of accepting the brunt of protest to the war continued to fall upon the people at the entrance and examining stations; surely, these people were never compensated with sufficient gratitude from the Nation they served so loyally.

The young men who acted so strangely worried me most of all. They mirrored the desperation that had overtaken so many of our youth. Only the termination of the fighting in Southeast Asia would alleviate their grief.

Setting Our Own House in Order

While trying to understand some of the forces bearing upon us externally, we still had other matters within the agency to understand. One of these related to the financing of Selective Service. My first briefing in late April of 1970 brought the reality of our situation to light: it was critical. National Headquarters exercised only loose control over state directors; and while all of them tried to operate reasonably as they understood the requirements placed upon them, each state posed unique problems, and we had virtually no standard by which to judge the adequacy of their staffing.

Since more than 90 percent of our spending went into salaries, an absence of staffing discipline rendered expense control impossible. General Hershey recently had waived his loose staffing guidelines so that state directors could meet the requirements of the random selection legislation passed during the previous fall. Consequently, we had 125 more people on the full-time payroll and 1,000 more on the intermittent payroll than the Bureau of the Budget authorized us at the end of the fiscal year. Our spending in dollars exceeded the rate that would make it possible to finance the agency until the start of the new year.

Clearly we had to take immediate action to restrict the leak in the cash box—and we did. I talked with Jim Schlesinger, Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget, asking for help, and he responded with eagerness to assist as soon as we could formulate a staffing plan. We also had a favorable hearing before the Pastore Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations in support of our 1971 budget. But finally the House cut our request by $433,000 and the Senate concurred with the reduction; this was the first time my associates in Selective Service could remember that the Senate had not supported us and then split the difference with the House in conference. This development helped to convince Headquarters personnel that we must learn to operate efficiently, a process that forced us to break with tradition and adopt new techniques.

Before we could introduce much change, we had to create communications channels throughout the agency. In all human enterprise, most of the people want to do their work well and in more efficient ways. If one loses faith in the striving of people to assist in accomplishment, then he is destined to search for workers who will follow orders almost blindly—a course fraught with frustration and disappointment. We all know many people who operate that way.

I much prefer trying to establish an environment where people are challenged to think and to contribute. In our meetings, often including people at all levels of responsibility, I tried to impress upon those present that we wanted to find the best idea regardless of who suggested it. I knew that I could not determine the superior course of action in all of our activities and I did not try to do so. Neither did Pep. Rather, we coaxed, encouraged, even pleaded with people to offer us their best. They responded generously, from the young people in National Headquarters, to the reserve officers on active duty, to the people in our state offices. Once an organization is structured for cooperation, then communication seems to follow.

Pep did more than I to encourage this attitude. In particular, he formulated a plan to gain the support and the fresh ideas of state directors by calling them together at working sessions. General Hershey had a policy committee of half a dozen state directors, and Pep brought them to Washington in June of 1970. The group on that occasion included Paul Akst from New York City, Glenn Bowles from Iowa, Herbert Hope from Oklahoma, Carlos Ogden from California, and Art Holmes from Michigan—all able men. Pep received such sound advice from that group that he decided to bring the directors together by regions, in groups small enough to permit participation by each director present. The first group met in St. Paul during July 1970, followed by others in Atlanta, Kentucky, and Oklahoma City. By that time, the device had proven to be a useful means of evaluating ideas and we continued the process thereafter.

While we worked to master the existing system, President Nixon continued on his course of reform. In early April 1970, the President had decided to announce steps to achieve an all-volunteer force and the means to reform the draft. He wanted to issue an Executive Order phasing out occupational, paternity, and agricultural deferments, and ask Congress to pass a law permitting him to control undergraduate deferments and establish a national call by random sequence number. In mid-April, I received the National Security Council Decision Memorandum to indicate the manner by which this should be accomplished. The timing of the Presidential message was delayed by the explosion aboard the Apollo 13 spacecraft and the emergency splashdown.

A few days after that, I went to the Hill with Roger Kelley to explain the President's program to senators and representatives. Our reception seemed to spell doom for any legislation that year. Congress did not want to pass a bill changing student deferments in the election year of 1970. As one prominent congressman explained the

issue to me, too many of those supporting him also wanted to keep their sons in college and out of the war in Vietnam. It did not matter that this procedure was inequitable: a congressman voting to eliminate it would risk reelection.

On April 23, the President called the leadership of both houses to the White House to hear Mel Laird and me explain the changes that would be included in the message to Congress later that day. Mel discussed volunteerism, and I followed with the details of the pending Executive Order phasing out occupational, paternity, and agricultural deferments. I then explained that the President wanted discretion to phase out educational deferments on the basis that anyone not enrolled in an academic or apprenticeship program on that day would not be eligible to apply in the future for such a deferment. Finally I described the President's wishes for a national call.

At the White House meeting and during the press conference that followed, I received compliments for the President on his program. The next morning we read laudatory editorial comments in some of the leading papers. At National Headquarters we had worked long hours to provide our people in the field with the information they needed to explain the changes to registrants. Within a few days, we published Local Board Memorandum 105 to carry out the intent of the President's Executive Order 11527. We took special precaution with this memorandum, a prototype of what we intended to publish on other subjects, with the thought that a collection of local board memoranda would serve as a definitive guide for local board practice. We encountered one problem in Illinois where a retiring state director seemed to take a position counter to our instructions, but we quickly corrected that problem. Elsewhere the new program went smoothly.

But we had to wait for a more opportune time to correct the inequity of student deferments. Our soundings on the Hill had been accurate.

Reforming the Lottery

Early in May of 1970, we began to evaluate the serious complaints made about the first lottery held by Selective Service in December of the previous year. Statisticians had noted soon after publication that the results of the drawing were far from random. As soon as the procedure for the drawing was analyzed, the reasons for this lack of randomness were quite apparent. Capsules had been loaded with dates, starting January 1 and ending with December 31;

as capsules were filled they were deposited in a box. From this box, someone reached in and drew out capsules to establish priority of call. Obviously this process established greater vulnerability for those whose birth dates fell in the latter half of the year. When asked why he appointed a certain officer to supervise that first lottery, General Hershey is reputed to have answered that the man had a great interest in bingo!

To design a lottery that would insure random selection I asked Greg Nelson, a young and bright Army major on loan to Selective Service, to determine how we might be able to satisfy the complaints of statisticians. Greg visited people on college and university campuses. Despite the climate of disapproval toward the war and the Defense Establishment, Greg received numerous suggestions, many of them excellent ones. Most helpful among those Greg visited was Professor John W. Tukey of Princeton, the chairman of a committee of statisticians concerned about randomness in the lottery. The good professor met many of us, going over our plans with great care. I must confess that I never would have thought of considerations that he judged quite important to the outcome of an appropriate drawing.

The plan that finally evolved called for 25 random tables of numbers 1 through 365 and 25 random tables of dates for each day in the year; these we requested from the National Bureau of Standards. From each of these sets, someone selected an envelope containing dates and another containing numbers. The tables provided the random means of depositing capsules containing numbers into one lucite cylinder and dates into the other. Baffles in these cylinders mixed the capsules while the cylinders rotated. Professor Tukey admitted that little was known about the physical dynamics of mixing, but he suggested the design of these cylinders and advised us to fill them with equal numbers of black and white capsules; this would help determine how long we should rotate the cylinders to assure mixing. Doing this, we decided to turn the cylinders for an hour before the drawing began and for several turns between each selection.

When July 1, 1970, arrived, we held the drawing before an impressive array of cameras and microphones in the meeting room of the Department of Commerce Building. Elaborate security reflected the unfortunate reality of the time. We arranged careful observation for every aspect of preparation and execution of the lottery, with a representative from the National Bureau of Standards, a statistician, and a member of the press corps acting as observers. At 9:00 a.m. people started turning the cylinders.

Just before the drawing began at 11:00 a.m., I stood to face the cameras for my statement to the television and radio audiences who would follow the proceedings. I knew most of the news photographers and many of the television cameramen, and I felt at ease as we began an important event. Television cameramen wear earphones, and when they converse with each other they talk at a level of intensity just below a shout. Thus I could not help but hear one say to another, "Look at that cocky guy; he's about to face 60 million people, he hasn't a note in his hand, and he hasn't even started to sweat!"

My introduction simply explained the process we would follow and assured the audience that we had taken great care with such an important event, one crucial to many young Americans. Then the drawing began, with young people from the Youth Advisory Committee of Selective Service doing the drawing. Some of the members of the committee on the previous day had expressed reservations about participating, believing that doing so would indicate approval of the draft. Their function was to make the process equitable, not to approve of the draft, so I promised to cover this point in my introduction and did so. Numbers were drawn from one cylinder and dates from another; together these determined the priority of call. For instance, if February 14 and number 167 were drawn at the same time, young men with a birthday of 14 February 1952 would have RSN 167.

The lottery went well with only one mishap at the start. An axle broke on one of the drums, forcing us to recruit a GSA maintenance crew to repair the difficulty. We did so to improve the theater of the drawing, allowing rotation between capsule selection; long before that we had assured randomness. By 1:30 p.m. we had completed the drawing.

I remember only one complaint about our procedure from a student of statistics. He observed that we should have had 366 numbers and dates instead of 365, even though 1971 would not be a leap year, because some of the men in the 1971 pool would be deferred for education and would come back into a pool during a leap year. When they did so, their vulnerability would be altered just slightly over what it would have been had there been 366 days in the 1971 drawing. He was correct, and we changed the procedure thereafter. That was the last lottery complaint, not a bad performance for a collection of amateurs who had to do their statistical homework on a cram course. I recommended Greg Nelson for the Legion of Merit.

We did ask a committee of statisticians to review our work, as Professor Tukey had suggested we should, after the event. Listening carefully to what we had done, they approved. Later, Al Bowker, my friend from Stanford, summed it up best: "A clear case of statistical overkill!"

Overkill it was. But it was not the only time that we had to take extreme precautions to insure equitability in the draft; to erase the negative image of the System we had inherited, we had to continually reinforce an image of absolute fairness. This was one of the many lessons we learned in our two years.

5

Cambodia and Other Confrontations

At 9:00 p.m. on April 30, 1970, President Nixon announced that American troops would enter Cambodia to clear North Vietnamese and Viet Cong from sanctuaries where they had launched attacks into South Vietnam. The President reasoned that Cambodia, where Prince Sihanouk recently had been ousted, could not prevent enemy activity within its borders and insure its neutrality from the Southeast Asian War. The President offered to send small amounts of military aid to Cambodia. He promised that our Nation would not attempt to preserve the Government of Cambodia, but rather that we would join them to fight a common enemy.

As I watched the report on television I gasped. The uneasy truce invited by the magic of Vietnamization and continuing draft reform could explode now, I suspected. How vulnerable would our draft boards be when young people, disillusioned by this latest move, vented rage upon us? In a larger context, it seemed that the President either thought he could bring significant destruction to the enemy or that he would exert pressure upon them to come to the peace table in Washington: he had termed this a golden opportunity to encourage a quick ending to the war. Of more immediate interest to me, however, was that the Cambodian incursion reawakened the opposition to the draft and thereby complicated efforts to reform the system.

I still fretted about the threat of failure when I saw Mel Laird the next day at a Pentagon ceremony where Bob Seamans presented me with an Air Force award. I told Mel I thought our youth would be greatly disturbed. He realized this might be so, but he hoped that our troops would leave Cambodia before the students organized a major protest.

But the pace of dispute exceeded those calculations. By May 4, the states had mobilized National Guard units in several places to curb violence, one tragic expression of which caused four student deaths at Kent State University. The emotional response following that incident triggered other confrontations.

Young people planned a mass demonstration in Washington on May 9. The day before that, I spent a great deal of time talking with students who came to my office to question and argue about the President's policies. On the evening of May 8, the President announced that the operation had gone well in Cambodia, that some American troops would be withdrawn in a few days, that all would be out by mid-June, and that the success of the operation would insure our ability to continue withdrawing troops from South Vietnam. Obviously the President was thinking about the actions of the thousands of protesters then congregating nearby to demonstrate on the following day. Perhaps as many as 100,000 did so, but fortunately we encountered no violence.

During the following week I continued my long talks with students who had come to the Nation's capital. A group from Yale argued that I could not retain my position with honor and should resign. Four young men from the University of Wisconsin Law School asked seriously, "Is the President really listening to us, or is he simply trying to cool us off?"

The next day, students from Fairleigh Dickinson University in New Jersey came to our National Headquarters asking that the boards in their state be closed in memory of the students killed at Kent State. They brought along a member of a congressional staff as well as a law professor. They soon began arguing that I should resign and that no decent man could keep the job I had. I told them frankly that I had thought about the problems of continuing in that assignment; in fact, I had talked with Bob Seamans and John McLucas the day before, and both told me that some officials in the Pentagon had deep misgivings about the actions of our Nation. But then I explained to the New Jersey students that while I had concerns, I had concluded that I could help the Nation more by continuing my present work.

As the group departed from National Headquarters, they encountered Stan Benjamin, the able reporter from Associated Press. They told Stan that I was considering resigning. I then spent another hour with Stan, discussing the former conversation. Later I faced questions from newspaper and television reporters about when I might resign in protest.

Meanwhile I had other problems. Over 2,000 students surrounded our headquarters at Albany, New York, closing that office and the adjacent Post Office as well. Red Blount, the Postmaster General, called to ask if I could do anything to help eliminate the threat to the Postal Service. He had called John Mitchell, the Attorney General, who also had offices there. But what could any of us do?

At an Air Force intelligence briefing on May 13, I did not gather much encouraging information on the Cambodian operation. Although our troops had found sufficient supplies to maintain the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops for many months, they found no trace of the major command headquarters that our leaders had hoped to destroy. By June 3, the President, in his report to the Nation, optimistically called the Cambodian operation the most sucessful military action of the war. Yet signs of deep uneasiness were visible throughout the land.

The first came from members of Congress. On May 20, my wife and I attended a beautiful dinner at the home of Nancy and Dick Dickerson. After a delicious meal we listened to Henry Kissinger plead with guests to support the administration. Dr. Kissinger stated that we had murdered one President, discredited another, and he feared we now were on the way toward undermining a third, a calamity our society could not tolerate.

Senator Hugh Scott rose to answer. While the Republican leader saw the need to support the Presidency, he added that the President must understand the necessity to support the Senate as well. Frank Church, who had introduced legislation with Senator Cooper to prohibit the use of American troops in Cambodia after July 1, emphasized what Senator Scott had warned. Senator Church added that the problems in Southeast Asia could not be solved by confrontation between the Chief Executive and the Senate. This colloquy foreshadowed the continuing debates we would observe in the Senate over the months ahead, particularly focusing upon our attempt to continue the President's authority to induct men after July 1 of the following year.

Of more urgent and immediate concern became the ability for us to operate our boards. On June 14, vandals ransacked the Rhode Island State Headquarters, destroying records of the state and all of its local boards. Two nights later a similar attack wrecked the state headquarters in Wilmington, Delaware, where two of the five local boards of that state also were housed. In each case, teams of state officials and reserve officers, within a week, had begun the laborious

process of restoring torn, mangled records, and replacing others with information recorded elsewhere. These states continued making their calls, a triumph to the dedication of those diligent people.

The pressure fell upon my wife and daughters, perhaps more than it did upon me. I recall how upset Pam became when some boys in her high school class learned about my position and tormented her about it. Later, one of the teachers attacked her verbally in history class.

During the months ahead, we experienced more attacks on local boards; as Pep and I huddled each morning to review the news and plan the day, I usually asked first if any boards had been hit. Fortunately our employees escaped injury because attacks usually came after boards had closed. I recall only one case where a lady in one of our boards in New York nearly suffered injury; fortunately a plainclothesman was present when a young man began his assault with an ashtray.

On February 8, 1971, South Vietnamese troops launched an invasion of the Laotian panhandle from Khesanh, employing about 30,000 troops under US air cover to intercept supplies moving southward on the Ho Chi Minh trail. Promptly students assembled at the University of Michigan and in Washington to protest. Although the North Vietnamese did not react immediately to the penetration, they did so within two weeks and with strength. Both sides sharply contested the possession of Sepone, a key road intersection. The longer the allies stayed in Laos, the more intense became the debate over the President's authority to continue inductions beyond June 30.

Confronting Student Protesters

By mid-March, I became heavily engaged in discussions with students who had crusaded to Washington to plead for withdrawal from the war. Toward the end of that month, the South Vietnamese left Laos, in some cases under punishing attack. On April 7, the President announced that the success in Laos caused the North Vietnamese even more damage than the Cambodian attack, and thus permitted further American withdrawals from Southeast Asia.

But some American students by then had resolved upon more militant means to alter national policy. On April 21, 1971, groups of veterans came to Washington to protest, although they did not disturb operations at National Headquarters. They were joined by many more students who congregated during the weekend of April 24-25.

On April 26, I spent several hours with five young people who planned to visit the Headquarters with substantial numbers of protesters the following day. These were bright, reasonable young people, idealistic in their outlook and frustrated.

They wanted to confront each employee of Selective Service, arguing the morality of the draft. I would not let them do that, but I did promise to permit them to meet employees who wished to talk in a designated room of our building, and I also agreed to invite employees to a nearby park to talk with them if any wished to do so. We found it difficult to convince these young people that we would listen to them and still to make plans for the protection of our employees.

That evening, I wanted to take my family to dinner to celebrate Pam's fourteenth birthday. But with so many people protesting in downtown Washington, I decided not to risk an incident with my family. Later that evening, Pep called to say that the young people had held an organizational meeting where they decided to enter our building the next morning under the guise of going to a designated room but instead moving out and confronting our employees at their work places. Hearing this, we had no alternative but to prohibit them from entry.

When I arrived on April 27, about 75 young people had assembled in front of our offices, not attempting to block the entry of our employees, although they had done so earlier. After I learned that we had sufficient police protection, I agreed to invite groups of four students to one of our public information offices to talk with a few of our managers; I sat with two of these groups. I remember those, and other discussions, some of the most critical and exciting I have ever attended.

I recall the bright young girl who asked, "Why do we need armed forces?" As she talked, her face bespoke sincere idealism. Any professor would have been proud to invite her to his class. These young people could not rest with the awareness that nations always had fought wars; the weapons of terror perfected since World War II should make intelligent people consider war obsolete, they argued. Some of these youth saw the only threat to world peace coming from the actions of our own Nation. I tried to point to the times when we had invited catastrophe by our weakness or our lack of resolve to act, and the occasions when our determination to use force if necessary had prevented aggression and war.

We talked also about the morality of national actions. Many of these young people accepted more willingly the news from the North

Vietnamese than from our own sources. They had become so discouraged with our Nation's course that they felt more closely aligned with our official enemies than with the American leadership from either political party. Some of them assumed that because the South Vietnamese Government was imperfect, that of North Vietnam must be somewhat better.

Why cannot we rely upon volunteers? Invariably most discussions touched this point. It was not sufficient to note that if one opposed both the existence of armed forces and immoral national actions, reliance upon volunteers for the armed forces improved nothing. I cannot be certain, but I believe many of these protesting before our building felt guilt that they had been rescued from going to Vietnam by student deferments. Although the young women had no deferments, I believe they felt similar guilt that others of a less privileged class had been assigned the dangerous role of waging the Nation's war. I did not talk about guilt, but I did provide information about the extent to which the Nation still relied upon draftees to fill the ranks.

But the most penetrating question asked was, "Why do I owe the government anything?" So many young people posed the situation in these terms: "If this is a free country, why can't I be free, do my own thing, obey the laws I want?" Older associates of mine would term this an irresponsible position. But my young friends spoke with conviction.

So together we discussed the social contract of Locke and Rousseau and the philosophical positions upon which these ideas rested: that men serve the state in order that just laws, established by the general will, can preserve freedom. We talked about the positions of Hume and John Stuart Mill, continuing the thread of thought that the government may require each of us to serve in some ways in order to preserve society.

These young people talked a great deal about civil disobedience. On occasion we discussed the courage of Antigone when she defied Creon to bury the body of her brother Polynices. Few of these youth had read Thoreau's "Civil Disobedience," his protest against a government that protected slavery and carried war into Mexico. But most of them were familiar with the idea that Thoreau had done once what they were doing in 1971. We often talked about the testimony of Martin Luther King, Jr., expressed so poignantly in his "Letter from Birmingham City Jail."

So we talked of protest. But what of service? Must there not be some balance between freedom and authority? How could anarchy

insure justice? Should we give up what we have worked to gain, even though imperfect, for the possibility that something untried would be superior? Thus I reasoned.

I argued patiently that we must have armed forces that could not be maintained with volunteers. I am not certain that my hours of talking with young people convinced even one of them that I was right. But I am sure that many of them admired me for meeting them in discussion on their own terms. For my part, I believe these sessions, on this occasion and others throughout my two years as director, provided me with a continuing opportunity for growth and understanding of youthful protest. I met bright, motivated young people. Some were abusive, but not many; most treated me with courtesy and respect. That someone's frustration caused a momentary lapse of manners did not remove my desire to meet him on human terms. Doing so compensated me. But then I always have had great affection for young people.

While Ken Coffey and I were trying to build a bridge with the young in the city, the Senate Armed Services Committee was approving our draft reform legislation. Also on that fateful day of April 27, 1971, I had numerous calls from the White House, encouraging me to hold a press conference announcing that the efforts of the young people were useless, since the President already was withdrawing troops from Vietnam and reforming the draft. At first I replied that we had an emergency to handle, and that I had no time for a press conference.

Then another person called, saying he was speaking for Bob Haldeman and asking that I set up a news conference. I understood this message clearly. The White House staff demanded that I try some magic to convince the press that the youth campaign was useless. Shortly thereafter, one of the President's assistants inquired when I would hold the conference. I told him that by then students had blocked the entrance to our building prohibiting me from going anywhere. He suggested that I surreptitiously slip out of the rear of the building, agreeing to meet television crews on a prearranged corner. I thought then that the best way to gain coverage would be to alert reporters that at a certain time I would try to climb our back fence! I realized on that afternoon how isolated the people in the White House had become. I did talk to several reporters by telephone. At one point we received the report that students momentarily might attack the building to force their entry. The next day would be difficult.

When I arrived on April 28, the police already had begun the process of clearing a pathway to our building. I had determined that

we must continue our work despite the protest. In an hour, the police arrested about 200 young people, carrying each to a van, taking a photograph, and placing the person into custody. These protesters soon joined 10,000 others arrested alsewhere in the city and herded into Robert F. Kennedy Stadium. Since the court set bail at a figure higher than the students had expected, many of them had to spend that night in jail.

During that day, as rain fell, two young women carrying babies sat in front of the building, the only protesters not arrested. Again someone from the White House called to ask that I arrange a news conference. I told him I had spent 15 minutes talking to reporters as police were making their arrests. This finally satisfied him. Meanwhile a group of young people complained to me that I acted too militantly, although elsewhere in the city a rabble beat down a wall to force access to the HEW building.

On May 3 we faced our most dramatic day of protest. The young people had stayed on in the city, frustration among them mounting as the primitive conditions in their camp near the Lincoln Memorial became even less tolerable owing to theft, illness, and a permissiveness that offended the standards of many gathered there. After a weekend of planning the leaders of that movement elected to make a mass demonstration in Washington on that ominous Monday. People in the White House reacted by insisting that all Government offices be opened at regular hours, recommending that some of us come into our buildings three hours early to insure "normal" operations.

Dennis and Pep met me at a few minutes before five at my home, and we drove through darkness towards our building. Moments after we drove along Canal Road, someone sent a garbage truck crashing down the bluff beside that route, an act that left a tumbled mass of junk along the highway. Fortunately, we reached our building without further incident, although we saw many signs of stirring activity as well as evidence of comprehensive plans by authorities to resist violence.

In our building, we soon received radio reports of attacks on the transportation network into the city. A car burned on Key Bridge. But soon, demonstrators left the bridges, which were taken over by Army and Marine troops, and the young people retreated into the city to block traffic at intersections. I watched, almost as a witness to fomenting revolution, as about 50 protesters would gather at the intersection of 18th and "F" Streets, just below my sixth-floor office perch. With the change of lights, the protesters would bring trash cans and boxes into the streets to block vehicles. Before long, three

or four policemen on foot would come running to the scene, removing the obstacles to traffic, while the protesters regrouped elsewhere. Moments later, the hit-and-run theater began again with different players and so the pathos continued throughout much of the day.

We heard many conflicting, confusing reports by radio. When we went out for breakfast, we could see flares on the grass of the Ellipse where helicopters landed troops. Tear gas canisters went off in many places throughout the city, burning the eyes of many pedestrians. It seemed unreal walking on the streets with protesters marching from one place to another to cause trouble, while police cars weaved among the traffic that seemed jammed but still continued to move. Trying to do "business as usual" appeared as logical as dusting before Armageddon.

Thereafter we encountered no more mass protests in Washington or elsewnere. Attacks, generally at night, continued against our local boards, but we quickly gained organizational expertise to handle those disruptions without affecting our performance. The one form of protest that continued as long as we inducted young men came through the legal process.

Silent Protest

The most disturbing silent protest against Selective Service arose from failure to register. Only the young man knew for certain if he had complied with the law. We had no way to check upon his doing so. At one point I investigated whether it would be possible for us to compare our records with those of Social Security or Internal Revenue; I was told bluntly that doing this would infringe the privacy of the individual. I understood this, but I worried about the rights of the individual who had to go to war because another did not fulfill his obligation. Only in the small communities, where private matters often are perceived generally, did our boards know if young men registered.

My concern carried to our problem of enforcement in the courts. Erwin Griswold, the Solicitor General of the United States, called upon me in April of 1970 to warn that we faced a serious problem of enforcement. He indicated that the image of Selective Service needed to be recast to emphasize the civilian nature of the agency; that younger people must be appointed to responsible posts; and that we must show our desire to serve young people rather than simply to order them into the armed forces. General Griswold

advised that we draft new memoranda to provide local board personnel with clear guidelines for conduct. It was apparent that he wanted to help. But he emphasized that many cases were so rife with procedural errors that US attorneys could not prosecute them. The Solicitor General added that he thought many judges awaited some indication that our new administration intended to approach our responsibilities differently from those who worked before us, and that if we did they would help. But if we did not change, then we might soon have on our hands a law unenforceable in the courts.

With that sober warning, I hurriedly arranged a briefing where I learned that in many parts of the country we faced serious resistance. In Northern California half of all criminal indictments in the office of US Attorney James Browning covered Selective Service violations. We saw similar records from Boston. By October 23, I had enough information to make a comprehensive report to the President. In it, I noted that we had records of about 30,000 violations to the Selective Service Act, of which US attorneys had accepted about 11,000 for prosecution. The remaining 19,000 had been rejected because of local board procedural errors. Increasingly the courts insisted that the local boards justify their classification of a young man as I-A, a view quite opposed to the tradition that a young man had a responsibility to serve unless the local board determined a valid reason for deferment.

In 1966, Federal courts heard 663 cases for Selective Service Act violations. In 1969, that number had grown to 3,305 but 11,000 more remained in the hands of US attorneys. In 1969, only 1,746 cases were completed, and of these 901 involved convictions of which 545 were imprisoned. Throughout the Nation in 1969 about 1 man in 3 taken into Federal court was imprisoned; in some parts of the country, notably California, only 1 man in 15 whose cases were tried went to prison. In Texas judges sentenced violators to jail for as much as 5 years, while in Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and California the violators received what amounted to suspended sentences.

From this exploration, several problems emerged. First, the risks were not great for imprisonment if one disobeyed the law, particularly in California. Because the attitude of California judges became known by draft counselors throughout the Nation, many young men wishing to violate the law simply chose to move their records to a California board, a procedure that our regulations permitted. Thus we increased problems in an area where we could least cope with them.

In March of 1971 we ameliorated this difficulty somewhat with a new regulation, based upon an Executive Order, whereby a registrant ordered to report for induction by his local board could report to an AFEES near him rather than to travel back to his local board for processing. But he could not transfer his permanent board assignment. Nevertheless, the location of the violation determined the site of his trial.

The second problem derived from the local board's inadequate preparation of information on the violation. After carefully reviewing cases in California, I decided that we should return all marginal cases not yet sent to the Grand Jury for indictment, asking that the local boards study the case to determine if the young man again should be called in accordance with new instructions we had given to the board for classification, procedural delay, and call. Doing so made it possible for us to eliminate errors made when the first call was issued and it gave us a new violation more easily prosecuted in court in the event the young man did not respond a second time to his order for induction.

Third, we had a problem with judges, particularly in California. In my home state, I found one celebrated case where a young man had been classified as a conscientious objector by his local board. When called to his alternate work assignment, he abandoned it. In court, the judge found him guilty of doing so, gave him a probationary sentence, and then required that he cut the family lawn for two years.

In August of 1970, Solicitor General Griswold and I visited with Attorney General John Mitchell to emphasize the need for appointing judges who would uphold the Selective Service law. Attorney General Mitchell promised to do what he could in an admittedly difficult situation. General Griswold also promised to talk with an officer in the Justice Department, trying to persuade him to visit with the Chief Judge in San Francisco. The next day the man promised to carry that message. By the end of my service as director, we had some evidence that this work helped us in California.

Fourth, the load of Selective Service cases in the offices of US attorneys often came close to paralyzing their entire efforts. They had too many Selective Service cases, their lawyers often preferred to deal with more interesting issues, and they could not devote sufficient time to prepare our cases for trial. To assist the US attorneys we decided to utilize our Selective Service Reserve Officers who also were lawyers, letting them go through cases in US attorneys' offices to determine if they were ready for trial, and prepare them for the

attorneys who would defend the Government in court. This procedure seemed to provide needed assistance to prosecution, particularly in New York and California.

Despite our efforts to gain enforcement we did not improve considerably our performance in the courts as shown in the following table of Selective Service violation cases:

	1969	1970	1971
Total defendants:	1,744	2,833	2,973
Dismissed	747	1,570	1,701
Acquitted	97	236	236
Convicted:	900	1,027	1,036
Imprisoned	544	450	377
Probation or Fine	356	577	659

At the end of 1971, we still had a two-year backlog in the courts, with indictments exceeding cases accepted by about two to one. I left office convinced that in another emergency a Director of Selective Service must face early the means by which the agency seeks to gain support in the courts and thereby to enforce the law. Without some better agreement on enforcement between the three branches of Government, a director in the future may face an unacceptable degree of violation.

Another and less turbulent form of complaint faced us late in 1971. We had an appeal from Quaker groups to organize a continuing protest in our local board offices. When I consulted with our Selective Service lawyers I was surprised to learn that we had to handle such requests with great care because otherwise we would invite trouble for ourselves in the courts. Naively I assumed that anyone trying to encourage young men to break the law which we were trying to carry out was not entitled to the relative comfort of our facilities.

My General Counsel argued differently, and we thus permitted these people to stay in our outer offices provided they did not disturb registrants or our own people and did not cause overcrowding. But perhaps we lacked courage. In April of 1972 the Supreme Court refused to review the case of a man found guilty of distributing leaflets in a local board area. With that refusal we quickly communicated to local boards that no one could enter a local board area with intent to disrupt its operation or intimidate registrants from carrying out their responsibilities under the law.

After the Congress had extended the President's authority to induct, in the fall of 1971, enterprising antidraft lawyers began to dispute the Government's authority to induct young men for 90 days after the President had signed the measure into law. To test this proposition some of these lawyers introduced a class-action suit in California to bar the inductions. The logic employed was that the original law had had a 90-day freeze before men could be inducted under the procedures set forth within it; Congress never intended that subsequent amendments to the act would require a similar freeze, but these lawyers in the class-action suit argued that the freeze still held.

In Selective Service we had an immediate concern. If the suit succeeded, inductions of all young men since the amendments became law could be reversed. But other cases throughout the country argued that the amendments provided procedural rights that did not exist before, and that accordingly all actions by the System must of necessity be repeated before a man could be inducted. That reversal could have required us to register, hold a lottery, and classify all registrants once again.

The difficulties this could have imposed for those who had been registered in a prior year were nearly impossible to imagine; clearly the success of those actions could have blocked inductions for months. The Government had another major concern. If inductions had been illegal within 90 days after amendments were signed into law, so too would have been the inductions following any amendment to the law for the same period. A judgment thus could invite an avalanche of lawsuits. Damages would have been incalculable, especially where men had been killed or injured and their lives disrupted.

A judge in Boston handled one such case forthrightly. When the lawyer argued that the 90-day freeze applied to recent amendments, the judge asked about those inducted after previous changes in the law. The lawyer replied that these young men also probably had been inducted illegally. The judge replied that it did not seem possible that not one Member of Congress would have heard about so many illegal inductions, and he dismissed the case.

In California, another judge rejected a class-action suit. The next day, December 1, Justice Douglas ordered a temporary restraint upon inductions until the matter could be studied again by the court. On December 9, the judge hearing the case decided that the American Civil Liberties Union position did not have merit, and he dismissed the temporary restraining order.

Personal Confrontations

Thus it is apparent that my two years in Selective Service were at times fraught with confrontation and serious dispute. It was not likely that I could emerge without some personal involvement. I remember well two situations that drew me into the tension.

In September of 1970 I accepted an invitation to speak to members of the American Psychological Association at their annual meeting in Miami. I had no idea then that a scholarly meeting could become so boisterous. When Ken Coffey and I arrived in Miami, our host began to brief me on what I might expect. I learned that the hotel security man could not guarantee my personal safety because of the numbers of protesters expected. Accordingly, he had alerted the Miami police.

When I reached the room about 30 people had gathered to hear me, but soon many more appeared, most of them militant young people. I doubted that they were members of the association; of the 200 who eventually appeared, few seemed to have come for professional reasons. Speaking on the topic "Motivation and the All-Volunteer Force," I suspect I won few converts! After I had answered a dozen questions, mostly hostile, the hotel security man signaled to me to leave with him by the side entrance. As I left the podium, a young lady charged down the aisle shouting accusations.

In the hallway, three sturdy fellows entered a waiting elevator with me. For a moment I wondered what side they represented until their pocket radios gave them away. When the elevator stopped, they whisked me into another waiting elevator that took us to the twelfth floor, where we stayed in a room for a few moments. The policemen told me firmly that I was to leave by a side entrance to avoid a disturbance in the lobby. They arranged to have Ken Coffey bring our rented car there and they instructed him to drive away quickly, giving the appropriate directions. Thus we avoided further incidents. The Miami police have my continuing gratitude.

The second incident took place in my office. Because I had tried to maintain open lines to young people I met with groups almost every day. I had encouraged Lois to make appointments with those who wished to see me. When I arrived each morning, she presented me with a card that listed my appointments for the day. In the spring of 1971, a priest who taught at a Catholic college in New York State called to make an appointment with me. Lois confirmed a date of June 1. A few days following, he called back to say that the questions he wanted to ask were so important to all young people that he

wished the interview could be televised. Lois agreed, provided the priest would arrange for the crew; I had television interviews often enough so that we all accepted them as normal.

On that day, I had a luncheon appointment and returned to find the crew in my office awaiting me. I met the priest and four young people accompanying him. We sat at the end of my office on the furniture arranged in a "U" around an oblong coffee table. I sat in one chair, a tall young man, a young lady, the priest, and another young lady occupied a long leather sofa to my right, and the other young man was in the leather chair opposite me. After I had said a few words and asked background questions to help each of these five people overcome their nervousness, I asked them to proceed. The priest turned to the young lady on his left, inviting her to ask the first question.

Whereupon the woman stood, unrolled an elaborate scroll, and commenced reading. Although the content was by then familiar to me, this formalized procedure was not. She began by stating that "Whereas you, Curtis W. Tarr, Director of the Selective Service System, are an immoral war criminal," and then continued to claim that 73 percent of the American people wanted to be out of the war. Since Congress would not listen, these five had decided to take their case directly to public officials. In this long and militant lecture, I interrupted a few times, trying to point out where she had erred either in fact or judgment. But she had no interest in my interruptions; in fact, she was offended by my impertinence in speaking. At the end, I asked if she welcomed any reply, and she admitted no interest in hearing it.

The next question also took on the proportions of a speech, again read from a manuscript, by the second woman. She hammered on the point that public officials must listen since the Congress would not act. I countered by saying that a public official cannot judge the mandate with which any individual might speak, and therefore while we listen to all points of view, we must look to Congress and the President for guidance and obey the laws. To this she and the others took violent exception.

After nearly an hour, the second woman still was reading when Ken Coffey, the only other Selective Service person in my office, slipped me a note from Lois saying that these five young people intended to make a citizen's arrest and handcuff me following our discussion. At the end, Lois had typed the plaintive query, "What do we do now?" At about this time I noticed the room filling rapidly with photographers. After pondering the situation briefly, I decided to

terminate the conversation from a standing position. I rose while the woman read, interrupting her to say that I had listened patiently until then but at that point I would close the interview.

"Aren't you going to listen to the entire presentation?" the young woman screamed.

"All right, since you will not hear us, we hereby arrest you," mumbled the priest.

At that point each of the five fumbled in their clothes and came out with handcuffs eyeing me for an appropriate opening. Boldest of the five was the youth opposite me, who bounded around the coffee table intent upon his mission. I caught him with my hands, aided by adrenalin pumping in my system, lifted him off the floor and sent him flying across the room where he struck a camera case and started rotating backwards. Just then, a photographer from the *Washington Post* caught the action, winning for himself first place in news photography in the White House News Photographers' Association competition for the year 1971.

Thereupon the priest began to complain that the plan was hopeless; that he knew when he saw me that they could not handcuff me, so they should handcuff themselves together. This they did in two groups and laid themselves in front of two doors to my office, to prevent an exit by anyone. But the office had three doors, so photographers and newsmen left without difficulty. I called the General Services Administration police and asked that they take these people outside to the street but not arrest them. The police did so, dragging them across carpeting to the elevator and then again to the curb. Despite vigorous protests from the five, the police made no arrests, thus thwarting their attempt to gain a nationwide audience.

After the incident, I learned that these people had planned my arrest for months, hoping thereby to attract attention to their views since no one would listen otherwise. They arranged the interview and television coverage on a subterfuge and then called the media into a park before coming to the office to promise that the arrest and handcuffing would take place at three-thirty in my office. My warning came from the editors of the *Washington Post* who felt that they had been used by this group to help stage an event for publicity purposes. Thoughtfulness by the *Post* editors saved me a great deal of embarrassment. Police did arrest two of these same young people a few months later as they tried to wreck the board offices in Camden, New Jersey.

The next morning, Saturday, I found my picture on the front page of the *Post*, and my heart sank. I felt that I had not represented

the position I held in a dignified way. Besides, I had sought to communicate with young people and to understand their concerns, not to punish them or push them in my office. But the deed was done.

Calls and letters quickly approved of my action often in ways that I regretted. Several congressmen sent word of their support. State directors did the same. Virginia State Director Ernie Fears wanted to be my boxing manager! The following Tuesday, Lois came to me in Pep's office, saying that the President wanted to speak to me. When I reached my telephone Mr. Nixon said he had been reading the newspaper and wanted to compliment me. I apologized for the event, but he quickly took the opposite position. "Don't let them push you around," he counseled.

From then on, I found that picture on bulletin boards around the world, mostly in armed forces offices. When I spoke to any group of active or reserve officers, the one introducing me invariably referred to the event with obvious pride that someone had stood up for the Nation. So, uninvited as the incident was, it followed me thereafter. I never overcame my embarrassment because of it.

Nevertheless it did not change my basic aims in carrying out needed reform of Selective Service. In some small measure I sought to help heal the wounds of a great Nation, draw young and old together again, and assist in making way for a promising tomorrow.

6

Reorganization

The most noteworthy of our attempts to reform the Selective Service System involved changes to improve the equity in the way we selected young men to serve in the armed forces. But Pep and I had another important object in restructuring the agency: we wanted to make it a showpiece of efficiency as well. To most knowledgeable observers of government agencies, no organization in the Federal bureaucracy was in greater need of improvement. Perhaps that made the challenge all the more exciting to us.

Within a few days of our arrival at Selective Service, Pep and I began to pore over recent reports of Selective Service operations. The principal studies were done by The National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, a distinguished panel named by the President and serving under the Chairmanship of Burke Marshall, reporting in February of 1967; the Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement, commissioned by the House Armed Services Committee under the guidance of General Mark Clark, which completed its work on February 28, 1967; the Task Force on the Structure of the Selective Service System, an interagency group appointed by the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Selective Service, and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, led by General Carter B. Magruder, completing its study dated October 16, 1967; various reports prepared by the General Accounting Office; and finally, the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, chaired by Senator Edward Kennedy, which completed its report just before I became director in 1970. We also read carefully the studies ordered earlier by the Nixon administration, chiefly the Enke report, which led to the request to Congress for a change in the law in 1969.

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The results of these studies intrigued us because they reflected different philosophies. As an example, the Marshall Commission recommended that Selective Service consolidate the 4,000 local boards into 300-to-500 area offices, eliminate state headquarters and establish instead eight regional offices, create civilian panels at both area and regional offices to replace the local and state appeal boards, and use data processing equipment for keeping records and reports.

The Clark Panel, organized in part to blunt criticism of the status quo that came from the Marshall Commission, advised that Selective Service preserve the existing organization and not use centralized data processing equipment.

The Magruder Task Force called for some grouping of local boards in large metropolitan areas, but the members believed in preserving the existing organization. Like the Clark Panel, this group saw no advantages to data processing equipment.

The General Accounting Office advised that either local boards be consolidated or that clerical help be grouped for savings.

The Kennedy subcommittee counseled that Selective Service study the Marshall findings. It recommended the use of data processing equipment.

The key element in the Marshall findings focused upon a change in structure, moving away from dependence upon the support of the governor. Although I saw some wisdom in doing so, I did not believe we could accomplish this during an unpopular war; we needed all the friends we could hold, and most governors had helped us. To organize the System differently would require changes in the law that I did not believe the armed services committees of the Congress would support. So I did not attempt to change from states to regions. In retrospect, I doubt that we could have done otherwise.

I did find problems with our state organizations in metropolitan areas. For example, in New York we had a headquarters for New York City and another in Albany for the remainder of the state including Long Island. It seemed to me that the New York City office could better handle the work to be done on Long Island. We had difficulties in two other states with large urban concentrations, Illinois and Pennsylvania. But we were not able to make any structural changes in these.

We had another problem in California, where we concentrated our personnel too heavily in the northern part of the state, causing serious problems south of the Tehachapi Mountains. My first hope

was to split the state, establishing a headquarters in the south independent from the one in Sacramento. But we did not wish an emotional battle at the time.

After a great amount of negotiation, we finally established a regional office in Southern California managed by a Deputy Director who reported to Carlos Ogden, the State Director in Sacramento. We divided our call between these two regions. This new organization soon proved its worth.

Consolidation and Collocation

The opportunity to consolidate some local boards and to locate others together provided us with feverish excitement for two years. In 1940 Selective Service sought to establish a board in each county of the Nation. Obviously the philosophy in laying out counties in America had varied considerably; some counties in western states were larger than some entire Eastern states. Many critics argued that we should serve registrants rather than preserve authority on county lines. Thus in many places, Selective Service had already combined the activities of several counties, an innovation permitted by the 1948 law. Elsewhere many boards had been located together. Sometimes over a hundred did so, in order that efficiencies in the use of personnel could be achieved. General Hershey had begun this work with urban boards in 1944. Both efforts worked to achieve one of the goals set forth by the Marshall Commission, reducing the offices from which we operated.

At our first policy committee meeting in June of 1970, we discussed both consolidation and collocation of boards. Half a year later, as we looked at the budget constraints before us, we realized that we must absorb all cost increases in order to operate with an appropriation no larger than the one for the previous year. The only way we could do this was to reduce employment, nearly seven hundred people according to an early estimate.

But other problems convinced us that collocation would be a superior alternative to the status quo. With all of the changes in procedures and regulations we had imposed upon local board personnel, we wondered how we could supervise these people in dispersed locations so that their work would meet the increasingly severe tests of the courts. Locating the activities of boards together would reduce the number of executive secretaries.

It also would permit some of our offices to remain open longer. Many executive secretaries served part-time, and thus the board

office often was closed. Furthermore, training new part-time people posed difficult, often nearly insuperable obstacles.

Perhaps more important than any other rationale for collocation was the Selective Service policy of maintaining so many offices throughout a state. This procedure had distributed resources most heavily away from the urban areas where the greatest problems in the early seventies occurred. We maintained an office in Colorado where we had not drafted anyone for more than a year. If we had staffed offices throughout the Nation as generously as we did those in North Carolina, we would have required about 46,000 persons in board offices rather than 6,600. The attitudes of the appropriations committee members seemed unlikely to permit us to increase our bureaucracy as our calls diminished.

So we developed a careful set of guidelines for our state directors to follow, relying heavily upon recommendations of specialists from the Office of the Archivist of the United States. We would eliminate no board; we would ask each board to continue meeting in the same community; and a person working from a central office, with a minimum of two persons full-time, would assist each board. Longer open hours for offices would be more convenient to working registrants. When a board met, the Selective Service employee assisting the board would go to the community early enough in the day to meet with registrants who might have questions, and with board members if any needed help. All of this would operate under the existing law that permitted us to locate together the activities of boards in a five-county area. We would make registration possible in several places in each community.

State directors responded with creative plans that dramatized the benefits of such changes. Late in February, 1971, Major General Jack Blair from West Virginia told me he could reduce his operations easily to a fourth of his present locations. A few days later, Vic Bynoe in Massachusetts showed me his plan to operate from 18 offices. Jimmy Davis in Mississippi proposed contracting from 89 to 22 locations. Mike Hendrix persuaded the Governor of Georgia to endorse his plan for combining 164 sites into 60. Major General F. B. McSwiney from New Hampshire reported fine progress on his plan to operate from four locations. Ernie Fears anticipated no difficulties in Virginia. Pete Pierce in Florida, where there had not been a board in each county since World War II, told me in mid-March that he expected smooth sailing. So did Major General Melhouse in North Dakota. Frederick Palomba, the new State Director in Connecticut, wanted to operate from seven sites. These reactions typefied what

we received from most states, where the leaders perceived that these plans could reduce costs, improve service, and encourage better supervision. Nationwide, we estimated that we would reduce full-time equivalent local board personnel from 6,599 to 5,772, and sites from 3,168 to 1,199, while maintaining each of the 4,102 local boards. The 826 people removed from our employment would reduce the cost of operating the agency by about 10 percent, a savings certainly worthy of consideration.

But I soon learned that politicians view these matters differently.

By mid-February 1971, community pressure began to build, with frantic appeals to me not to close offices. Governors promptly wrote for explanations and so did members of Congress. Furthermore, I learned at the same time that one of those officers I had retired was spending a considerable amount of time on Capitol Hill, campaigning against collocation; friendly calls from several congressmen kept me appraised of his activities.

To withstand the mounting political pressures, I began daily trips to Congress early in March. Most of the senators and congressmen simply wanted information. But early in my visiting, I encountered one resolute gentleman from North Carolina who warned me to go slow on collocation or face difficulties in appropriations. About the same time, Ed Braswell called to say that Chairman Stennis was upset by the pressure that collocation had brought upon him.

Before I could visit with the chairman, Congressman Jack Brinkley, with seven others, helped to change our course. Debate on our bill to reform the draft and extend the President's authority to induct had begun in the House. The Brinkley amendment would prohibit collocation.

I had impressive support. Congressman Nichols called me to his office, looked me straight in the eye and said, "If that is what you really believe, then whatever you do stay with what you think is right." Peter Flanigan insisted that under no circumstance should we back down under congressional pressure on collocation. One morning I read Moses' admonition to Joshua, "Be strong, be resolute." This seemed particulary timely.

Friends on the Hill called to advise me where to apply my persuasive effort. I rushed to respond. I found one determined member of the Georgia Delegation who had convinced the state legislature to denounce our collocation plan, and he vowed to do the same in Congress. When I visited with him, and others like him, invariably I had a good audience. Primarily these people wanted information.

But their pressures were not my pressures. One man from Mississippi smiled as he told me that the ladies who ran the local boards in that state knew that they had "the best deal in town." People understood our problems. Congressman Brinkley ended a long and thoughtful session with me by saying that he knew I had studied the matter with great care and that he and others admired me for the stand I took. He did not mean he would vote with me; he could not. But he admired my stand.

Chairman Stennis had perplexing problems. No one ever helped me more than he did, and he handled me as a father caring for his son. I am certain the chairman understood what we sought to accomplish. But, as will be shown later, he had decided to await action in the Senate on draft legislation until Eddie Hebert could marshal forces in the House and pass a bill. As he waited, the venerable leader wondered what kind of bill he could present that his colleagues would accept. He knew then much more than I the emotion over Vietnam that soon would explode like a clap of thunder in the Senate chamber.

One afternoon in mid-March, Chairman Stennis granted me a long visit on the subject. He did not share with me the specific pressures he felt in his home state, although I knew they must be substantial. And no one tried harder to represent his constituents than John Stennis. Also, the chairman clung too closely to the older norms of statesmanship to share with me any of the concerns and hopes that his colleagues had thrust upon him. But I could sense their weight as he spoke. Finally, he said that he did not see how he could accept the responsibility for enacting the President's program of extending and reforming the draft if I continued to make major changes like collocation.

Only an idiot would proceed against the chairman's warning.

I explained to the chairman that I might have gone so far on my plans that I could not easily withdraw from them. He then suggested that the best way to handle the matter might be to let the Congress write something into the legislation that would accomplish what many Southerners wanted and what I could not now gracefully suggest. We both promised to think more on the matter. Meanwhile, I decided to order state directors to hold further action on plans that were then in the process of adoption.

Meanwhile, pressure in the North Carolina Delegation threatened to erupt into a major confrontation. To discuss it with care, we invited these men to meet with us, asking Bill McCachren, our North Carolina Director, to present his plan. We did so at a breakfast meeting in the Capitol on March 30.

Bill's presentation went well. The congressmen asked excellent questions. A few tried to support us. But as the hour passed, the senior people indicated their bitter opposition. Finally Senator Sam Ervin denounced the plan as foolish, indicating that we could not possibly have introduced it at a less appropriate time. After a long peroration, he promised to do everything possible to defeat us. That opposition obviously depressed us.

The next morning, March 31st, the House Armed Services Committee asked us to prepare an amendment that Jack Brinkley could introduce to prevent collocation. Sam Shaw took it to the Hill. That afternoon it passed with a voice vote. Congressman Arends, who was supposed to handle our bill in the House, had to leave suddenly for Illinois owing to the death of a sister, and my former Congressman from California, Charlie Gubser, had to substitute without preparation on that issue. After the collocation amendment had passed, Congressman Brinkley quickly introduced another amendment to terminate multicounty boards, an action that passed almost unnoticed by a voice vote. That reversed a provision that had been in the law for years.

So I had really walked into a trap. Some of the people on my staff had argued the case for financial reasons, but the arguments proved unreliable. I was to blame for accepting them. All of the members of my staff agreed that collocation had merit other than the savings we could realize. But without question we could have made much more impressive progress by awaiting the enactment of the new bill. Clearly I had made a serious strategic error.

Sometimes when you fail you never receive another chance. Luckily we gained partial restitution.

After we had weighed the implications of the second Brinkley Amendment, we decided not to react to it as if it were law. To do so would have forced us to open 340 new offices: 216 to replace consolidated, intercounty boards; and 124 to split up the locations of boards formerly collocated. Texas would have required 138 new locations, Kansas 23, Washington 21, and Florida 16. Somehow, we felt, the Senate would help us. But we could not disregard the House action completely, particularly because of opposition to us existing in the Senate.

Our patience paid a dividend. On April 23, the Senate decided to eliminate the House language on intercounty boards, and it decided also to permit collocation in a state with the consent of the governor. This provided us with some encouraging latitude, if the conference would agree.

I had one more confrontation with a congressman from North Carolina. Because of budget constraints, we had to reduce some of the ladies there from full to part-time. The congressman argued that Congress would always provide sufficient money to take care of such salaries. I countered by suggesting that they had failed to do so in the previous year, reducing our budget from $76 to $75 million. He insisted that it must have been a Bureau of the Budget action, but I pointed out that it clearly was not. He reasoned that this was a poor time to cause unemployment in North Carolina, that the ladies could not live on part-time compensation, that they could not find other work; that the communities they served relied upon them to do many things other than Selective Service business. All I could say in reply was that I had to solve the problems I faced with the money I had been given. After serious conversation, he rather cheerfully asked me to take another careful look.

With that, the opposition collapsed.

The conference accepted the Senate language. Before I left Selective Service, state directors had begun quietly to work with governors to adopt plans for collocation. Major General Melhouse did so with Governor Guy in North Dakota. Meanwhile, Art Holmes did the same with Governor Milliken in Michigan. In the Upper Peninsula area, registrations had cost us $70 each, as we operated 34 offices, some of which were occupied only 16 hours a week. Art's plan consolidated this effort into 8 administrative sites, each staffed by two full-time people.

Collocation, as it proceeded, overlapped with the dismemberment of the entire Selective Service System. But it provided us with valuable experience. We knew it would work, that in a future emergency we had no reason to return to the local system set up in 1940; and that it would be foolish to do so.

Paperwork: Forms and Reforms

Another major effort involved us in almost no publicity, but gave us good experience. In 1970, Selective Service employed the same paperwork methods that had been adopted by the pre-World War II agency. We worked entirely with handwritten, typed, or printed papers. In October of 1970, John Dewhurst began to apply his restless mind to the problems of storing and maintaining information on registrants.

The Department of Defense frequently asked for information about registrants, in order to improve its mobilization planning. But

we could only respond by requesting officers in each state to answer particular questions. Usually the states could do so only by going through mountains of records and making hand tallies. Our answers to the Defense Department, when finally given, lacked consistency, and we had no way to verify the results.

Obviously the Marshall Commission had these problems in mind when it suggested the extensive use of data processing equipment. Few doubted the efficiency of doing so. The Clark Panel and the Magruder Task Force objected because the use of centralized data processing might take away some of the independence of the local boards. Since the Justice Department lawyers already had told us we had to curb that independence or fail in the courts, we had other reasons for doing so as well. Besides, data processing did not interfere with the quality of judgment that was the strength of the local board.

One problem in these preliminary studies was how to place the information into computer memory. We realized that we must store this data on computer tape and extract it by batch processing; live storage would have cost a great deal at that time and would provide no compensating advantages. But how should we place the data on tape?

Keypunching was the tested means of doing so, making a small computer card on a machine similar to a typewriter, and then using the card to create an electronic "image" on a computer tape. Many organizations, insurance companies for example, went through these same steps to record similar information.

But John Dewhurst had another idea. He reasoned that if we created the registration at the board on an optical character recognition (OCR) typewriter, then we could employ optical scanners to read the information from the form and place it directly on the tape. Probably if I had known enough about optical scanners, I never would have authorized him to go ahead. Few were in use. To employ them, we would need an OCR typewriter at each local office. Because scanners then had little flexibility, we foresaw at least part of the training we would be forced to undertake, in order that the work from 3,300 locations would pass the demanding requirements of an impersonal scanner. In what now seems to have been an incredible leap into the arms of fate, I decided to go ahead with optical scanning. It worked!

From the start, we encountered resistance. Some said the process would not work. The General Services Administration argued;

that we had established unrealistic purchasing schedules. A manufacturer charged that we had not purchased OCR equipment properly. Meanwhile, the reports on the possibilities of our work encouraged us. Throughout 1971 we worried about allegations against us; but at the end of that time, no more obstructions lay ahead.

One afternoon, I visited a warehouse we maintained near Washington. There our people, through an arrangement with the local high school, had hired students, working under the supervision of their teachers, to type the information on 1971 registrants onto registration forms; from there they went to the optical scanner. This employment helped young people earn money badly needed to supplement family incomes, and it solved a problem for us. Later I went to our data processing center near Alexandria, Virginia, where I watched the scanner and the computer operating. The process seemed nearly flawless.

Fiscal and Other Economies

After solving the software problems of what we called our Registrant's Information Bank, our bright and dedicated young people turned to the challenge of developing accounting and payroll systems for the agency. This had not been completed when I departed from Selective Service, but we planned to inaugurate the new service with the start of fiscal 1974, a few months after my departure.

In this exercise, we learned a great deal that in another day others might be able to use. Certainly if we again establish the machinery for conscription, we must utilize computers and data processing to store and provide information. Had we developed these techniques earlier, we could have done all paper activities by computer after the original registration, provided we continued to update the individual file. The computer could print a call for the preinduction physical examination, for induction, or for information needed for classification. Backup tapes would provide security against destruction. Any local or state office could be burned without disrupting the system. A monthly printout would provide each board with all the information required about registrants, eliminating most filing and record-keeping there. (Much of this philosophy of processing became the basis for mobilization planning undertaken in 1975.)

Throughout our time together, Pep continued a program of cost reduction that would have pleased any hard-nosed business executive. He attacked our costs of equipment, travel, overtime, paperwork, postage, and general operations. One will never know what costs

would have been without his efforts. But aside from our feelings that these reforms provided an overall standard for a national system, they gave us confidence when we went to the Congress to ask for the money for another year. I never felt that we were careless spenders in any respect.

One way to reduce expenses came through the service centers. In 1970, each state provided all of the administrative support for its headquarters and local offices. In the larger states, no particular difficulties arose in doing so. But the smaller states had to process payroll and employment records by hand, a costly process. Furthermore, this fragmented system would have made impossible a computerized accounting system.

Earlier, Selective Service had agreed to centralize these functions in regional centers to utilize equipment available through the Treasury Department. In the fall of 1970, we opened our first of six regional centers in Fort Worth, Texas. Soon thereafter we established centers near San Francisco, Atlanta, and Denver. Chicago and Philadelphia followed that next year.

As we looked forward to the extension of the President's authority to induct in 1971, Dan Cronin, Glenn Bowles (who had come from Iowa to work with Dan), and some of their associates determined new procedures that would eliminate substantial work at the local board. In any year not all eligible men would be called, and that probably would be true in any future emergency. Thus it appeared that we could calculate the random sequence numbers needed for the year, add for a contingency, and then classify the men with numbers above that ceiling into a new I-H category. Doing so would eliminate the need for action by the local board for men in that group.

Since many men asked for a hearing when the local board classified them I-A (this was a legal means of delaying availability for call), the board and the executive secretary would save a great deal of effort if the men with high numbers, perhaps half of the total pool, were not placed in a classification that was not vulnerable to call. To do so, we would classify them I-H. Similarly, the board would avoid hearing appeals for conscientious objection or hardship if those registrants in I-H did not feel threatened by the possibility of a call. Technically a young man could appeal this I-H classification, if he wanted to make a point about conscientious objection, for example, but most registrants would not bother to do so. More important, the new I-H classification would provide registrants with assurance they did not have under the existing system.

Although the I-H plan required no legislative authorization, we did not want to endanger the final passage of the draft reform bill by announcing these intentions prematurely. We did not believe anyone would object seriously, but our collocation experience taught us to fear any action that would disturb legislative agreement on other issues.

Consequently, we did not announce I-H until after the President signed the act. In a series of training conferences held throughout the Nation in the late fall of 1971, we prepared our personnel to take advantage of this important change. In the future, it should be an integral part of any random selection system.

As I met with Selective Service personnel across the land, I tried to illustrate the need for change by drawing upon experiences in other contexts. One of the most durable of these came from my interest in early American History.

Most of us remember the story of Pocahontas, who saved the life of Captain John Smith when he fell captive to the warriors of Powhatan, her father. Later she married John Rolfe, the man who introduced tobacco culture to Virginia and thus provided an economic basis for the survival of the colony at Jamestown. As the first Englishman to marry an Indian woman, Rolfe wanted to take Pocahontas to his homeland to meet the Queen.

Powhatan saw no evil in this, but he imagined in the opportunity a chance to measure the strength of the English nation. While he had lived peaceably thus far with the new settlers, some day war might come, and then he would require some estimate of the strength of his adversary. So Powhatan gained Rolfe's permission to send along one of his warriors as a friend of Pocahontas, someone with whom she could talk in her native tongue about her homeland and the people of her village. Powhatan instructed the warrior to take with him a stick that he could notch for every Englishman he saw when he reached the foreign shore.

When the party landed, the warrior immediately began notching his stick, but even his furious pace could not account for the many strange people he encountered. Soon he abandoned the stick, enjoyed his visit, and prepared to return to America. Sadly, Pocahontas contracted a disease and died in England not long after her arrival.

Thus the warrior brought the sad news of Pocahontas' death to Powhatan. But eventually the Indian chieftain asked for the stick by which he could measure the strength of the English nation. The warrior told of his perplexity upon landing but Powhatan persisted in

his request for information. So, according to one early Virginia historian, the warrior answered in words with a biblical ring: count all the stars in the sky, all the leaves on the trees, all the grains of sand on the seashore, all of these and even more are the people of England.

Too often in the past, Selective Service had tried to stay abreast of progress with a notched stick. No longer could it do so in the future.

Conscientious Objection

With the worst of the Cambodian confrontation behind us, and a good start on reshaping the agency, perhaps we faced life a bit too complacently. If so, the Supreme Court changed our lives dramatically with the *Welsh* Decision on June 15, 1970. This action interpreted that part of the Universal Military Training and Service Act that exempted from combatant and noncombatant service a young man "who, by reason of religious training and belief, [is] conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." Specifically, the court, divided five to three, concluded that a person merited the exemption if he deeply and sincerely held beliefs, even though partly ethical or moral, that imposed upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in war in any form.

A History of American Conscientious Objection

Conscientious objection had been a part of American tradition since the founding of some of our colonies. The first national conscription in 1863 did not exempt a man who was a conscientious objector, but it did permit hiring another to go in one's place. At times, Quaker communities had difficulty raising sufficient money to engage others to do so, and President Lincoln, apparently, was torn between his obligation to uphold the law and his desire to help those sincere people.

In World War I the law exempted from the draft those who were members of religious organizations holding principles against participation in war in any form. Obviously that language prohibited the Nation from drafting members of the historic peace churches, thus

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sparing President Wilson the grief that came to President Lincoln. The President had authority to assign conscientious objectors to noncombatant duty in the armed forces; in 1918, he permitted men with personal rather than religious objections to be assigned to noncombatant duty as well.

The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 extended the basis for classification as a conscientious objector by offering that status to anyone who could prove sincere opposition to participation in war in any form by reason of "religious training and belief." Thus the Nation agreed that a person might be a conscientious objector even though not a member of an historic peace church; the new dimension imposed the duty on the local board to measure whether the person met this standard. Could a man profess to be a conscientious objector when his church did not officially oppose war in any form? Or would a man be a conscientious objector if he did not belong to any church?

Between 1940 and 1948, two appeal courts held that "religious training and belief" did not include philosophical, social, or political beliefs. But members of both armed services committees in Congress worried that the concept might become loose and thus unenforceable, so in 1948 they added to the language of the 1940 Act:

> Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.

From testimony given then and later, the committee members clearly intended to restrict this provision of the law.

Nevertheless the Supreme Court interpreted their action differently in the *Seeger* Decision of 1965. There, the court considered three cases involving the same principle but tested under dissimilar circumstances. The court decided that the Congress had chosen the words "Supreme Being" instead of "God" so that the law would permit exemption to members of all religions, while excluding essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views. The court continued,

> We believe that under this construction, the test of belief in a relation to a Supreme Being is whether a givén belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption.

Shock waves followed, thundering throughout Selective Service and in the armed services committees as well. The decision, handed down on March 8, 1965, came just a few months before President Johnson made his ominous pledge to send 50,000 men to Vietnam. Calls increased, as did protests to the draft. To evaluate criticism of the draft, President Johnson named the Marshall Commission, mentioned earlier. Its members did not recommend any changes following the *Seeger* decision. But L. Mendel Rivers, Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, named the Clark Panel to air another side of virtually every question raised; members of the panel worried seriously about the *Seeger* ruling, thinking that soon the individual might become the judge of his own case. Thus the panel advised returning to the language of the 1940 Act as an indication that Congress wanted the concept treated as it had been during World War II.

Both houses weighed the matter carefully. Many questioned if the Nation could return to the 1940 operating concept. But finally the House prevailed in the conference, and the new law of 1967 restated the 1940 language. The report from the Senate did not mention conscientious objection, while the report from the House Committee did so specifically as it related to the *Seeger* decision. To reduce the possibility of unjustified appeals for exemption, the report explained, the committee rewrote the law so that legitimate claims thereafter must be based upon "religous training and belief" according to the intent of Congress in 1940. The conference report indicated that the Senate conferees agreed to narrow the basis for classification as a conscientious objector. Thus Congress attempted to show its intent.

The Supreme Court in 1970 found in favor of Welsh despite the fact that Welsh did not consider himself to be religious and his views largely were political. The court said that the views of registrants could not be held against them in this regard, because

> very few registrants are fully aware of the broad scope of the word [religious], and accordingly a registrant's statement that his beliefs are nonreligious is a highly unreliable guide for those charged with administering the exemption.

If the views held are "religious," then the claim cannot be rejected even if it is based partly upon political conviction, the court concluded.

Implications of the Welsh Decision

The blockbuster decision immediately put me on the spot. Reporters within minutes of the announcement clamored for clarification on what Selective Service would do. Within the agency and among friends in Congress, two groups offered opposing recommendations. One of these urged that we try to interpret the Supreme Court action to the local board. The other insisted that we set aside the ruling on the logic that Welsh had failed to report for induction in 1965 and had been sentenced in 1966; thus the Supreme Court had judged the case appropriately under the language of the law at that time and in light of the *Seeger* finding; since the language of the law had been changed, the *Welsh* decision did not apply to the situation in 1970. My General Counsel held to the latter view, as did members and staff on the House Committee on the Armed Service.

The view that the decision did not apply to the present law had technical merit. The opinion by Mr. Justice Black consistently refers to the language of the law written in 1948, making *Welsh* the logical extension of *Seeger*. Thus superficially I could find reasons to overlook the decision. The more fundamental question, however, preoccupied my thoughts. Would the Supreme Court focus national attention on a legal point that had only historic interest?

Alone, I pored over both the *Seeger* and *Welsh* decisions, trying to follow the logic. As I did so, I could not believe that the Supreme Court would have found differently in *Welsh* if it had dug more deeply into the 1967 change of language. Members of the court understood the congressional intent of 1967; but still they preferred to interpret "religious training" broadly rather than to discard the entire section of the law as defective under the First Amendment. I felt I had no alternative, so I met the press on the following day and said we would attempt to follow the law as interpreted by the court, instructing our local boards on how to do so.

Much of the decision still troubled me, and I did not handle the press well. Members of my staff had pleaded with me not to face a critical press group so soon. But I decided to do so, sensing that many judges, US attorneys, and suspicious young men would await my decision. Some organizations fighting for the rights of conscientious objectors wanted me to admit that *Welsh* permitted more than the decision allowed. Some editorials opposed me. Senator Goodell introduced a bill to remove me from my job for ignoring the Supreme Court and to abolish the System as well.

But Chairman Stennis upheld my decision and so did Secretary Laird. One board in Chicago resigned with the declaration that a

local board could no longer judge conscientious objection. But thereafter the tension eased. Many stated, prematurely, that we already had a volunteer Army.

Within the agency we began to draft an appropriate local board memorandum (LBM) to instruct volunteers throughout the System. Three weeks after the *Welsh* decision, we released LBM 107, trying to incorporate the Supreme Court tests for both *Welsh* and *Seeger*, since the System never had published instructions to its boards following the landmark ruling in 1965. Justice Department lawyers cleared LBM 107 before we released it.

We emphasized three requirements that local board members must find satisfied. The applicant must oppose participation in war in any form. The applicant must be "religious" as the court found Seeger and Welsh to be; this may include moral or ethical beliefs, but those beliefs must be the primary controlling force in the man's life. We added a sentence that we did not find in any of the tests given us by the court: "The registrant must demonstrate that his ethical or moral convictions were gained through training, study, contemplation, or other activity, comparable in rigor and dedication to the processes by which religious convictions are formulated." This was an attempt to help local board members assign some meaning to the idea of "training" that the law still required but the court had not mentioned. Finally, we indicated that a registrant failed to qualify if he did not hold beliefs that rested, at least in part, on ethical, moral, or religious convictions.

Before releasing LBM 107, we asked for help from state directors. We also invited representatives from some of the more active outside organizations interested in conscientious objection, who provided us with their ideas. Doing that began to close the only major legal incident on conscientious objection that we had during my two years in the agency. We faced spirited encounters, but never anything to wrench the system as *Welsh* did. The following March, the Supreme Court gave us a clear eight-to-one decision opposing conscientious objection to a particular war.

Naturally many people questioned the effect *Welsh* might have had upon those who applied for conscientious objector status. We never found a way to measure that. The *Welsh* decision came in June, a time when petitions to local boards began to increase owing to graduations from college. But over the years, more young men had thought about conscientious objection; in fiscal 1952, at the end of the Korean War, local boards had classified 7,602 young men I-O (Conscientious Objectors); in fiscal year 1970, local boards had classified 19,714 in that way. The comparison is more dramatic when one

considers that under random selection, less incentive existed for men with high numbers to make a plea in 1970, whereas the entire pool of men was subject to call in 1952. With calls of about 200,000 in fiscal 1970, local boards classified 1 man as a conscientious objector for every 10 inducted. Thus, with many more than the 19,000 requesting consideration, local board personnel had a gigantic task in handling these pleas fairly.

I appreciated meeting many of those people who represented the organizations interested in conscientious objection. Although circumstances drew lines between us, we all strove to bridge those gaps when we could. One day Mr. Andrew Kinsinger and an associate from the Old Order Amish in Pennsylvania came to visit with me. The young men from this order had been sent to a farm established by the order to do alternate service, and these leaders wanted to preserve this arrangement made years before with General Hershey. I gladly consented to do so, and I plied them with questions about their lives. I was sorry I could not accept the invitation of these fine people to visit in Pennsylvania.

The Seventh Day Adventist Church historically had supplied large numbers of young men in the I-A-O classification, meaning a conscientious objector who would serve in the armed forces as a noncombatant. The leadership of the church felt a responsibility to continue assisting the Government in this regard, although their young men increasingly wanted to be I-O, conscientious objectors out of service, and they wanted to serve their church overseas. I encouraged these representatives to establish alternate service programs overseas that I could approve.

I had great sympathy for those who objected to war as a matter of conscience, particularly those who did so on religious grounds. Everyone who believes in God must assign all other loyalties in his life to a lower priority. I have always done so. I believe wars and warfare are wrong but often they are not the greatest evil among the alternatives available to us. I do not believe God commands us to be pacifists. Thus I am not a conscientious objector, even though I understand why sincere people could be.

With several groups I encountered resistance to our desire really to learn what young men believe. These representatives argued that almost all applicants for conscientious objection are sincere, and thus we did little service to the Nation to test these beliefs in the local board. I replied that often local board members complained that many applicants for conscientious objection were trying merely to defeat the system. These representatives could not believe this; I

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must confess that I never had any data that went beyond what our people commonly accepted as true. But clearly the law required the system to weigh evidence and make judgments.

These people with whom I worked frequently called or wrote the instant they thought we erred. In February of 1971, we learned that we had used objectionable language in a form letter. When Pep and I saw the letter, we agreed and promptly changed it. Late in 1971 we had one misunderstanding over the form by which registrants applied for exemption as a conscientious objector. Some in the agency wanted more detailed questions on the form, and I was one of these, while others argued for a short form. We solicited the best suggestions of people in the System concerned particularly with problems of classification. Finally, we decided to ask for help from the outside organizations. Misunderstanding us, they printed the form without explanation in a publication with nationwide circulation to draft counselors, a move that generated mountains of mail and telephone calls keeping most of us busy for weeks!

Alternate Service

Although our boards did not have particularly difficult problems classifying conscientious objectors under the *Welsh* guidelines, and our inspectors continued to watch carefully how they did so, still they had problems with placement of "I-Os" in alternate service. This developed into a major problem for which we never found adequate solutions. It became so difficult in one state that the director asked me to petition Congress for a change in the law to eliminate alternate service.

Meanwhile, members of the House Committee on Armed Services moved in the opposite direction. Chairman Hebert opened hearings during February of 1971 by suggesting that the law be changed to permit any young man to become a conscientious objector if he volunteered to accept three years of alternate service. Members of the committee, worried about the increased interest of young men in conscientious objection as a way to avoid service, agreed with the chairman and wrote this provision into the legislation the House sent to the Senate. The chairman defended three years of service as opposed to two years in the armed services because by law the discharged soldier had another four years of obligatory service in the Individual Ready Reserve; as such, he could be called to active duty in an emergency, usually to replace a man lost in combat.

Some of our people worried about the Hebert initiative. The organizations interested in conscientious objection opposed it. Solicitor General Griswold thought judges would resist special punishment (in terms of longer service) of conscientious objectors, and he believed that ultimately such a law would be declared improper in the courts. All we could do was to await action in the Senate where Senator Schweiker told me that he and others disagreed with the House provision. Late in April, the Senate did eliminate the House language and the Senate version prevailed in the conference.

With alternate service, our problems continued, and in fact grew throughout the two-year period.

Most conscientious objectors found appropriate assignments for themselves in hospitals, churches, libraries, colleges, or welfare agencies. Some of them went to work when they found an opening, before the necessity for doing so. But in many communities, no amount of diligence produced appropriate opportunities, despite searching by registrants, executive secretaries, and board members.

Other registrants classified I-O had no interest in serving, and though they had the responsibility to seek appropriate work, the local board people had to keep a constant watch to make certain that the registrants did so. If the registrant did not find an opportunity for work before the time when he would have been called had he been classified I-A, then Selective Service could order him to an assignment if we had one, but his term of service commenced at that point. Many men fulfilled much of their obligation for service by awaiting our placement of them into a job.

One way to handle the problem was to establish Federal programs to undertake work that needed doing, funded by the Government. Of course there were opportunities in the Peace Corps and VISTA (Volunteers in Service to America); Joe Blatchford, the Director of these activities, and I worked together throughout the two years on assignments for I-Os. In May of 1970, I talked with Peter Flanigan in the White House, suggesting a Federal service for conscientious objectors. Peter seemed interested in the possibility. A few months later, we talked with Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, about the idea. From this discussion, we agreed on the establishment of a conscientious objector corps that would undertake projects assigned by other Government agencies.

There were also discussions at that time on national service. This idea fascinated many people in government and influential people in private life as well. Any start we made with conscientious

objectors would foreshadow the work that could be undertaken in a broader program. I had misgivings about a gigantic program of national service before the Nation had some clear idea what these young people could accomplish. It would take years before able people could organize and provide suitable work to harness the idealism of the young people who would be involved.

Nothing came of these rather ambitious plans. As we scaled down calls and worked to achieve a volunteer force, it seemed counterproductive to organize a Federal work program for conscientious objectors. We would have had to make a good case to the Congress for funding, and this we could not have attempted until 1972, a year of small calls.

In 1971, Congress changed the law by charging the National Director of Selective Service with finding work for I-O men and then supervising their participation. This improved the administration of alternate service over the former local board arrangements. But the director could not assign a conscientious objector to service until he had control of programs to which assignments could be made. Thus we made no real progress in the administration of alternate service.

But we did gain some experience in programs undertaken in California and Washington. In April of 1971 Congressman Harold T. "Bizz" Johnson called me. Bizz and I had run against each other in the Second Congressional District of California in 1958, and despite a hard campaign we have been friends ever since. Bizz told me that our mutual friend Jim Sterns, Director of Conservation for California, had proposed using conscientious objectors to do conservation work.

When I called Jim, I learned about his exciting plans. Jim wanted to use 5 of 21 camps built initially for prison interns in California but not occupied at that time. Jim said that Governor Ronald Reagan already had established a conservation corps for conscientious objectors. The young men would work for two years at $15 per month plus food and lodging, doing conservation work in the state and national parks and forests of California. Prison interns could not work on Federal lands, but these young men could do so. Sterns hoped for contracts with the Interior Department.

A few months later, I went to California to visit with Carlos Ogden and spent some time with Jim. During that time, he took me by automobile to Angel's Camp where we visited with the conscientious objectors working there. These men were learning to fight fire; they had already built equipment for California State Parks; some of them had worked on trails and had done development work on range

land. I talked with ten young men, all of whom seemed enthusiastic about the work they were doing.

The program in Washington State began just after the one in California. There our new State Director, Dick Marquardt, helped to spark the idea among state officials, and by the spring of 1972, he wanted to show me what he had accomplished. By helicopter we flew to Whidbey Island. There, the old Army coastal defense fort had become a home for ten conscientious objectors. They had been busy making trails, building campsites, constructing heavy tables, assembling cooking grills, and checking erosion. The morale among these young men seemed high. Each one told me how much he looked forward to the summer, working in the primitive camps at high elevation.

I had a good visit with the State Natural Resources people who supervised the work. They seemed genuinely pleased by the accomplishments. They had budgeted the time they thought the young men would take, based upon experience with summer crews, and in each case jobs had been finished on or ahead of the budgeted schedule.

The trip to Whidbey Island was my last in Selective Service. As I flew back to Washington, DC, I thought about what I had seen, something beautiful that these young men fashioned in the forests of California and Washington. Somewhere in the future, there may be many other young Americans who follow in their footsteps. Though modest, these were encouraging beginnings.

8

Visiting Servicemen

When I first visited with President Nixon in his office on March 4, 1970, I expressed a wish that as Director of Selective Service I might have the opportunity to visit servicemen in the field and on the water, throughout the world. The President seemed interested, but he asked why I wanted to do so. I explained that I would be visiting with scores of young people preparing for service and that I should know what conditions they would encounter. As a civilian not in the Department of Defense I might be a catalyst for change and improvement if I offered valid ideas to my friends there. Finally, as we all would be working toward the success of an all-volunteer force, any suggestions I could make that would help to improve enlistments could assist greatly. The President agreed with enthusiasm.

During my two years as director I took advantage of that opportunity. At bases in the United States, throughout Southeast Asia, in Europe and the Mediterranean, and at sea with the fleet, I learned a great deal. Some of my observations I reported directly to the President. More often I did so to members of his staff. My closest contacts were with Roger Kelley in Defense; Bob Seamans and John McLucas in the Air Force; Stan Resor and later Bob Froehlke in the Army; and John Chafee and John Warner in the Navy. I also maintained relations with the Service Chiefs and many friends who were officers in each service.

My extensive travels provided me with an appreciation for the attitudes of young servicemen about conscription. Of course, I had talked to many young people in civilian life who aired their complaints about the draft. But only a miniscule percentage of these ever went into the service. Thus I needed this contact with draftees.

Furthermore, I learned about the motives that prompted other youth to enlist. Difficult though these visits often were, they offered me insight I could gain in no other way.

I began my travels by going to Newport, Rhode Island, for an introduction to the Navy. Rear Admiral Sheldon Kinney, with whom I had done personnel work in the Pentagon, served as my guide. Our host welcomed us aboard *Puget Sound*, a destroyer tender, where I talked to officers and enlisted men, observing their work to maintain a destroyer or cruiser in operating condition at sea. Thus the tender was filled with machine tools; electronics gear; radio testing equipment; communications, electrical, and mechanical repair shops; and facilities for medical and dental care. The introduction served me well. I witnessed many examples of the extent of training the Navy had to provide to prepare young people for these tasks. The lessons for volunteerism showed plainly: the Navy needed bright young people willing to commit themselves to difficult working conditions for sufficient years to offset the cost of extensive training that many of them required.

Next we visited the *Farragut*, a relatively new ship with Terrier missiles for protection against aircraft. Again I marveled at the technology crammed into every conceivable space. From the *Farragut*, we went to the cruiser *Little Rock*, whose principal armament was the Talos missile. Sheldon and I visited these ships tied to the dock. Next we boarded the destroyer *Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr.*, for a short cruise. As the Commander took the *Kennedy* out to sea I observed young men at work with the vessel underway, learning more about the requirements of various positions.

After we had completed our run at 29 knots on two boilers (all four boilers provided steam to cruise at flank speed, 34 knots), I retreated below to converse with a dozen young officers, all bright college graduates. We talked about attracting men to volunteer for a "hitch" or a career in the Navy. These officers offered me excellent information about ROTC programs, retention in the Navy, pay and allowances, discrimination against bachelors, and overseas tours. I returned to Washington refreshed and thoughtful after that solid experience with the Navy.

Korea and Vietnam Visits

Although I visited Southeast Asia with the Air Force in the fall of 1969, I decided to return in 1970 so that I could spend time with ground troops in combat areas and also with young Navy men in the

Tonkin Gulf. I began early in December with visits to the Alaskan Command at Elmendorf Air Force Base near Anchorage and at the US Embassy in Tokyo. Everywhere I went I found diplomats and military men interested in progress at Selective Service and prospects for volunteerism. Few had much optimism for the latter, but I confessed how fragile were the chances to maintain the draft during the withdrawal from Vietnam.

In Korea I visited with troops at various locations. Most informative was my trip to those stationed on the DMZ (demilitarized zone). As I flew along the line in a helicopter, I saw the bleak area where American soldiers stood guard. Of necessity our Nation continued its commitment there. We landed and I walked along the fence with one young soldier. Soon, he and his unit would be replaced by volunteers. Could we attract sufficient numbers of them? Would the volunteers be good or better soldiers? Such questions made me uneasy as I walked along the DMZ at sunset, an icy wind biting through my coat.

Flying to Saigon, I went immediately to Danang where I boarded a Navy plane that landed on the deck of the *Ranger*, on Yankee Station in the Gulf of Tonkin. This 80,000-ton carrier was a home to 5,000 men who worked long hours under trying conditions. Often I saw men off-shift sleeping in their bunks under bright lights and amidst incredible noise that would have kept most of us awake constantly. I found that they had little space for personal articles, and *Ranger* offered virtually no place to which they could retreat; most of them spent their time at work stations where they did the complicated tasks of maintaining the supersonic and other aircraft that made *Ranger* such a potent factor in that grim war. Worst of all were conditions in the engine room where oppressive heat and coal dust made this like a scene from Dante's "Hell."

No one can take night operations on an aircraft carrier lightly. To bring supersonic aircraft weighing 55,000 pounds down onto a lurching deck the length of three football fields during the black of night strains imagination. These men did it each day and night during the six months or so that they remained on station. I could easily see how these long hours of tension could take a dramatic physical toll on the men.

I slept in the luxury of the Captain's cabin, but I could not be oblivious to life aboard this fighting ship. An elevator carrying planes from the hangar to the flight deck kept jarring the structure of the ship, along with voices barking commands, the roar of ammunition carts rolling down steel decks, the piercing scream of jet planes

straining at their tethering chains as they built up thrust, and finally the trembling lunge of the catapult. After a restless night I prepared for further visits with the fleet.

By helicopter, I flew to one of the nearby destroyers (a carrier would be vulnerable in hostile seas without a screen of ships to provide protection against submarines or surface ships). Within minutes we reached the *Anderson*, and I prepared to descend to the deck in a sling fastened to the helicopter's cable. This proved to be a unique and somewhat hazardous experience for an uninitiated, since no amount of careful piloting of both the destroyer and the helicopter could provide a fixed distance between them: one moment I dangled in the air and the next I had hit the deck with considerable force as it bounded up to meet me!

On land again I went first to the 23d Americal Division. The division commander took me to a fire base about 30 miles south of Danang where I met with a platoon of infantrymen gathered there. I talked with them, including two bandaged soldiers who had been injured nearby during an attack the previous day. Next we flew to Chu Lai to talk with a company of infantrymen who had just returned from the "bush" to dry out, draw clean clothes, and prepare to return to the field. They had been drinking beer and their exchanges were loud and boisterous when I entered. After their captain introduced me, one boy asked, "How does it feel to have a job where everybody hates you?" But we got along well. They talked about life in the Army and chances for volunteerism. Finally, the lad who had begun the conversation ended it with a request to draft a boy in his neighborhood of Los Angeles who was "no good at all!"

At nightfall the general and I flew to a small camp made by engineers building a road nearby. By then it was raining so hard that everyone had taken cover; the lieutenant commanding the group pointed to a "hooch" where I could find some men. I crawled there on hands and knees in deep mud, approaching a culvert converted into a shelter. One of the boys cheerily welcomed me: "It may be a sewer to some, but to us it's home!" We talked for an hour, studying each other by the light of a candle. That evening I had dinner with five young captains, company commanders who bore the burden of command in decentralized operations. We talked about leadership for the recruits of today and tomorrow.

The next day I flew north to the DMZ to join the First Brigade of the Fifth Infantry Division (the remainder of the Division had returned to the United States). We drove through a sea of mud to visit young men in infantry and artillery outfits. Next I went south to Hue

to visit the 101st Airborne Division. I spent an hour with some of the men of an infantry battalion preparing to return to combat, enjoying lunch with them.

The Marines accepted me next. Shortly after I arrived at the Headquarters of the First Marine Division I had a chance to sit alone with six men who had just returned from a patrol on which the enemy pinned them down by fire for an hour. Finally they had been brought out by helicopter. We talked about why they had joined the Marines, how they worked as a unit, what each one did, the weapons they used, and the tactics they employed. Each marine knew what the other did, and each respected the other. We spent a fascinating hour talking. Then I visited an infantry outfit where the young men I met seemed highly motivated. In contrast was the low morale of a truck battalion I visited just at nightfall. In the first two situations the young men thought a volunteer force would work if a few changes were made; in the truck battalion no one could see any amount of change that would insure the success of volunteerism!

The following day I went to Bien Hoa to meet Lieutenant General Michael Davison, Commander of the Second Field Force, Vietnam. Tall, handsome, and bright, General Davison impressed me as a superb commander. He immediately began to talk about the drug problem in Vietnam and what he was trying to do to curb drug use, particularly heroin. He had established a rehabilitation center where those wanting to break the habit were invited to seek the assistance of hard-core users who had reformed.

Together we flew to the First Air Cavalry Division where I talked for an hour with some young men who had volunteered to meet me. Accordingly, it was a "gripe" session where men complained about harassment, the indifference of noncommissioned officers, poor pay, the unpopular war, lack of promotion, inadequate training, and poor use of their talents. But one man made the session particularly enlightening: a recent graduate from the University of Iowa, he had a fine mind and a reasonable perspective. From there we went to a base camp, a battalion headquarters, where I met another group of disgruntled young men.

At mid-afternoon we flew to a fire support base near a rice-growing area where our troops were attempting to protect the rice harvest then underway. On a gloriously sunny day the men at "Fire Support Base Peggy" worked to improve their camp, did other chores, listened to music, and played softball. This reminded me of the frontier outposts in early American history with the flag flying proudly while the men of the cavalry troop busied themselves, awaiting the next call to action.

At another cavalry troop, this one part of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, I met the troop commander, a young West Point football player of a few seasons before. He was one of the finest leaders I have ever encountered. He offered to introduce me to his men, and I asked that he let me go with him to visit the crews at each of their vehicles. As we went from one to another I could see the genius of this young man at work. At each vehicle he had something positive to say: this crew kept the neatest vehicle, this tank gunner was the best in a recent regimental contest, that driver had the greatest skill under fire, this man handled a .50 caliber machinegun better than anyone else in the unit. The quiet, almost shy way he said these things impressed me that he meant what he said, and the men seemed to sense his honesty. If he said something in error his men corrected him politely and he accepted the correction in a way that indicated he felt no threat to his leadership. I would trust those men to follow their captain.

I made many other informative visits in Vietnam. I grew accustomed to bursts of gunfire and the explosions of artillery shells and bombs nearby and at a distance. This war was everywhere. I found many general officers who believed that the only chance to improve morale and to gain public support for the Army was to leave Vietnam. I went to Vung Tau to visit with the men who maintained Army helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. Many of these jobs required the same training and credentials that one would find in the Air Force and Navy. Before leaving Vietnam I stopped to talk with General Creighton Abrams, a leader who had great understanding for the problems of his men.

At Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines I visited my old friend (from Air Force days), Lieutenant General Marvin McNickle. He let me talk with some of the men on the base about their conditions and problems. From there I flew to Thailand for more visits with Air Force officers and men. The mission at U-Tapao was to support B-52 strikes in Vietnam and KC-135 tanker missions, and to refuel bombers from Guam and fighters from Vietnam and Thailand. From there I returned to the United States, relieved to be home.

"If ya gotta have a draft, . . ."

The long flight gave me ample opportunity to reflect upon what I had seen. I did not believe then that we could achieve an all-volunteer force before we had ceased our combat operations and withdrawn most of troops from Vietnam, and until pay reforms

brought substantial benefits to the enlisted men. I saw also a need for managerial reforms affecting the manner in which the armed forces utilize and lead people. Until all of that was accomplished—and I could see that some progress was being made—I believed that we must maintain the draft.

Several recurring comments consistently impressed me, and they were offered regardless of the service or the location, something that surprised me. One young lad said it for many: "If you gotta have a draft, random selection is the fair way to run it." I really found no objection anywhere in Southeast Asia to that statement. Young officers and enlisted men alike had told me, "College deferments are unfair," unfair because they discriminate in favor of those who are able to go to college, and unfair because sometimes they keep a man in college against his will; when he does enter the armed forces he is overtrained for the work that needs to be done and less able emotionally to accept the routine, often dull, sometimes physically taxing requirements of ground combat. In conclusion, young men seemed to be saying, "If ya gotta go, the younger the better."

I found the men none too sanguine about an all-volunteer force. Over and over I heard: "It will never happen; the pay is not enough; why can't they treat us as grown-ups; they have to stop harassing us; the senior NCOs don't want to understand us; there's not enough chance for promotion; the recruiters make promises and the services do not deliver; job assignments do not take into account my talents; and the training was lousy preparation for the job I got."

Behind these common complaints I believe I heard more subtle points. These young men wanted to be accepted as individuals. They wanted to feel that they were needed. They asked to be led, not driven. I came back to my duties in Washington understanding much better what we needed to do to achieve an all-volunteer force. I certainly prepared myself well for congressional questioning soon to come.

Perhaps the most important revelation to me was that these young people were from the same generation as those I had met throughout the land, even the protesters surrounding our offices. The two groups shared many of the same perspectives despite the fact that some were chanting slogans and carrying signs and others were counting cadence and carrying guns. We would err if we believed that "only a few" felt differently from the way my generation thought about our Government, our Nation, and the world in which we lived.

Visiting Servicemen

I made several other interesting visits. In the Mediterranean in 1971 I joined a carrier task force commanded by my able friend, Rear Admiral Robert Baldwin. I also visited again with General Mike Davison after he had been promoted to lead US Army forces in Europe. In Heidelberg we talked for 45 minutes about race problems, drugs, crime among the troops, and volunteerism.

In November of 1971 I went to Fort Carson, Colorado, to meet Major General John Bennett, Commander of the Fourth Mechanized Infantry Division. I immediately liked this independent man who had a fierce loyalty to the country. We talked about the need for change in the Army, something he believed with compelling fervor. Then he demonstrated to me what he was doing with his own division.

We met five young men who were members of the Division Enlisted Men's Council. Each battalion in the division had a council of elected representatives. These men aired any problems that they thought existed at the battalion level. When council members had an issue to take up with the establishment, they did so with battalion officers and noncommissioned officers. The battalion council elected one man to serve on the brigade council, a group that acted at a higher level than the battalion, and finally the brigade council elected one man to serve on the division council. This established communication upwards as well as downwards through the command. As I talked with these young men, I felt their sense of pride in helping to make the division successful. They seemed to seek improvement. We talk now about participatory management; John Bennett had undertaken it successfully to manage a division that previously had been plagued with excessive turnover and inadequate manning.

Lastly, I went to Florida to cruise on the nuclear submarine *Rayburn*, recently converted to carry the Poseidon missile. Going out to sea I visited with many of the 125 enlisted men and petty officers of the crew of the 8,000-ton vessel. I watched with interest as the crew and officers went through two simulated firing exercises, following one of these on the bridge and another in fire control. I stopped next at the nuclear reactor in the engine room where the crew checked constantly for radioactivity in this immaculate area. I could only marvel in comparing this with the engine rooms on conventional ships I had visited.

I found conditions on the nuclear submarine excellent, with ample airconditioning and filters to maintain air purity, with fixed bunks for its crew. The *Rayburn* obviously had been designed for human beings as well as missions. The submarine was an orderly mass of complicated technology that would respond flawlessly

under the control of a highly motivated, professional crew. But the *Rayburn* could not be operated without those professionals, and I found evidence that many men did not want to stay after fulfilling their initial commitments to the Navy. Of the six I talked with at some length, only one thought he would continue another enlistment. The others had decided to depart because of the long tours at sea, pressure from wives to stay home and help raise the family, and loss of pay if shore leave were available. Most of these men really wanted to stay: they loved the Navy. Each had had several years of training and each had a keen mind.

So my visits taught me a great deal about what the services had become in an age of technology. Gone were the days when we could use many men of low intellect. We need bright people to grapple with the demands of new jobs often much more complicated than those offered young men in industry. The services required a new breed of men and women. To motivate these young people, the services no longer could assume traditional attitudes of leadership. They required more of the imagination of men at the top like Mike Davison, John Bennett, and Bob Baldwin, as well as leaders in the field like that young troop commander I met in Vietnam--men who could draw from this intelligent group of young people an appropriate response. Only then could we provide an adequate defense with volunteers.

9

A New Law

Of all the experiences during my two years in Selective Service, I enjoyed most the opportunity to participate in the passage of a major bill. Here my civics lessons, much of my study of history, an understanding of human relations, my native intuition, and more patience than I thought I had, came to bear in an activity that reinforced my faith in the American system of government.

The process of creating a new law is not complicated. But maintaining progress on a critical bill challenges participants as they debate and make timely compromises. Indeed, the creation of a law is a story of compromise, a fundamental element in political action.

First, for administration bills, key subordinates of the President usually recommend a draft of legislation that the President accepts and sends to the Congress. The chairman of the responsible committee of one house usually holds hearings, after which committee members decide upon changes in the President's recommendations, a process called the "markup."

Next, the entire house considers the committee bill for passage, often amending it from the floor before sending it to the other house. Usually there it will be assigned to a committee that already has had hearings on the measure. Committee members then mark up the bill from the other house and send it to the entire body for action. Where the two houses have passed different bills, generally the case with important legislation, then each house appoints conferees to meet in a committee on conference to settle differences and file a conference report. The report goes to each house for action, after which the President may or may not sign the bill into law. Obviously that basic theme has many variations, making the process more exciting and less predictable.

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Although I had worked with the Senate and the House Armed Services Committees in 1970 to enact the President's program for draft reform, the leadership had made it clear to me at the outset that the measure had no chance for passage in an election year unless we were willing to welcome every conceivable amendment that would have made the final bill intolerable. Our experience in 1971 proved how perceptive the two chairmen had been. So while we gave up hope for that year, we continued to prepare the package for 1971.

On November 18, 1970, I talked with Peter Flanigan and Brigadier General Al Haig of the National Security Council about our legislative recommendations. I suggested that the President seek a four-year extension of induction authority, thus letting him establish an all-volunteer force by reducing calls to zero. General Haig agreed with enthusiasm. I also recommended that the President request authority over student deferments and a uniform national call. We reached tentative agreement, although the National Security Council would make the recommendation upon which the President could act.

In my staff we continued to study these matters, as well as minor revisions to the law that changing times required, the housekeeping duties for which each agency is responsible. On December 7, 1970, we sent a 22-page legislative recommendation to the Office of Management and Budget, who submitted it for comments to interested agencies. We proposed several reforms: a four-year extension of induction authority; the uniform national call; Presidential control over undergraduate student deferments awarded after April 28, 1970; extension of a doctor's liability to age 35; and elimination of exemptions for divinity students. Informally, Sam Shaw, my Chief of Legislation and Liaison, shared the contents of this memorandum with the staffs of the armed services committees. On December 19, Senator Stennis wrote to me urging that the Executive Branch send its legislative proposal to Congress by the first of the new year because he hoped to begin hearings soon after February 1.

Secretary Melvin Laird responded to our suggestions in a December 28 memorandum to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger, saying that the Department of Defense favored a two-year extension of the induction authority but accepted other changes we had recommended. By December 31, Sam Shaw had prepared supporting statements for the legislative package.

On January 8, 1971, Peter Flanigan called a meeting in the White House to discuss the President's message on draft reform. Only Al

Haig and I defended a four-year extension of the induction authority; my friends Martin Anderson of the White House staff, and Roger Kelley, argued that the President could only defend a two-year extension because it would maintain pressure on the armed forces to establish a volunteer force. The group accepted the two-year proposal and thereafter agreed to each of my other recommendations.

By mid-January we had completed our first draft of a bill to send to the Congress. At the same time, Sam Shaw wrote to each of the chairmen and each ranking minority member of the armed services committees, providing them with the administration's recommendations.

He did not include a time period for the extension of induction authority, because the President had agreed not to decide that matter until Secretary Laird had returned from Vietnam and reported on progress toward reducing calls to zero by July 1, 1973. On January 26, Laird told Kissinger he would inform the committee chairmen that the Nixon administration favored a two-year extension of the induction authority, justifying this unusual procedure because Chairman Stennis had scheduled hearings to begin February 2 and needed this information immediately.

Two days later I wrote to the President of the Senate, enclosing a 13-page bill to accomplish the President's wishes. A few flurries of activity occurred just before hearings started, mostly frantic calls from the White House saying that something had not been cleared, requiring a portion of my testimony to be changed. But that seemed to happen before most hearings. Committees always want statements in advance so that members and staff people can study the material and formulate questions.

On February 1, *US News and World Report* carried a rather long interview I had with its editors on "How Congress Should change the Draft." In it, I emphasized our program. On the same date, *Nation's Business* published a long interview with me, "Winds of Change in the Draft."

Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings

On February 2, at 10:10 a.m., Chairman Stennis called his Senate Armed Services Committee to order to begin hearings on S. 427 (to amend the Military Selective Service Act of 1967), and two military pay bills that he and Senator Margaret Chase Smith had introduced for the President. Secretary Laird appeared as the first witness, emphasizing the importance of extending the induction

authority and of enacting the pay bills to encourage recruitment. In the questioning, members asked about volunteers, the cost and composition of an all-volunteer force, the use of reserves in an emergency, force levels, and undergraduate deferments.

In the afternoon, Roger Kelley and I read our statements, I emphasized the necessity to extend the President's authority to induct, and other reforms. Roger received most of the questions. I had only to respond to Senator Ervin on universal service and Senator Thurmond on inductions into the reserve forces, and the two-year as opposed to the four-year extension of induction authority.

On February 4, the committee heard Senator Kennedy plead for the reform of Selective Service, including a number of measures: a uniform national call; abolishing student deferments; a ceiling on inductions; the right of registrants to counsel and to present witnesses before the local board; broadening conscientious objection; a study on conscientious objection to include opposition to a specific war; reorganization of the agency as recommended by the Marshall Commission; and other elements in a bill he had introduced recently. Next, Senator Hatfield testified on behalf of an all-volunteer force, recommending pay increases to support enlistments and an immediate repeal of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967.

In three more days of extensive hearings, committee members listened to three dozen people, most of whom called for more liberal opportunities to plead for conscientious objection or to end the draft. Roger Kelley and I went before the committee again on Friday, February 19, to answer questions partly based upon earlier testimony and partly upon written answers Roger and I had supplied to questions submitted to us by the committee staff. The chairman put me on the record on a number of issues that obviously concerned him.

First, Chairman Stennis wanted to know why we set the date of April 23, 1970, after which enrollment for the first time in college or university would not qualify the applicant for a student deferment. I replied that we had to select a date and this was the one on which the President had told young Americans that he wished to cease granting undergraduate student deferments. Next, why would we abolish exemptions for divinity students? I replied that for several years enrollments in divinity schools exceeded opportunities for graduates of those places; that exemptions tended to channel young people into courses of study that otherwise they might not elect; and that in fairness if we abolished all other deferments for education we should abolish these exemptions as well.

Then, the chairman wondered how we would insure sufficient numbers of technically trained specialists. I replied that we had no

indication that we would face shortages by abolishing deferments, but that the National Security Council should continue to review national needs and make recommendations on possible deferments in the future. The chairman asked me to provide the committee with language we could use in case the committee did not adopt a uniform national call. Finally, Senator Stennis asked if the *Welsh* decision had greatly increased the interest among registrants in applying for status as conscientious objectors. I could not see much evidence that it had, although generally we noted increased applications as a result of growing opposition to the war on moral grounds.

Chairman Stennis held hearings one more day and then adjourned the committee. House hearings were to begin the following day, February 23. Meanwhile I had taken some soundings in the Senate. Senator Kennedy told me the committee might not report a bill with a uniform national call, but he promised to work on the floor to restore it. Senator Thurmond supported us. Senator Ervin seemed to favor the uniform national call and the elimination of deferments. Senator Cannon, as a Mormon, questioned terminating student deferments, but was pleased that I had discussed this with Church Officials in Salt Lake City. I also visited with Senator Dominick, who had no confidence that the committee would mark up a bill or that if it did the Senate would pass it. Although he opposed eliminating student deferments, he thought my answer to the committee merited careful study.

A few days later Senator Smith offered to help us by submitting questions that we could answer for the record to strengthen our case. Senator Symington surprised me by saying he was not so enthusiastic about volunteerism after a breakfast discussion where General Jack Ryan, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, described for the senator recruiting difficulties. Early in March I received an interesting signal on Senate intentions from Congressman W.C. (Dan) Daniel, who had helped manage Senator Harry Byrd's campaign in Virginia. Senator Byrd believed that Senator Stennis would await House action on a bill to which the Senate could then react, believing that doing so would provide a stronger bill and one that would have a better chance of passage in the Senate. With that opinion from an intelligent source, I decided thereafter to work entirely in the House, even though I had until then visited with only eight of the sixteen members of the Senate committee.

In addition to writing replies to questions from the Senate committee, preparing my statement for the House hearings, calling upon senators, and managing the daily activities of the agency, I had my hands full at that time with the collocation controversy and student

protests already described. On February 22, after finishing with the Senate committee, I visited with Chairman Hebert about the hearings that would begin the following morning. I had no doubt that on this, his first major action as Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, he intended to lead in his own unique and effective way.

House Committee Hearings

After the chairman pounded his gavel on February 23 he stated his position on a number of points. As I sat there with Secretary Laird and Roger Kelley, I compared the two chairmen with whom I was working: Senator Stennis, the polite Southern gentleman who kept you waiting before he let you know his disagreement with your public statement; and Congressman Hebert, rough and unequivocal, who could tear apart your inconsistencies while smiling at your discomfort! I liked and admired them both.

Secretary Laird began the testimony with a defense for extending the authority to induct and for higher pay to make possible the voluntary services of the future. Then Roger and I, after submitting our statements for the record, made short oral reports. In my written statements, I had reviewed for the committee our operations during calendar year 1970 and then explained the changes in law that the President sought. I spoke specifically about eliminating undergraduate deferments and the equity of the uniform national call. After luncheon we three responded to questions, often very specific ones about the operations of our agencies, until four-thirty.

The following day, Roger and I appeared for another four hours of questions. Frank Slatinshek, Assistant Chief Counsel for the committee, directed to me the most penetrating ones, beginning with an inquiry into our plans for the uniform national call. I did not take advantage, as I should have, of help committee members sought to give me, something Congressman Al Pirnie emphasized when we met a few days later. As an inexperienced witness, I was too inclined to view hearings as adversary proceedings. Although sometimes they are, that is not universally the case. It became apparent from this session that we had committee support for the uniform call, but that Frank Slatinshek and thus probably the chairman preferred to maintain state quotas. They also had reservations about the manner by which we had operated random selection.

Next we considered student deferments. Though members of the committee did not generally oppose abolishing them, they definitely followed the chairman in rejecting the President's plan to

abolish deferments for those who did not receive them before April 23, 1970. The chairman argued that by giving deferments we had made a promise to registrants that we could not now cancel, regardless of the President's message. Interestingly enough, Roger Kelley had argued for that position, and I had won out in the administration for holding the April 23, 1970 date. I believed that using the date of the new law would protect college students for as long as we had a draft, thus perpetuating the inequities. Discussing the doctor's draft, I admitted that we would not expect to induct medical specialists when we had established an all-volunteer force.

As the committee worked its way through the entire bill, members asked me specific questions about each part of the law the President sought to change. I could not imagine a committee making a more careful inquiry. Thereafter, Chairman Hebert held nine more days of hearings, the final one on March 11. In these long sessions, the members heard testimony from eleven of their colleagues and three dozen others, representing widely divergent views, and they received and put into the record the written testimony of more than one hundred individuals and organizations.

Before the hearings ended I began visits with congressmen, seeing from two to seven a day. Each one had specific questions to ask and often one would tell me what help a colleague needed. Visiting with the most senior people of each party first, I saw 36 of the 41 members of the House Armed Services Committee. Meanwhile I maintained contact with the White House staff, and of course I continued to have problems with restive young people and with animosity over collocation.

When the House committee had finished its markup of H.R. 6531 we came out well. By a vote of 36 to 4, the committee had decided to: extend the President's authority to induct for two years; permit the President to end undergraduate student deferments; repeal the exemption for divinity students; establish a uniform national call; change the maximum age for members of local boards from 75 to 65 years and maximum service from 25 to 15 years; prohibit a state director from holding an elected or appointed position without approval of the Director of Selective Service; and finally, induct young men responsible for registering as long as they were liable for doing so, waiving the statute of limitations. By a vote of 30 to 9 the committee had defeated an attempt to limit the President's authority to induct to one year. The committee also included a military pay section on the bill that now went to the House for action.

The committee released its report on March 25. Meanwhile I worked with members of the committee and others in the House to

learn the strategy that foes might employ. I worried about attempts to pass an amendment on the floor limiting the authority to induct to one year, but both Chairman Hebert and Leslie Arends were optimistic. Congressman Price promised help in case a one-year extension threatened.

House Debate

The House debate on H.R. 6531 began on March 30. The House quickly resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, and Chairman Hebert read a statement explaining what his committee had done. Other members of the committee followed to do the same, emphasizing the authority to induct, the establishment of the All-Volunteer Force, and improving military pay.

The following day the House continued its work, first debating an amendment by Mrs. Abzug that would have abolished the Selective Service System on January 1, 1972, defeating this overwhelmingly. The House considered and passed the Brinkley amendments to prevent collocation and consolidation. Then it spent a great deal of time on divinity school exemptions, a difficult one for the House to handle, and finally accepted the Byrnes amendment to oppose the administration by a vote of 114 to 29. The Committee of the Whole rejected an amendment for broadening the basis for exemption as a conscientious objector, before spending a long and emotional afternoon arguing over the extension of the induction authority. First they considered an amendment by Mr. Harrington from Massachusetts that would have ended Selective Service on July 1, 1971, finally defeating that action by 330 to 62.

At that point Mr. Whalen moved the same action for July 1, 1972, the possibility about which I had worried. Just before discussing this issue the House heard that Lieutenant Calley had received a life sentence for the Mylai massacre. Debate on this amendment, a more practical one than that offered by Mr. Harrington, divided members of the House Armed Services Committee. It appeared that the amendment would carry until the chairman and his associates in the cloakroom urged others to vote. As the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole began to pound his gavel, two congressmen voted against the amendment, making the final tally 200 to 198 opposing a one-year extension. This close action provided a grim augury of what I could expect later.

On that second day the President had lost only the amendment on divinity student exemptions, something I knew we would lose in

the Senate after Senator Stennis had questioned me. Anticipating this I wanted to ask Chairman Hebert to report out the bill from committee without this provision so that we would not be defeated on the floor. But those in the White House handling our bill would not permit any deviation from the President's recommendations, so we suffered an unnecessary defeat.

The next day, April 1, the House finished its action on the bill and sent H.R. 6531 to the Senate, spending until seven-thirty that evening beating down a variety of proposals to curb the President's ability to continue the war in Vietnam. The final tally of 293 to 99, with 40 not voting, put us in a good position to begin work in the Senate.

Senate Markup

I began two efforts, the first to gain support from the Department of Defense in working with the Senate, and the second to see as many senators and their assistants as I could. By mid-April, when we met in the White House to discuss the legislation, I gave my tally of the committee on the extension of induction authority: seven favoring a two-year extension, three favoring one year, and six undecided. Ken Belieu of the White House legislative staff agreed generally. Following that meeting we each took specific assignments for calls.

In conversations with senators I found that on some issues they supported me while on others they opposed me. Senator Schweiker demonstrated this a few days later when he admitted he could not pass the one-year extension in committee but certainly he would do so on the floor; I knew he bluffed here because so many senators then were uncommitted. But he promised to help remove the Hebert three-year provision for conscientious objection, something that I knew would cause us giant problems in the courts, and he also pledged his help to remove the Brinkley amendments from the Senate bill.

Many of the staff assistants helped me more than I could help myself calling on the senators. Furthermore, I explored the network among the assistants that provided much of the information senators used when they voted. Each senator has such diverse responsibilities on so many committees that even the most conscientious cannot prepare totally for each vote. To win a senator's support, I often had to convince that assistant who advised the senator on voting. By the time the Senate committee started its markup I thought I had converted some senators to support us. I also had provided committee members and staff with written material to assist them.

Action the first day of markup surprised me. Some of my contacts complained that Chairman Stennis had lost control of the committee. Yet, when the chairman introduced the four-year extension, he lost by only four votes. That paved the way for the committee to accept the two-year extension by 12 to 3. Meanwhile I started calling upon senators out of the committee, trying to muster support on the floor.

On the second day of markup the committee agreed with the House on student deferment, permitting the President to withhold granting them to new applicants. Perhaps they could do little else but guarantee existing holders, after a nationwide mail campaign by freshmen students and their parents. The committee also eliminated the House language on collocation, substituting the possibility for doing so with consent of the governor. They eliminated the House language on conscientious objection, saying the President could extend alternate service in the event he had to mobilize the inactive reserve.

Finally on April 27 the Senate completed its markup. The uniform national call failed in the morning, 6 to 5. But then Mrs. Smith asked how to count her two proxy votes. The chairman let her contact Senators Goldwater and Tower, who agreed to support the provision. So the committee accepted the uniform call in the afternoon, 7 to 6. The committee agreed with the House limit on maximum age for local board members at 65 years but increased the limit of tenure to 20 years of service. They also set a maximum number of inductions for each of the two years at 150,000.

Meanwhile, senators had become upset with the student protest in Washington. Many predicted to me that the sooner the debate began on the floor, the better were our chances for passage of the committee bill intact. The committee released its report on May 5. Some suspected Senator Mansfield of maneuvering to frustrate those who would filibuster on the issue of extension. At the same time we could detect increasing pressure from those who wanted to amend the bill to limit the President's authority to continue the war.

The next day, Senator Gravel announced that he would attempt a filibuster on the President's authority to induct; news reports predicted that Senators Hughes and Proxmire would join him. Although the Senate could vote cloture to limit debate, many who favored extending the President's induction authority also strongly defended the filibuster. Senator Mansfield, according to one source, thought the Senate might debate the issue six weeks without a filibuster. We knew then that the induction authority probably would terminate on July 1.

Senate Debate

Chairman Stennis introduced and explained H.R. 6531, as revised by his committee, to the entire Senate on May 6, followed by Senators Smith, Saxbe, Thurmond, Cannon, and Ervin. During this show of strength for the bill, other senators promised amendments: Kennedy on procedural rights to registrants, Schweiker to extend only for one year, Hughes to improve the pay provisions, and Humphrey to prohibit sending a draftee to Vietnam against his will. On May 11, committee members continued as Senator Bentsen spoke for a two-year extension, and Senator Schweiker for a one-year amendment, with Senator Hughes supporting him in colloquy.

At that point, Senator Mansfield introduced a far-reaching proposal to reduce by December 31, 1971 the US commitment to NATO to 150,000 military personnel, half of the total then committed; he cited the Nation's balance of payments problem as justification for doing so. As Senator Scott defended the committee bill, he became involved in a debate with Senator Gravel that led to animosity on both sides. This running battle gave Chairman Stennis time to compose his thoughts for an answer to the speech Senator Mansfield had delivered on the commitment to NATO. On May 12, after long debates on the Mansfield amendment, the Senate agreed to vote on that proposal on May 19.

Meanwhile, outside the Senate chambers, another development held our interest. We had considered the possibility for continuing inductions, even though the President's general authority expired. Section 17(c) of the existing law stated:

> notwithstanding any other provisions of this title, no person shall be inducted for training and service in the Armed Forces after July 1, 1971, except persons now or hereafter deferred under section 6 of this title after the basis for such deferment ceases to exist.

Thus those who had been deferred as college students could be inducted after July 1. On May 12, David Rosenbaum, the enterprising reporter from the *New York Times*, called to ask about this provision, and I gave him my understanding of it. Continuing our exploration, we speculated upon what effect this provision might have on passage of the legislation then being debated. Legally the President also could terminate student deferments if it were in the interest of the Nation to do so.

I talked with Clark McGregor in the White House about this. He saw considerable merit in announcing this authority of the President,

encouraging me to prepare a speech that he could give to someone in the Senate to use. White House staff members began discussing a Presidential message that the draft would continue in July on this basis. On May 18, Senator Cranston introduced an amendment that would eliminate the possibility of employing Section 17(c) after the general authority to induct had expired.

Meanwhile, the Senate consumed most of its time on May 13, 14, 17, and 18 in debating the Mansfield motion. On May 19, the Senate considered amendments that softened the impact of the Mansfield amendment, rejecting decisively those by Senators Nelson, Bayh, Mathias, Fulbright, and Church before rejecting the Mansfield amendment by 61 to 36.

That day we learned about the procedural rights initiative that Senator Kennedy would submit to the Senate the following day. One amendment granted the registrant the right to appear with counsel before a majority of the local or appeal board to plead his case and to bring witnesses, while also obligating the Government to provide a lawyer if the registrant could not afford one. The second amendment would permit the registrant to take his grievance to Federal court if he disputed the action of a local or appeal board. Such changes would paralyze the System, making inductions possible in many cases only after lengthy litigation. Until new courts and attorneys accepted the workload, the Federal judiciary could not possibly keep up with the added burden; even with the slow rate at which courts had accepted violations of orders to report for induction, Selective Service cases absorbed half of the load of US attorneys.

On May 20, the Senate considered the Schweiker amendment to extend the President's authority to induct for one year. By the next day, the Senate had other similar amendments: Dominick's, to extend the authority 18 months; Hatfield's, to end the draft; and Nelson's, to prohibit sending draftees to Vietnam after December 31.

On May 25, the Senate began consideration of the Nelson amendment, thereafter modified by Tunney, to prohibit sending a draftee to a combat area outside of the United States without his consent. The Senate rejected the Nelson proposal 52 to 21. Senator Humphrey had jointed Senator Nelson on this issue, and the Wisconsinite had worked hard to win acceptance, so the margin of his defeat surprised me. This action had special interest, because the day before Jim Schlesinger had proposed to a White House meeting that we accept this amendment since it likely would pass. He thought George Schultz would favor doing so. I argued strenuously against that idea which would make the Army much more difficult to manage

with two classes of enlisted men. Later I learned that Dave Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense, had made a strong presentation to the White House staff, thereby killing what until then had been growing interest in accepting the Nelson proposal.

On the same day, I had a most informative conversation with Chairman Stennis, who promised that the Senate would pass some kind of bill for us. He said Senator Mansfield opposed any draft, but he objected even more to a filibuster, so he pledged to the chairman his full support to pass whatever the Senate would approve. The plethora of amendments for consideration indicated how a minority of the Senate would seek to stifle action.

The Senate the next day defeated the Dominick measure to extend induction authority by 18 months, by a lopsided margin of 67 to 8. Senator Hughes proposed that the Senate accept the House pay proposal for the armed services. The Senate refused to do so by a closer vote of 42 to 31, causing us to speculate that the majority acted in this way to prevent opponents to the draft from saying that sufficient pay had been offered to follow the Gates Commission recommendations immediately. Dave Packard and the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned the Senate that the House pay plan would force the military services to reduce procurement and close bases.

The following day, the chairman called me to huddle in his office with Ed Braswell and himself to formulate a strategy for defeating the Schweiker amendment to end the draft in a year. Senator Stennis wanted me to provide him with information on Section 17(c) and to refine the statistics on how many could be inducted in the event the President used that provision. He wanted also to know about men enlisting into technical programs to avoid being drafted into ground combat jobs. After four intensive days of study and research, I did not report back favorably on the use of 17(c) for two major reasons: partly because we did not have a clear indication of congressional intent, an uncertainty inviting court action; and secondly, because an attempt to induct these men who had been deferred would plunge our boards into procedural delays that would make it difficult to provide men on the schedule the Army would prefer. Also, we found a high percentage of young men in technical specialties because the draft had induced them to volunteer.

On June 2 and 3, the Senate considered the Hatfield amendment before voting on June 4, a most important day for us. By a margin of 67 to 23, the Senate refused to terminate Selective Service at the end of that month. Thus the Senate had agreed upon extension. Thereafter, on a much closer division, the Senate turned down Senator

Schweiker's one-year extension by 49 to 43. (On that same afternoon, the Catholic priest and four young people tried to handcuff me in my office.)

During the next few days, the Senate worked frantically on amendments. With amazing persistence, it rejected a measure by Gravel to reduce terms of service for local board members, approved one by Scott to require the administration to report progress on volunteerism; agreed to two amendments by Kennedy to report on requirements for medical service in the armed forces and the US, and to give special admission rights to students drafted from college; accepted a Packwood motion to prohibit drafting a man whose father, brother, or sister had been killed in service or at the time was a captive; agreed to one by Eagleton to employ local boards for voter registration; supported Allott to boost the pay of servicemen; rejected a Hart initiative to grant conscientious objection to a specific war; and agreed to limit calls to 130,000 in fiscal year 1972 and 140,000 in fiscal year 1973. Whenever time permitted, we assisted the chairman by analyzing the effect of these amendments on our operations. All of these long hours of debate prepared the Senate for a major issue a week later.

On June 10, discussion began on the McGovern-Hatfield amendment to prohibit the use of funds to support military operations in Southeast Asia after December 31, 1971, subject to the release of American prisoners held by North Vietnam and other adversaries. This bill, sponsored by 31 senators, constituted the eighth effort in the Senate to end the war, a movement that began in the fall of 1969. During four days, senators explored the implications of the amendment and the military commitment in Southeast Asia. Finally, on June 16, a tired Senate rejected the measure, 55 to 42, close enough to make all of us wonder what might take place before the final bill passed.

The following day, Senators McGovern and Hatfield drafted 24 amendments that they intended to introduce. Clearly the minority of the Senate that had sustained the momentum of offering crippling amendments intended to accomplish what Senator Gravel early in the debate had pledged, to halt the President's ability to induct men for an unpopular war. This is not to say that all or even most of the amendments considered thus far fell into that category. Nor did the minority remain stable; members voted on issues with considerable movement from one side of the controversy to another. But inevitably the Senate moved closer to a motion for cloture.

On June 17, the Senate approved Senator Kennedy's suggestion that proposed Selective Service regulations be published for comment in the *Federal Register*. But they could not accept his procedural rights amendment, described earlier, that would force boards to act more nearly as courts. On the same day, the Senate narrowly defeated two more Hatfield proposals to improve the chances of attaining an all-volunteer force and to increase the numbers of ROTC scholarships. After another day of debate on the Hatfield and Gravel motions, Senator Mansfield sent up a cloture motion, signed by himself and 24 associates including Senator Stennis. The Senate agreed to vote on cloture on June 23.

Meanwhile the Senate faced important business introduced by Senator Mansfield. He proposed an act declaring it to be the policy of the United States to terminate military action in Southeast Asia not later than nine months following passage of the act, subject to the release of American prisoners of war; the act also urged the President to arrange a phased withdrawal after negotiating with North Vietnam for an immediate cease-fire. The Senate, after agonizing, followed the distinguished Majority Leader as they had not done on the NATO amendment, by a comfortable vote of 57 to 42. Few modern votes had been more historic, another significant benchmark in congressional curbs on the Presidency.

Then, on June 23, the Senate voted cloture by 65 to 27, with a strong group of Southerners, led by Senators Stennis, Ervin, and Thurmond, contributing to the success of the measure. That the Senate did so, and on the first vote, served as tribute among his colleagues for the solid, often inspiring leadership of Chairman Stennis. Republicans Case, Hatfield, Javits, and Schweiker joined the minority.

The following day, I learned that Senator Kennedy would introduce his procedural rights amendment in slightly different form. That did not surprise me. His position on the bill had been somewhat difficult to follow: he opposed a volunteer force but many of his amendments, so far as we could honestly assess them, would make Selective Service difficult and perhaps impossible to manage. On other issues he sought to help us. I called Senator Stennis to ask for advice on how to handle the threat, and the chairman believed that the Senate once had rejected this and probably would do so again. But he saw no objection to calling other senators. I then called Senator Smith who advised me to call the White House. I reached one of the President's legislative men, who promised immediately to help; thereupon he telephoned my secretary, asking her to call one of his

subordinates to assist us instead! Lois finally located one man who apparently did nothing.

Meanwhile I tried to locate Senator Scott, but he had gone to London. I talked with 20 senatorial assistants, and also with Senators Bentsen and Taft. I had no confidence as the Senate began to consider the measure. Senator Kennedy modified his earlier position somewhat, introducing the concept of "reasonableness" in the number of witnesses and the time granted to the registrant, restricting counsel to providing advice but not to participation in the proceedings, and not requiring the Government to provide counsel for indigent registrants. He did not introduce the amendment that would require a Federal court action before inductions would be possible. After Senator Kennedy had made a short presentation, Senators Baker and Javits did likewise. The Senate agreed by a vote of 46 to 41. I wondered how many local board members now would consider abandoning an already thankless job.

After the vote, I talked to Senator Allott, who had opposed the Kennedy measure. He seemed disgusted. Senator Tower told me that the conference, of which he was a member, should discard the action. That hope proved to be only partly accurate.

Senate Passage; On to Conference

The Kennedy amendment came shortly before the Senate acted on the bill. Weary after debate that sometimes must have seemed endless, the senators passed H.R. 6531, as amended, by a vote of 72 to 16, an amazing show of strength considering the number of senators who had been defeated on amendments they had sponsored. The Senate by then had debated for seven weeks, considering many of the 230 amendments submitted. Senators Allen, Byrd of Virginia, Ervin, Griffin, Cranston, Tunney, and Byrd of West Virginia all proclaimed their admiration for the masterful handling of a difficult bill by Senator Stennis, fit praise for a remarkable, sustained performance.

As I rejoiced at this progress, I wondered how the Conference Committee would handle the Mansfield amendment. If the committee rejected it, or blunted its thrust, the Senate might not accept the conference recommendations. But on June 28, the House specifically had instructed its conferees not to accept the Mansfield amendment, by a vote of 219 to 176. I talked the next day with Chairman Hebert, who, in his usually crusty way, flatly refused to accept the Mansfield amendment in conference.

Meanwhile, I agreed to prepare for each chairman some language on aspects of the bill that might be helpful to conferees in their discussions, particularly on issues where the two houses had contradictory positions. I did so in identical 12-page memoranda on June 28, indicating the language that I would prefer to avoid litigation, improve performance of the System, and still provide what it seemed both houses wanted. Later the staffs of both committees thanked us for this assistance, commenting that the language had been helpful in reaching compromises and sometimes was used in the agreement.

On July 1, for the first time since 1948, the President faced the termination of authority to induct young men into the armed forces. I talked with Secretary Laird on the same day at a Pentagon gathering. He said the President wanted to hold out for at least six months if necessary rather than to accept the Mansfield amendment, believing he could use 17(c) to assure the needs of the armed forces. Although the Senate a few days before had defeated the Cranston amendment to eliminate 17(c), I told the Secretary I thought the political effects, and perhaps the legal ramifications of doing so, would invite tragedy that we should avoid at all costs. Mel said I must convince the people in the White House on this or the President would not encourage Chairman Hebert to take a more flexible position with the Senate conferees. On the same day, Chairman Stennis publicly stated that while he believed the Nation needed the draft, he could see no way around the triple impasse created by the Mansfield amendment between the Senate, the House, and the President.

Later that afternoon, I drafted a telegram to state directors instructing them to stop inductions except for doctors, but to continue, as the law permitted, to register, classify, and call men for preinduction physical examinations. At the same time, I refused to hold a news conference to avoid questions on the Cassius Clay decision from the Supreme Court. While that decision offended many of our people, it did not disrupt the System or force us to alter procedures. Also, I started assigning work to various people to collect information on 17(c) that earlier we might have overlooked.

July provided us with a full share of intrigue. I soon learned that the President no longer thought of using 17(c) to provide young men for the armed forces. Ed Braswell, the Senate Committee Counsel, called to protest a quotation from Chairman Hebert that, based on conversations with me, he saw no need for inductions for several months. I realized that each chairman was using the press to try to make more flexible the position of the other. I replied to Ed that the

Army was not counting upon inductions until the fourth week in July, but if Selective Service did not deliver 16,000 by September 1, the Army would not meet its authorized strength. This provided Braswell with what he needed, but he did not believe the deadlock would break unless the House agreed on a date for withdrawal from Vietnam. (Subsequently, enlistment and retention rates higher than I calculated made my estimate erroneous.)

The Conference Report

The Committee on Conference had reached agreement by July 1 on 27 differences between the actions of the Senate and House. Only the Mansfield amendment continued to haunt them. The House concurred with the Senate on the ceiling for inductions, 130,000 in FY 72 and 140,000 in FY 73. On conscientious objection, the House gave up its three-year alternate service provision with the understanding that the Director of Selective Service be responsible for ordering and monitoring conscientious objectors in alternate work assignments. The House agreed to Senate language that would give the President discretionary authority over student deferments while not permitting him to take away those granted before passage of the act. The House accepted Senate language on the surviving son, provided that the sister or brother be "of the whole blood," language we had recommended. The House approved Senate language granting statutory deferments to divinity students, leaving unchanged the exemption for ministers.

In resolving other differences, the House accepted Senate language on collocation and consolidation with the approval of the governor of the state. The House concurred with the Senate provision to publish regulations in the *Federal Register* for comment 30 days before taking effect. The House approved the Kennedy procedural rights reforms, except that of being accompanied by counsel, with the understanding that regulations carrying out these reforms must insure the smooth operation of the System and not create an unreasonable burden on the local boards. The Senate bill said that to the maximum extent practicable, the President should appoint members to local boards so that they represent, by race and national origin, the registrants in the area; the House had passed a provision that to the extent practicable local boards by January 1, 1972, should represent the economic and sociological background of the population they serve; the conferees agreed upon the Senate language. The House took the Senate limitation of serice on the

local board to 20 years, as opposed to its own limitation of 15 years. Other differences had little impact upon Selective Service.

One can see easily that the House consistently accepted Senate language. That set the stage for consideration of the Mansfield amendment. Conferees could not agree at either the July 7 or July 12 meetings. News from the White House reported upon Mr. Kissinger's travel in Asia, Secretary Laird's visits to Korea and Southeast Asia, and some increased pace of activity in Paris where Ambassador Bruce began his preparations to depart because of failing health. Thus as the President sought to influence the Conference, it appeared to the public that this might be an improper time to tie his hands. The Conference Committee met on July 20 and then again on July 26. Finally, the conferees took perhaps the only course open to them, agreeing on the Mansfield amendment without setting the nine-month deadline for withdrawal from the war. Chairman Hebert released the Committee on Conference Report on July 30.

Promptly on August 4, the House of Representatives considered the conference report. First, the Rules Committee asked that the House grant a waiver from the terms of the Reorganization Act passed the previous year, because the report included provisions of substance not passed by either house. Though members generally agreed that the House must accept the report, they did so reluctantly as a signal to the Senate that they considered important the necessity to follow the new rules. After approving the motion to waive the rules, the House then accepted the report by a vote of 297 to 108.

In the Senate, Senator Gravel again had threatened to filibuster the acceptance of the conference report when Senator Stennis brought up consideration of it on August 6. Senator Mansfield objected that consideration of the report so late in the session inhibited free expression so essential on a measure of gravity. Reluctantly, Senator Stennis consented to postpone action until September 13, aware of the problems thrust upon the armed services without the draft or pay increases. Thus the Senate recessed.

Talk about a filibuster continued during the lull. On August 25, the *Washington Post* reported that Senator Gravel intended to sue Secretary Laird because young men in the 1972 pool had been given preinduction physical examinations. Within Selective Service, our own people worried that the Kennedy amendment on procedural rights might make it difficult for boards to function. Inactivity seemed to increase nervousness.

On September 10, Senator Stennis described for his colleagues the Report of the Conference that he intended to submit for their

consideration the following Monday. As discussion began, Senator Gordon Allott of Colorado, Chairman of the Republican Policy Committee, complained about the conference agreement on military pay. The conference had accepted pay provisions of $2.4 billion, less than the House bill of $2.7 billion and the Senate bill of $2.8 billion. Senator Allott then promised, at an appropriate time, to move to table the conference report. That day he felt he could not do so, owing to the death of Senator Winston Prouty from Vermont. Services were held the following afternoon, September 14, limiting Senate discussion.

The Allott position on pay worried me because a move by him to table the report provided an opening for an unnatural alliance between those who sought more pay for young enlisted men and officers, those who wanted to kill the draft, and those who demanded sterner language in the Mansfield amendment. Some assistants of senators thought H.R. 6531 might be split, with draft extension considered separately from military pay. I talked with Senator Smith, finding that she opposed vigorously Senator Allott's action, particularly because he had used his leadership position to sway his colleagues. She agreed with me that House members might take offense at being brought back to another conference.

On September 15, Senator Mansfield announced to the Senate that he would move to table and request that conferees be appointed to work with House conferees only on pay. Senator Stennis, seeing that seven months of hard work thereby could be lost, objected strenuously. Later in the day, I learned from a friend on the Hill that Senator Mansfield thought he had enough votes within the coalition to table the report. Then we received an ominous news report that the Majority Leader would not accept language less specific than that which passed the Senate, requiring the President to withdraw from Southeast Asia in six and one-half months instead of the original nine, thus deducting for the time taken to pass the bill.

At this point, help came both from the White House and the Department of Defense. Defense legislative people helped me to make calls to the Senate. I contacted our appropriate state directors to telephone Senators Taft, Buckley, Jordan, Percy, Hollings, Beall, Mathias, McIntyre, Chiles, Cannon, Packwood, and Gambrell. It seemed that these contacts helped. Meanwhile the President communicated with Senator Allott, saying he would accept a motion on the floor to increase the armed forces procurement bill by $300 million for additions to pay. This probably swung six votes. On the *Today* show, Senator Mansfield again denounced the draft as

unfair, promising that he would not accept the language of the conference on ending the war. But the President had one more opportunity to assist, and it proved crucial: he arranged to have Congressman Stafford sworn in to replace Senator Prouty, and then he had the new Senator flown to Washington to participate in the voting.

Senator Mansfield moved to table the report on September 17. The result greatly discouraged him. By 47 tc 36, the Majority Leader's colleagues refused once again to follow him. Never before had Senator Stennis been so resolute, so insistent, so persuasive, almost as if he thrived on difficulty.

The chairman immediately filed a cloture motion. On September 21, the Senate accepted the cloture, 61 to 30, perilously close since if one voting for it had voted against it, the motion would have failed. Likewise, if only one of the nine not voting had done so against the motion, it would not have carried. If all nine nonvoters had been present (Hartke, Magnuson, Moss, Mundt, Pastore, Pell, Ribicoff, Stevens, Taft), likely cloture would not have succeeded. Thus are great issues of the Nation often settled by thin margins.

Immediately thereafter, the Senate accepted the conference report by a vote of 55 to 30. Republicans opposing it were Baker, Brooke, Goldwater, Hatfield, Mathias, Percy, and Schweiker. Among the Democratic aspirants for the Presidency—Bayh, Hughes, Humphrey, Kennedy, McGovern, and Muskie—all opposed the bill, and only Senator Jackson from Washington favored it.

That afternoon I visited with Chairman Hebert, who told me that Senator Stennis had come to him to ask for another conference. Hebert had refused to discuss the Mansfield amendment once again. Because of the refusal, Senator Stennis had to return to the Senate to fight for the conference report. But in doing so, Stennis had won a delay that provided the President with a chance to appease the Allott faction and to have Stafford sworn in as Senator.

A week later, on 28 September, the President quietly signed the new Selective Service bill into law.

10

Preparing for a Volunteer Force

Although my duties required me to work hard to maintain inductions for the Army, I spent a great deal of time during my two years as director trying to help establish an all-volunteer force. I came to the Pentagon in 1969 to join the team Secretary Laird assembled; from the outset of our work together, Mel emphasized the two goals of the Nixon administration in the Department of Defense: to withdraw our forces honorably from the war in Southeast Asia, and to eliminate the draft from American life. I fully subscribed to both.

I admit that as director, some of my hope for an all-volunteer force derived from my practical concerns about whether we could continue inductions as long as we needed them. Although I gained confidence after we had brought more equity into the system and thereby increased public support, my early days gave me many anxious moments about the possible collapse of the entire effort.

The Gates Commission, about which I have already written, recommended providing substantial economic incentives to recruits, the only means possible to convert from the draft to volunteerism. The commission suggested offering these financial incentives on July 1, 1970, adding that these incentives should eliminate the need for a draft within a year.

The administration could not provide financial incentives on that schedule, owing to budget constraints. Furthermore, the leaders in the armed services did not see any hope for the success of volunteerism so long as fighting continued in Vietnam; I agreed with that pessimism. But the climate in the Congress, as indicated by resistance to an extension of the President's induction authority in 1971, indicated clearly that the Nation had better prepare soon for the day

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when the draft no longer would serve the manpower needs of the services.

Many people at the time thought that because only the Army relied upon drafted men, only the Army had a recruitment problem. In fact most of the volunteers in the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and most particularly in the Reserve and National Guard units, had joined to avoid the draft. Without the draft, I had assumed in 1971 that each of the forces would be in real difficulty. As a consequence I considered it a part of my responsibility to work with leaders in the services to improve recruiting, utilization of manpower, training techniques, and incentives both to enlistment and reenlistment. I used well the lessons I had learned visiting young servicemen throughout the world.

An indication of our problems in the Congress began with hearings on draft reform legislation in February of 1971. Secretary Laird began the testimony, speaking enthusiastically in favor of an all-volunteer force. Chairman Stennis reacted strongly in opposition to that idea. Senator Ervin favored universal service as a more reasonable alternative to the draft.

As I continued working with Senators during the markup of the bill, Senator Margaret Chase Smith promised me once again that volunteerism would not succeed. Senator Thurmond could not support the all-volunteer concept. Senator Saxbe definitely opposed it. When the House opened its hearings, Chairman Hebert said that "the only way to get a volunteer force was to draft one." This is not to say that the all-volunteer force idea lacked support in Congress, for many members believed enthusiastically in the concept. But they were not leaders on the armed services committees, where ultimately we had to find support.

Another difficulty that we foresaw early was to provide medical doctors and specialists for an all-volunteer force. In February of 1971 I met in Chicago with the Selective Service Medical Advisory Group. Although the members agreed to study the matter for a year and then provide their recommendations, few then thought it possible to draft doctors in an otherwise voluntary environment. Later I met with representatives of the American Medical and the American Dental Associations. These conversations corroborated that earlier suspicion.

I continued to work on the problems of providing doctors. I worried about other agencies of the Government who also recruited their doctors because of the threat of the draft. But I made no progress stimulating interest in the Department of Health, Education and

Welfare. Finally, I concluded that the best way to provide medical services for the armed forces in a voluntary environment was to offer scholarships to students studying to become doctors, with the understanding that they would serve in the military forces for a fixed term after graduation, a system that has proven its merit despite the severity of the problems created by volunteerism.

The British Experience with Volunteerism

In order to foresee some of the more difficult problems ahead, Roger Kelley and I decided that we should travel to Great Britain to learn how the British had adjusted to voluntary methods. We went with a few members of our staffs in January of 1971, just before Senate hearings on draft reform, and we spent a week with the leaders of Britain's armed forces, who explained their problems and how they had approached them.

In 1957, Duncan Sandys had issued a White Paper for the government on defense policy; Great Britain had decided to rely more upon a nuclear than a conventional deterrence. At that time the government also had decided to withdraw most of its forces east of Suez. This dramatic change in defense policy raised questions about a manpower program appropriate to the times. Britain then inducted nearly every able-bodied young man into the services. With shrinking forces, universal conscription would provide too many persons unless the government limited the term of service to such a short time that no effective training would be possible. The alternatives to universal service were selective service and volunteerism.

British officials decided that they could not defend selective service to the British people, arguing that such a policy would cause political turmoil. Consequently they elected to use voluntary methods for manning the armed forces, to be carried out in a gradual transition as the size of the forces diminished according to manpower requirements to fulfill changing policy commitments. By 1964, Britain had abandoned the draft entirely. The British calculated that their forces would shrink until 1974, at which point the volunteer force in Britain would face its sternest test.

In many respects we had difficulty comparing the British situation to our own. With 370,000 British men and women in the armed forces, about .66 percent of the total population, Britain needed to enlist about 1.3 percent of the available pool of males aged 15 to 24; that figure would rise to 1.6 percent in 1974. If we recruited with equal success, given the larger US population, we would sustain a

force of about 1.4 million people, considerably below our expectations for the post-Vietnam armed forces. We found that the British had used advertising well. Periods of enlistment greatly exceeded ours, utilizing terms of 6, 9, and 12 years. The British seemed much more dependent upon younger men and boys; 20 percent of all recruits were 15 years of age and 57 percent were 17 or younger. These patterns seemed to be changing in Britain because young people were staying longer in school. Many lads formerly had enlisted as a way to learn a trade, whereas more recently Great Britain had developed effective trade schools that kept young people occupied much longer than the educational system formerly had done.

In 1970 the government adopted a military salary system, equating each position in the armed forces with the nearest comparable civilian opportunities. In this way the armed forces determined what the person did and offered a competitive salary for it. The salary did not always follow rank, that being a function not of what the person did but what responsibility he had over the activities of others. Thus a corporal doing one kind of job might earn more than a sergeant doing another. To this basic salary the armed forces added an "X" factor, about five percent of the basic salary, to offset the loneliness, inherent danger, separation, and turbulence of military life. In addition to the "X" factor, the services also offered extra monetary rewards for activities such as flight or paratroop duty for which the services traditionally provide additional compensation.

The military salary system immediately caused enlistment rates in all services to increase dramatically. Recruits in the first five months of 1970-71 increased 24 percent in the Royal Navy and Marines over a comparable period the year before; the number of Army recruits swelled 10 percent and those in the Air Force 13 percent. The British had the economic data to prove the case that the Gates Commission had made to the American people. But rather quickly the impact of the military salary lessened, and for the same reason: inflation soon made a good plan less competitive.

Thus the British learned quickly what we discovered later. Governments set financial incentives by processes that require long periods of negotiation and compromise. Seldom do the means exist to adjust those incentives to the changing requirements of the economy; some things individual businesses can do in minutes consume months in the federal system. I cannot remember any conversations then about indexing military pay to increases in the cost of living.

But the British warned us of one other phenomenon they observed. In their society, and they suspected in every one, a small

group of men by their natures welcome the rigors, discipline, deprivation, and danger of the military, and they will elect that life regardless of the economic rewards. This our British counterparts labeled the "French Foreign Legion hard core." The society also includes another type of person who will accept military life if it offers him a combination of economic rewards, security, variety, adventure, training, and many other attractions that young people seek. This person will be influenced to a considerable degree by the extent of the financial incentives, and the British had attracted him in such gratifying numbers by the military salary plan of 1970.

Beyond these groups, according to the British, you will attract few people regardless of the incentives you offer. Where the line might be drawn they could only guess. But clearly, many with whom we talked so intently believed that they had nearly reached the line by recruiting 1.3 percent of the available pool. This, then, was the limitation they suspected of the Gates Commission philosophy that you can attract more people when you pay more money. If the British were correct, that financial rewards have limited rather than unlimited attractiveness, and that governments can hope only to equal what the economy readily offers, then the people of the United States must realize that volunteerism will never be an easy or certain manpower policy.

The British had one more interesting lesson to teach us. Compared to a military strength of 370,000, they had a defense civilian payroll of 312,000, meaning that of a total of 701,000 in their defense establishment, 55 percent were military and 45 percent were civilians. They had assigned logistical support, largely, to civilian workers. With their new regional defense policy, they had opportunities to do what we did not have with our continuing global commitments. But by comparison, in World War II they had utilized 75 percent military and 25 percent civilian forces. In 1970 the United States had 2,874,000 military and 1,152,000 civilians, or 71 percent military and 29 percent civilian. So the British were telling us, subtly, that if we wanted to make volunteerism work, then we must look much more carefully at what positions we designate for military people and those tasks we expect civilians to undertake.

Before leaving Britian each of us visited a base of the armed forces. Pep and I selected a Royal Air Force installation north of London, spending an interesting day with bright, motivated people. To the man, we found enthusiastic acceptance of voluntary methods; the leaders thought that volunteers handled the work much more capably and with better attitudes than their conscripted predecessors. None would have welcomed a return to the draft. When we

assembled to compare notes, our associates reported similar reactions with the Army, Navy, and Marines.

Perhaps for me the highlight of the trip was a long conversation with Dennis Healey, the former Minister of Defense in the Labor Government, who had inaugurated pay reform the previous April. When I asked him if the services would be able to attract sufficient numbers of people to meet national commitments in the years ahead, he replied that I had confused the priorities.

Healey argued that a democracy will not tolerate selective service and that the reality of modern technology no longer would support large forces where general conscription could be utilized. The only sound approach, then, was to offer the best possible incentives to attract volunteers. When a nation had done all that it could to recruit the people it needed, then it must tailor its commitments to that manpower reality. He thought that this national policy was realistic for a democracy because the number of men the nation can draw into the armed services depends on the nation's concern for the policies its leaders have adopted.

That conversation impressed me then and it still does. Is it true that the aspirations of the nation must be those with which its youth identify? Admittedly we do not operate government financing entirely on the same basis. I wondered if our own effort to maintain the draft and a worldwide commitment had permitted the British to retreat from responsibilities that might as well have been theirs as ours. But I am grateful to Mr. Healey for posing such a fundamental question to me concerning the limitations that democratic action places upon national policy. I continue to speculate upon the validity of his argument. If Mr. Healey is correct, then volunteerism may require us to reduce our commitments as Britain did—something no administration yet has considered in our country.

Volunteerism and the Issue of Quality

Back home I continued to work for passage of the President's legislation during that long summer of 1971. On July first the President lost his authority to induct young men, so Selective Service reverted to a standby operation. This hiatus provided time for us to plan for the future. It gave me an excellent opportunity to make some statistical studies of volunteerism. For months I had reviewed the data on volunteers by random sequence number. With this I had developed a methodology for estimating true volunteers. I decided to look particularly at August recruitment, since in July many young

men and even recruiting personnel did not know that the President's authority to induct had expired.

Of course, many of the 38,739 young men who volunteered in August did so to escape the draft when it came again. Admittedly, measuring those numbers who were draft-induced is difficult. But it seemed certain that those with low random sequence numbers had more reason to enlist to avoid the draft than did those with high, "safe," numbers.

In 1970 we had called men with numbers 195 and below. In June of 1971 we had reached men with numbers of 125 and below. Thus a man in August of 1971 might still believe he would be taken if his number were below 195. But if a man were to come into the service with a number above 195, then likely he would be a "true" volunteer. There also are "true" volunteers at lower numbers, and I assumed that there were as many proportionately with low numbers as there were with "safe" ones. This, then, was the methodology for making a rough calculation of "true" volunteers. Comparing August of 1971 with the same month a year earlier, I found that "true" volunteers among draft-age recruits increased from 40 to 70 percent. Among young men who were most vulnerable, those who enlisted to avoid induction dropped from six out of ten to three out of ten.

The difficulty with the methodology lay in the fact that we had taken men out of the pool earlier in the year, both for enlistments and inductions, which may have overstated somewhat the numbers of "true" volunteers among men with low numbers produced by my calculations. But many new men had come into the pool in the summer from high school, college, or university. We also had taken volunteers with high numbers throughout the year. Thus, this rough means of approximation seemed to be the best I could devise.

I also studied the numbers of recruits below draft age. The services typically relied more heavily upon these than they did on men of draft age. Although the draft exerted some pressure upon these younger recruits, it did not do so to the extent that it did upon older youth, and thus one could assume that these younger recruits were nearly "true" volunteers. This was particularly so because with a decline in combat operations, waiting for the draft would less likely involve a young man in battle. In the year that had passed, those recruits below draft age had climbed from 65 percent of the total to 73 percent, with each of the armed forces drawing more than 70 percent of their numbers from these younger ages. Thus again I found the services to be relying less upon the draft as an inducement among these younger men.

We needed also to look carefully at the capability of recruits to handle the jobs that existed in the armed services. Each recruit took the Armed Forces Qualification Test to be placed in a mental category. Thus, among 100 representative men in the military age population, the highest 7 would be in category one, the next 28 in category two, 34 in category three, 28 in category four, and the lowest 10 in category five. The armed forces then were not taking category five people. Comparing all accessions for August 1971 with August 1970, I found the following percentage of total persons taken:

Mental Category	August 1970	August 1971
1	5.3%	3.7%
2	33.2	29.4
3	43.8	47.9
4	17.7	19.0
	100.0	100.0

Thus the services had been less successful attracting category one and two men, and more able to attract those in groups three and four. "True" volunteers in August 1971 constituted 59 percent of those in category one, 56 percent in category two, 75 percent in category three, and 87 percent in category four. Voluntary methods clearly attracted more readily those in lower mental categories. A mental category four person usually has the reading comprehension of a fifth-grader. Without unusual assistance he cannot keep pace with beginning classes of recruits. Many training programs can be undertaken only by people in categories one and two.

I reflected back on my experience with the Navy, recalling that on the nuclear aircraft carrier *Enterprise*, of the 2,834 enlisted men's positions, 2,711 of these or 95 percent required men in a category one or two. All of the 124 enlisted men on a nuclear submarine had to be category one or two. Each man in an F-4 aircraft squadron doing maintenance work was a category one or two. Of course, there were other jobs in the Navy with less demanding mental requirements. But you could not operate a blue water force without these capabilities. Air Force requirements would be as demanding as those in the Navy.

Of course, the Army and Marine Corps, being less technology-oriented than the other services, did not need so many personnel in category one or two. But even these services are becoming more

technologically sophisticated. And, quite apart from technology demands, we mislead ourselves not to consider mental capabilities in measuring the effectiveness of a ground fighting force. One day I had a call from a friend in the White House asking about progress in recruiting. I told him that the numbers encouraged us but that the quality posed problems. When I explained to him about mental categories, he said:

"Oh, that's fine; they should make good infantrymen."

Not wanting to mislead him, I posed a question.

"Suppose I had power over your life and tomorrow morning could order you to make a dangerous patrol in Vietnam. You could take any five men with you; whom would you select?"

"I don't know," he replied. "What kind of men should I choose?"

"If I were you, I would select those most likely to return."

"Who are they?"

"From all we know about survivability in combat, the brighter boys seems to have the best chance to return."

Most people do not think about that. But we should think about it, because either defense is so important that we must do it well, or we should forget about it. Nations do not collect silver medals in war.

I found out one more thing about August volunteers. Unquestionably the services would have a difficult time attracting category one and two minority recruits; and conversely, minority recruits among category three and four men would come to the services in greater numbers then their share of the population. The brighter minority lads could select opportunities anywhere in the society. So the profile of the voluntary force that emerged from these studies showed lower numbers of bright men and higher concentrations of minority personnel. This was not inevitable, because steps could be taken to offset these tendencies among brighter candidates for recruitment. And larger numbers of minorities could be handled with appropriate attitudes among service people. But the tendencies were apparent.

In March of 1972 as I prepared to depart from Selective Service, I went to the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks in Pennsylvania to talk to old friends and many others who had assembled there. I reported the trends I saw in recruitment and what I thought the services, and particularly the reserve forces, must do to attract the people they need to meet their commitments. After my formal presentation with charts they continued to ask me questions for nearly an hour. I ended with an illustration I had used frequently in my two years of similar presentations.

One great danger in planning for manpower is that we are apt to let the numbers mislead us. It reminds me of the evening that Pam and Cindy took me to a football game at Langley High School in Virginia outside Washington. Out on the field I saw eleven Langley boys, all looking physically fit, with splendid equipment, playing with a football on a 100-yard field. Two days later, my friend and associate, Dan Cronin, invited me to go with him to see the Washington Redskins. There I saw eleven men, all looking physically fit, with splendid equipment, playing with a football on a 100-yard field. If I had known nothing about football, I might well have reasoned that the Langley High School team could beat the Washington Redskins half of the time. But nobody who knew football would ever be so mistaken.

How much different is the defense of the Nation? Could anyone believe that an F-4 aircraft was the same defense instrument, regardless of who flew it? Or that a Poseidon submarine would be? I could remember from World War II that some divisions simply performed better than others, remarkably better on some occasions. Yet all fielded the same complement of people and were issued the same equipment. The quality of people made the difference. So it would be in a future defense of our Nation. We had to attract the best people so that we could expect our forces to perform in a superior manner.

Thus I left Selective Service, having done what I could to prepare the armed forces for the volunteerism that soon would follow.

11

Finishing Touches

When the President signed H.R. 6531 to make it Public Law 92-129, on September 28, 1971, we had a great deal of work to accomplish quickly. We had not inducted anyone since the end of June. But owing to declining force levels and encouraging enlistments, the services had not suffered greatly. Thus, the Department of Defense placed our calls at 10,000 for the period November-December, typically poor months to begin troop training.

We had to arrange the transition to the uniform national call with these inductions, so we elected not to take anyone with a random sequence number above 125, the number we had used in June. We used the same limit for preinduction physical examinations. Although we continued asking each state director to deliver specific numbers of men, we directed them to use a uniform state call. This permitted some states to fill calls with a lower ceiling than other states, but each board in the state used the same maximum random sequence number. By these methods we inducted 10,640 men. We handled the extended priority as we had previously, except that we did so on a national rather than a state basis. Thus everyone not called with a number 125 or below, anywhere in the Nation, went into extended priority for consideration in calendar year 1972.

At the end of the year we encountered an unfortunate incident. Secretary Laird, in a news conference, announced that Defense probably would not call anyone during February and March. Since we had no calls in January, anyone deferred and with a random sequence number below 125 could drop his deferment, accordingly going into extended priority for call in the first quarter of 1972 when

there would be no inductions. But Mel Laird made the announcement a few days before the government holiday on Friday, December 31, 1971, and the news reached the public the Thursday before.

Pep went into the office on the holiday to work at his desk and telephone calls soon swamped him. He quickly summoned people to headquarters to answer telephones. State headquarters had the same problems. Many suspected that we had arranged the Secretary's announcement just before a holiday to prevent registrants from dropping deferments, an impossibility since we had no warning of the Secretary's announcement and he did not have enough information about extended priority to imagine the consequences. One judge in Colorado, alarmed by the circumstances, forced Fred Obitz, our State Director, to maintain the year-end option for registrants until the evening of January 3. We continued to be plagued by calls for a week into the new year.

Then, for several weeks I had difficulty explaining to people in the Pentagon the implications of what the Secretary inadvertently had done. Inductions during February or March would have taken those who had worked so frantically to expose themselves to potential induction in 1971, causing acrimony among those called as well as those chronically perceiving nefarious plots at Selective Service. Alas, by the middle of January, the Defense Department had decided not to issue calls during the first quarter, letting us place those extended priority registrants into the second priority group.

Publishing Draft Regulations

Next, we had to prepare for the publication of our regulations in the *Federal Register* for comment. Although many of our people resisted doing so, and it required a great deal of study to pepare for the publication, I believe that this action should have begun earlier. Then, Selective Service could have entered the decade of the seventies with a more comprehensive and understandable system.

For some time we had worked with people in the White House to gain permission to issue our own regulations. Selective Service once had that privilege, but the President withdrew it long before my appointment. By August 1971 we understood that the new law would contain the requirement that we publish proposed regulations for comment 30 days in advance of taking effect. If the President continued to issue regulations, then he would publish for criticism what he intended doing and the law would require the director to

weight the criticism before final publication. Since the President usually followed Selective Service recommendations, it seemed better for us to take the blame for our errors or faulty judgment.

Before the President signed the law I talked with Peter Flanigan about the possibility of Selective Service issuing regulations. Peter understood the implications immediately. On October 12 the President signed an Executive Order giving to the Director of Selective Service the right to issue regulations, provided he circulate the proposed change to interested agencies and bring to the President for decision any unresolved differences. Following that, prepublication for comment in the *Federal Register* could be made. This permitted us immediately to circulate new regulations to the agencies and then publish them for comment.

Prior to that time we had begun work on a draft of new regulations. In August I decided that Walter Morse, our General Counsel, should have the responsibility to prepare regulations, and Walter assigned Henry Williams, Deputy General Counsel, to that duty. By early September, Henry had prepared his first list of changes for our study. On October 13, the day after the President's Executive Order, I sent them to the agency heads for criticism, following the new procedure.

To analyze Henry's suggestions I repeatedly called together my staff and we spent hours going over each idea. This seemed essential to me, although certainly over the next six months it proved to be laborious. Some on the staff performed much more effectively than others. But all of us had to be aware of changes being made, particularly where change might affect the particular office or function that was the responsibility of the staff member.

We also had to determine what we should publish in the *Federal Register*. This new law said only that "No regulation issued under this Act shall become effective until the expiration of thirty days following the date on which such regulation has been published in the *Federal Register*." We interpreted that phrase initially to cover what formerly had required an Executive Order. Instructions that derived from regulations or local board memoranda would be excluded from prepublication and could be published as a matter of record. On October 15 I explained to Chairman Hebert the regulations we intended to prepublish and the procedures we would follow, and he concurred with my interpretation of congressional intent.

But this process became much more complicated than we originally had imagined. Before going far, interested lawyers both within the agency and outside advised that we should not make significant

changes in prepublished material and then publish it in final form, as the language in the new law seemed to imply. Rather, we should offer substantive changes in another prepublication, available for criticism. That lengthy procedure had sound logic because someone might have agreed with the original version while opposing the altered version in final form wth no opportunity to complain. Thus we decided that we would not publish regulations that had been altered in a substantive way from the prepublished version. At times we published in final form a regulation on which we had considerable opposition in order to have a regulation with which to operate while at the same time preparing to prepublish a new version for further criticism. When doing this we tried to alert interested groups.

Then the lawyers looked carefully at the President's recent Executive Order granting us the latitude to issue regulations, and they decided that we could not prepublish in the *Federal Register* any material on which we had received substantive criticism from another agency. If we decided to make changes, then we should circulate them again to the agencies for consideration. Likewise, if we received criticisms from prepublication we should circulate these to the agencies before again inserting the material into the *Federal Register* for criticism. I felt like Gulliver, awaking from his nap, bound by the Lilliputians.

We had yet another complication. We decided to publish local board memoranda in the *Federal Register* as a matter of record, although my intuition led me to believe that we should also prepublish these. My own lawyers objected strenuously to doing so, and reluctantly I agreed with them. But in April 1972 a judge reversed an order to report for induction given to a registrant on the ground that the local board had complied with a local board memorandum we had published for the record on November 10, 1971, and that this memorandum had the force of a regulation; and thus, the judge ruled, the memorandum could not be a valid instruction to a local board until it was published for criticism 30 days prior to printing in final form. Thereafter we altered our procedure to react appropriately.

On November 3, 4, and 5, we inserted our first regulations into the *Federal Register* for criticism, 15 pages of material. On this we received considerable response, including one long letter on Senator Kennedy's letterhead signed by himself and 22 other Senators, only two of whom had voted to accept the conference report in September. I took these and other suggestions carefully into account, usually writing to those I knew who had commented, making certain that someone in the agency responded to all other communications,

and then working with my staff as we evaluated the material we had received.

Not all criticisms came from the outside. On occasion a person with a vested interest would contact someone in the Government, thinking that might have a more profound effect upon us. Only once did a White House official direct me to make a change. I received a call one morning from a young man I knew well who said that the President wanted me to alter one of our prepublished regulations. As soon as he began speaking I knew the person he had talked with, because my people also had discussed the exact change with that person. The suggestion could not be followed without embarrassment to the government. And I knew that the President had no idea whatsoever of this request.

So I replied that I would not make the change. The young man complained bitterly at my resistance. He insisted that the President demanded that the change be made. So I said, "OK, you dictate a note to me asking for that change, slip it on the President's desk, and when he signs it I will do what he says."

"What do you mean, playing that kind of game?" he asked with petulance.

I explained that I took the position because he had not been truthful with me and his demand was a foolish one. I heard nothing more about the request.

On December 9 we published 13 pages of regulations in final form revised from those submitted in November, but we withheld other parts that we wanted to study further. I kept our state directors informed of our actions. On January 12, we submitted 9 pages of regulations for criticism, having gained first the agreement of other agencies. We also published in tentative form our new Form 150 with which a registrant could apply for conscientious objection.

By the year's end we had begun to encounter problems throughout the agency. My staff had grown frustrated with the process of publication and weighing criticism. The people in the state headquarters throughout the country grew uneasy about the lack of direction from National Headquarters, direction we could not supply until we had firm regulations on which to base our instructions. We had to keep working until we had published all of our material in the *Federal Register* in final form. Sometimes the most difficult steps are at the end of a long march. Fortunately Pep maintained his resoluteness throughout, a strength to all of us. I remembered then the old phrase, "It is always too early to quit!"

We published other regulations for comment on January 29, and then inserted most of the January insertions in final form on March

10. At the same time we included regulations for comment, as we did on March 25, and these were ready for final publication April 15 and April 29. Thus at the time I departed from the agency there were two more portions of the regulations not yet submitted to the *Federal Register* in final form, those published first on April 1 and April 27. That entire exercise brought to a close one of the most demanding intellectual and administrative efforts of my experience.

Meanwhile we had another ambitious project underway, the preparation of manuals. These instructions were to provide registrants, local board members, counselors, and employees of the System with all the information needed to make decisions, give advice and help, and operate the agency at all levels of activity. Ken Coffey had kept his staff busy preparing material for local board members and advisers, as well as registrants and counselors, on hardship, conscientious objection, and the general perspective on conscription. Some of John Dewhurst's associates prepared manuals on personnel, fiscal, and procurement procedures; data processing; and accounting. Henry Williams had the responsibility for a registrant's processing manual, significant portions of which had such substantial interest to registrants and counselors that we decided to publish these in the *Federal Register* for information during March and April. Walter Morse prepared a complete file on Selective Service case law to assist our regional attorneys, as well as others, showing what judges had decided and how we must approach problems of enforcement. I edited most of these manuals, partly to understand the contents, but also to make the language clear to registrants. I kept my early aspiration that in Selective Service we would communicate with each other and with the public in simple, understandable English.

Early in 1972 we began working on plans for the lottery, which we held February 2. In contrast to our first drawing, this one commanded little national publicity. We also studied where we should set the I-H classification cutoff, taking advantage of our new procedure (see pages 77-78). Since we did not know how great the calls would be during 1972, we decided to inform the boards to start using RSN 200, understanding that the actual cutoff for the uniform national call probably would be much lower.

In March, students at Rutgers University made us victims of a practical joke that almost caused widespread alarm. As a hoax, the student newspaper carried what was supposed to be an interview with me. It included startling "information": that we would draft 30,000 men into the reserves in July; that we would reach a much

higher RSN in 1972 than in 1971; that we would extend inductions into 1975; and that during 1972 we would call college graduates first. The college news service sent the story nationwide. Frantic telephone calls followed. Few of these people understood student newspapers so well as an old college president!

After pushing our reforms through the Congress, we undertook a comprehensive training program to educate our employees and volunteers about the new Selective Service. In these sessions we found that some of the best students had never worked previously with the agency. Random selection, and now the uniform national call, together with I-H and procedural rights for registrants, all caused confusion in the minds of many veteran workers. But on the whole, these people took the change with poise. All of these alterations pointed up the necessity for insuring that 4,000 boards acted in the same way, a legal necessity now more than ever before in Selective Service history. Under Pep's leadership we transformed our Inspection Division into a Management Evaluation Group, people who could work extensively with the nationwide system, training and correcting our people. We brought all of the members of this group to Washington in February for an intensive training session.

Maintaining Agency Morale

In retrospect, it might seem that we undertook with great energy to reform an agency that obviously faced an uncertain future. But we needed a cause to keep striving, despite uncertainty all around us. Indeed, in the National Headquarters we had begun to prepare for a standby organization for Selective Service, including plans to scale down employment, the size of the reserve force assigned to the System, and expenditures. This study caused people to wonder about their job security. In January, to complicate problems of morale, rumor began to circulate throughout the System and the Pentagon that the President would move me elsewhere. My reassignment in itself caused no concern, but it added to the growing anxiety about the future of the agency. At the time I knew only that people in the White House had considered transferring me. I had told the President earlier that I had completed most of what he sent me to do and that I would appreciate being relieved. But I could only confess to my staff that I had heard nothing from the President. As I surveyed the ebbing elan in the agency, always amazingly high under attack, I feared that we would not do all that needed doing. The old truth could apply to us, that when a living thing stops growing it starts to die.

Soon we received a new cause. At the end of January a young man from Senator Kennedy's staff called to inform us that the senator wanted hearings before his Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary, to discuss selective service and amnesty. I began immediately to prepare for this new challenge. Although I had difficulty with some of the senator's bright young staff who viewed draft obstructionists as their clientele, I had always gotten along well with the senator.

Rather early in February we learned that the Kennedy staffers felt they had abundant evidence to embarrass us at the hearing. They believed we had abused the new law by emasculating the rights of registrants, as well as by our failure to prepublish regulations. We heard also that the confidence of the Kennedy group had overflowed to the Senate Armed Services Committee staff, where the chairman would not try to help us if the allegations were true. Phrased another way, chairmen do not invade the territories of other chairmen lightly. In this area, Senator Kennedy had an organizational reason to inquire.

Reacting to this news, Pep and I huddled to formulate an appropriate strategy. Shrewdly, Pep judged that the Kennedy staffers would count upon our publishing critical regulations in final form that we had prepublished in January, including registration for conscientious objection, personal appearances before local and appeal boards, appeals to the National Selective Service Appeal Board, reopening classifications, postponement of induction, and alternate service. Regardless of what we did on these, someone would attack us. Thus Pep suggested that we not publish these in final form until after the hearings, removing from that forum an inquiry into these changes. Oddly enough, the law stated that "No formal hearing shall be required on any such regulation,"and yet it seemed that this might be the means for the Kennedy staff to demand one.

Accordingly, we decided to withhold final publication. By mid-February, a Kennedy staff operative called to ask when we would publish the regulations. Not satisfied with the first answer that we had not yet set a date, he called three other people in the agency on the same day. I told Walter Morse to inform him that we would publish the regulations as soon as we had evaluated all of the criticisms, something we had not yet completed.

Immediately the intrigue took another tack. The young man called Sam Shaw to inquire when I would appear at the hearings. Courtesy demanded that I be invited to testify first on these matters.

But this question further confirmed our suspicion that the staffers wanted us to publish before my coming, let others criticize what I had done, and then ask me to appear as a final witness and fitting sacrifice. I told Sam to respond that I was counting on being the lead witness on February 28, the first day of the hearings and a poor one for publicity since we expected the President to return that day from his historic trip to China.

On February 20, I spent Sunday writing a 17-page presentation to the committee. Pep, Lois, and I devoted the following day to the statement; on Tuesday we did so with my staff. February 23 we sent the statement to the White House and the Justice Department for comment. By then we had also received from Assistant Attorney General Ralph E. Erickson a 10-page judgment on the publication of regulations under the requirements of the new law. Erickson advised us that regulations meant regulations, not local board memoranda or letters to all state directors, as alleged by Senator Kennedy and the other senators who had written earlier to me. Erickson pointed out that if every directive that went to state directors to take certain actions had to be prepublished, the law would impose on Selective Service the restrictions that might make operation impossible, something that the Senate obviously had not intended. He did advise that we publish local board memoranda if in fact they could be interpreted as giving directions to local boards where there were no regulations to cover those actions, thus anticipating the judge's decision soon to come. We sent a copy of the Erickson letter to the Kennedy staff, together with my statement, on February 25.

On Saturday, February 26, I went over "dirty questions" prepared to sharpen me for my appearance. Pep, Walter Morse, and Sam Shaw grilled me during four hours of careful dialogue. From it I could see that we had developed a system much more comprehensive than that which existed before the change of the law and our work on the regulations, something that would have been impossible under the old procedure of Presidential Executive Orders. I understood also that the new system could not be manipulated so easily by registrants and draft counselors. As we continued to work we received numerous calls from the Kennedy staffers, diligently trying to prepare for their side of the confrontation.

But in truth the real confrontation, the most difficult in Congress that we faced during that two-year period, took place in the preliminary maneuvering. Although I worried about staff questions, I welcomed being with Senator Kennedy, whom I personally liked. As Pep and I departed for the Hill on the morning of February 28, he buoyed

my confidence by saying that he and others felt I was prepared to speak for Selective Service.

As I awaited the start of the hearings I recalled the advice Sargent Shriver, the Senator's brother-in-law, was said to have offered to Peace Corps recruits: "You will have rocks thrown at you; you will be cursed, insulted, spat upon; your motives will be questioned; you will be called names; but then, when you leave Washington, . . ."

The hearings themselves did not trouble me a great deal. Chairman Kennedy let me read my entire statement, complimenting me at times, and then questioned me closely. The months of work on the regulations now benefited me. But the chairman had one difficulty of his own to overcome: he had made an unfortunate comment, during a discussion on amnesty, that Confederate soldiers had been "traitors." His staff people erased that reference from the printed record, but not in the mind of Senator Thurmond, who was present as a member of the subcommittee. Thurmond fulminated with rage at the reference. I believe it took much of the sharp edge off the subcommittee's attack.

We had another set of hearings before the Bentsen Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee. Originally this group had been formed to divert some of the attention from the Kennedy hearings, but the questions we received all came to the Bentsen group from the Kennedy staff. We also had to appear before appropriations subcommittees in each house, hearings that included discussions on the operation of the agency as well as its spending plans. None of this inquiry seemed to point out concerns that we had overlooked.

Final Actions: Resignation

By then my time was drawing short and I wanted to remember some of those who had done so much. I asked the Army Office of Heraldry to help design an appropriate medal; they proposed a blue and gold ribbon on which we hung a gold World War II Selective Service medal, altered to remove wartime markings. While striking the gold medal we created silver and bronze ones of the same design, permitting state directors to award the bronze and to recommend the award of the silver. This became the means to honor hundreds of faithful workers.

Someone promptly challenged my right to create a medal. Any dispute on this matter I settled quickly because I wanted to give the first ones to four special members of Congress. So, in late January I

went to the Hill to present gold medals to Senators Stennis and Margaret Chase Smith, and Congressmen Hebert and Arends. All four seemed pleased to be remembered in such a way. From then on, no one doubted the longevity of the Selective Service Medal.

On March 17 the state directors joined Pep, my staff, and me in a beautiful, black-tie dinner. For two days we had reviewed our work and what we must yet achieve. But now we relaxed in good fellowship, the last such event I would attend as director. At that dinner I awarded silver medals to Glenn Bowles, formerly the State Director of Iowa, who had come to National Headquarters to do such a magnificent job as our Chief of Operations; and to State Directors Jimmy Davis of Mississippi, Herb Hope of Oklahoma, Art Holmes of Michigan, and Paul Akst of New York City, all fine men and great leaders. In doing so I really awarded my respect to their counterparts as well, because it was difficult for me to choose 4 from the 56 men who had supported me so loyally and well.

I saved the best until last. Byron Pepitone had provided the creative spirit for much that we had accomplished. He authored most of the actions that had established a new agency from the wages of neglect we had found two years before. To a thoroughly surprised gentleman and friend, I presented the gold medal.

Although several people wanted to replace me as director, I won from the White House the promise that Byron Pepitone would serve as Acting Director. He quickly proved to the President his worth as a leader and soon was appointed Director, a thoroughly sound appointment for both Presidents Nixon and Ford.

Having completed all the final touches to implement our reforms, I had but one more duty. On April 30, 1972 I wrote a long letter to the President, reporting what I had attempted during two years to bring equity to the System, to inform registrants of their responsibilities and their opportunities, and to replace the confederation of independent local boards with a national agency; that done, I submitted my resignation.

Then I departed to assume new duties in the Department of State.

12

Perspective

Nine years have passed since I departed from Selective Service. The Nation continues to recover from its wounds suffered in the Vietnam era, although the problems we abandoned in Southeast Asia continue to plague those whom we temporarily assisted. Some opposition to things reminiscent of Vietnam apparently has subsided.

President Carter has initiated registration once again in the event that we need inductions during an emergency. Since no one has ever predicted that we could face a national defense emergency without a draft, I never considered it prudent to eliminate registration. But as President Reagan begins a new administration, his stated views cast a shadow of uncertainty upon the continuation of that process.

Yet, it is well now to recall that the Ford administration encountered difficult problems of enforcement that will come again in any registration. We cannot easily determine whether those who should register in fact have done so, because the best means to do so would be to compare registrations with the information collected by other agencies, such as Social Security and Internal Revenue, and the law does not permit this. Furthermore, in the event someone was found in violation, US attorneys likely would not take the case to court; if they did, the violator would avoid punishment. Penalties for failure to register are so unrealistic that most judges would merely compel the guilty one to obey the law, in itself encouragement for noncompliance. Thus registration may be prudent, but it burdens our Government with difficult problems of enforcement.

Many times I have asked myself whether Selective Service could have lasted beyond 1972 as the means to satisfy the manpower

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needs of our armed forces. Without the tragedy of Vietnam it may have survived, although I do not believe it would have done so, lacking sweeping reforms. With Vietnam the draft might have continued successfully, although the chances are even less, but reforms would have been required much earlier in the war. With the war and without reforms until 1970 and 1971, conscription could not survive.

A National System

As I look now at our reform program I doubt that we should have done much that was different. The United States needed a national system much earlier, with published regulations and careful instructions to enlighten local board members. My bewilderment comes, even yet, from trying to understand how the old system worked as well as it did. I remember an early visit I made to a local board office in the foothills of California. When I asked for the file of information to help determine appropriate action on cases to be decided, the clerk produced a dusty, looseleaf binder with several old local board memoranda, none of which provided accurate or comprehensive instructions based upon the present law and regulations. Apparently, no one from state or National Headquarters made any effort to help the board understand better what to do. I wondered if a draft for the War of 1812 could have been more loosely structured!

A national system depends also upon training. The training sessions I remember best had taken me to Kentucky where Taylor Davidson, a master trainer and State Director, brought some of his executive secretaries together. But I recall now that we always had training underway somewhere. No system can carry out national policy at the local level without that training, based upon sound materials.

Conscription that takes young men at ages 19 or 20 should permit few exemptions and deferments if it is to be equitable. At the end we had preserved only those for hardship, conscientious objection, divinity students, and ministers. Frankly, I would not suggest retaining the latter two in the future. Increasingly it will become difficult to determine who is a divinity student or a minister, with the growth of cults, the activities of diploma mills, and erosion in the meanings of clerical titles. A future Director of Selective Service probably would encounter difficulty trying to draft young people enrolled in college. While sound national policy should provide opportunities for a registrant to complete the term or semester in which he is enrolled, following that he should go into the service if called upon to do so.

What about medical doctors? Although we have managed nationally to train those we require to provide medical service to the people, we often have failed to do so for the armed services. The Department of Defense now has established a medical school where defense doctors of the future will train. But this facility cannot satisfy total needs. Defense has also offered scholarships for people in medical schools who are then obligated to serve after graduation. More use may be made of contract services whereby civilian doctors living near defense installations provide treatment for service people.

Can we draft doctors during an emergency? Legally I believe the Nation can do so when it is drafting young people to enter the armed services. But resistance would be great if that were to be done without a draft for the ranks as well. Furthermore, if a man had earlier been exposed to call it would be difficult to expose him again because he had become a doctor.

The young soldiers in Vietnam told me that random selection provided equity when a nation did not require all young men in the services. Even though the British and the Germans had warned me that selective service would not work, I believe that it is the only means available to us in the future, provided we do not decide to take everyone in an age group for some kind of national service. Together with random selection, we should take the youngest year of exposure first on a uniform call throughout the Nation.

I cannot imagine conscientious objection becoming easier to define in the future. Although traditional beliefs in God are less widely accepted, more young people worry about the problems of conscience. Boards, even those composed of professional people, would have difficulty determining who really passes the tests handed down thus far by the courts.

The Nation, responding to conscientious objection in a future emergency, should provide dignified, suitable opportunities for young people to serve when so classified. The law now specifies that the National Director must assign a conscientious objector to alternate service at the same time he would otherwise be inducted into the armed services. Courts at the end of the Vietnam era became more insistent that the director either assign the conscientious objector to suitable alternate service or release him from all obligations to serve.

Although creative work can provide alternate service opportunities in communities throughout the Nation, those must be supplemented by a Federal program in the future, preferably funded by Selective Service but operated in conjunction with other Federal

agencies. In the future, a young person in alternate service should not be disadvantaged because of his plea of conscience, but he should be asked to serve with the same diligence, pay, deprivation if necessary, and perhaps with equivalent danger, either in the forests or along the shore, in cities, hospitals, schools, or reacting to natural disasters.

We attempted to work with US attorneys and the courts, and we made miniscule progress. I believe we would have fared much better had we tried to administer the system on the basis of the law and regulations that finally evolved by 1972. But enforcement never will come easily. As the Constitution prescribes, no one really controls the judges of Federal courts, and fortunately so. Probably they react best to the demands and concerns of the public. That should be sufficient warning to any President in the future who attempts to commit the American people to a war they cannot understand or support.

Since 1972 the Nation has done relatively well with volunteerism. As we started the All-Volunteer Force, I made predictions, as noted in Chapter 10, that have found partial fulfillment. I believe the services have done well, given the enormity of the task. Most of us close to the effort in the early seventies should confess that volunteerism has worked about as well as we hoped it would.

The Nation never has solved the problem of keeping military salaries competitive, for reasons explored earlier. One way to do so is to index them to the cost of living. A move to do this certainly would generate a clamor among civil service advocates for equal treatment. Indexing would add to the budget and would not be controlled by Congress—a difficult alternative to accept. Clearly, inflation is the enemy of volunteerism.

Some other actions should be undertaken. More civilians can be used in logistical support of the services, particularly through contracts. Mandatory retirement of military people at unrealistically young ages should not continue. Supplemental benefits such as a modern GI Bill to cover some of the costs of higher education can help to attract first-term enlistees. Opportunities for women in the active forces have continued to grow and they should, taking pressure from requirements for men. Leadership still is the appropriate response of the services to the challenge of the All-Volunteer Force.

Alternative Systems of Conscription

Yet, despite heroic recruitment efforts we might make, declining populations of youth becoming 18 throughout the eighties will chal-

lenge the concept of volunteerism severely, perhaps overwhelmingly. As an example, in 1984, if we seek to maintain the armed forces and reserves at levels authorized in 1978, with the same ratios of male and female personnel, we must recruit one of every two eligible young male Americans who will not continue in higher education. It is difficult now to imagine the circumstances that will insure the success of that effort. But what are the alternatives to the All-Volunteer Force?

In the event that we cannot provide the number of young people the armed services require, should we take the approach recommended to me by former British Defense Minister Dennis Healey, to scale down our forces and the national commitments we expect from them? As we watch the leaden movements of the Russian bear we grow uneasy with that alternative.

If someday we must return to conscription in peacetime, then certainly we must consider the alternatives available to us. One would be a draft based upon random sequence numbers, similar to what had evolved by 1972. A second alternative would be a draft into the armed services, coupled with a voluntary program of national service. A third would link conscription into the armed services with that into national service, both based upon random sequence number. The fourth approach would be compulsory national service for all youth between certain ages. A fifth would be universal military service, the dream of the Army leadership during the last days of World War II.

Let us discuss these in reverse order.

The problem with universal military training, in practical rather than philosophical terms, lies with the numbers of people available for call. The Europeans have learned well this arithmetic. For example, in 1961, 2.2 million male and 2.1 million female babies were born in the United States. Let us assume that half of those males in 1980 are eligible, mentally and physically, for military service. Of that total, 220,000 probably would be conscientious objectors, requiring alternate service on a scale never before imagined in America. To provide simple training for the remaining 880,000 youths, the Department of Defense would require the professional services of about 175,000 officers and enlisted men, taking them away from their essential duties of providing for the defense in units ready to meet an emergency. The cost of this program with alternate service might be: $11 billion for recruit pay and subsistence, $4 billion for professional cadre, plus the cost of building camps and providing equipment.

Since minimal training would require about six months, these youths could provide service to the Nation for only half of their total

terms, too short a time to warrant sending them to units abroad or integrating them into combat-ready forces in the United States. The men for those units would, of necessity, be volunteers drawn from these trainees for longer periods of service. Some of this number would elect to train for specialties requiring more time in preparation, some of them as great as one year, thus obligating that person to an extended term. Others might decide to leave the service after six months of training, committing themselves to three years of duty with the reserves.

The short time during which trained young men would be available under this alternative rules out their assignment to active units of any of the services. One must therefore judge the worth of universal military training by comparing whether it would provide more volunteers for longer periods of time than would other manpower policies. In these terms the expenditure of $15 billion each year does not seem to be an economical way to attract the nearly 400,000 young people that the active forces require each year and the 220,000 needed in the reserves. If the Nation decided to call women along with men, then the costs would double as a means to attract the same numbers of volunteers for the services.

To provide more useful service, young people could be kept for two years rather than one, again doubling the numbers and the cost while tripling useful service compared to training. But the armed forces nearly would double in size compared to those made up of volunteers or recruits provided by Selective Service; if women were included, the total force would be three times as large. Since the military professional force always is volunteer, such great numbers could only contribute to a reduction in the capability of units to carry out sophisticated missions, because of the increased demand for training cadre, even though units would be much more plentiful.

Next let us consider compulsory national serice for all youth. Most young people would prefer options other than the military, and since youth probably would have freedom of selection, only added inducements would attract them to the armed forces. To overcome the restriction of short periods of service, the military forces must attract people to serve longer periods than those in other actiities or else professional capabilty would suffer. Probably the armed forces could not expect their manpower budgets to drop under this alternative. But certainly the total Government budget would burgeon alarmingly.

I have two problems with this alternative. First, I doubt that the Constitution permits Congress and the President to draft people into Government service, except for the armed forces. Courts have

upheld the military draft because the Constitution grants congress power to provide for the common defense, to raise and support armies, and to provide and maintain a Navy. One could include the authority to institute national service under these powers only with delusive imagination, since an opponent could show rather easily that other and less inclusive means exist to provide for the needs of the armed forces. Thus, compulsory national service may be a wise policy for the Nation, eventually; but I do not believe it will come about without an amendment to the Costitution.

My other reservation refers to the work that most of our youth would undertake. Probably, national service need not require the high physical standards set by the armed services and thus most of the young men and women in the pool could serve, nearly four million. A great deal of work exists that these young people could do well. We need more willing people to care for the sick, particularly the aged. Youth could work in ghetto areas, removing some of the blight, helping children better to prepare themselves to enter public schools, or assisting teachers in the classrooms. The environment cries for attention, from cleaning up the mess we have thrown carelessly upon the land or into streams and lakes, to developing more parks, camp grounds, and trails. A modest amount of imagination opens encouraging possibilities. We have work that needs doing.

But would national service accomplish this? How many years would it take before government bureaucracies could organize to provide a real challenge for idealistic young people? A moderate pessimist might conclude that never would the bureaucracy respond. Only the armed services know how to expand to absorb huge numbers of young people and obviously they could not be asked to undertake this work. Another approach might be to budget the money for work that needs doing and let contractors hire the young people to do it. This might not cost any more and still it would avoid the curbs on freedom that characterize national service.

A third possibility links conscription for the armed services with conscription into national service based upon random sequence number. Here, the young person could select either national service or the armed forces and the number drafted would depend upon how many might choose national service. Presumably the armed forces could provide inducements to persuade youth to select military training.

I believe that the same Constitutional problem exists with this alternative because the Congress could as easily provide for defense by drafting only into the armed services. The numbers of youth

under this arrangement would be less than under national service, making the work projects easier to organize. Still they would be massive.

Some people have suggested a fourth possiblity, linking conscription with voluntary national service. Under this proposal, problems of conscientious objection diminish because one who wishes to avoid military service, for any reason, simply elects national service. Others not under pressure of the draft could enter voluntary service as well. This program would require organization so that the rigor of national service equates in some measure with duty in the armed forces. Organizationally the national service effort might fall to Selective Service, working with government agencies throughout the Nation.

Lastly, the Nation could return to a system similar to the one that emerged from the reforms of the early seventies.

Whatever the Nation chooses, the American people must be willing to support it. I do not favor forcing young people to do something they would rather avoid simply because someone else judges that it might be good for them. At eighteen or nineteen, with the right to vote, young people should make that judgment for themselves. The only reason for forcing anyone to do anything is that the society cannot endure otherwise. I cannot see that we thus require programs to take everyone. Instead, I favor the system that least disrupts the lives of our youth. If volunteerism cannot provide adequately for our needs, I would prefer either the draft with alternate service for conscientious objectors or the draft with voluntary national service.

President Carter has focused our attention upon registering women, with the possiblity that they may be drafted in the future. The armed forces thus far have attracted the women they seek through voluntary methods. Undoubtedly the services will open more opportunities for women in the future. If these exceed the numbers of volunteers available, then the case can be made for registering and, if need be, for drafting women. Presently that is not the case, although ultimately the courts may decide that women must be included, both in registration and conscription if it is resumed.

Plans by the Department of Defense rest upon a return to the draft in the event the Nation must mobilize. This certainly is a possibility that we must prepare to meet, unwelcome though the prospect is. But we also must anticipate the day when we need a draft and the President has no reason to mobilize. Frankly, I believe this is the more likely possibility, although volunteerism must be a glaring failure before many admit its inadequacy.

Ten years ago I hoped to be one of the last to do what Moses began when he required each tribe to provide a thousand men to fight the Midianites. But given the realities under which we must live, we may face a draft in the future just as we have in the past.

If conscription again becomes necessary, then I have some advice for a future director and those who assist him.

First, the agency must be efficient and without moral defects. Many of the reforms made between 1970 and 1972 modernized the management of a Government bureaucracy that had become almost fatally decrepit. It must never again fall into such disrepair. Selective Service cannot be viewed as "just another agency" and excused as another bureaucratic morass. It has control over the lives and welfare of youth and thus it must be a model of efficiency, humanity, and justice.

Second, a director never should overlook the contributions that young people can make. They proved to us they were a boundless source of ideas, ideals, and imaginative solutions to difficult problems. I did not attempt a major initiative without their assistance. Young people are the primary clientele of the agency, and a director who operates skillfully will maintain his communications with them.

Third, the media hold the means of communicating with the American people. Naturally, those who work in television, radio, and newspapers will have personal biases as do other intelligent Americans; at times, these biases will affect objectivity. But professionalism will motivate most of the journalists who report on the work of Selective Service, and they will do so accurately. As allies, these men and women can be most helpful, both in conveying information and in submitting criticism, but they cannot be manipulated or misled. A director must work carefully to foster this channel of communication with the people, particularly the youth.

Fourth, a director should take every opportunity to work with the Congress. The individuals who represent us in Congress generally seek what is best for the Nation, even though they differ in the means to secure it and have various constituencies. Hearings can be helpful if approached constructively. The complaints, the questions, and the advice that come from these sessions can inform an official in a useful way.

Fifth, enforcement in the courts always will confound a director, particularly so if the people of the Nation cannot agree upon the direction of national policy. The Government will have the burden of proof in the courts, for no longer can we presume an obligation for the qualified individual to serve. Thus, Selective Service people must prepare cases with meticulous documentation of the failure by a

registrant to obey the rules and procedures prescribed by law. Detection of failure to register, always a vexing problem, will require particular attention from the Congress and the Department of Justice.

Sixth, a director will have increasing problems with conscientious objection unless the Nation elects the option of conscription coupled with voluntary national service. If boards must determine who is a conscientious objector, given the present broad definition of that profession, then board members must have much more explicit tests to make or rules to follow, or the boards must include people with special and unusual competence. Because of these complications, I would prefer a system of voluntary national service so that conscientious objectors could declare themselves by accepting this alternative.

Without that voluntary service, then the director will have to find alternate service possibilities for huge numbers of young people. Unless the Government provides money for the work to be done, I do not believe that alternate service will be practical for conscientious objectors, because the director will not be able to find sufficient opportunities locally for them, nor will he be certain that these jobs meet a test of national uniformity. Without alternate service, conscientious objection would become a more attractive option for some, and a more conspicuous target to attack for others, both of which we should avoid.

Balancing Freedom and Responsibility

Every society struggles with the balance between freedom and responsibility. Ours has placed its trust in freedom, trying to preserve this ideal against all forms of encroachment; and only when the survival of the society seems to require doing so do we allow any curbs on that freedom. Admittedly, we have limited an individual's freedom in order to protect the freedom of others. But we have insisted that the curbs be minimal, and we have imposed them only after agonizing thought and scrupulous care in their administration. Let us strive that this always be so.

Conscription severely strains the traditional balance produced with such patience and caution throughout the annals of Western civilization and particularly during our Nation's history. Conscription really does not have a permanent place in this balance. In wartime, we have accepted the draft as a necessary disruption. This toleration even carried into the Cold War. But Vietnam made Americans wonder if we had not gone too far in curbing the freedom of our

youth in order to pursue policies that our citizens never understood as protection against an immediate threat to national survival. The All-Volunteer Force was the American reaction.

If the high hopes for volunteerism are transient, if the armed forces cannot in the future recruit and retain sufficient numbers of highly qualified people, then we must look either to conscription or to change in our strategic commitments. The American people then must decide whether to restrain the freedom of youth through selective service in the armed forces or to tailor national policy to the capabilities of forces supported by voluntary participation.

We cannot and we should not judge hastily between these alternatives. We may require conscription to hold the only place in the world that is a feasible one for our Nation; indeed, since World War II, the lessons seem reasonably clear that we have avoided the danger of war best by being prepared to wage it, and that weakness on our part attracted aggressive behavior from others. Thus we may have to avow that no longer can we rely upon the traditional balance between freedom and responsibility in a modern world. We may need this further curb upon freedom to preserve the broader concept of freedom for all Americans.

Others will argue strenuously that a nation opposing us in any foreseeable war will be one which has emasculated freedom in favor of the authority of the state. Must we, the argument continues, temporarily abandon freedom in order to defeat such a state and thereby preserve freedom for the future? My own judgment, in the case of failure of volunteerism or in the event of a defense emergency, is to favor selective service, but it is not an easy one.

May God help us to choose wisely.

Sources

While I was Director of Selective Service I kept a journal. Each day I dictated notes about the significant events of the previous one, usually as I drove to work in the morning. This let me review the significance of what had transpired, reminding me what actions I should take. Now, years later, the journal serves better than memory to reconstruct in my mind the events of two turbulent but exciting years.

I kept copies of important papers and letters I wrote and received. These have helped me, although I am somewhat overwhelmed now to survey the abundance of what I saved. When I departed from Selective Service I sent to the National Archives a chronological file of my correspondence. The basic file of all papers, of course, stayed at Selective Service.

I have referred closely to copies of the *Congressional Record* for an account of the debates and the votes in both the Senate and the House. In all cases I referred to prints available the following day, and thus some details may vary from the final form of publication. I used published committee hearings for each of those in which I participated, and reports from various committees. My semiannual reports as director have guided me now, as well as the statistical tables included with them. For the material on regulations we published I studied copies of the *Federal Register*. Most of the significant Executive Orders of the President are included with my semiannual reports. There one can find the important local board memoranda as well. The decisions of the Supreme Court on cases related to conscientious objection provided the record from which I drew material for that chapter.

During those years I gave a few interviews that were published and I wrote several articles. These include: "Draft Outlook for '70 and '71," *US News and World Report*, 6 July 1970; "New Questions about the Draft," *US News and World Report*, 16 November 1970; "Youth and the Draft," *Youth Magazine*, 20 December 1970; "How Congress Should Change the Draft," *US News and World Report*, 1 February 1971; "Winds of Change in the Draft," *Nation's Business*, February 1971; "The Heart of the Matter," *The Retired Officer*, March 1971; "Students and Selective Service," *NASSP Bulletin*, May 1971; "Selective Service and Conscientious Objection," *American Bar Association Journal*, October 1971; "In Pursuit of Equity; Who Serves When Not All Serve," WACSG *Review*, 1970-71; "High Pay Alone Will Not Produce Good Soldiers," *The Officer*, October 1971; "As Draft is Renewed," *US News and World Report*, 4 October 1971; "Youth Advice Shapes National Draft Policy," *Commanders Digest*, 9 December 1971; "Could We End the Draft Now?" *US Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1972; and "The Obligation to Serve," Air University Review*, July-August, 1972.

In writing an account such as this one, a person longs to relate the stories and experiences etched finely in memory. But consistently I found

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my memory to be an erring harbinger of the truth set down in written word. Thus, I have tried to overcome temptation and rely upon these source materials, even though often my mind kept warning me that I remembered distinctly something quite contrary to what I found there!

Significant Dates and Events

A list of appointments, speaking dates, and events in the life of Curtis Tarr, Director of Selective Service, 1970-72. Locations are in Washington, DC, unless noted otherwise.

1970

March	**4**	President Nixon
	12	White House Press Conference
	19	Senate Committee on Armed Services, confirmation hearings
	20	Senate confirmation
	23	First visit to Selective Service headquarters
	24	National Security Council
April	**6**	Swearing-in
	7	First staff meeting; Subcommittee, House Committee on Appropriations
	9	Washington, DC headquarters
	10	Mississippi headquarters, Gov. John Bell Williams; Alabama headquarters
	13	Georgia headquarters; South Carolina headquarters, Gov. Robert McNair
	18	Indiana High School Students, Indianapolis
	21	American Association of Universities
	22	Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Appropriations
	23	Executive Order 11527, eliminating deferments for occupation, agriculture, and paternity; White House meeting of Republican Leadership; White House Press Conference
	24	Delaware headquarters
	28	Virginia headquarters
	30	Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio headquarters; President announces Cambodian Campaign
May	**4**	Kent State tragedy
	6	Arkansas headquarters, Gov. Winthrop Rockefeller; Louisiana headquarters
	7	Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma headquarters
	8	President reports on Cambodian campaign
	9	100,000 youth gather on Ellipse
	11	Reorganization of National Headquarters; talking to students

	12	Students demand resignation
	20	US Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland
	22	North Carolina, West Virginia headquarters
	26	Pennsylvania headquarters
	27	Breakfast for House Republican leaders; Stanford Alumni Club of Washington; Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Appropriations
June	**1**	New York City, New York State headquarters
	3	President reports on Cambodian Campaign
	4	US Army Recruiting Command, Norfolk, Virginia
	10	California headquarters, Gov. Ronald Reagan
	11	Colorado headquarters; University of Kentucky Alumni, Covington
	14	Vandals enter Rhode Island headquarters
	15	*Welsh* and *Mulloy* decisions announced by Supreme Court
	16	Press conference on *Welsh*, Delaware headquarters attacked
	17	Republican Congressmen, Rayburn Building
	18	Reserve Officers Association, Annual Convention, Philadelphia; Maryland headquarters
	25	Selective Service policy committee
	29	Massachusetts headquarters
	30	*Today* show
July	**1**	Lottery
	4	Bob Hope and Billy Graham organize massive patriotic celebration
	6	Missouri, Kansas headquarters, Gov. Robert Docking
	7	Nebraska, Arizona headquarters, Gov. Jack Williams
	8	Utah headquarters, Mormon headquarters, Salt Lake City AFEES; Nevada headquarters
	9	California local boards
	10	US Attorneys, San Francisco; Oakland AFEES and local boards
	22	American Legion Boys Nation
	23, 24, 29	Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee
	30	Regional state directors, Atlanta
August	**10**	Minnesota headquarters
	14	Michigan headquarters
	17	Wisconsin headquarters, Gov. Warren Knowles
	19	Department of Defense summer interns
	21	Iowa headquarters, Gov. Robert Ray

	24	Indiana headquarters
	27	Amvets Convention, New York City; Merv Griffin Show, New York City
	28	Illinois headquarters, Springfield; local boards, Chicago
September		
	6	American Psychological Association, Miami
	16	National Guard Association
	18	Presidential Appointees, Department of Defense, Airlie House, Virginia
	22	Men's Fellowship, Metropolitan Memorial Methodist Church
	24	Industrial College of the Armed Forces
	25	College student meeting, Sheraton-Park Hotel
	28	Office of Emergency Preparedness relocation site, Virginia
October	1	Navy ships, Newport, Rhode Island
	3	White House Conference on Children and Youth
	5	Connecticut, Rhode Island headquarters
	6	New Hampshire, Maine headquarters
	7	Vermont headquarters
	8	New Jersey headquarters
	11	YMCA International Crossroads Breakfast
	16	Business Council, Homestead, Virginia
	21	Oregon headquarters, Regional state directors, Portland
	23	LBM 117 permits dropping deferment to be classified I-A
	28	Regional state directors, Cadiz, Kentucky
November		
	4	Bob Kennedy Show, Chicago; local boards, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; headquarters, Madison
	5	Initiate study on data processing for Selective Service; Regional state directors, Oklahoma City; Lord Mountbatten black tie dinner, White House
	10	North Dakota headquarters, Gov. William Guy; South Dakota headquarters; Wyoming headquarters, Gov. Stanley Hathaway
	11	Advocates Show, Los Angeles; AFEES; Editorial Board of Los Angeles Times; Merv Griffin Show, Los Angeles
	12	Fort Worth Service Center
	15	Laymen's Day speaker, Bolling Air Force Base Chapel
	18	Engineering Officers, Fort Belvoir, Virginia
	25	President Nixon
	30	Idaho, Washington headquarters

December

1	Alaska headquarters; Alaskan Command
3	American Embassy, Tokyo
4	Eighth Army, Korea
7	Seventh Fleet, Yankee Station
8	23d Division, Vietnam
9	5th Infantry, 101st Airborne, and 1st Marine Divisions; XXIV Corps, Vietnam
10	Second Field Force, 1st Air Cavalry Division, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Vietnam
11	Army headquarters, Long Binh, 1st Aviation Brigade, Vietnam
12	General Lucius Clay, General Creighton Abrams, Vietnam; Clark Air Force Base, Philippines
13	U-Tapao Air Force Base, Thailand
14	American Embassy, Bangkok; US Forces, Thailand
15	Anderson Air Force Base, Guam; Guam, Hawaii headquarters
17	Alameda Service Center
30	Mendel Rivers funeral, Charleston, South Carolina

1971

January	**8**	White House meeting on draft reform
	11-15	Great Britain to study voluntary forces
	26	Houston local boards; National Association of Secondary School Principals, Houston
	27	Texas headquarters
	28	President sends message on draft to Congress
February	**2**	Senate Committee on Armed Services
	8	Cosmos Club
	10	South Vietnamese forces invade Laos
	17	National Security Commission, American Legion
	19	Senate Committee on Armed Services
	23-24	House Committee on Armed Services
	25	National Health Resources Advisory Committee, Chicago
March	**1**	Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
	2	Harvard Republican Club
	3	Massachusetts headquarters, Gov. Francis Sargeant
	8	Supreme Court opposes selective conscientious objection

	9	Phil Donahue show, Dayton, Ohio
	12	50 Yale students
	15	Subcommittee, House Committee on Appropriations
	16	Students from Wesleyan College of West Virginia
	19	Florida headquarters
	22	House Committee on Armed Services finishes markup on H.R. 6531
	24	South Vietnamese troops leave Laos
	25	House Committee on Armed Services issues report on H.R. 6531
	30	Breakfast with North Carolina Congressional delegation; House begins debate on H.R. 6531
	31	House debate
April	1	House passes H.R. 6531
	7	President announces success in Laos
	9	Minnesota, Montana headquarters
	12	Wisconsin headquarters
	21	Supreme Court rules that registrant cannot file conscientious objector claim after receiving orders to report for induction
	24-25	Youths gather for demonstrations
	26	Youth demonstration at National Headquarters
	27	Senate Committee on Armed Services approves H.R. 6531; demonstrators block entrance at National Headquarters until 9:15 a.m.
	28	Police arrest 200 protesters blocking entrance to National Headquarters
May	3	Massive youth demonstration
	4	New York City headquarters
	5	Subcommittee, House Committee on Appropriations; Senate Committee on Armed Services releases report on H.R. 6531
	6	Harvard Business School Club of Washington; Senate debate on H.R. 6531 begins
	7	University of Maryland, Air Force ROTC Dining-in
	10-13	Senate debate
	14	Chamber of Commerce Armed Forces Day luncheon, Columbus, Ohio; Senate debate
	17	Senate debate
	18	Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Appropriations; Senate debate

	19	Georgia headquarters; Senate debate
	20	Mississippi, Alabama headquarters, Senate debate
	21	Miami local boards; Senate debate
	25	Recruits at Fort Belvoir, Virginia; Senate debate
	26	Senate debate
	27	United States Board of Parole
	31	Puerto Rico headquarters
June	1	Gov. Luis Ferre, Puerto Rico; Virgin Island headquarters, Gov. Melvin Evans
	2	Senate debate
	3	Alumni of Industrial College of the Armed Forces; Senate debate
	4	Explorer Scouts National Meeting; handcuff incident with priest and 4 students; Senate debate
	6	Commencement address, Culver Military Academy, Indiana
	7-9	Senate debate
	10	LBM 116 prohibits transfer to another local board; Senate debate
	11	Kentucky training session, Lexington; Kentucky headquarters; Senate debate
	15-17	Senate debate
	18	Reserve Officers Association Annual Convention, San Diego, California; Senate debate
	21	California headquarters; California Ecology Corps; Senate debate
	22	Senate debate
	23	Selective Service policy committee; Senate debate
	24	Senate passes H.R. 6531
	28	Gov. David Parker, Panama Canal Zone; House debate on Mansfield Amendment
	29	Canal Zone Headquarters; Southern Command headquarters
July	1	Inductions halted
	12	Pennsylvania headquarters
	20	General Michael Davison, US Army in Europe, Heidelberg, Germany
	21	German Ministry of Defense, Bonn
	25-26	US Fleet in the Mediterranean
	30	Conference report on H.R. 6531

August	**4**	House accepts conference report on H.R. 6531
	5	Lottery
	6	Senate debate on conference report begins
	12	Regional state directors, Indianapolis
	20	Local boards, Cleveland
	23	Minnesota, Iowa headquarters
	27	California divided into two operational units, each managed by a deputy state director; Missouri headquarters
September		
	1	Dedication of Air Force Museum, Dayton, Ohio
	9	Regional state directors, Sacramento, California
	10	Senate debate
	13-17	Senate debate
	20	Senate debate
	21	Senate accepts conference report
	23	Training conference, Louisville, Kentucky
	24	National Health Resources Advisory Committee, Chicago
	27	Industrial College of the Armed Forces
	28	President signs H.R. 6531
	29	Regional state directors, Georgia
	30	Reserve Forces Policy Board
October	**2**	US Military Academy, West Point, New York
	5	Recruitment Conference, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas
	7	Regional state directors, Oklahoma City
	12	Executive Order 11623 delegates to Director of Selective Service the authority to issue regulations
	21	Air Force Reserve Forces Policy Board
	22	Dining-out, Robbins Air Force Base, Georgia
	26	Wisconsin headquarters
	27-28	Regional state directors, Denver
	29	Denver Service Center; Colorado headquarters, Gov. John Love
November		
	2	Selective Service lawyers conference
	3	*Federal Register* prepublication of regulations
	4	Air Force Academy Dining-in; *Federal Register* prepublication
	5	Air Force Academy; North American Air Defense headquarters; Fourth Mechanized Infantry Division, Fort Collins, Colorado; *Federal Register* prepublication

	11	Tennessee headquarters; Gov. Winfield Dunn
	18	Selective Service inspectors conference, Savannah, Georgia
	22	Cruise on submarine *Rayburn*
	23	Eastern Test Range and National Aeronautics and Space Administration facilities, Florida
	24	Poseidon missile launch
December		
	2	Defense Supply Agency; New York City headquarters
	3	Connecticut executive secretaries, Hartford; Selective Service dinner, New Brunswick, New Jersey
	7	Minneapolis local boards; North Dakota headquarters
	8	North Dakota training session; Gov. William Guy
	9	Michigan headquarters, Gov. William Milliken; Lansing local boards; *Federal Register* final publication
	10	*Federal Register* final publication
	16	National War College
	22	White House meeting on reelection of the President

1972

January	4	Florida headquarters, local boards
	5	Tampa local boards
	12	*Federal Register* prepublication
	19	Adjutants General Association
	25	Distinguished Service Award to Chairman Stennis, Senator Smith
	26	Distinguished Service Award to Chairman Hebert, Congressman Arends
	29	*Federal Register* prepublication
February	2	Management Evaluation Group replaces Inspection Services Division
	10	National Health Resources Advisory Committee, San Clemente, California
	28	Subcommittee, Senate Committee on the Judiciary
March	10	Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Armed Services; *Federal Register* prepublication
	15	Subcommittee, House Committee on Appropriations
	16-17	State directors conference

	21	Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
	24	Rockford College, Rockford, Illinois
	25	*Federal Register* prepublication
April	**1**	*Federal Register* prepublication
	5	Washington State headquarters staff
	6	Washington Ecology Corps, Whidbey Island; local boards
	8	Young Republicans, St. Louis
	11	President announces his intention to nominate Curtis Tarr to become Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance
	13	Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Appropriations
	15	*Federal Register* publication in final form
	16	Apollo 16 launch, Florida
	21	Friends of Richard Nixon
	25	Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, confirmation hearings
	26	Senate confirmation; *Federal Register* prepublication; last day at Selective Service

Abbreviations

AFEES	Armed Forces Entrance and Examining Station
AVF	All-Volunteer Force
DMZ	demilitarized zone
FY	fiscal year
GAO	General Accounting Office
GSA	General Services Administration
HEW	Health, Education and Welfare
I-H	Selective Service classification for draftees with high lottery (random sequence) numbers and thus unlikely to be called. See pp. 77-78.
I-O	Selective Service classification of "Conscientious Objector"
LBM	local board memorandum
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	noncommissioned officer
OCR	optical character recognition
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
RSN	random sequence number
17(c)	provision of Selective Service law which permitted President to induct previously deferred college students after his general induction authority had expired. See p. 111-112.
USIA	United States Information Agency
VISTA	Volunteers in Service to America

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