AD-A091 484 ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS F/G 5/1
VARIABLES AFFECTING THE INTEGRATION OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN DEFENS--ETC(U)
1973 F H LEIGH

UNCLASSIFIED SBIE-AD-E750 027 NL

1 OF 3



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS 1963 A

PHOTOGRAPH THIS SHEET

AD-E250 027

AD A091484

DTIC ACCESSION NUMBER

III

LEVEL

INVENTORY

Army Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS

"Variables Affecting the Integration of Public Affairs In Defense Department Policymaking"

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

Master's thesis By: Leigh, Frederic H. Date: 14 Jan. '73

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

ACCESSION FOR		
NTIS	GRA&I	☒
DTIC	TAB	☐
UNANNOUNCED		☐
JUSTIFICATION		
BY		
DISTRIBUTION /		
AVAILABILITY CODES		
DIST	AVAIL AND/OR SPECIAL	
A		

DISTRIBUTION STAMP

DTIC
ELECTE
NOV 12 1980
S D
D

DATE ACCESSIONED

DATE RECEIVED IN DTIC

PHOTOGRAPH THIS SHEET AND RETURN TO DTIC-DDA-2

DTIC FORM OCT 79 70A

DOCUMENT PROCESSING SHEET

N-19052.157-5 AD-E750 027

AD A091484

VARIABLES AFFECTING THE INTEGRATION OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT POLICYMAKING

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree

by

FREDRIC H. LEIGH, MAJ, USA
B.A., Central State University, Ohio, 1963
M.A., Syracuse University, New York, 1972

Approved for public release;
distribution unlimited

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1973

80 11 04 022

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate Fredric H. Leigh

Title of Thesis Variables Affecting the Integration of Public Affairs in Defense Department Policymaking

Approved by:

_____, Research and Thesis Adviser

_____, Member, Graduate Research Faculty

_____, Member, Graduate Research Faculty

_____, Member, Consulting Faculty

_____, Member, Consulting Faculty

Date: 14 Jan 73

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency.

ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to determine the proper role of public affairs and the variables which affect its participation in DOD policymaking.

The research is descriptive. A search of the literature reveals that participation in policymaking is a proper function of public affairs, although the status and place of the function varies. Interviews of DOD public affairs personnel in December 1972 reveals that the variables are: the key decisionmaker, the organizational environment and the practitioner. These variables are explained using "administrative man" and organization theories.

A central conclusion is that public affairs participation in policymaking is a function of the decisionmakers experiences, learning and past behavior in interaction with the organization environment and the practitioner, which are also interacting; each of the latter variables have their own perceptual sets which influence their interaction. (author)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am particularly indebted to the following persons who contributed to the development of this research:

Dr. William P. Ehling of Syracuse University has influenced the direction of my thinking regarding public relations.

Colonel DeForest Ballou, III, my research advisor, attempted to keep the direction of my thinking from leading me too far astray from the research task.

Lt. Colonel W. C. Pierson (USAF), Plans and Programs Directorate, OASD (PA), arranged the interviews of DOD personnel and gave much time and thought to my research problem during my visit.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
LIST OF FIGURES	ix
CHAPTER	
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM AREA SOURCE, IMPORT AND VALIDITY	1
SOURCE	1
Statement of the Problem	1
Analysis	2
Specification of Delimitations	2
Sources	3
Time Period of Research	3
RESEARCHER'S DESCRIPTION OF PUBLIC RELATIONS	4
IMPORT AND VALIDITY	9
SUMMARY	13
ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS	14
Organization and Functions	14
Environmental Constraints	16
Impact of Modern Presidents	17
Impact of Congress	21
Impact of Military Services	23

Page

II. RELATED RESEARCH AND PROFESSIONAL LITERATURE 27

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS AS A STAFF FUNCTION ACCORDING TO PROFESSIONAL LITERATURE 29

FUNCTIONALISM AND INTEGRATION--A GENERAL SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM 36

PROBLEMS IN ACHIEVING AND CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR INTEGRATION 42

ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS FOR ACHIEVING INTEGRATION 48

THE DECISIONMAKER--HIS RELEVANCE TO THE PROBLEM 52

Attitude and Behavior 53

SUMMARY 59

III. METHOD OF RESEARCH AND RESULTS 61

GENERAL 61

METHOD 61

SPECIFICATION OF DATA NEEDED AND SOURCES OF DATA 66

TECHNIQUES FOR GATHERING DATA 68

TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING DATA 68

QUALITATIVE TABULATION OF INTERVIEW DATA . . 68

TREATMENT OF RESPONSES WITH RESPECT TO VARIABLES IDENTIFIED 70

QUANTITATIVE TABULATION OF INTERVIEW DATA . 71

DISCUSSION OF INTERVIEW DATA 74

SUMMARY 77

IV. DISCUSSION OF A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM . . . 79

Page

INTRODUCTION 79

THE PROBLEM AND ITS ANALYSIS 79

Research Problem 79

Problem Analysis 79

THE PROPER ROLE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 80

THE VARIABLES WHICH AFFECT THE PROPER FUNCTIONING 85

Relationship of the Findings to Theory . . 85

SUMMARY OF THE DECISIONMAKER VARIABLE . . . 92

THE ORGANIZATION ENVIRONMENT AS A VARIABLE . 93

Introduction 93

SUMMARY OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT VARIABLE 104

V. THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS PRACTITIONER 106

INTRODUCTION 106

THE PRACTITIONER VARIABLE 107

THE FUNCTION IN COMPARISON 108

The Role in Literature 108

The Difference 110

The Status in the Literature 110

POLICYMAKING PROCESS AND POLICY ANALYSIS . . 113

Policymaking Process 114

Public Affairs and Policymaking--When Involved? 115

Insuring Involvement in Policymaking . . . 115

A View of the Public Affairs Environment . 117

Page

The Practitioners Environment 118

Application of Models 125

General 125

Intraorganizational Environment 126

Policy Analysis 128

SUMMARY 132

VI. CONCLUSIONS 135

INTRODUCTION 135

THE PROPER ROLE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 136

THE INTERNAL VARIABLES WHICH AFFECT THE FUNCTION 137

The Literature 137

The Interviews 137

THE DECISIONMAKER VARIABLE 137

Recommendation 138

THE ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT VARIABLE . . 139

Recommendation 141

THE PRACTITIONER VARIABLE 141

SUMMARY 142

Recommendation for Further Study 143

APPENDIX 146

BIBLIOGRAPHY 187

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure		Page
1.	Three generalized environments and the types of interaction	121
2.	Public affairs generalized environments with their time dimensions and types of interaction	122
3.	Total public affairs environment	129

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM AREA

SOURCE, IMPORT AND VALIDITY

SOURCE

The research topic for this thesis was obtained from DOD Suggested Research Topics for Professional Service School Attendees, 1972-73. The problem was stated in this source as: "To determine the proper role of public affairs as a staff function in the formulation of Department of Defense policy and means of insuring that the function is integrated into DOD staff actions during the planning phase of the decision process."[1]

Statement of the Problem

During the course of research the above problem was redefined as: Determine what variables affect the role of public affairs as a staff function in the Department of Defense (DOD) and hinder or facilitate the integration of the function during the planning phase of the decision process.

---

[1] DOD Suggested Research Topics for Professional Service School Attendees, 1972-73, p. I-54.

Analysis

The focus of this research is the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD (PA)). Questions to be answered are:

1. What is the proper role of this staff function?

2. What variables affect the proper functioning?

3. What measures are employed to insure that the function is integrated in the decision process?

4. How does the functioning of public affairs in DOD compare with the public affairs function in some large U.S. corporations?

5. What are some of the implications of 1, 2, 3 and 4 for the public affairs information officer in the U.S. Army?

Specification of Delimitations

This investigation addresses only in broad terms the multiple interactions of OSD (PA) with other functional staff areas of DOD, other government agencies and the Office of the President. The different services are examined only in terms of perceptions of individuals regarding the problem area. The U.S. Army is viewed more closely than the other services. Decisionmaking and policymaking is viewed only in terms of the Secretary of Defense being the principal decisionmaker with whom the OSD (PA) relates. Decision processes within OSD (PA) are not addressed.

Sources

1. Library at U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

2. Selected publications obtained from the Defense Documentation Center.

3. Materials made available by OSD (PA) and the Office of the Army Chief of Information.

4. Interviews of personnel in OSD (PA) and the offices of the services' chiefs of information.

5. Personal library and files.

6. Telephonic interview with Dr. William P. Ehling of Syracuse University.

Time Period of Research

This investigation was conducted during the period September 1972 to May 1973. Before proceeding with the exploration of the problem, it may be worthwhile to establish the predispositions of the author with respect to the topic. During the period January 1971-June 1972, I pursued a Masters Degree in Public Relations at Syracuse University. My emphasis was balanced among research methods, management and communication theory. As part of the degree requirements, it was necessary for me to formulate my own operational description of the public relations function. This description should give the reader an indication of the direction of my thinking. My approach to the research problem has

admittedly been influenced by my academic experiences. I have not had a military public affairs assignment.

RESEARCHER'S DESCRIPTION OF PUBLIC RELATIONS

In presenting an operational description of public relations (PR), one might begin with the simple--the "doing" activities: writing, editing, media placement, event and image promotion, speaking, production of publications, programming and institutional advertisement. With what publics does one relate? This depends on the nature of the organization, but some common publics are: the press, employers, the community, investors, educators, consumers, government, other organizations and varied other publics. The International Public Relations Association provides this definition: "public relations is a management function of a continuing and planned character, through which public and private organizations and institutions seek to win and retain the understanding, sympathy and support of those with whom they are or may be concerned."[2] This definition hints at the management role and fails altogether in indicating the applicability of modern communication theory to the managerial role. Neither do the "doing" activities or the definition clarify the view of PR that I have derived from my study.

---

[2] S. M. Cutlip and A. H. Center, Effective Public Relations, 4th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), pp. 5-6.

Kenneth E. Boulding has described the organization as a social system. "The unit of such systems," wrote Boulding, "is . . . the 'role'--that part of the person which is concerned with the organization or situation in question, and it is tempting to define social organization . . . as a set of 'roles' tied together with channels of communication."[3] The organization, itself, is such a "role"--a subsystem of the environment. It interacts systematically with other subsets of the environment such as the publics described above. Any one of these publics has a role. Systematically, following the line of Donald McKay, an information theorist, each interacting subset in the environment, has a repertoire of basic acts that in combinations make up its behavior. Each is both a terminal sender and receiver in the communication process. Both the organization and its organized publics are goal-directed, self-adaptive systems. Information exchanged in the communication process performs the logical work for orientation and organizing for adaptive updating in the changing environment.[4] The public relations manager plays a vital role in sensing systems change and facilitating the exchange of information between the organization and its publics. What

---

[3]K. E. Boulding, "General Systems Theory-The Skeleton of Science," Management Science, Vol. 2, No. 3, April 1956, p. 205.

[4]Walter Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 48-49.

he senses and transmits must serve the adaptive needs of the organization and its publics. The organization is an open system which depends on feedback from the environment. This enables the system to correct for its own malfunctionings, or for change in the environment.[5] Up to this point, I have tried to describe what it is one observes in public relations; the environment in which the observations are made; and the broad sensing operations to be performed.

The kinds of observation to be made can be seen by first looking at modern communication theory. Stafford Beer wrote in Decision and Control that ". . . viable systems maintain equilibrial behavior only by multiple contact with whatever lies outside themselves . . ."[6] The mathematical theory of communication provides proof that enough channel capacity must be provided in the feedback loops to match the capacity of the system to make an erroneous response. Information about the changing environment is essential for formulating adaptive strategies. How many channels must be maintained? An amount equal to the organizations capacity to err, which intuitively is greater than the sum of its normal publics. Each, of course, will require differing degrees of attention. The PR manager then, is an environmental sensor, who facilitates two-way communications that

---

[5] S. M. Cutlip and A. H. Center, op. cit., p. 11.

[6] Stafford Beer. Decision and Control, (London: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), p. 257.

allow each terminal to adopt adaptive strategies. These strategies will not always be optimal for either interacting subsystem. In sensing, he not only interprets but also participates in the decision process leading to organization adaptation.

At times, environmental change may present conflict or potential conflict. Russell L. Ackoff operationally defines conflict as being when decisionmaker, I_1, is in a "choice situation," and the presence of decisionmaker I_2 decreases the expected utility of I_1.[7] The point of interest for public relation's management is the means of intervention in conflict identified by Ackoff. The means of intervention are environmental and behavioral. The latter means of intervention is to change either the actions selected, or the way they are carried out, or the utilities placed on outcomes. This is accomplished by communications. This is an operational activity of public relations management. It is not unrelated to the sensing function described earlier.

What the public relations manager seeks in the conflict situation is described as "peaceful adjustment" by Robert A. Dahl.[8] Deadlock and coercion are not public relations objectives, though they may result. Participation

---

[7]R. L. Ackoff, "Structural Conflicts Within Organizations," Operational Research and the Social Sciences, ed. J. R. Lawrence (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967), pp. 428-429.

[8]Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 59.

in policy analysis or partisan analysis may be a public relations management function. The objective of such analysis would be to establish grounds for communication by exploring alternatives, reviewing ways of executing alternatives, and reevaluating the value or utility placed on outcomes to the end of arriving at mutually beneficial solutions. The consequence would be cooperation or competition, regulated conflict in Ackoff's discussion.[9]

The import of analysis and participation in decisionmaking makes it imperative that the student of public relations be well aware of his management role and the tools for effective decisionmaking problem analysis. In a managerial sense, determining courses of action, their likely consequence, assigning values, and the appraisals needed in dealing with uncertainty are more important than layout, type selection, press releases.

There are two other dimensions which go beyond the "doing" activities. Both are related to ethics. First, to the extent that the communications activities of the organization are a continuous monological flow with "feedback" seen only as a way of improving the message, to that extent are these activities manipulative and coercive. For the organization's role in the social system to be socially constructive, a dialogue must be established. Secondly, the public relations manager must seek to motivate the

---

[9]R. L. Ackoff, op. cit., pp. 430-31.

organization to generate acts in its and the public's interest. Pertinent to both points is the argument of David Finn that the organization must be aided in defining its ethical threshold as part of its definition of its social role.[10]

It is that "role" which interacts. It is of that "role" that public relations speaks. It is with respect to that "role" that the public relations manager organizes, supervises and operates programs to inform. It is with respect to public perceptions of that "role" that he collects and analyzes information. It is the goal-seeking behavior of that "role" which most often leads to conflict with other environmental "roles."

The aforementioned provides a context for completing the operational description of public relations. It is "doing" activities; it is a management function that centers on sensing the environment, facilitating adaptive communications, resolving conflict communicatively--all occurring in a process which includes: factfinding and feedback, planning and programming, action and communication and evaluation. (See Appendix 1, Explanation and Definition of Terms)

IMPORT AND VALIDITY

What is the proper role of public affairs/information? This problem is not peculiar to the Department of Defense.

---

[10] David Finn, "Struggle for Ethics in Public Relations," Harvard Business Review, p. 58.

Cutlip and Center in their book, Effective Public Relations, 4th edition, observe that there is no unanimity, even among practitioners, on a single proper function common to all--"The role performed and the stature enjoyed vary from client to client and from one institution to the next."[11] The demand for a universal voice in policymaking affairs, notes Cutlip and Center, has irritated some management people, misled some others, and made many shy away.

The complaint as stated in the original problem source is: "The information function too often is required to operate after the fact. If it is to serve a bonafide staff function, public affairs should participate in concurrent planning." The impact of "after the fact" public affairs can be seen in the reaction it engenders. Charles W. Ackley, in The Modern Military in American Society, writes:

> . . . after the fact explanations are always forthcoming, for the public relations apparatus of the Department of Defense has kept pace with the growth of the institution itself, and with typical Yankee vigor and ingenuity sells the military solution to every problem . . . of course the military needs an information program, but it should be one designed to inform, not promote or possibly deceive.[12]

One could counter that even after the fact public affairs functioning can be purely informative. The point is that the public affairs person too often is seen as a "fire-fighter" and "cover-up man."

---

[11] S. M. Cutlip and A. H. Center, Effective Public Relations, 4th edition, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), p. 156.

[12] C. W. Ackley, The Modern Military in American Society (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1972), p. 70.

The public perception described may be frustrating to the public affairs operator, but what is important is the impact of such public perception on the credibility of what is said by spokesmen of the DOD.

According to Cutlip and Center, the public relations function has been established longer in government than in any other field of practice. Government practitioners face more hostility. This hostility, write these authors, stems from four basic conflicts of interest in democratic government: (1) continuing struggle between the press fighting for "peoples right to know" and the government officials insisting upon discretion; (2) continuing struggle for balance of power between the legislative and executive branches of government; (3) continuing struggle between the major political powers; and (4) industries, institutions and other vested interests decrying the use of public funds to carry the day against their interests.[13]

An observer to the above described conflicts is the citizen, who has a functional obligation to participate in the governing process. No longer does that citizen enjoy the involvement inherent in the town meeting. Cutlip and Center note that the increased centralization of government has produced a sense of remoteness in the citizen, who increasingly defaults his obligation. Central to the reason

---

[13]Cutlip and Center, op. cit., p. 536.

for this default, say these authors quoting the columnist, Joseph Kraft, is: "The simple fact [is] that the study of public life eludes the grasp of the ordinary man."[14] "Much of the meaningful dialogue required to make democracy work today is shaped and phrased by the public relations practitioners," writes Cutlip and Center.[15] The practitioners become the intermediaries. In support of the aforesaid, Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., wrote:

> Government information can play a vital part in the cause of good administration by exploring the impact of new social forces, discovering strains and tensions before they become acute, and encouraging a positive sense of unity and national direction.[16]

C. W. Borklund, in The Department of Defense, wrote:

> DOD is by far the largest organization in the executive branch of the federal government . . . Department of Defense is also considered by many to be the most important of federal agencies. Not a day passes that at least one of the actions or proposed projects does not receive nationwide--even worldwide--scrutiny and comment.[17]

Reinforcing the import of the implication of the public affairs function, Cutlip and Center write:

> The armed forces drain heavily upon the nation's wealth, manpower and natural resources . . . The drain of funds will require sacrifice on the part of the American people for the foreseeable future . . . They must have confidence in the spenders and the commanders.

---

[14] Ibid., pp. 529-30. [15] Ibid., p. 531.

[16] Z. Chaffee, Jr., Government and Mass Communications--A Report from the Commission on Freedom of the Press (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 736.

[17] C. W. Borklund, The Department of Defense (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968), p. 3.

> It is mandatory, therefore, that the armed forces gain public understanding of their mission.[18]

On this same point, James V. Forrestal said, "This job not only has to be well done, but the public must be convinced it is being well done."[19]

What has been the implication of failures in public affairs participation in policymaking in the past? Cutlip and Center observe that history is replete with illustrations of public opinion prevailing over what was deemed sound military strategy. An example during the Civil War was that widespread fear along the East Coast forced the fragmentation of the Union Navy and the abandonment of what Naval leaders thought sound strategy. These authors note that military leaders were taught anew in the Viet Nam War that public opinion shapes and limits battle plans.[20]

SUMMARY

The import of the problem should be clear. The validity of the problem is generally accepted; however, a slightly different perception was surfaced during the conduct of this research. Interviews of persons working in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) Plans Division indicated that the problem was not valid at

---

[18] Cutlip and Center, op. cit., p. 608.

[19] Borklund, op. cit., p. 233.

[20] Cutlip and Center, op. cit., p. 609.

their level at this point in time. They averred that it was still a prevailing problem at lower levels. Resolution of the problem at their level seemed to be a function of the relationship between the principal public affairs officer and the principal decisionmaker. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter III. As a final note on the import of the role of public affairs as a staff function in DOD: "Much of the history of American government pivots on the use of information as an instrument of political power."[21] ". . . information policy has been at the very center of governing the United States from the beginning."[22]

ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS

Organization and Functions

The annual United States Government Organization Manual, 1971/72 edition, describes the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) as the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for public information activities and community relations.[23] The task areas described in this source are summarized as follows:

---

[21] W. L. Rivers and W. Schramm, Responsibility in Mass Communication (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969), p. 79.

[22] Ibid., p. 77.

[23] U.S. Government Organization Manual 1972, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 125.

1. Provides for security review of all material for public release and publication originated by DOD. This includes Congressional testimony.

2. Reviews official speeches, press releases and other information originating within DOD for public release for conflict with established policies or programs of DOD or the national government.

3. Approves military participation in public activities of national or international significance.

4. Maintains liaison with and assists all information media and national and civic organizations on matters relating to activities of the DOD.

5. Approves credentials for U.S. and foreign news gathering representatives covering official DOD activities.

6. Is the sole DOD agent for the release of official information at the seat of government.

The public affairs staff is functionally organized to accomplish the above activities. (Appendix 2.) Department of Defense Directives specify the responsibilities, functions, authorities and relationships of the subject office. DOD Directive 5122.5, dated 10 July 1961 is the basic document governing the activities of this staff agency. (Appendix 2.) With respect to the topic area of this thesis, the cited directive states that one of the functions of the Assistant Secretary is to:

> . . . provide policy guidance to the Department of Defense on public affairs matters and approve public affairs aspects of actions which have national or

international significance in the fields of public information and community relations.

It would seem clear then that functional participation in policymaking is provided for in the organizing directive. Why then is there a perception that too often the public affairs function is after the fact? Why is there a perception that a problem exists regarding participation in decisionmaking? When public affairs is functional in policymaking is this by organizational design or is there some more tenuous phenomenon operating? How pervasive is this phenomenon throughout the military services regarding the public affairs staff function? These are some of the questions which will be partially explored and partially answered in this thesis.

Environmental Constraints

Before focusing on the problem, it is necessary to examine the larger environment in which DOD public affairs operates and the major constraints imposed by elements of that environment. The many publics such as the general community, interest groups, contractors and other government agencies will not be addressed; nor will the news media. Important elements in the environment which impact directly on policymaking will be discussed briefly. These elements are the Executive Office of the President, the Congress, the Military Services and the other staffs which together with the Secretary of Defense complete the structure of the Department of Defense. One might suspect that the President

can decidedly set the tone for public affairs in any executive branch agency; the discussion of selected external elements impacting on the DOD public affairs function, therefore, begins with a review of the modern Presidents.

Impact of Modern Presidents

The Executive Office of the President is important because it sets the tone of the information environment. Rivers, Peterson and Jensen in their book, The Mass Media and Modern Society, provide portraits of the roles of the modern presidents in setting the tone of the information environment.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

> Neither artful nor devious, write these authors. Harry S. Truman was so open and obvious that even the correspondents who respected his crusty strength sometimes found it difficult to remember that they were questioning the President of the United States.[24]

The authors noted further that the focus of the media was so much on Truman the man, that few noticed the growth of the publicity apparatus he had inherited.

> By the end of Truman's Presidency, the machine had doubled. The Executive Branch had 3,632 employees working in the 'Information' and 'Editorial' Civil Service classification, plus an unknown number whose titles were 'Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs,' 'Administrative Assistant . . . and the like.[25]

---

[24] W. L. Rivers, T. Peterson and J. W. Jensen, The Mass Media and Modern Society (2d ed.; San Francisco: Rinehart Press, 1971), p. 128.

[25] Ibid., p. 129.

Senator Byrd called for a reduction of 25 percent hoping that this would result in "more news and less bull . . ." The authors say, "Characteristically, Truman ignored him."[26]

DWIGHT EISENHOWER

The authors assert that the Eisenhower Presidency best reveals how astute press agentry can overwhelm the Washington press corps. "During Eisenhower's first four years, Executive information personnel nearly doubled . . ."[27] James Hagerty was the press secretary. "Hagerty," says the authors,

> often made subtle decisions about which stories should involve the President. The news of the first successful U.S. satellite was released not from the launching site but from Augusta, Georgia where the President was vacationing.[28]

When White House reporters asked later where they could learn whether an Army satellite fired that morning had gone into orbit; Hagerty answered, "If it is in orbit, we will have an announcement."[29] When asked if the White House would release the news if the satellite failed, Hagerty replied, "No."[30] The satellite did not orbit, and the Army announced the failure say the authors.[31]

---

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid., p. 130.

[28] Ibid., p. 131.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Kennedy was not marred by news management and mismanagement say the authors, because this was "one of the most sophisticated shapers of public opinion in Presidential history."[32] His information policies:

> were complicated--and sometimes contradictory--but their thrust was not to be found in the blunders of the beleaguered Defense Department. The center of information was the White House, and there the policy was the precise reverse of censorship . . . the open White House enabled Kennedy . . . to become the dominant source of news, explanation, and opinion.[33]

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Lyndon Johnson used informal and spur of the moment press conferences. This caused him to face only the White House correspondents. The authors note that Johnson could avoid questions from the specialists covering Washington who had no vested interest in remaining on good terms with the President.[34] "The intimate atmosphere," write the authors, "of small conferences discourages embarrassing questions."[35]

RICHARD M. NIXON

Nixon's strategy for relations with the mass media became apparent in the 1968 campaign according to the authors. Nixon's strategy was described by quoting James Reston of the New York Times:

---

[32] Ibid., p. 132.

[33] Ibid., pp. 132-33.

[34] Ibid., p. 135.

[35] Ibid., pp. 135-36.

> His television performances are masterpieces of contrived candor. He seems to be telling everything with an air of reckless sincerity, but nearly always in a controlled situation, with the questioners carefully chosen . . . the questions carefully screened.[36]

The authors point out that Nixon did not often submit himself to the adversary relationship of the news conference.

> . . . during the first two years in office, he averaged less than one meeting with the Washington press corps a month, about one-third as often as his three immediate predecessors. He preferred to go on national television with statements and not to respond to questions.[37]

Remembering that the Secretary of Defense and his key assistants are political appointees, one can see intuitively that the tone of the President does impact on the public affairs function in DOD. A current illustration of this impact is seen in an Associated Press (AP) report of a General Accounting Office (GAO) charge. GAO asserted that the White House staff broke the law in assembling a "Battle of the Budget" kit as a speechmaking guide for top federal officials. The AP report states:

> . . . White House speechwriters put together 30 to 50 copies of the kit and distributed them to cabinet officials, agency heads and other presidential appointees of the highest rank. A second set of 120-150 copies was printed and paid for by the Republican National Committee and made available to presidential appointees of lesser rank and agency public affairs officers.[38]

A subtle illustration of this impact can be seen in the current White House organization on information matters.

---

[36] Ibid., p. 136. [37] Ibid., p. 137.

[38] "President's Staff Charged with Lobbying Illegally," (Washington (AP)), Kansas City Times, May 5, 1973, p. 8B.

The position of White House Secretary was created in 1929. President Nixon split the functions of this position and created a Director of Executive Communications. Herbert G. Klein holds this position. Mr. Klein had been Richard Nixon's public relations advisor in the 1960 campaign. Cutlip and Center write that Klein saw his job as being:

> My main responsibility is coordinating the flow of information from various departments of the executive branch, as well as maintaining a liaison role with the Republican National Committee, maintaining contacts with the Republican side of Congress, and serving as a member of various policy committees in the White House.[39]

The press is handled by the Press Secretary, Ronald Zeigler, who serves as a spokesman for the President.

Impact of Congress

Regarding the Congress as an element in the larger environment of DOD public affairs, Cutlip and Center, speaking of government as a whole, reports:

> Almost from the beginning, the public relations function in government has been handicapped by the opposition of legislators. Their continuing opposition prevents maximum effectiveness in government practice . . .[40]

These authors assert that this conflict is inherent in our system of checks and balances:

> The legislative body cannot view calmly the skillful use of public relations by the executive to achieve his legislative goals. On the other hand, the executive cannot dispense with them and do his job.[41]

---

[39] Cutlip and Center, op. cit., p. 555.

[40] Ibid., p. 542.

[41] Ibid., p. 244.

This strain between the legislative and executive branches of government has produced legal constraints affecting the function of public affairs. Federal law doesn't say public relations is illegal. It doesn't mention public relations, per se. Section 3107 of Title V of the U.S. Code, October, 1913 reads: "Appropriated funds may not be used to pay a publicity expert unless specifically appropriated for that purpose."[42] To many, publicity experts and public relations men are one and the same. It is for this reason, says Joseph S. Rosapepe, that you don't find public relations officers in the Federal Government--they are called anything but public relations men.[43]

Other legal restrictions which tend to confuse and confound public affairs practice in the federal government are cited by Cutlip and Center as:

> The "gag law" of July 11, 1919, prohibits using any part of an appropriation for services, messages, or publications designed to influence any member of Congress in his attitude toward legislation or appropriations. (See 41 U.S. Stat. 68.)
>
> The law, also passed in 1919, but not strictly enforced until 1936, requires that all duplicating of material, including multilith and multigraph, must be done by the Government Printing Office or at least farmed back to the department for reproduction by the GPO. (See 40 U.S. Stat. 1270.)
>
> Restrictions on the privilege of executive departments and independent establishments in use of the free mail frankly prohibit any executive department mailing material without a request. (See Title 39, U.S.C.A. Sec. 321n.)[44]

---

[42] Joseph S. Rosapepe, "Neither Pinkertons nor Publicity Men," Public Relations Journal, October 1971, p. 12.

[43] Ibid. [44] Cutlip and Center, op. cit., p. 546.

In contrast to these restraints, Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Law in 1966. This act requires government agencies to give the public more information about their activities than ever before. Rosapepe explains this contrasting legislation history by pointing out that ". . . attempts to reduce or eliminate the funds used to inform the public shows that the objection has not been against the publicist, but against the information he was disseminating."[45]

Impact of Military Services

The final environmental element impacting on the function of public affairs to be discussed briefly is the military services and other staff agencies. To place the military services in context, it is necessary to review them in a historic sense. Prior to 1949 each service conducted its own public relations free from centralized direction. From 1949 to 1954 the public relations program was directed from the Office of Public Information (OPI) in the Defense Department. The reason for this, observes Cutlip and Center, was that James J. Forrestal, first Secretary of Defense, wanted to unify and coordinate the programs of all the services. An aim was the elimination of service feuding for funds and manpower.[46] Forrestal's successor, Louis A. Johnson, tried to implement this centralization.

---

[45]Rosapepe, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

[46]Cutlip and Center, op. cit., p. 615.

> Through his Assistant to the Secretary, he set up eight divisions in OPI and stripped the service staffs in the Pentagon . . . Johnson envisioned OPI as the public relations office for the whole military establishment . . .[47]

With the expansion for the Korean War, the services' public relations staffs were rebuilt. OPI became more of a referral agency says Cutlip and Center. During the tenure of Robert S. McNamara the current organization and functions of the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) were established. Cutlip and Center observe that the control over service public relations staffs was made more effective than ever before. "In 1964," write these authors,

> . . . the Secretary cut the number of civilian and military personnel assigned to public relations duties, moved the service book-magazine and organization liaison sections to DOD, and eliminated the separate military service desks in DOD.[48]

The military service setups for public relations are the product of experiences gained since World War II, the unification of the services and the creation of a centralized coordinating agency in the DOD. The organizations, observe Cutlip and Center, remain rather fluid and are periodically revamped.

Rounding out the summary of some elements in the DOD public affairs environment are the other staff agencies.

---

[47] Ibid., pp. 615-16.

[48] Ibid., p. 616.

Borklund notes that DOD has many different collections of specialists who require persuading (even generals). These specialists' functions are to advise the Secretary of Defense on what proper policy, programs and projects, ought to be. Borklund writes, "Once a Secretary of Defense has made a decision, they carry it out, presumably to the best of their ability, even if they disagree with it." By design or default, notes this author,

> opposition to or faulty execution . . . can come from any one or some or all of these specialists . . . They compete with each other for the Secretary's approval, and for the men, money and material resources that must accompany that approval. Abrasions and controversy develop, of course.[49]

Regarding the special interests which induce internal conflict, Borklund explains that individuals in certain human clusters have both professionally expert and personal views about how the Department should work.[50] This author notes further that these clusters have as generic factors--the military and civilian. "Subdivided under the two broad job function categories of military and civilian are other conclaves which nurture and promote different attitudes and opinions."[51] The major conclaves identified, in addition to the ones previously discussed, are the unified and specified commands and the Defense Supply Agency (DSA).

---

[49] Borklund, op. cit., p. 105.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid., p. 109.

Appendix 4 discusses issues and concepts which are pertinent to the general environment of public affairs in DOD as follows:

Tab A. The conflict between and among various government agencies in gathering and distributing information.

Tab B. Explanation of the difference between the concepts "informing the public" and "winning public support."

Tab C. Explanation of the differences between the concepts, "right to know" and the "right to secrecy."

These issues and concepts are entwined and are present in the life of the public affairs function in any government agency. Awareness of these issues and concepts is essential to any understanding of the research problem setting.

CHAPTER II

RELATED RESEARCH AND PROFESSIONAL LITERATURE

This chapter discusses the related research and professional literature pertinent to the role of public affairs as a staff function and the variables which are the foci of the investigation.

The following subdivisions are included in this chapter:

1. The role of public affairs as a staff function as described in professional literature.

2. The Office of Chief of Information, Army view of the problem and subsequent conclusions and recommendations.

3. The relation of organizational theorists' views of functionalism and integration as their findings impinge on the DOD and Army problem.

4. The implications of "administrative man theory" on the problem.

5. Policy analysis as a potential tool for the public relations/public affairs practitioner.

Exploration of the first four topic areas aids in understanding the dimensions of the research problem. Future conclusions are facilitated by subsuming aspects of the problem under a broader body of related knowledge. Policy

analysis may provide an additional tool to the practitioner for affecting the extent of his function's integration.

Again, the problem is to determine what variables affect the role of public affairs as a staff function in the Department of Defense (DOD) and hinder or facilitate the integration of the function during the planning phase of the decision process.

Three conceptual areas will provide points of departure in answering the questions stated under the Analysis paragraph in Chapter I. The "administrative man theory" of Herbert Simon and the work of organization theorists will provide a context for the discussion of the decisionmaker and the organization environment. The dysfunctions of functionalism as an organization principle will be discussed to expand the discussion of the decisionmaker in an organization. Briefly stated, the propositions of "administrative man theory" are:

> 1. Choice is always made with respect to a simplified model of the real situation . . .
>
> 2. Decisions are made within the unique frame of reference or 'psychological set' of the decisionmaker . . .
>
> 3. Dissatisfaction with either present status or available alternatives stimulates search for additional alternatives and information about possible consequences.
>
> 4. Search behavior is concerned with the discovery of satisfactory alternatives; only in exceptional cases is it concerned with the discovery of "optimum" alternatives.
>
> 5. Continued failure to achieve a minimum standard of satisfaction results in the successive lowering of

> the standard until an acceptable compromise is achieved: conversely, easy success tends to raise minimum standards.[1]

The second conceptual area is the body of knowledge accumulated about the management function, public relations. The term public relations has been used in ways which tend to confuse. Appendix 1 discusses the confusion surrounding the term and provides definitions for terms used interchangeably with public relations. Definitions in Appendix 1 establish the meanings of terms as used in this thesis.

The third conceptual area is policy analysis. Policy analysis will be viewed as a potential tool for the public relations practitioner seeking to assess or sense the environment in which he functions.

The presence of certain variables will emerge in the discussion of the role of public affairs. How and why these variables can hinder integration in any organization will be suggested by the discussion of functionalism as an organizing principle. "Administrative man theory" may facilitate explanation of decisionmaker behavior.

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS AS A STAFF FUNCTION ACCORDING TO PROFESSIONAL LITERATURE

Cutlip and Center agree that public relations/public affairs is a staff function. The function embraces both

---

[1] A.C. Filley and R.J. House, Managerial Process and Organizational Behavior (Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1969), p. 107.

advisory and operational tasks.[2] "In the advisory role," say these authors,

> the practitioner analyzes public opinion and counsels line and other staff officers on the public relations aspects of organizational policies and problems. In the operational role, he handles the organization's communications outside the line function.[3]

John J. Ducas, a public relations counselor, agrees with the above assessment. In discussing where public relations "fits" into the management structure, Ducas avers that ". . . the best qualified public relations man will not be able to function as much more than a publicity man unless he is an integral part of the policymaking group."[4]

In an interview in 1957, Earl Newsom, a president of a counseling firm, stated that a major function is: ". . . help modern management to have a full awareness of the public judgments which will probably be passed on actions when they are known."[5] To the question of how much authority should the public relations offices have, Newsom replied, "The point

---

[2] S. M. Cutlip and A. H. Center, Effective Public Relations, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), pp. 165-66.

[3] Ibid., p. 166.

[4] J. J. Ducas, "Corporate Citizenship," Handbook of Public Relations, ed. by H. Stephenson (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960), p. 393.

[5] E. Newsom, "A Philosophy of Corporate Public Relations," Public Relations Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2., 1971, p. 12.

of view of the public relations officer or counselor should prevail only to the extent that it deserves to prevail--just as a lawyer's counsel . . ."[6] Newsom cautioned that before managers are going to listen to advice, competence must have been demonstrated.[7] Don J. Forrestal, public relations director of Monsanto Company, St. Louis, echoed the latter sentiment by writing, "The Chief listens only when public relations has something practical and pertinent to propose."[8]

The above theme is also expressed by Cutlip and Center:

> The public relations aspect of each problem confronting an organization should be given due consideration--but no more than this--along with all other aspects of a particular problem or a proposed policy. The staff can ask for no more.[9]

To indicate how public relations policy involvement is provided for in actuality, Cutlip and Center list the statement of responsibilities in Chrysler Corporation. The first statement is illustrative:

> Assist corporate management in the development and maintenance of effective current and long-range policies, plans, and practices designed to project a favorable image of Chrysler activities to the public on a world-wide basis.[10]

---

[6] Ibid., p. 13.

[7] Loc. Cit.

[8] D. J. Forrestal, "Align PR to Management Needs," Public Relations Journal, October 1971, p. 40.

[9] Cutlip and Center, op. cit., p. 166.

[10] Ibid, p. 168.

Cutlip and Center note that a Master's thesis by Louis F. Hamle supports the generalization that the importance of the public relations function and its directing specialist have been recognized by organization executives.[11] After a detailed study of a representative sample of American Corporations, Hamle concluded:

> Corporate management . . . has placed the function in the higher levels of the organization structure; . . . has recognized the specialized nature of the function and . . . has practiced sound organizational principles by the establishment of separate public relations departments headed by a specialist.[12]

Hamle's conclusions are supported by a study by Robert W. Miller of American University. Surveying 182 corporations nationwide, Miller reported that in 39 percent of the corporations the person in charge of public relations is a member of the policymaking group. More than one-third were titled vice-president.[13] Miller's study also noted that in 78 percent of the corporations, the public relations man reported to the President-Chairman of the corporation.[14]

---

[11] Ibid., p. 169.

[12] L. F. Hamle, "Public Relations, Its Place in Corporate Management" (Master's Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1967), S. M. Cutlip and A. H. Center, Effective Public Relations, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), pp. 159-60.

[13] R. W. Miller, "Corporate Policies and Public Attitudes" (Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1965) S.M. Cutlip and A.H. Center, Effective Public Relations, 4th edition (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), p. 160.

[14] Ibid., p. 28.

The literature indicates that the import of the role and function is recognized broadly. Does the public relations staff in corporations share the problem perceived in OASD (PA)? The literature indicates that they do to some extent.

Cutlip and Center state that the function tends to go up and down in some organizations. "This reflects many factors," write these authors, "--the differing values of succeeding executives, the intangible nature of public relations results, changing needs of the organizations, and variations in competence of public relations specialists."[15] (The up and down aspect was cited by one of the military persons interviewed when this researcher visited OASD (PA). Knowing that former Secretary Laird was to leave OSD shortly, I asked one respondent what effect his departure would have on the public affairs function. The reply was there would be a period of adjustment and perhaps even a period of education with the new Secretary.)

A Master's thesis by Robert Sullivan suggests those factors which influence the "place" of the public relations function. Sullivan lists:

The attitudes of top management.
Capabilities and personalities of public relations staff.
General organizational structure and policy.

---

[15] Cutlip and Center, op. cit., p. 159.

Organization's traditions, goals, objectives.
Company product and market areas (in case of business(s)).
Company size and location.
Big government.[16]

The first four of these factors are salient to this research. Prior to discovering Sullivan's listing, the interview of public relations personnel in DOD made the researcher aware of at least three operating factors or variables. Broadly, these were: the organizational environment, the decision-maker and the public relations practitioner. The theoretical base for the discussion of the variables will be presented in this chapter as indicated earlier. The organizational environment will be discussed by reviewing the literature on functionalism and integration. It is first necessary to return to the milieu of the military and defense organization with respect to the public relations function and note what has been written regarding the problem. (Public affairs and public relations are essentially synonomous in the discussion of DOD, See Appendix 1 Definitions.)

Research filed in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Library has addressed the topic of public affairs or public information or Army-media relations. The problem of this thesis has not been investigated. A

---

[16] R. Sullivan, "Evaluation of a Corporate Public Relations Function," (Master's thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1967), S. M. Cutlip and A. H. Center, Effective Public Relations, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), p. 159.

Department of the Army study titled "A New Direction for Army Information--Final Report of the Smith Committee" was completed in January 1969. This study indicated that the Office of the Chief of Information (OCINFO) shares with OASD (PA) the problem of not becoming involved or aware of major actions in the planning stages.[17] The cause of this was reported to be a lack of recognition of the public affairs implications of various actions on the part of action officers and supervisors. A conclusion of this study was that ". . . OCINFO is not consulted early enough on many Army actions concerning public affairs impact and guidance requirements."[18] To overcome the problem the study recommended that the following steps be taken to strengthen the Information Officer Liaison System:

> a. Increase efforts to provide periodic orientations and updating briefings to Information Liaison Officers (ILO).
>
> b. Bring ILO's into a more active role in the staffing of important OCINFO actions.
>
> c. Provide Army staff agencies with guidelines for selecting ILO's.
>
> d. Establish and sponsor an ILO orientation course of instruction, possibly at the Defense Information School.[19]

---

[17] BGR Smith, "A New Direction for Army Information--Final Report of the Smith Committee," January 1969 (OCINFO), p. IV-G3.

[18] Ibid., p. IV-G-6.

[19] Ibid., p. IV-G-7.

The problem conclusion and recommendations described above are related to research on functionalism and problems of integration performed by several organization theorists. For the purpose of establishing a more universal context for the problem under study, a review of some of the literature in this area is necessary. The use of ILO's mentioned above appears similar to the "linking-pin" concept of Rensis Likert, which is described in the concluding portion of the following section on functionalism and achieving integration.

FUNCTIONALISM AND INTEGRATION--A GENERAL SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM

The roots of functionalism observes R. J. Hopeman, is in the specialization of labor.[20] This can be seen in a cursory review of the "four pillars" of formal organization theory. The division of labor is one of the technological dynamics underlying the "collision effect" described by Scott. The reason for dividing work is to promote efficiency. "Division of labor, or specialization, is not restricted to production-line jobs," says William Scott, "but extends to all the functions at the highest level of organization."[21] With respect to the "collision effect" and specialization,

---

[20] R. J. Hopeman, Systems Analysis and Operations Management (Columbus: Charles Merrill Publishing Company, 1969), p. 106.

[21] W. C. Scott, Human Relations in Management (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962), p. 116.

Scott avers: "It follows that no matter where the division of labor occurs . . . all the subdivided functions are closely interrelated in terms of the total operation of the company."[22] It also follows that integration is of paramount concern. This will be seen in the subsequent discussion of differentiation and integration with respect to organization performance. (See Appendix 5, Findings on Functionalism and Integration.)

The two principles which seem most salient to the problem of the role of public affairs and its participation in policymaking early in the planning process are the coordinative and the functional. To illustrate, the Smith Committee Report identifies the breakdown of the ILO system as a contributor to OCINFO not being apprised of impending Army Staff actions.[23] It is this system, according to the report, which is a principal means for OCINFO to keep informed. The functional principle is applicable since DOD and the Military Departments are functionally organized. According to the Smith Committee Report, OCINFO conducted an orientation program for all newly assigned Army Staff officers. That should have helped offset some inherent difficulties of functionalism.

---

[22] Ibid., pp. 14-15.

[23] BG R. Smith, op. cit., p. IV-G-3.

However, despite the ILO system and the orientation program, the Smith Committee Report stated that OCINFO continued to be cut into actions after decisions were taken.[24] Understanding why the above occurs might be made more clear by the further discussion of functionalism and integration.

The central framework of the functionalist view is the classification of managerial behavior into three categories: planning, organizing, controlling. Other categories are named with different degrees of emphasis.[25] All three are of concern in achieving the integration necessary for full participation in policymaking by the public affairs function.

There are many criticisms of functionalism. None of these say it is not workable. There are variables which mitigate against maximum total performance, however, such as complexity, size and the state of technology involved. All three are probably pertinent to the problem being studied. The relative power of each variable is not known. On the surface, complexity and size appear particularly relevant.

With respect to specialization and administrative efficiency, Simon notes that as a principle it is ambiguous

---

[24] Loc. cit.

[25] D. E. McFarland, Management: Principles and Practices, 3d ed. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970), p. 10.

since efficiency does not necessarily flow from specialization.[26] The major types of specialization (by purpose, process, clientele or place) cannot be simultaneously achieved, for at any point there is a question about specialization at the next level. Either of the four types can conflict with and compete with the others. The pertinence of the aforesaid to the public affairs staff function is validated by an assertion in the staff study accompanying the Smith Committee Reports ". . . within the Army there is overlap between information related-activities and some of those activities under the auspices of other staff sections."[27] Organization by purpose is an arrangement of structure to parallel the systems of means and ends involved in accomplishing organization purposes. This is often impossible, since the means-end hierarchy is seldom an integrated, completely connected chain. "Often . . . there are internal conflicts and contradictions among objectives, or among the means selected to attain them."[28] For functionalization to be effective, Simon says:

> . . . it must be technologically feasible to split the work activity as well as the objectives along functional lines; these segregated work activities must not affect, to a substantial degree, values extraneous to the specified functions.[29]

---

[26] H. A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision Making Processes in Administrative Organizations, 2d ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1957), p. 22.

[27] Ibid., p. 29.

[28] Ibid., p. 64.

[29] Ibid., p. 192.

Blau states that the disadvantage of organization by function is that "it creates strong interdependences between subunits."[30] Large organization size reduces the advantages and enhances disadvantages of organization by function.[31] Other factors which lead to dysfunction in functional organization are described by Blau in Appendix 5.

Scott says that the division of labor creates a set of human problems. Some of these are:

1. Intensified employee interdependency. The conditions of interdependency generated by functionalism create strains and tensions. As staff organization emerges a special category of frictions are created between staff and line.

2. Because the division of labor gives rise to many different, often narrow, areas of specialization, the need for coordination becomes paramount.

3. The special problem at executive levels is related to "empire building" and the breeding of jealousy about guarded functional segments in the organization.

4. The ultimate in efficiency which was the reason for functionalism is denied because of the human problems created.

---

[30] P. M. Blau and M. W. Meyer, Bureaucracy and Modern Society, 2d ed. (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 126.

[31] Loc. cit.

5. The delegation of authority and responsibility presents a class of problems related to the "scalar"and functional"processes. First of these is the insufficient delegation of authority. The next problem stems from gaps in or overlaps of functions. Both produce tension and friction.[32]

Rensis Likert notes similar dysfunctions. Some of these which operate at the executive level and may be particularly relevant to military organization are:

1. Function heads seek decisions beneficial to their function which are not necessarily beneficial to other functions.

2. Information shared is often trivial since the motivational pressures are against sharing anything of importance. Functional organization enables a manager to benefit from keeping information to himself. He can often use knowledge secretly to connive with peers or subordinates. He increases his own power and influence at the expense of the organization.

3. Problem solving contributions rarely reflect an organization view. Problems tend to be solved in term of what's best for a department, not what is best for the organization as a whole.[33]

---

[32]Scott, op. cit., pp. 123-4.

[33]Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962), pp. 106-109).

PROBLEMS IN ACHIEVING AND CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR INTEGRATION

Before viewing alternative organization concepts for achieving integration it would be useful to establish some of the conditions necessary, given functional organization, for achieving the desired integration. The following comments support the conclusions and recommendations of the OCINFO study.

Asserting that the second overall consideration in designing organization structure is that of coordinative activities, Kast and Rosenzweig define integration as: ". . . the process of achieving unity of effort among the various subsystems in the accomplishment of the organizations task."[34] Functional principles recognize the need for achieving integration, and proponents of functionalism speak to this point. But functional concepts increase the difficulty of achieving integration, not merely because of the dysfunctional consequences resulting from human problems mentioned earlier, but because the process of vertical and horizontal differentiation separates the activities required for organizational performance. These activities then have to be integrated. Kast and Rosenzweig note that the more the

---

[34] F. E. Kast and J. E. Rosenzweig, Organization and Management, A Systems Approach (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), p. 187.

differentiation of activities and specialization of labor, the more difficult are the problems of coordination.[35] A glance at a DOD or Military Department organization chart would cause one to conclude intuitively that coordination will indeed be difficult. Staffing procedures have been implemented to facilitate coordination. Still coordination problems will accrue if the action agency is left with the decision to determine who else is involved in the action. This is especially so with respect to a function sometimes not so concrete as public affairs.

Differentiation is bidirectional, horizontal and vertical. An appreciation of the difficulty in achieving organization integration can be seen by first looking at the vertical differentiation. Talcott Parsons, focusing on the difficulties which arise at the various levels in the hierarchy of control and responsibilities, specifies three levels: the technical system, the managerial system, and the community or institutional system.[36] This breakdown is according to three references of function or responsibility which become more clearly marked in terms of external relations. The three levels are equatable in business terms to the plant, firm and corporation (the command, the service

---

[35] Loc. cit.

[36] T. Parsons, "Some Ingredients of a General Theory of Formal Organization," Organizations: Systems, Control and Adaptation, ed. by J. A. Litterer (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1969), p. 197).

and Department of Defense). The importance of Parson's levels to this discussion is that "at each of two points of articulation, there is a qualitative break in the line of authority."[37] Higher levels do not simply tell lower levels what to do. Lower levels are not simply "spelling out" of the top level functions. Each level has functional orientations, has functional needs which impose functional demands. Clearly there are gaps between the levels in functional perspective which must be bridged. Parsons notes that the three levels are relatively independent which renders the continuous authority-line picture of formal organization absurd. Parsons avers that because of the different points of articulation in the hierarchical levels, there must be linkage points to embrace the range of possible different perspectives articulated functionally at each level. Perhaps the extreme example of this is the public affairs line(s) from DOD to the Navy Department to the Unified Command to ships of a fleet. OASD (PA) provides policy guidance to the Unified commands. The Navy Department provides technical advice to the Navy component. Ships of a fleet have their commander who accepts, ignores or rejects the advice of his PAO. Because of the nature of naval operations and the traditional autonomy of the captain of a ship at sea, linkage of perspectives would appear to be difficult.

---

[37] Ibid., p. 200.

What about the horizontal problem? This dimension is particularly salient at DOD and Army Staff level. The preceding question can be addressed by viewing the organization as a system. Defined as a system, the organization is:

> . . . a system of interrelated behaviors of people who are performing a task that has been differentiated into several distinct subsystems, each subsystem performing a portion of the task, and the efforts of each being integrated to achieve effective performance of the system.[38]

Differentiation refers to the segmentation of the system into subsystems, each of which develops attributes in relation to the requirements posed by its relevant environment.[39] Differentiation includes the behavioral attributes of members of the subsystem. Some of the problems with respect to integration and functional differentiation are:

1. difference in orientations are related to difficulties in collaboration;

2. there is a relationship between the degree to which members of two groups share norms, values, and/or superordinate goals and the ability of the two groups to cooperate;

3. differences in goals and perceptions of reality could be conditions for intergroup conflict; and

---

[38] Ibid., p. 213.

[39] Loc. cit.

4. the greater the degree of "requisite integration" between two subsystems, the more difficult it is to achieve integration.[40] These four points will be cited again. All of them have direct bearing on problems of staff coordination. The second points to a situation of particular pertinence to the problem at most levels of military organization. On one hand, there is the public affairs/information staff which exists in part to facilitate information flow--for these persons contact with the media is desired, and to some extent they, by training, share values and norms with media representatives. On the other hand, the commander and or his staff may see information flow as a value but may look at media representatives as suspect.

Regarding the fourth point, a possible corollary might be--the greater the degree of unawareness of "requisite integration" between two subsystems, the more improbable is the achieving of integration. The OCINFO Study noted:

> It is entirely possible for an officer to go all the way through the various levels of Army schooling without ever having received a comprehensive presentation on the importance of the information function.[41]

The essential dilemma imposed by functionalism is that the greater the vertical and horizontal specialization or differentiation, the greater the task of integration.

---

[40] Ibid., p. 233.

[41] BG R. Smith, op. cit., p. IV-G-4.

Lawrence and Lorsch argue, according to Filley and House, that --"integration does not . . . automatically follow from organizational design. For effective integration, the conflicts emerging from differing goals, time and interpersonal differences must be resolved."[42] The effectiveness of integration depends on such factors as:

1. the formal position of liaison personnel who coordinate and integrate differentiated departments;

2. the influence of integrators and its source, knowledge, expertise, position, power, etc.;

3. the reward system for integrators;

4. the total level of influence in the organization;

5. influence centered at the required level in the hierarchy; and

6. the modes of conflict resolution--confrontation, smoothing over, or forcing.[43]

Items 1 and 2 parallel problems identified and recommendations made concerning the Information Liaison Officers in the Smith Committee Report. Regarding the problems the report noted:

1. A cause of failure is a lack of recognition of the information implications of various actions on the part of action officers and their supervisors.

---

[42] A. C. Filley and R. J. House, Managerial Process and Organizational Behavior (Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1969), p. 95.

[43] Loc. cit.

2. A cause of failure is the relatively low level of authority and responsibility of those selected by the Army staff agencies to carry out information liaison activities.

3. A complaint is that the ILO is only the initial point of contact.[44]

Functionalism may be necessary, but overcoming the problems of integration inherent in functionalism is vital. Vital if public affairs is to participate in concurrent planning and policymaking.

ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS FOR ACHIEVING INTEGRATION

Kast and Rosenzweig observe that it is possible to achieve both differentiation and effective integration, but new organizational arrangements are required to do so.[45] Some of the types discussed by various authors are: "dual hierarchies," "matrix structures," "tactical units," "self-contained units" and "linking pins." (See Appendix 5, item 4.)

"Linking-Pins," an alternative concept of Rensis Linkert, will be the focus of this portion of the chapter. His concept and the first five factors identified by

---

[44] Smith Committee Report, op. cit., p. IV-G-3.

[45] Kast and Rosenzweig, op. cit., p. 89.

Lawrence and Lorsch regarding factors which determine effective integration seem most salient to the problem identified in the Smith Committee Report.

Likert observes that the increase in functionalization makes effective coordination both more necessary and even more difficult. He suggests "linking pins" as an organizational concept which will facilitate integration without abandoning functionalism. Linkert's "linking pins" would operate between the various units of an organization as follows:

> Horizontally there are several participants who are members of two separate groups and serve as coordinating agents between them. On the vertical base, individuals serve as 'linking pins' between their own level and those above and below. Through 'linking pins,' the voluntary coordination necessary to make the dynamic system operate is effectively achieved.[46]

This concept constitutes a multiple overlapping group structure in the organization. The ILO's may function as linking pins. It should be noted, however, that the first two factors identified on page 35 and in the OCINFO study must be redressed.

Likert writes that the entire organization must consist of multiple overlapping group structure with every work group using group decisionmaking processes skillfully. This requirement, according to Likert, applies to the functional

---

[46] Ibid., p. 189.

departments. Likert concludes that: (1) the organization meeting this requirement will have an effective "interaction-influence system," through which the relevant communications flow readily; (2) the required influence is exerted laterally, upward and downward; and (3) the motivational forces needed for coordination are created.[47] This appears to be accomplished at the top level of DOD and the Military Services as indicated by the interview of public affairs staff members. (See Appendix 5.) Similarly, the use of committees of persons with primary and secondary interests in the staff action should also promote "interaction-influence.

The benefits of Likert's system, contrasted with the dysfunctions of functionalism mentioned earlier, that should result are:

1. it should be impossible for one department to force a decision beneficial to it but detrimental to others;

2. solutions to problems should be sought from an organizational perspective;

3. group-decisionmaking should facilitate the introduction of different contributions essential to competent thinking and decisionmaking;

4. the motivation to communicate accurately all relevant and important information should be facilitated;

5. individual fear should be reduced since ideas which may be undesirable will emerge from the group;

---

[47] Ibid., p. 190.

6. involvement in group decisions should facilitate ego identification with organization goals;

7. organizations should be able to staff at less than peak loads because of the cooperative atmosphere;

8. undesirable individual competition should be reduced since promotions would be based on total performance in the workings of the group.[48]

What emerges in Likert's "linking pins" system is an organization with overlapping committees with a contact man from each functional area accomplishing the linking function. Major structural change in DOD organization is not warranted in the view of the researcher. It is necessary to recognize what kinds of problems can stem from functionalism. It may be possible to achieve overlap and linkage informally by exploiting fully all means of interfunction interaction.

In partial summary, if we are to exploit the merits of functionalization, we must resolve the inherent dysfunctions imposed by human behavior. Essentially we must negate those variables which mitigate against the cooperation necessary for integration. In a sense, we must somehow equate the dual function of modern organization, i.e., satisfy needs and desires of members and accomplish some technical

---

[48] Likert, op. cit., pp. 109-11.

or economic result of use to the environment, with the single goal of survival. Chester Barnard observes that to survive organizations must create a surplus--surplus is achieved through cooperation.[49]

THE DECISIONMAKER--HIS RELEVANCE TO THE PROBLEM

In the first part of this chapter on the role and function of public relations, allusion was made to the role of the decisionmaker in determining the status of the function. In one instance regarding the "up and down" nature of the function in organizations, Cutlip and Center were cited as stating that one of the factors causing this was "the differing values of succeeding executives." In a second instance a listing of factors which determine the "place" of the function was shown. The first factor reported in the cited Master's thesis was "the attitudes of top management." This portion of the chapter will review what is reported in the literature about the above quoted factors.

Walter Buckley quotes [George Mead's description of] how an "organized self" arises in the individual and becomes the "reflexive seat" of decisionmaking and control behavior. This "organized self" is the ". . . organization by the

---

[49] C. I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, 30th ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 256.

organism of the set of attitudes toward its social environment and toward itself from the standpoint of that environment."[50] The implication of this is seen in the second proposition of "administrative man theory" mentioned earlier: "Decisions are made within the unique frame of reference or 'psychological set' of the decisionmaker."[51] Patterns of attitudes and behavior are implicit in the above. While it is not the purpose of this research to examine attitude theory in any depth, certain points from the literature must be established to support subsequent discussion on the role the variable, the decisionmaker, plays in the problem of this thesis.

Attitude and Behavior

There are two views about the direction of causality in attitudes and behavior. One says attitudes cause behavior; and the other says behavior causes attitudes.[52] Attitudes perform four functions for the personality:

1. The "adjustment function" is derived from the tendency to maximize rewards and minimize penalties.

---

[50] W. Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 98.

[51] A. C. Filley and R. J. House, Managerial Process and Organizational Behavior (Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1969), p. 115.

[52] H. C. Triandis, Attitude and Attitude Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1971), p. 6.

2. "Ego-defensive function" allows the individual to protect himself from acknowledging uncomplimentary basic truths.

3. "Value-expressive function" gives pleasure because they allow the person to reveal basic values he holds dear.

4. "Knowledge function" is based on the individuals need to give structure to his environment, to understand it, to predict events, etc.[53]

"Attitudes are inferred," writes H. C. Triandis, "from what a person says about an attitude object, from the ways he feels about it, and from the way he says he will behave toward it."[54] What one actually does is dependent on the relationship between attitudes and behavior. The naive view, notes Triandis, considers the relationship strong when, in fact, it is rather weak.[55] Behavior is not only determined by what people would like to do, but also by social norms, habits and the expected consequences of the behavior.[56] Regarding behavior then, it is a function of attitudes, norms, habits and expectancies about reinforcements.[57]

---

[53] D. Katz, "The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes," (Public Opinion Quarterly, 1960, 24, pp. 163-204), in H. C. Triandis, Attitude and Attitude Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1971). p. 5.

[54] Triandis, op. cit., p. 14. [55] Loc. cit.

[56] Loc. cit. [57] Triandis, op. cit., p. 16.

Attitudes, norms and habits combine to produce behavior. Regarding the view that behavior causes attitudes, there is experimental evidence that beliefs, attitudes and values of a group are determined by their task experiences.[58]

The point of this discussion of attitudes and behavior is to give content to Mead's notion of the "organized self" and H. Simon's notions of "frame of reference" and "psychological set" of the decisionmaker. As previously stated, the patterns of attitudes and behavior are implicit in these notions. Of importance to the thesis problem, the decisionmaker does come to the organizational situation with Mead's "organized self" and Simon's "frame of reference" or "psychological set." Psychological constraints are imposed on his decision processes or "decision-style."

Filley and House cite research evidence which supports the second proposition of "administrative man theory." One variable determining a decisionmaker's "psychological set" according to these authors is his perceptual process. Citing the research of Costello and Zalkind, the authors identify five ways in which perception is distorted:

1. Persons are influenced by considerations they are unable to identify;

2. difficult perceptual judgments are sometimes distorted by irrelevant cues;

3. emotional factors enter into abstract or intellectual judgments;

4. people tend to rely on favorable sources of information more than unfavorable or unknown sources;

---

[58]Triandis, op. cit., p. 6.

> 5. it is unlikely that anyone facing a decision is able to identify all the factors on which his judgments are based . . . (when he can he finds it difficult to estimate how much weight he gives to each.[59]

Subjective criteria enter into decisionmaking behavior despite the oft heard claims of objective rationality. Research shows that under complex decision conditions, persons fail to use information that assists in avoiding error; they chose instead, their own subjective criteria.[60]

Concerning proposition 2 of "administrative man theory," Filley and House summarize the research evidence as follows:

> . . . the evidence rather convincingly demonstrates that man does apply his own subjective rationality in problem-solving and decisionmaking situations, and that as the complexity or difficulty of the problem increases, the use of subjective rationality becomes less and less adequate.[61]

The relevance of this discussion to the public affairs staff function is that the information seeking, processing and dissemination behavior is a function of the decision-makers "psychological set" or "frame of reference." There are "bounds of rationality" using Simons term.

---

[59] T. W. Costello and S. S. Zalkind, Psychology in Administration (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963) in Filley and House, Managerial Process and Organizational Behavior (Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1969), p. 115.

[60] R. E. Morin, "Strategies in Games with Saddle Points," Journal of Experimental Psychology, in Filley and House, op. cit., p. 116.

[61] Filley and House, op. cit., p. 116. *H. Simon defines decision as "subjectively rational" if it maximizes attainment relative to the actual knowledge of the subject.

> The principle of bounded rationality: the capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solutions is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world--or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality.[62]

Simon writes that to predict decision behavior:

> . . . we must understand the way in which this simplified model* is constructed, and its construction will certainly be related to his psychological properties as a perceiving, thinking, and learning animal.[63]
>
> Present behavior emerges from the past and is conditioned by possible future results. Man's ensemble of symbols represents a mapping of possible behavioral relations with his environment, which may be continually created by mutual stimulation and responses of gesturing individuals interacting in the environment.[64]

It may follow then that a decisionmakers cognition of the public affairs function, his beliefs about the function and his past behavior with respect to public affairs will largely determine the place and effectiveness of public affairs.

(See H. A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, A Study of Decisionmaking Processes in Administrative Organizations, (2d ed.) (New York: The Free Press, 1957), p. 76.

[62] H. A. Simon, Models of Man-Social and Rational (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957), p. 198.

[63] Ibid., p. 199.

*Regarding "simplified model," Simon writes that the first consequence of the principle of bounded rationality is that the decisionmaker is required to construct a simplified model of the real situation in order to deal with it. Loc. cit.

[64] Buckley, op. cit., p. 99.

Before concluding this section, mention must be made of the decision behavior of others in the OASD (PA) environment with respect to sharing information. From empirical study it is possible to note some of the social forces which direct information flow:

1. On the whole, they are motivational forces--people communicate or fail to communicate in order to achieve some goal, satisfy some need or improve their immediate situation.

2. In pursuit of work goals, communication is with those who will help achieve aims, and not with those who will not assist, or may retard aim attainment.

3. Communication is directed toward those who can give security and gratify needs, and away from those who threaten, make them feel anxious and generally provide unrewarding experiences.

4. In organizations, persons tend to communicate as if they were trying to improve their position.[65]

The discussion of the social forces directing information flow is pertinent to the earlier discussion of the dysfunctions of functionalism and the problems of achieving integration in formal organizations.

Thus far, the literature and research findings have shown the general effects of organization environment and the

---

[65] G. T. Vardarmann and C. C. Halterman, Managerial Control Through Communication (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), pp. 313-315.

decisionmaker operating in such an environment. As to the third principal variable, the public affairs practitioner, all of the forementioned applies to him equally. More specifically, he must achieve effectiveness inspite of the difficulties that the aforesaid implies. The practitioner will be addressed specifically in Chapter V. Hopefully, some conclusions and recommendations can be offered.

SUMMARY

In this chapter the role and function of public affairs/public relations, as discussed in the literature, was presented. The research of L. F. Hamle was cited to demonstrate the status of the function in corporate management--"Corporate management . . . has placed the function in the higher levels of the organization structure." A survey of 182 corporations by R. W. Miller revealed that in 39 percent of the corporations the person in charge of public relations was a member of the policymaking group. In the 78 percent of the cases the public relations man reported to the President-Chairman of the corporation. The role and function was seen to be increasingly an integral part of policymaking. Why there are variations in the status of public affairs/public relations in an organization were then explored. Research identified a list of factors. Of import for this study were the factors relating to the organization

environment, the attitudes and values of top management (decisionmaker(s)), and the public affairs practitioner himself.

These three variables were discussed, specifically to subsume them under a theoretical framework which might further the explanatory effort of this research. The organization environment was discussed in terms of organization theorists' views of functionalism and problems of integration. The decisionmaker was discussed in terms of "administrative man theory" and the public affairs practitioner was stated to have been subject to both variables. The practitioner is not only affected, however, but he also affects. This point will be discussed after the interview of DOD public affairs personnel have been discussed.

This chapter has established a broader reference for the role of public affairs and for those variables which can operate to hinder the effective integration of the function into the policymaking process. The following chapter, after explaining the research methodology, focuses on what was actually learned by visiting DOD and interviewing some public affairs personnel.

CHAPTER III

METHOD OF RESEARCH AND RESULTS

GENERAL

This chapter includes a discussion of the research method and technique, specification of data needed to answer the questions of the problem analysis, identification of the sources, technique for gathering and analyzing the data and a discussion of what was revealed in the interviews of DOD public affairs personnel.

METHOD

The research method used is descriptive research. As such, this study does not have a set of clearly delineated dependent and independent variables.[1] Although three variables are the foci of this study, the direction of their relationships is not explored. That the relationships are interactive is assumed.

The research problem is: Determine what variables affect the role of public affairs as a staff function in the

---

[1] J. L. Simon, Basic Research Methods in Social Sciences--The Art of Empirical Investigation (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 52-3.

Department of Defense and hinder or facilitate the integration of the function during the planning phase of the decision process. Secondary and primary sources discussed in the preceding chapter identified some variables which effect the role of public affairs in corporations and the Army Staff. Briefly, these sources revealed the following:

a. R. Sullivan's Masters Thesis[2]

1. Attitudes of top management.

2. Capabilities and personalities of public relations staff.

3. General organization structure and policy.

4. Organization's traditions goals and objectives.

5. Company product and market areas.

6. Company size and location.

7. Big government.

b. Smith Committee Report

1. Lack of recognition of the information implications on the part of action officers and their supervisors.

2. Relatively low level of authority and responsibility of those selected by Army Staff agencies to implement information liaison activities.

---

[2]R. Sullivan, "Evaluation of a Corporate Public Relations Function," (Masters Thesis, University of Wisconsin 1967), S. M. Cutlip and A. H. Center, Effective Public Relations, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), p. 159.

3. The information liaison officer (ILO) is only the initial point of contact and does not follow through on an action.[3]

The first four of R. Sullivan's listing and all of the Smith Committee listings are pertinent to this problem. In the preceding chapter these listings were collapsed under three variables and discussed as such. The variables selected were those revealed in the interviews of DOD personnel. The variables are:

a. The organizational environment (Sullivan's third and fourth items and all three of the Smith Committee Report).

b. The decisionmaker (Sullivan's first item and the first two of the Smith Committee Report).

c. The public affairs practitioner (Sullivan's second item).

The findings of R. Sullivan and the Smith Committee Report describe "what is" external to, but relevant to, the specific research problem.

"What is" was discussed at length in terms of related theory which may contribute to an understanding of why. In brief, the decisionmaker was said to have a particular frame of reference or psychological set which he brings to the organizational setting. This frame of reference is the locus

---

[3]BG R. Smith, "A New Direction for Army Information--Final Report of the Smith Committee," January 1969 (OCINFO).

of his decision behavior. His search behavior with respect to alternatives and information is stimulated by dissatisfaction with his existing status. What he does is dependent on the relationships between his attitudes and behavior. His attitudes can be inferred not only from what he does, but to some extent by what he says he will do. The preceding is not absolute because behavior is also a function of norms, habits and expectancies about reinforcement. In a simplified way, the decisionmakers "todays" are significantly influenced by the organizing impetus of his yesterdays. To predict decision behavior it is necessary to understand that the way one decides is related to his psychological organization as a perceiving, thinking and learning being. If a decisionmaker tends to be impulsive when faced with complexity, one would expect him to continue to do so as long as this behavior is reinforced by favorable consequences. If a decisionmaker has enjoyed the benefits of good public affairs advice in policymaking, one would expect this information source will continue to be used. With respect to the organization environment variable, the points of view of various authors were offered. Briefly, these views indicated that there are dysfunctions inherent in functional organization. Achieving integration among functions requires an understanding of both structure and human nature as they affect communications networks. As noted in Chapter II, there are social forces which direct information flow in communication

networks. Goal achievement and need satisfaction promote communications. Communication is directed towards those who help not those who retard goal achievement. Organizationally, people communicate as if they were trying to improve their position. The public affairs function must aid others in their goal-seeking activities if the function is to be an active terminal in a communications network. Simply, the PAO must show others what he can do for them. Then timely communications will be directed at the public affairs function allowing the PAO to know his environment, anticipate events and formulate alternatives for inclusion in policy-making.

"What is" with respect to the specific research problem was determined by the interview of DOD public affairs personnel (Appendix 6, Transcript of Interviews).

Regarding methodology, the following comments are appropriate to the interview:

1. The sample was not randomly selected. the researcher asked that a mixture of persons with varying ranks and experience levels be among those interviewed.

2. Respondents were interviewed in their working environment.

3. In that the thrust of the study had not yet been identified, it was desirable to have the respondents focus freely on the original problem to see what trend(s) if any would emerge from their responses. Therefore, the interview

technique used was an open-ended modification of the "focused interview." D. Miller describes the "focused interview as being a technique where attention is focused upon a given experience and its effects; the interviewer knows in advance what topics or questions he wishes to cover.[4]

4. To provide some explanation for "what is," during analysis the variables of the problem were subsumed in a larger context where empirically tested theory and propositions might provide a base for explanation. This larger context was discussed briefly above and at length in the preceding chapter.

SPECIFICATION OF DATA NEEDED AND SOURCES OF DATA

1. The proper role of public affairs? This question is answered by both the literature on public affairs/public relations and the Department of Defense Directives governing the role and function of OASD(PA). The discussion of the first source was presented in the preceding chapter. The role as specified by directive was discussed in Chapter I. The implementing directive is at Appendix 3.

2. What variables affect the proper functioning? The literature identifies some factors which affect the role and functioning of public affairs. These factors were cited in the previous chapter. To discover what variables were

---

[4]D. Miller, Handbook of Research Design and Social Measurement, 2d ed. (David McKay, Inc., 1970).

actually operating in the OASD (PA) environment only inference could be made from the general literature--it was necessary to visit DOD and interview participants in the public affairs process. Three variables were deduced from the verbal behavior of the respondents: the organization environment, the decisionmaker and the public relations practitioner.

3. What measures are employed to insure that the function is integrated in the decision process? This question could be answered by viewing policy directives and implementing procedures established within DOD to facilitate integration; and by interviewing participants in the process. The sources for answering this question are: Interview data, extracts of the Smith Committee Report, extract of the SOP for Army duty officers, Army Chief of Staff Regulation 360-1 and the basic DOD directives organizing OASD (PA).

4. How does the functioning of public affairs in DOD compare with the public affairs function in some large U.S. corporations. To properly answer this question it would be necessary to survey major U.S. corporations regarding the research problem in a general sense. Time and other requirements presented an obstacle. The literature does provide some clues. Additional information from the Public Relations Institute at Syracuse University in July 1972 has also been helpful. The researcher gained some insight into the operations of public relations in Texaco, Inc., during a field trip in April 1972.

5. What are some of the implications of 1, 2, 3, and 4 for the public relations officer in the U.S. Army? This question can be answered through deduction from the responses to questions 1, 2, 3, and 4.

TECHNIQUES FOR GATHERING DATA

See transcript of interviews, at Appendix 6.

TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING DATA

The interview data was subjected to a qualitative content analysis. Responses were classified in the categories shown in the following tabulation. This classification provided the identification of the three variables which are the foci of the investigation.

QUALITATIVE TABULATION OF INTERVIEW DATA

1. Reasons given for the perceived resolution of the problem at participants' levels. (R=respondent)

R_1 and R_2--Role of Secretary and Mr. Henkin.

R_3 --Chief of Staff of the Army emphasis.

R_4 --Chief of Staff Memorandum.

R_5 --Chief of Staff and CINFO emphasis.

R_6 --Cooperation at the top.

R_7* --

R_8 --Actions of Mr. Henkin.

R_9* --

R_{10}* --

*R_7, who did not indicate at what level the problem was most prevalent, did indicate that if there was a failure in the PA function it was the commanders' fault because DINFOS (Defense Information School) provided PIOs and PAOs the necessary education for the level of assignment.

R_9, who said the problem was prevalent at the field level, indicated that rank may be the problem at some levels.

R_{10}, who said that the problem was prevalent at the field level, indicated that the professionalism of the public affairs practitioner was key to resolving the problem.

2. Participant suggestions of what must be done to alleviate the problem when it is prevailing at any level.

R_1 --"attunement" of top man to public affairs.

R_2 --concurs with R_1

R_3 --emphasis at the top.

R_4 --emphasis at the top.

R_5 --educate commanders; emphasis at the top; PAO/PIO initiative.

R_6 --educate commanders in the field who are resistant and who also serve at staff level here and continue to be resistant.

R_7 --practitioner must sell himself while gaining experience--train commanders and other staff agencies--acquire more means of educating.

R_8 --PA people must gain confidence of commanders, sell commander first (can't overlook personalities).

R_9 --recognize that success is partly due to the personality and knowledge of the commander.

R_{10} --need professionals in public affairs who are naval professionals first. (R_{10} is a member of the U.S. Navy)

TREATMENT OF RESPONSES WITH RESPECT TO VARIABLES IDENTIFIED

1. Principle variables derived by summarizing 2 above.

Variable	Respondents who directly or indirectly identified the variable.
The decisionmaker	R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R_5, R_6, R_7, R_9
The organization environment	R_3, R_4, R_5, R_6, R_7
The public affairs practitioner	R_5, R_7, R_8, R_{10}
Education or learning behavior	R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R_5, R_6, R_7, R_8, R_9, R_{10}

2. Operational definitions for the variables/categories which are the foci of this research.

Decisionmaker: The principal policymaker/problem-solver at the organization level of concern. At DOD he is the Secretary of Defense. At the service level he is the Chief of Staff of the service or the Secretary of that service. At a command level he is the commander.

Organizational environment: The interacting relationships of a staff at a given level of command encompassing those functional areas with which the public affairs staff coordinates.

Public affairs practitioner: The principal public affairs/public information advisor and operator at a given staff level.

QUANTITATIVE TABULATION OF INTERVIEW DATA

Item 1--Interviewee perceptions of level at which problem is most prevalent.

Interviewee/ Respondent	Levels of Problem Prevalence			
	OSD	Military Service Level	Below OSD Military Service Level	At All Levels
R_1 (USAF/DOD)		X		
R_2 (USMC/DOD)		X		
R_3 (DAC)*			X	
R_4 (Army)*			X	
R_5 (Army)			X	
R_6 (USAF/DOD)				X
R_7 (USAF)*			X	
R_8 (USAF)				X
R_9 (Army/DOD)*			X	
R_{10} (Navy)			X	
TOTALS=10	0	2	6	2

NOTE: In some instances respondents specifically identified the level at which the problem was most prevalent. In the cases asterisked, the problem level is inferred from the focus of the reply that respondents made to the research problem question. Sixty percent of the respondents place the problem at a level lower than OSD/Military Service level. Eighty percent place the problem at a lower level than their own. It might prove interesting to ascertain at what level lower level public affairs personnel would place the problem.

Item 2--Interviewee perceptions of what must be done to alleviate the problem regardless of the level at which it prevails.

Interviewee/ Respondents	Corrective Actions				
	(a)Emphasis at the Top	(b)Educate Top Commanders	(c)Personality and knowledge of commander	PAO/ PIO Initiative	Educate Staff Personnel
R_1 (USAF/DOD)	X				
R_2 (USMC/DOD)	X				
R_3 (DAC)	X				
R_4 (Army)	X				
R_5 (Army)	X	X		X	
R_6 (USAF/DOD)		X			
R_7 (USAF)		X		X	X
R_8 (USAF)				X	
R_9 (Army/DOD)			X		
R_{10} (Navy)				X	
TOTALS=10*	5	3	1	4	1
N=14	35.7%	21.4%	7.07%	28%	7.07%

*Some respondents offered more than one corrective action. Actual responses=14.

Item 3--Variables identified which affect the role of public affairs participation in policymaking.

Interviewee/ Respondent	Variables Identified			
	Education/ Learning	Decision-maker	Organization Environment	Public Affairs Practitioner
R_1 (USAF/DOD)	X*	X	X	
R_2 (USMC/DOD)	X*	X	X	
R_3 (DAC)	X*	X	X	
R_4 (Army)	X*	X	X	
R_5 (Army)	X	X	X	X
R_6 (USAF/DOD)	X	X	X	
R_7 (USAF)	X	X	X	X
R_8 (USAF)	X			X
R_9 (Army/DOD)	X	X		
R_{10} (Navy)	X			X
TOTALS=10	10	8	7	4

NOTE: Responses=29 since some respondents identified more than one variable. *Reference to education or learning is inferred from their responses, rather than a recording of specific statements. While the education/learning variable was not a focus of the research, it is present in interviewees' responses. I speculate that this variable is intervening or is a dimension or condition state of the other three

variables. What is important is that these variables can be identified from the responses and are in consonance with the first four factors identified in R. Sullivans thesis. These variables do operate to hinder or facilitate the integration of public affairs during the decision process--they affect the status of the function.

DISCUSSION OF INTERVIEW DATA

From item 1 of the quantitative tabulation, the most striking indicator is that few respondents perceive that there is a problem in public affairs participation in policymaking at their level or the next higher level. The problem is perceived to be at lower levels. Item 1 of the qualitative data may shed some light on this. Seven of the ten respondents specifically attributed the resolution of the problem at their level to the role/action of their level's key decisionmaker, or to the actions of the key public affairs practitioner in concert with the decisionmaker. The other three indirectly suggested the role of the commander or the relative rank and professionalism of the public affairs practitioner.

The qualitative expression of what is necessary to alleviate the problem at any level is tabulated in item 2 of the quantitative data. It is readily seen that correction of the problem is seen by half of the interviewees as a function of "emphasis at the top." Corrective actions (a), (b)

and (c) relate to the key decisionmaker. When responses in those categories are combined, actions by the decisionmaker are considered necessary to correct the problem in 65 percent of the responses. This closely parallels the previous observation when 70 percent of the respondents indicate the problem was resolved at their level because of "emphasis at the top." Interestingly, only 28 percent of the responses pointed to the need for corrective action by public affairs persons taking the initiative.

Regarding the variables identified as facilitating or hindering the role of public affairs participation in policymaking, the findings are not surprising. Prior to any tabulation, the researcher sensed the presence of these variables during the interviews. It is for that reason that the literature was reviewed to ascertain whether these same variables had been previously identified. As reported in Chapter II, they had been reported. The variable, education/learning, in item 3 of the quantitative tabulation can be reasonably assumed to be intervening or interacting with respect to the other three. The function of this variable may actually be key to resolving the problem. The function of learning, formal or informal, is implicit in the "administrative man theory" discussed in Chapter II. Actually it is moot whether an economic theory or administrative man theory is appropriate since both provide for adaptive behavior whether minimaxing or just learning to alter ones perceptual model.[5]

What is clear then is:

1. The variables identified in other research are found to be operational in the DOD public affairs environment.

2. Interviewees for the most part do not perceive the problem as existing at their level or the next higher level.

3. Interviewees for the most part perceived the problem as existing at the services in the field level.

4. Interviewees perceived that the key to resolving the public affairs problem of participation in policymaking resides in the role of the key decisionmaker, and then to the relationship of the public affairs practitioner with the key decisionmaker.

The above might be summarized in the following proposition:

The effective participation of public affairs in the policymaking process is a function of the attunement of the key decisionmaker, the skill and aggressiveness of the public affairs practitioner and the organizational environment.

---

[5] H. A. Simon in Models of Man-Social and Rational, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957) compares game theory and learning theory as explainers of rational behavior. He is the author of "administrative man theory" cited previously.

SUMMARY

This chapter discussed the research method and technique for interviewing DOD personnel to ascertain what variables operate to facilitate or hinder the integration of the public affairs staff function in the DOD policymaking process.

How the three variables, which are the foci of this study, came to be identified was also described. Qualitative and quantitative tabulation of interviewee responses demonstrate the existence of the three variables--decisionmaker, organization environment and the public affairs practitioner.

Of significance is the confirmation that the variables found to be operating to influence the public affairs function in general are also operating in the specific instance of DOD. This may have been reasonably assumed using intuition; however, with respect to increasing knowledge, it is not now necessary to rely on assumption or intuition.

In the preceding chapter the three variables identified from the literature and other research were subsumed in a larger theoretical framework and discussed largely outside the context of the specific DOD environment. This was done to increase the understanding of decisionmakers behavior and to identify some dysfunctions of functional organization in general. In this chapter the existence of the three variables in DOD were verified. In the succeeding chapter the findings of the former will be merged to attempt to arrive

at some generalizations. The generalizations will be directed at determining how the role and function of public affairs might be better integrated in the policymaking process at DOD.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION OF A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter the questions asked in the analysis of the research problem will be reviewed. The answers to these questions as derived from the research and discussed in preceding chapters will be stated. The findings of this study will be compared to the findings in the literature at large so that the former can be brought into the larger pool of knowledge. Recommendations which follow from the foregoing will be offered with particular emphasis given to the public affairs practitioner, who to this point has been discussed peripherally.

THE PROBLEM AND ITS ANALYSIS

Research Problem

Determine what variables affect the role of public affairs as a staff function and hinder or facilitate the integration of the function during the planning phase of the decision process.

Problem Analysis

In Chapter I it was stated that the answers to certain questions would emerge as the problem was investigated.

These questions were:

1. What is the proper role of the staff function?

2. What variables affect the proper functioning?

3. What measures are employed to insure that the function is integrated in decision processes?

4. How does the functioning of public affairs compare with the public affairs function in some large U.S. corporations?

5. What are some of the implications of the above for the public affairs/information officer in the U.S. Army?

THE PROPER ROLE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

In Chapter I there is a statement regarding the proper role of public affairs. There it was reported that there is no unanimity, even among practitioners, on a single proper function common to all--"The role performed and the stature enjoyed vary . . . from one institution to the next."[1] With respect to DOD public affairs, the proper role is not in question. The stature of the function may vary as conditioned by the three variables discussed in Chapters II and III. Regarding the proper role, the DOD directive specifies that a function of OASD (PA) is:

---

[1]Cutlip and Center, Effective Public Relations, op. cit., p. 156.

> Provide policy guidance . . . on public affairs matters and approve public affairs aspects of actions which have national or international significance in the fields of public information and community relations.[2]

Participation in decision/policy processes is specified as a proper function. This aspect of the problem is therefore moot. What is germane is why the function is not included in the process, since the implementing directive states that it ought to be? It has been previously asserted that the answer lies in the interaction of the three variables: decisionmaker, organizational environment and the public affairs practitioner. The interplay of these variables influence the difference between what ought to be and what is. What ought to be is specified by directives and illustrated in organization charts. What is was sufficiently at variance to cause OASD (PA) to submit the topic as a research problem. In the course of operations a problem is perceived, yet in DOD Directive 5122.5, Part IV, Relationships the following provisions are made:

1. Secretaries of the military departments and their staffs shall exchange information and cooperate fully with OASD (PA).

2. All major components of DOD shall secure the advice of OASD (PA) through established command channels

---

[2] Department of Defense Directive No. 5122.5, "Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), July 10, 1961, p. 2, para 1.

before taking actions which have significant public affairs implications.

3. All major components of DOD shall provide pertinent information to OASD (PA) to enable concurrent planning to the end that maximum information within the limits of national security can be made available to the public.

It would seem from the above that not only has the proper role been specified, but prescriptive conditions necessary for the execution of that role have been insured. This is not perceived as so by the researcher. The onus for what has significant public affairs implications and what is pertinent information rests with the DOD components. The directive allows functional areas the latitude to determine when another function has an interest. Several points from the literature cited in Chapter II are pertinent.

--function heads seek decisions beneficial to their function.

--information shared is often trivial because of motivational pressures.

--problems tend to be solved in terms of whats best for a department, not what is best for the organization as a whole.

--cooperation is minimized as a result of self-interest or function interest.

--there is a relationship between the degree to which goals, norms and values are shared and the ability of two

groups to cooperate.

--differences in goals and perceptions of reality could be conditions for intergroup conflict.

The above are only a few of the dysfunctions of functional organization cited in Chapter II. What seems to be dictated by these assertions is: Whatever is essential to the proper role of one function cannot be controlled or dictated by another function. When there is, one can expect a gap between what a function ought to do and what it actually does. As noted by Rensis Likert, the greater the degree of "requisite integration" between two subsystems, the more difficult it is to achieve integration.[3] It would assuredly be absurd if the general counsel function was dependent on other staffs ascertaining when there are legal implications and only then seeking the advice of the general counsel.

When other staffs assume what is a public affairs function, two extremes can result--everything is or nothing is--unless other staff persons are, in fact, knowledgeable about the role and functions of public affairs and sensitive to the function's requirements. Either the public affairs function should be allowed to say it has no interest, or other functions must be required to positively state that there is no public affairs implication. The latter point

---

[3]E. Kast and J. Rosenzweig, Organization and Management, A Systems Approach, op. cit., p. 233.

insures that at least some thought is given to the question. Error with accompanying consequence may motivate future coordination.

The above comments are applicable to the Army Staff. Chief of Staff Regulation 360-1 directs Army Staff Agencies to "Inform OCINFO of the status and content of plans, policies, programs, or operations, whether they are or not, if they have public information implications."[4] Again, the burden is placed on other agencies to determine if there are public information implications. It may be that this is why "firefighting" occurs. It is noteworthy that the Smith Committee Report observed that there is a "lack of recognition of the information implications on the part of action officers and their supervisors."[5] It may be that this is why the three variables identified are important.

What then is necessary if the function is to fulfill its proper role in policymaking? If the decisionmaker is attuned and emphasizes the function, if the organizational environment is receptive to and aware of the import of the function to the organization, then the public affairs function will be properly included in the policymaking process--

---

[4]Chief of Staff Regulation No. 360-1, "Army Information-Army Staff Public Information Program," Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, (Washington, D.C., 4 January 1972), p. 2, para b(8).

[5]Smith Committee Report, op. cit., p. IV-G-3.

if the public affairs agency takes the necessary initiative and reinforces the foregoing with a good "track record."

The decisionmaker, the organization environment, and the public affairs practitioner are the principal variables which affect the role of public affairs. Those variables hinder or facilitate the integration of the function during the planning phase of the decision process.

The preceding assertion is supported by the following:

1. The findings reported in R. Sullivan's Masters Thesis--"Evaluation of a Corporate Public Relations Function" cited on page 62, Chapter III.

2. The findings of the Smith Committee Report cited on page 62-3, Chapter III.

3. The results of the interview of DOD personnel cited in Chapter III.

THE VARIABLES WHICH AFFECT THE PROPER FUNCTIONING

Relationship of the Findings to Theory

The decisionmaker. Early in this thesis the "up and down" nature of the public affairs function in organizations was noted. Cutlip and Center were cited as observing that one of the factors causing this changing status was "the differing values of succeeding executives." A similar factor was cited in R. Sullivan's Masters Thesis as "the attitudes

of top management." The two similar factors differing values and attitudes, are critical to understanding the function of the decisionmaker as a variable in this research problem. Two of the propositions of "administrative man theory" are directly relevant to these factors:

> Choice is always made with respect to a simplified model of the real situation.
>
> Decisions are made within the unique frame of reference or 'psychological set' of the decisionmaker . . .[6]

C. W. Borklund makes a similar point in his discussion of how Secretaries of Defense exercise functional control:

> . . . how well each Secretary has exercised control has been, in part, a product of his own preference in management methods, and in part, a product of the time and circumstances when he served.[7]

Considering the propositions of theory and Borklund's comment, we can understand why Melvin Laird may have been attuned to Congress's needs as asserted by one of the interviewees, and the increased use of participative management which is a contemporary technique. On these two points the former Secretary noted:

> The decisionmaking process in Defense . . . has changed. Now the emphasis is on participatory management, with both our civilian and military leaders being given an opportunity to be heard fully before decisions are reached. There is also a changed relationship

---

[6] A. C. Filley and R. J. House, Managerial Process and Organizational Behavior, op. cit., p. 107.

[7] C. W. Borklund, The Department of Defense, op. cit. p. 119.

AD-A091 484 ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS F/G 5/1
VARIABLES AFFECTING THE INTEGRATION OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN DEFENS--ETC(U)
1973 F H LEIGH

UNCLASSIFIED SBIE-AD-E750 027 NL

2 OF 3
AD
A091484



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS 1963 A

> between the Department of Defense and the Congress . . . we recognize the partnership that must exist.[8]

During the period when Melvin Laird was Secretary of Defense, the key decisionmaker was apparently attuned to a need for an informed public. What evidence exists to demonstrate that his "frame of reference" or "perceptual set" may have indicated an attunement to the public affairs function? Mr. Laird was formerly a Congressman. As such he openly advocated passage of the current Freedom of Information Act.

> The importance of the public information function was vigorously established in the debate that preceded enactment of the FOI (Freedom of Information) law. Many Senators and representatives asserted the "right to know" of the public. Among the most articulate proponents were . . . Representative Melvin Laird (Wisconsin) . . .[9]

If verbal behavior is some index of disposition toward an activity, the following comments of Secretary Laird are further suggestive of his attunement to the public affairs function:

> . . . a strong, free country and a strong free press go hand in hand . . . What we need is not to shout at one another. Rather, we need to sit down and talk over together the problems of national security news coverage which have arisen in the past decade or so. It is time for improved professional contacts . . . that recognize

---

[8] Melvin R. Laird, National Security Strategy A Realistic Deterrence, Annual Defense Department Report FY 1973, (US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., No. 0800-0165), p. 5.

[9] J. S. Rosapepe, "Neither Pinkertons nor Publicity Men," Public Relations Journal, Vol. 28, No. 10, October 1971, p. 49.

past mistakes and seek future understanding.[10]

> Our obligation to provide the public with accurate timely information on major Department of Defense programs will require in some instances, detailed public information planning and coordination within the department and with other government agencies . . . sole purpose of such planning and coordination will be to expedite the flow of information to the public.[11]

As further evidence, Mr. Daniel Henkin advised a Naval War College audience that as of November 1972, Secretary Laird had made 135 public addresses and 185 "on the record" news conferences.[12] The foregoing support one of the interviewees comments regarding Secretary Lairds' role in resolving this research problem: ". . . improvement probably due to Laird . . . a political . . . attuned . . . over time this has filtered down to lower levels . . ."

What is key in the foregoing discussion is that regarding the decisionmaker as a variable hindering or facilitating the function of public affairs in the policy-making process, his past experiences and learning should largely determine his perceptions of the public affairs function and how well that function is integrated. As

---

[10] Address by the Honorable Daniel Z. Henkin, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., November 16, 1972, (OASD (PA) News Release), p. 2.

[11] Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the JCS, etc., Subject: Public Information Principles, Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., March 1969. Memo reported in Congressional Record-Senate, No. 197, Vol. 115, December 1, 1969, p.

[12] Address of the Honorable Daniel Z. Henkin, op. cit. p. 2.

George Meade noted, ". . . an 'organized self' arises in the individual and becomes the 'reflexive seat' of decisionmaking and control behavior."[13] That organized self according to Meade, is the organization of a set of attitudes with respect to the self and the environment from the standpoint of the environment. As noted previously this is the "frame of reference" or "perceptual set" of which H. Simon writes in "administrative man theory." Several interviewees indicated a pragmatic awareness of this in their statements such as:

1. The same commanders who are resistant in the field are resistant when assigned at this level.

2. No substitute for the ability to sell yourself.

3. You have to ask what is the training of commanders regarding this (PA) role.

4. We do need more means to educate . . . about how and why to use public information and public affairs.

5. If you can't sell your commander on information, how can you sell anything else. If he (IO) gains confidence of the commander, he will be in on every action at any level.

6. You can't overlook the role of personalities in this problem.

What is inferred from the above is, given that the decisionmaker comes to the organization setting with a frame of reference, the public affairs function interacts with the

---

[13] W. Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory, p. 98.

embodiment of that frame of reference, not merely the organizational description of the roles and functions of the decisionmaker. It is as critical then for the public affairs practitioner to assess and analyze this internal public affairs target as he would any other public affairs target. Not to manipulate, but to adapt so that the function can effect its proper role for the sake of the organization.

A comment from an interviewee in OASD (PA) suggests that the above may be an informal process already. The researcher asked what was the expectant impact of the change in Secretaries? The respondent indicated that no one really knew but there may be a period of education and adjustment. It would seem sensible to ascertain just what the individual's past experiences and behavior have been. This should not be too difficult when an individual is transferring from another executive branch agency.

More than the decisionmakers yesterdays' decision behavior is important. C. W. Borklund notes several other factors which, in the opinion of the researcher, can indirectly influence the public affairs function in DOD. Among these are: increased inter-service rivalries, reduced budgets and the conflict of interest emerging therefrom, and the support of the President for the particular Secretary. These factors also influence the total environment in which public affairs operates.[14]

---

[14] C. W. Borklund, op. cit., pp. 119-124.

It would be too simplistic then to assert that when the Secretary of Defense or the commander is in favor of public affairs participation that the function will always be included, or will be cooperatively received by other staff agencies. It should be remembered that Secretary McNamara's management theories did not happen overnight. As Borklund notes, "It took nearly two years at the top Pentagon level itself to build a broad base of understanding about how the Department was to be run . . ."[15] While the matter of the public affairs function is in no way as pervasive a change as the introduction of McNamara's techniques, the latter does illustrate the extent to which the organization environment can be resistant to the decisionmaker's actions and policies. In the instance of this research problem one can note that despite the specification of the roles, functions and relationships of OASD (PA) informal directives, there still exists the public affairs complaint of not being included at the planning stage of the policymaking process. As noted in the beginning of this chapter, deliberately or not--the DOD directive places the onus for determining what is pertinent information and what has significant public affairs implications on the DOD component agencies. The directive, when signed by the Secretary, has the effect of law notes Borklund.[16]

---

[15] C. W. Borklund, op. cit., p. 131.

[16] Borklund, op. cit., p. 114.

> But there is a good deal more to controlling and directing the organization effectively, than simply exercising these officially recognized tools of authority . . . The higher one climbs in the Defense management pyramid, the more decisive is the ability to persuade in determining if not what, at least how well, Defense fulfills the Secretary's demands.[17]

It is not enough then for the decisionmaker to provide for public affairs participation in policymaking by directive. "The Secretary of Defense needs from his organization both creativity and administrative harmony, doled out in proper proportions at the right time."[18] The organization itself is a variable which effects the function of public affairs. How organization environment facilitates or hinders the public affairs function will be the focus of subsequent discussion.

SUMMARY OF THE DECISIONMAKER VARIABLE

From preceding discussion the decisionmaker variable is summarized thusly: Whether the decisionmaker facilitates or hinders the integration of public affairs in the policymaking process is a function of the decisionmakers past experiences/behavior and new learning with respect to public affairs. He is also affected by the organizational environment and the public affairs practitioner. The interaction of the decisionmaker with the organization environment and the practitioner is also conditioned by the interaction

---

[17] Borklund, loc. cit. [18] Borklund, op. cit., p. 118.

between these two variables.

If H=hinder, F=facilitate, De=decisionmaker experience(s), $\longleftrightarrow$ =interaction, O=organizational environment and P=public affairs practitioner: using this symbology, whether public affairs is hinder or facilitated by the decisionmaker can be shown as:

$$H \text{ or } F \quad (De_1, De_2, \ldots, \ldots, De \longleftrightarrow (O \longleftrightarrow P))$$

It should be noted that the interaction of O and P is influenced by their own sets of experiences which partially determine the degree of cooperation or integration.

THE ORGANIZATION ENVIRONMENT AS A VARIABLE

Introduction

The preceding portion of this chapter discussed the decisionmaker as a variable hindering or facilitating the participation of the public affairs function in the policy-making process. It was shown that regardless of a favorable "frame of reference" which the decisionmaker may bring to the organization, and however he uses the authority tools which he has to effect demands, the public affairs function may still be hindered in playing its proper role. The organization environment in which the decisionmaker and the public affairs function interacts is also a variable which cannot be ignored.

All that has been said about the key decisionmaker regarding "administrative man theory" also applies to the

many lesser decisionmakers posited horizontally and vertically in the organization structure. Additionally, these lesser decisionmakers interact in functional subsystems which have their own unique patterns of interpersonal relations and subsystem perceptions of the surrounding environment. Alex Inkeles proposed:

> . . . people have experiences, develop attitudes, and form values in response to the forces or pressures which their environment creates. By 'environment' we mean, particularly, networks of interpersonal relations and the patterns of reward and punishment one normally experiences in them . . . Insofar as industrialization, urbanization and the development of large-scale bureaucratic structures and their usual accompanments create a standard environment with standard institutional pressures for particular groups to that degree should they produce relatively standard patterns of experience, attitude and value--standard, not uniform, pressures.[19]

Inkeles study was cross-cultural. This should enhance the generalizability of his findings as it applies to organizations within a single culture. In everyday experience, there are countless examples of subunits of an organization having a "we-they" attitude regarding other organizational subunits. Inkeles writes further that ". . . in accord with the differences among positions in the modern occupational hierarchy, the different occupational groups will have differentiated attitudes and values."[20] What is likely,

---

[19] Alex Inkeles, "Industrial Man: The Relations of Status to Experience, Perception, and Value," The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LXVI, July 1960. A reprint from the Bobbs-Merrill Reprint Series in the Social Sciences, p. 2.

[20] Ibid., p. 4.

observes this author, is that a particular structure of experience, attitude and value takes its form from the occupational structure.[21]

We may begin to see how complex is the nature of the variable, organization environment, as it affects the integration of the public affairs function. In Chapter II the dysfunctions of functionalism as an organizational principal were discussed in some detail. Some remedies provided by the literature were proposed which in instances were comparable to the remedies recommended in the Smith Committee Report. These remedies pertained to effective integration. Briefly these were: the formal position of integrators (ILO's on the Army Staff) who coordinate and integrate, the influence of integrators and its source, knowledge, etc.; the reward system for integrators; the level of influence in the organization; the centering of the level of influence in the hierarchy and the modes of conflict resolution.

Given a setting where the key decisionmaker is favorable to the integration of the public affairs function and the public affairs staff is competent with respect to the problem, if information is not shared horizontally and vertically--timely, the function may still be placed in a position of fighting "brushfires." Implicit in the above is a responsibility for each functional area to exchange

---

[21] Loc. cit.

information. This has been partially provided for in the DOD directive and Chief of Staff Regulation cited earlier. It should be recalled that both provide that their agencies must interact with the public information/affairs function regarding matters with significant public information implications. Where the onus for information-sharing seemingly is placed was discussed earlier in this chapter. Interestingly, the responsibility for informing the public affairs officer as specified in the "Army Information Officers Guide" is at variance with the previously cited sources. The guide states:

> Other staff officers are similarly responsible for coordinating matters in their areas of interest with the information officer. They should keep him fully informed of existing and projected plans and other activities without prejudging the information or news values involved. If pertinent facts are withheld, the information officer cannot estimate the information situation.[22]

We see then an instance of where formal documents are designed theoretically to provide for the environmental conditions necessary for the effective functioning of public affairs integrated into the policymaking process; yet, gaps are left for coordination to fail. Since things can and do "fall through the cracks" it is important to emphasize again and understand the dysfunctions of functionalism. The

---

[22] "Army Information Officers Guide," Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 360-5 (Hqs, Department of the Army, August 1966), para 2-4d., pp. 2-2.

import of the prescription in the literature to make effective use of integrators to overcome inherent dysfunctions becomes clear. Some of the dysfunctions cited in Chapter II are selectively cited here for their relevance to the specific problem. Most of the dysfunctions cited have application at all levels of Defense organization. As noted in Chapter II, some are specifically supported by the findings of the Smith Committee Report.

Factors which cause dysfunction and are assumed pertinent:

1. The conditions of interdependency generated by functionalism create strains and tensions. As staff organization emerges a special category of frictions are created between staff and line.

2. Because the division of labor gives rise to many different areas of specialization, the need for coordination becomes more paramount.

3. The special problem at executive levels is related to "empire building" and the breeding of jealousy about guarded functional segments in the organization.

4. The ultimate in efficiency is denied because of the human problems created.

5. The delegation of authority and responsibility presents a class of problems related to the "scalar" and functional processes. First of these is the insufficient

delegation of authority. The second problem stems from gaps in or overlaps of functions. Both are sources of tension and friction.[23]

Other selected dysfunctions from Rensis Likert's listing are:

1. Suboptimization results since one man cannot know all the ramifications in a given problem. He could perhaps with information; however, needed information is often not forthcoming since some individuals identify more with their function than with the organization.

2. Function heads seek decisions beneficial to their function which are not necessarily beneficial to other functions.

3. Functional organization enables a manager to benefit from keeping information to himself. He increases his own power and influence at the expense of the organization.

4. There is a tendency to feed superiors information they want to hear.

5. Competition between functions minimizes cooperation as a result of self-interest or function interest.[24] It is not enough for the key decisionmaker to direct a policy for staff interaction involving the public affairs.

---

[23] W. S. Scott, Human Relations in Management, op. cit. pp. 123-4.

[24] R. Likert, New Patterns of Management, op. cit., pp. 106-9.

Organizational factors intervene, This is so even with respect to major policy actions focused externally. As cited in Chapter I, C. W. Borklund notes:

> . . . the Secretary of Defense, heads a department of government populated by several different collections of specialists who require persuading. (Even generals are specialists . . .) Their functions are to advise the Secretary on what proper policy ought to be . . . once the Secretary has made a decision, they carry it out presumably to the best of their ability even if they disagree with it. Whether it develops by design or default, opposition to or faulty execution . . . can come from any one or some of all of these specialists. The (specialists) compete . . . Abrasions and controversy develop . . .[25]

Several factors have been cited which were said to be inherent dysfunctions of functionalism. The fact that things do "fall through the cracks" inspite of implementing directives providing for integration was also noted. One of the interviewees indicated that some things "fall through" even when the decisionmaker in another agency is motivated to coordinate. Allusion was made again to the Smith Committee Report findings of why there was a breakdown in the information-sharing activity necessary for the public information/affairs function to become involved early in the policymaking process. One can intuitively conclude that for the reasons cited, people do not talk to each other. Another view of why this is so, especially with respect to decision processes, is provided by William M. Jones in his study, Decisionmaking in Large Organizations.

---

[25] C. W. Borklund, op. cit., p. 105.

The Jones study was sponsored by the RAND Corporation and has particular relevance to military organizations and information systems. This author describes the kinds of intraorganizational communication that occur in decision processes as formal, subformal and personal. Regarding the formal level, Jones writes: ". . . an information distributing system designed solely in the pattern of the formal level will have little useful effect on the decision process, and may prove to be detrimental."[26] The formal level consists of patterns specified by organization charts, SOP's, orders and directives and messages which are a matter of record, according to W. Jones. The advantages of the formal level are that in being overt it serves as a guide to a first point of contact when communications must be established between staffs, and by being explicit it has the effect of legalizing communications at the particular level.[27] Of pertinence to this research problem and the impact of the organization environment variable, W. Jones asserts that the formal level is the structure most apparent to the outsider--". . . much of importance to the understanding of organizational attitude and activities lies beneath this surface."[28] This point is commonly understood by students

---

[26] William M. Jones, Decisionmaking in Large Organizations, Memorandum-3968-PR. (Santa Monica, Calif: The RAND Corporation, March 1964), p. v.

[27] Ibid., p. 3.

[28] Loc. cit.

of organization and communications. This point partially explains comments from interviewees such as:

1. With reference to awareness of the public affairs role--

—"Greatly improved . . . not seen as important 15 years ago by myself or my friends."

—"The same commanders who resist in the field are also assigned at this level--they will resist at OSD level--its an educational process."

—"Dr. Wilbur . . . coordinates beautifully, but occasionally things slip through there."

—"You have to ask what is the training of commanders and other staff officers regarding this role . . ."

2. With respect to inclusion in the policymaking process--

—"Its a problem at any level--always will be . . . especially (in) the military (because) it is an objective oriented organization . . . Those who traditionally participate are those who contribute directly to the achievement of the objective."

—"Part of the problem is the rank structure at a given level--(PIO) might have to fight to be heard."

—". . . There is a positive correlation between the experience of the commander and the public affairs officer in determining whether public affairs participates in decisionmaking."

The above comments serve to illustrate how the very human dimensions of education, learning, habit, status, etc., serve to defy formal directives prescribing normative behavior in organizations. W. Jones appears to classify the communications activity implicit in the above situations as subformal. To the author, the subformal level embraces those activities which are:

> . . . our way of doing things . . . rules governing their use are organizational necessities as they permit a certain latitude in operation within the formal structure and allow for personality variations that cannot be reflected in the formal organization.[29]

According to Jones, these subformal activities and attitudes are unknowable to the outsider and are usually learned by experience and example. The author notes:

> An outsider may be aware that they exist, may suspect he knows some of the rules, but is unlikely to know the degree of import the insider attaches to them.[30]

A major point of W. Jones study is that one facet of the decision process is the functionary's sense of how closely he is linked to the decision of the moment. Knowledge that a decision is being made is a consequence of information available from formal, subformal and personal sources.[31] This may be obvious. What is important is that it makes

---

[29] W. Jones, op. cit., p. 4.

[30] Op. cit., p. 5.

[31] W. Jones, op. cit., p. 14.

clear that the public affairs function cannot rely on form 1 [illegible] for its proper inclusion in the policymaking process. In redressing a situation where the public affairs staff is too often involved after the fact, the following observations of W. Jones are worthy of consideration:

1. Large organization communications with each other (external) are usually rather rigidly confined to the formal level with some superficial elements of the informal and personal levels.[32]

2. Regarding interstaff communications for decisionmaking.[33]

a. Ability to predict, and therefore influence the probable attitudes and activities of other staff agencies and elements is reduced by your lack of adequate communication with them as contrasted with your daily communication with your own staff. (Efforts to overcome this deficiency is indicated by interviewee reference to PAO/PIO taking the initiative, use of committees, attendance at meetings, etc.; all of which serve to increase the degree of interaction and awareness).

b. Communication with other staffs tend to be at the formal level. Images that one has of the other are distorted, and one is usually not conscious of these influences.

---

[32] W. Jones, op. cit., p. 7.

[33] W. M. Jones, op. cit., p. 12.

3. People and organizations that have a history of frequent interaction and consequently a reasonable degree of mutual predictability, tend to achieve coordination faster than those that have no such history.[34]

SUMMARY OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT VARIABLE

It has been shown that neither the presence of a motivated key decisionmaker, nor formal directives, nor formal descriptions of organization interaction processes are sufficient to insure the proper participation of the public affairs function in the policymaking process. Not only are there dysfunctions inherent in formal organization as discussed in Chapter II and reviewed briefly here, but structure dictates communication patterns. The aforementioned sources of problems are compounded by the very human problems they create. Education and increased interaction are necessary if the organization environment is to operate to facilitate public affairs participation in policymaking. These are required to promote mutual understanding of inter-staff roles and functions and how these relate to total organization survival. Some methods to increase interaction are presently employed at DOD level. At the highest level the morning and evening sessions described in Appendix 6 is

---

[34] Ibid., op. cit., p. 20.

operative. The use of committees, meetings and Information Liaison Officers may also serve to enhance the needed interaction so that the functionary can exploit the information available in formal, subformal and personal sources.

It appears that the public affairs officer cannot wait for the organization to initiate formal methods of interaction. Just as the key decisionmaker should be considered a "target" to be persuaded about the function, so ought the organization itself. Again not in any manipulative sense, but to insure that the staff function for which the organization does expend resources, does provide the benefit sought. The ultimate burden may well rest with the practitioner. Not because it ought to be, but because if the problem prevails, it may not be resolved without public affairs initiative. The succeeding discussion focuses on this third variable, the public affairs practitioner. In what ways does he facilitate or hinder the integration of the function in policymaking? The answers to questions 4 and 5 stated in the beginning of this chapter will be offered.

CHAPTER V

THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS PRACTITIONER

INTRODUCTION

As stated previously in this thesis, participation in policymaking is a proper public affairs staff function. Two variables which hinder this participation have been discussed. Regarding the decisionmaker variable, it was asserted that his past experiences and learning may largely determine his perceptions of the function and how well the function is integrated in the policymaking process.

An observation in a recent Military Review article illustrates the impact of experience and perceptions with respect to the command information function:

> Officers at the highest levels of the Army today were brought up on the old World War II concept of TI&E (Troop Information and Education) with a mandatory and standardized period of instruction usually delegated to a so-called TI&E NCO . . . Because the centralized concept lagged far behind the realities of the post war communication explosion, officers and NCO's developed a stereotype of TI&E that persists today . . . In spite of . . . the redesignation of troop information to command information in 1964, and . . . announced tremendous changes, many senior members of the Army still think of command information as the old TI&E period . . . their perceptions influence the attitude of those junior to them.[1]

---

[1] Paul B. Parham, LTC, USA, "Command Information," Military Review, Vol. LIII, No. 6, June 1973, pp. 39-40.

With respect to the organizational environment variable, several observations were made. It was suggested that neither the presence of a motivated key decisionmaker, nor formal directives, nor formal descriptions of organization interaction processes are sufficient to insure public affairs participation in policymaking. Education and increased interaction are necessary. These are required to promote understanding of roles and functions as they relate to the total organization.

In the preceding chapter the impact of the organizational environment was cited. This variable will not be discussed again here, but the proposition linking the three variables is useful.

The proposition previously offered was: The effective participation of public affairs in the policymaking process is a function of the key decisionmaker, the skill and aggressiveness of the public affairs practitioner and the organizational environment. If this proposition is viable, it follows that regardless of the state of the decisionmaker and organizational environment variables; integration is still dependent on the practitioner to some degree.

THE PRACTITIONER VARIABLE

In discussing the effect of the public affairs practitioner variable, the following areas will be examined:

1. How the function compares between DOD and the commercial environment.

2. Inferences from interviewee responses regarding the impact on the practitioner of the decisionmaker and the organization environment.

3. Inferences from interviewees' responses regarding the practitioner variable.

4. Policymaking as a process and policy analysis as a tool for public affairs.

The last item requires clarification. The purpose of examining this area is to uncover some methods for influencing the policymaking process despite the restraints imposed by the decisionmaker and organizational environment.

THE FUNCTION IN COMPARISON

The Role in Literature

It has been shown in Chapters I and II that the role of public affairs/public relations is generally acknowledged in both government and business. It was shown that the actual status of the role varies among organizations. L. F. Hamele's conclusion, cited previously is pertinent:

> Corporate management . . . has placed the function in the higher levels of the organization structure; . . . has recognized the specialized nature of the function and . . . has practiced sound organizational principles by the establishment of separate public relations departments headed by a specialist.*

---

*Cited in Chapter II, p. 4.

Dr. William P. Ehling** supported this observation in a telephone interview. Ehling observed that 'Xerox Corporation's public relations man is titled vice-president for Corporate Communications and he sits in on all policymaking sessions. Blue chip companies, generally include their public affairs/ public relations man in policymaking sessions. The public relations man role—plays and talks in behalf of various groups and interests to insure that these interests are heard prior to decision.' Ehling's comments are consonant with the findings of Robert W. Miller reported in Chapter II, p. 4 and 5. Briefly, Miller's study reflected the growing tendency in corporations to place the public relations function at the vice-president level. These vice-presidents were reporting to the president or chairman of the corporation.

What is the public affairs officer's role in DOD? The Defense Information School Public Affairs pamphlet states:

> . . . public affairs officer (PAO) assists and advises the commander in the speciality area of public affairs in accomplishing the mission of the command . . . the man between the command and the public . . . a two-way bridge of communication.[2]

**Dr. William P. Ehling is Chairman of the Department of Public Relations and Director of Graduate Studies at the Newhouse School of Public Communication, Syracuse University. Interview was held on 4 May 1973.

[2] Public Affairs Department Handbook, (Defense Information School, Ft. Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, September 1972), p. 1-2.

The Difference

There is a difference between commercial and governmental public relations/affairs which should be noted. The possible effect of this difference on the status and integration of the function in policymaking is beyond the scope of this study. The effect might be significant. The essential difference is:

> Commercial public relations is based on the free enterprise concepts of marketing a product or service for a private corporation. Military public affairs programs exist to provide information and maintain an awareness and concern for public opinion regarding an organization that is owned and operated by and for the American people.[3]

Failure to effectively integrate the various functions in the corporate environment might adversely affect profits. Government public affairs does not have this same dollar-driving impetus. However, failure to achieve integration can be translated into missed opportunities or losses in credibility which do represent a significant value to the organization. To illustrate: "Favorable public opinion is considered the keystone of the successful accomplishment of the Department of Defense mission."[4]

The Status in the Literature

As to why the status of the function varies among organizations, R. Sullivan identified several variables

---

[3] Public Affairs Department Handbook (Defense Information School, Ft. Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, September 1972), p. 1-1.

[4] Public Affairs Department Handbook, Ibid., p. 1-3.

listed in Chapter II, p. 6. Of importance here is his listing of--"Capabilities and personalities of public relations staff." This variable has been labled as the 'public affairs practitioner' in this study. As noted previously, this is the third major variable which hinders or facilitates the public affairs functions' participation in the policymaking process in DOD.

A subconclusion of Chapter III was: Interviewees perceived that the key to resolving the public affairs problem of participation in policymaking resides in the role of the key decisionmaker, and then to the relationship of the public affairs practitioner with the key decisionmaker. Seven of the ten respondents offered comments supportive of the aforementioned. An assumption that seems implicit in interviewee comments is that the public affairs practitioner has the requisite functional expertise. This assumption is based on the observation that most respondents asserted that the problem did not exist at their level. Additionally, only 28 percent of the responses suggested that the public affairs practitioner effects the role of the function in policymaking. In other words, few saw themselves as part of the problem. The lack of expertise, at least in experience, appears to be the source of the problem at lower levels. The following interviewee responses reflect the aforementioned.

1. With respect to experience and judgment of the PAO/PIO--

> Thats the dilemma at the lower levels . . . judgment and experience--commander versus the information officer.
>
> . . . no substitute for the ability to sell yourself while trying to gain experience . . . commanders have to be tolerant of young IO's.
>
> . . . there is a positive correlation between the experience of the commander and the public affairs officer in determining whether public affairs participates in decisionmaking.

Contrasting with the above is the expertise of the key practitioners at the higher levels. Not only have the past and present Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs had journalistic backgrounds, but they also had considerable experience in OSD public affairs prior to becoming the Assistant Secretary. Additionally, the Army Chief of Information has had prior experience. The Navy Chief of Information is the first public affairs specialist to obtain flag rank in that service.

Not only were the practitioners apparently especially qualified, but the key decisionmaker with whom they interacted was favorably disposed to the public affairs function. This was noted in the preceding chapter. There may have been other factors in the environment of the DOD which may explain the impression by some interviewees that the problem was resolved at the highest levels.

Such factors are the CBS TV report on the "Selling of the Pentagon;" Senator William Fulbrights' book, <u>The Pentagon Propaganda Machine</u>, and his Senate reports on public relations in DOD. These events occurred during the tenure

of Secretary Laird.

It might prove interesting to investigate the internal and external public affairs related actions of Mr. Laird prior to the CBS program and Senator Fulbright's inquiries. Such an inquiry is beyond the scope of this research.

While the impact of the above events has not been measured, they do illustrate that elements in the external environment of an organization may also impact on the public affairs function.

What is still important is that regardless of the source of impetus, if the key decisionmaker considers public affairs important, the function will probably be included in policymaking. This does not mean that organization factors will not impose obstacles to integration. Nor does this mean that public affairs participation will be effective or continuing.

POLICYMAKING PROCESS AND POLICY ANALYSIS

To participate in policymaking, public affairs must be able to contribute to the ends of policy. During the interviews, MG R. N. Ginsburgh made the following comment regarding public affairs participation in policymaking:

> Those who traditionally participate are those who contribute directly to the achievement of the objective . . . If he (IO) gains the confidence of the commander, he will be in on every action at every level. (Appendix 6.)

A similar sentiment is found in an article by Dan J. Forrestal. Forrestal quotes Richard Darrow as saying:

> Back a few years, a study of management attitudes indicated many corporate executives were quite critical of those public relations people who 'failed to dig deeply into the actual problems of business.' The executives . . . encountered too much that was superficial, . . . publicity oriented--and too little aimed at sharing and solving the problems of management . . . I'm not sure the gap has been closed . . . a study today would probably show some public relations people cater-wauling around in high complaint of unacceptance, oblivious of the need to merit managements respect . . .[5]

Policymaking Process

It is not the intent here to discuss at length the process of policymaking. Deliberately understated, it is a process whereby means are determined for application against an identified problem or opportunity in pursuit of organizational goals. It is the developing of goal-oriented strategy. Charles Lindblom notes in his book, The Policymaking Process that different disciplines have different but converging perspectives with respect to the policymaking process.[6] The public administration view and the political scientist view averred by Lindblom are of interest here. The

---

[5]Dan J. Forrestal, "Align PR to Management Needs--Or Prepare to Abandon the Corporate Ship," Public Relations Journal, Vol. XXVII, No. 10, October 1971, pp. 40-41.

[6]Charles E. Lindblom, The Policymaking Process (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968, pp. 2-3.

first group asks how "men make an organization serve their purpose." The second group studies "how conflicting interests are reconciled in society."[7]

Of specific concern for public affairs is how one defines the function's interest in policymaking in the context of either of the above views. First the function must identify when, in general, should public affairs be involved? Given the preceding identification, how does one insure involvement? Neither question is easily answerable, but answering the first question is essential to even addressing the second.

Public Affairs and Policymaking--When Involved?

DOD Directive 5122.5 specifies areas of concern for public affairs inclusion in policymaking. As noted in a previous chapter, formal directives do not necessarily insure inclusion. The directives do specify boundaries for the function. Generally, if the public opinion environment or communications are integral parts of the decision to be made, then public affairs ought to participate if the defense organization is to be served properly. When to be involved is neither never nor always.

Insuring Involvement in Policymaking

It is important to keep in mind what has already been said about the impact of the organizational environment and

---

[7] Ibid., p. 2.

the decisionmaker as variables which hinder or facilitate participation in policymaking. The decisionmaker can be a decidedly limiting factor.

Additionally, the proposed solutions which reach the decisionmaker may come from a variety of sources: Congress, the President, any informed or interested observer, contractors, other agencies and the specialized groups within the Defense organization.[8] With some proposed solutions the public affairs function may only be able to advise how best to communicate the proposed policy, rather than assist in shaping the policy. A key point is that policymaking is not always the simple rational process suggested by many problem-solving paradigms. Lindblom notes that policy is sometimes the outcome of compromise, sometimes it springs from opportunity and not a problem; and sometimes policies are not decided, but just happen.[9] Insuring involvement first requires a realistic view of the capabilities and limitations of the public affairs function; secondly, recognition that the function is supportive and not decisive; thirdly, that the process is not always rational; and finally that policy may come from sources and/or forces outside the Department of Defense. An appreciation of these may not insure

---

[8] C. W. Borklund, The Department of Defense, op. cit., p. 115.

[9] C. E. Lindblom, op. cit., p. 4.

inclusion, but some of the frustration too often cited may become less pressing. The following discussion addresses a view that the public affairs practitioner might consider in becoming able to insure that his function does participate in policymaking. This view is offered so that the tool, policy analysis, might be used in the public affairs function.

A View of the Public Affairs Environment

Given the potentially negative or positive impact of the other two variables affecting public affairs participation in policymaking, a burden of serious proportions rests with the practitioner. This burden forces the asking and answering of some unavoidable questions. Since the function complains of "firefighting" and after the fact inclusion, some proper questions are:

1. Had you been included what could you have said with any degree of confidence regarding the impact of the policy?

2. Were you prepared to offer alternatives?

3. Why did you not know about the problem and impending policy, if you were aware, though you may not have been formally included, why did you not bring your knowledge to bear informally?

Some may scoff at such questions, but it is important for the public affairs practitioner to minimize "after-the-fact-

wisdom-exercises" and become knowledgeable about the environment in which he operates, and all its obstacles to effective functioning. He must be prepared to contribute to problem solving in his organization. It is not enough to have expertise in using media tools. He must have an understanding of the important publics affected by the problem of the moment. He must understand the probable position of various organized publics and the potential sources of conflict when viewing alternative policies. He must understand means of resolving imminent conflict, if any, given the adoption of a particular policy. In essence, he must be able to anticipate, analyze, evaluate, recommend and monitor for feedback. He must be able to say more than--'I think . . .' This is especially so at lower levels where years of experience and a pattern of success may not be sufficient to insure presumed competence. The commander's and other staff officer's 'I thinks' may become quite competitive.

Essential to accomplishing the above is a sensing by the practitioner of the environments which affect his function in the organization. By sensing it is meant that the practitioner scans, monitors, selects, and evaluates pertinent information from the environment. After sensing he develops adaptive communications strategies.

The Practitioners Environment

There are three generalized environments of concern to the practitioner--the intraorganization, interorganizational

and extraorganizational. These generalized environments have common purposeful interaction characteristics of concern to public affairs: cooperative, competitive and conflicting. These are characteristics of concern to public affairs because they represent conditions or states which result or fail to result from communicative interaction.

In my usage, intraorganization refers to interaction within the internal structure and membership of the organization. Interorganizational refers to the interaction between and among formal organizations, i.e., branches and agencies of government, corporations, news media, organized interest-groups, etc. Extraorganizational refers to the requisite interactions with elements outside the organization which have no long term formal function or structure; i.e., the public. It should be noted that the public is not a static quantity. Elements may become organized around issues. When this organization occurs this dictates a change in the pattern of interaction.

The three generalized environments have three dimensions of pertinence to the public affairs practitioner. These dimensions are: historical, current and futuristic. These dimensions do not have sharply defined breaking points among them. The practitioner and his organization purposefully interact within and without in a context influenced by the dimensions cited. This purposeful interaction is characteristically: competitive, cooperative or conflicting.

In partial summary, the public affairs practitioner functions in purposeful interaction with three generalized environments which have three dimensions, and the nature of the interaction is potentially of three types (See Figure 1 & 2.)

The above assertion is wrought with complexity. It is in this complexity that the public affairs officers function. To cope, the PAO must simplify his organization's interactions with respect to his function so that only relevant or key "publics" are of concern. Appendix A of the Public Affairs Department Handbook discusses the publics of DOD and means of gaining their support. This handbook refers to the common division of the publics as internal and external, with a three part division of the latter.[10] The concern of this thesis is not "how" and to whom public affairs relates on behalf of DOD. The concern is how information about these groups can be brought to bear in the policymaking process, then the ultimate message might be made more adaptive for both terminals in the communication process. For this reason I categorize the publics differently, as follows:

1. Interorganizational
    a. Office of the White House
    b. Congress and its committees and offices.

---

[10] Public Affairs Handbook, op. cit., p. A-1.



FIGURE 1--Three generalized environments and the types of interaction.



FIGURE 2--Public affairs generalized environments with their time dimensions and types of interaction.

c. Other executive branch agencies.

d. Defense related industries.

e. Organized interest-groups.

f. News media representatives.

g. Educational and research institutions.

2. Intraorganizational

a. Military services and memberships.

b. Civil service employees.

c. Political appointees.

3. Extraorganizational

a. General populace and targets therein.

b. Semiorganized interest groups.

This partial listing of publics does not define. Definition would require an answer to--with respect to what issue, of what intensity, for what duration.

The practitioner must be able to achieve definition if he is to do anything more than merely react. His definition focuses on key publics, not some amorphous notion of the public.

Largely, practitioners of public affairs need not be advised of the interorganizational environment and the extraorganizational environment. Coping with elements of these two environments is the focus of academic study in public affairs/information. Since this research effort focuses on the problem of achieving integration in the policymaking process within DOD, it is argued here that not

enough attention is given to the intraorganizational environment and the key publics therein. This is the immediate context in which the key decisionmaker, the organizational environment and the practitioner interact. This is the context in which the public affairs function participates in policymaking or continues to operate after the fact in a "firefighting" role.

Each element, in the intraorganizational environment, be it the key decisionmaker or other staff functions and heads has its own repertoire of behavior with respect to the public affairs function. It is to this repertoire of behavior, not formal descriptions of roles and relationships, which largely determine the pattern of interaction with the public affairs function. This is not to say that formal descriptions have no relevance; they do, but they do not determine the quality of interaction. In fact, formal descriptions of structure, functions, roles and relationships may impede quality interaction for the many reasons cited in Chapter II as dysfunctions of functionalism. Some similar points from Chapter IV are repeated here for emphasis:

> Ability to predict, and therefore influence the probable attitudes and activities of other staff agencies and elements is reduced by your lack of adequate communication with them . . .
>
> Communication with other staffs tend to be at the formal level. Images . . . are distorted, and one is usually not conscious of these influences.

> People and organizations that have a history of frequent interaction and consequently a reasonable degree of mutual predictability, tend to achieve coordination faster . . .[11]

Previously, it was asserted that each of the environments of concern has three dimensions, historical, current, futuristic, and three characteristic interactions, cooperative, competitive, and conflict. (Figure 2.) It is obvious that cooperation is what is being sought intraorganizationally. As noted previously, Chester I. Barnard observed that to survive organizations must achieve a surplus, and surplus is achieved through cooperation.[12]

Application of Models

What is the usefulness of such models as shown at Figure 1 and 2 to the problem of public affairs integration in policymaking?

General

The generalized environments have a demand/need relationship which in total time, temporarily patterns the type of purposeful interaction. Cooperation, competition and conflict are the potential type interactions. Public

---

[11] W. M. Jones, Decisionmaking in Large Organizations, op. cit., p. 20.

[12] C. I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, 30th ed., op. cit., p. 256.

affairs has a function in policymaking whenever competition or conflict can be regulated or altered by communications. Public affairs has a generally routine function when cooperation is the hoped for prevailing state of the interaction. The solid line to the extraorganizational environment illustrates this hoped for prevailing state. Cooperation in that relationship may facilitate cooperation in interorganizational interaction. The broken lines are exception states to be avoided by the organization. The public affairs function must sense this extraorganizational environment to detect emerging competition and conflict, for elements in this environment might become key publics. He must also sense the interorganizational. It is this environment which offers the greatest potential for conflict and competition.

The inter and extraorganizational environments will not be discussed at length since they are beyond the scope of this problem. But what is said about the intraorganizational environment is applicable, though at a different threshhold.

Intraorganizational Environment

Whether or not the public affairs function participates in policymaking timely depends on the state or type of interaction within the organization, i.e., the relationship among the decisionmaker, organizational environment and practitioner variables.

Graphically, the public affairs function is shown in Figure 1 as separate from the "intraorganizational environment." This is for clarity only. The function is shown as partially out of the internal environment to indicate that, with respect to information flow, the function may not share values with all other elements of the organization. For example, their perceptions of what should be secured from public knowledge may differ.

In terms of the research problem, it is the intraorganizational environment which is of most importance. Here the practitioner interacts with the key decisionmaker and the organization. To facilitate the adoption of strategies for inclusion in policymaking, the practitioner must regard these as key publics. As such, he is required to sense their behavior sets which hinder or facilitate cooperation. There is no formula, but the practitioner must be mindful of what has been noted regarding the decisionmaker, and the dysfunctions of functional organization. Each intraorganizational public has the dimensions illustrated in Figure 2. The analysis of these publics must consider each of those dimensions. What has been the past practice of the decisionmaker and organization elements with respect to public affairs? Who has failed to coordinate, and more importantly, why? Who has cooperated? What is the present state? What are the aspirations? Asking and answering these questions may reveal factors which allow corrective initiative

from the public affairs function. The complexity of asking and answering these questions can be seen in the simplification of the many relationships in Figure 3.

Policy Analysis

Policy analysis may present a conceptual tool for dealing with any of the generalized environments cited. It is not a new tool, for decisionmakers have made use of similar concepts. Faced with the problem of being informed after the fact, policy analysis says--ask what is the real problem? Is it because agent X did not inform? If so, why? What actions are available to alter agent X's action? No illusion is made to coercion by the principle decisionmaker as a solution here, since he may be indifferent to the public affairs function. The purpose of policy analysis is to determine what ought to be done by the public affairs function to stimulate information flow. The answers are:

--recognize the human obstacles to the flow of information and adopt corrective strategies;

--recognize that each function in an organization has its unique past and future orientation which affects the present state of affairs; adjust your interaction to facilitate exchange;

--recognize that the key decisionmaker has a frame of reference or perceptual set which largely determine his responses to the public affairs function; and interact with that actual behavioral role, rather than the formally



FIGURE 3

PP-M=Sec Defense(principal policymaker)
Type A=Functions whose personnel and interest are principally military
Type B=Functions whose personnel and interest are principally civilian or well-mixed
PA(M)=Public Affairs persons-military
PA(C)=Public Affairs persons-civilian
Sensing activities
——— Interacting relations formally prescribed
- - - - Interacting influences which prescribe perceptions.

defined role; and

--recognize that public affairs ought to participate in policymaking, but only when its participation is required. It is required only when the policy considered implicitly contains conditions which will induce conflict or competition with key publics which can be reduced or regulated by organizational communications. Within this context, insist on the right to determine when it is proper to be involved. If that is denied, then the question of inclusion is no longer organizationally legitimate. Public affairs can do no more than the organization will allow. If what is allowed is "firefighting," then that should be seen as organizationally useful, though not desirable.

As stated, policy analysis offers a conceptual tool for dealing with publics in any of the three generalized environments cited. Here the focus is the intraorganizational environment. It is here that the interaction-influence system existing determines the degree of participation in policymaking. By policy analysis I do not mean a concept based on applied decision theory or rigorous systems analysis. I do mean taking a systems view of the process by which choice is made in the organization. I do mean searching for available alternatives. Borrowing from Yehezkel Dror,* I do mean:

---

*Yehezkel Dror, Policy Analysis: A Theoretic Framework and Some Basic Concepts, (RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, July 1969.

1. Penetrating into underlying values of other functions and the key decisionmaker for determining how these may view alternatives in choice situations.

2. Considering feasibility of a public affairs view given the state of the above.

3. Preparing to accept sequential acceptance of the public affairs view, and working creatively to that end.

4. Determining just what the policymaking interaction-influence system is, so that public affairs may be input, even if indirectly through another function.

5. Recognizing that there are limits to analysis imposed both by time and knowledge.

The term policy analysis is used because I am assuming that each element in DOD can be said to have a position or "policy" with respect to policy. That position may be uniquely function bound or shared. That position is often the backdrop for a functions contribution to the choice process. The degree of import of a position may be dictated by the relevance of the function to the problem. Import may be dictated by the degree of influence of the function and or the function head. This may be a reality which the public affairs function should be prepared to accept. Public affairs should recognize that the other function, as an intra-organizational "public," must be the object of its communication effort anytime competition or conflict can be anticipated from an awareness of that functions position.

Policy analysis is directed at determining what other positions or alternatives might be acceptable when the public affairs view is not in harmony. Other alternatives must be conveyed if persuasion fails.

SUMMARY

As does the Department of Defense, many corporations specify that policymaking participation is a proper role for the public affairs function. Nevertheless, the status of the function varies. The degree of participation in policymaking varies.

Variables which affect the degree to which public affairs participates in policymaking in the Defense Department are: the Secretary of Defense, the vertical and horizontal elements in the organizational environment and the practitioner. As noted in Chapter IV, whether public affairs participation is facilitated or hindered is a function of the decisionmakers past experiences/behavior and new learning, and his interaction with the organizational environment in which public affairs is also interacting.

Given this interdependence, how can public affairs influence the process? He needs to develop a view of his function which allows for the deliberate treatment of his operating environment as having several key publics. Such a view recognizes the extraorganizational and interorganizational environments with which he interacts purposefully

on behalf of his organization. Such a view focuses on key publics externally and recognizes the types of potential interaction. This is important because it aids in setting boundaries for when public affairs ought to be involved in policymaking. Additionally, such a view recognizes the time dimensions which influence the policy behavior of external publics and may change their definition as key.

This view is applied to the intraorganizational context for the purpose of resolving the problem of this research. Each element of the intraorganizational environment is a subsystem which behaves in a manner perceived as adaptive. Some of these elements may be key in facilitating or hindering public affairs inclusion in policymaking. They ought to be targets of communication interaction whenever their behavior is competitive or in conflict with the public affairs perception of its proper function.

To alter behavioral patterns which hinder participation, policy analysis may offer an effective tool. Policymaking influence is essentially political. It is necessary therefore to understand the interaction-influence system which affects choice processes. It is necessary to understand the positions of key elements in this system and what range of alternatives are available to influence the process, given the position or "policy" of vying functions. With analysis, strategies can be developed. They may be educational; utilities might be exchanged; or elements which

are cooperative may be used to indirectly influence elements which habitually compete or are in conflict suboptimally.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION

The original research problem required the determination of the proper role of public affairs as a staff function, and means of insuring the functions integration in DOD policymaking.

When the interviews were conducted in December 1972, most of the respondents indicated that the problem of integration did not really exist at their level. They attributed the resolution of the problem to the attunement of former Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, to public affairs, and the effectiveness of Mr. Daniel L. Henkin, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. Military service public affairs personnel reflected a similar view.

The questions that arose in my mind were: what if the Secretary of Defense was not attuned; what if the public affairs officer did not have the particular attributes and experience of Assistant Secretary Henkin; should the effectiveness of this staff function be dependent on tenuous phenomena? It seemed necessary to determine what the proper role of public affairs was in policymaking. Should it participate or is that dependent on the relationship between the Secretary and Assistant Secretary.

These questions led to a revision of the research problem to: Determine what variables affect the role of public affairs as a staff function in the Department of Defense (DOD) and hinder or facilitate the integration of the function during the planning phase of the decision process.

The general environment of DOD public affairs was said to be extremely complex. There are external variables which affect the role. Presidents can set the tone of all government public affairs. Media relations with government agencies can impact. Congressional relations and other external variables have their impact on the role of public affairs. The research effort did not focus on these external variables, but sought to identify the internal variables and examine them in a broad way to determine how they might impact on the role. First, the proper role.

THE PROPER ROLE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

The literature reveals that participation in policymaking is increasingly recognized in the corporate world as a proper function of public affairs. Many have elevated the function to the Vice-President level. The Department of Defense also recognizes that participation in policymaking is a proper function. This is specified in the DOD Directive implementing the function. Why then the complaint from both spheres that too often their inclusion is after the fact? The following discussion of the variables may illuminate this point.

THE INTERNAL VARIABLES WHICH AFFECT THE FUNCTION

The Literature

The literature revealed that the attitudes of top management, capabilities and personalities of public relations staffs, organizational structure and policy-traditions, goals and objectives, product and market areas, company size and location and big government affect the status of the public relations/affairs function.

The Interviews

Four variables were identified from the interviews of public affairs personnel in DOD. These were: the decisionmaker, the organization environment, the public affairs practitioner and education/learning. The last variable is assumed to be operating in the preceding three, so only three were the focus of this research. These three are verified by the literature list when allowance is made for those variables which are peculiar to the commercial world.

THE DECISIONMAKER VARIABLE

Many respondents emphasized the role of the key decisionmaker in the integration of public affairs in policy-making. Of applicability at all military levels, respondents said:

— commanders who are restricted in the field are resistant when assigned at DOD level.

— you have to ask what is the training of commanders regarding the public affairs role.

It was shown that former Secretary Laird was active in public affairs. He delivered many public addresses, held many news conferences and while still a member of Congress actively supported passage of the Freedom of Information Act. What we conclude is that whether the decisionmaker facilitates or hinders public affairs participation in policymaking is partially a function of his past experiences and learning. Partially, because the decisionmaker has other interactions, e.g., with the President and other functions, which intervene and may negate the decisionmaker's predispositions towards public affairs. Following from "administrative man theory," a decisionmakers cognition of the public affairs function, his beliefs about the function and his past behavior with respect to the function will partially determine the place and effectiveness of public affairs in policymaking.

Recommendation

View the key decisionmaker as a internal public affairs target. The decisionmaker is an element in the intraorganizational environment who has dimensions in time (historic, present and futuristic), and who interacts purposefully in cooperation, competition or conflict with

the public affairs function. It is necessary therefore to analyze the actual behavioral set of the decisionmaker to direct adaptive communication to that actuality rather than a formal description of the role.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT VARIABLE

Functional organization has inherent dysfunctions. These are both structural and human. From the literature lists can be compiled indicating the dysfunctional consequences. Chapter II discussed these at length and Chapter IV provides a summary of those dysfunctional consequences deemed most relevant to the research task. We conclude that structure dictates communication patterns and these are compounded by the human problems created by identification with ones own function in the organization. Education and increased interaction are necessary if the organization environment is to facilitate public affairs integration in policymaking.

The present education effort may be inadequate. As an example, the researcher recently attended a two hour class on the Army Information Program at Command and General Staff College. The general reaction observed was that this was offered to fill two hours in the schedule. One student defined the Information Officer (IO) as 'the person who lies after we're screwed up.' It is not emphasized why this occurs. It is not emphasized that the IO is responsible for monitoring the environment so that when information is shared

for policymaking he can provide estimates of possible impact of various alternatives.

As for increased interaction, various means are presently employed according to interview data. Morning and evening meetings at the Secretary-Assistant Secretary level facilitates information sharing. Participation on committees provides a means of internal sensing. The Information Liaison Officer system is an additional means of sensing, if the system works.

The organizational environment is an umbrella term for the many elements of the intraorganizational environment. Elements in this environment should be regarded as public affairs targets to stimulate functional cooperation when conflict or competiveness operates to impede information exchange. Elements of this environment should be analyzed to determine what interfunction communications can be employed to alter dysfunctional behavior. Such analysis should be aware that organization subsystems have historic, present and future dimensions which cannot be ignored in formulating adaptive communications.

In conclusion, public affairs must exploit every opportunity to educate organization elements and increase interaction. The function should not rely on formally specified means of interaction, but should analyze and determine where the system dysfunctions exist. Then determine why and develop strategies to adjust.

Recommendation

Utilize a problem solving process such as policy analysis to ascertain why the organization environment variable, at a point in time, hinders participation in policymaking. Then interact to correct. That one does not participate is not the real problem; why, is.

THE PRACTITIONER VARIABLE

It is obvious that if the practitioner is incompetent or impersonable he will be his own hindrance. Assuming competence and personability, the practitioner must acquire means of insuring his participation in policymaking regardless of the state of the other two variables. This point is expressed by some interviewees as: 'first job is to sell yourself to the commander.'

The practitioner needs a perspective about his role and function. He must carefully define what is and is not the interest of public affairs. This is especially so if the boundaries are not specified by the organization. Obviously, this is not a simple task, but if he does not define someone else may.

This research offers a conceptual view which may aid the practitioner in defining his domain. This view recognizes three generalized environments, with three dimensions in time and three characteristic types of interaction. The practitioner is a sensor in each of these environments

for his organization, which exists purposefully as a subsystem in external relations and an insular system internally. As a sensor focusing externally he facilitates a communication need directed at reducing conflict or competition to cooperation. When this is not possible through communications, public affairs has no function in policymaking at that particular moment in time. The state may change; the requirement to monitor is constant. As a sensor, public affairs scans for feedback and inputs for adaptation in policy as required. The process is cyclic. To perform this function it is necessary to determine the repertoire of behavior of environmental elements defined as key publics. It is also necessary to recognize that key publics are changing and emerging.

Such a view allows the development of realistic perspective about the public affairs function as it relates to the organization. It also provides a conceptual framework within which problem solving processes can be initiated without awaiting such dictation by unanticipated events. It is not argued that the aforementioned can achieve high accuracy. It is argued that solving the problem of participation in policymaking cannot await the presence of a facilitating decisionmaker and/or organizational environment variable.

SUMMARY

Hindrance or facilitation of public affairs participation in policymaking is a function of the key decisionmakers

experiences, learning and past behavior as he interacts with the organization environment and public affairs practitioner, who are also interacting and have their own sets of experiences, learning and past behaviors. This study was limited in scope and did not examine other variables which could affect public affairs participation in policymaking. The measures taken within DOD to facilitate integration is an area that requires more study.

Recommendations for Further Study

1. It was noted that many personnel interviewed did not perceive the problem of participation in policymaking as pertinent at their level. It might be useful, therefore, to study the perceptions of public affairs officers attending the Command and General Staff College. These officers' experiences should largely be at lower levels of military organization; their perceptions of where the problem exists may be quite different. An examination of why the difference, if any, should provide additional insight into the problem of public affairs participation in policymaking. A suggested research design is:

a. Determine those students who have had or plan to have assignments in public affairs/information. A list of these students could be readily obtained from the data bank student file.

b. Survey the students regarding their perceptions and compare the findings with those of this study.

c. Seek to explain the difference, if any, within the content of theory presented here or in terms of other theory.

2. To evaluate the effectiveness of Command and General Staff College instruction on the Army Information Program the following research design could be applied:

a. Develop a survey to determine the perceptions of Command and General Staff students regarding the Army Information Program, the role of public affairs, the impact of the function, and the desirability of specialization in this field in contrast with other specialty areas.

b. Select a random sample from the Command and General Staff College class. Divide this sample into two groups. One group would be a pre-test and post-test group. The second group will be post-test only. The latter group, while not a true control, should provide additional comparison, and will aid in ascertaining pre-test influence if any. For some control, it may be possible to use army officers attending the Armed Forces Staff College. The analysis of survey data after the post-test should provide a measure of instruction effectiveness if student perceptions have significantly changed.

3. Government public affairs problems could be compared with corporate public affairs problems regarding participation in policymaking. Selected corporations could be surveyed. Such a survey effort, however, would have to be

carefully planned to insure an adequate response rate. The granting of permissive TDY at no expense to the government by the Command and General Staff College might facilitate this research effort. A student could go to a major city with a representative sample of corporations to follow-up his survey effort.

4. Regarding this study's assertions about the three variables' affects, a follow-on study might examine the impact of selected external variables; e.g., the mass media. This study proposed that former Secretary Laird's public appearances and position in support of the Freedom of Information Act might be indicative of his attunement to the public affairs function. It might be useful to examine media criticisms of the Department of Defense prior to Mr. Laird's public appearances. The question might be: To what extent was the apparent attunement of Mr. Laird to the public affairs function influenced by the mass media? The answer to this question may provide a rival explanation to this study's speculation about Mr. Laird's "frame of reference" or "perceptual set."

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX 1

EXPLANATION AND DEFINITION OF TERMS

1. Public Relations. The management function which is concerned with the attitudes and opinions of publics of concern to its organization. In executing its tasks, the function engages in fact-finding, planning, programming, message formulation, transmission through selected media, and evaluation of feedback. Conceptually it is a two-way communications bridge between the organization and its relevant environment. The function facilitates adaptive linkage through communications.

2. Public Relations Officer. A specialist in communications who advises and assists the management of an organization in its relations with relevant publics. He is selected by the management of the organization to facilitate the flow of opinion from the organization's publics, so that policies and operations may be kept compatible with the needs and views of those publics.

3. Public Information. A term used to denote the public relations sub-function whose purpose is to provide instructive or educational communications to selected external publics, so those publics can have the necessary information for adaptation in their relations with the organization.

4. Information. A term used to denote the public relations officer or function in some government agencies. The purpose is to inform, not necessarily engage in activities designed to win public support. Public support may accrue to the organization, but only because the communication received is objectively instructive or explanatory, and satifies a public need to know.

5. Public Affairs. The public relations function in government and corporations which evaluates the effectiveness of policies and actions on issues involving public opinion. In so doing, public affairs makes recommendations concerning policies and actions which effect public opinion, and conducts information programs designed to keep the public knowledgeable. The interest of public affairs is social, economic and political, and its activities are in response to these forces.

6. Terminology in Department of Defense. Different terms used by the Armed Services are generally interchangeable and identify the function embraced by the term public relations in civilian life.[1] "The determination of title usually rests with the headquarters concerned and the trend appears to be towards "public affairs officer" (PAO), and "public affairs specialist."[2]

---

[1] Public Affairs Department Handbook, Defense Information School, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana: revised September 1972, p. 1-1

[2] Loc. cit.

APPENDIX 2

ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE
OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE, PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY

DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY

IMMEDIATE OFFICE

DIRECTORATE
FOR DEFENSE
INFORMATION

PRESS
AUDIO-VISUAL

DIRECTORATE
FOR PLANS
AND PROGRAMS

DIRECTORATE
FOR COMMUNITY
RELATIONS

PROJECTS

EVENTS

ORGANIZATIONS

DIRECTORATE
FOR SECURITY
REVIEW

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR FORCE

CONGRESSIONAL

SIMPLIFIED ORGANIZATION CHART

Ch #1 10
Ch #2 8 Jan 63

July 10, 1961
NUMBER 5122.5

GC/DoD

Department of Defense Directive

SUBJECT Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

I. GENERAL

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense and the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, including the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, one of the positions of Assistant Secretary of Defense authorized by the Act is hereby designated the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) with responsibilities, functions, and authorities as prescribed herein.

II. RESPONSIBILITIES

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) is the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for public information and community relations. He is responsible within the Department of Defense for an integrated DoD public affairs program which will:

1. Provide the American people with maximum information about the Department of Defense consistent with national security.

2. Initiate and support activities contributing to good relations between the Department of Defense and all segments of the public at home and abroad. These activities will be carried out in overseas areas in collaboration with the Department of State and the United States Information Agency.

3. Plan for Department of Defense retaining public media censorship activities during a declared National Emergency.

III. AUTHORITY

Under the direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public

Affairs) shall perform the following functions in his assigned fields of responsibility:

1. Provide policy guidance to the Department of Defense on public affairs matters and approve public affairs aspects of actions which have national or international significance in the fields of public information and community relations.

2. Develop public affairs plans, policies and programs in support of DoD activities, and approve public affairs actions which have significance to DoD plans, policies and programs.

3. Provide for security review under the provisions of Executive Order 10501 of all material for public release and publication originated by the DoD, including testimony before Congressional Committees, or by its contractors, departmental personnel as individuals, and material submitted by sources outside the Department for such review.

4. Provide for review of official speeches, press releases, photographs, films, and other information originated within the DoD for public release, or similar material submitted for review by other Executive agencies of the Government. This review will be for conflict with established policies or programs of the DoD or of the national Government.

5. Provide news analysis and clipping service to the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Military Departments, as required.

~~6. Supervise the Department of Defense Information Declassification Program.~~

7. Evaluate and approve requests for DoD cooperation in programs involving relations with the public.

8. Administer a DoD program for the accreditation of news media representatives to the Department, and prescribe attendant policies and procedures.

9. Provide for approval of travel in military carriers of news media representatives, and of other non-Defense personnel, for public affairs purposes.

10. Provide the sole representation of the DoD with regard to formulation or implementation of Government-wide plans, policies, and programs concerning public affairs.

11. Coordinate public affairs in the DoD with those of other departments and agencies of the Government.

12. Provide for the receipt and evaluation of requests for speakers received by the DoD, and, when required, assist in scheduling, programming, and drafting speeches for the participation of qualified personnel.

13. Such other functions as the Secretary of Defense assigns.

IV. RELATIONSHIPS

A. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and their military and civilian staffs shall exchange information and cooperate fully with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) and his staff in a continuous effort to achieve efficient and economical administration of the public affairs activities of the Department of Defense.

B. Commanders of the unified and specified commands established by the Secretary of Defense shall similarly cooperate with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) to insure that public affairs activities throughout all echelons of their commands properly reflect efficient and economical administration of public affairs activities as directed by the Secretary of Defense. The channel of communication for direction and guidance in public affairs matters shall be directly between those commands and the Secretary of Defense. As to such matters, the ASD(PA) is authorized to communicate directly with commanders of unified and specified commands, coordinating on operational matters with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, as appropriate, with the military departments.

C. All major components of the Department of Defense shall secure the advice of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) through established command channels before taking actions which have significant public affairs implications.

D. All major components of the Department of Defense shall provide pertinent information to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) to enable concurrent planning to the end that maximum information within the limits of national security can be made available to the public.

E. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) shall coordinate actions, as appropriate, with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other agencies of the Department to insure responsive fulfillment of his responsibilities.

F. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) shall, in the performance of his functions:

1. Maintain [illegible] appropriate assistance to all information media with respect to matters relating to the activities of the Department of Defense.

2. Maintain liaison with and assist private organizations with respect to matters relating to the activities of the DoD.

V. **AUTHORITIES**

A. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), in the course of exercising full staff functions, is hereby specifically delegated authority to:

1. Issue instructions and one-time directive-type memoranda, in writing, appropriate to carrying out policies approved by the Secretary of Defense for his assigned fields of responsibilities, in accordance with DoD Directive 5025.1. Instructions to the military departments will be issued through the Secretaries of those departments or their designees.

2. Through channels established by statute, provide policy guidance to the commands and other organizational entities established by the Secretary of Defense for all public affairs activities, including the release of official information for publication through any form of information media, and the conduct of any informational programs directed in whole or in part to the general public.

3. Obtain such reports and information (in accordance with the provisions of DoD Directives 7700.1 and 5158.1) and assistance from the military departments and other DoD agencies as may be necessary to the performance of his assigned functions.

4. Act as the sole DoD agency at the Seat of Government for the release of official information for dissemination through any form of public information media.

5. Assure the implementation of all public affairs policies and procedures of the DoD, and the integration of all Department of Defense Public Affairs plans, programs, and related activities.

6. Establish the criteria and be the approving and issuing authority for all credentials required by the United States or foreign news gathering media representatives traveling in or outside the United States in connection with coverage of official DoD activities.

7. Approve military participation in public exhibitions, demonstrations, and ceremonies of national or international significance.

8. Make use, as he deems necessary for carrying out his assigned responsibilities and functions, of established facilities in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, military departments, and other DoD agencies.

9. Act as the sole agency of the Department of Defense for coordination of all matters covered by this Directive with other departments and agencies of the Government, as appropriate.

B. Other authorities specifically delegated by the Secretary of Defense to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) will be referenced in an enclosure to this Directive.

VI. DEFENSE PUBLIC AFFAIRS WORKING GROUP

There shall be a Defense Public Affairs Working Group to advise and assist the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) in implementing the provisions of this Directive. The Group shall consist of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), as Chairman, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), and the Chiefs of Information of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

VII. CANCELLATION

DoD Directive 5122.5, dated February 27, 1959, is hereby cancelled. Service regulations will be amended accordingly.

VIII. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Directive is effective immediately.

Roswell Gilpatric
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Enclosure

References to Other Authorities Specifically Delegated by the Secretary of Defense to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) in Other Directives

No other authorities have been specifically delegated by the Secretary of Defense to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) as of the date of this directive. Any future specific delegations will be referenced in an enclosure to this directive.

APPENDIX 4

CONCEPTS AND ISSUES WHICH AFFECT GOVERNMENT PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

TAB A. Explanation of the conflict between and among various government agencies in gathering and distributing information to clientele groups.

There are many separate departments, boards, commissions, authorities, agencies and activities through which the work of government is being carried on in the United States. Neither the President nor the Congress can exercise effective supervision and direction over such a chaos of establishments, nor can overlapping, duplication, and contradictory policies be avoided.[1] The forementioned is central to an explanation of the conflict between and among various government units in gathering and distributing information to clientele groups. This is so, because many of the separate departments, boards, etc. have their own information offices. These offices are merely integral parts of the whole, "a combination internal advisor and sometimes outside messenger for the agency."[2] The information

---

[1] J. L. McCamy, Government Publicity: Its Practice in Federal Administration (Chicago: The University Press, 1939), p. 173.

[2] Ibid., p. 184.

office reflects only the morale of its own agency and therefore the lack of coordination among agencies is just as true for their information offices. The result is confusion and contradiction in the public releases of agencies who lack knowledge of each other, or are subject to different pressures about related matters. Often officials will answer identical questions without having time to see what a fellow-official will say. Clientele groups will find little comfort in conflicting responses from so-called official sources. Government is expected to provide reliable information, but it cannot do this without agreement in its releases.[3]

Aside from the conflict that arises merely as the result of organization, there are instances where the disparity in information released may reflect a conscious and deliberate conflict of policy between separate agencies. These conflicts should be settled outside the public prints if the citizen-client is to know what the administration's policy is and where to fix responsibility.[4]

Conflicts in gathering and disseminating information to clientele groups is a reflection of conflicts underlying policy and practice among agencies.

> If coordination is lacking in the fundamental operations, it will be lacking in the publicity content . . . when confusion exists in the policies of executive

---

[3] Ibid., p. 185.

[4] Ibid., pp. 185-6.

> agencies, the resulting contradictory publicity robs the public of reliable information, and also damages the reputation of the administration.[5]

Much of the conflict arises from overlap among agencies regarding services to clientele groups. As long ago as 1936, when the federal government was still small by today's standard, T. Swann Harding counted twenty-four agencies that supply information to the consumer. Arch A. Mercey listed thirteen agencies dealing with land use.[6] Overlap of this type is central to President Nixon's desire to reorganize the executive branch of government by consolidating like functions.

The forementioned explanation of conflicts in the process of informing the public is centered on coordination or lack of among various agencies in government. Conflicts can arise internally also. Cabinet members, as department heads, in their relationship with the Congress confine their role essentially to supplying information. In such testimony and other public statements the members of the president's team are supposed to reflect his policies. But the interest they have in advancing their departmental programs may induce them to be more responsive to the legislative committee dealing with the department's affairs. Similarly they may

---

[5] Ibid., p. 187.

[6] Ibid., p. 188.

respond to organized groups which regard themselves as clientele, rather than to the goals sought by the president.

> Departmental heads are able to move rather freely in a no-man's land of political convenience, checked only by such factors as their loyalty to the president and their fear of the price of a full-scale conflict with him.[7]

In turn, department heads can be plagued by the career bureaucrats who may put that part of a departmental program for which they are responsible first, as contrasted with other parts. "A strong-willed subordinate, convinced of the public benefits of his division's work, may feel free to concentrate on building up support for it."[8] He may push his position through clandestine alliances with Congressional friends and among leaders of interest groups. This may happen even if the head of the department sees things altogether differently than the underling.[9]

A twist in the above is seen in the decision by the past Secretary of Labor prohibiting the professional statiticians of the Bureau of Labor Statistics from briefing the press regarding the monthly figures on inflation and unemployment. The decision was made according to Secretary Hodgson "to avoid awkwardness to the professional staff that might result from policy questions."[10] According to the

---

[7] "Government Departments," Encyclopedia Brittanica (Vol. 10., William Benton, Published, 1968 ed.), p. 630.

[8] Ibid., p. 631. [9] Ibid.

[10] "America Notes--War of Words," Time, March 29, 1971, p. 10.

Time magazine report on this, there is more than a suspicion among Washington newsmen that the "awkwardness" has arisen simply because the professional statisticians have in the past explained some disconcerting economic truths that conflicted with official optimism on the economy.[11]

The conflict can be seen further in a cursory examination of the State Department is multidimensional. It must be responsive to the Congressional jealousy emanating from its perceived role in foreign affairs, and its sense of exclusiveness in relating to the public; it must be responsive to the public in its demand for information; it must deal with pressure groups; it has international obligations regarding propriety in diplomatic matters; and it must contend with the mass media who have their own channels with all of the forementioned. All of the above potential for conflict is the result of the increasing public dimension of American foreign policy. According to Chittick, the State Department needs general public support, especially when policies adversely affect important domestic interests. To obtain annual appropriations and authority to implement policies, it has been compelled to augment the legal power with whatever other support it could muster. As a result, the State Department has developed its own constituency. First it has gone to the general public and second, it has

---

[11] *Ibid*.

attempted to create and maintain the active support of private and civic interest groups. These help to neutralize the opposition of other special interests.[12] Compounding the problem is the Congress, which has become quite wary of Department efforts to speak directly with the public.[13]

An example of how conflict can emerge because of international obligations can be seen in the difficulty for most Americans to understand why the State Department refused to admit for so long that U.S. planes were using bases in Thailand for air-raids into North Vietnam and Laos. The Department refused to acknowledge this on the grounds that they had an agreement with the Thai government not to reveal this fact.[14]

TAB B. Explanation of the difference between "informing the public" and "winning public support."

The difference seems to be a function of the intent of the communication and the motive of the communicator and/or his sponsor(s). These notions are not necessarily polar, because a communication "informing the public" can have the effect of "winning public support." Ideally, when "informing the public," there is no desire on the part of the communicator to alter or reinforce attitudes or opinions in a

---

[12] W. Chittick, State Department, Press, and Pressure Groups: A Role Analysis (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970), p. 20.

[13] Ibid., p. 37.

[14] Ibid., p. 150.

predetermined direction. The communicator and the message are "pure"; i.e., the communication is objectively instructive or explanatory. There is no ulterior motive. The intent is to provide some knowledge, some skill, some awareness about which the public can be pro, con, or indifferent. No public decision is sought. "Winning public support," on the other hand, is persuasive communication. Influence of attitudes and opinions is an objective. This does not imply, necessarily, propaganda in its adverse connotation, but it could. Advocacy is characteristic of communication to "win public support." Objectivity, theoretically, is characteristic of communication to "inform the public."

According to Chittick, a test of whether a communication is one that "informs the public" is affirmative responses to these: truthfulness of information, clarity of information, completeness of information, and accuracy of information.[15]

The attempt to differentiate between these two notions is part of a long existing controversy over the proper role of government in its relations with the governed. Information versus propaganda and the people's "right to know" are entwined in this issue. The controversy extends to the ethical responsibilities of institutionalized mass media in discharging their obligations, both as agents to

---

[15]Chittick, op. cit., pp. 151-2.

gather information, and as channels for the dissemination of information. The foundation of all of this is the belief in a democratic system that the public has a right to be informed; and unless they are, then they cannot effectively engage in the dialogue vital to participatory government. The technological revolution in the media has compounded the problem from all aspects. The public is more hungry to know, and the government has the unparalleled opportunity for contact with the governed.

Chittick, in discussing specifically State Department information, shows how conflicting information policies have emerged from the desire to satisfy the public hunger for information as made possible by mass media--"press seeks full disclosure; agencies manipulate information for policy reasons."[16] Rourke discusses this when he states that the most deeply rooted of all apprehensions over the role of government publicity has long been the fear that it will be employed to "sell" the public on official policy.[17] The publicity activities of government have been subjected to criticism from many fronts. The Harness subcommittee in 1948 condemned techniques of government propaganda by which Federal officials seek to perpetuate themselves in office, and generate pressures on Congress for more and bigger

---

[16] Ibid., p. 292.

[17] F. E. Rourke, Secrecy and Publicity--Dilemmas of Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), p. 183.

appropriations. Federal activity has often been rationalized in the name of national emergency or by an artifically stimulated public demand.[18] The Buchanan committee, at the same time, argued that executive agencies have an "obligation to keep the public informed of matters within their jurisdiction."[19]

"The central issue, to which studies of domestic information programs ordinarily address themselves, is whether it is possible to enforce a meaningful distinction between proper and improper activity by executive agencies in the field of publicity."[20] According to Rourke, the basic difference which confronts all attempts to prevent improper publicity is "that few if any executive agencies could discharge their governmental responsibilities at all if they were obliged to work under very severe restrictions on the amount of informational activity they could carry on."[21] According to Chaffee, persuasion of the right sort is a necessary element of a fruitful information service. "The government explains its work to its citizens in order to obtain their cooperation in bringing about orderly adjustments of human relations and a profitable employment of natural resources of materials, labor, ingenuity."[22]

---

[18] Ibid, p. 185

[19] Ibid., pp. 185-6.

[20] Ibid., p. 189.

[21] Ibid., p. 190.

[22] Z. Chaffee, Jr., Government and Mass Communications, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 733.

Chaffee emphasized the forementioned by quoting Felix Frankfurter, who said, "Democratic government may indeed be defined as the government which accepts in the fullest sense the responsibility to explain itself."[23] This is not confined to the level of national government.

Most elements of society would concur that government has the right and obligation to inform the public. The contention arises over the matter of "winning public support." The concern centers on the capacity for government to manipulate information in response to "the desire of those in power to stay in power."[24] The danger as expressed in the Harness subcommittee report is that:

> The average citizen . . . assumes his Federal government to be objective, impartial, and fair in its information services. He ordinarily accepts as authoritative that information which comes from Government through official channels. Whereas the individual might reject propaganda coming to him from other sources, he is more likely to be receptive to it when it is offered in the guise of 'information' which comes through official channels.[25]

This may not be an accurate appraisal today.

Rourke offers that, even considering the above, it will never be wise, or possible to deny executive agencies the right to enter the forum of public debate. "As long as executive agencies have policy responsibilities, they will inevitably be expected to furnish information and advocate change in areas under their jurisdiction."[26]

---

[23] Ibid., p. 752.

[24] Ibid., p. 763.

[25] Rourke, op. cit., p. 206.

[26] Ibid., p. 207.

It seems that a balance between "informing the public" and "winning the public support" can be achieved to guard against abuse. This requires vigilance of all institutions having a role in the information process. This signifies especial vigilance on the part of the press and other information media, and the Congress as the representatives of the people and the guardians of the "purse-strings."

TAB C. Explanation of the difference between the "right to know" and the "right to secrecy."

a. According to Rivers and Schramm, the people's right to know involves:

(1) Freedom to know--a social right belonging to all people to receive the information needed to organize their lives and to participate intelligently in governing.

(2) Freedom to tell--right to transmit information freely, and to argue publicly on issues; it is a right of all people, but it has been institutionalized in the mass media.

(3) Freedom to find out--right to access to sources of public information; this right has largely been delegated to the mass media.[27]

---

[27] W. L. Rivers and W. Schramm, Responsibilities in Mass Communications (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers 1969), p. 54.

b. The "right to know" or the "right to secrecy" are not new issues reflective of contemporary society in the era of "big government." Regarding this issue, Patrick Henry said that the government must keep from the press:

> Such transactions as relate to military operations or affairs of great consequence, the immediate promulgation of which might defeat the interest of the community . . . the press must prevent government officials from 'covering with the veil of secrecy' the common routine of business; for the liberties of the people never were, or never will be secure when the transactions of their rulers may be concealed from them.[28]

The first example of the notion of "executive privilege" in American government is just as ancient. After the resounding defeat of General St. Clair in 1792 a House committee, conducting an investigation of the disaster, called for the original letters and instructions bearing on the expedition. The request was rejected by President Washington who replied,

> We had all considered and were of one mind that; (1) the House Committee was an inquest, and therefore might institute inquiries; (2) they might call for papers generally; (3) that the Executive ought to refuse those the disclosure of which would injure the public.[29]

The matter of withholding that which is injurious to the public if revealed is the core of the general acceptance that governments must have the rights to secure certain matters pertaining to military and diplomatic affairs. The notion of executive privilege goes beyond these areas, for presidents

---

[28] Ibid., p. 77.

[29] Ibid., p. 79.

and other high executive officials have always argued that a certain measure of privacy is essential for the effective conduct of civilian affairs. This has been asserted principally on the grounds that it invigorates executive deliberations by protecting career officials from political reprisal for incautious remarks or proposals they may offer. The foundation of the doctrine of "executive privilege" rests on the forementioned.[30]

Stated succinctly, executive privilege is "the notion that executive officials have an inherent right to withhold information from the public and the legislature."[31]

c. Max Weber in his analysis of bureaucracy as a form of social organization holds that preoccupation with secrecy is an inherent characteristic of administrative institutions. According to Weber, this preoccupation is based in good part on functional necessity.[32] While the secrecy is rooted in a perfectly rational concern, Weber also argues that "this legitimate concern tends inevitably to transform itself into an obsession . . . secrecy becomes an end in itself."[33] This has been the concern of the proponents of the people's "right to know."

---

[30] Rourke, op. cit., p. 11.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid., p. 21.

[33] Ibid., p. 22.

d. The legal foundation of the "right to secrecy," particularly as it was manifested in the notion of "executive privilege" was Section 22, Title 5, USC, adopted in 1789. This came to be known as the "housekeeping rule." The parts of the law pertinent to the evolution of secrecy in government is:

> The head of each department is authorized to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with laws, for . . . the custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers and property appertaining to (the department).[34]

This was the statute which supposedly justified executives' denial of information to the public. In refutation, the House Government Information Subcommittee, headed by Congressman John Moss of California, asserted that "this section does not authorize withholding information from the public or limiting the availability of public records."[35]

e. The issue of the "right to know" versus the "right to secrecy" was investigated for ten years by the forementioned committee. The result was the Federal Public Records Law. The greatest value of the law according to S. J. Archibald is that "the burden of proof that secrecy is necessary is put upon the government."[36] The law according

---

[34] "U.S.C. 22--Relic of 1789," Bulletin of the American [illegible] of Newspaper Editors, December 1, 1957, p. 1.

[illegible].

[illegible] 14. "The New FOI Law--Codified but [illegible] the American Society of Newspaper [illegible].

to Archibald's analysis is really two laws. Sections a and b are a public records law requiring government agencies to explain how they operate, and to publish the orders, opinions, policy statements, manuals and instructions that are the end product of their operations. Section c applies to both public records and freedom of information parts of the law, spelling out those categories of government records which are not public property.

According to the law any person denied access to a public record has the right to ask the district court to rule on the propriety of the refusal with the burden of proof resting on the denying agency.[37] The agency's proof must show that the public record falls into one of nine exempted categories. These categories in abbreviated form are:

(1) President is authorized to protect secrets in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.

(2) Clarifies law protecting operational manuals and applies to negotiations in pursuing transactions.

(3) Covers documents which are already withheld under other statutes.

(4) Covers "trade secrets" and commercial and financial information obtained as privileged or confidential information.

---

[37] Ibid., p. 7.

(5) Covers staff memos and letters. These are protected to permit the free exchange of ideas and to prevent premature disclosures.

(6) Protects unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

(7) Restricts access to "investigative files" of law enforcement agencies.

(8,9) Pertains to business and the restriction of access to government information about financial institutions and protects information which oil company geologists must file with the government.[38]

The exempt categories seem to be written broadly enough to insure that the skirmish between the proponents of the right to know" and the "right to secrecy" will continue.

---

[38] Ibid.

APPENDIX 5

FINDINGS ON FUNCTIONALISM AND INTEGRATION

1. Other "pillars" of formal organization theory.

The other "pillars" follow as corollaries of the division of labor. Briefly they are: scalar and functional processes--deal with vertical and horizontal growth respectively, with emphasis on authority-responsibility and kind of activity-process; structure refers to the logical relationships that exist--it implies some system and some pattern; span of control refers to the number of subordinates one manager can effectively supervise.

According to Scott, Mooney and Riley in Onward Industry developed a sequential arrangement of broadly applicable principles to demonstrate the meaning and logic behind functional relationships in formal organizations. The first of these principles is the "coordinative."[1] The second principle was the scalar, which is the grading of duties according to degree of authority and corresponding responsibility.[2] The third is the "functional principle" which involves the differentiation of kinds of duties performed in the organization.[3]

---

[1] W. G. Scott, Human Relations in Management (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962), p. 35.

[2] Ibid., p. 36. [3] Ibid.

2. Other factors leading to dysfunction in functional organization--P. M. Blau.

a. Changes in orientation produced by superior education of members leads to less concern about employer prerogatives and authoritarian practices, and more interest in exercising responsibility and discretion to obtain satisfaction from the work itself. The willingness of some in DOD public affairs to express dissatisfaction with the degree of participation in policymaking may be expressed by increased education from formal sources or by recurring assignments in a specialized field. If so, one might expect growing dissatisfaction as the information officer specialist program fully impacts.

b. Advances in technology challenge the assumption of hierarchical authority as the primary means of achieving coordination. Increasing specialization resulting from technological advances questions the notion of "chain of command." Dependence on technological specialists constrains managers to abandon their prerogatives and find other means of leadership.[4]

3. Other dysfunctions noted by Rensis Likert.

a. Assumptions of hierarchy imply greater knowledge, superiority, etc., which is not necessarily so. Presidents

---

[4] Blau and Meyer, Bureaucracy and Modern Society, 2d. ed. (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 142-3.

following such an assumption convene meetings for information-sharing but not for decisionmaking. Suboptimization results because one man cannot know all the ramifications in a given problem. He could perhaps with information; however, needed information is often not forthcoming since some individuals identify more with their function than with the organization. Functional organization indirectly encourages the myopic view.

b. In organizational communications, the flow upward is often highly filtered. Orders flowing down are sometimes distorted. There is a tendency to feed superiors information they want to hear.

c. Many of the above are consequences of the effects of competition between functions. Cooperation is minimized as a result of self-interest or function interest.[5]

Many military readers may readily see the application of the above to their own experiences.

4. Concepts for achieving integration.

a. Dual Hierarchies--found in some research and development divisions. It involves a clear distinction between the operating hierarchy and the technical hierarchy. Would work best for straight-line manufacture and mass production.[6] This approach does not appear to be applicable with respect to R&D organization in general.

---

[5]Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962), pp. 106-109.

[6]Filley and House, op. cit., p. 487.

b. Matrix Structure--minimizes the role of hierarchy, and is usually based on a highly technical functional departmentation, receiving technical direction from within the department and administrative direction from project leaders. The result is dual supervision (administrative and technical) and little job mobility. May be most important for unit and small batch production as in aerospace industries.[7]

c. Tactical Units--an exploitative unit for innovation, drawing resources from a parent firm, operating with little structure under a leader selected for well-defined personality traits. Most suitable where operations are labor--intensive but not highly technical.[8]

d. Self-Contained Units--each unit makes a contribution to organizational goals independently of all others. Each unit produces and shows a profit. Little hierarchical control is needed. Performance is easily measured. May be suitable for large organizations with product groups.[9]

---

[7] Loc. cit.

[8] Ibid., p. 488.

[9] Blau and Meyer, op. cit., pp. 126-8.

APPENDIX 6

SUMMARY OF FIELD RESEARCH AND TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEWS IN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

General. The research and interviews in DOD occurred 27-29 December 1972. Plans for the visit were coordinated with Lt. Commander Lowell N. Frazier, USN and LTC W. C. Pierson, USAF. These officers are assigned to the OASD (PA), Plans and Programs Directorate. It is this directorate which submitted the problem for this research.

LTC Pierson received this researcher on 27 December, and together with COL. W. V. H. White, USMC, discussed the research problem. Both described OASD (PA) organization, the functions of their office, their perceptions of the research problem, and the activities in public affairs of immediate concern to them.

LTC Pierson had arranged an itinerary for my visit which included interviews with the Chiefs of Information of the major services. The itinerary also included a visit with operating elements of each of the services' public information organization and with the immediate office of OASD (PA).

The interviews occurred on 27 and 29 December. December 28 was a nonduty day because of the funeral of former President Harry S. Truman. The free day was used to

review notes of the interview on December 27, transcribe them and identify points to followup on 29 December.

Each person interviewed was asked to respond to the original problem statement. Subsequent questions were based on responses received. The questioning was informal and open-ended by design.

The original problem statement was:

"To determine the proper role of public affairs as a staff function in the formulation of Department of Defense (DOD) policy and means of insuring that the function is integrated into DOD staff actions during the planning phase of the decision process." The complaint centers on having to operate too often after the fact as a consequence of not being included in concurrent planning.

Responses to the basic question. Conversation at desk of COL White with LTC Pierson present on morning of 27 December:

1. LTC W. C. Pierson--The problem doesn't really exist presently at OSD level. The problem statement should really be revised to focus at the lower levels or DOD as a whole.

2. COL White--Concurred with LTC Pierson (When asked their perceptions of why the problem was not presently prevalent at OSD level, LTC Pierson replied:

> . . . improvement probably due to Laird . . . political . . . attuned . . . over time this has filtered down to lower levels . . . there are better relations in Congress than in the past because of Laird.

3. Granville Gilstrap (civilian in OCINFO). Plans and Policy Division). In response to the basic question he replied, "Decided improvement in last two years." When asked why, the response centered on the emphasis that the Chief of Staff of the Army had given on the need to include the Information Office in all policy actions. Reference was made to the Chief of Staff Memorandum, directing coordination.

4. LTC Louis N. Elmore (Policy and Plans, OCINFO)--Note: LTC Elmore is not an Information Officer specialist. This was his first such assignment. His response to the basic question was: "Have seen in the past year an increased awareness of the role played by OCINFO." When asked to what he attributed this, he offered, "Chief of Staff Memorandum requires that all actions be coordinated with OCINFO."

5. BG Dewitt C. Smith, Jr., Deputy, CINFO. Note: General Smith indicated that this was his first assignment in OCINFO. He has had other assignments on the DA staff, and has since been reassigned. To the basic question, General Smith offered:

> Greatly improved . . . was not seen as important 15 years ago by himself or his friends . . . Today it is almost the rule. It is emphasized by the Chief. (General Westmoreland) Our people go to innumerable meetings just to keep aware.
>
> Chief of Staff and CINFO, at periodic commanders' conferences emphasize this point over and over. It is starting to improve.

General Smith was asked: "Do you feel that information officers in the field have the experience and judgment which

would cause commanders to want to count on their recommendation?

General Smith's reply: "That's the dilemma at the lower levels . . . judgment and experience--commander versus the information officer."

6. LTC W. M. Taylor, USAF, Executive Assistant, to the then Assistant Secretary of Defense (PA), Mr. Daniel Z. Henkin. Conversation occurred after lunch on 20 December. Because of the previous responses to the basic question indicating that the problem was not so severe at higher levels, the question was modified for LTC Taylor. He was presented the basic question and then asked, "At what level is this problem most prevalent?"

LTC Taylor replied:

> It's an across the board problem . . . the same commanders who resist in the field are also assigned at this level--they will resist at OSD level--it's an education process . . . if you have cooperation at the top, the problem can be solved . . . At this level, things do slip by . . . (e.g.) Dr. Wilbur, Assistant Secretary for Health and Environment, coordinates beautifully, but occasionally things slip through there.

7. LTC D. O. Schillerstrom, USAF, Executive Assistant to Director, Office Information, USAF. When presented the basic question, LTC Schillerstrom elected to make some general observations of the problem and then respond to specific questions.

". . . no substitute for the ability to sell yourself, while trying to gain experience . . . commanders have to be tolerant of young IO's.

Question. What does the IO in the field do when a perceived problem is beyond his experience and judgment level--is there sufficient guidance provided?

Reply. "Information Officers in the Air Force have access to advice through information channels."

Question. What is the impact of the knowledge of commanders on the effectiveness of the information function?

Reply. "I do believe that there are known (IO) functions where he does play an important role . . . there's only so much he (IO) can do . . . you have to ask what is the training of commanders and other staff officers regarding this role . . . (he does have some leverage) key role as "gatekeeper" for recognition."

Question. What would you advise the young IO who perceives that he is not being included in planning prior to decision?

Reply. "He can go and make sure others know what he can do for them . . . IO must educate others . . . here's what he can do: educate, if experienced; make staff visits to inform; obtain staff assistance from higher levels on long-range big problems . . . We do need many more means to educate officers who will command and manage about how and why to use public affairs and public information."

8. MG Robert N. Ginsburgh, Director, Office of Information, USAF. General Ginsburgh was presented the basic problem question and asked to comment on where he perceived the problem to be most prevalent.

> It's a problem at any level--always will be in any organization, especially the military--(because) it is an objective oriented organization . . . Those who traditionally participate are those who contribute directly to the achievement of the objective. You don't bring in personnel services, maintenance, long-range planning people or public affairs types. You can't bring in everyone or you won't get anything done.

Question. What is your reaction to the assertion that the PA functions too often are after the fact--firefighting?

Reply. "Putting out fires is a traditional complaint. I put the blame on information specialists. If you can't sell your commander on information, how can you sell anything else. If he (IO) gains the confidence of the commander, he will be in on every action at every level."

Question. Some of the persons interviewed have indicated that the problem does not really exist at OSD level to any great degree. What is your response to this observation?

Reply. "The reason it may not seem to be a problem at OSD is Henkin. He did the first job of the public affairs man (gain confidence/sell commander)."

General Ginsburgh advised that you can't overlook the role of personalities in this problem.

9. COL W. A. Brant, Deputy Director for Plans and Programs, OASD (PA). NOTE: Since COL Brant was responsible for monitoring the Defense Information School (DINFOS) at Ft. Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, questions to him were pertinent to the qualifications of information officers for participation in the policy or decisionmaking process.

Comments. Knowledge to resolve this problem is inherent in the studies at DINFOS.

> . . . they receive the knowledge that a PAO needs to perform duties at the level assigned including the planning phases . . . If a failure, then it is the commander or the command.

Question. What factors would he say contributes to the failure?

Reply. "Commander's personality and knowledge. The command's organization and procedures." COL Brant attributed part of the problem to the rank structure at given levels. He indicated that a Lieutenant or Captain PIO assigned at brigade level might not have many problems in being included early in the planning phases. However, a Lieutenant or Captain at Post level might be overwhelmed by the rank of other staff officers and might have to fight to be heard.

COL Brant stated that he had no experience when assigned to his first PA job as a Colonel, and could empathize with a Lieutenant or Captain with no experience. He indicated that he had to fight to be included in planning meetings. He stated that it was "not the commander's fault either, at least not clearly." COL Brant said that his predecessor apparently had not sought to participate in meetings for whatever reason.

This completed the first day interviews. The researcher reviewed many of the observations with LTC Pierson and asked him to outline how OASD public affairs is integrated

AD-A091 484 ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS F/G 5/1
VARIABLES AFFECTING THE INTEGRATION OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN DEFENS--ETC(U)
1973 F H LEIGH

UNCLASSIFIED SBIE-AD-E750 027 NL

3 OF 3
AD
A091484

END
DATE
FILMED
12 80
DTIC



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

at this level of government and how policy making situations might be handled on a given day.

1. Response regarding integration of OSD with other executive branches regarding public affairs.

Time Schedule:

0900--Conference call among White House, OSD and other executive departments.

0930--OASD (PA) meets in the Office of the Secretary of Defense with the other assistant secretaries. The impact of events is reviewed. The objective of the conference call and the 0930 meeting is to facilitate speaking with one-voice in the executive branch of government.

1130--Daily Press Briefing, DOD, Conducted by Mr. D. Henkin, OASD (PA) or Mr. J. Friedheim or at times by the Secretary of Defense.

1200--White House Press Briefing by Mr. Zeigler.

1230--State Department Press Briefing.

NOTE: Early morning coordination is to insure "one voice" by the time of the first press briefing.

NOTE: Earlier in Chapter I, the role of Mr. Herbert Klein, Director of Communications, in achieving this coordination was cited.

LTC Pierson advised that each service has a similar process.

Regarding policy, LTC Pierson outlined how the Secretary of Defense and his immediate office are the origin

of policy. Pertaining to public affairs, prior to 0900, OASD (PA) reviews all news items of special interest and determines what comments are to be made. Policy may result. "Sometimes items are included by staff people in order to get policy--staff may propose policy for acceptance or rejection." LTC Pierson then offered that the PA job is to protect and assist the commander in executing his mission. The commander has to set policy--PAO proposes and advises.

December 22, 1972. The researcher was scheduled to interview Admiral Thomson, Chief of Naval Information. The Admiral was preoccupied so the interview was with Captain D. M. Cooney, USN, Assistant CHINFO (Plans and Programs).

After hearing the basic question, Captain Cooney gave an update of public affairs issues of immediate concern to the Navy such as the moratorium on participation in public activities due to President Truman's death, developing policy to eliminate problem-sailors administratively, and the retirement of ships. These topics were the focus of the discussion in the staff meeting the researcher observed.

Regarding the basic question, Captain Cooney offered: "Once a serious problem but not so now." When asked why, Captain Cooney replied:

> There were two reasons. During the early years of World War II public affairs was under intelligence. Commanders did not understand (the function) and were antagonistic. For example, when Admiral King was asked about press policy in 1942, he replied, 'Go win the war and tell them who won it.'

The second reason offered was essentially tradition. Captain Cooney stated:

> The naval officer, perhaps taking his cue from the Royal Navy felt his business was not the public's business. The exception was in Naval Aviation, which had to defend itself internally and externally--best communicators turned out to be Navy aviators . . .
>
> Did set up a good public information system after 1942 . . . tradition was maintained after World War II using the forty volunteers.

Question. What is your reaction to the often stated complaint about not being included in the decision process early in the planning phase?

Reply. "Until we've developed public affairs professionals who are naval officers first and PA specialists second, we don't have a right to demand to be heard in decisionmaking."

Question. How do you see the problem at lower levels--at ship level?

Reply. "Young public affairs officer with collateral duties has a terrible problem . . . There is a positive correlation between the experience of the commander and the public affairs officer in determining whether public affairs participates in decisionmaking."

Question. What would you advise the PAO who has been excluded from the decision process?

Reply. "Young officer must show the commander what his (the commander's) problem is and how the PAO will help solve it."

Question. With respect to the level of assignment, do you feel that rank is a factor?

Reply. "Professionalism is more important than rank, although there is a correlation . . . we try to match job requirements with the education of the officer . . . When the young officer has problems in a command, he must educate other staff officers and help them with their jobs--if you are professional, you can be effective."

Question. How do you insure awareness of imminent actions so that you can input?

Reply. "Public affairs staff people must make contacts . . . show how their role fits . . . Navy PA people get assigned to committees and study groups such as the "home port" program--and they have a voice . . ." One officer is assigned as a program coordinator and his job is to "know what's going on in the Navy . . . No such thing as a pleasant surprise" is what we want.

Returning to the basic question, Captain Cooney concluded by saying,

> Not a problem at Navy level, but it is a problem at lower levels. You have to be effective and demonstrate it--then you will be included . . . Things do fall through because of lack of planning and early notification.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Ackoff, Russell A. Scientific Method. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962.

Ackley, Charles W. The Modern Military in American Society. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1972.

Barnard, C.I. The Function of the Executive. 30th ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.

Beer, Stafford. Management Science. Garden City, New Jersey: Doubleday Science Series, Doubleday and Co., 1968.

_____. Cybernetics and Management. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959.

Bernays, Edward. Public Relations. 1st ed. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1952.

Blau, P.M., and M.W. Meyer. Bureaucracy and Modern Society. 2d ed. New York: Random House, 1971.

Blau, Peter M. and R. A. Schoenherr. The Structure of Organizations. New York: Basic Books Inc., Publishers, 1971.

Borklund, C.W. The Department of Defense. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968.

Buckley, Walter. Sociology and Modern Systems Theory. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967.

Cater, Douglas. Power in Washington. New York: Random House, 1964.

_____. The Fourth Branch of Government. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959.

Chafee, Zechariah. Government and Mass Communication--A Report from the Commission on Freedom of the Press. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1947.

Champion, Dean J. Basic Statistics for Social Research. Scranton, Pennsylvania: Chandler Publishing Co., 1970.

Chittick, W. State Department, Press and Pressure Groups: A Role Analysis. New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970.

Churchman, C.W. The Systems Approach. New York: Delacorte Press, 1968.

Crozier, Michael. The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

Cutlip, Scott M. and Allan H. Center. Effective Public Relations. 4th ed. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971.

Dahl, Robert A. Modern Political Analysis. 2d ed. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970.

Davis, James A. Elementary Survey Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971.

Filley, Alan and R. J. House. Managerial Process and Organizational Behavior. Glenview, Illinois: Scott Foresman and Co., 1969.

Folsom, Marion Bayard. Executive Decisionmaking. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962.

Fulbright, William J. The Pentagon Propaganda Machine. New York: Vintage Books, 1971.

Hopeman, R.J. Systems Analysis and Operations Management. Columbus: Charles Merrill Publishing Company, 1969.

Jones, Manley Howe. Executive Decisionmaking, rev. ed. Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962.

Kast, F.E. and J.E. Rosenzweig. Organization and Management, A Systems Approach. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970.

Likert, Rensis. New Patterns of Management. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962.

Lindblom, Charles E. The Policymaking Process. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968.

Litterer, J.A., (ed.). Organizations: Systems, Control and Adaptation. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1969.

McCamy, J.L. Government Publicity: Its Practice in Federal Administration. Chicago: The University Press, 1939.

McFarland, D.E. Management: Principles and Practices. 3d ed. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970.

Miller, D. Handbook of Research Design and Social Measurement, 2d ed.

Mollenhoff, Clark R. The Pentagon. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1967.

_____. Washington Cover-Up. 1st ed. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1962.

Nimmo, Dan D. Newsgathering in Washington--A Study in Political Communication. New York: Atherton Press, 1964.

Rivers, William I., Theodore Peterson and Jay W. Jensen. The Mass Media and Modern Society. 2d ed. San Francisco: Rinehart Press, 1971.

_____, and Wilbur Schramm. Responsibility in Mass Communications. revised ed. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969.

Rourke, F.E. Secrecy and Publicity--Dilemmas of Democracy. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1961.

Schuchman, Abe. Scientific Decisionmaking in Business. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1963.

Scott, W.C. Human Relations in Management. Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962.

Simon, H.A. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-making Process in Administrative Organizations. 2d ed. New York: The Free Press, 1957.

_____. Models of Man-Social and Rational. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957.

Simon, Julian L. Basic Research Methods in Social Sciences--The Art of Empirical Investigation. New York: Random House, 1969.

Stephenson, Howard, (ed.). Handbook of Public Relations. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1960.

Thayer, Lee O. Administrative Communication. Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1961.

Triandis, H.C. Attitude and Attitude Change. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1971.

Waldo, Dwight, ed. Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence. Scranton, Pennsylvania: Chandler Publishing Co., 1971.

Wooton, Graham. Interest-Groups. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970.

Vardarmon, G.T., and C.C. Halterman. Managerial Control Through Communication. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968.

PERIODICALS

"An Eye on the Pentagon," The Military Journalist, vi, 2 (Spring 1971), pp. 12-13.

"America Notes--War of Words," Time, March 29, 1971, p. 10.

Archibald, S.J. "The New FOI Law--Codified but not Automated," Bulletin of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, July 1967, pp. 6-10.

Boulding, Kenneth. "General Systems Theory--The Skeleton of Science," Management Science, II, 3, (April 1956), pp. 197-208.

Finn, David. "Struggle for Ethics in Public Relations," Harvard Business Review, undated clipped article received from Public Relations Society of America, Inc.

Forrestal, D.J. "Align PR to Management Needs," Public Relations Journal, (October 1971), pp. 39-41.

Friedheim, Jerry W. "Public Affairs in the Department of Defense," Journal of the National Classification Management Society, V, 2, (1969), pp. 69-73.

Hage, Gerald, Michael Aiken, Coca Bagley Marrett. "Organization Structure and Communications," American Sociological Review, 36, 5, (October 1971), pp. 860-871.

Inkeles, Alex. "Industrial Man: The Relations of Status to Experience, Perception, and Value," The American Journal of Sociology, LXVI, (July 1960), p. 2

Kansas City Times, May 5, 1973.

McCarthy, Eugene J. "The Pursuit of Military Security--The Power of the Pentagon," Saturday Review, 21 December 1968, pp. 8-10, and 44.

Mollenhoff, Clark. "Shields of Secrecy," Nieman Reports, January 1960, pp. 20-25.

Newsom, E. "A Philosophy of Corporate Public Relations," Public Relations Quarterly, 16, 2 (1971), pp. 12-13; 25-26.

Ramos, Alberto G. "Models of Man and Administrative Theory," Public Administration Review, XXXII, 3 (May/June 1972), pp. 241-246.

Rosapepe, Joseph S. "Neither Pinkertons nor Publicity Men," Public Relations Journal, October 1971, pp. 12-17; 49-50.

"U.S.C. 22--Relic of 1789," Bulletin of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, December 1, 1957, pp. 1-5.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Henkin, Daniel Z. Address by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., November 16, 1972. OASD (PA) News Release.

Laird, Melvin R. National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence. Annual Defense Department Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, FY1973.

U.S. Congress, House. Committee on Government Operations, Government Information Subcommittee. U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices--Administration and Operation of the Freedom of Information Act (Part 4). Hearing, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., March 6, 7, 10, 14 and 17, 1972. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972.

_____. (Part 5). March 20, 23, 24, 27 and 28, 1972.

_____. (Part 6). April 11, 14, 17 and 19, 1972.

U.S. Congress, House. Committee on Government Operations, Government Information Subcommittee--U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices--The Pentagon Papers (Part 1). Hearing, 92d Congress, 1st Session, June 23, 24, and 25, 1971. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971.

_____. (Part 2). June 28 and 29, 1971.

_____. (Part 3). June 30 and July 7, 1971.

U.S. Congressional Record. Vol. 115, No. 197.

U.S. Congressional Record. Vol. 115, No. 198.

U.S. Government Organization Manual 1972. Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service. General Services Administration. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) PUBLICATIONS

Chief of Staff Regulation No. 360-1. Army Information-Army Staff Public Information Program. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff. Washington, D.C., January 8, 1972.

Defense Information School. Public Affairs Department Handbook. Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana: September 1972.

Department of the Army Pamphlet 360-5, w/c-1. Army Information Officer's Guide. Washington, D.C., August 1968.

Department of Defense Directive No. 5122.5. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). July 1961.

Department of Defense Directive No. 5158.1. Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Relationships with the Office of Secretary of Defense. Washington, D.C., December 1958.

Department of Defense Directive No. 5230.13. Principles of Public Information Policy. Washington, D.C., May 1961.

Department of Defense Directive No. 5400.4. Provision of Information to Congress. Washington, D.C., February 1971.

Department of Defense Directive No. 5400.7. Availability to the Public of Department of Defense Information. Washington, D.C., June 1967.

Department of Defense Directive No. 5410. Public Affairs with Industry. Washington, D.C., February 1968.

Department of Defense Directive No. 5410.18. Community Relations. Washington, D.C., February 1968.

Department of Defense Instruction No. 5400.6. Freedom of Information. Washington, D.C., May 1967.

U.S. Air Force Regulation 190-6, w/c-1. Air Force Information Program. Washington, D.C., March 1966.

U.S. Air Force Regulation 190-20. Community Relations Program. Washington, D.C., May 1966.

U.S. Army Regulation 360-5. Army Information--General Policies, 1967.

U.S. Marine Corps Informational Services Manual. P5720.44A, Washington, D.C., January 1970.

U.S. Navy Public Affairs Regulations. NAVSO P-1035 (Rev 12-65), Washington, D.C.

OTHER SOURCES

Dror, Yehezkel. Policy Sciences: Developments and Implications. The RAND Corporation, No. P-4321, Santa Monica, California. (March 1970). Distributed by National Technical Information Services, U.S. Department of Commerce.

Dror, Yehezkel. Policy Analysis: A Theoretic Framework and Some Basic Concepts. The RAND Corporation, No. P-4156, Santa Monica, California. (July 1969). Distributed by National Technical Information Services, U.S. Department of Commerce.

Ehling, William P. Telephonic Interview. 4 May 1973.

"Government Departments," Encyclopedia Brittanica. 1968 ed. 10, 630.

Jones, William M. Decisionmaking in Large Organizations. Memorandum-3968-PR. Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, March 1964.

Public Relations Society of America, Inc. An Occupational Guide to Public Relations, 1969.

UNPUBLISHED WORKS

King, Justice B. (LTC) USA. "News Reports on the Armed Forces: Objectivity or Sensationalism." Unpublished research paper, United States Army War College, 1970.

Rhyne, Hal B. (LTC) USA. "The Image of the Army in 1970." Unpublished research paper, United States Army War College, 1970.

Smith, R. (BG) USA. "A New Direction for Army Information--Final Report of the Smith Committee." January 1969, filed with Office Chief of Information, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.

Weinstein, Saunders. (LTC) USA. "Communication--Catalyst of Crisis." Unpublished research paper, United States Army War College, 1970.

DAT
FILM

2