STUDENT RESEARCH REPORT

THE DECISION TO INTERVENE
A comparison of Soviet intervention from 1953 to 1980
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THE DECISION TO INTERVENE,
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JOHN G. CANYOCK
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SUMMARY

This paper explores five moments of crisis for the Soviet Union since the end of the Second World War. It is a comparison of the East German uprising in 1953, the Polish and Hungarian crises of 1956, the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968, and the Afghanistan intervention of 1979, to determine how much deviation and how much democratization from what the Soviets consider the norm is tolerated by the Soviets before they will intervene militarily. Additionally, this paper analyzes possible factors that the Soviet Union considers in making the decision whether to intervene.
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INTRODUCTION

...Party elites must be viewed as having two major validators: the constituents at home and the organizer and coalition leader, the USSR abroad (Guetzkow, 1963: 110-115).

Any study of the East German uprising in 1953, the events in Poland and Hungary in the fall of 1956, the reforms in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and events in Afghanistan in 1979, which led to Soviet intervention of one form or another, involves comparison of some of the Soviet bloc's greatest moments of crisis. From comparison of these five crises one can discern how much deviation and/or democracization from what the Soviets consider the basic tenets of socialism/communism (as perceived by the Soviet leadership) will be tolerated. One sees that there are similarities in a decision about intervention made by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies to those made by other powerful non-Communist nations in that the perceived "need" to intervene must outweigh the perceived difficulty of armed intervention and the estimated domestic costs as well as costs to its position in world affairs.

In a comparison like this, one also obtains a feel for the popular aspirations in these Communist countries that blossom out of dormancy when prospects for a change in the political system or return to pre-Communist domination days appear possible. It also sheds some light on the struggle for political survival of Communist leaders in Eastern Europe and other areas of the world, who are attempting to walk a tightrope between the demands and nationalistic feelings of their own people and the requirements placed upon them by the Soviet Union, which holds, or may attempt to hold, the keys to their political futures, if not their lives.

The scope of this study has been intentionally limited to the countries in which the Soviet Union actually intervened with their own forces or Warsaw Pact forces under Soviet control. Poland was included because Soviet forces were actually on Polish soil and moving towards Warsaw when the crisis seemed to be resolved to the satisfaction of the Soviet leadership and the troops were returned to their barracks. Limiting the scope of this study to these five countries is not to say that the Soviet Union has not considered intervention into other nations, nor that they have not used other forces to intervene to support the cause of Communism around the world.

Before conclusions are submitted on these issues, the events comprising the East German, Polish, Hungarian, Czechoslovak and Afghanistan situations will be summarized. At the end of each of these historical sketches the situation will be analyzed in terms of the possible division of the Soviet decision-making process posited in the introduction: the perceived "need" to intervene must be greater than the perceived difficulty of armed intervention and estimated domestic costs as well as costs to its position in world affairs.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The East German Uprising of June 1953

Democratic economic development and also the awareness of the working class and the majority of the working people have reached such a level that building socialism has become the principal task (Walter Ulbricht, quoted in Pravda, 11 July 1952:4).

In July 1952 at the Second Conference of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), the leadership of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) announced its "new tasks" for the rapid building of socialism in East Germany. Walter Ulbricht, the General Secretary of the Communist SED reported that this all out effort to build socialism was being done with the blessing of the Kremlin by stressing that the "only government which supported the national peaceful interest of the German people was, and still is, the USSR government (Pravda, 11 July 1952:4)."

In speeches on 10 and 11 July at the SED conference, the new economic policies of the GDR were announced by Wilhelm Pieck, the President of the GDR and Otto Grotewohl, the GDR Prime Minister. Included in the new economic policy were measures to speed up construction in the GDR and the strengthening of the agencies of state security (Pravda, 12 July 1952:4). On 23 July 1952, the 24th special session of the Volkskammer (the first chamber of the parliament in the GDR) passed legislation reorganizing the territorial divisions of the GDR, abolishing the former provinces and replacing them with precincts in order "to conform to new economic development (Pravda, 24 July 1952:3)." In addition to these changes, agriculture was collectivized and ownership of small businesses and independent tradespeople came under close scrutiny by the security police. The initial results of these and other measures was an increase in the number of refugees fleeing to the West of which over 50 percent were skilled workers (Fejto, 1971:20).

With the socialization process in full swing, conditions which had existed in the GDR prior to the announcement of full socialization did not improve. The shortage of food which had existed since the end of World War II worsened. In October 1952, the Minister of Trade and Food was relieved of his post (Baring, 1972:18). In November 1952, an intensified propaganda program was initiated by the GDR and the German Communist Party of West Germany pushing for the reunification of Germany by attempting to publicize the socialist gains in the GDR and stressing the problems in the West (Pravda, 13 November 1952:3). The reunification theme also began to appear in editorials in the Soviet press, stressing the rebirth of West German militarization and downplaying the economic crisis that was facing the GDR (Pravda, 13 November 1952:3, and 14 November 1952:1). On 27 November 1952, the municipal council of East Berlin prohibited the sale of food and industrial products to West Berliners due to shortages in the GDR (Baring, 1972:177). In January 1953, the SED began to address its press attacks at the trade unions within the GDR for disregarding the urgent question of strengthening the economy by meeting higher work norms. On 3 February 1953, the Central Committee of the SED passed a resolution calling for a "campaign for strict economy" in the public sector (Baring, 1972:178). Simultaneously with this campaign, the GDR again began to push for reunification with apparent Soviet blessing, while blaming their economic problems on the "capitalists" and "saboteurs" from the West (Pravda, 5 February 1953:4).

On 5 March 1953, Joseph Stalin's death was announced and his powers in the Soviet Union were divided between the members of his staff. The formation of
this collective leadership was done with a great sense of urgency which underlined the new leaders' need to survive the shock of his death without disturbance among the Soviet population or the satellite countries of Eastern Europe. All of the leaders of the satellites attended Stalin's funeral in Moscow, and for the first twenty days after his death an emergency governmental structure of collective leadership carried out all the state functions, with Georgi M. Malenkov as Premier and First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. On 25 March 1953 public announcements of a power shift in the Soviet Government and Communist Party were made with Malenkov remaining as premier and the reins of the Party being handed over to Nikita S. Khrushchev.

During this period of crisis in the Soviet Union, the situation in East Germany remained relatively unchanged, with the economy continuing to deteriorate as a result of the forced industrialization and agricultural collectivization begun in 1952. The number of refugees fleeing the east zone continued to increase. According to Stefan Brant "from January 1952 to April 1952 no less than 22,852 farmers had exchanged livelihood under Communism...(1957:37)." The total number of refugees that entered West Berlin during the period December 1952 through March 1953 was 124,142 (Brant, 1957:37). These losses from the manpower pool, especially in the realm of agriculture, could not be tolerated in a country rebuilding from the destruction of a World War. By beginning of April 1953, protests had begun in many sectors in the GDR over the shortages of food and other consumer goods.

In early April 1953, Walter Ulbricht asked the Soviet leadership for economic aid, but on 15 April, Malenkov advised the East German regime to adopt a new economic course ("New Course") to mitigate the rigors of forced collectivization, reduce the pressure on the various social groups and increase production of consumer goods, since Moscow was faced with similar economic problems and would be unable to provide financial aid. However, a trade agreement for a general increase in trade was reached on 26 April 1953 for non-consumable goods (Pravda, 28 April 1953:2).

During this April meeting with the Kremlin concerning economic aid, Ulbricht probably had a meeting with Lavrenty Beria, Minister of Internal Affairs and a member of the Soviet collective leadership, who explained his "German Policy" (a policy directed at reunification) which Ulbricht later claimed at a Central Committee meeting he had rejected (Petjo, 1971:20). On 16 April 1953, after receiving a negative response on the aid request from Moscow, Ulbricht delivered a speech to high SED party officials advocating the continuance of their present policy of socialist construction and his intentions to push for more production from the industrial sector (Das Neues Deutschland, 16 April 1953:1). Ulbricht's speech was in direct contravention to the advice received from the Kremlin to adopt a new economic course. Although there was no direct comment concerning Ulbricht's speech in the Soviet press, the Kremlin was probably furious, and on 21 April an article appeared in the Soviet newspaper, Literaturnaya Gazeta, which was directed at the people's democracies and China stating that "it is impossible to be a true fighter for the people's interests... without being a friend and supporter of the Soviet Union (Matyushkin, 21 April 1953:2)."

On 21 April, the USSR Council of Ministers announced the removal of Vladimir Semyonov as the Political Advisor to the Soviet Control Commission in the GDR (Pravda, 21 April 1953:4). The Pravda announcement gave no reason for his removal other than he was being reassigned to other duties. However, there is a possibility that he was returned to Moscow for consultation since he was returned to the GDR at a later date in a different position. Semyonov's replacement on the Control Commission was Pavel Judin (Pravda, 21 April 1953:4),
During this same period of time a severe crisis developed within the party ranks of the SED. The SED was a loose coalition of Communists and Social Democrats which had been brought about by the Soviets following World War II. A merger that had caused considerable friction between the two factions. In connection with the economic crisis an anti-leadership faction also began to develop within the ranks of the Communists in the SED, brought about by the slowness in resolving the economic problems faced by the country. In the spring of 1953, two of the leading party members, Wilhelm Zaisser, the GDR Minister of State Security and a Politburo member, and Rudolf Herrnstadt, the editor of Neues Deutschland, the Party's official newspaper and a candidate member of the Politburo, organized a conspiracy in the top Party circles of the SED. The purpose of the conspiracy was to depose Ulbricht, who was the chief proponent of maintaining a hard line and building up industry at the cost of consumer items and foodstuffs needed by the population who were at near starvation levels. Zaisser's and Herrnstadt's desires were in line with those of Malenkov's which Ulbricht had rejected, a program stressing priority for consumer goods. In the Soviet Union Malenkov and Beria were pushing similar programs as was Nagy in Hungary. Zaisser reportedly had held several conferences with Beria in Moscow and Beria's emissaries in East Berlin without the knowledge of the GDR Politburo. Although this split in the party ranks did not become evident until after the June uprising it probably played an important role in later SED problems and the Soviets perception of the situation in the GDR.

On 13 and 14 May 1953, the SED Central Committee adopted a resolution in line with Ulbricht's desires, calling for an immediate revision of all work norms, raising them by 10 percent by 1 June in order to raise the output in the construction and industrial sector of the economy (Dokumente der SED, Vol. IV:410ff). However, the GDR Council of Ministers did not act as rapidly as usual and there was a delay in confirming the Party's resolution by the Government. Normally, the Party's recommendations were made into government decrees within 48 to 96 hours, "and when Grotwol's Cabinet eventually took active notice of the norms question on May 28 it was already too late to achieve the scheduled result" of raising them by 1 June (Brant, 1957:56-7). On 28 May, the GDR Council of Ministers ordered the SED Resolution be carried out, raising output norms by 10 percent, with a new target date for the achievement of these goals by 30 June 1953 (Dokumente der SED, Vol. IV:410ff).

On 29 May, Moscow reacted to the events in the GDR once again. The USSR Council of Ministers decided to abolish the Soviet Control Commission and to relieve the Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces of police and administrative control functions in the GDR, restricting his functions to command only (Pravda, 29 May 1953:2). In the same Pravda announcement, the Council of Ministers instituted the post of Soviet High Commissioner for Germany and returned Vladimir Semyonov to Berlin in the newly created post.

On 7 June, Pravda announced another major change in the GDR with the appointment of Colonel General Andrey Antonovich Grechko as the Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces, reassigning Vasily Cluykov, the tough World War II hero of Stalingrad and the Soviet attack on Berlin, to the Ministry of Defense (7 June 1953:4). Grechko had been a close associate of Khrushchev in the Presidium of the Ukrainian Communist Party where both of them had been members; he had also been elected as a candidate member of the USSR Central Committee at the 19th Party Congress in October 1952.
Semyonov returned to Berlin on 5 June 1953 to assume his new position with some pretty strict instructions on how to deal with the SED and the GDR government. Almost immediately after his return, the Politburo of the SED went into session at Semyonov's request and considered the instructions that Moscow had given the new High Commissioner to pass on to the SED. On 11 June 1953 the front page of Neues Deutschland published without comment a lengthy statement concerning the mistakes the Party and the government had been committing in the different fields of government endeavor and promised "to correct mistakes... raise the standard of living," and provide relief from other repressive measures (Brant, 1957:47-50). The same day, the Council of Ministers put the new measures into effect as proposed by the Soviet authorities, and outlined by the Politburo. Pravda also published the texts of the Politburo and Council of Ministers communiques without comment on 12 and 13 June 1953. However, even with this change in government policy, the work norms established on 28 May remained in force and tension at all levels of society affected by these norms continued to increase.

The day following the official change in the government's position on how to pursue socialism was payday. Although pay was not supposed to be calculated under the "new norms" until 30 June, pay for construction workers at the Stalinalle housing project was calculated under the new system and paychecks were considerably smaller (Brant, 1957:57-59). The workers were at a loss as to the real course of action the Party and Government was following. An account of the pay problem was published in the Sunday edition of Neues Deutschland on 14 June 1953 which in essence told all of the Eastern sector that the new "work norms" were not included in the changes from the Politburo.

Speculation as well as discontent was running high by Monday 15 June 1953, and no further comments had been made by the Government or Party concerning the 11 June communique. On 16 June, the workers on the Stalinalle construction project in East Berlin laid down their tools after reading or hearing about a newspaper article in Das Tribune (a union newspaper), stating that the raising of the work norms by the government was irrevocable. The workers elected representatives and marched as a group through the streets of Berlin to the House of Ministers. The group picked up strength on its way to the seat of government from passersby on the streets and arrived at the House of Ministers at 1300 hours. At 1400 hours they were informed by government representatives that the Council of Ministers had withdrawn its decision to increase the work quotas (Baring, 1972:41-48). But by this time placards had begun to appear calling for not only lowering the work norms, but resignation of the government and free elections with secret ballot. Even after being informed that the new "work norms" were being dropped, the demonstration continued on into the evening. That same evening Ulbricht called a meeting of party leaders and announced that the party was abandoning the false path that it had been pursuing and was "setting out on a new course" (Petjo, 1971:22).

On the following day, 17 June, the revolt became general. The construction union on the Stalinalle project declared a strike and most of the other unions followed suit throughout East Berlin and East Germany. Processions and demonstrations began to take place throughout East Germany in industrial areas.

On the morning of 16 June when the first demonstrations had taken place at the House of Ministers, the East Berlin Police had asked permission of the Soviets to disperse the crowds and had been forbidden to intervene. On the 17th when the demonstrations spread, the Soviet forces intervened themselves. Late in the afternoon of the 17th the Soviet Military Commandant of Berlin, General Debora, declared martial law (Pravda, 19 June 1953:4). Up until the time martial law
was declared, the demonstrators were not against the Soviets but against the SED and their own government. Based on the lack of casualties in the groups dispersed by Soviet forces, the Soviet troops were probably instructed to use great restraint in the dispersal of crowds.

On 18 June 1953, the uprising was over in Berlin. Soviet forces remained on the streets but everything was quiet. In other parts of Germany demonstrations went on for several days before being entirely subdued.

Thus ended the first Soviet military action outside its borders after the end of World War II. The Soviet Union had taken military action to suppress developments that it perceived as a political-ideological threat to its security. The question is why did the Soviets decide to intervene with their own armed forces to suppress the riots when they probably could have been handled by the GDR internal security and police forces? The first reason why the Soviets may have perceived a need to intervene was that the SED Party seemed to lose control of the events and a possibility existed that if the Soviets did not take firm control of the situation there would have been a change to a non-communist leadership, since the Socialist Unity Party was not entirely made up of Communists, but an amalgamation of Communists and Social Democrats. This change could have been caused by the riots and demonstrations which began to call for reunification with West Germany rather than government economic reforms, which had been the initial reason for the uprising. Although Ulbricht had gone against the Kremlin's advice in April by failing to adopt a new economic course, the Kremlin probably had no doubt as to Ulbricht's loyalty to the Communist cause and to close ties with the Soviet Union. But after Ulbricht failed to heed Malenkov's advice in April, the situation in the GDR continued to deteriorate rapidly and Communist control of the SED seemed to slip to discontent within the Party ranks. Then after the announcement of the increase of work norms in late May, the Soviet forced self-criticism by the SED of its past failures on 11 June, and with the uprising occurring 6 days later, the Soviets probably believed that Communist Party control of the SED was in grave jeopardy of collapsing.

In terms of difficulty of intervention, the Soviet forces were already stationed in the GDR as a result of the four power agreements after the conclusion of World War II. The Soviet Union controlled the GDR government and there were no active armed forces in East Germany other than Soviet Forces. When Soviet troops moved against the demonstrators, the East Germans in many cases only attacked the Soviet tanks with rocks and sticks. The major East German grievance was not against the Soviet presence as much as it was against the failures of the SED in rectifying the critical economic situation in the country. So, difficulty in terms of armed resistance against the Soviet forces was probably not a major factor in the decision to intervene in the GDR.

A factor that was probably weighed in terms of difficulty was the politico-geographic location of the GDR in terms of its proximity to the US, French and British occupation forces, not to mention the West Germans, who along with their eastern brothers were interested in the reunification of the two states. Although there was talk by the Kremlin concerning reunification they probably were not prepared to allow reunification to take place by force or the overthrow of the Communist leadership in East Germany.

The Soviet intervention into the GDR also came at a critical time for the Soviet leadership in that for the first time in its history it was not a monolithic, but a collective leadership. Reports indicate that after Stalin's death in March 1953 and until the fall of Malenkov, there was a vicious struggle within the hierarchy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The fall of Beria, in
June 1953, was one of the initial indicators of this struggle. This internal struggle within the Soviet leadership also may be the reason the Soviets returned Semyonov to Moscow then back to East Germany in June of 1953. Semyonov was recalled to Moscow immediately after Ulbricht denounced the Malenkov proposal for a new economic course, with no explanation for his recall. He was returned to East Germany on 5 June 1953. On 7 June the Military Commander of the GDR was also changed, with the appointment of Grechko as the new Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces. The departure and return of Semyonov is a possible indicator of the internal unrest of the Kremlin. After the uprising in Berlin, Semyonov was blamed by Beria for not taking the proper actions in maintaining control in East Germany. Whether Semyonov was one of Beria's appointees is not known, but Khrushchev's close ties with Grechko have been well established. Additionally, although there is no concrete evidence to prove it, there is a possibility that the various members of the collective leadership in Moscow tried to offset each other's appointments in East Germany with their trusted confidants to insure knowledge and control of the situation. The Soviet actions in June seem to reveal that the Soviet leadership may not have acted rapidly enough in directing the SED and the GDR government on what to do in the economic crisis. Ulbricht's initial rejection of Soviet guidance, and this lack of Soviet affirmative action may have been due to the domestic leadership crisis that the Soviet Union was facing at home.

Another factor that the Soviets may have considered before using their forces to put down the uprising in the GDR was reaction from other Communist parties. During the period of the East Germany uprising, Eastern Europe was beset with economic problems. Just prior to the uprising there had been riots in Pilzen, Czechoslovakia on 1 June. These riots were in protest of a currency reform designed to stabilize prices which hit the working class with a tremendous impact. Order had been restored in Pilzen without Soviet intervention. When East Germany exploded there was little comment by the other Eastern European Communist parties since the same problems existed in their countries. In fact most press comments in the Soviet Union and other East European countries blamed the problems in East Germany on "western agents", but this happened only after the fact.

The Polish October, 1956

For them the word "democracy" had wider and deeper implications that were revolutionary, and perhaps naive and Utopian. But the first stage in the realization of their national and liberal aspirations had to be the overthrow of the discredited regime, and the radical elimination of the Polish Stalinists and all of the country's symbols of subjection (Fetjo, 1971:66).

Boleslaw Bierut, Jakub Berman and Hilary Minc, a Stalinist triumvirate, had ruled Poland since Bierut's Soviet-supported victory in a power struggle in 1948-49 with then Party Secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka. Upon assuming power they managed to jail Gomulka in 1951 for nationalistic deviation from the proper belief in the primacy of the Soviet Union and delaying the Soviet-supported collectivization policies for Poland. With the death of Stalin in March 1953, the Polish leadership began to relax controls in Poland. This was done reluctantly because with this relaxation of controls the Polish leadership was allowing the institution of various reforms for which they themselves had had Gomulka sent to prison for advocating.
Despite the Polish Communist Party's caution in reforms, it managed to stay close to the masses by preserving some small but stubborn independence from the Kremlin. Poland had been the only satellite not to erect a statue of Stalin, although national competition had occurred and prizes for the best design had been awarded. Staged show trials of dissidents had not occurred and no physical liquidation of the chief opponent of Stalinism (Gomulka) took place. When queried about the status of Gomulka by the Soviets, they merely insisted that the charges were still being prepared (Dziewanowski, 1959:256-7).

In Poland, reforms first began to transcend economic policy in 1954. After the Soviet liquidation of Lavrenti Beria in 1953 and the defection to the West of high-ranking Polish secret police officers soon thereafter, the Party moved to relax secret police controls. The new freedom from fear of arrest facilitated a storm of criticism from within the Party ranks and other circles concerning reform within the country. This forced the Stalin-instilled leadership to grant even more concessions, including the secret release of Gomulka from jail in December 1954. When Gomulka's release was finally announced on 6 April 1956, the regime reluctantly announced that an injustice had been done (Pravda, 8 April 1956:5). However, when 30,000 other political prisoners received amnesty of 28 April 1956, [following the 20th Party Congress in Moscow] the leaders insisted on the justice of the sentences they had received (Halecki, 1957:554).

The Soviet-Yugoslav thaw also had a pronounced effect on the policies of the Polish leadership. First Party Secretary Khrushchev and Soviet Prime Minister N. I. Bulganin's trip to Belgrade, Yugoslavia on 26 May 1955 led to the public Soviet acknowledgement of Tito's right to his own method of attaining Communism. Khrushchev took the unprecedented step of making a public apology to the Yugoslav people at the Belgrade airport upon his arrival stating: "We sincerely regret what happened," adding that the "material on which the serious accusations and insults were based...were fabrications of enemies of the people...in the ranks of our party (Pravda, 27 May 1955:1)." This, together with Tito's public rehabilitation by the Soviet leaders as an orthodox Communist (Izvestia, 3 June 1955:1), seemed to indicate an influential part of the Kremlin hierarchy, headed by Khrushchev, was not opposed to the decentralization of the world Communist movement. The Yugoslav government was assured that the Stalinist policies of the past would not be resumed against them. From this series of meetings the so-called Belgrade Declarations were issued providing for "non-intervention" in the internal affairs for any reason whatsoever, because questions of internal institutions, various social systems, and the various forms of socialist development are exclusively the affair of the peoples of the individual countries (Izvestia, 3 June 1955:1).

Thus, the atmosphere in Poland became one of relaxation and increased independence from the Soviet Union. As a result, "the former Gomulka line appeared less and less heretical (Brzezinski, 1967:242)." Through literary clubs and the still-censored press, a new political line was beginning to form. Party domination of cultural activity came under increased criticism. Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, put Party dogmatists on the defensive and increased political discussion in Poland. In a speech by Anastas Mikoyan, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, at the 20th Congress, published in Pravda on 18 February 1956, it was reiterated that there was more than one way to achieve socialism and he specifically referenced Yugoslavia (4-6). In Kommunist in March 1956, the lead editorial was dedicated to restoring the norms of Party life in the Leninist fashion and "strengthening the ranks of the Party and increasing its effectiveness..." by exposing "violations" that are directly connected with the "...cult of the individual, specifically that of J. V. Stalin..." (Kommunist, March 1956:3-12).
Clearly, "...the theoretical basis for the old regime was being washed away (Brzezinski, 1967:243-4)."

Perhaps the Stalinist regime, by continuing its policy of gradual concessions and occasional warnings, could have weathered the crisis but the Polish Stalinist Party leadership suffered a terrific blow with the unexpected death of Bierut on 12 March 1956, while he was attending the 20th Party Congress in Moscow. "Not unnaturally, many people in Poland concluded that he had been murdered by the Russians" and little was done to dispel this when Premier Cyrankiewicz described Bierut's death as a "blow that took us all by surprise" (Syrop, 1957: 33). The VI Plenum of the Communist Party Central Committee of Poland met in Warsaw on 29 March with Khrushchev in attendance, and elected Edward Ochab unanimously as the Party First Secretary. Ochab, somewhat of a conservative, had been a leader in the anti-Gomulka drive of the late 1940's and his previous leanings towards Moscow seemed to promise loyalty to the Kremlin as well as moderation in reforms.

On 6 April 1956, Ochab gave a report to the Party organization of Warsaw on the results of the Soviet 20th Congress, stating that the Polish Party completely agreed with the results of the Congress (Pravda, 8 April 1956:5). In his speech, Ochab also announced the rehabilitation of Gomulka and other former high officials who were purged with Gomulka (Pravda, 8 April 1956:5). In this same speech, he also noted that "attention should be drawn to the fact that some comrades are, as it were, losing their equilibrium and beginning to lose their sense of proportion between just criticism and criticism from positions which cannot be of benefit to the Party... (Pravda, 8 April 1956:5)."

In mid-April another loosening of Kremlin controls occurred. The Information Bureau of Communist and Workers Parties (Cominform) was dissolved. Pravda announcements once again pointed out that "...each party or group of parties will, in the course of developing its work in conformity with common aims and tasks of Marxist-Leninist parties and the specific national features and conditions of their countries, find new and useful forms of establishing links and contacts among themselves (Pravda, 18 April 1956:3)." In another Pravda article concerning the dissolution of the Cominform the following statement appeared:

...Each Communist Party must make a thorough study of the economic and political situation in its country... and on this basis evolve the ways and forms of an advance towards socialism which conforms as fully as possible to the characteristics and traditions of the given people (Pravda, 18 April 1956:3).

This article and others in the Soviet press most probably left many questions not only in the Polish Workers Party, but also in the Communist Parties of all Eastern Europe as to how far they could really deviate from the Moscow line.

As the Party leadership changed hands, criticism among the masses increased. Minc's claim that the Polish Six-Year Plan had successfully raised the standard of living by 27 percent met violent ridicule (Halecki, 1957:552). Mounting pressure from the Party and the population at large forced the removal of Berman on 6 May 1956. In the late spring and early summer of 1956 the Polish Communist Party "for the first time in history" demonstrated independence from the Soviets in granting various concessions (Zomke, 1967:90-1). Among these concessions many state security functions were transferred to the Ministry of Interior and confidential union reports on individual workers were destroyed and the procedures for keeping them were abolished. The Party press criticized the Polish
Sejm (the Polish Parliament) for always voting unanimously and in June the Polish-Soviet economic policy came under great criticism when the Polish regime admitted that the standard of living was actually declining.

In another shock to the Communist World, Tito visited the Soviet Union and the so-called Moscow declaration of 20 June 1956 was published (Pravda, 21 June 1956:1). Tito was received like a returning hero in Moscow, and diplomatic and Party relations were re-established between the two nations. The Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement gave practical recognition that each Communist Party must find its own best method to achieve socialism and that the relations between socialist states were relations of a new type seemingly based on equality, independence and sovereignty. However, the Soviets remained deliberately vague on just what they meant by their acceptance of "different roads to a socialism". The reverberations throughout the Communist world were tremendous, first the speeches of the 20th Congress and then the Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation. The Communist parties were in a state of turmoil as to what paths they could take in building socialism and solving their domestic problems.

Ochab's Polish Government seemed reluctant to make more than marginal reforms, however, which made the people and even the party rank-and-file vocally disappointed.

The combined reluctance of the regime to grant concessions, together with its inability to curb the mounting wave of protest led to an ever growing ambivalence: the government permitted a hitherto unheard of freedom of criticism, while doing little, if anything, to rectify matters (Halecki, 1957: 555).

Fortunately for Ochab and his supporters, several factors occurred which enabled him to convince the Soviets that the situation was under control. The 20th Congress had only recently rehabilitated the Polish Communist Party; the Party at this time was united, Ochab's reforms had been moderate, and change on the Polish political scene had been slow and evolutionary (Brzezinski, 1967:247).

Nonetheless, Ochab's hopes that he might be able to appease the masses with limited reforms were destroyed at Poznan (Bromke, 1967:88). Oppressive labor conditions bred the late June workers' uprising in Poznan, and quick, firm use of the Polish Army ended it at great costs to Army morale. The Central Committee immediately labeled the riots as an anti-Communist plot by the West against the "peoples regime" (Pravda, 30 June 1956:4). Tito and Palmiro Togliatti, head of the Italian Communist Party announced their support of the Polish regime in the quelling of the riots by force. The riots at Poznan took place during an international trade fair at which many foreign businessmen were present. The official casualty figures placed the number of demonstrators killed at forty-four, nine members of the government forces killed, 300 military and demonstrators injured and 323 people arrested (Polish News Agency Statement, 17 July 1956.).

On 30 June 1956, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) issued a resolution "On Overcoming the Cult of the Individual and Its Consequences," stating that "certain of our friends abroad are not completely clear on the question of the cult of the individual and its consequences and sometimes give incorrect interpretations of certain points connected with it" (Pravda, 2 July 1956:1-2). The resolution went on to attempt to clarify what had transpired at the 20th Congress and stated that Communist parties must help one another in strengthening themselves against the threats from within and the capitalist world. In closing remarks of the resolution it stated that demonstrations in Poland were
financed by the capitalist world and "subversive activities in the Peoples' Democracies will fail in the future as well" (Pravda, 2 July 1956:2). Looking back on this resolution today it can be seen as a veiled warning to the Communist parties of Eastern Europe to remember that the leader of the Communist movement was the Soviet Union and it was going to remain the leader. It is clear that the Poznan events had shaken the Soviet Union, and on 16 July 1956 an article appeared in Pravda disclaiming any disunity between the socialist countries (Pravda, 16 July 1956:2-3). The article stated in part:

...Creatively applying Marxism-Leninism in the conditions of their own countries, free people, under the leadership of the Communist Party, are moving towards one goal, towards communism. It is impossible to move separately or haphazardly towards such a great goal. The working people of all socialist countries are marching towards this aim in unison, grasping each other firmly by the hand. No one will succeed in destroying this unity. The necessary consideration of national peculiarities not only does not lead to estrangement among the countries building socialism but, on the contrary, contributes to their solidarity (Pravda, 16 July 1956:2).

The article further stated that "Relations among socialist countries are firm because they are founded on the principles of fraternal friendship, equality, non-interference in internal affairs and many-sided mutual aid." (Pravda, 16 July 1957:2).

In Poland, one of the immediate results of the Poznan riots was the introduction of a number of financial concessions to the Polish industrial workers by the government on 6 July. Additionally, the 7th plenary session of the Polish Workers' Party was called. At this plenum Mr. Ochab all but recanted the statements previously made not only by the Polish Government, but by the Soviet Government and the CPSU concerning the causes of the Poznan riots.

...In the appraisal of the reasons for these incidents, it would be wrong to concentrate attention above all on the machinations of provocateurs and imperialist agents. It is necessary to look first of all for the social roots of these incidents, which have become for our Party a warning signal testifying to the existence of serious disturbances between the Party and various sections of the working class, these should be sought after first of all...(Pravda, 21 July 1956:4).

This statement appears as the first major divergence made in public between an East European Communist leader and the Soviet Union since Walter Ulbricht's speech on 16 April 1953 which was in contravention to the Soviet leadership's feeling on how socialism should be constructed in the GDR. The speech also must have been interpreted immediately as a divergence by the Kremlin because on 12 July, Marshal N. I. Bulganin, Prime Minister of the USSR, and Marshal Georgi Zhukov, Soviet Minister of Defense, arrived unexpectedly in Warsaw, ostensibly to represent the Soviet Union at the celebrations honoring Poland's Communist National Day. In Marshal Bulganin's speech he made clear the Soviet position on the Poznan riots and on what the 20th Party Congress meant to Poland as well as the Soviet Union and its leading role in Communism (Bulganin, 22 July 1956:i-3). On Poznan, Bulganin stated:
...The recent events in Poznan, provoked by enemy agents, provide new evidence that international reaction has not altogether as of yet disregarded its mad plans for the restoration of capitalism in socialist countries. We must not forget about this for even a minute... (Bulganin, 1956:3).

In his speech Bulganin made no reference to the workers' problems or grievances, the existence of which had already been recognized by the Plenum. It is not known what the Soviets wanted of the Poles, probably a recantation stating that the Poznan riots were entirely caused by "foreign agents". At the end of the Plenum on 29 July 1956, the communique that was issued announced a program of economic concessions to the industrial workers and admitted that much of the responsibility for the riots was due to living conditions and the high cost of living, while foreign agent provocation was only mentioned in passing.

During the period between Bulganin's visit on 21 July and the release of the Polish communique on the results of the 7th Plenum, Pravda published another article concerning the 30 June Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee once again speaking about the "Unity of Countries in the Socialist System" (Pravda, 24 July 1956:3-4). Although this article seemingly was directed against Western propaganda, it also seemed to contain a warning directed against Hungary and Poland and other socialist countries that were re-evaluating the Party and its progress. The article stated that while some are counting on disunity to cause a breakdown in the socialist camp, this would not happen, but:

\[
\text{this does not mean that in some socialist countries there are not confused individuals or opportunists who are inclined to succumb to external corrupting influences. (Pravda, 24 July 1956:1).}
\]

The article further stated:

Different paths toward socialism are by no means paths that diverge. On the contrary, all these paths lead to a single goal. And loyalty to the great banner of proletarian internationalism, the constantly growing solidarity of fighters for socialism have the greatest significance for the success of the great common cause... (Pravda, 24 July 1956:3-4).

There was no reversal by the Polish Party as to what the primary causes of the Poznan riots were: not hostile agents, but Party failures. It is now clear that more than the Poznan riots and economic failures were topics at the 7th Plenum. A number of economic changes which took place in August of 1956 probably had their origins in the Plenum.

Despite the Soviet emphasis on Party unity, the Poznan riots created a top-level split in the country. Two factions emerged at the 7th Plenum: a Stalinist faction known by their meeting place as the Natolinites and an evolutionist/revisionist faction. The Natolinites presented three hard-line goals—external identification with the USSR, crackdown on the press, and continuation of the Stalinist agrarian class struggle policy. The Natolinists favored four concessions—limitation of Jews in highly-visible leadership posts (an attempt to placate powerful anti-Semitic sentiment in Poland), release of Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski, a 50 percent wage increase for the workers, and inclusion of Gomulka in the Politburo (Syrop, 1957:55-66).
Opposition to the Natolinite goals welded the Social Democrats and evolutionary Communists into the evolutionist/revisionist faction. The group, fearful of a further deterioration in Polish-Soviet relations, was hesitant to support Gomulka's reinstatement into the Party. Workers' Councils under the Party apparatus were vehicles for organization against the Natolinites, as differences between non-Party people and rank-and-file Party members temporarily became unimportant (Lewis, 1958:158-9). Though originally a Stalinist, Ochab was forced to straddle the gap between the two factions, perhaps because of his opposition to Gomulka's return.

On 5 August 1956, Gomulka was readmitted to the Communist Party and all charges against him from the 3rd Plenum of November 1949 were withdrawn by direction of the 7th Plenum (Pravda, 6 August 1956:3). Pravda stated that Gomulka was a major problem for the 7th Plenum to resolve and did not go into any of the other problems resolved by the Plenum other than the readmittance to the Party of General Spychalski, Zenon Kliszko, and General Wacław Komaj, all of whom had been expelled in the late 1940's with Gomulka (Pravda, 6 August 1956:3). After the conclusion of the 7th Plenum and Gomulka's reinstatement, Ochab presided over an uneasy stalemate. His government lacked both an effective sense of direction and the power to suppress the new diversity. Reformists, however, realized that because of Soviet support of the regime, profound changes would probably need Soviet approval. The political situation continued to deteriorate throughout the summer and early fall.

Urged by the liberals to speak out, Gomulka insisted on his immediate appointment as Party First Secretary and as head of the new Politburo (Petjo, 1971:67). It was becoming necessary for the struggling political factions to negotiate with Gomulka for support. In early October, it became known that Gomulka could not accommodate the Natolinites with his views concerning collectivization, the Bierut regime and Polish-Soviet relations. Ochab and Cyrankiewicz, who had by this time assumed leadership of the evolutionists, concluded that sharp reforms were necessary and only Gomulka could administer them without incurring Russian wrath. When they reached agreement with Gomulka, Hilary Minc resigned on October 9th. It should be noted that in September Ochab had attended the Chinese Party Congress in Peking, where he had had discussions with Mao Tse-Tung and Chou En-lai, and with Anastas Mikoyan, representing the Soviet Union. It seems that Chou En-lai encouraged Ochab to pursue an emancipation policy, even at the risks of displeasing the Soviets, advice that seemed to be in accordance with Mao's views at that time advocating genuine independence of all Parties (Petjo, 1971:68).

From 13 to 15 October, a new Politburo was formed and Gomulka attended the session (Pravda, 16 October 1956:5). The Natolinites, outnumbered in the new Politburo, sent urgent warnings to the Kremlin. On 17 October the Kremlin invited the Polish Politburo to Moscow for consultation. "Sensing the danger, Ochab declined the invitation on the pretext that it was impossible to put off the 8th Plenum, which had been scheduled to take place two days later (Petjo, 1971:68)." On that same day, the Natolinite leaders decided to stop the erosion of their power by a coup d'état in the name of loyalty to the Kremlin. Lacking Politburo, Central Committee, and popular support, they counted on the assistance of the local Party apparatus, the Army and eventually the Soviets. When the Polish leaders postponed any trip to Moscow until after the 8th Plenum, the Natolinites decided to move. But the evolutionist workers at the Zeran auto factory obtained a copy of the list of some 700 people whom the Natolinites intended to arrest and warned them (Petjo, 1971:68). The security police guarded the Central Committee and national radio headquarters and the Army refused to march.

With the coup attempt aborted, 19 October marked the start of the
plenum. Just prior to the opening of the Plenum, a delegation unexpectedly arrived from Moscow, consisting of Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Foreign Minister Molotov, and Kaganovich, Deputy Chairman to the USSR Council of Ministers (Pravda, 21 October 1956:1). It was reported the delegation accompanied by Marshal Konev (Commander of the Warsaw Pact Forces) and eleven other generals in full dress uniform (Fetjo, 1971:69). The reason for their arrival could have been the result of numerous factors. During the summer and early fall, the Polish press had published numerous articles which were anti-socialist in nature and preached rejection of the socialist path (Pravda, 20 October 1956:3). Even during Bulganin's speech in Warsaw on 21 July he had warned against the "adverse elements in the Polish press, which, under the flag of nationalism, sought to exploit the difficulties of building Socialism." (Pravda, 22 July 1956:3). Another reason, of course, was the coup d'etat attempted by the Natolinites in order to stop the slow transition of Poland to national communism, similar to that of Yugoslavia. The Soviets probably had hoped to reverse this trend towards a nationalistic type of communism and felt that their presence might influence the Plenum from choosing this course.

Even with the arrival of this prestigious Soviet delegation, the Polish Central Committee met as planned and proceeded to make major changes in its membership (Pravda, 22 October 1956:3). Gomulka became a Central Committee member and Ochab announced Gomulka's candidacy for First Party Secretary. The meeting was then suspended for talks with the Soviets. At that very moment, as Gomulka joined the Polish delegation to face the Kremlin leaders, Soviet armored troops were moving towards Warsaw.

As has been noted, foremost among the Soviet concerns were implications of Polish trends for Polish-Soviet relations and how socialism was going to be maintained. To the Soviets the content of recent and projected reforms were not of principal importance. The Poles sought to convince the Soviets that reforms would strengthen Polish socialism and that personnel changes in the government and Party would help to improve Soviet-Polish relations as well as strengthen Communism. In conjunction with these statements, the Poles demanded that all Soviet troop movements cease, and proceeded with the Soviets present, to order Polish security forces and workers' militia to assume defensive positions in Warsaw (Halecki, 1957:559). The Army, under the command of Soviet Marshal Konstanty Rokossovsky, was unpredictable, but the security forces, headed by rehabilitated General Waclaw Komar, would have definitely acted against the Soviet forces in Polish interest. The Soviet leadership, realizing that armed intervention would be resisted by the security forces and that a large portion of the Army had only recently disobeyed Rokossovsky during the abortive coup of 17 October, ordered a halt to the Soviet troop movements. Concluding that Poland on its current path was not going to abandon communism and the Warsaw Pact, the Russians returned to Moscow (Pravda, 21 October 1956:1).

Gomulka had returned to power not because of demonstrations and popular ferment in his favor, but because the Polish Communist Party needed a leader who would stand up to the Soviets. Khrushchev and his delegation's threatening appearance in Warsaw actually strengthened Gomulka's position by magnifying his popular hero status in the eyes of the anti-Soviet masses (Syrop, 1957:132).

On 23 October Khrushchev told Gomulka by phone that even the Polish domestic line was accepted (Trybuna Luda, 23 October 1956:1). At this time the Hungarian revolution broke out and anti-Soviet activity swelled in Poland. Gomulka indorsed Imre Nagy, the new Hungarian leader, but effectively called for and maintained order in Poland as bloquehed in Hungary began. There were some riots and demonstrations in Poland, which normally might have invited Soviet intervention had the Soviets not been so occupied in Hungary to pay much attention.

Soon after taking over, Gomulka relieved Marshal Rokossovsky (Pravda, 19 November
1956:4), who, despite his able administration of the Polish Army, was symbolic of Soviet interference in Poland and would no longer be effective.

So ended the second Soviet intervention into another Communist state. However unlike in East Germany Soviet troops did not actually become engaged in any police-type actions and were returned to garrison by the Soviet leadership. It is apparent by the movement of Soviet troops in Poland towards Warsaw that the Kremlin believed that there may have been a valid reason to intervene with military forces. However, when Khrushchev and his delegation met with the Polish leadership they apparently changed their minds and called off the military intervention. It is apparent that Gomulka and the reorganized leadership of the Polish Party was one of the Kremlin's greatest concerns when they went to Warsaw. But Gomulka was apparently able to persuade the Kremlin leaders that no deterioration in the position of Poland as a satellite would occur as a result of the internal Party changes or domestic reforms. In addition the Soviets found that the Polish Party was not threatened with takeover by non-Communist elements, but was remaining in the leading role in the country and with Gomulka's return had gained even greater support from the populace.

Another major factor that the Kremlin probably weighed when deciding whether to use force in Poland was the Polish Army and how it would react to a Soviet takeover. According to Konrad Syrop, in Khrushchev's decision not to intervene with troops and to back down, "...the crucial factor must have been the military situation," where the Polish Army would have fought to support its government (Syrop, 1957:96-96). Contrary to what the Soviet leaders had believed before their arrival in Warsaw, the Polish Army would not obey Marshal Rokossovsky and the internal security forces under General Komar were completely pro-Gomulka. Organized armed resistance to any Soviet invasion promised to be heavy due to hatreds built up over many generations from being under the Russian or Soviet yoke. With only the Polish Army available to enforce his will, Khurschchev must have decided that deviations by the Polish were not sufficiently extreme to warrant the shedding of Russian blood. Additionally, the situation in Hungary at that time was rapidly deteriorating and there were indications that the Hungarian Communist Party was losing control, and to intervene in Poland might have provided the spark to ignite the situation in Hungary and they would have had to intervene in two places simultaneously which could have been been too costly in terms of manpower.

The Hungarian Revolution
October-November 1956

One of the single most important factors in the Hungarian revolution was the division of the Communist Party into Stalinist and reformist factions. This split began in the early 1950's and ended on 3 November 1956. The Stalinist faction leader was Matyas Rakosi, and later Erno Gero. Imre Nagy led the reformers. According to former Hungarian General Bela Kiraly, the events leading up to the revolution basically had three distinct stages (1969:52-53):

3) The liberal upsurge under equally dogmatic Erno Gero, culminating in Nagy's return to the premiership (18 July 1956 - 24 October 1956).
With the death of Stalin in 1953 and the assumption of a Soviet collective leadership seething with internecine feuding, direct control over the satellites was loosened by the Soviets and collective leadership was fostered in East Europe. This, coupled with the Yugoslav example of an alternative to the Soviet model of communism, started the Hungarian reform movement which eventually led to the revolution. During a meeting on 27 and 28 June 1953, the Hungarian Communist Party Central Committee condemned Rakosi's Stalinist regime and promulgated the "June Resolutions," which contained the elements of Imre Nagy's "New Course" directed at raising the production of consumer oriented products (Pravda, 1 July 1953:3 and 5 August 1953:3). This change in economic direction was in line with what was being undertaken in the GDR and actions that were taking place under the Khrushchev-Malenkov regime in the Soviet Union. Probably by directive of the Soviets, Nagy was installed as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers on 4 July 1953. Soon after becoming the Chairman, he announced the contents of his "New Course." However, Rakosi continued to dominate the upper party circles and two factions were thus created. The Soviets carefully avoided destroying either faction to preserve future options. Malenkov's speech on 8 August 1953 reinforced Nagy's "New Course," when the Soviets announced that they were planning to undertake a new economic course to help raise the production of economic goods (Pravda, 9 August 1953:1-4). Since this indicated that the Soviets were for economic reforms, neither Nagy or Rakosi was able to gain the upper hand, as Nagy's tacit Soviet support balanced Rakosi's control of the Party. As a result, "something vaguely reminiscent of pluralism began to emerge on the Hungarian political scene, resulting in a conflict of interest groups (Brzezinski, 1967:216). The Stalinists were firmly in control of the Party, while Nagy and his group tried to carry out their reform programs with only the "executive branch" of the government in their control, and against constant stumbling blocks placed in their way by Rakosi's group, and despite rapidly dwindling support from the Soviet Union. During the period of 2 to 4 March 1955, the Hungarian Central Committee met. Its members were well briefed by Rakosi and associates as to the new Moscow Party line, which had withdrawn its support for the "New Course" due to failures. In addition to this, the Rakosi group succeeded in linking Nagy to the then-deposed Soviet Premier and Politburo member Georgi Malenkov who had stepped down under pressure from Nikita Khrushchev, the First Party Secretary, less than a month earlier on 8 February 1955. It had become evident in January that the "New Course" probably was coming to an end by the wording of Khrushchev's speech to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in Moscow. On 25 January 1955, Nikita Khrushchev stated:

V. I. Lenin taught that only the heavy machine industry can serve as the material basis of socialism. Developing Lenin's instructions, Stalin emphasized that to slacken the speed of development in heavy industry would be suicide. Under Stalin's leadership, the Party steadfastly implemented this only correct policy. It is consistently carrying out this policy at the present and will continue to do so without wavering in the future (Izvestia, 3 February 1955).

Although the designation of the "New Course" was never specifically employed by the Soviet Union, the intention to pursue a different course was openly and officially discussed (Kommunist, 1953:No 12, p. 15). Khrushchev's speech indicated a move away from this policy and a reimplementation of Stalin's policy. The speech also can be seen as an end to Malenkov's role in the Soviet government, which in fact took place a scant two weeks later according to the Soviet press. Therefore, the stage had been set for Nagy's downfall and he was removed from his position as Prime Minister and from membership on the Central Committee.
of the Communist Party. In addition, Rakosi managed to have Nagy expelled from the Party, but did not have him arrested, perhaps because he had been originally chosen by the Kremlin or perhaps because of the recent thaw in Soviet-Yugoslav relations, which may have restrained Rakosi from suppressing a man whose reformism was akin to that of Josip Tito. (See section on Poland, pp. 17-18 for details on Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement.)

Thus, the Nagy alternative haunted Rakosi throughout his second regime [April 1955-July 1956] (Brzezinski, 1967:217-22). Discontent over the great difference between official descriptions of living conditions and reality was widespread. The majority of Hungarians came to feel "that the Rakosist regime was an obstacle to both individual and national prosperity" (Petoj, 1967:311). A loose coalition of anti-Communist and Communist reform groups formed in opposition to Rakosi (Brzezinski, 1967:219). Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of Josef Stalin at the 20th Congress forced Rakosi to relax his Stalinist economic policy by mid-1956, but at the same time he began to crack down on intellectual dissent. Rakosi mistakenly construed the 20 June 1956, Soviet-Yugoslav declaration of "many ways to socialism" as support for his own Stalinist tendencies. The peak of the Hungarian reform movement before the outbreak of armed violence was the Petofi Circle's meeting on 27 June 1956. The Petofi Circle was a debating club, officially set up with the approval of the Hungarian Workers Party Central Committee on 17 March 1956, for writers, actors, and people from all walks of life. The Stalinist regime expected it to serve as a safety valve that would provide a means of relieving tensions between the Party factions. During the meeting of 27 June, writers and journalists denounced the censorship in the country and the personal failings of the Rakosi regime. In addition, it demanded the return of Imre Nagy co the Party and denounced the structural shortcomings of the Party. The Petofi Circle demands caused quite an uproar in Hungary and also were probably one of the reasons that the Soviet Central Committee issued its resolution on "Overcoming the Cult of the Individual and its Consequences" a few days later (Pravda, 2 July 1956:1-2). Although Hungary was not mentioned specifically in the resolution, the implications concerning a Stalinist-type leadership and the problems it can cause were outlined in depth. Rakosi, probably alarmed by the riots in Poznan, Poland, the Soviet Central Committee resolution, and the rising tide of discontent in his own country fueled by the Petofi Circle demands, began a last ditch effort to consolidate his position and curb the liberal forces. However, it is likely that Rakosi's fate already had been determined as evidenced by a few short lines in the lead editorial in the Soviet journal Kommunist published later in July 1956. The article, a further explanation of the Central Committee resolution on the "Cult of the Individual," was directed at the various Party organizations in the Soviet Union and in the peoples democracies' stated:

...persistent and consistent Party work to develop Party democracy, to restore and strengthen collective leadership at all levels, is the chief guarantee against relapses into the cult of the individual. Where Party democracy and collective leadership hold the power, there is not and cannot be undue influence by one individual on decisions... (Kommunist, July 1956:9).

As has already been mentioned in the section on Poland, this article and the others that appeared in July 1956 had a great influence on the futures of various leaders in Eastern Europe.

Rakosi made his final mistake in Hungary when a plan, drawn up by him and
his supporters calling for the arrest of Nagy and his group, was discovered. With the discovery of this plan, Rakosi lost the support of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers Party. On 16 July, the liberal members of the Hungarian Central Committee appealed to Moscow for help in thwarting Rakosi’s plans. The appeal was most probably made through Yuri V. Andropov, the Soviet Ambassador to Hungary. The timing of the appeal seemed to be perfect, for on that day the Soviet Party newspaper had run a two-page editorial condemning Western influence in the Petofi Circle and the Poznan events and additionally stating that “Communist and Workers’ Parties Central Committees” were waging a “consistent, principled struggle against the cult of the individual and its consequences” (Pravda, 16 July 1956:2-3).

On 17 July, Anastas Mikoyan, of the Soviet Council of Ministers arrived in Budapest to look into the situation that had developed. He apparently had instructions for Rakosi from Moscow, because on 18 July Rakosi resigned and Erno Gero became First Party Secretary. Gero, who had been a protege of Rakosi, in his first major speech to the Hungarian Central Committee acknowledged that:

Perhaps our Party’s policy and its general line before and after the 20th Party Congress was incorrect?...

But in carrying out the correct political line, certain uncertainties and red tape were observed at times. Comrade Rakosi, First Secretary of the Central Committee, although he tried, was not able to reorganize his work and that of the Politburo and the Secretariat according to the new requirements (Gero, in Pravda, 20 July 1956:5).

Gero also pointed out that Nagy’s actions, which had led to his expulsion from the Party in March of 1955, were still considered justifiable (Gero, 20 July 1956:5).

The Soviets, despite their proclamations of equality among socialist nations, had orchestrated major changes in the internal affairs of Hungary by having Gero placed in the First Secretary position in an attempted compromise between Stalinist and Titoist (national Communist) elements in Hungary. Almost immediately with Gero’s elevation, several former political prisoners of the Rakosi regime were released and returned to high Party positions. One of these individuals, Janos Kadar was to become the First Party Secretary after the revolution. But as indicated in Gero’s speech, Nagy was not considered eligible for consideration for a position in the new Party structure.

Appointment of Gero over Nagy [which Tito opposed (Tito, 1956:1)] seemed to most Hungarians and other Communists throughout the world to be inconsistent with the recent relaxation of Stalinist controls being undertaken in the Soviet Union and other Communist-controlled nations in Eastern Europe. Nagy’s faction, though completely disorganized, had popular support and the ideological offensive. The Party, demoralized by the Rakosi purges during the preceding years, also supported Nagy. Gero, on the other hand, had the backing of the instruments of power—the Army, the secret police and the Soviet Union.

At the end of August, Gero stated in a press release that the Party was now following the course outlined by the 20th Party Congress, that many of the previous mistakes of the Party had been corrected, and that these actions had been accomplished since the resignation of Rakosi (Gero, 26 August 1956:5). This statement and others by high Hungarian Workers’ Party officials may have been
partially directed for foreign consumption, especially Yugoslavia, in order to gain Tito's support for the Gero regime and support from the people at home. An article written by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Hungarian Workers' Party, Istvan Dobi, that appeared in the Soviet newspaper Izvestia in early October, declared that great progress had been made in the "further development of socialist democracy" in Hungary (Dobi, 5 October 1956:5), and seemed to indicate that a direct attempt by the Gero group was in progress to woo Tito, with Moscow giving the direction. Actually, Gero did meet with Tito "in the Crimea at Khrushchev's country home" on 30 September (Kovacs, I, 7 October 1956:5), a meeting which was apparently set up by Khrushchev himself. It is possible that Gero and his Soviet supporters felt that closer ties could be developed between Tito and Gero and their countries, then Gero would gain credibility with his own people and weather the storm being created by Nagy and his supporters. On 7 October 1956, the Hungarian Central Committee announced that a meeting was to take place between Tito and Gero in Belgrade on 15 October (Izvestia, 7 October 1956:3). On 6 October while in Budapest for a tribute to individuals purged and later rehabilitated in 1949, it is possible that Mikoyan and Mikhail Suslov, a member of the CPSU Presidium, urged Gero to even further enhance his position with Tito and his own people by making more concessions to the people and readmitting Nagy to the Party. Nagy's letter of 4 October requesting readmittance stated that he agreed to follow the decisions of the Hungarian Central Committee from the July Plenum and to act in accordance with the decisions of the 20th Party Congress that started the de-Stalinization process, even though he did not agree entirely with these decisions (Pravda, 17 October 1956:5). The Politburo made its decision on 13 October to allow Nagy back into the Party. The initial announcement acknowledging receipt of Nagy's letter, the text of his letter and the Politburo's decision, were published simultaneously on 14 October, the day before Gero's meeting with Tito, in the Party newspaper Szabad Nep and released to the foreign press probably to assist Gero and his group in selling Tito on the fact that they were reformist.

Gero made another surprise move to relieve tensions in Hungary just prior to leaving for Yugoslavia. He ordered the arrest of General Mihaly Farkas, former head of the Security Police, and soon after ordered the release of several senior Army officers from prison with reinstatement in the service. With this move, the Army went into a state of confusion and morale collapsed due to the simultaneous existence of incumbent and rehabilitated command structures. All of this resulted in a breakdown of indoctrination activities and officers and cadets moved to join Nagy and his supporters (Brzezinski, 1967:226-7).

Between 15 and 22 October, members of the Hungarian delegation were in Yugoslavia for talks with Tito and his government (Izvestia, 24 October 1956:4). The Hungarian delegation was led by Gero and included most of the top members of the Politburo.

During the period that Gero was in Yugoslavia, the discontent at home continued to increase and the rise to power in Poland by Gomulka on 21 October "proved to be the spark that ignited the accumulated tensions in Hungary" (Brzezinski, 1967:210). It also seemed apparent, based on the Polish situation, that the Soviets would not use force to prevent the replacement of Stalinist leaders with national Communists. Gero appeared to have lost his dual support—the Army, and the Soviet forces (Brzezinski, 1967:227).

On the night of 22 October 1956, the leadership of the Petofi Club met and drew up a declaration to the Politburo recommending that a meeting of the Central Committee be called and that Nagy be included in preparing a program to straighten
out the country's economic and social problems (Radio Kossuth, 22 October 1956). The revolution had begun.

On 23 October a crowd of approximately 200,000 gathered in Budapest's Parliament Square. Following Nagy's cautious address to the crowd, Gero made a provocative, blundering speech (Kertesz, 1962:125-6). Gero seemed unwilling to resign, and angry crowds surrounded the radio building. Gero's only remaining supporters, the security police, fired on the crowds and Budapest exploded into rioting.

In desperation, on the 24th the Central Committee selected Nagy to be the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Gero remained as the First Party Secretary (Pravda, 25 October 1956a:4). One Politburo member, alarmed over the series of events, appealed in Nagy's name for Soviet military assistance in controlling the situation. The Soviets, hoping to avert widespread revolution, sent troops into Budapest on 24 October. On the same day, Mikoyan and Suslov arrived in Budapest from Moscow. The Soviet intervention, following as it did Gero's final mistakes and the police attack on the radio building, "made inevitable a full-scale revolt" (Kertesz, 1962:126).

Almost all the violence of the Hungarian revolution occurred in and around Budapest. Aside from the police and a few Party hardliners, the Soviet forces were the only Moscow supporters in Hungary. The basically unorganized Hungarian resistance during the opening days of the revolution in October was centered in Killan Barracks in Budapest under the command of Colonel Pal Maleter; this group effectively stalemated the Soviet forces in the beginning.

Almost immediately after arriving in Hungary the Soviets declared that the riots were foreign-inspired and had "received support from foreign reactionary forces who systematically incite the antipopular elements to strike out against legally constituted authority" (Pravda, 25 October 1956b:4).

Once in office, Nagy began to lose some of his previous support as his Stalinist colleagues attempted to use his presence in the government as a means of maintaining power (Kertesz, 1962:127). The anti-Stalinist coalition, never well organized, began to come apart. Opposition to the Soviet intervention, distrust of Nagy, who was blamed for acts of a government not yet under his control, and memories of RakosI's 1955 return to power drove many Hungarians to call for the guarantees of multiparty social democracy and neutrality (Brzezinski, 1967:230-1).

Kadar replaced Gero as First Party Secretary on October 25th. As the Stalinists began to lose power, Nagy began to act with greater independence from his new office in the Parliament building. In the waning days of October, he called for an end to the collectivization process. Kadar supported Nagy, calling for a new Communist Party, "suitable to the economic and historic characteristics of the country" (Kertesz, 1962:127-8).

On 28 October, Nagy reconstituted the government and included in the reorganization were Bela Kovass and Zoltan Tildy who were appointed to the Council of Ministers (Pravda, 28 October 1956:6). Kovacs and Tildy were two prominent non-Communists in Hungary, and Tildy had been the President of Hungary at one time before the Communist takeover. Also on the 28th, supported by the Poles and Yugoslavs, Nagy called for an immediate cease-fire in Budapest.

During the entire period, the Soviet press kept a constant tirade going, blaming the West and the United States for causing the problems in Hungary. At the same time, the Soviets continually justified their intervention as having taken place at the request of the Hungarian movement. However, in a radio speech on the
28th Nagy somewhat destroyed this myth when he stated that the "events of the past week unfolded with tragic rapidity...The grave crimes of the preceding era released this great movement...[which was] aggravated even further by the fact that up to the very last the leadership was unwilling to break totally with its old and criminal policy" (Nagy, 28 October 1956, 1723 Hours on Radio Kossuth).

On 29 October, Mikoyan promised Tildy that all the Soviet troops, some of which supposedly had left already, would soon withdraw. The question of neutrality was also brought up with Mikoyan, not as a non-negotiable demand, but as a tentative suggestion by Tildy (Kiraly, 1969:58). Also on the 29th, an article appeared in Szabad Nep entitled "A Reply to Pravda: 'The Sun is Rising...',' attacking an article in Pravda on 25 October titled "The Collapse of an Antipopular Adventure in Hungary" (Molnar, 29 October 1956:1). The article attacked the Pravda article as an error, stating that the "events in Budapest were neither antipopular, nor an adventure, nor was there a collapse..." (Molnar, 29 October 1956:1). The article further stated that Pravda was wrong in blaming British and American imperialism, and this was an insult to the people of Budapest who were responsible solely for the actions that had occurred (Molnar, 29 October 1956:1). It went on to say that "Hungary must be a free and independent country and she should live in peace and friendship with the USSR on this basis! This is what we have fought for and this is what we want...." (29 October 1956:1).

Again on 30 October, Nagy changed the government and announced the change over Radio Kossuth stating:

In the interest of further democratization of the country's life, the cabinet abolishes the one-Party system and places the country's Government on the basis of democratic cooperation between coalition parties as they existed in 1945. In accordance with this decision a new national government—with a small inner cabinet—has been established, at the moment with only limited powers.

The members of the new cabinet are Imre Nagy, Zoltan Tildy, Bela Kovac, Ferenc Erdel, Janos Kadar, Geza Losonczy and a person whom the Social Democratic Party will appoint later...

This provisional Government has appealed to the Soviet General Command to begin immediately with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Budapest. At the same time, we wish to inform the people of Hungary that we are going to request the Government of the Soviet Union to withdraw Soviet troops completely from the territory of the Hungarian Republic. (Nagy, 30 October 1956: Radio Kossuth).

The Soviet reaction to Nagy's break with the one-Party system and request for the withdrawal of Soviet troops appeared in Pravda on 31 October 1956 as a declaration to the socialist states (P. 1.). The Soviet declaration in respect to Hungary answered that it was willing to reconsider its Warsaw Treaty stationing obligations and pointed out that Soviet forces were in Hungary in accordance with the treaty and the ones in Budapest were there at the request of the Hungarian Government (Pravda, 31 October 1956:1). The declaration further stated that
they, the Soviets, were willing to withdraw "the Soviet army units from Budapest as soon as this was considered necessary by the Hungarian Government" (Pravda, 31 October 1956:1). In reasserting its position on the causes of the events in Hungary, the Soviet Declaration stated that the movement in Hungary was joined:

...by the forces of black reactionaries and counterrevolution which are trying to take advantage of the dissatisfaction of a part of the working people in order to undermine the foundations of the people's democratic system in Hungary and to restore the old landlord-capitalist ways in that country... (Pravda, 31 October 1956:1)."

The Soviet Declaration also made a statement which it very soon violated in Hungary and 12 years later in Czechoslovakia:

The countries of the great community of socialist nations, united by the common ideals of the construction of a socialist society and the principles of proletarian internationalism, can build their mutual relations exclusively on the basis of complete equality, respect of territorial integrity, national independence and sovereignty, and mutual non-interference in internal affairs... (Pravda, 31 October 1956:1).

On 31 October in a speech given at Kossuth Square which was broadcast over Free Radio Kossuth, Imre Nagy stated:

"...We are living in the first days of our sovereignty and independence...We have expelled from our country the Rakosi and Gero gang. They will answer for their crimes. They tried to dishonor me by spreading the lie that I called in the Soviet troops. This lie is infamous. Imre Nagy, the champion of Hungarian sovereignty, Hungarian freedom, and Hungarian independence, did not call in these troops. On the contrary, it was he who fought for their withdrawal... (Nagy, Free Radio Kossuth)."

On 1 November amid circulation of reports that more Soviet troops and tanks had arrived in Hungary, Nagy protested to the Soviet Ambassador, declared Hungary's neutrality and announced its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and requested that the United Nations consider the situation in Hungary (Kiraly, 1969:58-9). In actuality, by that evening Soviet forces were all over the country, occupying all airfields and had also surrounded Budapest (Kiraly, 1969:59). Throughout 1 and 2 November, Nagy negotiated with representatives of the Soviet Government on the withdrawal of Soviet troops and also protested the entry of the new forces into the country. These protests were to fall on deaf ears.

Chita Ionescu notes that from 30 October to 5 November:

The entire problem of the Hungarian revolution was transported from the national to the international plane. For all intents and purposes the revolution in Hungary and within the Hungarian framework was finished by the 30th of October; it had been won by the anti-Communist forces (1965:81).

The Hungarian Communists were not going to lose power without playing their trump
card: Soviet military takeover. Nagy had chosen to stay premier of Hungary whether it was Communist or not; Kadar and many other top Party members had left Budapest after Nagy's pronouncements of 1 November (Kertész, 1962:128:9). After the declaration of neutrality and the departure from the Warsaw Pact, the Communist ministers resigned from Nagy's Cabinet. On 3 November, Nagy formed another government filling the vacated Communist posts and releasing other Communists from their positions (Pravda, 4 November 1956:6 gives a list of the members of this government). By this time Mikoyan and Suslov had departed Hungary for Moscow. Last minute attempts had failed to convince Nagy to renounce neutrality and Warsaw Pact withdrawal. The front page of Pravda announced on 4 November 1956 that the government of Imre Nagy had collapsed and had "surrendered its position to antipopular elements...The urgent task dictated by the course of events is to block the path of reaction in Hungary..." (4 November 1956:1). The Soviets had made their decision, Soviet armored units which had surrounded Budapest on 4 November moved into the city.

Thus the events leading up to the Soviet intervention into Hungary ended. The necessity to intervene with military force was justifiable in the Soviets' view because Nagy had declared Hungarian neutrality and had withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact. Additionally, Nagy had already expelled most of the Communist Party members from his government and replaced them with non-Communist members of opposition parties.

In consideration of the difficulty of intervention the Soviets probably realized that they would face armed resistance in the cities, but the Hungarian Army would remain basically neutral, which it did with the exception of a few units in and around Budapest. The Soviets correctly anticipated that they would have little resistance from the security police, who had supported Gero at the radio station on 23 October. The imminent, extensive armed resistance, in Budapest, not surprisingly, failed to deter the Soviets because Nagy's and the general populace's transgressions had been severe.

Another factor that was probably considered by the Soviet leadership was the effect that the invasion would have on their foreign policy especially as it pertained to the satellite nations. Khrushchev was attempting at this time to defend his satellite policy of conciliation and relaxation against former Stalinist enemies as well as against neo-Stalinist and militants like Molotov. Intervention into the affairs of a satellite could be conceived as a failure in his foreign policy. This may have been a major important domestic factor in the Soviet intervention decision-making-unity when they were considering intervention into Hungary and also when weighing their options in Poland earlier in October.

Additionally it is possible that Kadar appealed to the Soviets when he and other Communist Party members left Budapest during the first days of November, at a time when the Soviets already were moving additional troops towards Budapest. The effect of such an appeal (if one was made) is unknown, but if so, it is possible that it would probably have carried some weight with the Soviets in making their decision.

Finally, if Hungary had been allowed to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and the Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe, not only would the Soviets have found it intolerable in terms of the European balance of power, it also would have been intolerable in the effects of anti-Soviet nationalism in Eastern Europe, most notably in the Ukraine and Poland.
The Czechoslovak Intervention, 1968

Comrades, in the system which has crystallized and stabilized itself in the course of the past 50 years and which to a certain extent has gradually accepted changes and compromises yet in substance remained firm, we are now experiencing revolutionary changes, a revolutionary turn. Our party, our society, seeks another political system, the opposite of the political system that we have had so far. (Authors emphasis)

(From a speech by current First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Gustav Husak, Bratislava, Czechoslovakia March 1968)

Czechoslovakia had survived the de-Stalinization era with a minimum of public unrest and crisis in leadership. In 1968 a reform period which began with Antonin Novotny's fall from power and the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee adoption of Alexander Dubcek's Action Program ended on 20 August 1968 with Soviet military intervention.

Alexander Dubcek, the First Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party and Antonin Novotny, First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and President, became locked in a power struggle at the 31 October 1967 meeting of the Czechoslovak Central Committee. The unexpected announcement of the removal of Novotny from the position of First Secretary occurred at a plenary session of the Central Committee of the CCP on 5 January 1968 (Pravda, 6 January 1968:1,5). His fall occurred as a result of growing dissatisfaction among top Czechoslovak Party leaders with his rule. Popular opposition to Novotny resulted from years of poor economic progress; from a growing sense of nationalism among the Slovaks, who resented being Czechoslovakia's "second people"; from intellectual demands for modernization of Marxist doctrine; and from prewar memories of democratic traditions among the Czechs (Mastny, 1972:73). During the summer and fall of 1967, incidents of capricious repression by cultural and policy-making authorities which culminated in student riots in October, contributed to a growing conviction that Novotny was losing his grip and would probably have to be replaced.

In the waning days of Novotny's regime, Czechoslovak army officers apparently exerted pressure in the Central Committee and placed their units on alert on behalf of Novotny (Skilling, 1972:46-7). On 8 December 1967, Leonid Brezhnev, Soviet First Party Secretary, flew to Prague to amplify the Soviet Ambassador's support for Novotny at the December Plenary Session of the Central Committee CCP. However, Czechoslovak progressives unanimously opposed Novotny and Brezhnev finally declined to intervene. When Novotny was removed on 5 January 1968, Alexander Dubcek was elected as the First Secretary (Pravda, 6 January 1968:1,5). Although the official Soviet reaction to Dubcek appeared to be neutral, there is some possibility that Soviet leaders approved of the change. The Soviet press really did not elaborate on Dubcek's selection as is usually done with leaders approved and backed by Moscow. On his way back to Moscow from Prague, Brezhnev reportedly met with and approved of Dubcek. It is interesting to note that after Novotny's removal and the selection of Dubcek, most Czechoslovak comment claimed that Brezhnev took a neutral stand, adjuring any role in the internal changes in the Prague regime (Harrer, G. 1968).

From January until August 1968, events in Czechoslovakia came to resemble trends which occurred throughout the Soviet bloc after the death of Stalin and soon after the 20th Congress in 1956. Dubcek, the new First Secretary, "favored a new style
of leadership and substantial reforms (Skilling, 1972)." He was perhaps a politician better suited to head a pluralistic society than a Soviet satellite:

Although he lacked the qualities for decisive leadership or a clear conception of the future, he was ready to consult specialists and to take account of conflicting interests and viewpoints in the formation of public policy (Skilling, 1972: 47).

On 22 February at the 20th anniversary celebration of the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, in front of Soviet First Secretary Brezhnev, he promised the "widest possible democratization" in the country (Pravda, 23 February 1968:2). In Brezhnev's speech at the celebration, he endorsed the decision of the January CCP Plenum which elected Dubcek, but in a manner which stressed continuity not change in the country (Pravda, 23 February 1968: 2-3).

During the early months of 1968, the Dubcek regime managed to convince the people that it supported radical reform and began to move rapidly, rehabilitating Stalinist victims and replacing hardliners with reformers at the top party echelons. Popular support of the new Czechoslovak leadership was derived from self-criticism in the Party, the abolition of censorship, proposal of the guarantee of the right to dissent and resistance to Soviet interference. By the beginning of March censorship had ceased to exercise effective control and almost unlimited free expression was allowed and criticisms of the political system began to flow like water over a dam in the calm after a storm.

The newspapers were filled with articles and round table discussions on the ills of the past two decades; the trials of the fifties; discrimination against Slovaks; freedom of the press; freedom of religion; Czech traditions, including the role of T. G. Masaryk;8 the meaning of democracy and of genuine elections, and many issues formerly taboo (Skilling, 1976:198-9).

However, although major reforms were underway, the Party and state seemed to lag behind the wave of the unofficial movements for change, and many of the key figures of the former Novotny regime were still in high positions to include Novotny himself, as President. By mid-March the National Assembly's Presidium expressed a lack of confidence in many of these members of the former regime and they were dismissed. To the general public, the continued presence of Novotny as President seemed to personify the slowness of the reforms and the danger of a relapse to the conditions of earlier days, and pressure for his removal increased. Due to this pressure the CCP Central Committee recommended to Novotny that he resign. On 22 March, Novotny announced his intention to retire "in light of the internal situation existing in our country at present and guided by the desire to assist by this step of mine the continued development of the socialist society and the strengthening of our socialist homeland..." (Pravda, 23 March 1968:4). After Novotny's "retirement," an informal nomination campaign was launched to find a new president (something that is unheard of in a Communist country). Numerous candidates were put forth by various organizations and in the end retired General Ludvik Svoboda, who led the Czechoslovak forces in WWII, was selected by the CCP Plenum. On 26 March 1968, Svoboda was approved by the Central Committee as the new President.

8Masaryk was a popular Czech leader before the Communist takeover.
On 23 March 1968, the day after the announcement of Novotny's "retirement," Dubcek and other Czechoslovak leaders went to Dresden, East Germany, to meet with the leaders of the Soviet Union and other socialist states. It was a one-day meeting of all the Warsaw Pact members, except Rumania (which declined to participate), and one of the major topics of the discussion was the situation in Czechoslovakia (Pravda, 25 March 1968:1). According to Pravda, in terminology similar to that used during the period leading up to the Polish October and 1956 Hungarian Revolution:

The representatives of the fraternal parties expressed the unanimous opinion that in the present international situation it is especially important to increase vigilance with respect to aggressive intentions and subversive actions that the imperialist forces are attempting to carry out against the socialist commonwealth. The delegation stated their determination to take the necessary steps for the further consolidation of the socialist countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism...

An exchange of opinions and information on the state of affairs in the socialist countries took place. The representatives of the C.C.P. and the C.S.R. government provided information on the progress in the realization of decisions made at the January Plenum of the C.C.P. Central Committee...Confidence was expressed that the working class and all the working people of the C.S.R. under the leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, will ensure the further development of socialist construction in the country (Pravda, 25 March 1968:1)...

After the meeting Dubcek admitted to the press that fears had been expressed about possible "anti-socialist elements taking advantage of Czechoslovakia's democratization, but that the meeting had ended in support for Czechoslovakia's course (Pravda, 23 March 1968a:4). Thus, political pressure on the Dubcek regime from the Soviet Union had begun. But, even after the Dresden Conference Dubcek continued to fill his regime with reformers and although Dubcek spoke in pro-Communist and pro-Soviet rhetoric, the Czechoslovak press was becoming more anti-Communist and anti-Soviet by the day. In Pravda on 28 March an article was published which attacked the "imperialist countries" for trying "...to drive a wedge into the relations among them" (the socialist countries) by portraying the "Dresden Meeting as some kind of interference in Czechoslovakia's affairs and to undermine the prestige of the Czechoslovak Communist Party; in so doing they are counting on the possibility of stirring to life anti-socialist elements in the country (Aleksandrov, I., 1968a:4). The article concluded by saying:

Nobody and nothing, under any circumstances, can shake our fraternal friendship, which serves the vital interests of the people of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia and the great goals of the construction of socialism and communism (Aleksandrov, I. 1968:4).

The Soviet leadership was worried about Dubcek and his reforms even after the assurances that he gave at Dresden. On 30 March Pravda published a speech given by Brezhnev to the Moscow Party Organization, where he called for "Iron Party discipline" and unity, warning of the danger of "revisionist and nationalist" elements attempting to undermine the rule of Communist parties and the solidarity
of the socialist camp (Pravda, 30 March 1968). Dubcek was not completely insensitive to these warnings coming out of the Kremlin. On 2 April 1968, he made a speech to the CCP Central Committee Plenum reasserting the determination of the Party to defend its "guiding role", that the socialist nature of their further path is inviolable..." and that the foreign policy orientation of Czechoslovakia depended upon "...firm alliance with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries..." (Pravda, 3 April 1968). Yet it should be noted that in this same speech he talked of reforms in the political system, and freedom of the press, which must have made the Soviets wonder what he was really planning to do.

On 9 April, with the help of both Party and non-Party intellectuals, Dubcek presented his Action Program, a general statement of the goals of his regime (RFE Research Bulletin Czechoslovak Press, Survey #2074, 1968). The program was issued on the very day that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union opened its Plenum to talk about the problems in East Europe. In the Action Program, the freedoms of speech and of the press were guaranteed, judicial reforms promised, secret police power curbed, the right to foreign travel declared and the functions of the new National Assembly enumerated. The program in some respects was radical; in other ways it was moderate and it was a great success for the Czechoslovak progressives. The Action Program guaranteed free speech and dissent without allowing legal opposition and this must have upset the Soviet leadership greatly.

On 11 April the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's Plenum resolution was published. It stated in part:

...the contemporary stage of historical development is characterized by a sharp aggravation of the ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism. The entire huge apparatus of anti-communist propaganda is now directed towards weakening the unity of the socialist countries and the international movement, dividing the progressive forces of our time, and trying to undermine socialist society from within (Pravda, 11 April 1968:1).

The declaration went on to say that in these conditions there must be an "irreconcilable struggle against hostile ideology." (Pravda, 11 April 1968:1). As a result of this Plenum a tremendous ideological campaign began, apparently designed to tell the Czechs exactly where the Soviet Union stood, as well as to warn the other Eastern Bloc countries that this was not a proper course to follow. As an example of the Kremlin's misgivings about the Action Program, Pravda announced the Czech Program on 17 April, eight days after it had been announced in Czechoslovakia. The editors of Pravda presented only some passages to their readers to underscore their point of view, but the various guarantees in the program did not appear in the Pravda edition (see Pravda, 17 April 1968:4). By late April, the schism between the Czechoslovak political situation and Soviet orthodoxy had widened. On 22 April an editorial appeared in Pravda blasting the Chinese Communist Party for being "revisionist" for replacing portions of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, and for allowing Maoism to exist; the article further stated that:

Revisionist, nationalist elements in other countries distort in their own ways the fundamentals of the Marxist doctrine, replacing it with disguised idealism or bourgeois liberalism under the banner of humanism and democracy...While hesitating
to come out openly against socialism, they attack the leading role of the working class party and the principles of internationalism; they speculate on the slogans of democracy and national independence (Fedoseyev, 1968:2).

The Action Program had done little to change Czech foreign policy. The objective was not to become as independent as Rumania or Yugoslavia, nor to try what Hungary had attempted in 1956. Dubcek's problems began essentially on the domestic level. His policy became one of slowly advancing toward reformist-supported Action Program goals, while assuring the Party conservatives that Communism in Czechoslovakia would not be weakened. His middle-of-the-road style became difficult to carry off successfully as the split between the reformers and the conservatives widened, and the split between his country and the Soviets widened. In May, the tone changed even more drastically and the liberal forces in Prague's press and broadcasting services began to blast the treatment that people in other Communist countries were receiving under their respective regimes (Schwartz, 1969:148-151). In the beginning of May a Czechoslovak delegation went to Moscow, headed by Dubcek. In replying to questions about the reasons for the visit, Dubcek stated that:

...they wanted to establish personal contacts with the Soviet leaders...we wanted to exchange views with them on some pressing questions of mutual relations, the international situation and the world communist movement...We consider it advisable or, more precisely, necessary, to discuss pressing questions with them at personal meetings, that is, in an efficient manner and without unnecessary delays (Pravda, 8 May 1968:4).

On Radio Prague, on 6 May 1968, Dubcek said that the Soviets had shown "anxiety lest the process of democratization be abused to the detriment of socialism."

The press continued to heat up on both sides with articles and editorials attacking various issues that were offensive to one or the other about the situation. Moscow had begun a series of denunciations of the new nationalism in Czechoslovakia singling specific Czech writers out for criticism and making inflammatory statements about Thomas Masaryk, the father of the Czechoslovak Republic (see Literaturnaya Gazeta, 8 May 1968:4; Pravda, 8 May 1968:5; Izvestia 11 May 1968:2-3). "In the atmosphere of the time, Moscow's propagandist could have picked no surer way to insult and alienate the majority of the Czechoslovakian people (Schwartz, 1969:150)." The Prague media in return began to direct its attacks on the Soviets as opposed to other Warsaw Pact nations. Questions were raised on the annexation of the Czechoslovakian Carpatho-Ukraine area; the effects on Czechoslovakia of the 1939 Stalin-Hitler Pact, and the role of Soviet agents in the state-managing of the purge trials in the early 1950's (RFE Czechoslovak Press Survey No's 2060-2086, 1968).

In May the first probable military pressure by Moscow began. On around 9 - 10 May a joint Polish-East German-Soviet exercise took place on Czechoslovakia's northern borders. The Czech Government claimed the exercises were routine, but the press saw it differently. On 8 May there had been a meeting in Moscow of the Communist Parties of the Warsaw Pact, excluding Czechoslovakia and Rumania, concerning "urgent problems of the international situation and the world Communist movement (Pravda, 9 May 1968:1; Pravda, 11 May 1968:1)." One of the significant comments to come out of the Moscow summit, which could be interpreted as a warning for the Czechs, appeared in a Pravda editorial, stating:
...communist parties should deliver a resolute rebuff to the intrigues by the enemies of socialism; to the forces of imperialist reaction—above all U.S. imperialism; to all their political and ideological sabotage, which is aimed at weakening the unity of the socialist countries and the international communist movement and dividing the progressive forces of the present; and to the attempts to subvert socialist society from within (Pravda, 11 May 1968:1).

Soon after Dubcek's visit to Moscow and the Moscow Meeting of other Warsaw Pact Nations, Premier Kosygin arrived in Prague ostensibly for a health trip at Karlovy Vary. The visit was low key, probably for the Soviet Premier to do an on-the-ground assessment of the situation in Czechoslovakia. He remained eight days in Czechoslovakia, conferring with Dubcek and other leaders. A week later a military delegation, headed by the Minister of Defense Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, arrived in Prague to discuss aspects of Czech-Soviet military cooperation and stationing of forces. The arrival of this military group must have signified to the Czechoslovakian government that the Soviets were upset about the recent chain of events.

When the Czechoslovak Communist Party Plenum met at the end of May, its proceedings were tense and the conservatives clashed with the liberals over many issues:

Dubcek had resolved to try to appease the Soviets on the lines of a gentleman's agreement just reached with Kosygin: the resolution placed a certain restraint on the April Action Program by stressing that the Party's leading role could not be questioned, that no opposition party would be permitted, and that the Party would resist the anti-socialist forces of change (Petjo, 1971:157).

Dubcek also stated at the Plenum that:

...all conferences with the representatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Government of the Soviet Union have been held and are being held on the principles of equal rights and noninterference in internal affairs (Pravda, 8 June 1968:4).

In this same speech Dubcek also announced that the Czechoslovakian Government had granted permission for the Soviets to conduct a "joint staff exercise of Warsaw Pact troops in June (Pravda, 8 June 1968:4)." However, the liberals managed to impose many of their own terms into the plenum which invalidated the concessions to the Soviets. Conservatives, however, took heart in the steady balance of the Central Committee of liberals and conservatives and the strong warnings against anti-socialism and anti-communism. Dubcek was hoping that the next Plenum would shift the power balance in favor of his centrist, step-by-step reform policy and prevent any major rifts in the Central Committee. In an article in late May published in Rude Pravo Dubcek had stated:

only a party that is guided by the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, is able to lead the working people along the socialist path, forward to Communism (Pravda, 29 May 1968:5).
It appears that Dubcek was truly attempting to stay with the Communist line according to Marx and Lenin, but the forces that had been created with his ascendency to power were making the situation untenable.

On 15 June the National Front Coalition was set up as a body to channel multi-Party dissent. Included in the coalition were the Communist Parties of Slovakia and Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, the Czechoslovak People's Party, the Slovak Revival Party and the Slovak Freedom Party. Although the one-party system had been pushed at the Plenum, this pluralism was a radical departure from the past and probably the point of no return for the Dubcek regime even though he opposed the formation of the coalition.

The press reaction to the Front by the Soviets was strong and unfavorable (see Platkovsky, V., 1968:4-5). The Soviet Union, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary and Poland denounced the Czechoslovak Communist Party and began to completely exclude them from meetings within the Warsaw Pact.

On 27 June 1968 an article entitled "Two Thousand Words," written by novelist Ludvik Vaculik and signed by 70 intellectuals and a few workers appeared in Literarni listy and three other Czechoslovak newspapers. This article was addressed both to Communists and the mass of the population and called on them actively to engage in the struggle against "the old forces". This article was essentially a call for a non-violent mass effort to accelerate and consummate the evolution towards democracy. It openly warned against attacks against Dubcek and instead aimed its thrust at the conservative party elements still entrenched in the mass media and the various sectors of public life ("2000 Words," 1968: 12-13). The article also recommended the establishment of committees for the defense of freedom of expression and pointed out the possibility of foreign intervention in Czechoslovak affairs, stating that the signatories would bear arms to support the government as long as it fulfilled its mandate. The article caused an almost immediate uproar in Czechoslovakia; the conservatives were horrified, the general population rejoiced and the liberals running the government were embarrassed and probably at a loss as to how to respond to the article. Realizing that outright condemnation was probably impossible, the regime made little direct reference to the article but called for unity and greater trust in the Party, stating that attacks on the Party are an obstacle to further development (Pravda, 29 June 1968:2).

Although no definitive comments came out of the Soviet Union concerning "2000 Words" until 11 July 1968, Brezhnev and Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the Hungarian Workers Party, had some very pointed comments about the situation in the Socialist countries on 3 July at a rally honoring Kadar at the Palace of Congresses in the Kremlin. A portion of Brezhnev's speech was devoted to the situation in the socialist countries and he stated:

...socialist countries are united by common principles
...Despite all the diversity of forms and all the specific national characteristics of each country, this foundation remains immutable because if it does not exist, socialism does not exist...Socialism does not and cannot exist without the leading role of the Communist Party, armed with the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

We Communists are each building socialism and communism at home in our own country, and we view this as our primary obligation, but at the same time we are
internationalists in the basis of our convictions, in our backgrounds and in our hearts, and we cannot and never will be indifferent to the fate of socialist construction in other countries and to the general fate of socialism and communism on earth (Brezhnev, in Pravda, 3 July 1968:2).

Kadar in his speech was even more specific concerning his position on handling any anti-socialist activity. Kadar stated:

Our strongest weapon is our world view, our theory, Marxism-Leninism. In socialist countries, even while holding power, we conduct and defend our policy primarily with ideological weapons. But as soon as our class enemies resort to organized and violent demonstrations and attack the foundations of the socialist system, it is our right and duty also to use power to defend the cause of socialism, the cause of the working class (Kadar, in Pravda, 3 July 1968:3).

The point made by these speeches seems very clear, a socialist country can only go so far in developing socialism differently before it may face interference by other socialist nations, especially the Soviet Union.

Specific comments of "2000 Words" appeared in the Soviet press almost two weeks after it had appeared in the Czech press. The mood in the Kremlin appeared to have hardened dramatically, because the lengthy Pravda article was purportedly written by I. Aleksandrov, the editor. Aleksandrov stopped short of claiming that the Dubcek leadership had lost control. But he did give excellent rationale for Soviet intervention in stating that the Dubcek regime was failing through indifference to meet the pledge of its May Plenum to combat "antisocialist forces". He further stated that:

It is now more obvious than ever before that the statement "2000 Words" is by no means an isolated phenomenon, but evidence of the activization of right-wing and actually counterrevolutionary forces in Czechoslovakia which are obviously associated with imperialist reaction (Aleksandrov, I. 1968b:4).

Aleksandrov further likened the events in Czechoslovakia with the events in Hungary in 1956 saying:

Now, 12 years later, the tactics of those who would like to undermine the foundations of socialism in Czechoslovakia are even more subtle and insidious. And the Czechoslovak working people as well as all who hold dear the achievements of socialism, cannot fail to see the danger concealed behind the incipient, provocational activity being urged by "2000 Words" (Aleksandrov, I., 1968:4).

If there was any question in anybody's mind as to whether Aleksandrov's article was the official Soviet stand on the Czechoslovak situation, it was answered on 13 July in Stockholm by Kosygin at a press conference. When asked what the Soviet government's attitude was towards the process of democratization in Czechoslovakia
and towards the reforms that had been taking place, Kosygin replied:

...I would advise you to read the article published the other day in the newspaper, Pravda. It reflects our appraisal of the events now taking place in Czechoslovakia (Kosygin, A. N., 15 July 1968:4).

In response to Soviet pressures concerning "2000 Words," Dubcek apparently did just enough to temporarily appease them and prevent a Soviet takeover at that time. Despite his reassurances to the Soviets of loyalty, the other Warsaw Pact countries held a meeting in Warsaw on 14 and 15 July to discuss the Czechoslovak situation (Pravda, 16 July 1968:1). At the conclusion of the meeting, a joint ultimatum was issued to the Czech leaders, an ultimatum that was also approved by the CPSU Central Committee at a plenary session on 16 July (Pravda, 18 July 1968:1). The ultimatum, or "Warsaw Letter," basically stated that the developments in Czechoslovakia "have aroused profound anxiety in all of us" and the situation in your country "imperils the interest of the entire socialist system (Pravda, 18 July 1968:1)." The ultimatum outlined three basic conditions to the Czechs: (1) a crackdown on right-wing anti-socialists must begin, (2) all non-socialist activities must cease, (3) the Czechoslovak Communist Party must resume control of the press and abandon this new pluralism in favor of centralized control by the Party (Pravda, 18 July 1968:1-2). Dubcek was not at the Warsaw Pact meeting in Warsaw, where this letter had been drawn up, since he had declined to attend due to pressing matters in Czechoslovakia. This no doubt had been a slap at the Soviets as well as the other leaders.

The chief aim behind the Warsaw Letter was probably not to have the Dubcek regime replaced, but to have it modify its policies by strengthening the power of the Communist conservatives. Until the time of the letter, the Soviets had criticized the anti-socialist tendencies in Czechoslovakia. Now, the Soviets and the Soviet press was accusing the Czechoslovak Communist Party of these tendencies (Pravda, 19 July 1968:1). The Warsaw Letter and almost daily attacks against Czechoslovakia by Pravda and other Soviet press media convinced Dubcek of the need to be more cautious with his reform policies. (See Pravda, 19 July 1968:4); Krasnaya Zvezda, 20 July 1968:1; Krasnaya Zvezda, 23 July 1968:3; Zhukov, Y., in Pravda, 26 July 1968:4 for attacks on the Czechoslovak situation and the Czechoslovak Communist Party.) These articles, along with the Warsaw Letter enraged the general populace of Czechoslovakia and served as a catalyst in increasing anti-Soviet feeling and demands for greater autonomy. As a result, a situation developed which encouraged the Soviets to put even greater pressure on the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Dubcek, after deliberating the Warsaw Letter with the Czechoslovak Central Committee, rejected the demands of the letter. The Soviets immediately printed a response in the form of a Pravda editorial stating that Czechoslovakia was underestimating the situation in its country and didn't realize the possible consequences, and called for a bilateral summit (Pravda, 22 July 1968:4). The Soviets allowed the world to believe that the Czechs had gotten away with the rejection. Dubcek and the CCP Central Committee met with the CPSU Central Committee at Cienca on the Tisa from 29 July 1968 until 1 August 1968 (Pravda, 2 August 1968:1). Then a meeting was held in Bratislava on 2 August with not only Soviet delegations but delegations from Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and East Germany, with each delegation headed by the First Secretary of their respective Party (Pravda, 3 August 1968:1). A joint statement, issued at the end of the Bratislava meeting, stated that the meeting had discussed the ways of strengthening unity among the socialist nations and ways to fight anti-socialist elements inspired by the imperialist factions of the West (Pravda, 4 August 1968:1). Warsaw Pact troops withdrew from Czechoslovakia where they had been conducting exercises on and off during June and July. Apparently the Soviets had been considering an invasion, and kept
their options open by leaving these troops in Czechoslovakia until the Bratislava meetings. The outcome of the Cierna and Bratislava meetings seemed to have averted the crisis engendered by the Warsaw Letter and to have warded off the danger of a Soviet resort to force. The meetings apparently convinced the Soviets once again that the Dubcek regime was going to be more forceful in maintaining control and would temper his policies. In early August, Tito and Rumanian leader Nicolae Ceaucescu were visitors to Prague and were warmly received. But a later visit by Walter Ulbricht from the GDR was met with a cool reception by the Czech press and the general populace who demonstrated against his visit in Prague. Even after the meetings with the Soviets at Cierna and Bratislava the Czechoslovak press continued to publish anti-Soviet articles and other governmental acts apparently persuaded the Soviets that Dubcek was not changing his course to follow the desires of the Soviets or other members of the Pact.

Thus, as a result of the CCP's inability to convince the Soviets that Czechoslovak Communism and Czech membership in the Warsaw Pact were not threatened by the reforms that were taking place in Czechoslovakia, military units of five Warsaw Pact nations, estimated at two hundred thousand to five hundred thousand troops, crossed the borders into Czechoslovakia at 11 P.M., 20 August 1968 (Littell, 1969:9).

The Soviets apparently believed that the Czechoslovak Communist Party would eventually lose complete control of the situation, like the Hungarian Communist Party had in 1956. Additionally, although Dubcek had not stated any intentions of withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact the Soviets probably also saw this as a possibility and therefore there was a need to intervene before the situation deteriorated further. Even if these dangers were not immediate, they were regarded as future possibilities arising out of the potentialities of the situation and the rapidity with which events were developing. Although there are no Western reports that assistance from Moscow was requested by any members of the Czech Communist Party, there was a strong conservative group in the CCP, who could have been viewed as an alternative to Dubcek by the Soviets, therefore making intervention less distasteful to the Soviets. After the intervention the Soviets did in fact claim that they were invited by the CCP, but as indicated before there is no Western evidence to substantiate this, and since no new leadership was immediately installed after the intervention, one can assume that no invitation was tendered by the Czechs.

The Soviet intervention into Czechoslovakia was unopposed militarily by any of the Czechoslovak peoples. Prior to the intervention the Soviets succeeded in getting one of the top Czech military leaders dismissed. Additionally, they had the Czech Political Military Academy in Prague closed where the majority of Dubcek supporters were stationed. If any resistance was planned in Czechoslovakia, it was unable to form due to the speed and surprise with which the Soviets and other Pact countries entered Czechoslovakia on 20 August. The Soviets also must have considered masses as an element that would reduce resistance, since the intervention forces entering initially numbered between two hundred and five hundred thousand men. With this number of troops it seems that the Soviets were prepared for some resistance, but planned to insure rapid victory.

Another major factor that the Soviets probably considered when they intervened was the politico-geographic location of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia's common borders with West Germany, East Germany, Poland and the USSR, made it especially important to the Soviets that Dubcek's nation should remain in the Soviet bloc. In the case of the USSR, Czechoslovakia borders on the Ukraine area and having
a non-Communist neighbor could have contributed to the nationalist sentiment there. Czechoslovakia, geographically divides Eastern Europe into two sections, East Germany and Poland to the north and Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in the south. With the exception of Bulgaria the other Eastern European nations, to include Albania, had expressed initial support for Dubcek's reforms, but this support deteriorated as the programs progressed. The position of the country was important because of its common borders with other Warsaw Pact nations and the Soviets may have seen the Dubcek reforms as possibly contagious and therefore dangerous as a source of internal liberalization that could start in other bloc nations. So the weighing of this factor in terms of intervention versus non-intervention probably played an important role in the Kremlin.

The Afghanistan Intervention 1979-80

On 27 December 1979, the Soviet Union began a massive troop intervention into the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). The Soviets moved against the three-month-old administration of President Hafizullah Amin, killing him, members of his family and a number of followers. By the beginning of January 1980, there were over 40,000 Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan with replacements and reinforcements arriving by the day. The Soviet Union had intervened in the same fashion that they had moved on Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Hungary in 1956, but this time outside of Eastern Europe.

Russia has had an interest in Afghanistan since before the nineteenth century. In tsarist times, Russia vied with Great Britain for control of the north-south and east-west trade routes that pass through Afghanistan which connect the Middle East with south-central Russia and with the Orient. The Soviet Union's ties with Afghanistan date back to a few years after the Communist takeover of Russia. In 1919, the Kabul regime requested assistance from Moscow in a dispute they were having with the British. In 1921, the USSR concluded a Treaty of Friendship with Afghanistan and recognized the country's neutrality in the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression in 1931.

The Soviet Union and Afghanistan share a border of about 1200 miles and it was military conquests in the 19th century that determined the present border, not ethnic reasons, although both countries have large populations of the same nationalities. These ethnic factors as well as geopolitical factors cause the Soviets to have a great interest in Afghanistan. The common nationalities of the two countries are, the Pathans (Afghans), Tadzhiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kirghiz and others. The Pathans form the largest group in Afghanistan with the Tadzhiks second. The Tadzhik population in Afghanistan is more than double the Tadzhik population in the neighboring Tadzhik Soviet Socialist Republic. The geopolitical factors which make Afghanistan of interest to the Soviet Union are not much different than those which interested the Tsars in Imperial Russia. Afghanistan commands the main line of communication between the Soviet Union and the Indus valley, as well as being strategically located between Iran, China and Pakistan. Afghanistan also provides a wedge between CENTO (The Central Treaty Organization), separating Asian members from Turkey and Iran. Based on these factors the Soviet Union has had a strong interest in Afghanistan, and the interest has continually grown since the 1973 coup which deposed the King of Afghanistan Muhammad Zahir Shah, who had ruled since 1933. During the reign of the King, Afghanistan had maintained a policy of neutrality, especially during the Cold War between the Communist and Western nations. During the 1950's and the 1960's, Afghanistan accepted loans from both the Soviet Union and the United States for economic development. In the early 1970's Afghanistan was hit by severe economic problems due to a drought which caused a famine, killing thousands of persons.
In 1973, Lieutenant General Mohammed Daoud Khan, the King’s brother-in-law, overthrew the monarchy with the help of Moscow-trained officers, some of whom he later purged. Upon assuming power, Daoud established the Republic of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union probably viewed the coup as a positive development and move towards the socialist camp, but Daoud maintained the non-alignment of Afghanistan. Although the relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union remained good, Daoud "skillfully followed a foreign policy of playing one neighbor off against the other, in order to advance the well-being of the country (Robert Rand, 28 April 1978:2)." In June 1974, Daoud first went to Moscow and met with the Soviet leadership. In December 1975, a delegation led by Nikolai Podgorny visited Kabul, then in April 1977 Daoud again visited Moscow. When Daoud was in Moscow in 1977, the Treaties of 1921 and 1931 were once again reaffirmed (Pravda, 15 April 1977:4). Additionally a new treaty was drawn up, called the Treaty on Development and Economic Cooperation Between the Soviet and Afghan Governments, for a period of twelve years. This treaty was based on the principles of:

...equality, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, mutual respect for sovereignty, national independence and territorial integrity (Pravda, 15 April 1977:4).

During his visit Daoud reaffirmed his stance of non-alignment and neutrality and strongly advocated that peoples should have the right to determine their own futures (Pravda, 16 April 1977:4).

Throughout Daoud’s reign he seemed to follow the advice of the Soviet Union, but maintained his non-aligned position. He allowed Soviet advisors into the country and many specialists from Afghanistan were trained by Moscow, including many members of the military forces. Daoud nationalized private banks, adopted labor legislation, and started land reforms giving land to the landless as well as establishing agricultural collectives. Additionally, Daoud instituted a plan to promote industrial growth in his country. This was probably not enough for the Soviets, who would have preferred that Daoud take an active pro-Soviet line and pull out of trade and aid agreements with the West. The Kremlin was also very much aware that there were various opposition movements against the Daoud regime and probably hoped that if Daoud were replaced that his successor would have a more pro-Soviet outlook than Daoud had. Definitely if Daoud were to be overthrown, it would have been better in the Soviet view not to have a right-wing Moslem movement seize power, since any such group would have resented the Soviet persecution of the Moslem nationalities in the USSR. It is probable that when Daoud was overthrown in April 1978, the Soviet Union at least knew of the plot, if they were not actively involved. There are a couple of very important reasons that the Soviets may have been involved in the plot to have Daoud removed. First, Daoud had been strengthening ties with the West in late 1977 and a possibility existed that the British would replace the Soviets in the role of training the military (Rand, 2 January 1980:3). Secondly, he was also looking for Western help in exploring the iron ore reserves near the Soviet border as well as developing greater ties with the Shah of Iran. Possibly the crowning blow to the USSR was the murder of the pro-Moscow Parcham party leader, Ahrbar Khyber, which was followed by a round-up and arrest of other Parcham party leaders by the Daoud regime on 17 April 1978.

Ten days later, Daoud was overthrown in a military coup de’etat led by Lieutenant General Dagarwal Abdul Khadir, an officer who had been trained in the Soviet Union. On 30 April 1978, Nur Mohammadi Laidaki, the head of the pro-Soviet Communist Afghan Khalq party, was named prime minister and head of state.
of the newly proclaimed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union immediately recognized Taraki’s government. In his first moves as the new leader, Taraki set up a 35-member Revolutionary Council made up of members of the Par- cham and Khalq parties which were sub-groups of the People's Democratic Party. In organizing the government, Taraki appointed Babrak Karmal as vice president and deputy prime minister, Hafizullah Amin as deputy prime minister for foreign affairs, and LTG Abdul Khedir as the new defense minister. Taraki also announced that his country would not become "a satellite of any country," and would follow a fully independent, peace-seeking, non-aligned policy (and, 2 January 1980:2). He also maintained that his government was not Communist. On 7 May, Pravda ascribed the coup to the failure of the Daoud regime to make the promised political and economic reforms during his reign.

During the remainder of 1978, relations with the Soviet Union continued to improve with each passing month. Soviet advisors began to take an active part in many areas of the Taraki government. Taraki began to develop socialism, within the country at a rapid rate after his takeover, and almost as rapidly internal opposition grew. In July 1978, Taraki purged several members of his cabinet to include Khadir and charged them with planning a coup. He also reassigned Vice President Karmal as the Ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Later when he attempted to recall Karmal for possible involvement in plans for a coup, Karmal disappeared. In addition Islamic tribesmen began to oppose the socialization process undertaken by the Taraki regime with armed resistance.

In December 1978, Taraki visited Moscow to secure Soviet pledges to assist the Afghan regime in its efforts to put down the Moslem insurgency and to assist in helping the regime in consolidating its grip on the country. In talks with the Soviet leaders on 4 December it was noted that as a result of the April revolution "qualitatively new conditions have appeared in Afghanistan for expanding, improving and deepening cooperation between Afghanistan and the USSR (Pravda, 5 December 1978:1)." International issues were also discussed in these talks. The next day, the conclusion of the talks, a Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation was signed, under which the USSR promised to take "appropriate measures to insure the security, independence and territorial integrity" of Afghanistan (Pravda, 6 December 1978:1). Additionally, Moscow made it very clear by the wording in the treaty that this meant that it would support the Afghans militarily. These talks may have been called by Moscow, which was probably upset over the Moslem anti-government activities that were taking place in Afghanistan, fearing that some of the sentiment would spill over the border to its population.

The first major indication that Moscow was worried about this unrest, however, surfaced in an article by I. Aleksandrov on 19 March 1979. The appearance of an article signed by the editor in Pravda over the past decade or so has always indicated that the Soviet leadership is deeply disturbed over a particular problem, and such an article presents the Kremlin’s position. In 1968 the Soviets warned Czechoslovakia that its reforms had gone too far in an Aleksandrov article. His 1979 article expressed Soviet support for the Afghan regime without committing the USSR to any specific action, while at the same time it condemned and issued a warning to neighboring Pakistan, Iran, and China as well as the West against aiding and abetting Afghan "rebels and counterrevolutionaries (Pravda, 19 March 1979:5)."

Articles on the 20th and 21st by U. Verbin in Izvestia and A. Petrov in Pravda also commented on the situation in Afghanistan, and noted the close ties of the USSR to Afghanistan. In all the comment it was apparent that the Soviets were concerned over the influence of Islamic resurgence occurring in Iran and Pakistan at the time. The Aleksandrov article claimed that the Afghan government had "adopted a loyal position with respect to religion," while Verbin and Petrov were
more forthright in admitting that some of the local Afghan population, "under the influence of reactionary clergy" were siding with the rebels and conceded that "many believers" would "almost blindly" follow the mullahs. It is appropriate to note that US-Soviet relations concerning Afghanistan at this point were strained due to the murder of Adolph Dubs, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan on 14 February in Kabul.

After the Aleksandrov article appeared, the US State Department warned the Soviets against interfering in Afghan affairs militarily since it would heighten tensions (Rand, 2 January 1980:5). In the ensuing months the Soviet press began to cover the Afghan situation more closely and began to blame the situation more and more on "external forces" as well as "certain internal elements" that wanted the previous capitalist system revived. The Soviets also began to step up their propaganda attacks on Iran, Pakistan and China, accusing them of being deeply involved in the problems in Afghanistan, naming these countries specifically in their attacks in the press and over the radio.(See JPRS:073310 and Pravda, 10 April 1979:4; V. Midtsev, 15 April 1979:4).

In early April 1979, General A. Yepishev, the head of the Soviet Armed Forces Main Political Directorate visited Afghanistan to survey the situation, [and this was] possibly to determine the problems that the Afghans were having with desertions to the rebel forces. On 21 April at the first meeting of the Presidium of the 10th USSR Supreme Soviet, the Afghanistan situation was a subject of consideration. In discussing the ratification of the Treaty of 5 December 1978, Brezhnev stated:

...The Soviet people are providing internationalist assistance and support to the friendly people of Afghanistan. We understand and are sympathetic with the goals of the Afghan revolution and the social and economic transformations that are being undertaken in the interest of the working masses. The accomplishment of these tasks is not an easy matter. We know from our own experiences that it requires the overcoming of resistance of internal and external enemies, as well as persistence, endurance and solidarity. But we are firmly convinced that the new Democratic Afghanistan will emerge successfully from all its trials.

While the treaty strengthens Soviet-Afghan relations, it is not directed against any other country and does not infringe upon other countries' legitimate interests. The Soviet Union has repeatedly emphasized that it understands the desire of Afghanistan's new leadership to adhere to a policy of non-alignment and to develop cooperation with all states (Brezhnev, 21 April 1979:1-2)...
trying to shift the blame for Afghanistan's internal problems onto the shoulders of Pakistan and Western countries, as well as to disquiet rumors of Soviet interference in Afghan affairs (Glukhov, 13 June 1979:5; Pravda, 15 June 1979:5; Mironov, 18 July 1979:5). However, Brezhnev appeared to be providing a justification for intensified Soviet assistance to Afghanistan, when he stated on 11 June:

...The constant, secret and blatant attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan do not further the situation in Asia. We decisively condemn subversive actions against the Afghan revolution and we will not leave our friend, the Afghan people, in the lurch, as it has the right to build up its life as it wishes (Brezhnev, 12 June 1979:2).

In August 1979, a Soviet military delegation under the leadership of Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of Soviet Ground Forces General Ivan Pavlovsky went to Kabul to assess the situation. His mission according to the US magazine Newsweek was "to study the insurgency and determine ways of propping up the Kabul regime (Newsweek, 14 January 1980:10)..." Newsweek also stated that one of the conclusions of this delegation was that "Taraki's Prime Minister" for Foreign Affairs, Amin, was the cause of many of the problems and had to go (Newsweek, 14 January 1979:10). How deeply Moscow was involved in the events that followed in September is really not known, but one can assume that the Soviets played some role in order to maintain their influence in Afghanistan. Their investments in men and material had been too great to allow for anything but a closer union with the USSR to be acceptable.

In early September Taraki left Afghanistan to go to the conference of non-aligned nations in Havana. On his return trip home he visited Moscow and had talks with Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Gromyko in the Kremlin on 10 September (Pravda, 11 September 1979:1). Taraki then returned to Afghanistan possibly to take actions against Amin, who the Soviets may have wanted ousted, according to various sources. However, the opposite apparently happened, since on 16 September TASS repeated, without comment, a Kabul Radio report that Taraki had requested to be relieved of his post "because of his state of health," and that his request had been granted. That same day Hafizullah Amin was "elected" General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and President of the Revolutionary Council (Pravda, 17 September 1979:1). On the 18th Pravda published a very short congratulatory message to Amin from Brezhnev and Kosygin on his election (Pravda, 18 September 1979:1). The exact demise of Taraki has never been clarified, but it is speculated that he was killed on 14 September in a gun battle between his supporters and those of Amin. Although there has been no mention in the Soviet press about the demise of Taraki, the Kremlin probably was not too pleased that he was ousted immediately after returning from a highly publicized trip to the Kremlin.

During the period of October through early December 1979, Soviet-Afghan relations seemed to cool somewhat, although the Soviet press kept up a barrage against imperialist intervention and support of Moslem insurgents into Afghanistan. But the frequency seemed to die down as if the Soviets were attempting to assess the Amin government. During the fall the Soviet government attempted to provide more support to the Amin regime in order to put an end to the rebel movements, however this seems to have been rejected by Amin (Binder, David, 2 January 1980). In November the Afghani's and the Soviet advisors ran a large successful campaign against the rebels in the Paktia Valley south of Kabul but insurgents soon returned to the area. On 5 December, in a message to Amin on the anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty, Brezhnev and Kosygin stated:
We are certain that the treaty will further contribute to the successful development and strengthening of our relations and friendship, good neighborliness, and cooperation between our countries in the spirit of equality and revolutionary solidarity (Pravda, 8 December 1979:1).

During the first three weeks of December, Soviet "advisors" in Afghanistan began to increase notably. On 23 December, Pravda stated that the USSR was not involved in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and quoted Amin as saying that: The Soviet Union always shows a deep respect for our independence and national sovereignty...and there never was or will be a belittling of our sovereignty, national independence, national traditions, and honor. (Pravda, 23 December 1979; also see Rand, 2 January 1980:7)."

On 25 December Soviet troops began to move into Afghanistan in force. According to the Western press, the General Staff of the Afghan Army had been more or less neutralized at a party. On 27 December the regime of Amin had been toppled and the Soviets had assisted in the installation of Babrak Karmal in his place. (Karmal had fled the country under the Taraki regime in the summer of 1979.) On 31 December Pravda issued the first major public Soviet statement on the events in Afghanistan. The article, signed by Aleksei Petrov, accused the United States, Egypt and the People's Republic of China of being behind the insurgent movement in Afghanistan (Petrov, Pravda:4) The article went on to justify the Soviet intervention into Afghanistan under the terms of Article 4 of the Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty, stating that the forces had been requested by the Afghani Government to prevent anti-revolutionary forces from taking over and that the Soviet Union

...made the decision to comply with the request and to send to Afghanistan a limited Soviet military contingent, which will be used exclusively for assistance in the repulsing of external armed interference. The Soviet contingent will be withdrawn fully from Afghanistan after that...(Petrov, 31 December 1979:4).

This statement almost mirrors the statement that the Soviets made in justifying their interventions in both Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It is doubtful that Amin requested such assistance since he was killed shortly after the invasion. According to David Binder of the New York Times, who quoted unnamed officials, the Soviets attempted to persuade Amin to accept Soviet combat forces on 24 December, and also to adopt a softer policy towards the general population of Afghanistan, but Amin refused (Binder, 2 January 1980).

Based on the speed that the Soviet forces entered the country, it is apparent that it had been well planned in advance and the question remains as to whether Karmal was involved in the planning of the intervention with the Soviets. From statements by Karmal and others it is apparent that Amin had never been the Soviets real choice for the leader of Afghanistan and there is a probability that the coup in September really took the Soviets by surprise. After Amin's death he was accused by Karmal as being an imperialist agent in league with the United States (Pravda, 31 December 1979:4). By mid-January there were over 80,000 Soviet combat troops in Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union's intervention into Afghanistan in December 1979 marked the fifth time since the end of the Second World War that the Soviets have used their military forces or threatened to use such forces to enforce its will on
another Communist state, but it was the first time that the Soviets had intervened militarily outside of Eastern Europe. Additionally, Afghanistan had continually proclaimed its neutrality and was not aligned with the Soviet Union in any mutual defense treaties such as the Warsaw Pact, nor was it an occupied territory as East Germany was in 1953 when the Soviets intervened in its internal policies.

In evaluating the events leading up to the Soviet intervention into Afghanistan, the major contributing factor that appears to have caused the Soviets to decide to intervene was that the Amin regime seemed to be losing ground to armed anti-Communist factions in the country and this was putting the Communist movement in jeopardy and had the potential of wiping out past socialist gains. Additionally, Afghanistan’s geographic location has always been of importance to the Soviet Union in that it served as not only a buffer state to the very anti-Communist, pro-US Shah of Iran, but as a wedge between the former CENTO nations of Turkey and Pakistan. It is possible that the Soviets may have felt threatened by the instability of Iran caused by the overthrow of the Shah and that the Moslem movement in Iran could possibly overflow into Afghanistan leading eventually to the establishment of a Moslem state as opposed to a Communist state.

In considering the difficulty of intervening into Afghanistan, the Soviets probably expected to face some armed resistance to the introduction of Soviet combat forces since they had been losing advisors that were working with the Afghani forces. However, they had probably not expected to run into the amount of resistance they have actually encountered from the poorly armed Moslem guerilla groups which has caused the Soviets to introduce additional forces to put down the resistance. They also apparently expected to get some resistance from within the Afghani armed forces since they are reported to have arrested a great many of the pro-Amin officers on the night before the intervention. Additionally, prior to the intervention the Soviets had built up their advisory forces and already had military control over major lines of communication in the country with their advisors performing guard functions in some cases.

Finally, it is unknown if or to what extent the Soviet Union consulted with other members of the Warsaw Pact before they intervened into Afghanistan. Probably they consulted after the fact, and were endorsed in their action by all Pact members with the exception of Rumania, which denounced the move. The fact that Afghanistan does not border on any of the other Warsaw Pact nations was probably a key factor to the Soviets in considering what reaction the intervention would precipitate from the Pact members. The Soviets probably expected the negative reactions it received from Yugoslavia and the Peoples Republic of China concerning the intervention and consideration of these did not play a major role in the decision of whether to intervene or not.
CONCLUSIONS AND COMPARISON

Having outlined the events leading up to the Soviet intervention in East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan and the non-military intervention in Poland, one question arises; where can the Soviet Union be expected to draw the line between permissible satellite and other socialist state activities and events which demand armed intervention? This question implies that there is possibly one point which, even if its exact location is at times vague, applies at all times and under all conditions.

Basically this implication only can hold true if contributing factors are constant and equal. For example, one might conclude after a comparison of the 1956 events in Poland and Hungary that certain acts are always permitted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and all other acts will trigger armed intervention. The simplicity of such an answer results from a comparison of two crises which occurred almost simultaneously. In 1953, during the period leading up to the East German uprising and eventual Soviet armed intervention, the Soviet Union was in the midst of a leadership crisis, and East Germany was not going through such a crisis nor undertaking radical reforms that could be construed to be antisocialist. Actually the opposite was true in East Germany; socialism was developing rapidly and the East German leadership probably had the ability to put down the uprising if they had been allowed to by the Soviet administrators.

During the period of Czechoslovak reforms in 1968, the Soviet Union had different leaders and different international concerns. In 1979 when the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan, the leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet Union was the same as it was during the Czechoslovak crisis, although the actual participation of Brezhnev and Kosygin in the decision is questionable due to their health and advanced age.

It is also possible that similar Soviet regimes under similar conditions could react differently to a crisis in a satellite country or in a developing socialist country in which they are actively involved in assisting the attainment of socialism or maintenance of the status quo. There is an element of uncertainty as to when and for what reasons the Soviet Union will intervene in the affairs of other socialist states and/or developing socialist states. Therefore it is necessary to consider several factors in the Soviet decision-making process.

In the introduction to this paper a possible division of the Soviet decision-making process was posited: the perceived "need" to intervene must be greater than the perceived difficulty of armed intervention, and estimated domestic costs as well as costs to its position in world affairs. The perceived "need" to intervene, i.e., events in the other socialist country, may be the principal factor, but certainly not the only reason for employment of the Soviet armed forces. In looking at the "need" for intervention the major question that arises is how much deviation and diversity, including democratization from what the Soviet Union considers proper socialist norms is tolerated?

The interventions in East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan indicate that limits do exist, even if vaguely defined, and that these limits are transcended at the point where the initiation of change, or the failure to make expected changes or take expected actions, are likely to cause the loss of Communist Party control in the subject country.

With regard to Soviet-East European relations, internal changes alone do not seem sufficient to provoke armed intervention, the primary Soviet concern seems
to be that the Soviet bloc, and since 1955 the Warsaw Pact, must remain intact. When Soviet foreign policy pronouncements at various times are analyzed, especially after the Czechoslovak intervention, it appears that any indication that a member nation will withdraw from the Warsaw Pact may cause intervention. In 1968 S. Kovalov in Pravda declared that "a Socialist state that is in a system with other states constituting a Socialist commonwealth, cannot be free of the common interest of that commonwealth (26 September 1968:4)." Kovalov further stated that:

...even if a socialist country seeks to take an extra bloc position, it in fact retains its national independence thanks precisely to the power of the socialist commonwealth and primarily to its main force, the Soviet Union and the might of its armed forces. The weakening of any link in the world socialist system effect on all the socialist countries and they cannot afford to be indifferent to this. Thus, the antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia were in essence using talk about self-determination to cover up demands for so-called neutrality and the C.S.R.'s withdrawal from the socialist commonwealth...Such self-determination, as a result of which NATO troops might approach Soviet borders and the commonwealth of European socialist countries would be dismembered, in fact infringes upon the vital interest of these peoples to socialist self-determination. The Soviet Union and other socialist states in fulfilling their duties to the fraternal peoples of Czechoslovakia and defending their own socialist gains had to act and did act in resolute opposition to the antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia...(Kovalev, S., Pravda, 26 September 1968:4).

This statement in the wake of the intervention by the Soviets and other socialist countries (Warsaw Pact Members) into Czechoslovakia, represented the core of the so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine" of limited sovereignty. This was personally reiterated by Brezhnev in a speech at the Fifth Congress of the Polish Workers Party held in Warsaw in November 1968. Brezhnev stated:

...The CPSU has always advocated that each socialist country must determine the specific forms of its development along the road to socialism with consideration for its specific national situation. However, it is known, comrades, that there are also common laws governing socialist construction a deviation from which might lead to a deviation from socialism as such.

And when the internal and external forces hostile to socialism seek to revert the development of any socialist country towards the restoration of capitalism, when a threat to the cause of socialism in that country emerges, then a threat to the security of the whole socialist community emerges, this then no longer is a problem only for the people of that country, but is also a common problem of concern for all socialist countries (Brezhnev, 1968:2)."
Although Brezhnev denied the existence of such a doctrine in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1971, this doctrine or a similar one was probably in existence during the Khrushchev era and also when Malenkov and the collective leadership had to deal with the East German situation in 1953.

Based on the Brezhnev Doctrine it seems that although states may possess the right to sovereignty they may not be able to exercise the independence of sovereignty. Josef Stalin, as early as 1920, when writing about the national minorities and the Soviet Republics, stated that it was necessary to restrict sovereignty when the possibility existed that if sovereignty was unrestricted it might be injurious to the socialist movement (Stalin, 1920:351-363). The Soviet Union also apparently distinguishes between the sovereignty of socialist and capitalist states. N. A. Ushakov wrote in 1969 that:

The sovereignty of states with differing socio-economic systems has a different social basis. In this sense the sovereignty of socialist states differs fundamentally from that of bourgeois states (Ushakov, N. A., 1969:98).

Thus the concept of sovereignty as outlined by Kovalov in his 1968 explanation of the Brezhnev Doctrine was probably valid in the 1920's and is still valid today as evidenced by the events in Afghanistan. The Brezhnev Doctrine now appears to apply not only to nations aligned with the Soviet Union, but also to non-aligned socialist states. In an article by A. Petrov in Pravda on 31 December 1979 concerning Soviet actions in Afghanistan, he almost completely restated the Brezhnev Doctrine as the justification for Soviet armed intervention (Petrov, 31 December 1979:4). Therefore, in light of Petrov's comments concerning the Afghanistan intervention it seems that the Soviets feel that once Communist control of the government has been achieved, every effort will be made to insure that this type of control remains, especially if its geographic location relative to the USSR could present a threat at some future time if it returned to a previous capitalist form of government. In addition, those states within the Warsaw Pact must remain under the absolute control of their Communist Party. Any attempt, or possibility that a Pact member or Soviet-backed border state may change from a Communist to a non-Communist state seems to practically insure Soviet intervention.

In East Germany, the Party seemed to lose control of the events in June 1953, and a possibility existed that if the Soviets did not take firm control of the situation there would have been a change to non-Communist leadership. In Hungary, the 4 November 1956 Soviet takeover was justifiable in the Soviet's view because Nagy had not only declared neutrality and withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact, but he had expelled most of the Communist Party members from his government and replaced them with non-Communists. In Poland, the Soviets already had troops moving to intervene when they made the determination that the Polish Party still had firm control of the country and that radical deviations from what the Soviets considered Party norms were not taking place. In Czechoslovakia, the reforms being undertaken by the Dubcek regime seemed to be pointing towards eventual withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the gradual erosion of strict party control. In Afghanistan membership in the Warsaw Pact was not a factor since it was not aligned with the Soviet Union in any mutual defense treaties. It had not only maintained its neutrality, it maintained its own foreign policy. However, it appeared that the Communist Party under the control of Amin was losing control over the country and a possibility existed that the country could move back into the capitalist camp.

Public disorder, freedom of the press and dissent, spontaneity in a satellite's internal politics, refusals to make changes as requested by the Soviets seem to
cause a great nervousness in the Kremlin leadership and there seem to be limits to what is acceptable in these categories. But none of these actions alone appear to cause the Soviets to intervene into the affairs of socialist states with armed force. It also cannot be stated that these actions when taken in combination would not cause the Soviets to intervene. Based on the Soviet intervention in the countries reviewed it is most probable that all these actions played a role in the decision-making process at one point or another. However, the overriding factor that seems to have caused Soviet intervention in these countries appears to have been the possibility or actuality of the loss of Communist control over the country and/or the possibility of or attempted withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Either of these factors alone appear to have provided the necessary provocation for Soviet intervention.

Upon determining that a "need" existed for intervention into the subject countries, there is little reason to doubt that the Soviets weighed this "need to intervene" in terms of the difficulty of intervention and the domestic costs at home. In terms of difficulty of intervention the Soviets probably considered an exhaustive list of different variables in weighing difficulty against "need," but five major variables can be discerned.

First, the speed with which events develop in the subject country appears to be a factor influencing the difficulty of Soviet intervention. Armed intervention in another nation's affairs is a step sufficiently serious in world public opinion to warrant, in the Soviet view, "immediate provocation" and "utmost certainty that it was necessary" (Brzezinski, 1967:260-1). Only very sudden or revolutionary changes in the subject country seem to provide the degree of certainty required by the Kremlin leadership for intervention. The situation in East Germany, although it developed slowly over a period of more than a year, started to deteriorate rapidly after Ulbricht failed to heed Malenkov's advice in April 1953. Then after the announcement of the increase of work norms in late May 1953 and the Soviet-forced self-criticism by the SED of its past failures on 11 June 1953, the uprising occurred six days later. In 1956 the situation in Hungary seemed to develop very rapidly and open criticism and heavy press coverage by the Soviets of the events in Hungary did not begin until a few days before the intervention. In Poland, however, the pattern of gradual change was never really interrupted. There was never a moment when it developed a revolutionary character of such a magnitude that the Soviets could justify full intervention. Additionally, it is possible that when the Soviets weighed the situation in Poland versus the situation in Hungary they felt that the latter was potentially more dangerous. In Czechoslovakia the events which led up to intervention developed over a period of approximately a year, while in Afghanistan the situation developed over a period of years and exploded in a matter of months after the coup which placed Amin in power.

A second major factor that the Soviet leadership probably considered when weighing the option to intervene in all these countries was the willingness of the nation's population and armed forces to resist the intervention. In the case of Poland the Soviets were told by the Polish leadership that they would resist and had actually alerted their armed forces. In Poland's case the threat of major armed resistance coupled with the knowledge that the Communist Party was still in control of the situation, probably was a major factor in the Soviet decision to stop their troop movements in Poland. In Hungary, although some Hungarian Army units fought valiantly, it is likely that the Soviets had anticipated that the army would remain neutral throughout most of the conflict. In East Germany only passive resistance to the Soviet intervention was noted. In Czechoslovakia if any resistance was planned, it was unable to form due to the speed with which the Soviets and other Warsaw Pact nations invaded. In
Afghanistan Soviet losses since the intervention have reportedly been high and are continuing to mount. How much resistance the Soviets expected is unknown, but it is very possible they did not expect the massive resistance they have been faced with by the Afghani population and Afghan Army deserters.

Third, politico-geographic considerations also played a major role in the Soviet decision to intervene in all these countries, as has already been noted.

Fourth, the reaction of other Communist Parties is another factor that the Soviets probably considered when planning for intervention. However this factor seems to influence Soviet decision-making mostly in marginal cases if at all. The only case where this seems to be of major importance was the Czechoslovakian intervention where the other Warsaw Pact nations with the exception of Rumania intervened in support of the Soviets. In other interventions it is probable that the Soviets did not even consult with their allies before the intervention.

A fifth major factor that the Soviets probably consider when evaluating the difficulty of intervention is the unity of the Communist Party in the country that they plan to enter. It is important for a socialist country supported and backed by the Soviet Union seeking to avoid Soviet interference and intervention into its affairs to have a solid Communist Party structure and attempt to preclude any division in its Party ranks. A study of East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan seems to indicate that a losing faction if any top-level Party power struggle will probably appeal to Moscow for help if it can. Any such appeal may, depending upon the situation supply grounds for Soviet intervention and make the intervention less distasteful to the Soviet leadership.

The final major variables that appear to influence the Soviet decision-making process are the estimated domestic costs and cost to its position in world affairs. During the East German crisis the major domestic factor affecting the Soviet leadership was that a relatively new Soviet leadership had just come to power. The Soviet Union had a collective leadership in which a power struggle was taking place.

The 1956 Polish and Hungarian examples also reveal one important domestic factor in Soviet decision-making-unity in the CPSU. In 1956, Khrushchov was attempting to defend his conciliation and relaxation against neo-Stalinists and militants like Molotov. He was cautious to intervene militarily in Poland and Hungary because to do so would be to concede a failure in his foreign policy.

In the case of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet and other Eastern European leaders were concerned not only with the events in Czechoslovakia but with the possible impact of the Czechoslovak events on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as a whole. On 8 May 1968, East German, Bulgarian and Polish Communist leaders met with the Soviet leadership to discuss the implications of the events in Czechoslovakia, probably very concerned with the possible problem of contagion. It appears that the Soviets and the other East European leaders even after the meetings at Bratislava and Cieerna, were not completely unanimous in the direction to take against Czechoslovakia.

During the period leading up to the Afghanistan intervention, the Soviets had suffered what they considered a number of setbacks in their foreign policy. The SALT II Treaty (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) was in jeopardy in the United States Senate, there had been setbacks in detente with the United States and Western Europe, including the decision to deploy improved medium range
nuclear missiles in Europe. Tensions with China had not been eased in 1979 and China had in fact moved closer to the United States. Finally, Soviet efforts in Afghanistan were facing possible defeat at the hands of anti-Communist insurgents. It is probable that the Soviets felt they had nothing to lose by moving into Afghanistan in December. The decision was probably made to prepare for such an intervention as early as mid-September when Amin took over, with the final decision to exercise this option coming in December when the position of the Amin government failed to improve.

In all five crises there probably was some discord at the highest levels of the Soviet political and military authority. In some instances, especially during the reign of Khrushchev, this top level disunity caused ambiguities in Soviet foreign policy pronouncements, which may have been misinterpreted by the other socialist governments. Therefore, many of the crises studied here can be explained in terms of misinterpretation of the permissible limits of reform or disunity resulting from attempts at reform because of the ambiguity of Soviet intentions. In all five situations the Soviets were faced with a difficult decision of whether to intervene militarily, a decision that would in all cases cause them political damage throughout the world if they intervened, and if they didn't would cause them damage within their own sphere of influence. In the arena of world politics they in all cases faced not only the further division of the world Communist movement and the weakening of communist parties in non-Communist countries. Additionally, they have exposed their government as a violator of international law, although they proclaim nonintervention, noninterference, independence and sovereignty as being sacrosanct (Aspaturian, 1970:17). Finally, they have set a precedent and justification for other major countries to intervene not only in inter-bloc affairs but into extra-bloc affairs. Finally, the Soviets have shown that they really don't care what world opinion is about their actions even though there are costs involved.

In the four cases where the Soviet Union intervened militarily, the "need" to intervene appears to have outweighed the costs and difficulty of intervention in the Soviet view if for no other reasons than the possibility of losing a Communist state to Capitalism or a bloc ally, both of which are intolerable. Afghanistan has shown that the Soviets are willing to intervene outside the Warsaw Pact to support the Soviet Communist movement; only the future will show whether they are willing to use their forces in other areas outside the Warsaw Pact and along their border areas to intervene.
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